TNA ADM 199 795

COPY 3.
Sir,
I have the honour to report that, in accordance with the Instructions of 10 June 1940 received by me from the
Secretary of State for War, I duly left SOUTHAMPTON by ship at 1400 hours on 12 June, and reached CHERBOURG at
2130 hours the same evening.
For reasons connected with local French orders, it was not possible to disembark until 0030 hours on 13 June when
Brigadier G. Thorpe (Base Commandant) came out to the ship in a tug and took me ashore with my staff.
2. At 0800 hours 13 June I left CHERBOURC by car, and reached LE MANS at-1400 hours after & journey much hampered by the crowds of refugees on the roads.
Communication Troops, and Brigadier J.G. des R. SWAYNE.
KARSLAKE, Major-General P. de FONBLANQUE, G.O.C., Lines of
There I was met by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry
General I at once KARSLAKE. I instructed him to return to England, took command of all British troops in France from which he did by plane that afternoon.
3. At 1500 with General WEYGAND and, after a journey 1 Mission hours I left LE MANS with Brigadier SWAYNE of for
)
an interview reached the Headquarters of 2000 No. hours that
(Major-Ceneral some 170 miles, Sir Richard HOWARD-VYSE) at evening. was away at a Cabinet meeting, would see but, me on his return, General he WEYGAND sent a message to say that he at 0830 hours on 14 June.
4. I had left as my it was known by The General general inference staff at LE MANS to get KARSLAKE in touch and with of to bulk be of that, the after troops crossing engaged would the SEINE move South in to encircle PARIS.
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FOOTNOTE: ( ) THE THE
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CU] 1 1
The situation on the front that evening, SO far as it was known, was that the Tenth French Army, which included the 157 Infantry Brigade of the 52nd Division, Armoured
) Division (less one Brigade) and BEAUMAN Force, was holding a line from the Sea West of the SEINE to NEUBOURG and thence to CONCHES. Between the Southern flank of the
157 Infantry Brigade and DAMVILLE, there was & gap of some
8 miles, which was only lightly held by elements of the
3rd D.L.M. South of this area the Army of Paris was supposed to be holding & line from DREUX to BONNECOURT on the SEINE, but there was no confirmation that this Army was actually in position.
14 JUNE
5. At 0830 hours I saw General WEYGAND. He spoke most frankly and explained the situation to me. He said that the French Army was no longer capable of organised resistance, that it had now broken up into four groups - one of which was the Tenth Army (General ALTMAYER) with which the B.B.F.
was operating - and that considerable gaps existed between the groups.
the orders The of their own Commanders, but co-ordinated
Armies he explained, would continue to fight action under of the force as & whole would no longer be possible. out.
Reserves were exhausted and many formations worn
He then Allied Covernments, BRITTANY was vicinity to of informed me that, in accordance with be at defended decision taken by the line across the peninsula in the to General
GEORGES' RENNES. by holding Headquarters He & suggested to that discuss we should with him proceed the details of this project.
/ We
BEAUMAN Division was an improvised was
FOOTNOTE: ( )
organised as follows:-
The formation which, on 13th June, of personnel from auxiliary military
"B" Bde Bde - - THE
212 213 - - - Army Engineers.
"E" "E" "C" 4 Provisional reonnel. - the the (improvised). Engineers.

in its defences, had had no time to organize rearward defences, nor any reserves with which to counter-attack.
It was forced back to the line of the river Bresle, the next natural obstacle, 15 miles in rear.
5. Meanwhile the 1st Armoured Division was refitting south of the Seine. Its tanks were in poor mechanical condition, owing not only to battle casualties but also to the long road distances they had been forced to cover, and to the lack of opportunity for adequate maintenance.
It was in fact in no condition for offensive operations.
6. On the 7th June the Garmans out in & smashing attack with their 5th and 7th Amoured Divisions on the point of junction between the two Corps of the Tenth French Army.
This drive was directed from west of Amiens on Rouen and the lower Seine, with the object of splitting the Tenth
Army and cutting off its IX Corps between the Saina
Estuary and Dieppe. The IX French Corps than comprised the British 51st Division on the extrema left, and then further east the 31st and 40th French Divisions and the
2nd and 5th Light Cavalry Divisions. The wh le of this force was completely sundered from the X Corps on its right by the penetration of the German tanks.
British base at Rouen, General Sir Henry Karslake, 0.0.0.
7. Meanwhile, owing to the threat developing to the the Lines of Communication, had scraped together an improvised force for its local defence. This force comprised nine infantry battalions of a sort; they out to France for pioneer duties and partly of composite consisted partly of second line Territorial units sent base. They had no war equipment except rifles and &
units made up from miscellaneous reinforcements at the never fired before. guns They were without artillery, wans few odd Bren and enti-tank weapons, which they had
District, units were of the formation, this transport command heterogeneous thus was Lines misled given complete of and Brigadier the of signal into Communication. collection with t tile thinking equipment. artillery Besuman, of had of Division; that untrained been in and Vary it They charge given was ancillary unfortunately were The $ and the of righting French the placed task ill-aquipped services. orth of under
Beauman's holding back so-called line along Division the Rivers Bethung and Andella the covering a Rouen, and had done good work in organizing defence of this position.
on While the Cerman of the 7th June, General Weygand personally impressed
8. armoured attack was at its height visited the afternoon Headquarters east of Rouen and the on Tenth Army and on General Evans commanding holding the
German attack Armoured on the Seine at all costs as this
British General Altmayer, Division, the necessity for was "the decisive battle of the war.
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It was now becoming obvious that to enable the IX Corps to fall back in good order to the line of the Lower Seine, a cover position would have to be held along. the River
Andelle, some 12 miles east of Rouen. General Evans, therefore, at once ordered his 3rd Armoured Brigade (in fact reduced to some four weak squadrons of 30 tanks in all)
to stiffen up the right flank of Beauman's defensive line.
9. On the 8th June the German amoured drive continued on the Axis Amiens - Rouen, and succeeded in penetrating the weak British defences on the watershed butween the
Rivers Andelle and Bethune, west of Forges-Les-Baux.
Beauman's ill-equipped units, with the British tanks supporting them, fell back to the line of the Soino.
That night German armoured units penstrated into Rouen, and the French Tenth Army lost all touch from then onward with its IX Corps in the Pouen - Dieppe cul-de-sac.
10. The 51st Division was thus completely cut off from its proper line of retirement via Rouen. This was mainly due to the failure or inability of the French High Command to withdraw their left wing while there was still time and space for this manoeuvre. Throughout all these operations it was becoming clear that the French High
Command was issuing "die in the last ditch orders, which their troops had no intention of carrying out. From this time onwards, until the final evacuation of the B.E.F. on was crushed and that it had little Intention of offering the 18th, it was obvious that the spirit of the French Aray serious resistance. This spirit was also shared by the
Headquarters literally ceased to function for 48 hrs; It higher commanders; on the 8th June the Tenth French Army had lost all touch, and its X Corps was broken and in full retreat.
11. The had on the 9th June reached the line of
The 3rd Armoured and Brigada and Beauman's fragmentary units the Seine Germans had ustablished bridgeheads at several points.
which had been refitting at Louviers, was put in to support were withdrawn to reorganize, and the 2nd Amounted Brigade,
General hold de la Laurencie's south III Corps of Rouen. which was It was trying now to being apparent to the 12. drive Tenth the It employed was Seine Laurie, that south-west French at sent an the elsewhere, this crossings able was out Army German critical towards and rushed to from France. cool-headed armoured while the up On Alencon juncture and the Armee three Its units ni placed with commander, de leading ht that Army Paris. and of & under Corps the view 12th/13th air brigade, 52nd Brigadier the to force were separating Division orders June were detached the or it the Tenth Freuch right Army. sector of the III Corps frontenst of 8 miles of
Conches, took over the very exposed position, with & battalions gap on on its right, in a and two newly arrived French its left west of Evreux.
/AS