Admiralty reports on naval operations off the Dutch, Belgian and French coasts during 1940.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/795. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.
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397 4. |
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397 4. 371 Th-3015 tide, arrangements were to be made to ensure that all craft should be kept afloat in not less than one foot of water pending ships being available to embark troops. I also discussed with the Brigadier, the need for ensuring that troops would be properly fallen in when the final evacuation took place to prevent so far as possible an almost inevitable ugly rush, but nothing definite could be fixed up in this matter pending the promulgation of the final plan not then received. I learnt that the Brench final evacuation was expected to take place on Friday, completing on Friday night, in view of the closing in of the enemy and as soon as I had specific instructions that my beach parties were not to be taken prisoner and in order, for psycholigical reasons, to avoid the undesirability of the Naval personnel embarking to the possible exclusion of Military personnel (even if they could do so), I left instructions that half of the personnel were to embark between midnight and the early hours of Friday. At about 2000 I again set off for La Panne intending to return that night as soon as I had seen the Rear-Admiral. There were many men embarking in the few boats available going off to about 2 or 3 destroyers and sloops lying off La Panne and I had considerable difficulty in getting a WORCESTER as his Flagship, but he himself was ashore. passage off. I eventually found the Rear-Admiral was using I decided to wait for his return which did not occur until about 2230. Meanwhile, enemy aircraft were active in the vicinity and destroyers were filling up with troops. I stressed to the Rear-Admiral the urgent need for ships and boats already obvious), and maintained to him the question of covering fire during the evacuation, but my main object was to get his concurrence which he gave me, to my embarking the following day in at motor boat off the beaches to rectify the projected recurrence of emptied boats being cast adrift. It was too late to return to Bray that night by she sailed for Bray in the early hours, disembarking me land, and after the Rear-Admiral had transferred to EXPRESS into the trawler OLVENA at about 0400(?) At this time there were a very considerable number of destroyers, paddlers, trawlers, acoots, etc., off Bray and embarkation was proceeding satisfactorily, but at 1010 had already started. From Bray I of about ten motor yachts which arrived from England. transferred to SCIMITARY motor boat and later to ANNI, These one 31/5 craft drew 6 to 7 feet and were unable to get across any of the beaches. I used ANRH as my headquarters during the day, and instructed half the yachts to proceed to La Panne and the other half to work off Bray. During the forenoon, considerable firing of empty craft towards the beach was carried out and only about two boats were allwed to get adrift and ultimately aground. with the falling tide, however, till the tide rose in the afternoon. These included the ALC, a quite a number of boats were seen to ground and remained ashore fast motor boat and a lifeboat. Other power boats broke down. Nevertheless the embarkation, much hindeedd by the lop, proceeded satisfactorily. As destroyérs and sloops arrived, I instructed them to lower their motor boats whalers where this had not already been done. These boats, sepecially destroyers motor boats were quite invaluable. During the morning, at certain [Contained in Vol 4, p112 amount/