TNA ADM 199 795

NOT
KOSHLUGH
So.
thom
ЯНИГО
REMARKS
VESSEL
OWNERS
БУМДОКУ
of
Released 1.6.40.
ОТНАЯ
ROSELYNE
Capt. C. Dines
ROSE MARIE
F. Upton
Returned to Owner.
ROYAL THAMES
J. Mears
Returned to Owner.
RUMMY II
A.G. Smith
A.P.S
A.E. Rylend
Re-allocated to A.P.B.
RYEGATE II
P.G. Broom
Returned to Owner.
RAPID
RUBY
J.F. Caine
Prepared for Dynamo but did not go.
of ton
ROSABELLE
J.C. Wood
No trace of return from Dynamo.
ROSE LN.19
A. Large
Returned to Owner 7.6.40.
G. Alexander 82.2
Returned to Owner.
SANDOWN
SCARBOROUGH
FISHING VESSELS vessels,
Prepared but did not go.
SEAGULL LN 203 C. Loose
Returned to Owner 7.6.40. 10
ST. DENIS
P.C. Allen
Vessel did not go.
ST. PATRICK
W.B. Thompson
T.98. No report received from List of Missing Vessels.
SALLY FORTH
Dr. Purvis
Returned to Owner.
CUAM
SALVAGE LAUNCH RIZDON BEASLEY
Released
1.6.40.
SANTOSY 74B
L. Odell
T.98. No report received from List of Missing Vessels.
SATYR
C.H. Masters
T.98. Returned to Owner.
SCENE SHIFTER
B.E. Longman
T.98. No report received from List of Missing Vessels.
Jon
SCHEDAR
Wood
Re-allocated to
SEA FALCON
W.H. Elce
Abandoned Dover and Littlehampton
Lists.
SEA FOAM
W.T. Cayton
Returned to Owner.
SEAGULL
E.G. King
Returned to Owner 18.6.
SEA HAWK
Mr. May
Returned to Owner.
SEA ROAMER
Mr. Wheatley
Re-allocated to.P.S.
SEASALTER
(Seasalter & Ham
Returned to Owner.
(Cyster Fishing Co.
SEASCHOOL
Shipping Federation
Did not go.
SEASWALLOW
Capt. R. Drake
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
SEYMOUR CASTLE
R. Dart Steam Boat Co.
Returned to Owners 19/6-
A. Barrel
Abandoned off Dunkirk.
SHAMROCK
Mr. Peters
Returned to Owner - damaged.
SHANNON
H.J. Davis
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
SHELDRAKE
SHUNESTA
Per Crouch Eng. Co.
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
SILVER FOAM
W.T. Ceyton
Returned to owner 18.6.
SILVER SPRAY
J. Collet
T.98. Returned to Owner 19.6.
SILVERY BREEZE
A. Verley
A.P.S.
SINBAD II
H.W. Hare
Returned to Owner.
SILVER SPRAY
LI.230 W.A. Begless
Returned to Owner.
SKYLARK II
SM.281 F.T. Collins
Presumed lost.
SARAH & EMILY J. Todd
No report received from List of
Missing Vessels.
SUCCESS (WY.12) M. Leadley
Prepared but did not go to Dunkirk.
SINGAPORE I
D.F. Bostock
T.98, A.P.S.
SINGAPORE II+
-do-
T.98. A.P.B.
SKYLARK
Myalls Ltd.
to owners.
SKYLARK (BM. 5)IV F.T. Collins
Special Service (6A).
SKYLARK I
(N.E. Knight and
Re-allocated to Special Admiralty
(We Stephenson
Service (6A).
SKYLARK III BM. F.T. Collins
Reported lost per Fishery Office
391
No confirmation.
SKYLARK II
Myalls Ltd.
Returned to owners.
SKYLARK III
W.F. Coisan
T.98. No information of release from Dynamo.

APPENDIX 'B'
SURMARY OF OPERATIONS ON B.E.F. IN FRANCE
FROM 1ST TO 18TH JUNE 1940
1. After the evacuation of the main British Expeditionary
Force from Flanders in the first week of June the only
British troops remaining in France were the 51st Division, which had been holding 3 sector of the Sarre Front, and the incomplete 1st Armoured Division, which had begun its disembarkation on 20th May and had been rushed up piscemeal in a desperate effort to relieve the sorely tried right flank of the B.E.F. By the 1st June this attenuated
Division, which was incomplete when disanbarked and had lost heavily in its first engagement on the Somme, could only muster roughly one third of its quota of tanks.
2. These two formations, the 51st Division and the 1st
Armoured Division, the only British fighting formations
General Altmayer, commanding Tenth French Army, which held remaining in France, were placed under the orders of the left sector of the Some front from Amiens to the S88.
The handling of the British troops, which had been delegated to General Altmayer by General leygand, was co-ordinated and supervisied by a British ilitary Mission at Tenth Army
Headquarters.
Somme sector was sixteen miles in-extent, an excessive
3. The frontage allotted to the 51st Division on the
Fre ch divisions were holding at the time owing to amount, but probably not much greater than that which their many action the Sarre front, and had had & long and arduous On depleted resources. The Division had already been in
4th June the 51st Division Commander was ordered which to carry journey on from the Eastern frontier to its new sector.
out the Abbeville bridgshead, for operation an attack the newly on arrived French 31st Division and was 8 placed under as well PS 160 French tanks of was effective co-operation between British notice, however, considerable not a success, ainly owing to the and his orders, reinforcement of French artillery. difficulty The attack,
French arranging guns and tanks at such casualties... short and the 51st infantry, Division suffered fairly heavy
4. On the following against the whole front to the day (5th June) the Garmang held launched by the
Seventh a powerful and offensive Tenth French Armies, from in an St. exhausted uentin condition, sea.
Tenth The The after from too Division 51st wide the Army 12 a days Division front, Commander, front fought of replied to continual was bravely, be when by able that widely this asked movement to but he time resist scattered had was to no relieve and forced effectively. reserves battle, posts. back the available. Division and by Owing German was The holding to infiltration the extent between of its frontago its the division had no depth
/in its

5
SECRET
8
Page 3.
had embarked.
17. At about 2130 H.M.Tug St. Clears endeavoured to take the ship in tow, but it was found that the vessel was held fast aground aft, and at about 2215 the tow parted, and the tu:
abandoned the attempt.
18. At about 2300 H.M.S. Havant endeavoured to take us in tow but without success.
19. During the night a further 350 French and 50
English troops were embarked, and these were brought to England.
20. At 0300 on the 30th. H.M.S.Locust was ordered to take us in tow, and by 9400 the ship was waterborne and in tow of Locust:
21. Between 9400 and 0700 the tow parted three times, and we had progressed only three miles. But after 0700 the tow was satisfactory and H.M.S. Locust towed us across to the
English coast, arriving at the North Goodwin Light Tessel at
2100. Speed made good since 0700 2.4 knots.
22. A single Junker bomber appeared for a moment above the fog near the North Goodwin, but made off eastwards.
23. Shaped course to pass eastward of the Goodwins.
At 2245 a French soldier, fully equipped, was seen to jump over the sideby two of Bidefords shipscompany. The tow was stopped.
Although a buoy was dropped and a boat lowered to search, it 1
is regretted the man was not recovered. The sea was calm and the visibility at that time was good. The man's name is not known.
24. At 2315 we proceeded. The tow parted again at
0330/31st, but after that no further trouble was experienced a and we arrived at Dover at 1130 on 31st May.
25. The casualties to personnel were:-
(a) Bideford's ships company
(1) Killed. Three officers and nine nen.
(11) Missing, believed killed. Four nen.
(111) Dangerously wounded. Two men.
(iv) Seriously wounded. Ten nen.
(v) Slightly wounded. One officer & six nen.
Total ship's company casualties. Four officers and thirty one men.
(b) Passengers.
(1) Killed. Swo officers & ten other ranks.
(11) Wounded. Two officers (one dangerously).
Total passenger casualties. Four officers and ten men.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
VICE AUNIRAL 1940
*
DOVER
Lieutenant Commander in Command.

troops
Dpam 355
Bluloh m:- Commanding Officer, H.M.S. If LORMONT
se:- 19th June 1940.
11
-
Vice Admiral Commanding Dover Forces.
7/640.
Your 1949/18.
Sir,
With reference to operation Dynamo, I should like to draw your attention to the following members of the
Ship's Company:-
Sub. Lieutenant K.M.Cutler, R.N.R. who under difficult circumstances and with unreliable compasses, performed the navigation throughout with success. I should like to recommend this. Officer for advancement to the rank of Lieutenant.
Sub. Lieutenant A.Davidson R.N.R. who under fire took away the motor launch in order to rescue a British
Airman in Dunkirk Roads.
Temp. Sub. Lieut. (E) H.Henshaw R.N.R. who throughout the operation remained in the Engineroom in order to maintain and even exceed the designed speed of the Ship.
The remainder of the Ship's Company were in excellent spirits throughout, remaining at their posts

Holiday
4,
-Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Lormont".
and Action Stations for 36 hours, backed efficient
-19th June, 1940.
the four Marines, namely:-
Vice Admiral Commanding Dover Forces.
Mne A. Habberjam.
7/640.
Mne H. Ambrose.
Mne. F. Brace.
Mne.E.Brackpool.
Your 1949/18.
Whilst in Dunkirk Roads the Lewis Guns in char of Mne A..Habberjam performed good work in bringing, down one and possibly two Enemy Dive Bombers.
ith reference to operation Dynamo, I should like to draw your ention to the following members of the Ship's Company:-
have the Honour to be,
Sub-Lieutenant K.M.Cutler,R.N.R.who under difficult
Sir, cumstances and with unreliable compasses, performed the
Your obedient Servant, igation throughout with success. I should like to recommend
S Officer for advancement to Lieutenant.
WISmithi
Sub-Lieutenant A.Davidson,R.N.R who under fire took away le motor-boat in order to rescue a British Airman in Dunkirk
VICE ADMINI
Lieut. Commander R.N.
ads.
21 JUN 1940
Commanding Officer.
Temp: Sub-Lieut: (E) H. Henshaw, RNR who throughout the
DOVER
*
peration remained in the Engineroom in order to maintain and ven exceed the designed speed of the Ship.
The remainder of the Ship's Company were in excellent pirits throughout, remaining at their posts and Action Stations or 36 hours, backed efficiently by the four Marines,namely:-
Mne.A.Habberjam.
Mne.H.Ambrose.
Whilst in.

178
THE BROWN HOUSE HOTEL.
DOVER.
A.A. TELEPHONE 66 R.A.C.
Is is submitted that the conduct
Caprain Oldis and Clark RNR
Y he brought so he notice of their aships. the former handled his ship userly and the latter by his skill
Nairgarion, and The valuable assistance was always ready so reader, quarly
10 the success $ the two operations concerned. These were their with and never trips so Duskink
The conduct of he slever satings from Ajax and Hothpur was quite exemplary.
5- JUN 1940
@
E
Skipwith
Commander.

282
260
14 OLD SQUARE
NAVAL OFFICER IN CHARGE
LINCOLNS INN. W C.2.
-4JUN1940
*
HOLBORN 1038
3rd June 1940
RAMSGATE
Sir,
Sub-Lieut. Lucey, R.I.
The above officer was out in CO and of the Fire
"Massey Shaw" for the purpose of embarking troops
Float from Dunkirk on the afternoon and night of the 31st May-
1st June.
member of the crew, which consisted entirely officers As 8 and men of the London Fire Brigade brief and Aux- acof Fire Service, I venture to send you 8 occasion, count might of not otherwise be brought to the notice be iliary the work done by Mr. Lucey on this of which his superior officers, in the hope that he will given proper credit for it.
skiff in tom from
Ramsgate, Mr. on 8 the Float. grass the Lucey proceedings. The beach, line After Massey and but on I an and this swam Shaw to unsuccessful It SO an was bring ashore was brought R.A.F. swamped stern then out with motor 8 attempt decided of a in light a load the the light boat with boat, of breakers to which line troops attempt 3 the rocket and was early grass to to made aground the line, get in fast a grass line bauled to the in from the Float. come As it success- seemed unlikely that the breakers stern-first, we at the line then being the motor boat was going to attempted to transfer the line Float was gov under way In and was drag lost fully through to the box but unfortunately order to same moment the out, and the line took charge it back to the motor boat the line but was unable to get From that
I swam after was hauled aboard the Float, in the cathering the beach and was alone on the beach who were rather point Mr. Lucey about 50 or 60 soldiers, which time I
darkness demoralised, with for two three hours, most of believe he spent in the water.
The Float falling tide, and various attempte Lucey were then had to be shifted into deeper to water get owing to the with the motor boat and Mr. about 11
into contact Eventually at, I think, from another o'clock unsuccessful. to the Float in a boat further
Mr. Lucey got out immediately insisted upon boat, attempte and went ship. He then ferry out more men with this ashore while being made it to again himself and remained in the boat.
ashore some thirty in or forty men were brought out

-330
303
2/6
On Sunday Ramsgate was buzzing with rumours and it seemed probable that the small Motor boats would not go out so I
volunteered to go as Lewis Gunner in the War department Speed boat
"Marlborough".
At this juncture I would like to recommend very highly the
18
civilian coxswain of the "THARK" a man by the name of Ambler. This man who had only had River experience succeeded intaking the boat to to Dunkirk and back with no officer in the boat. He took the boat over again on Monday night and it was sunk but I believe that the crew was saved.
The "MARLBOROUGH" had & crew of four Subs, two solicitors from the treasury four Leading Stokers and two Sergeants of the
R.A.F. We put to sea on Sunday night in company with our sister
2/6
ship the "HAIG" and had a quiet voyage acress. We went alongside a jetty and took off about 40 "poilus". One of our solicitors were alongside there was slight enemy air activity and much against spoke French which assisted the operation considerably. While we the wishes of the rest of the crew who said I was merely attracting air, unfortunately with no success. We returned to Ramsgate without attention, I succeeded in firing several hundred rounds into the mishap.
and so we signed on an army officer who had been invalided shot
The next day, Monday, our solicitors had to return to the and Treasury a retired colonel who had a reputation for being a crack with a Lewis.
out at 1930 and picked Admiral Taylor up half way
We channel went from the Motor Boat "MERMAIDEN". When we the got canal to
Dunkirk we The Admiral went ashore accompanied by time acress the went inside the harbour and quite & long way two up of our and secured. the teeth. The test of us occupied our found a looting very and crew trying armed to to start up derelict cars. Sub.Lt.Poole nice motor cycle and rode it round the docks.
We went secured again. Shortly afterwards warehouse machine about off oneeto bring boats to the point of gunning started quite Fortunately our job was done blockage of embarkation and then near and a shell landed in so a we were able to
150 leave. yards On away. our way down too near the the canal shore we went came aground the on badluck a on some to lose rubble shipping, and going water by a shell. We had refused to tow us both off knocked into the rudder. Three French tugs out to the main but harbour our fortunately screws where and we our a secured Motor A/S to Vessel the Motor who Yacht took us "GULZA" who towed us back to Dover.
We returned to Ramagate on I Tuesday returned morning to Sheerness by lorry inthe to find
Schoot the operation "PATRIA" had which been broke cancelled. down on the way and we were towed in by a Drifter.
The times in the above are only approximate.
I have the honour to be,
OF
RAL
Sir,
17 JUN 1940
Your obedient servant
*
A
E
(SD.) A. CARSW HUNT.
Sub. Lieutenant, Royal Navy.
The Nore

355
329
Friday 31st May.
The following signals were made:-
0320, "Request more shipsto load Dunkirk."
0445. "Every available ship will be required at Dunkirk during the next two hours to evacuate rest of army.
0605. "Embarkation proceeding satisfactorily in spite of bombardment. I would again stress the need for more ships and constant fighter protection
0638. "Am now receiving a number of Frenchmen. I have raised no objection to their embarking in British ships and am allowing them to do so.
0940. "Request you will inform me whether troops are now being ordered to march to Dunkirk from the beaches.
0945.
"Sun is now coming through and I have a big target of ships in harbour. Request special air protection for next two hours.
0957. "Lord Gort has agreed that 5,000 Freich troops should be embarked here this evening after dark in British vessels. Request necessary ships may be sent to arrive at dusk.
1044. "We have been continually heavily bombarded and they are gradually finding the range of our as loading
I would rather only enter ships necessary berth. for the flow of troops.
Continuous and heavy shelling all the morning, but the evacuation proceeded fairly speedily. At last ships were arriving in large numbers and strong a 1. protection kept bomeing attack away. The only thing necessary was to tostop the shelling. At 1200 a signal was received from the Air Liaison
Officer at Dover asking for position of enemy battery. This was not known with any certainty as the battery was probably mobile, but it was in the district of Loon Plage Brouge Kerk
Soch. A reply was made to this effect. The bombardment, nevertheless, become more intense and a great deal more accurate.
Very heavy attacks were delivered during the evening but were Dive concentrated chiefly upon derelict ships in the roads.
bombing attacks were carried out on the ships loading but without success. The embarkation proceeded smoothly.

379
353
7.
avoiding action at high speed in very confined waters full of shipping.
Finally when the helm jambed he continued to keep her under control.
Commodore G. 0.Stephenson
Did most valuable work off the beaches in a motor boat at
La Panne and Bray, organising and controlling small craft and the embarkation of Lord Gort. When La Fanne became untenable owing to shell fire he moved to Bray and only left the coast when driven off by the air attack of Ist June.
Lieutenant R.G.H.G.Eyre - M.A/S.B. 10
Handled his boat with the greatest coolness and skill inside
Dunkirk in crowded waters, darkness, and under shell fire. His good work greatly facilitated my task of control.
Lieutenant Commander C.J.Wynne-Sdwards
This officer assisted no throughout the operations and was invaluable. Unsparing of himself he net any call on him with the greatest efficiency. On two occasions he carried out difficult tasks with complete success, controlling small craft and directing Merchant ships to beach themselves so that they could be boarded at low tide.
Ideutenant Viscount Kelburn
Acted as my Signal Officer and carried out his duties with the greatest efficiency under most trying conditions.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servent,
VICE AD MIRAL
*
DOVER
Rear Admiral.
The Vice Admiral Commanding,
Dover.

393
SECRE
111
17.
As it was desired to leave a few men behind to embark at La Panne, and as I had already lost touch with General
Montgomery, commanding llnd Corps, who had left earlier,
I apologised to General Johnston for the non-arrival of the boats, and informed him that I would go down to the piers and assist in the embarkation of those who were not to march.
18.
It being dead low water, it was now about half a mile
2130
to the end of the piers, which were now high and dry, and whilst walking there, I was twice knocked down by H.E. bursts, one splinter smashing the box signalling lantern I was carrying and another slightly injuring my left ankle.
Several houses on the front were now blazing fiercely.
19.
When I reached the embarkation point, I was informed that there had been no boats in for over half an hour, and the naval beach party had apparently left. This was probably in accordance with my orders that they were to go off in the last boat.
20.
There being neither ships nor boats now at the beaches,
I ordered a general retirement westward of all the groups on the beach, without waiting for further orders, with the object of getting them inside the defended perimeter outside these
Bray orders were being carried out, I rounded up all the stragglers
Dunes, which had been arranged for 0400. Whilst
I could find and sent them off after the other bodies of men with officers.
21.
After this was done, I set out to Bray Dunes, and walking
0700
along the edge of the water to avoid the shelling, collected & few other men of all units.
22.
About out three ships at anchor and soon after met to attract a small two or more miles down the beach towards Bray,
I made who informed me that they had endeavoured There being attention by parties ahead whom I could see authorities by should had party, firing shots without success. flashes no boats, that all troops were being withdrawn to close enough Panne, further large and being anxious that the naval from La be informed best to swim off, and managed get line brought
I to thought "Gossamer" it to be picked up by a lifebelt on a to me by one of the ship's company.
informed the captain of the change inform of R.A. plan Dover, and
23.
I then beaches, and asked him to being sent where by the cypher, state of to the avoid the possibility of boats they were not required.
to walk numbness, because I of
24.
my should to state left be THE that more I of a hindrance than a help as its if I felt I returned that I ashore. regret

396
3.
370
/th.38/5
No further ships arrived during the forenoon off Bray or
La Panne and a great opportunity was missed for embarking troops undisturbed. During the forenoon the Sappers in conjunction with the First Division, built a long pier of lorries off Bray into the sea, with plank decking. This was an excellent piece of work and proved invaluable later as a pedestrian pier, but it was insufficiently stable for such craft as paddle steamers to go alongside. Nor was it desirable for smaller pier craft to go alongside in safety especially in a lop. It was, nevertheless, later invaluable for embarking troops into small boats.
During the forenoon I proceeded to Dunkirk and met S.N.O. He informed me that embarkation had proceeded very satisfactorily during the night and estimated that
12,000 to 13,000 troops had been embarked. I told him that I estimated 6,000 to 7,000 troops had embarked during the night from the beaches, and I stressed the urgency for more ships to arrive and more and more boats, but few if any ships arrived during the forenoon.
On my way to Dunkirk, I found the water Lighter
CLAUDE high and dry, but ample supplies of water, and on my return to Bray arranged with the Military Authorities for lorries and/gune to collect and déstribute this sorely needed requirement.
Acting on S.N.O's instructions, I sent officers on board the CRESTED EAGLE to destroy any secret equipment still in her, but fire had already done all that was necessary. In the afternoon (Thursday) one or two scoots and 2 or 3 motor yachts and paddlers arrived and anchored to the westward of Bray, where no doubt they first observed large bodies of troops waiting embarkation. None, unfortunately, proceeded East of the Bray Pier where the
First Division had waited many hours patiently and most orderly. Eventually some of the First Division proceeded to Dunkirk where they hoped embarkation facilities were better. One or two destroyers or sloops passed en route from the westward, to La Panne, and I tried without success with at very ineffective improvised lamp to tell them to anchor off the Pier. Eventually I managed to get at signal to Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker in a passing ship asking him to arrange for this. I sent an officer with a representative of the First Division staff to Dunkirk to represent the urgent need for destroyers to anchor off Bray. (Not until two days later did I learn that all the destroyers, etc., had been given specific instructions as to which beaches they were to anchor off). Later a certain number of destroyers sloops and scoots had anchored off Bray and the embarkation proceeded satisfactorily. Unfortunately however, owing to at lack of Naval Officers, time after time did one see the a projected procession of boats going off loaders with troops, only to be cast adrift empty floating to seaward.
About 1700(?) I paid a further visit to G.H.Q.
to calar up a point about the allocation of troops to the several beaches, and returned to Bray.
About 2000 I decided that I must go and interview
Admiral Wake-Walker who I believed to be embarked in at ship off
Bray. Before leaving I gave instructions that in the falling tide/

7.
404
378
Brilish two bs at and just east or Dunheran and many henoh troubs as X was MaGo.
7. On my notume to Bray. arranged in accordance with mishination from S NO, for
" Crestid Ease & a virited any reent equipment & be destruyed. the fire. had in tact dons all that was necessary
3. Dumis the day the RE: amisha by rediorm had conshind a las soon of Comes * Manhs
5H Bray - the shamed have grown about 10 her of walk at high wall and was misa Guable lace as a Additions him * the small enaft G lazy alamyside but 06 was insufficiently stable the lamps to secure fif and will & daman small craft by holu's themselves expecially - a
9. asamt from a Scoot one the no no shirts amind the the Grander dumy 1 forman but smill sawden and a yours or his amired fin the wastward dumis a afternom and and were of
Bray when easy no dougs fink absorved Rudiu of waiters trustn
Later two or 3 destroyen and slown same easiward k La Paum and Great without success to sugual them & another & a eart of the Aven when are /or Division have Been wallens - can' for sculn and Goat. (ddid not am ace Same days each that all seesh

4144
8.
wereembarked.
The bombardment however became more intense and a great deal more accurate. The enemy were finding the approaches to the mole, and also the range of our headquarters. Very heavy air attacks were delivered during the "Evening Hate" but were again concentrated on derelict ships in the roads. Dive bombing attacks were carried out on the ships loading but without success. The embarkation proceeded smoothly.
I asked the R.A. Dover with his Flag in "KEITH" to send destroyers to Dunkirk to provide A.A. protection for these attacks but he replied that none were available. This was unfortunate as we were running out of ammunition onshore. I was getting a little uneasy as the bombardment had fired the magazine about
100 yards behind our Headquarters, and the French Officers kindly informed me that it was liable to explode at any noment.
However, it didnt.
The S.N.O. returned in the evening and we attended & confer ence between the French General, (dmiral Abrian, General Alexander
G.O.C., British Force,. Brigadier Parminter, Commander Henderson, the B.N.L.O. Captain Tennant and I were present. The plans of the
British and French Generals were at variance. The British plan for evacuation was to be carried out in accordance with V. Dover's
Most Secret Memorandum of 30th May. The French however considered that the evacuation should be spread over a longeryberiod of 4 or
5 days. It was not the opinion of General Mexander that the port of Dunkirk could be held for that length of time, and he stated that if his view were correct, that there could only result a situation where many of his rear guard would be taken prisoner.
The Generals decided to refer the matter to their respective
Governments, and General Alexander telephoned to Mr. inthony Eden.
As a result it WAS decided to stick to the original plan of immediate withdrawal rather than to accept the French plan of a prolonged operation.
An incident this evening was that on returning to the Noval
Headquarters with Commander Henderson after the meeting,a shell