TNA ADM 199 795

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with large stocks of vehicles and material which had been accumulated since September, 1939. Major Macartney of the
Quartermaster General's Movement Staff arrived from the War
Office that night. He brought with him & list showing the order of priority for shipment of stores etc., and &
suggested outline plan for evacuation. A Senior Naval
Officer also arrived early next norning.
15 JUNE
12. At 0315 hours Lieutenant-Censral J.H. MARSHALL-CORNWALL
reported to me, and we discussed the situation. I placed all British troops with the Tenth French Army under his command, and gave him orders to co-operate with that Army until an opportunity arose to disengage his troops and withdraw them to CHERBOURG for embarkation to the United
Kingdom.
The subsequent operations of Lieutenant-General J.H.
( ) MARSHALL-CORNWALL'S troops (Norman force) are described in that officer's report which is attached as Appendix B.
13. The withdrawal of B.B.F. started in the early hours of
15 June. The flights of the Canadian Division which had arrived in the Concentration Area were sent beck to EREST
for embarkation, Corps Troops were re-embarked at ST. MALO, and various L. of C. troops in the LE MANS area were moved nearer the Port areas.
14. Information as to the position of the enemy on the front of the Tenth French Army and southwards was very meagre as bad visibility prevented air reconnaissance, and there were no ground troops to reconnoitre between ALENCON and TOURS.
were engaging enemy the 157 Infantry Brigade in the area CONCHES.
little activity west of ROUEN, but hostile infantry of
The general inference, however, was that there was aircraft landing, about EVREUX and that he had seen & seemed to of forced A reported that he had run into heavy column
British pilot of a Bomber aircraft, who had made anti- a was moving South with its left on CHARTRES.
confirm arms previous moving information that the Fourth all fire south in that area. This report Garman Army
/ 15.
FOOTNOTE:
(
)
NORMAN Force was an improvised formation which, on 15th June, comprised:-
3rd 157 Brigade Group (157 Infantry Brigade:
Armoured Brigade.
71 Field Regiment RA; Troop-Carrying
BEAUMAN Division (see Roonote ( ) page ).
Company, 52 Division).

in its defences, had had no time to organize rearward defences, nor any reserves with which to counter-attack.
It was forced back to the line of the river Bresle, the next natural obstacle, 15 miles in rear.
5. Meanwhile the 1st Armoured Division was refitting south of the Seine. Its tanks were in poor mechanical condition, owing not only to battle casualties but also to the long road distances they had been forced to cover, and to the lack of opportunity for adequate maintenance.
It was in fact in no condition for offensive operations.
6. On the 7th June the Garmans out in & smashing attack with their 5th and 7th Amoured Divisions on the point of junction between the two Corps of the Tenth French Army.
This drive was directed from west of Amiens on Rouen and the lower Seine, with the object of splitting the Tenth
Army and cutting off its IX Corps between the Saina
Estuary and Dieppe. The IX French Corps than comprised the British 51st Division on the extrema left, and then further east the 31st and 40th French Divisions and the
2nd and 5th Light Cavalry Divisions. The wh le of this force was completely sundered from the X Corps on its right by the penetration of the German tanks.
British base at Rouen, General Sir Henry Karslake, 0.0.0.
7. Meanwhile, owing to the threat developing to the the Lines of Communication, had scraped together an improvised force for its local defence. This force comprised nine infantry battalions of a sort; they out to France for pioneer duties and partly of composite consisted partly of second line Territorial units sent base. They had no war equipment except rifles and &
units made up from miscellaneous reinforcements at the never fired before. guns They were without artillery, wans few odd Bren and enti-tank weapons, which they had
District, units were of the formation, this transport command heterogeneous thus was Lines misled given complete of and Brigadier the of signal into Communication. collection with t tile thinking equipment. artillery Besuman, of had of Division; that untrained been in and Vary it They charge given was ancillary unfortunately were The $ and the of righting French the placed task ill-aquipped services. orth of under
Beauman's holding back so-called line along Division the Rivers Bethung and Andella the covering a Rouen, and had done good work in organizing defence of this position.
on While the Cerman of the 7th June, General Weygand personally impressed
8. armoured attack was at its height visited the afternoon Headquarters east of Rouen and the on Tenth Army and on General Evans commanding holding the
German attack Armoured on the Seine at all costs as this
British General Altmayer, Division, the necessity for was "the decisive battle of the war.
/It

It was now becoming obvious that to enable the IX Corps to fall back in good order to the line of the Lower Seine, a cover position would have to be held along. the River
Andelle, some 12 miles east of Rouen. General Evans, therefore, at once ordered his 3rd Armoured Brigade (in fact reduced to some four weak squadrons of 30 tanks in all)
to stiffen up the right flank of Beauman's defensive line.
9. On the 8th June the German amoured drive continued on the Axis Amiens - Rouen, and succeeded in penetrating the weak British defences on the watershed butween the
Rivers Andelle and Bethune, west of Forges-Les-Baux.
Beauman's ill-equipped units, with the British tanks supporting them, fell back to the line of the Soino.
That night German armoured units penstrated into Rouen, and the French Tenth Army lost all touch from then onward with its IX Corps in the Pouen - Dieppe cul-de-sac.
10. The 51st Division was thus completely cut off from its proper line of retirement via Rouen. This was mainly due to the failure or inability of the French High Command to withdraw their left wing while there was still time and space for this manoeuvre. Throughout all these operations it was becoming clear that the French High
Command was issuing "die in the last ditch orders, which their troops had no intention of carrying out. From this time onwards, until the final evacuation of the B.E.F. on was crushed and that it had little Intention of offering the 18th, it was obvious that the spirit of the French Aray serious resistance. This spirit was also shared by the
Headquarters literally ceased to function for 48 hrs; It higher commanders; on the 8th June the Tenth French Army had lost all touch, and its X Corps was broken and in full retreat.
11. The had on the 9th June reached the line of
The 3rd Armoured and Brigada and Beauman's fragmentary units the Seine Germans had ustablished bridgeheads at several points.
which had been refitting at Louviers, was put in to support were withdrawn to reorganize, and the 2nd Amounted Brigade,
General hold de la Laurencie's south III Corps of Rouen. which was It was trying now to being apparent to the 12. drive Tenth the It employed was Seine Laurie, that south-west French at sent an the elsewhere, this crossings able was out Army German critical towards and rushed to from France. cool-headed armoured while the up On Alencon juncture and the Armee three Its units ni placed with commander, de leading ht that Army Paris. and of & under Corps the view 12th/13th air brigade, 52nd Brigadier the to force were separating Division orders June were detached the or it the Tenth Freuch right Army. sector of the III Corps frontenst of 8 miles of
Conches, took over the very exposed position, with & battalions gap on on its right, in a and two newly arrived French its left west of Evreux.
/AS