TNA ADM 199 795

APPENDIX 'B'
SURMARY OF OPERATIONS ON B.E.F. IN FRANCE
FROM 1ST TO 18TH JUNE 1940
1. After the evacuation of the main British Expeditionary
Force from Flanders in the first week of June the only
British troops remaining in France were the 51st Division, which had been holding 3 sector of the Sarre Front, and the incomplete 1st Armoured Division, which had begun its disembarkation on 20th May and had been rushed up piscemeal in a desperate effort to relieve the sorely tried right flank of the B.E.F. By the 1st June this attenuated
Division, which was incomplete when disanbarked and had lost heavily in its first engagement on the Somme, could only muster roughly one third of its quota of tanks.
2. These two formations, the 51st Division and the 1st
Armoured Division, the only British fighting formations
General Altmayer, commanding Tenth French Army, which held remaining in France, were placed under the orders of the left sector of the Some front from Amiens to the S88.
The handling of the British troops, which had been delegated to General Altmayer by General leygand, was co-ordinated and supervisied by a British ilitary Mission at Tenth Army
Headquarters.
Somme sector was sixteen miles in-extent, an excessive
3. The frontage allotted to the 51st Division on the
Fre ch divisions were holding at the time owing to amount, but probably not much greater than that which their many action the Sarre front, and had had & long and arduous On depleted resources. The Division had already been in
4th June the 51st Division Commander was ordered which to carry journey on from the Eastern frontier to its new sector.
out the Abbeville bridgshead, for operation an attack the newly on arrived French 31st Division and was 8 placed under as well PS 160 French tanks of was effective co-operation between British notice, however, considerable not a success, ainly owing to the and his orders, reinforcement of French artillery. difficulty The attack,
French arranging guns and tanks at such casualties... short and the 51st infantry, Division suffered fairly heavy
4. On the following against the whole front to the day (5th June) the Garmang held launched by the
Seventh a powerful and offensive Tenth French Armies, from in an St. exhausted uentin condition, sea.
Tenth The The after from too Division 51st wide the Army 12 a days Division front, Commander, front fought of replied to continual was bravely, be when by able that widely this asked movement to but he time resist scattered had was to no relieve and forced effectively. reserves battle, posts. back the available. Division and by Owing German was The holding to infiltration the extent between of its frontago its the division had no depth
/in its

in its defences, had had no time to organize rearward defences, nor any reserves with which to counter-attack.
It was forced back to the line of the river Bresle, the next natural obstacle, 15 miles in rear.
5. Meanwhile the 1st Armoured Division was refitting south of the Seine. Its tanks were in poor mechanical condition, owing not only to battle casualties but also to the long road distances they had been forced to cover, and to the lack of opportunity for adequate maintenance.
It was in fact in no condition for offensive operations.
6. On the 7th June the Garmans out in & smashing attack with their 5th and 7th Amoured Divisions on the point of junction between the two Corps of the Tenth French Army.
This drive was directed from west of Amiens on Rouen and the lower Seine, with the object of splitting the Tenth
Army and cutting off its IX Corps between the Saina
Estuary and Dieppe. The IX French Corps than comprised the British 51st Division on the extrema left, and then further east the 31st and 40th French Divisions and the
2nd and 5th Light Cavalry Divisions. The wh le of this force was completely sundered from the X Corps on its right by the penetration of the German tanks.
British base at Rouen, General Sir Henry Karslake, 0.0.0.
7. Meanwhile, owing to the threat developing to the the Lines of Communication, had scraped together an improvised force for its local defence. This force comprised nine infantry battalions of a sort; they out to France for pioneer duties and partly of composite consisted partly of second line Territorial units sent base. They had no war equipment except rifles and &
units made up from miscellaneous reinforcements at the never fired before. guns They were without artillery, wans few odd Bren and enti-tank weapons, which they had
District, units were of the formation, this transport command heterogeneous thus was Lines misled given complete of and Brigadier the of signal into Communication. collection with t tile thinking equipment. artillery Besuman, of had of Division; that untrained been in and Vary it They charge given was ancillary unfortunately were The $ and the of righting French the placed task ill-aquipped services. orth of under
Beauman's holding back so-called line along Division the Rivers Bethung and Andella the covering a Rouen, and had done good work in organizing defence of this position.
on While the Cerman of the 7th June, General Weygand personally impressed
8. armoured attack was at its height visited the afternoon Headquarters east of Rouen and the on Tenth Army and on General Evans commanding holding the
German attack Armoured on the Seine at all costs as this
British General Altmayer, Division, the necessity for was "the decisive battle of the war.
/It

It was now becoming obvious that to enable the IX Corps to fall back in good order to the line of the Lower Seine, a cover position would have to be held along. the River
Andelle, some 12 miles east of Rouen. General Evans, therefore, at once ordered his 3rd Armoured Brigade (in fact reduced to some four weak squadrons of 30 tanks in all)
to stiffen up the right flank of Beauman's defensive line.
9. On the 8th June the German amoured drive continued on the Axis Amiens - Rouen, and succeeded in penetrating the weak British defences on the watershed butween the
Rivers Andelle and Bethune, west of Forges-Les-Baux.
Beauman's ill-equipped units, with the British tanks supporting them, fell back to the line of the Soino.
That night German armoured units penstrated into Rouen, and the French Tenth Army lost all touch from then onward with its IX Corps in the Pouen - Dieppe cul-de-sac.
10. The 51st Division was thus completely cut off from its proper line of retirement via Rouen. This was mainly due to the failure or inability of the French High Command to withdraw their left wing while there was still time and space for this manoeuvre. Throughout all these operations it was becoming clear that the French High
Command was issuing "die in the last ditch orders, which their troops had no intention of carrying out. From this time onwards, until the final evacuation of the B.E.F. on was crushed and that it had little Intention of offering the 18th, it was obvious that the spirit of the French Aray serious resistance. This spirit was also shared by the
Headquarters literally ceased to function for 48 hrs; It higher commanders; on the 8th June the Tenth French Army had lost all touch, and its X Corps was broken and in full retreat.
11. The had on the 9th June reached the line of
The 3rd Armoured and Brigada and Beauman's fragmentary units the Seine Germans had ustablished bridgeheads at several points.
which had been refitting at Louviers, was put in to support were withdrawn to reorganize, and the 2nd Amounted Brigade,
General hold de la Laurencie's south III Corps of Rouen. which was It was trying now to being apparent to the 12. drive Tenth the It employed was Seine Laurie, that south-west French at sent an the elsewhere, this crossings able was out Army German critical towards and rushed to from France. cool-headed armoured while the up On Alencon juncture and the Armee three Its units ni placed with commander, de leading ht that Army Paris. and of & under Corps the view 12th/13th air brigade, 52nd Brigadier the to force were separating Division orders June were detached the or it the Tenth Freuch right Army. sector of the III Corps frontenst of 8 miles of
Conches, took over the very exposed position, with & battalions gap on on its right, in a and two newly arrived French its left west of Evreux.
/AS