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SECRET.
20
From Director of Trade Division.
To Consular Shipping Advisers Amsterdam
"
"
"
Rotterdam
"
"
"
Antwerp
(Copy to Naval Attache Hague)
QUESTIONNA.IRE to accompany N.C. 3/2/69.
(Note very early replies, even if incomplete, are of
the first importance. Accurate information, if
obtainable, should follow in a supplementary report).
1. Small coasters known to be laid up.
(a) In what localities are any laid up?
(b) In what numbers?
(c) In what state of readiness for sea as regards stores, fuel, crews,
quick access to the sea?
2.
Small coasters.
Do these craft carry anchor equipment with which they can moor
themselves head-and-stern? (Those which may come to Poole
or Milford Haven will be required to stow very closely and
stern moorings will be essential.)
3. Fishing Vessels.
What number and description are likely to take part in an
evacuation?
From what ports do they work? Where are any laid up?
4. Shipping.
What number and description is likely to be found in Flushing?
In Terneusen? In Ghent?
Considering Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Flushing, Terneusen,
Ghent :-
Do you agree with the estimate offered in Admiralty Memorandum
NL/TD 61/40 paragraph 3 as to the maximum number of refugees
which could safely be embarked, on the assumptions there made?
How long would be required to clear each port of Shipping?
Is any emergency line of communication prepared at Ymuiden,
Flushing, and Hook of Holland?
Is there any possibility, during an emergency evacuation of
observers at these three places checking and reporting the
numbers of ships which pass out?

Details

COPY.
HOME OFFICE,
9
WHITEHALL.
URGENT AND CONFIDENTIAL.
20th January, 1940.
S
929
dam
he
1940
Dear Cadogen,
I had a conference this morning with
representatives of the Admiralty, the Ministry of
Health and the Ministry of Food on the question of
what provisional arrangements can be made for a
to
situation which would arise If large numbers of
en
Dutch and Belgian refugees came to this country
3
owing to the invasion of Holland and Belgium. The
view of the Admiralty is that their representatives
in Antwerp, Amsterdam and Rotterdam ought to have
instructions which would enable them to tell the
captains of Dutch and Belgian ships where they must
go if they are bringing refugees to the United Kingdom.
Moreover, It appears from the discussion with the
Admiralty that there are insupurable difficulties
about bringing these ships into London or ports on
the South and Best coast. We urged upon the Admiralty
being nad for their safety and health during a 3 to 4 days winter
voyage.
This estimate is offered with the greatest reserve, and
should be subject to improvement in the light of fuller
information.
4./

Details

Note: Ships can carry 80000
HO expect 500, 000.
11061/40 40
laps application
MEMORANDUM.
DTD)
Evacuation of Shipping from Dutch and Belgian Ports.
14
In an emergency it is lik ; ; y that a large number of ships
will wish to clear from the three chief ports, Amsterdam, Rotterdam
and Antwerp, and that they will carry a great many refugees. The
ships may not be confined to those wearing the Dutch and Belgian
flags.
It is known that on 16th January 50 ships were in
Amsterdam and 75 in Rotterdam, their sizes ranging from the
smallest to 16,000 tons. The number in Antwerp, including Ghent
(for which figures have not yet been secured) was possibly between
50 and 75. In addition there are known to be 200 small coasters
laid up in Dutch ports.
2.
No estimate can be formed of the number of refugees likely
to demand passage, but it may well be great, and the probability is
that no provision will be made for victualling those who embark
and who may be forced to remain in the ships for a fortnight or
more.
3.
A very rough high limit of the number which should
properly be allowed to embark is suggested to be 80,000. This
is based on the assumptions that the greater part of the shipping
referred to in paragraph 1 sails for United Kingdom anchorages,
and that the numbers embarked will be subject to control, regard
being had for their safety and health during a 3 to 4 days winter
voyage.
This estimate is offered with the greatest reserve, and
should be subject to improvement in the light of fuller
information.
4./

Details

MEMORANDUM.
Evacuation of Shipping from Dutch and Belgian Ports.
Note: The Home Office
In an emergency it is likely that a large number of ships
expoctation ? 500, 000 upples
will wish to clear from the three chief ports, Amsterdam, Rotterdam
mush he modified to 80, 000
atailable in in thiffing in the fish
the hims I accomordation
and Antwerp, and that they will carry a great many refugees. The
ships may not be confined to those wearing the Dutch and Belgian
flags.
instruck.
Others may come befare have, or
It is known that on 16th January 50 ships were in
later.
Amsterdam and 75 in Rotterdam, their sizes ranging from the
smallest to 16,000 tons. The number in Antwerp, including Ghent
(for which figures have not yet been secured) was possibly between
fuhere ent
50 and 75. In addition there are known to be 200 small coasters
You had
laid up in Dutch ports.
confiss Turneral
water This a)
2.
No estimate can be formed of the number of refugees likely
to demand passage, but it may well be great, and the probability is
uples
that no provision will be made for victualling those who embark
and who may be forced to remain in the ships for a fortnight or
more,
5-4898 unless the shur phen end) up with Through
=) Belgin
3.
A very rough high limit of the number which should
n3 200 ships with
properly be allowed to embark is suggested to be 80,000. This
400 passelles each
is based on the assumptions that the greater part of the shipping
80, oro
referred to in paragraph 1 sails for United Kingdom anchorages,
and that the numbers embarked will be subject to control, regard
200 coasters with
being had for their safety and health during a 3 to 4 days winter
go stenges each
voyage.
= 4000
This estimate is offered with the greatest reserve, and
should be subject to improvement in the light of fuller
information.

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. I
13TH MAY
Occupation of Walcheren and Zuid Beveland imminent
in accordance with their plans, and by the May, units of the latter
Movements of the main bodies of the French 13th Ist and 7th Armies continued
north of Antwerp on the Dutch border. It was, however, becoming in-
of Walcheren and Zuid Beveland, which was developing from the north-east.
creasingly evident that they would be unable to prevent the enemy occupation
northern forces to the general line Louvain-Antwerp.
During the day and the following night the Belgians were withdrawing their
14TH MAY
Germans cross Meuse
May the 14th was crucial, for on that day the enemy penetrated the French
9th Army front, and crossed the Meuse between Sedan and Mézières.¹ (See
Plan 1).
15TH MAY
Dutch Army surrenders
On the 15th May the Dutch Army laid down its arms. The immediate effect
of this on the operations of the B.E.F. was small, but "I anticipated says
Lord Gort, "that this would come as a shock to the Belgian Army".2
The French 7th Army withdrew its advanced formations to the neighbour-
hood of Antwerp, and the French divisions on the B.E.F.'s left flank were
ordered to move across the British rear to fill the gap which had been created
on the French 9th Army's front. This move did not, however, actually take
place till some 3 days later,² and it then left the Belgian Army responsible for
the security of the British left flank.
On the British front the day passed quietly on the whole. The 1st Corps
[Lt.-Gen. M. G. H. Barker] was not attacked in strength; 3rd Division [Maj.-
Gen. B. L. Montgomery] of 2nd Corps [Lt.-Gen. A. F. Brooke] was attacked
north-west of Louvain, and its forward positions were penetrated, but a counter-
attack successfully restored the original line.
and, in spite of British support, some ground was lost.
At about 1800, however, the enemy penetrated the French 1st Army's front,
16TH MAY
Allies withdraw to river Escaut
was were impracticable,3 because the French 1st the B.E.F.'s right flank
By the 16th May it became clear that a prolonged defence of the Dyle position
withdrawal unlikely to make good the ground lost on Army the on and a further
It seemed likely to be forced on them by events previous in day the south.³
on night of Senne and one day on the River Escaut, spending on the
the was River therefore decided to withdraw to the River one day
began. 16th-17th May, the 15 to 20 miles withdrawal Dendre. to Accordingly, the Senne positions
2 1 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 22.
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 23. 24.
2

Details

PLAN 1
Soate of Miles
10
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The German
break-through
on 17th.18th
KENT
OSTEND
ANTWERP
DUNKIRK LA PANNE NIEUPORT
BRUGES
18th MAY
may
13th
MAY ON MAPS IN LORD CORTS DESPATCH
R.M.
FURNES
Yser
GAND
MALINES
GRAVELINES
a
BERGUES
CALAIS
SPYKE
RIYS
R.Senna
ALOST
WORMHOUTE
th
F.
LOUVAIN
YPRES
18MAY
Phyle
WATTEN
COURTRAI
MENIN
Escaut
BRUSSELS
13th MAY
CASSEL
COMINES
BOULOGNE
StOMER
R.Dendre
WAVRE
HAZEBROUCK
ARMENTIERES
P.LYS
AIRE
MERVILLE
LILLE
ATH
R.Meuse
EXOLISH
NAMUR
StAMAND
LA BASSEE
R.Sambre
VALE CIENNES
DOUAI
Fscaut
RRA
R.
18th MAY
18thMAY
13th:MAY
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
ABBEVILLE
R
2.50mm
ALBERT
DIEPPE
PERONNE
AMIENS
st QUENTINE
18th MAY
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oire
Approximiste BritishFrenchead Belgiadine on 13ᵗʰ May:
R.Aisne
"
" " 18th " :
German break break-through shewn in blue
RMass
TSD/HS (655)
C.B.H. 16675- Wt.41534 Dd. -625-6/49

Details

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles
to
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The Allied
withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
.
30ᵗMAY
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
+
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
30th May
May
+
4.
FURNES
MALINES
Yser
GAND
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
LINES
C
GRAVE
STATES
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
R
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
Escant
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
Dandre
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
ZEBROUCK
INS
ARMENTIERES
R.
R
AIRE
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
St. AMAND
NAMUR
.
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R.
Sambre
St.POL
.
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
BARRAS
Escaut
a
CAMBRAI
OULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
R.Somme
PERONNE
him
AMIENS
StQUENTIN
French 10th Arm
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
Mause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May.
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shewn in blue
TSD/HS (ESG)
C.B.H.16675

Details

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles
to
5
o
10
20
30
40
&
The Allied
withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
30thmay
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
+ 30th May May +
+
x
FURNES
GAND
MALINES
LINES
Yser
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
C
SAYKER
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
a
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
Dandre
ZEBROUCK
IVS
ARMENTIERES
R.
AIRE
LALT
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
.
St. AMAND
NAMUR
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R
Sambre
St.POL
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
ARRAS
R.Escaut
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
Somme
PERONNE
AMIENS
him
St.QUENTIN
French 10th Army
MEDIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
RMause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shown in blue
TSD/HS (E56)
C.B.H.16675

Details

C.S
MINISTRY OF WAR TRANSPORT
NOID
15
REFERENCE SHEET.
TA6
16
(Rm YOY!)
how S.H. Brown
S.T.
In
1st July, 1941.
24
Gentlemen,
p&S. THE DUCKS.SS "THE MARQUIS"
ss THE MARQUIS
An enquiry has been received on behalf of a
Miss Emmerson, resident in Spain, regarding relatives
who endeavoured to get to England from Antwerp when
Belgium was invaded. It is believed that the Emmersons
embarked in "THE MARQUIS" at Ostend on the 27th May, 1940.
as
possible I should be glad if you would be good enough to
inform me whether you have any record that a family of
this name embarked in "THE MARQUIS" and, if so, at what
Port they di sembarked in this country.
and game, 1940.
I am, Gentlemen,
TA
Your obedient servant,
brans
S
(Sgd.) B.E. Bellamy
for Director of Sea Transport.
Herearth
Messrs. J. Hay & Sons Ltd.,
45 Renfield Street,
GLASGON, C.2.
Mb

Details

21
INTERNATIONAL MARINE RADIO COMPANY LIMITED,
DIRECTORS:
F. GILL.O M.INST C.E. M.I.E.E.
CONNAUGHT HOUSE,
TELEPHONE: HOLBORN 8765.
COMMANDER F.G. LORING, O.B E.M.I.E.E.
TELEGRAMS: INTELCOMAR,ESTRAND,LONDON.
H. THORPE-WOODS, M.N.E.C.INST.
63, ALDWYCH,
UNLAND
A.DAVIDSON,
T.G. SPENCER.
LONDON,W.C.2.
19th June 1941.
W. Carter Esq., C.B.E.,
Ministry of Sea Transport,
Berkeley House,
Passual
Berkeley Square,
S.W.1.
Dear Carter,
I should be very grateful for your help in making the following inquiry,
assuming there is no objection to it.
We have been asked by our Spanish company to try and trace the relatives of
their English secretary, Miss Emmerson. The Emmersons were a British family
resident in Antwerp, who endeavoured to get to England when Belgium was invaded.
It has been ascertained from the Harbour Master at Ostend, that these people
left Ostend in either the S.S. "Marquis" or the S.S. "Duchess" on 27th May, 1940.
Nothing more has been heard of them by Miss Emmerson. The first inquiry seems to be to
ascertain if these ships (or either of them) on 27th May 1940, reached an English
port, and if so which port.
If you could help to obtain this information, it would be very kind of you.
Please forgive my troubling you, but I do not know how to set about this inquiry
otherwise.
With kind regards.
Yours sincerely,
7.00mg