TNA ADM 199 795

CU] 1 1
The situation on the front that evening, SO far as it was known, was that the Tenth French Army, which included the 157 Infantry Brigade of the 52nd Division, Armoured
) Division (less one Brigade) and BEAUMAN Force, was holding a line from the Sea West of the SEINE to NEUBOURG and thence to CONCHES. Between the Southern flank of the
157 Infantry Brigade and DAMVILLE, there was & gap of some
8 miles, which was only lightly held by elements of the
3rd D.L.M. South of this area the Army of Paris was supposed to be holding & line from DREUX to BONNECOURT on the SEINE, but there was no confirmation that this Army was actually in position.
14 JUNE
5. At 0830 hours I saw General WEYGAND. He spoke most frankly and explained the situation to me. He said that the French Army was no longer capable of organised resistance, that it had now broken up into four groups - one of which was the Tenth Army (General ALTMAYER) with which the B.B.F.
was operating - and that considerable gaps existed between the groups.
the orders The of their own Commanders, but co-ordinated
Armies he explained, would continue to fight action under of the force as & whole would no longer be possible. out.
Reserves were exhausted and many formations worn
He then Allied Covernments, BRITTANY was vicinity to of informed me that, in accordance with be at defended decision taken by the line across the peninsula in the to General
GEORGES' RENNES. by holding Headquarters He & suggested to that discuss we should with him proceed the details of this project.
/ We
BEAUMAN Division was an improvised was
FOOTNOTE: ( )
organised as follows:-
The formation which, on 13th June, of personnel from auxiliary military
"B" Bde Bde - - THE
212 213 - - - Army Engineers.
"E" "E" "C" 4 Provisional reonnel. - the the (improvised). Engineers.

6
15. At 0810 hours I considered that my position at LE MANS
was too exposed, since there was no known body of troops covering that area. I therefore moved my Headquarters back to VITRE, just west of LAVAL. I took with me the G.O.C.
L. of C. Area, a part of whose Staff I had amalgamated with my own since I was entirely dependent of L. of C. Signals for my communications. My own staff consisted only of 4
officers and 2 clerks, the remainder having been stopped at
ST. MALO and sent back to England.
16. At 1230 hours the C.I.G.S. telephoned to say that the Prime Minister was anxious about the withdrawal of the
52nd Division (less the detachment with Tenth French Army).
The Prime Minister wished the embarkation to be cancelled, as he feared the effect of such a withdrawal on the morale of the French.
I pointed out that my plans had already received approval, that orders had been issued for the move, and that
CHERBOURG and might well endanger it. The C.I.G.S., however, any alterations now would complicate the embarkation of at said that the Prime Minister did not wish the division to be embarked without the approval of His Majosty's Government.
of At whereabouts of the enemy on the LE MANS front towards caused
17. this time the complete absence of any information me the as any penatration of enemy troops safety
LAVAL some and anxiety, RENNES would have seriously endangered the of the B.E.F.
18. again to the C.I.G.S. at 2150 hours. and I I
more explained to on him the need to evacuate 52nd The
I spoke him the situation as I knew it, Division once
(less impressed with Tenth French Army).
necessary kept idle. The air situation was also at the detachment shipping was available at CHEREOURG that and time was being favourable.
half later the C.I.G.S. gave and permission other details the infantry of 52nd of the Division. Orders implementing to embark one Division which were not needed these
An hour and Field a Regiment, one Field Company to support instructions were at once issued.
CORNWALL'S tank Guns from orders for the protection of
19. Later that 52nd Division were put under the CHERBOURG
night another battalion and General a troop MARSHALL- of Antipeninsula at ST. SAUVEUR.
of the enemy's movements moment could to have be obtained, No information but he did not appear at the exploited the gap at LE MANS.
were 20. During reported the to have been avacuated from preceding 24 hours just over the 12,000 different troops ports.
/ 16 JUNE

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16 JUNE
21. At 0700 hours the C.I.G.S. rang me up and said that all arrangements could be made for the evacuation of 52nd
Division (less the detachment with Tenth French Army), but that no actual movement was yet to take place. At 0830
hours, however, he rang up again and confirmed that 52nd
Division (less the detachment with Tenth French Army) could now begin to embark: NORMAN Force itself was to continue to co-operate with the Tenth French Army. I then asked the C.I.G.S. what the policy should be with regard to troops of the French Army who might wish to embark at CHEREOURG.
He informed me that they would be allowed to do so.
Orders for the embarkation of 52nd Division (less the detachment with the Tenth French Army) were issued.
I issued orders to G.O.C. L. of C. to the effect that work of re-embarkation of personnel, stores, and vehicles was to continue at all ports as long as the tactical situation permitted.
and from NORMAN Force showed that the enemy was on contact ance was possible, but reports from Motor Contact Officers
22. Owing, once more, to poor visibility no air reconnaisswith the Tenth French Army along its front but that be was
Further to the South enemy movement seemed to be directed attacking seriously only against 157 Infantry Brigade.
on CHARTRES.
which Information that the Fourth German Army was to attack and FREST. that was received later from captured orders day with showed the ultimate object of gaining CHERBOURG
52nd The C.I.G.S. (less the detachment with Tenth unable to
23. telephoned at 1325 hours to French confirm Army) that could now embark. the future of NORMAN Force, Tenth to
Division He said that he was still which was continue in the out that that Army was carrying LAVAL
give orders as to meantime to co-operate with the out French the
Army. I pointed had been ordered to withdraw should on be and
RENNES. BRITTANY Plan therefore and asked that NORMAN Force allowed to I disengage and withdraw on CHERBOURG.
decision, The ring him up my was not prepared to again give on the arrival at my
24. reached to REDON At REDON 1430 which hours, soon lies that after about I moved it 1615 had 30 my miles hours. been Headquarters decided N. of I ST. then that S.W. that NAZAIRE, rang NORMAN from Army up and VITRE the Force
C.I.G.S. who said the Tenth French Army MARSHALL-CORNWALL until was to stay with when General either to could started withdraw to disintegrate, his force for embarkation CHERBOURG
or the nearest available Port.
25.

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25. I had previously arranged that 90,000 rations, as well as ammunition, should be sent up to CHERBOURG, as this was the port on which NORMAN Force would be based. Any alterations to this plan at this stage would have caused & breakdown in the supply arrangements which were very difficult because the roads were congested and the railways working.
spasmodically.
26. During that evening I was in touch with Ma.jor-General
J.S. DREW commanding the 52nd Division. He informed me that he had embarked one of his brigades and expected to proceed to the United Kingdom with his second brigade.
get the other away the next day. I gave him orders to
) 27. Brigadier J.G. des R. SWAYNE, Head of No. 2 Mission, reported to me on his way to the United Kingdom.
I also dispatched Brigadier N.M. RITCHIE, B.G.S., 2nd
Corps to the United Kingdom that night, as there was no longer need for his services in France on account of the reduction of the number of troops.
28. Throughout the day the Germans maintained evening their pressure on received from General MARSHALL-CORNIALL in the Tenth French Army. In the &
message which he was it as his opinion that the Tenth French This Army would disintegrate gave if it were seriously attacked.
R. was R.T.R.) who called at my Headquarters front the opinion confirmed by his G.S.O.1 (Lieutenant-Colonel about
German hours continued, and the gap between the Tenth miles
2300 Briggs, that night. On the rest of the wide. Army German forces were in this gap it was impossible and
French advance and the Army of Paris was well over 50
air say, reconnaissance as no was much hampered by low to What allied fighting troops were in cloud the area and thunderstorms.
29. the previous 24 hours about 47,000 have troops been and
250 vehicles During of all kinds were reported to embarked.
17 JUNE
30. morning I received a message from French General was in full retreat troops to CHERBOURG. His own CHEREOURG. Headquarters
MARSHALL-CORNWALL on LAVAL and RENNES, and
Early that to the effect that the Tenth that he was Army withdrawing his AVRANCHES and would go next explained to the were At 1015 moving hours, to I spoke to the C.I.G.S. and situation to him.
/ On to
FOOTNOTE:
(
)
a
Operations).

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On receiving General MARSHALL-CORNWALL's report I
ordered Air Commodore COLE-HAMILTON - Commanding the Air
Component - to move with two fighter squadrons and his one flight of reconnaissance aircraft to the Channel Islands whence he was to co-operate with NORMAN Force by carrying out reconnaissance tasks and by protecting the embarkation of that Force at CHERBOURG. As soon as he had completed these tasks he was to proceed to the United Kingdom. The remaining Fighter Squadron was to operate from BREST to give close protection to that port during the embarkation of the
B.E.F.
31. At 1130 hours, I spoke to Air Marshal BARRATT, and explained my plan to him. I also discussed with him the arrangements for the withdrawal from LA ROCHELLE of his party, which was defending NANTES and ST. NAZAIRE during the evacuation. He expressed himself as satisfied with the arrangements that were being made.
32. At 1300 hours, the C.I.G.S. telephonedand informed me that the B.B.C. had reported that the PETAIN Covernment had asked the Germans for an Armistice (this was subsequently confirmed by Capitaine MERIC of the French Mission). He directed to getting personnel away and afterwards, if the agreed that, in view of this, all efforts should now be situation allowed it, as much material as possible. He
United Kingdom that evening. I said that I would ring up further agreed that I should leave with my staff for the again about 3 to see if there were any final orders and that, if I p.m. should be unable to communicate owing to the cable being out, I would embark as arranged.
Officer (Captain ALLEN, R.N.) explained the situation and
I then saw General de FONBLANQUE and the Senior Naval ordered them to make every effort to get all personnel away, and also as many guns and vehiclesas possible.
33. hours I rang up the C.I.G.S. as arranged, hours but I
he had At 1445 returned to the War Office. At 1530 all communications up again, with LONDON had been cut with at RENNES, any port and except that rang not but was informed by Signals that
NANTES. did it was at also 1615 I, hours impossible therefore, - and Senior to proceeded decided get Naval in with to touch Officer leave my staff REDON to a and - point which the G.O.C. about I
H.M.S. hours. for 4 L. 34. miles of At C. outside Area and ST. the NAZAIRE. ST. NAZAIRE There Western I in remained which the Approaches armed in had until carrying been trawler 2045 was not sent enemy time, survivors remained my available aircraft in from the that raids harbour afternoon. took during place, the which The but night. "CAMERIDGESHIRE" no had damage been During sunk was that done, by although three enemy a few air bombs were dropped ashore.
/ 18 JUNE