TNA ADM 199 788 A

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From:- Sub. Lieut. W.D.F. Claydon, R.N.R.
Date:- 4th June, 1940.
To:- Naval Officer in Charge, Ramsgate.
This is to report that during the visit to
Dunkirk on the night of 3rd June "Greater London"
(Southend Lifeboar) successfully refloated H.M.S.
Kellett, which had gone aground during operations at the entrance to harbour.
Whilst ferrying troops to the transport outside the entrance we were hailed by the Liaison Officer to stand by H.M.S. Kellett. Upon reaching her, her Commander asked me to endeavour to tow him off.
Whilst being somewhat doubtful as to our capability stern to do this, we at once took a line from her and within less than five minutes had her afloat.
then continued our ferrying and at 0250
picked We up our last batch and set off for Ramsgate.
compass had been hit by shrapnel and during we made encountering the a considerable amount of fog we managed a previous coast near Folkestone.
As our visit it became most unreliable However, after to make Ramsgate at 1200.

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From:- A.W. West, Skipper H.M.T. Gula.
Date:- 4th June, 1940.
To:- Naval Officer in Charge, Ramsgate.
This is to report that at 12 o' clock (mid-night)
Saturday, June 1st, we rescued twelve survivors from H.M.Y. Greives, which was blown up by a mine whilst entering Dunkirk. There were no other men in the water when we left.

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255
H.M.Y.
From:- Sub. Lt. R.E. Lee, R.N.V.R.
Alouette
Date:- 5th June, 1940.
To:- Naval Officer in Charge, Ramsgate.
Report that on 1st June we brought down a
Messerschmidt 109 dive bomber near Gravelines Point.
We had run in alongside D.15 at the Mole and were embarking troops when we were attacked by several squadrons of bombers; one bomb falling very close astern lifted us out of the water, causing engine trouble.
We loaded troops to our capacity and on clearing the Dunkirk Channel D. 15 passed us and we were again attacked by dive bombers. One Messerschmidt, after dropping his bombs, circled and dived to within 100
It of our deck and machine-gunned us. Our helm was put to starboard as soon as he was on our fore and aft line so that only two bullets came aboard causing no casualties. We held our fire until our aim was certain and then let him have everything.
Fabric was ripped off his wings, dense smoke from his engine and he crashed on started the beach issuing near Gravelines Point. The Admiral's barge from Ramsgate no doubt witnessed this.
this and other engagements the speak crew too stood unflinchingly During at their posts and I cannot highly of their behaviour.

NAVAL OFFICER IN GIVE
<60
ad
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256
From:- Act. Sub. Lieut. J.M. Chappell, R.N.
Date:- 7th June, 1940.
To:- Naval Officer in Charge, Ramsgate.
29th May.
30th May.
2200 Left Portsmouth in H.M.S. Nelson's picket boat.
a.m. Sighted submarine and warned a French convoy.
Port engine bearings ran out.
1730 Arrived Ramsgate on one engine.
2330 Left for Dunkirk, machine-gunned from the air two miles out of Ramsgate.
31st May.
Dawn Arrived Dunkirk Roads. Funnel carried away by shell-fire. Making water slightly; loaded with troops and left.
1400 Arrived Ramsgate.
1st June.
0830 Left for Dunkirk. Making water rapidly. Beached the boat; found bottom damaged by enemy fire.
Took command M.Y. Santosy and left for Dunkirk.
On return journey filled up with petrol; found too late that one can contained water. Proceeded on port engine only; towed by trawler. Trawler ran on to wreck East of N. Goodwin L/V and turned over on top of "Santosy". Cabin smashed; civilian volunteer Barrington severely injured.
Arrived Ramsgate on one engine. Discharged
Barrington to Deal Hospital; sent crew ashore for rest.
3rd June.
1600 Engines repaired. Left for Dunkirk with civilian volunteer J.W.S. Gilbert as engineer. Towed by tug Sun IV. Tow parted off Dunkirk; proceeded under own power. Starboard engines failed again.
Sea rising. Hailed Sun IV and on her commander's orders abandoned Santosy and boarded Sun VI with my crew.
REPORT: New gas used by enemy. Shells and bombs bursting near gave off white cloud which hung suspended in air. From burns on bodies in water gathered it to be of acid nature.

NAVAL OFFICER IN C.I.
ad
257
From:- Temp. Lieut. A.T. Cook, R.N.R.
Date:- 5th June, 1940.
To:- Naval Officer in Charge, Ramsgate.
At 2.30 a.m. on the 3rd instant saw motor cruiser under sail and abandoned off Dunkirk. Took her in tow and brought her to Ramsgate. Ship flying French
Mercantile flag, valued about £1,000 and should be open to salvage for myself and crew. Launch belongs to the Skylark Shipbuilding Co., Poole, and has
3 mile limit off Britain for cruising.

291 5
269
3
From:- Commanding Officer, H.M. Schoot "Antje".
Date:- 4th June, 1940.
To:- The Naval Officer in Charge, Ramsgate.
SPECIAL REPORTS:-
All personnel on board "Antje" behaved in accordance with the best traditions of the service;
no individual actions of heroism can be stated, but the bearing of all men taking passage in "Antje", whether Army or Navy or Air Force, was excellent.
(Sgd) M. BUIST.
Lieutenant.
Royal Navy.
Commanding Officer,
H.M. Schoot "Antje".

293 5
271 3
From:- Lieut.Comdr. N.H.Harrison.
Date:- 4th June 1940
To:- Naval Officer in Charge, Ramsgate.
No outstanding meritorious action has come to my notice during present operations.

289
DIARY OF PERSONAL EXPERIENCES AT DUNKIRK.
From. 31.5.40 3.6.40 incl.
31.5.40.
1230. In accordance from Southend, with Commander instead Boles' instructions, decided direct closed up. us to our destination. although we had no charts, other traffic bound keep to France
Signalled Decided that to the Bawley boats, and ordered them to at Ramsgate. constantly
Dunkirk these instructions of closing the Examination Vessel to proceed would lead
1410. Convoy of was 6 closed still up and passed Margate Roads where passing trawler ximately. us that Dunkirk open. Signalled convoy to steer course of S. 50° E. informed appro-
1820. Passing destroyers, etc.; subjected to severe air attack by approximately 25
avoid bombardment.
enemy aircraft. Kept 1/4 mile to starboard of main stream of traffic in attempt to
1840. Attacked by enemy aircraft. Our convoy of 6 and other ships in the neighbourhood subjected to attack by several Heinkels, bombs falling as near as fifteen yards to the ships - no damage however was sustained. In accordance with instructions they had received, skippers broke convoy formation and "starred".
1850. 3 or 4 Spitfires drove off enemy aircraft, 7 planes crashing into the sea.
Identity of crashing aircraft uncertain, though 5 at least were presumably German.
1915. Arrived Dunkirk Roads. Beach and shipping subjected to severe bombardment from shore batteries and aircraft.
1930. Attempted to beach boats, and take off men, but abandoned idea - too much ground swell, and semi-submerged trucks, army wagons and other equipment left, destroyed by the B.E.F. on beach, endangered the safety of ships.
2130. Ordered ships to proceed to outside of jetty, instructing them to fill up with soldiers and to ferry same to any larger ships unable to close harbour or beach.
Each ship was instructed to transport approximately 30 to 40 men (approximate total -
200) and they were transferred to H.V. Tilly and other ships cruising empty outside harbour entrance.
2240. Instructed ships to keep permanently closed up and to return to inside of harbour as swell made embarkation of troops from outside of jetty too difficult.
Contact between Bawley boats maintained by signal of one short flash every two minutes. Formation preserved.
2310. Mole and harbour severely shelled. Morale of the soldiers on all occasions
I was there, was superb, and though exhausted and under constant fire, their only thoughts were for the wounded among them, and of saving any equipment possible.
2350. Embarked approximately 200 men; transferred same to the trawler Sarah Hayes and various other craft returning to England not fully laden. Instructed convoy to continue ferry work but if separated from me to return to Ramsgate laden with soldiers.
1.6.40.
0140. Re-entered harbour; jetty crammed with British soldiers but no ships whatever alongside. Started loading troops, sending back to shore two German prisoners attempting to get to England, leaving them in charge of a Lance Corporal.
0200 - 0250. Jetty shelled, bombed and machine-gunned by enemy - very few casualties.
0300. Proceeded to Ramsgate fully laden with soldiers of 1st Division including the
Colonel in Charge of the Worcesters and Officers of the Camerons, accompanied by
Bawley boat Resolute. Arrived at Ramsgate 0930 approximately on 1.6.40.
CONDITION OF BAWLEY BOATS AT RAMSGATE.
DEFENDER.
Stem damaged. Returned with approximately 60 men.
RELIANCE.
Damaged side. Returned with 80 men.
LETITIA.
Undamaged. Returned towing Renown until latter was blown up.
(Troops transferred to trawler who took Bawleys in tow).
ENDEAVOUR.
Steering gear out of order; towed back by Sarah Hayes.
RESOLUTE.
Engine trouble. Returned with approximately 40 men.
RENOWN.
Mined and sunk off Dunkirk - all hands lost. (understand the 30
or 40 soldiers aboard were fortunately transferred to a trawler before mining occurred).

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290
I have since tropps been to informed drifter that Letitia and Renown, laden,
Renown pieces.
of tow was a blown to and were themselves towed returning to Ramsgate. fully
TOTAL number of of tropps Cockle transported by Bawley boats was 600.
Description a Bawley - 40' long, 12' beam, 2'6" over draft, Diesel engines
(All the following times are approimate)
Arriving at Ramsgate (1.6.40.) I decided that Bawley boats were not fit for further service, and so ordered them to porceed to Southend. Obtained permission to commandeer any craft available in Ramsgate harbour and to return to Dunkirk when ready.
1400. Commandeered tug Contess but crew deliberately put tug aground and made every possible obstruction to impede the sailing of same.
1700. Although tug Contess was afloat, engineer refused to put the ship: to sea, as he claimed his filters would be blocked by sand. Crew of Tug Fossa, with Skipper, volunteered to come instead, Commandeered tug Fossa and Motor boat Therune, which
I manned with one Petty Officer, and two Sea Scouts. (Unfortunately I lost track of their names and addresses after I was sunk)
0000. Arrived at Dunkirk and decided that harbour was too congested with larger craft to justify taking tug Fossa inside harbour. Proceeded with Motor-boats with intention of filling up same and transferring soldiers to tug Fossa, whose instructions were to lay off Dunkirk until contacted. Coming alongside the jetty, overheard
Naval Officer on Mole cry "Isn't there anyone here who can deal with these Frenchmen?"
2.6.40. 0035. Offered my services as Liaison Officer. Left Therune in charge of Petty
Officer with orders to continue loading tug Fossa until at least 300 men had been embarked, and then to return laden to Ramsgate if they could not find me.
Understand Fossa later went aground, but may have been re-floated.
0030 Mrs 0310. Due to fair knowledge of the French language Iwas able to render a embarkation of troops on the jetty. The speed of the embarkation was greatly and slowed the certain amount of assistance to Commander Cluston, Officer in Charge of the due to the lack of understanding between the French Officers and men, and up French believed that certain ships had been reserved for them,
English. The were on no account to be broken. As a result, serious could congestion not was found round one contacting the various officers in charge of the regiments, and in getting was, that their units gangway, while other ships at the end of the Pier I get however, the men aboard. able to By assist to a certain extent in clearing up the point,
0310. the French Understanding troops on that the move. the destroyer Winchelsea was the last ship to be leaving
Dunkirk I returned to Dover with her.
0800. Reported to H.M.S. Lynx and was ordered and submitted to contact chart Commander with
Goodenugh (on 2.6.40) at Castle. Reported to Commander Dunkirk, Goodenugh 31.5.40 and 1.6.40, with marked with rough details of state of of wrecks, affairs troops at on dunes, and from times Admiral of bombardments Ramsey to etc, approximate as positions nights. Obtained permission assisting in return noted to during Dunkirk these as Liaison two Officer with the object of again the embarkation of French troops. RAF Motor boats with RAF complement, Dunkirk plus
1500. signalmen As an and advance two French party Officers, in two 3 Naval Officers, returned to under
Commander 1855. Attacked Cluston's by 4 command. enemy aircraft, bambed as a and result finally of the sunk, bombing. foundering Enemy immediately. aircraft to
No seemed casualties, to be using however, delayed were action sustained bombs with an effect on side ship similar that of charge on a submarine.
My right a leg depth slightly in damaged water by by explosion. enemy aircraft (do not boat think to porceed any casualties to Dunkirk were by and enemy not to bombs pick and up machine survivors, gun as fire he if the remaining RAF boat attempted to us up.
1900. sustained) Machine Commander gunned Cluston shouted feared to remaining that we RAF would be detroyed in the pick water

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officer clinging to bows
French about 6 miles to try off to reach in the direction wreck of Gravelines. informed us that he saw an empty boat of
Cluston shortly same, and he and I decided Asked permission of Commander abandoned the to go off boat, and No.2., only which the shore the may water or occasionally, may was not slightly have but swim rough, at and 2230 returned it I was sighted impossible to a cling together. to to see the Commander remains the open
Reached slightly from exhaustion. aboard, as sides were too high, out for. and was destroyer suffering cutter same but was unable to climb been the original I set large empty
2300. other Decided side where to swim I found for German fender shore but fortunately before swam the to remains and attempted of my kit to used row as a a ladder, hanging I was down. able to With get the aboard. aid abondoning of the fender boat and might distance too approximately far, and one hour I abandoned the attempt, imagined as cutter the survivors was too over, be. After cutter with one oar in direction I Lashed helm hard large, it was already dark.
0000. Tide Dunkirk changed and and open boat instead of drifting towards the German remainder overboard, as I did not want to be identified should capture be
Dunkirk of kit Destroyed all personal belongings and identifications, and of threw between Channel. Calais, started to drift towards the Green flashing buoys shore, effected by the enemy.
3.6.40.
0130. Destroyers and other ships started passing by, about 25 yards away, but was unable to attract them, as they could not hear my shouts. Decided to shout in
French and English, and was finally picked up by a French fishing boat, Stella Mavis.
Crew "wined" me and put me in their bunks, dressed in French sailor's uniform, where
I passed out for a while, suffering from exhaustion.
0230. Skipper of Stella Mavis informed me that he was unable to make Dunkirk as he had no charts and had lost his convoy whilst picking me up. Imenquired his speed and he replied "6 knots". I estimated by the fires that the distance from Dunkirk was approximately 15 miles. Therefore it would have been 0530 before ship could have reached Dunkirk. Pointed out to Skipper that, in my opinion, it would leading a ship of this type and speed into unnecessary danger if he proceeded to Dynkirk in daylight. As Skipper had no charts I helped in navigating ship back to Dover, and at 0730 approximately, we were run down by Torpedo Boat S. 27, but not badly damaged.
Arriving Dover, Stella Mavis closed French Escort Vessel and as I was dressed in a
French Matelot uniform, and my story sounded far-fetched, the Commander held me on suspicion as a German spy. "Il pretend detre Anglais, mais moi je crois qu'il est allemand parcequil parle le français trop bien" was the remark passed by the French
Commander. Finally however, I persuaded them to let me be out ashore and arrested by British authorities.
1030. Successfully arrested by a Naval Lieutenant Commander and reported to Commander
Goodenugh and Admiral Ramsey.
1400. Sent to Chatham Hospital in ambulance for treatment to leg.
GENERAL REMARKS.
I feel mention should be made of the exemplary conduct of the civilian crews of the cockle boats.
bawley manned by volunteers who were rushed through in one day.
As far All as of I know, them were none of them had ever been under gun fire before, and certainly none of them under Naval discipline.
which These never ships, leave the it Estuary, and only one of their crew had been than had ever been should be remembered, were Thames Estuary Cockle further fishing afield boats,
Ramsgate. facts, and although they had neither charts nor equipment, orders carried perfect out formation with great was diligence, even under actual shell fire
In spite of these maintained throughout the day and night, and and all aircraft attack. were reports critising the conduct of the French dismissed, on the beach as any and
Mole, such opinion and feel was most the strongly result of the slight lack of understanding
I have overheard some that such illusions should be quickly between French and
British their On all occasions I came If anything, their discipline was too most as authorities. in contact with the French on the jetty good, and elsewhere, they did their conduct best was to embark excellent. as a complete regiment or other Army unit, being isappointed if they were forced to separate.

292
Officers but was before only to the fact that they were waiting for official orders
Perhaps the this men may due have refused to take orders from English Naval and Army from their Commander at the end embarking. of English officers trying to persuade them to proceed to ships this the jetty, shouted "Allez" at them, but the French naturally.considered. nothing more than an insult, which maymhave added to the general
As for the B.E.F. words cannot praise them too highly. They were under constant bombing and shelling, and unable to do anything active, many, too, having marched as much as 80 miles in 3 or 4 days, yet on no occasion was a single grumble or complaint overheard. They all just seemed to want to get back at it.
I understand that one R.A.F. mechanic was the only other survivor, besides myself.
He was picked up by a destroyer, clinging to remains of the motor boat. According to him, the rest had already died from exposure.
Although I realise that it is of no consolation to those bereaved, I feel that the extraordinary courage of all the poor fellows in the water should be recorded.
Even though they must have known that the end was near, they never grumbled, nor were they afraid; they even went so far as to ask permission of Conmander Cluston before removing their tin hats. When I left them clinging around the wreck, although already suffering from exposure, they were singing and discussing old times together.
Commander Cluston's example must have helped them all as it helped me. Although exhausted himself, he continued to chat, encourage and white-lie to the end.
Mata Soloner
(M. Solomon)
Sub. Lieut, R.N.V.R.

Дуламо 186.
328
301
Admiralty House,
Sheerness.
June 6th, 1940.
REPORT GIVEN VERBALLY TO LIEUT. COMDR. D.E. HOLLAND-MARTIN, R.N.
A.B. S. Palmer D/JX 148052.
He was put in charge of the "Naid Errant", a 7 ton motor yacht of about 30ft., which started from Sheerness.
She sailed for Dunkirk early on Friday, May 31st as one of a convoy of 7 motor boats which included the "White
Heather". Before reaching the beaches close to Dunkirk he helped to rescue the survivors of a French Destroyer. He picked up about 20, which he transferred to a French tug, and then proceeded to the beaches. On arrival the French soldiers swarmed over his boat preventing him going astern so that he drifted ashore. He left the "Naid Errant" and swam off with his crew to a Minesweeper, whose name he did not know. Shortly afterwards thellatter went aground, but, as the tide rose, both the Minesweeper and the "Naid Errant" floated off. Palmer asked permission to swim back to his boat, but this being refused, he shouted to some soldiers on the beach to bring her alongside. This they managed to do and Palmer jumped on board, cast off from the Minesweeper, and set course for home. He was the only naval rating, in a small boat without a chart, with one serjeant and 8 other soldiers, who he thinks were from the Middlesex regiment. The sergeant he said was all right - "he had some rum in his bottle!". Palmer admits to know nothing about the engines which had already given the stoker trouble on the way over. Off Dunkirk they broke down, and so he broke up the yacht's cabin door and made the soldiers start to paddle. Luckily one of the engines started up and at about 2200 he left the vicinity of Dunkirk seering W.N.W.
For a brief period one of the soldiers relieved him on the wheel. The soldier was willing but/new nothing of steering a course and, as Palmer found him making to the Eastward, he took over again himself and remained on the wheel througout the night. At about 0600 on Saturday, June 1st he picked up the coast somewhere off Dover and followed it up to
Ramsgate arriving there about 1100.
On Sunday, June 2nd, without orders, he sailed again with a crew of one other A.B., but as the "Naid Errant"
was too slow he was ordered back by the captain of the
"Usanco" after getting two or three miles out from Ramsgate.
A.B. Palmer stated that he passed for Leading
Seaman in May 1927, but presumably cannot have been recommended. He says that he has three Good Conduct badges and the Long Service and Good Conduct Medal. He was drafted for operation Dynamo from R.N.B. Devonport, where he has recently been employed on the Plymouth City Patrol.
1025/2

Dynams
Dipramo 323.
329
302
Kingmead,
Riding Mill,
Northumberland.
Friday 7th June, 1940.
Sir, g
I have the honour to submit the following account of my movements from Tuesday 28th May until Wednesday 5th June.
On my arrival at Sheerness I found a convoy of sixteen motor boats being prepared to assist in the evacuation of Flanders.
I took charge of a small boat "LIEBESTRAUM" and we proceeded for Dover towing whalers, at about 1730 on Tuesday.
285
About six miles outside Sheerness we broke down and were picked up by the Trawler "ASAMA" who towed us to Deal and then back to
Ramsgate where we arrived on Wednesday morning.
23/5
At Ramsgate I reported on the state of my boat and was appointed to the Dutch eel boat "JOHANNA" which had a diesel engine and was capable of about 6 knots. The crew consisted of a Leading
Hand and four ratings and three Dutchmen, who owned the boat and could not speak English. We set out in convoy that night with a
Motor boat under the Command of a Lieutenant Commander and other eel boat commanded by Sub-Lieutenant T.K. Edge-Partington R.N.
Finding the second eel boat only capable of 4 knots the motor boat left her behind and soon after left me. I had no charts so after casting around for a bit I secured alongside a ship, the name of which I did not find out, near the North Goodwin and stayed there for the night. Sub. Lt. Edge-Partington in the 'Chanticler' with great determination took his boat across, navigating by an extremely faulty compass and managed to bring troops back to Dover.
The next morning, Thursday, I returned to Ramsgate and 30/5
succeeded in joining up with the Dutch Schoot "Jutland" who towed me that evening. We had an uneventful crossing and anchored across about two miles east of Dunkirk at 2330. The Cutter and
Whaler went ashore. The Whaler returned to report that the cutter
I volunteered to the Captain of the Schoot to go was and see aground. what I could do but before we had got back the Petty Officer had succeeded in floating the boat.
this time the beach was swarming wi th shore French because soldiers of
I could not get of the water. I summoned heros" my and "Courage mes French
By my boats within 100 yards of the limited store of the shallowness and with cries of "En Avant mes water. My efforts were enfants" I I had to go and fetch them for miles and I leap to my aid tried to tempt them into the myself. My first unavailing and took so me into the only deep of patch the hole I waded into the water neck. Struggling out in rush and ashore. I
went in up to my to my waist the French came it threateningly. on a This was
Seeing me only up revolver and brandish get to the boats only compelled them to draw down my a bit but when crew they and I had to lift them a on few were quietened strong enough to trips get and in so brought my off about 200 in all, each time board. I had to go We did into six the water time and to get go. them. I only At had 0230 ten the Frenchmen Captain on of the
Schoot reckoned it was it was a bit choppy and all had to go below.
They board all the suffered "JOHANNA" from as sea sickness I on the sent way back. back boat on the our "LIEBESTRAUM" return Sheerness to Ramsgate and in I arrived the was Motor at boat 2230 "THARKS" to on Friday. Sheerness in On in 31/5
my old 1500 I left boats all of which reached charge Saturday of at a convoy of 12 motor Ramsgate.
1/6

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303
probable that to as Motor boats would not and
On Sunday the small Ramsgate was buzzing with rumours it seemed 2/6
volunteered "Marlborough". go Lewis Gunner in the War department go out so I Speed boat civilian who had only had River "THARK" a man by the name of very highly This coxswain At this of juncture the I would like to recommend the man and back experience succeeded Ambler.
go over again saved. on night and it was sunk but I believe that the boat the to Dunkirk Mohday with no ficer in the boat. intaking He took the boa t crew was from the We treasury four Leading Stokers and two Sergeants of the
The "MARLBOROUGH" had a crew of four Subs, two solicitors
R.A.F. "HAIG" put to sea on Sunday night in company with our sister 2/6
a jetty and off about 40 "poilus". One of our solicitors ship the took and had a quiet voyage acress. We went alongside spoke French which assisted the operation œnsiderably. While we were alongside there was slight enemy air activity and much against the wishes of the rest of the crew who said I was merely attracting attention, I succeeded in firing several hundred rounds into the mishap. air, unfortunately with no success. We returned to Ramsgate without
Treasury and so we signed on an army officer who had been invalided
The next day, Monday, our solicitors had to return to the 3/6
and a retired colonel who had a reputation for being a crack shot with a Lewis.
We went out at 1930 and picked Admiral Taylor up half way across the channel from the Motor Boat "MERMAIDEN". When we got to
Dunkirk we went inside the harbour and quite a long way up the canal and secured. The Admiral went ashore accompanied by two of our crew armed to the teeth. The test of us occupied our time looting and trying to start up derelict cars. Sub. Lt. Poole found a very nice motor cycle and rode it round the docks.
We went off onceto bring boats to the point of embarkation and then secured again. Shortly afterwards machine gunning started quite near and a shell landed in a warehouse about
150 yards away. Fortunately our job was done so we were able to leave. On our way down the canal we came on a blockage of shipping, and going too near the shore went aground on some rubble knocked into the water by a shell. We had the badluck to lose both our screws and our rudder. Three French tugs refused to tow us off but fortunately a Motor A/S Vessel who took us out to the main harbour where we secured to the Motor Yacht "GULZA" who towed us back to Dover.
4/6
We returned to Ramsgate on Tuesday morning by lorry to find
Schoot "PATRIA" which broke down on the way and we were towed in by the operation had been cancelled. I returned to Sheerness inthe a Drifter.
The times in the above are only approximate.
I have the honour to be,
A
Sir,
17 JUN 1940
*
Your obedient servant at E
(SD.) A. CAREW HUNT.
Sub. Lieutenant, Royal Navy.
Vice-Admiral, Dover.
Copy to: Commander-in-Chief, The Nore

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306
RATINGS.
CHARLES HENRY CANNING
P.O.
PJX 128237
DONALD WOMACK
STOKER
PJX 80757
BERNARD CHARLES KINGHAM
A.B. PJX 152715
The above ratings were part of a Royal Naval Division who were stranded on the beach at Dunkirk when serving as an embarkation party. They found a small motor boat, which they repaired. They then took on board twenty-three soldiers and crossed the channel to Margate without chart or compass.
On the way over the boat broke down twice, but the three ratings managed to repair it, and arrived safely in Margate with their load.
HARRY GRIFFITH
DECKHAND H. M. TUG "JAVA"
This man, a merchant seaman, member of crew of H.M. Tug
"JAVA" landed on the beach in a small boat. He ferried backwards and forwards continuously to the Tug under heavy bombing attacks, for eight hours, rescuing many soldiers during the day.
LDG. SEAMAN DUTCH SCHOOT "PATRIA"
J. HAGGAR.
For conspicuous whereby the Schoot On subsequent get service and gallantry "PATRIA" in was working able to an inexperienced crew over 1000 troops. beach, he able occasions, to off Braye making beach direct with contact with (W/D the CMB) large bodies was of troops embark through in "PATRIA" In "HAIG" and Haggar "HAIG", went time, to contacted Malon Les with Bains troops, and went and ashore in safety. in a loads small each boat of in 60 day men Haggar and put also them worked on board a machine "TANKERTON gun
TOWERS" took to such three and effect other that trawlers. he was able to keep dive bombers at an ineffectual height.

Remarks.
335
Sub.
Lt.
Don reported efloat. later He did went not in render abandoning unserviceable "YSER" which he could not
308
im.
He the Army M.B's and showed for much which keenness. I admonished
Sub. Lt. Liddell R.N. Took charge of"Bonny Heather"
Sub. Lt. Mac Intyre. Took charge of S/D "FAIRBURN".
Mr. Butler. I/C"LAROIC
X 209 Sub.Lt. W.R. Williams, R.N.R.
up. Sub. Made Lt. G.N. excuses Blake, for R.N.V.R., not H.M.S. VERNON. Bad case of ut aving ind picked in charge up R.A.F. of Admiral Officer going, from sea., returned Considered 3 hours after departure warrant him back. Barge again and sent him it to inadvisable office to get to asten this was supposed to Reported be no water. Gave in speedboat to
Wippingham her to Dunkirk. paddle steamer arrived p.m. Visited ommander S Powell, R.N.R. last night's trip Mde by order Flotilla to use Drifters sea water, under
"MAIE
1 Trip.
"SARAH HYDE"
"TWEENWAYS"
1 Trip.
"UNI
1 Trip.
"RIGG"
1 Trip.
"JACK EVE"
2 Trips.
"THREE KINGS"
1 Trip.
2 Trips.
"JACINTA" reported sunk on Goodwin and abandoned, officers name ot noted, was seen floating near RAMSGATE next day when one of the rawlersof same company went out and fetched her. Regret no record of his ship's name.
Block Ship party: Lt. Lloyd R.N.
Sub. Lt. Satterford.
Sub Lt. Don.
Sub Lt. E.R. Davis, R.N.R.
Sub Lt. Mulholland
Sub Lt. cantron
?
This party was not required taking off block ship officers, hough they were ready, instead they worked at Dunkirk ferrying.
Mr. Sidmouth-Welling, Sea Cadet Lt, showed great keenness and was ways to the fore to get over to Dunkirk.
Dr. Wrighinneve. rain Mouth Street, W. 1. did one trip in"CAIRNGORM".
m K Common Chantry ashbyRd waltn Searomer
The Averatich were unarmed showed great keenness in towing over amilite "PRIMA", "DUKE", "PRINCESS master 2
ТЛЬ WALLISE_6IUR & Sons, Dagenham Dock, Essex. It is they Benefit. owners for their willing and gallant
111. 61 tieds 30.2.
US. whelle BUBOR Shere: - Gordon Thomas, 4, Berners Street, London,
ISCS.). Har 1181 mizza herive, Wembley Park., Wm.Joseph Fir Mason, Tree Road, 55, Oakley Banstead, Gdns,
Mark son, R.N.V.R., Moorings,
HOUDS: Groanitz lavendoned Brook, Glen Haven, Taplow.
toegr. Ebrecume nder Admiral Capt. Taylor: Hammond took command of the 4 school.
BEO 110 Z2WA
DB 1-ADETEDA
RNR
IICI. BIWLLY
Lt. Commander Miller. DSV
DV 26 BLUEBIRD.
EANDER + 7 others, could not find names.

338
311
Small Vessels Pool,
Admiralty, S.W.1.
25th June 1940.
Dear Martineau,
I enclose a letter from Divine which gives you some information about him. You see he is not even getting T.124 pay now, and is more afraid of a hospital bill than any enemy action.
Milner Gibson is now at Hamble, you could get in touch with him, but I saw him last Friday and he agress that Divine is worth a R.N.V.R. commission which
I think should be given him at once, so as to clear his position in hospital.
I do hope you can do something to overcome red tape as he will be very useful when well, and even if not medically fit, can fulfil many R.N.V.R. jobs.
Yours sincerely,
Captain, R.N.
Commander Martineau,
Staff Officer, V.A. Dover,
Dover.

I enclose these remarks by Cound Richards Appendix
5
who I placed in change of the B.RAY Reaches.
367
Wennant
341
parties direction. SITUATION ON THE BEACHES.
in
10.
31
At about 1930 on Monday 27th I met the Captain not of the WOLFHOUND ashore and he told me that our instructions from the Senior Naval Officer were to proceed to the beaches.
the 2. Rerase of OA proceeded in close company with Lieutenant bea
Commander Dowling and his platoon. En route we met the and head of the Army who were proceeding in the same direction.
11. 3.
We arrived on the beaches after about 1/1 hour's march. During this march there was continuous bombing.
4. On arrival at the beaches it was apparent that app the first flight of the Army were showing signs of lack of
18. discipline and for about 20 minutes we had a difficult time to restore order.
5 I ordered the soldiers in my vicinity to sit down and at the same time placed my platoon cross the road to prevent any more men coming on the beaches. I then called for
Army Officers to assist me and about 7 or 8 approached me.
18.6.
I divided the soldiers up into parties of 30
and placed them under the care of an Army Officer or an Able
It Seaman and dispersed them at intervals along the beaches in the the direction of Dunkirk.
14.7.
As each party arrived on the road leading on to the up beach they were met by seamen who marshalled them into parties of 50/then and led them on to the beaches.
118.
Quiet was then maintained and the embarking in boats at commenced.
At about 2100 Commander Clouston sent a message of
9.
18.to say that large parties could be taken off at Dunkirk and accordingly/

368
342
27/5
accordingly parties of approximately 500 at a time were sent off in that direction.
10.
It was low water and embarkation in small boats was not an easy matter. Continuous air-bombing and machine-gunning from aircraft took place throughout the night but it seemed, by the Grace of God, that the smoke cloud over Dunkirk saved the beaches from being bombed, the main bombing being over the town and dockyard of Dunkirk and the town of St Malo.
28/5
11.
Embarkation continued throughout the night and in the early hours of the morning but during the forenoon the arrival of soldiers abated until there were only sailors left on the beach approximately 1 mile to the eastward of Dunkirk.
e
12.
I proceeded in close company with Commander Ken and
Lieutenant Commander Dowling with our platoons to Dunkirk. On arrival I reported to Captain Tennant who told me he wished a party to proceed to Bray de la Plage to embark 5,000 soldiers.
Volunteers were called for and Commander Ken and I
proceeded there by lorry (2 Commanders and 16 men).
13.
We arrived at approximately 1700 and found about 30,000
soldiers awaiting embarkation stretching from Bray to the eastward.
It was raining and conditions were most unpleasant for us but the other side was that we got no bombing during the night.
29/5
14.
At about 0130 (Wednesday 29th) a high wind had got up which made it obvious to me that embarkation from the beaches would be impossible or at any rate very inefficient. I therefore lined up the soldiers and sent them to Dunkirk in parties of 1,000
at varying intervals. I must have sent off 20,000 in the direction of Dunkirk.
15.
Later in the day the weather improved but there was a most lamentable lack of small boats.
16./

369
343
16.
At about 1200 Commander Ken and I motored into
29/5
Dunkirk to report progress as embarkation on our beach was then impossible. On our return our lorry was heavily machine gunned and hit. At this period a heavy bombing attack took place on the Fleet and beaches.
17.
On return to our headquarters (a lorry) we decided to make contact with General H.Q. but unfortunately our car broke down and we had to walk back 5 miles.
18.
During the night another naval embarkation party arrived on the beach to the eastward which reduced the limits of our beach.
30/5
19.
Early on Thursday morning 30th I proceeded to e
Brigade H.Q. and offered the suggestion that piers be built by running lorries out to sea. This was quickly done and was successful.
20.
I then drove Colonel Whitten and Colonel Mackenzie into Dunkirk to see Captain Tennant and then drove them back to Brigade H.Q.
21.
During the afternoon and dogwatches the French poured into our beaches but no boats arrived within 1½ miles of our H.Q.
22.
During the last dog the Germans directed mos t accurate artillery fire on our beach. This fire continued throughout the night and our lorry was hit. The beach was completely evacuated by allied soldiers.
23.
We had however taken up quarters in a water-boat that was ashore at low water. No boats had now been in for
16 hours on our beach.
24.
During the night the weather became bad once more -
and a heavy surf was running.
At/

370
Personal 31st may remarks be Rich 344
At about 0300, it was impossible to carry out embarkation on the beaches.
of
25.
Our men were showing signs of extreme exhaustion and as it was impossible to communicate with the Senior Naval Officer we decided to take over a whaler that we had salved and to go to the nearest destroyer to report to the Senior Naval Officer.
26.
We waited for high water and at about 0730 put to sea.
There was a very heavy surf running and we had only an uneven set of oars, rope crutches and only an oar to steer by.
27. We approached two destroyers but they both got underway.
Two other destroyers passed us at about 7 cables but paid no attention to us.
e to
28.
After about an hour as if from nowhere appeared the
Margate lifeboat. We asked the Coxswain to take us to the nearest destroyer but all were underway at this time. He was returning to Margate and so we came back with him.
29.
The men in my party were completely exhausted and were asleep within five minutes of being onboard the lifeboat.
30.
On arrival at Margate I phoned the Chief of Staff at Dover and reported our return.
31.
I was ordered to return to Chatham with my party.
was of in
%
is

371
Criticisms.
Personal remarks by bed Richardon 345
way of general criticism are:-
The points that I would like to bring home in the
(1) When being bombed in daylight and at night it is apparently the Army training for the men to lie over on their faces in a huddled heap and to await the completion of the air raid.
I consider that if one lies over on one's face during an air raid, one gets the impression that the bombs when falling with very horrid shrieking noises are each and all coming to land right in the small of one's back. There is little doubt that the Army were considerably cowed by the bombing and I do feel that this form of inactivity during a raid is psychologically e
bad. I would have thought it better that the men be trained to stand up and take cover and loose off their rifles and anyhow look at the bomber, especially by day. It appeared to us obvious which aircraft was going to be anywhere near us and which was
JT.
going to be miles away, while to watch the Army lying down with their faces to the ground with the bombs shrieking, one could see that they were going through a tricky time by being in such a position. I saw no sign, except in one very isolated case, of any of the Naval ratings being at all genuinely upset by the bombing. Machine-gunning, though, was quite embarrassing.
I thought the pom pom fire of the Fleet and 4" barrage fire (2) to be most effective and consistent. The absence of fighters was a source of great discussion and in many cases words. Although the reason for the absence of fighters it is bitter been explained by the prime Minister, I do feel that over has right to have a few bombers directly no doubt psychologically part in such an operation. There is but as the that men when taking fighters were present bombers did not come, soon,

372
346
soon as the fighters left, they seemed to know the exact moment in which to approach.
(3)
Lack of satisfactory communication arrangements was most noticeable. There were no portable wireless sets ashore with the beach parties nor were any field telephones supplied by the naval parties. Wednesday, The only method of communicating messages to ships embarking from the beaches was by a written message sent off in a boat. end BO far The 0.8 that most may direction,
Marrative
29th New
I action et 2000 from Dover in ESK, who had on boand 12 small beene persies. These were distributed at the beaches into any craft svailable end
Consedore Hallott VEHICLES jut E drifter to take ensige off shore at Bray est dissolore Stephanon off In Purpose:
30th May
At 0200, 30th which VOIDE off La Parme and heard the general situation from Geptrin
Almahie idain Cantro OF few ships, drifters and other orer's ere the
Locarding slowly with the few bosts available.
alrowd bauches black with troops, a number l beats may t'est bests, principally whalers, and some mater-boat is is visue were, aducation were low and the soa was oalm, but oven S
there vas assign must
It beneze immediately obvieus to time that any Iurge enharketion from the beached OR more inshore boats and crews. The ozens were the expenting WE E could not spare nen from A/A Guns and Americant and I
signaTied to this effect.
During the Porenoon I went into Dunkisk in HERE to 000 the S.N.O.
Was I Tenant VISA may with the C. in D. are La Panns, but nono the less I W.).8
sole to gir lasto the piature. Pinking that the harbour ovaila be used X
Furned No that enharkention States "smkirk was the only practical plan if nombers involved SA substrjuent efforts were directed to the 42. Visa ON 10 expiry signals.
10
At the same Use the benefits Your Se be taxing No the Fulless expecity of
N the boats and the problem X Eart to deal to control the available so as to Balance Mass viro
Control ind not easy? it ESS selfor in see income the beach, mil touch with bankirk involved a close agreement

you

Summary of the Reports Dunkirk concerning the Evacuation of Troops from
430 459
Area - May 27th - June 4th. 1940.
10.
MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS.
Small Vessels Pool. 461
Foreign Office - Letter of appreciation of services of three
Officers. 465
Narrative Account of Small Motor Boats. 166
List of Men who Signed T.124 Agreement. 474
Pie
H.M.S. VEGA Submarine Search and on Patrol 28th - 31st May, 1940
Analysis of Troops disembarked. 477.
Officers reporting at Sheerness. 502.
Use of Landing Craft. 501
Ramsgate & Margate - Reports from Base Departments. P 536
Summary of Reports from C.-in.-C. Sheerness. 551
Letter from C.R.G. recommending the B.D.O. 55L
Letter from J. W.Wright concerning his son Hugh Wright. 1556
Report from Commander E. G. de Jukes Hughes, Acting P.S.T.O.,
Dover. 50
A.L.C.16 C
p.523

Controller
434 461
Small Vessels Pool.
8th June 1940.
Dunkirk, work of the I desire In following connection to bring the your with recent notice operations the excellent at capacity in S.V.P. this emergency. found itself forced to act in an operational
Hutchins, case was one particular officer taking boats over, outstanding their services to fill the emergency of and civilians who offered an
1. Among the many officers allowed to Department, and asked had a from a certain M.C., Grenadier Guards. This officer Lieut.Col.R.L. day off
Ramsgate, where he was given charge of a motor boat. Wharton, On the way proceed with my Deputy, Captain my permission E.F. to be to useless. Continuing under one engine, on arrival off Dunkirk over the boat hit submerged wreckage which rendered one engine he found a steamer ashore with her boats at the davits. He went to a destroyer, asked for the loan of four hands, and with these men he lowered the boats, which he used to evacuate soldiers from the beach to the destroyer. I understand some
700 men were thus evacuated. He returned to London in time to go on duty the following morning.
2. Captain E.F. Wharton, R.N. This officer under
Ner
S.N.O., Ramsgate acted as Pier Master for four days at Ramsgate.
Upon him the detailed organisation of "ferrying" with the smaller boats from Ramsgate devolved. Captain Phillimore,
S.N.O., Ramsgate made a special report by telephone on the very valuable services rendered by this officer, and has been asked to report it officially in due course.
3. Paymaster Lieutenant Commander H. Garrett, R.N.V.R.
my Secretary. He showed immense capacity for tireless work, and was practically on the telephone for hours, using his own initiative throughout three nights consecutively. He was responsible for obtaining yachtsmen from the clubs in the late evening, putting them in Admiralty cars and sending them down to
Ramsgate and Sheerness; arranging special forms, which he signed himself, for petrol from garages to bring down over 100
boats from the Upper Thames - again on his own initiative. In various other ways he displayed a grasp of the urgency of the situation, which is deserving of much praise. His readiness to accept responsibility was most praiseworthy. He has of also been some 2,500 offers of motor boats received in responsible for the large additional organisation here collecting with Statute No. 718 of May 10th 1940. His methodical of accordance of these boats by areas allowed the great majority. in service those indexing boats requisitioned by S.V.P. officers being within a few hours.
Lionel Preston
Admiral.
Director Small Vessels Pool.

Director, S.V.P.
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS.
43562
0340 SWALLOW proceeded and VULTURE in company with embarked and at
(45' At 0300 Scott hours Paine on Power in
WOLFE to embark five vessels miles lying East off-shore. of Dunkirk, and troops to convey from the them beaches to destroyers one mile East and other to starboard damaged On passage the to Dunkirk, the wreckage of some description was the at normal from the shaft. excessive revolution revolutions indicator and of there ran likely revolutions that with only part of This normal engine throttle; subsequently it appeared at least one blade was stripped. the and On went arrival at Dunkirk, MARLBOROUGH entered to plan, from which alonside a paddle minesweeper, harbour loaded contrary with troops, other two boats she took off as many as she could partly and
Commander to he had damaged one propellor and proposed to return ask why that were deviating from the plan and same; was informed by the the we ahead of me did the I closed accommodate, MARLBOROUGH to direct Ramsgate.
Observing that the round trip Ramsgate/Dunkirk, including refuelling, would take about seven hours, and that the accommodation in the boats was small, I considered it a waste of effort merely to transfer troops already embarked and I explained this to the Master of
SWALLOW who had wished to return with the other boats (on account of damage already sustained and the fact that the water was full of wreckage and flotsam) and we proceeded to the beaches alone.
The situation at 0600 hours was as follows:-
Dunkirk was under a pall of smoke from fires which appeared to be mainly to the South and West of the port. There were numerous wrecks outside the harbour and along the beaches. There were large numbers of troops on the shore as far as it was possible to see to the Eastward, and the beach was strewn with all forms of motor transport. Along the foreshore were a very large number of pulling boats, aground, capsized or damaged, and abandoned. There were also a considerable number of motor boats, motor launches and yachts aground and, in most cases, abandoned, and several wrecks close inshore. About one mile out in the Dunkirk Roads were numerous destroyers and other vessels waiting to embark troops, but scarcely any boats were running between the shore and these ships.
There was a light onshore wind, which unfortunately freshened considerably later, andcaused a ground swell which made embarkation more difficult.
The tide at 0600 hours was setting
There was heavy bombardment going on fairly on shore, hard but to the the beaches Eastward. were quiet except for occasional late shelling and intermittent bombing which did not become heavy until afternoon.
On arrival at the beach I saw one small motor yacht, which I
but which appeared capable of being refloated, and was passed aground, her a towline and pulled her off. This yacht subsequently or signalled rudder out of action. I took her out and laid her alongside a small for further assistance and reported her steering gear coasting vessel which was at anchor.
There was a Service cutter lying astern of this coaster, I
and I took it over for use in embarking the troops. At first, three could see no British troops on the beaches, and in my first or four trips I conveyed only French troops whom I took to H.M.S. to
IMPULSIVE from whom I borrowed 2, and later 2 more, hands man
/my

Page 2.
cutter.
I
my For the Owing rest of to later the the day borrowed until my a whaler last trip and I 2 carried hands from only IMPULSIVE. British 3A36 troops.
were unguarded water than and five below feet, ground the swell hull, and we the fact that SWALLOW's propellors less inshore at some speed, check and it considered it unsafe to go shoot (50 fathoms were in towards turned of grassline the beach, bent and the on to it was nearing allow therefore, the the end cutter to of its run into to tow bows to seaward and the boat 30 fathoms was backed of 3" into rope), shore. the cutter's clambered megaphone how to the water and
Crowds over of the rushed into had by been embarked, I went cutter. and when I I instructed them inboard. of subsequently stopping while the hangers-on cutter out were of pulled reach the remainder; ahead so as to take thought enough cases occasion the when were the very weak and very helpless; was easier, for but in all on one
With men the British troops the loading were of the loaded, were blown in broadside on and to the the whaler, and which in the fully parted, both the cutter instance, case soldiers cutter, the combined efforts of the four Naval beach, ratings and it was only with great difficulty that we re-established it and hoisted a them, using SWALLOW's dinghy. The tow parted again and the line in to were unable to refloat her, so that I was obliged to send in the dinghy.
Each time after loading, I proceeded alongside IMPULSIVE, whicl had a jumping ladder rigged. In order to avoid waste of time in shortening in my eighty-fathom towline, I passed the end of it to
IMPULSIVE and requested her to haul the boats alongside, which was done by part of the ship's company doubling along her deck. After the first trip, I borrowed IMPULSIVE's whaler and two more hands, and made a number of trips from shore to ship towing both boats. There were at this time very few boats working between the shore and the ships, but there were some boats full of troops broached to on the beach and unable to get off. One motor boat belonging to a destroyer, one whaler and a small motor yacht were the only boats working on two or three miles of beach, and in view of the target presented to enemy aircraft by destroyers and other ships waiting to embark troops, I requested
IMPULSIVE to transmit a signal from me to Admiralty, repeated V.A. Dover, requesting more sutters and power boats to speed up the embarkation.
There was some shelling on the beaches, and a good deal of A/A fire from the ships as German aircraft appeared overhead at frequent intervals.
At about midday, IMPULSIVE hoisted two black shapes, and when
I next came alongside she reported that she had struck some wreckage and damaged her port propellor (this happened, I think, while she was taking avoiding action during an attack by aircraft).
As IMPULSIVE had to proceed for docking, I returned her whaler and the borrowed ratings who had manned my cutter, and proceeded to work with WINCHELSEA. Up to this time IMPULSIVE had taken some
400 soldiers, nearly all British. Before she left, I obtained from her
50 gallons of fuel for my boat.
I should like to mention here the ready co-operation of the
Captain, everything possible was done to assist me both by the handling the the First Lieutenant and many others of H.M.S. IMPULSIVE; of petrol, lending a whaler and hands to help in working my cutter short ship to provide a lee, by hauling the long tow line, and by providing and also by providing food for me and my boat's crew during the periods when we were alongside.
I later received much assistance and co-operation from H.M.S.
HINCHELSEA who lent me a signalman and ratings for my cutter and gave
De all her available petrol.

Page 3.
4374
In the early afternoon, the wind lightened and conditions became
Observing that there were boats at the davits of a wreck close
I borrowed some hands from WINCHELSEA to lower and man them, and a R.A.F. launch which was lying astern of a neighbouring vessel to over these boats ex- the wreck and embark troops.
Soon after this, on the suggestion of the Captain of WINCHELSEA, I
making boarded all remaining troops march to Dunkirk for embarkation.
KEITH to discuss with Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker the possibility of
By 1730 hours, there were few troops waiting to embark at this the this time WINCHELSEA signalled proposing that this beach and the remainder were making their way along the beach trip; I concurred. In the last trip only about 30
in the cutter, and I transferred them to the cabin and engine boat, handing over the cutter to the R.A.F. launch.
last half-hour, several dive-bombing attacks were made on which appeared to be straddled by the first salvo. A
transport further to the Eastward was hit about this time, and enemy air
SWALLOW was hit by a few small splinters, presumabli but was undamaged.
After the last trip inshore I proceeded direct to Ramsgate, and arrived there at about 2150 hours. The engines of the boat had and been a since 0315, and when outside Ramsgate first the port, minute running later, the starboard engine failed; the port engine was restarted.
The crew of the SWALLOW worked extremely well throughout and I
would of the Patrol Service at Lowestoft; this man was working and in was the like to bring to your notice the work of an Able Seaman, Peter
Johnson, single-handed for some of the earlïer trips to the beach I
cutter in his efforts and showed great initiative and resource;
put untiring him on board IMPULSIVE before she left and obtained his name as I
wished to draw attention to his very good work.
estimate the total number of troops embarked from 800. the beaches and transferred I to H.M. Ships by SWALLOW as between 600 and
Robin Hutchins
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Grenadier Guards.
(A.L.O., Admiralty).
To be attached to my upat, bleak himel Prescom
Dorp 13.6.

465
In any further communication on this subject, please quote
REGISTRY CENTRAL
429
No. K 9032/7083/217.
and addressnot to any person by name but to
FOREIGN OFFICE. S.W.L
The Under-Secretary of State,"
18550
6th June, 1940.
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.
1940
Sir,
I am directed by Viscount Halifax to state, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. that in the course of his report on the closure of the British Vice-
Consulate at Dunkirk on May 21st, Mr. Pro-Consul Wild pays tribute to the Sea Transport Officer, Lieutenant Commander Dunnet
R.N.R., who was extremely useful in providing transport for the large number of refugees leaving Dunkirk for the United Kingdom.
Mr. Wild mentions that he understands that this officer was later very seriously wounded by a bomb.
2. The Pro-Consul further states that Commander H. Henderson
R.N., Naval Liaison Officer attached to Amiral Nord, was also invaluable in supplying Destroyers and other craft at the Pro-
Consul's request for transport at Boulogne, Calais, Ostend and
Dunkirk. At one point Mr. Wild had heard that some fifteen hundred British subjects were stranded in Ostend. He informed
Commander Henderson of this, and a vessel was made available at
Ostend by dawn on the following day.
3. Mr. attached to the Vice-Consulate as Assistant remained Naval calm
Wild adds that Paymaster Sub-Lieutenant H. Penn R.N.R., Control who was also extremely helpful. This officer considerably under Officer, very was bad conditions and his cheerful attitude alleviated the despondency of the refugees.
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
The Secretary of the Admiralty.

1
440
APPENDIX 5.
RAMSGATE & MARGATE: DYNAMO OPERATION.
R.N.V.R. by arrangement with Rear Admiral A. H. Taylor.
Narrative account prepared by Temp. Lieut. A. Dann, l
any viling activitien UE IIID OVII particular unit or section, and only with the passing of time will the expert be able to piece together the various reports of all who took part.
This is the story of the small motor-boats and the part they played, but even here a connected narrativeis difficult, if not impossible. Each boat with its own tiny crew was thrown more or less upon its own resources; and upon the fortunes of war and the initiative of each boat's captain depends the story each may subsequently tell.
From all around the compass they came. From up the river, along the coast, from the yachting harbours, the pleasure beaches, Naval ports and fishing towns - anything that would
'float, move under its own power, and collect a dozen men or so from the beaches where they waited.
The first assembly to gather at Sheerness was typical of the whole of this miniature armada. A dozen or so of motor yachts from 20' to 50' in length; nicely equipped and smartly maintained by proud individual owners; a cluster of cheap jobs" mainly the work of amateur craftsmen who had

441
To present a comprehensive view of the whole of the naval operations at Dunkirk between May 27th and June 5th is a task for the historian. No man who took an active part can hope to describe anything beyond the activities of his own particular unit or section, and only with the passing of time will the expert be able to piece together the various reports of all who took part.
This is the story of the small motor-boats and the part they played, but even here a connected narrativeis difficult, if not impossible. Each boat with its own tiny crew was thrown more or less upon its own resources; and upon the fortunes of war and the initiative of each boat's captain depends the story each may subsequently tell.
From all around the compass they came. From up the river, along the coast, from the yachting harbours, the pleasure beaches, Naval ports and fishing towns - anything that would float, move under its own power, and collect a dozen men or SO
from the beaches where they waited.
The first assembly to gather at Sheerness was typical of the whole of this miniature armada. A dozen or so of motor yachts from 20' to 50' in length; nicely equipped and smartly maintained by proud individual owners; a cluster of cheap
"conversion jobs" mainly the work of amateur craftsmen who had set to work in their spare time to convert a ship's lifeboat or any old half-discarded hull into a cabin cruiser of sorts for week-end trips on the quiet waters of the up-river reaches.

442
Half a dozen Thames river launches resembling nothing so much as the upper decks of elongated motor-buses with their rows of slatted seats, but given a tang of the waterside by rows of white-painted lifebuoys slung around the upper rails.
The very names of these latter craft are redolent of the quiet of Richmond, Teddington and Hampton Court; "Skylark",
"Elizabeth" and "Queen Boadicea". A strange flotilla indeed to be taking an active part in what has been described as "the greatest naval epic in history".
The crews and their officers too were as miscellaneous an assembly as the craft they manned. First arrived a trickle of R.N.V.R. Sub-Lieutenants direct from training school, taken from their class-rooms often in the midst of a lecture on the
"practical pilotage" they were soon to put to such good account.
Many of these were entering a naval dock-yard for the first time in their lives, yet they clambered over the little ships, bawled for their requirements in food, fuel and water and set to work to prepare for the task in hand, as if to the manner born.
Next came another thin trickle - this time junior Royal
Navy officers who but a short time before were midshipmen on war vessels of various types; little more than schoolboys, yet each possessed of that indescribable sangfroid and cheerful discipline which is the hall-mark of the British naval officer whatever his age or rank.
Lastly - and only a matter of minutes before the time of departure - came the crews; Royal Fleet Reserve men this first batch - tough, stout-hearted and disciplined. No time to pick or choose; stoker ratings first, to man the little engines -
one man to each boat; then the seamen - "Swarm over those boats men and wherever you find an officer aboard ask him if he needs a crew! Three men to the larger boats and two each to the smaller".
2

4438
Ten minutes more and the first convoy is ready for the sea - manned, victualled and fuelled - equipped in fact with all but arms. Only later, when the full peril of their task was realised and returning troops had filled the depots with sandfouled small arms, were weapons available for the crews'
protection. The first convoys sailed gaily into the inferno of Dunkirk beaches without so much as a pistol between them.
Still the boats arrived and still the officers and men flowed into the port; "T.124's" now for the most part. Sturdy fishermen, lightermen and merchant seamen. Now, too, came in increasing numbers the civilian volunteers who played so fine a part in the operation.
In the very first flotilla to leave was one black motor launch, the "Advance", manned entirely by three bearded civilian yachtsmen. This boat and its crew stayed with the writer in convoy through the whole of the first journey across, and after the first murderous machine gun attack from the air three cheerful bearded grinning faces appeared above the fore cabin roof and three pairs of hands were clasped and shaken overhead as a signal that allwas well; only the "Jolly Roger" was lacking to complete that picture.
These men wore no uniform, were born on no ship's books but took the graver risks which attend civilians engaged in military operations as undisturbed as they would take a choppy sea on a week-end cruise.
The journey across, perhaps, afforded the individual his best opportunity of assessing the magnitude of the operation in which he was playing his part. Beautiful yachting weather
(half the small craft could never have made the crossing otherwise), hardly a chop on the water; thewhole vista bathed in summer sunshine; and, across the expanse of sea, an endless stream of laden ships.
From horizon ahead to horizon astern, spanning the whole scene from coast to coast, unloading their human freight and hastily returning for more; an endless
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succession of British shipping as motley in its larger form as were the motor-boats themselves. Tramps, cargo ships, barges, drifters, tugs, Dutch schoots, British warships, even river ferry-boats such as carry one's car across the Thames at
Woolwich and elsewhere.
Of individual acts only a few can be given; every crew, every man almost, experienced some incident or another. some adventure that could fill a whole small volume on its own. And yet what can a writer do when such men report such events in the tersest of language such as "heavily shelled whilst at work"?
A few reminiscenses may be given here in the hope that some idea of the work may be gathered by anyone who cares to piece them together. Here are some extracts from a letter written by Sub. Lt. W.R. Williams, R.N. which serve to illustrate that merry sangfroid which has been referred to earlier:-
"So I proceeded by compass (error 20°) to the Calais -
Gravelines sands and anchored a few hundred yards out.
I was pulled ashore in the boat, which waited for me while I walked inland in search of Allied soldiers.
After about a quarter of a mile I saw two men silhouetted against the glow of a distant blaze. I approached to within a few yards and hailed them.
I heard one of them say "Lieber Gott!" and they turned around and commenced to shoot at me. By this time I had come to the conclusion that I was in enemy territory, so
I hid behind a dune and shot back.
Fortunately it was a very dark night and the Germans could not see me properly, while I could see their outlines quite well. I shot the one on the right twice and he fell without a sound. The other one screamed when I fired two bullets at him, and he dropped whatever he was carrying and then fell and lay still. By this time I heard nearby shouts so, deeming discretion to be the better part of valour, I ran at top speed back to the boat and my ship was under way at her full six knots within less than five minutes."
-
"I proceeded back to Dunkirk as soon as I had landed the soldiers at Ramsgate and arrived just in time to catch the dusk bombing and shelling. There was a lot of shrapnel falling on the beach and I was greatly impressed by the Tommies and Poilus who waded out into the sea and helped the sailors with the boats. Nowhere did Isee any signs of cracking morale or anything but cheerfulness.
-
"I went back for the last time the same evening. Dunkirk was by now a flamir DIGHT unsulba in the "Swallow"
and proceeded todna S kct with a slower motor-bernoon INEM untern to manionother War
Department I -Denimm wartlerc vao imar reemonant nortly afterwards sunbSe=b6sih beat 6/PLB oDoor some of the

4457°
French with Staff, but I could up the Poilus and a few not find any so I filled shooting was extremely wild and in we German got away unscathed."
inner harbour was Tommies. already The furthest hands end but of their
He finishes up his letter with this characteristic remark -
in "That all." is all I did at Dunkirk (:). I went over five times
For brevity and preciseness in describing real achievement in the face of danger, the following from Lieut. C.W. Read,
R.N.R. is characteristic:-
"Made 7 complete return trips to Dunkirk Beaches; average number soldiers carried 60 = approx. 420 soldiers. Made
10 trips from Mole at Dunkirk to transports lying off, under shrapnel = 600 soldiers.
Rescued Chief Steward and 39 soldiers from water ex S/S
Scotia and bombed whilst doing SO.
On last return journey was caught in parachute flares, bombed and then machine-gunned, but escaped without damage owing to speed and quickness on helm of "Bonnie
Heather". Service finished at 5.0 p.m. on 4th June.
Estimated number of soldiers handled in launch:-
Dunkirk Beaches to Ramsgate
420/450
Dunkirk Mole to Transports lying off
600/650
Rescued from S/S Scotia
40.
With compasses of doubtful accuracy and no other navigating instrument but a lead pencil, the difficulties of navigation once a boat lost contact with the main convoy were immense.
Some of the small craft had not even a compass; yet all who left the other side in safety managed to reach the English coast to re-fuel and set off again to repeat the adventure.
One officer even tells how, after wandering all through the night with a compass he could not trust, he put into
Calais! Only after twenty minutes heavy shelling did he escape with his craft intact.
The narrowness of such escapes could be repeated again and again. The writer himself, whilst leading a column of six small white painted yachts was subjected to dive machinegunning from three successive flights of three enemy aircraft.
With no arms whatever with which to offer resistance, the column was almost a sitting target and the airplanes could approach till they almost touched the cabin roofs. Yet,
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44671
unbelievable close though it may seem, of all these six boats in formation not one lost so much as a chip of paint.
Amongst the commoner difficulties encountered were submerged lorries in whichtroops had apparently driven right down to the water' S edge at low tide. Another source of much trouble close inshore was the large amount of floating grass rope which various craft had used and lost in their rescue work and numerous articles of military equipment, such as greatcoats. Quite a few small motor boats were put temporarily out of action by the ropes and garments fouling the boats'
screws and many times the crews (stripped or not as occasion permitted) were obliged to go over the side and free these obstructions before they could carry on.
As those boats which made the earlier crossings returned with their stories of the difficulties to be overcome, other crews profited by their experience, to add to - or in some cases to subtract from - the equipment carried. Arms were principally in demand and the depot was raided time and again by officers and crews in search of anything with which they could hit back. As one manexpressed it "Even a record of the
1812 overture would be better than nothing".
By this time too, volunteers of all sorts, military as well as civilians, were besieging those boats which were ordered out, and many were the last minute "pier head jumps"
on to already moving craft by those who were determined not to be left out.
One story relates how two army cadets disappeared from a machine-gun nest on the harbour wall complete with gun. They were next heard of bringing down an enemy plane off Dunkirk from the deck of a small motor boat!
The principal work accomplished by these small craft consisted of what may best be called "ferrying". Theshore off the beaches to the east of Dunkirk shallows very gradually;
at times there is no more than two or three feet of water for
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447
over inshore a hundred yards out to sea. A long rolling surf flows most of the time and even the shallow draught motorboats could not approach closely with any degree of safety.
Open boats of all kinds from naval cutters and whalers to seaside dinghies were towed over from England by the motorboats themselves and by other craft. Some of these pulling boats were manned by odd naval ratings, others by the soldiers themselves.
One of the principal difficulties was to avoid fouling the motor-boats' screws with painters and odd lines attached to these pulling boats. It is amazing how much sea-room a soldier can take up with a couple of fathoms of rope! Carley floats and inflated motor inner tubes also played their part in carrying men from the beach to the motor boats, which in turn took aboard those on these more precarious perches and towed the loaded pulling boats to larger craft lying off in waiting, picking up their own or any other empty boats and towing them back inshore for further loads.
As petrol ran short each motor boat would pick up such men as it could carry and set off back to England for more petrol, then out again for further service.
During Wednesday, May 29th, the Mole at Dunkirk was apparently rendered temporarily useless so that most, if not all of the troops had to be taken from the beaches. During this day, too, and for at least a part of the following day, air attack continued almost unabatedly from dawn to dusk;
dive-bombing for the larger ships and machine-gunning for the smaller.
Later in the week, although the R.A.F. were present in greater numbers to relieve the pressure from the air, shelling added to the difficulties and men were being hit in the pulling boats as they carried on their work.
By the week-end evacuation from Dunkirk harbour was in full swing again and the beaches were often almost deserted.
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448
The as they slower motor boats still removed stragglers and odd parties with were encountered whilst the faster types co-operated larger ships inside the harbour, even when the enemy had reached the inner part of the harbour itself.
Those who lost their little commands returned to England as best they could, some aboard other small motor craft, others aboard larger ships lending a hand with the wounded or snatching a few hours sleep aboard before reporting for further duty.
Many officers spent sixty hours or more at a stretch before gaining a much needed sleep.
The total number of such small motor craft engaged in the operation cannot at present be assessed. It is doubtful if the exact figure can ever be computed since many who took a part did so with their own boats manned by their own relatives or friends; did their best, shared the dangers and discomforts and, when no further work remained to be done, stole quietly away unrecognised and unrewarded.
The numbers, too, of soldiers taken off the beaches by these motor boats can never be more than estimated. Lieut.
Read's report of 600 men ferried to transports and 420 brought direct to England in one 35' motor launch gives some idea of the usefulness of this "miniature armada".
of

Dynoms 181. 449474
LIST OF MEN ENGAGED IN THE DUNKIRK EVACUATION Ho SIGNED ON
T.124 AGREEMENT.
NAME
CAPACITY ENGAGED
ALLEN F.F
AMBLER H.
HAND
ADAMSON J.S.
CHARGE HAND
BELLCHAMBER W.
ENGINEER
ENGINEMAN
COOK DECK HAND
BURNS S.F.J.
ENGINEMAN
BROWN BROWN BARNARD BARNES CROUCH CLARKE COGGINS CALLEN CROCK CURTIS A.T N N. R.
S.
CHARGE HAND
ENGINEMAN
SKIPPER
A.
COOK
W.E
COOK DECK HAND
C
ENGINEMAN
A.A
ENGINEMAN
COX
DECK MAN
J.M
MATE
G
MATE
DICK
CHARGE HAND
DAVIES A.W
MATE
FORBES
DECK HAND
FAULKNER R.W.A
SKIPPER
GARRETT R
ENGINEMAN
GAYDON H.C
HAND
HEMPEL J
ENGINEMAN
HASTINGS H.G
CHARGE HAND
ENGINEER
HASTINGS W.B
HUNPHRIES D
COOK DECK HAND
HOBBS P.L
ENGINEER
HISCOTT C.H
CHARGE HAND
HODGESON N
ENGINEMAN
CHARGE HAND
HALL G.V
DECK HAND
HORNE G
ENGINEMAN
HETH RINGTON A.F
ENGINEMAN
HOPE-LAWSON
SKIPPER
HACKFORTH-JONES
CHARGE HAND
HALL a.w
DECK HAND
HILLS A.W
COOK DECK HAND
JOHNSON R
MASTER
JEFFREY E.R
MATE
JEFFREY V.S
2nd HAND
JAMESON J.W
SKIPPER
KIMBER G
MASTER
KEARNS N
MATE
LIGHTROLLER J.T
COOK HAND
LIGHTROLLER C.H
COOK DECK HAND
MCGRUPPIE K.C.
ENGINEMAN
MARKING A
CHARGE HAND
MONTY H.W.
SKIPPER
MOSS S.G
ENGINEMAN
MEDD T.W
MASTER
MASON T.W
ENGINEMAN
MESSENGER
MARDLING J.J
A.B.
MEDSON L.C.
SKIPPER
MUDD M
NICHOLSON R.A
DECK HAND
NUMMERY R.H
CHARGE HAND
ENGINEMAN
PIERCY OLIVER HAMILTON E
ENGINEMAN
PENRICK R.G.
MATE
POLLARD D
MATE
PECK E.W
CHARGE HAND
PORTER F.G
ENGINEER
PORTER F.

152476
450
PAGE II.
NAME
CAPACITY
PACE H.G
PEARCY H.H.
CHARGE
PATERSON J
DECK HAND
RICHARDSON W (Tel from F.O.I.C.)
CHARGE HAND
RICHARDSON J.E.
SKIPPER
RICKINSON D.W
MATE
RIPLEY T
CHARGE HAND
RUMNEY R
DECK HAND
RUDDICK R.S.
CHARGE HAND
RICHARDSON R.W.
ENGINEMAND
REEVE G.E
CHARGE HAND
ENGINEMAN
RUNDELL W
MATE
SMITH R.A
CHARGE HAND
STURGEON J
ENGINEMAN
SMITH F.J
COOK DECK HAND
SMITH S
MATE
SMITH H
CHARGE HAND
SHEPPARD L
ENGINEMAN
SKINNER E
DECK HAND
SKILT T
CHARGE HAND
TYE W
CHARGE HAND
TRAVERS MOSS T
ENGINEMAN
TROTTER W.P
DECK HAND
VIOLA G.F
ENGINEMAN
WHITAKER J.
CHARGE HAND
WAITE T.V
CHARGE HAND
YOUNG F (Tel from London)
CHARGE HAND
WINDLE J
A.B.
ASHCROFT G.E
MATE
BROWN S.C
COOK DECK HAND
BEDWELL F.E
MASTER
JEFFREY D
COOK DECK HAND
ENGINEMAN
JACKSON F.W
DECK HAND
MILLS J.B
5th June, 1940.
MASTER
TOWNDROW T.A
ENGINEER
THOMAS G

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
(vega's 31/28 Pk5 of 2nd June)
II
H 138.
ce Admiral, Dover.
py to Commander in Chief, Rosyth.
submitted for information.
RKew
CAPTAIN (D) ROSYTH
mmander in Chief's Offices, syth 6th June 1940.
VICE ADMIRAL
1° JUN 1940
*
DOVER

4560
EVACUATION OF B.E.F. INCLUDING ALLIED TROOPS.
ANALYSIS OF TROOPS DISEMBARKED AT FOLKESTONE.
Date.
Total Officers and O.R.'s
28.5.40.
499.
29.5.40
5271.
30.5.40
1797.
31.5.40
5543
1.6.40.
7560
2.6.40
75
3.6.40
4634
4.6.40
4128.
29,507
353