TNA ADM 199 795

B.
o:
LIST OF VESSELS LOST DURING 'DYNAMO', 'CYCLE' and 'AERIAL'
OPERATIONS.
Dns
Approx. 20thMay/1st July, 1940.
of Vessel
G.R.T.
Date.
Cause and Position
Remarks.
nd
S.
WORTHTOWN
27/5
Bombed by Aircraft,
Stores.
set on fire and abandoned
LOST
868
on Dunkirk Beach.
M.
1206
708.T.S.O
MAID OF KENT.
21/5
YEJSSVAW
Bombed in Dieppe Harbour
SUNK.
Pass.
.T.S.O
R.T.
W.
EIDAR GATSESO
04\8\08
OLD
.R.H.O
BRIGHTON.
S.
Hospital Carrier
24/5
Bombed in Dieppe Harbour
SUNK
.T.M.D
S. QUEEN OF THE
28/5
Bombed Position.
CHANNEL.
51°N25'N. 2° 40'E.
SUNK:
Pass.
Troops and crew
R.T. 1162
all transferred
.W.
to "DORIEN ROSE".
JB
.S.
SPINEL
25/5
Blown up at Dunkirk.
ABANDONED.
d:
Petrol.
CONSIDERED LOST
R.T.
650
W.
592
S. ABUKIR.
28/5
Torpedoed by surface craft
SUNK.
Tramp.
50 miles N.E.of N.
d.
.T.
694
Foreland.
900
LORINA
29/5
Bombed. Sunk in Dunkirk
SUNK
SS.
harbour.
8 of crew were lost.
A.T. 1578
W.
365
SSA
S.NORMANNIA.
30/5
Bombed whilst in tow
SUNK.
Pass.
2.71
Survivors in
Dunkirk breakwater 4
H.M.S.ROSS-&
G.R.T. 1567.
miles.
H.M.S. MOSQUITO.
D.W.
243
YOS
BOX
3.S. FENELLA.
30/5
Bombed at Dunkirk.
SUNK.
P.C.
Milla MOTHOISE
R.T. 2376
01\8\88
808.T.S.D
.W.
520
30/5
Bombed atDunkirk.
SUNK. АТИОУИС
.S.CLAN
02\8\18
888.T.F.O
MACALISTER.
C.L.
EQUAIM RICANO
G.R.T. 6787
04\8\08
828.T.H.O
D.W. 10905
EVIRD
S.S.SCOTIA
1/6
Bombed at Dunkirk
SUNK.T.S.O
G.R.T. Pass 3454
УЯРО DNIX
D.W.
540
05\8\08
TVSL.T.S.O
S.S. PARIS
2/6
Attacked by aircraft
WADAS.78
Pass approx. 51°11.5'N 2.07E.
SUNK.BUT
.R.T. 1790
650

(En clair)
DISTRIBUTION A AND EMPAX.
From: MOROCCO.
FROM TANGIER TO FOREION OFFICE.
Mr. Gascoigne
D. 1.17 p.m. 30th April, 1941.
No. EMPAX.
30th April, 1941.
R. 7.05 p.m. 30th April, 1941.
Depeche Marocaine of 30th April publishes offensive anti-British article from Vichy. Heading as follows: "A page of history. The truth on the epio of Dunkirk. Chivalrous
Mr. Churchill claims for the British Army the honour of co-operating in covering the retreat of Allied troops. 3a disregards the orders he gave. Admiral Darlan had to intervene directly with Churchill in order that the British Nest should not abandon one hundred thousand Frenchmen". Summary of article as follows:
(Begins): Gaullist propaganda during last for days had claimed that France should be grateful to her former Allies for help given latter during tragedy of Dunkisk. During Supreme
War Council held Paris end May, 1940, Churchill had in chivalrous manner insisted that British troops should fight but side by execution the British military Commanders Hill had side with French poilus to cover retreat towards adopted Duskirk different British help could only be given *as Admiral in actual tactics. During Supreme Council General much $
stated that General Cort, however, had informed his best Abrial,
Governor of best division. Following day immediately Alexander leaving possible". Dunkirk, that he would send to latter General
General and his battalion which he embarked complete the arrived with one duty of defending position. tragedy, To National precise to French and alone irrefutable today exposé following of Dunkirk new at particulare: Dunking had The
French radio broadcast what conditions French army armies without assistance covered from British Army, assistance Navy had first refused then have stated rearguard in and evacuation of Allied which had been promised.
accepted to evacuations. participate Because this It Dunkirk operation
We haveralso stated how British during last 48 is necessary hours in one that of all most 10
will give French you and British THE Prench. repeat possible difficult light statistics should be of Dankirk AP# I aloguent. 204,000
Darlan operations England. troops British night these 31st May 1st figures which that Darlan beach soldiers June Sands should some had sent Gort (sic). and announced have THE only of THE the I to consider Supreme On and Connoil, telegrams Admiralty had the Alexander arrived to French Impossible request at abandoning 'As varaed 1.45 appoaed and in remain that his During must of on to
THE soldiers Admiral what Dunkirk last THE Churchill in wall and day only of and 224,000 35,000 vigarous night French from
THE sare June/
3rd/4th June. by reason avacuated 3rd/4th was

COPY 3.
Sir,
I have the honour to report that, in accordance with the Instructions of 10 June 1940 received by me from the
Secretary of State for War, I duly left SOUTHAMPTON by ship at 1400 hours on 12 June, and reached CHERBOURG at
2130 hours the same evening.
For reasons connected with local French orders, it was not possible to disembark until 0030 hours on 13 June when
Brigadier G. Thorpe (Base Commandant) came out to the ship in a tug and took me ashore with my staff.
2. At 0800 hours 13 June I left CHERBOURC by car, and reached LE MANS at-1400 hours after & journey much hampered by the crowds of refugees on the roads.
Communication Troops, and Brigadier J.G. des R. SWAYNE.
KARSLAKE, Major-General P. de FONBLANQUE, G.O.C., Lines of
There I was met by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry
General I at once KARSLAKE. I instructed him to return to England, took command of all British troops in France from which he did by plane that afternoon.
3. At 1500 with General WEYGAND and, after a journey 1 Mission hours I left LE MANS with Brigadier SWAYNE of for
)
an interview reached the Headquarters of 2000 No. hours that
(Major-Ceneral some 170 miles, Sir Richard HOWARD-VYSE) at evening. was away at a Cabinet meeting, would see but, me on his return, General he WEYGAND sent a message to say that he at 0830 hours on 14 June.
4. I had left as my it was known by The General general inference staff at LE MANS to get KARSLAKE in touch and with of to bulk be of that, the after troops crossing engaged would the SEINE move South in to encircle PARIS.
/ The
FOOTNOTE: ( ) THE THE
MARKET

CU] 1 1
The situation on the front that evening, SO far as it was known, was that the Tenth French Army, which included the 157 Infantry Brigade of the 52nd Division, Armoured
) Division (less one Brigade) and BEAUMAN Force, was holding a line from the Sea West of the SEINE to NEUBOURG and thence to CONCHES. Between the Southern flank of the
157 Infantry Brigade and DAMVILLE, there was & gap of some
8 miles, which was only lightly held by elements of the
3rd D.L.M. South of this area the Army of Paris was supposed to be holding & line from DREUX to BONNECOURT on the SEINE, but there was no confirmation that this Army was actually in position.
14 JUNE
5. At 0830 hours I saw General WEYGAND. He spoke most frankly and explained the situation to me. He said that the French Army was no longer capable of organised resistance, that it had now broken up into four groups - one of which was the Tenth Army (General ALTMAYER) with which the B.B.F.
was operating - and that considerable gaps existed between the groups.
the orders The of their own Commanders, but co-ordinated
Armies he explained, would continue to fight action under of the force as & whole would no longer be possible. out.
Reserves were exhausted and many formations worn
He then Allied Covernments, BRITTANY was vicinity to of informed me that, in accordance with be at defended decision taken by the line across the peninsula in the to General
GEORGES' RENNES. by holding Headquarters He & suggested to that discuss we should with him proceed the details of this project.
/ We
BEAUMAN Division was an improvised was
FOOTNOTE: ( )
organised as follows:-
The formation which, on 13th June, of personnel from auxiliary military
"B" Bde Bde - - THE
212 213 - - - Army Engineers.
"E" "E" "C" 4 Provisional reonnel. - the the (improvised). Engineers.

4
AS H.M. Government had not been consulted with regard to the BRITTANY scheme, and the withdrawal of the B.E.F. had been approved, I considered that I was no longer in a position to carry out the dispositions settled with Generals
WEYGAND and GEORGES. I therefore requested the C.I.C.S. to inform General WEYGAND, and I understood this was to be done.
The instructions which I received later (see paragraph 10
below), stating that I was no longer under General WEYGAND'S
orders, confirmed this opinion.
Orders outlining the arrangements for the evacuation were at once issued, and an officer was dispatched to
Lieutenant-General J.H. MARSHALL-CORNWALL requesting him to come to my Headquarters.
9. The C.I.G.S. telephoned again at 2015 hours and said that it was most important that everything should be done to ensure good relations between ourselves and the French, and to avoid, in every possible way, giving the impression that the B.E.F. was deserting them. I replied that I would most certainly see that this was done, that I was moving no troops move back all other troops and material towards the ports.
engaged with the Tenth Army, but that I was arranging to asked about the employment of those elements or the 52nd
At this stage the Prime Minister himself spoke and
Division which were not under the orders of the Tenth
French I assured him that I considered that forces no useful Army. could be served by adding them to the restore already purpose with that Army. They could not possibly the of some 30 miles which now existed between the the situation on that front, nor could they close Tenth gap
French Army and the Army of Paris.
Prime Minister then agreed to my proposal should that remain the drawal fighting troops Moves The under of forces with the to orders ports remainder that moving army of of embarkation on the of for BREST, Tenth the the B.E.F. present, Corps French Tenth were should Troops therefore French Army whilst proceed. on Army) the ST. continued, with- MALO, on
Canadian 52nd CHERBOURG, Division of (less C. elements troops PALLICE. and with material Finally on ST. those MALO, elements BREST,
ST. with 10. situation NAZATRE, Tenth At 2235 admitted L. French hours NANTES Army I of and approval spoke their were LA to withdrawal to for the embark C.I.G.S. evacuation. at the from CHERROURG orders and that told The Army. of when C.I.G.S. him General of the informed the Prime me Minister's that I was no longer was under to act as an independent in every
WEYGAND, and that however, the B.E.F. to continue Army. to co-operate way force. I was, with the Tenth French were 11. embarkation During busily 150,000 / with personal, possible STATE THE myself for the

- 8 -
25. I had previously arranged that 90,000 rations, as well as ammunition, should be sent up to CHERBOURG, as this was the port on which NORMAN Force would be based. Any alterations to this plan at this stage would have caused & breakdown in the supply arrangements which were very difficult because the roads were congested and the railways working.
spasmodically.
26. During that evening I was in touch with Ma.jor-General
J.S. DREW commanding the 52nd Division. He informed me that he had embarked one of his brigades and expected to proceed to the United Kingdom with his second brigade.
get the other away the next day. I gave him orders to
) 27. Brigadier J.G. des R. SWAYNE, Head of No. 2 Mission, reported to me on his way to the United Kingdom.
I also dispatched Brigadier N.M. RITCHIE, B.G.S., 2nd
Corps to the United Kingdom that night, as there was no longer need for his services in France on account of the reduction of the number of troops.
28. Throughout the day the Germans maintained evening their pressure on received from General MARSHALL-CORNIALL in the Tenth French Army. In the &
message which he was it as his opinion that the Tenth French This Army would disintegrate gave if it were seriously attacked.
R. was R.T.R.) who called at my Headquarters front the opinion confirmed by his G.S.O.1 (Lieutenant-Colonel about
German hours continued, and the gap between the Tenth miles
2300 Briggs, that night. On the rest of the wide. Army German forces were in this gap it was impossible and
French advance and the Army of Paris was well over 50
air say, reconnaissance as no was much hampered by low to What allied fighting troops were in cloud the area and thunderstorms.
29. the previous 24 hours about 47,000 have troops been and
250 vehicles During of all kinds were reported to embarked.
17 JUNE
30. morning I received a message from French General was in full retreat troops to CHERBOURG. His own CHEREOURG. Headquarters
MARSHALL-CORNWALL on LAVAL and RENNES, and
Early that to the effect that the Tenth that he was Army withdrawing his AVRANCHES and would go next explained to the were At 1015 moving hours, to I spoke to the C.I.G.S. and situation to him.
/ On to
FOOTNOTE:
(
)
a
Operations).

It was now becoming obvious that to enable the IX Corps to fall back in good order to the line of the Lower Seine, a cover position would have to be held along. the River
Andelle, some 12 miles east of Rouen. General Evans, therefore, at once ordered his 3rd Armoured Brigade (in fact reduced to some four weak squadrons of 30 tanks in all)
to stiffen up the right flank of Beauman's defensive line.
9. On the 8th June the German amoured drive continued on the Axis Amiens - Rouen, and succeeded in penetrating the weak British defences on the watershed butween the
Rivers Andelle and Bethune, west of Forges-Les-Baux.
Beauman's ill-equipped units, with the British tanks supporting them, fell back to the line of the Soino.
That night German armoured units penstrated into Rouen, and the French Tenth Army lost all touch from then onward with its IX Corps in the Pouen - Dieppe cul-de-sac.
10. The 51st Division was thus completely cut off from its proper line of retirement via Rouen. This was mainly due to the failure or inability of the French High Command to withdraw their left wing while there was still time and space for this manoeuvre. Throughout all these operations it was becoming clear that the French High
Command was issuing "die in the last ditch orders, which their troops had no intention of carrying out. From this time onwards, until the final evacuation of the B.E.F. on was crushed and that it had little Intention of offering the 18th, it was obvious that the spirit of the French Aray serious resistance. This spirit was also shared by the
Headquarters literally ceased to function for 48 hrs; It higher commanders; on the 8th June the Tenth French Army had lost all touch, and its X Corps was broken and in full retreat.
11. The had on the 9th June reached the line of
The 3rd Armoured and Brigada and Beauman's fragmentary units the Seine Germans had ustablished bridgeheads at several points.
which had been refitting at Louviers, was put in to support were withdrawn to reorganize, and the 2nd Amounted Brigade,
General hold de la Laurencie's south III Corps of Rouen. which was It was trying now to being apparent to the 12. drive Tenth the It employed was Seine Laurie, that south-west French at sent an the elsewhere, this crossings able was out Army German critical towards and rushed to from France. cool-headed armoured while the up On Alencon juncture and the Armee three Its units ni placed with commander, de leading ht that Army Paris. and of & under Corps the view 12th/13th air brigade, 52nd Brigadier the to force were separating Division orders June were detached the or it the Tenth Freuch right Army. sector of the III Corps frontenst of 8 miles of
Conches, took over the very exposed position, with & battalions gap on on its right, in a and two newly arrived French its left west of Evreux.
/AS

AS none of the 52nd Divisional Artillery had yet arrived, the 157th Brigade was given the support of some French batteries.
13. On 14th June the Gurmans renewed their pressure on the Tenth French Army front, but most of their tanks and aircraft appeared to have been diverted on & south easterly axis towards Paris. A fairly sharp infantry attack developed on the left flank of the 157th Infantry
Brigade, which suffored some 50 casualties, and the French infantry on their left, P.S. well as the Fronch artillery supporting thom, retired hastily, leaving the brignds in the lurch. As & result of this prossure the Tonth French
Army withdrew south-west & distance of 30 miles to the wooded area north-west of Mortagne. AS the Armao de
Paris was retiring almost dua south on the Loiro, this divergence of the lines of retreat of the two armies created & gap of some 30 miles on the right flank of the
Tenth Army.
14. In conformity with this withdrawal the 157th Brigada moved back and took up a front of 8 miles astrido the
Mortagne - Vorneuil road, with the French Cavalry Corps on its right. On the night of the 14th/15th I WS placed by General Brooke in command of all the British troops operating with the Tenth French Army, and was ordered to withdraw them towards Charbourg for re-embarkation, whilst still co-operating, SQ far as possible, with the
French withdrawal. It had been my intention to leave the
157th Brigade in the line until mid-day on the 19th before withdrawting it, in order to allow General Althayer to readjust his front. I notified General Altmayer of this intention on the 16th, and no appreciated the respita granted him.
15. On the 16th Juni, however, the Garman motorized columns had already followed up swiftly the French
The French units on its right end laft retired without withdrewal, and the 157th Brigade WES attacked all day.
making any serious resistance, and the British Brigade was exposed to serious danger by both its flanks buing turned. As a result of this enemy pressure, the Tenth
Army issued orders for a general retirement on the axis
Alencon - Rennos, with a view to withdrawing into Brittery.
As co-operation with such a movement would have been contrary to s my Forco, the 3rd Armoured Brigade (which had own instructions, I at once issued orders and the 157th Infantry north-westwards to Charbourg.
16. To of Boauman's Porce and the 3rd Amount
Bri
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Bri 16. 2nd nger across the stultaneous simple operation, although this viliporps or the Tunth Any. The ill engagad with the anamy, tend the been handling and tactical h-wastward
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boat than our the own, Pass we realised at that state that it of was the tide, and anchored and accordingly to let the tide rise att the Smpt vicinity feet. "Manxman" of the Mieuport joined us Bank here Duoy a few hours later and afterwards passive 242. record PA Issurance brained regisht subs a acted HAY few June in 29th. concert 0355. with ordered Got us. under to enter way again the port and made proceeded fast immediately, just via the inside the pass Naval the to end evolution ontio
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(2)
191
171
May 31st Continued.
Spennos
2210 anchored off Pontoon Pier at Dunkirk. 2240 ordered by H.M.
Ship to La Panne, hove up and proceeded. 2315 anchored off La define
Panne.
June 1st. 0220, troops on board, terrific bombarding and shelling of beach taking place so hove up and proceeded. 0615, anchored off Margate roads. 0745, have up and proceeded to Pier.
0830 at anchor under 1 hours notice. 1315, left for Dunkirk.
Devision
1520, attacked and bombed by enemy aircraft, three bombs dropped, avoiding action taken. 1552, attacked and bombed by aircraft three bombs being dropped, again took avoiding action, and by doing so definately saved ship. Now came under heavy fire from enemy position at Gravelines Pier, and as two ships appeared to be blocking channel returned to Margate for instructions. 1730,
90
arrived Margate Roads. 1900 vessel under 1 hour's notice.
June 2nd 0115 received orders to sail. 0140 received orders not to sail.
1800 left anchorage. 2000 passed Hospital ship
Paris, having been bombed and ship's company in lifeboats, but all very cheerful and proceeded to Dunkirk. 2100 Heavy firing from b
shore batteries. 2130 arrived at Dunkirk and commenced embarking
French troops from middle pier in harbour. 2205 cleared harbour with more than complement of troops.
Monday June 3rd. 0155 arrived at Margate Pier and commenced disembarking troops. 0203, anchored off Pier. 1200 returned to
Pier. 1400, four seamen and two catering staff leave ship.
2015 left for Dunkirk. 2055, dense fog, visibility reduced to nil, but continue towards Dunkirk.
Tuesday June 4th. 0115, had slight collision with unknown steamer off No. 3 Dunkirk buoy. 0220 arrived at middle pier in harbour. 0255, overladen with troops and left pier, cutting our
G
own forward ropes. Heavy gun fire continuously; leaving harbour saw crew of unknown vessel being rescued by small boats. 0600, arrived Margate after 1 hours dense fog, and disembarked troops and at 0700 departed to anchorage. 2000 have up and proceeded to
Southampton. 2355 "Royal Sovereign" light vessel abeam.