TNA ADM 199 795

CU] 1 1
The situation on the front that evening, SO far as it was known, was that the Tenth French Army, which included the 157 Infantry Brigade of the 52nd Division, Armoured
) Division (less one Brigade) and BEAUMAN Force, was holding a line from the Sea West of the SEINE to NEUBOURG and thence to CONCHES. Between the Southern flank of the
157 Infantry Brigade and DAMVILLE, there was & gap of some
8 miles, which was only lightly held by elements of the
3rd D.L.M. South of this area the Army of Paris was supposed to be holding & line from DREUX to BONNECOURT on the SEINE, but there was no confirmation that this Army was actually in position.
14 JUNE
5. At 0830 hours I saw General WEYGAND. He spoke most frankly and explained the situation to me. He said that the French Army was no longer capable of organised resistance, that it had now broken up into four groups - one of which was the Tenth Army (General ALTMAYER) with which the B.B.F.
was operating - and that considerable gaps existed between the groups.
the orders The of their own Commanders, but co-ordinated
Armies he explained, would continue to fight action under of the force as & whole would no longer be possible. out.
Reserves were exhausted and many formations worn
He then Allied Covernments, BRITTANY was vicinity to of informed me that, in accordance with be at defended decision taken by the line across the peninsula in the to General
GEORGES' RENNES. by holding Headquarters He & suggested to that discuss we should with him proceed the details of this project.
/ We
BEAUMAN Division was an improvised was
FOOTNOTE: ( )
organised as follows:-
The formation which, on 13th June, of personnel from auxiliary military
"B" Bde Bde - - THE
212 213 - - - Army Engineers.
"E" "E" "C" 4 Provisional reonnel. - the the (improvised). Engineers.

- 3 -
)
we then went to General GEORGES' Headquarters, at
BRIARE, where we continued the discussion. I pointed out that the length of the proposed line was some 150
kilometres which would require at least fifteen Divisions.
I gathered from both General WEYGAND and General GEORGES
that they did not consider the BRITTANY project to be &
feasible proposition with the forces that now remained available in the Tenth French Army including the B.B.F.
General WEYGAND referred to the project as "romantic", and said that it had been adopted without military advice.
General WEYGAND stated, however, that, since the Allied
Governments had issued instructions for the defence of
BRITTANY he must carry out their orders. Consequently, in consultation with General GEORGES, he had drawn up instructions for the participation of the B.B.F. in the scheme. Being under the impression that H.M. Government had approved this plan, I signed the document which prescribed the role of B.B.F. in it. (Copy attached at
Appendix 'A').
6. WEYGAND had described to me, I immediately sent a telegram
In view of the gravity of the situation which General to inform the C.I.G.S. I also requested Ma or-General Sir
Richard HOWARD-VYSE to proceed to the War Office as soon as possible to report more fully to the C.I.G.S., and to take to the C.I.G.S. a copy of the document reproduced in
Appendix A.
7. I then returned to my Headquarters at LE MANS, arriving at 1615 hours. I spoke to the C.I.C.S. by telephone at
1630 hours and explained the situation. I asked whether the BRITTANY scheme had H.M. Government's approval and told him that both Generals WEYGAND and GEORGES appeared to consider it impracticable with the force available. The
C.I.G.S. informed me that he knew nothing of the BRITTANY
Scheme, but said he would refer the matter to the Prime
Minister.
I told the C.I.G.S. that, in view of the general state
French Army, I considered that all further movement of of disintegration which was beginning to spread in the arrangements should be started for the evacuation of the troops and material to France should be stopped, and that
B.E.F. from available Ports. The C.I.G.S. informed ne that orders had already been issued to stop the dispatch of further troops and material to France.
8. say that the Prime Minister knew nothing of the BRITTANY
An hour later (1715 hours) the C.I.G.S. telephoned to plan, and that all arrangements were to start for the evacuation of those elements of the B.E.F. which were at that time not under the orders of the Tenth French Army.
/ As
FOOTNOTE: ( ) General Georges was C.-in-C., North-
Eastern Theatre of Operations.

4
AS H.M. Government had not been consulted with regard to the BRITTANY scheme, and the withdrawal of the B.E.F. had been approved, I considered that I was no longer in a position to carry out the dispositions settled with Generals
WEYGAND and GEORGES. I therefore requested the C.I.C.S. to inform General WEYGAND, and I understood this was to be done.
The instructions which I received later (see paragraph 10
below), stating that I was no longer under General WEYGAND'S
orders, confirmed this opinion.
Orders outlining the arrangements for the evacuation were at once issued, and an officer was dispatched to
Lieutenant-General J.H. MARSHALL-CORNWALL requesting him to come to my Headquarters.
9. The C.I.G.S. telephoned again at 2015 hours and said that it was most important that everything should be done to ensure good relations between ourselves and the French, and to avoid, in every possible way, giving the impression that the B.E.F. was deserting them. I replied that I would most certainly see that this was done, that I was moving no troops move back all other troops and material towards the ports.
engaged with the Tenth Army, but that I was arranging to asked about the employment of those elements or the 52nd
At this stage the Prime Minister himself spoke and
Division which were not under the orders of the Tenth
French I assured him that I considered that forces no useful Army. could be served by adding them to the restore already purpose with that Army. They could not possibly the of some 30 miles which now existed between the the situation on that front, nor could they close Tenth gap
French Army and the Army of Paris.
Prime Minister then agreed to my proposal should that remain the drawal fighting troops Moves The under of forces with the to orders ports remainder that moving army of of embarkation on the of for BREST, Tenth the the B.E.F. present, Corps French Tenth were should Troops therefore French Army whilst proceed. on Army) the ST. continued, with- MALO, on
Canadian 52nd CHERBOURG, Division of (less C. elements troops PALLICE. and with material Finally on ST. those MALO, elements BREST,
ST. with 10. situation NAZATRE, Tenth At 2235 admitted L. French hours NANTES Army I of and approval spoke their were LA to withdrawal to for the embark C.I.G.S. evacuation. at the from CHERROURG orders and that told The Army. of when C.I.G.S. him General of the informed the Prime me Minister's that I was no longer was under to act as an independent in every
WEYGAND, and that however, the B.E.F. to continue Army. to co-operate way force. I was, with the Tenth French were 11. embarkation During busily 150,000 / with personal, possible STATE THE myself for the

- 7 -
16 JUNE
21. At 0700 hours the C.I.G.S. rang me up and said that all arrangements could be made for the evacuation of 52nd
Division (less the detachment with Tenth French Army), but that no actual movement was yet to take place. At 0830
hours, however, he rang up again and confirmed that 52nd
Division (less the detachment with Tenth French Army) could now begin to embark: NORMAN Force itself was to continue to co-operate with the Tenth French Army. I then asked the C.I.G.S. what the policy should be with regard to troops of the French Army who might wish to embark at CHEREOURG.
He informed me that they would be allowed to do so.
Orders for the embarkation of 52nd Division (less the detachment with the Tenth French Army) were issued.
I issued orders to G.O.C. L. of C. to the effect that work of re-embarkation of personnel, stores, and vehicles was to continue at all ports as long as the tactical situation permitted.
and from NORMAN Force showed that the enemy was on contact ance was possible, but reports from Motor Contact Officers
22. Owing, once more, to poor visibility no air reconnaisswith the Tenth French Army along its front but that be was
Further to the South enemy movement seemed to be directed attacking seriously only against 157 Infantry Brigade.
on CHARTRES.
which Information that the Fourth German Army was to attack and FREST. that was received later from captured orders day with showed the ultimate object of gaining CHERBOURG
52nd The C.I.G.S. (less the detachment with Tenth unable to
23. telephoned at 1325 hours to French confirm Army) that could now embark. the future of NORMAN Force, Tenth to
Division He said that he was still which was continue in the out that that Army was carrying LAVAL
give orders as to meantime to co-operate with the out French the
Army. I pointed had been ordered to withdraw should on be and
RENNES. BRITTANY Plan therefore and asked that NORMAN Force allowed to I disengage and withdraw on CHERBOURG.
decision, The ring him up my was not prepared to again give on the arrival at my
24. reached to REDON At REDON 1430 which hours, soon lies that after about I moved it 1615 had 30 my miles hours. been Headquarters decided N. of I ST. then that S.W. that NAZAIRE, rang NORMAN from Army up and VITRE the Force
C.I.G.S. who said the Tenth French Army MARSHALL-CORNWALL until was to stay with when General either to could started withdraw to disintegrate, his force for embarkation CHERBOURG
or the nearest available Port.
25.