Supplement 35305 — Gort’s France and Belgium despatch

IRumb. 35305 SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of FRIDAY, the 10th of OCTOBER, 1941 by Registered as a newspaper FRIDAY, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 . March* 1941. -. . The following Despatches have been received by the Secretary of State for // War from General the Viscount GORT, V.C., K.C.B., C.B.E./D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C., * Commander-in-Chief, British Expeditionary Force. (France and Belgium 1939-40.) FIRST DESPATCH (Covering the period from 3rd September, 1939, to 3ist January, 1940). General Headquarters,- 3. The plans for the despatch of the Force British Expeditionary Force, differed in two important respects from those…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 4. On landing the fighting troops were passed The towns of Le Mans and- Laval were rapidly through transit camps and their vehicles fifty miles apart, and the base ports were on an were cleared at once to Vehicle Marshalling average one hundred and fifty miles from the Parks, whence they were despatched in convoys, assembly area. Helpful though the French while troops left by rail on the same day as authorities were, the unfamiliar conditions made they landed. telephone communication difficult, apart from Since the troops and their vehicles were the danger of breach of security which it entailed.…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 ^5901 was provided at these river crossings. The certain French technical troops continued to weather was fine throughout the whole period of work in the sector under the command of the the move. French Commander of the Defensive Sector The first stage was one hundred and of Lille, Colonel (now General de Brigade) twenty miles. An average of five hundred Bertschi. vehicles moved daily over each stage of the route, While defences continued to develop on the maintaining a distance of one hundred yards lines of the original plan, based on the close between each vehicle as a precaution against defenc…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 5903 the weight of modern aircraft, has made it neces- requisite selective censorship on the abnormally sary to construct concrete runways, often of large number of letters now despatched daily. considerable extent, on the principal aero- Extremely useful reports on the outlook of the dromes in use. A number of special units of British Expeditionary Force as a whole and on the Royal Engineers had consequently to be its relations with the local French inhabitants raised, and a large amount of plant, grass seed are produced periodically. These are based and materials had to be provided. largely on…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 59<>5 as instructors to assist in the training of new I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the formations, while an equal number have been chief of the Mission, General de Division Voruz, attached to the Force, for instruction, from and to all his staff for their ever ready help to units at home. the-British Army on all occasions. Despite the almost complete absence of battle Thanks to their efforts, matters relating to casualties the supply of officers has caused me billeting, hire of land, and local purchase of concern. Over four hundred candidates have material have been handled without f…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 5907 28th March; 44th Division, on disembarkation, The sub-machine gun was taken into experi- moved into 3rd Corps reserve in the St. Pol area, mental use by patrols in the Saar front: its and 50th Division into 2nd Corps reserve, south- value had already been recognised and I trust west of Lille ; 42nd Division, on arrival, moved that a weapon of this type will be permanently to the area south-west of Amiens, in G.H.Q. included in the armament of the infantry. reserve. Preparation for Further Expansion. 5. The German invasion of Denmark and 7. In the meantime I had been preparing for Norway on g…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 5909 the Belgian Government were wedded. The Both these plans were worked out in the French authorities were never in a position to greatest detail, and orders and instructions obtain reliable and accurate details of the plans kept up to date as new divisions arrived and of the Belgian General Staff for the defence of the role of divisions changed. their country in the event of an invasion by The Escaut plan was by far the simpler of Germany; staff conversations were out of the the two; it involved sending armoured car question, yet plans had to be framed in such a reconnaissances to the river De…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 and troop carrying companies were allotted to OPERATIONS—FIRST PHASE Corps in such a way as to complete the move (ioth-i6th MAY) in 90 hours. Belgium calls on Allies for assistance: advance At the same time 44th Division was to march to the River Dyle by British and French to an area north-west of Audenarde, with a Armies: the Belgian anti-tank obstacle is view to organising the defence of the Escaut in found to be sited further forward than had this area. been expected. The enemy penetrates the front Movement in the first phase was to be con- of French gth Army and crosses the Meuse. tinuous by…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 declared an open town and that British troop Air Force to impede the enemy advance; but movements would prejudice its safety, but no such opportunities were of a fleeting character, adequate alternative routes to the Dyle were since the enemy established strong anti-aircraft available and I was therefore compelled to defences soon after his arrival, particularly in adhere to the original plan of using the outskirts towns at which roads converged. Tactical of the city. reconnaissance became virtually impossible The 3rd Division, on arrival, reported that a without fighter support, and the demands…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 59*3 vulnerable points, were ordered to relieve units 23rd Division moved to their positions during of ist and 2nd Corps on protection and traffic I7th May; they were provided with about forty control of main routes in Belgium. Railheads, field, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft guns from which had been advanced on i3th May to the ordnance reserves. general line Enghien—Ninove, were now moved The enemy break-through was now offering back across the frontier. an imminent threat to rear G.H.Q., to the During the night i6/i7th May the withdrawal communications over the Somme at Amiens to the Senne positi…

59^4 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 of Military Intelligence. The force was known occupied by the French. It was not however as Macforce and its task was to cover the practicable to move the 23rd Division again crossings over the Scarpe between Raches (3 and G.Q.G. were informed to this effect. Yet, miles N.E. of Douai) and St. Amand. It began by next morning no French troops had appeared to assemble at Orchies on the afternoon of i7th either on the right of 23rd Division or to relieve May. them. Later in the day, however, an order was received by which the commander of the French Withdrawal t…

17. OCTOBER/1941 "59*5 The enemy had, during the previous day, the abandonment of large quantities of equip- penetrated as far as Amiens, and rail communica- ment. It would obviously be unwelcome to tion with the bases was severed' at that'point. the Belgians who would be faced with the 'Communications by road and rail over the alternatives of withdrawing with us and aban- Sorrime at Abbeville were still holding on igth doning Belgian soil, fighting on a perimeter of May and the town was being placed in a state their own, or seeking an armistice. of defence with such resources as were available, So far as I am aw…

•5916 -SUPPLEMENT TO THE. LONDON GAZETTE, -17 -OCTOBER: Macforce. The remainder of the division was - I .discussed,--these- instructions- with,'.the moved that night (i9/20th) to the same area, .C.I.G.S. at- my Command Post at Wahagnies and was thus suitably placed for the counter at 8.15 a.m.; I put to him my view that attack in which they took part on 2ist May. withdrawal to "the south-westwards, however I also ordered I2th Lancers with a field desirable in principle, was not. in the circum- battery to move to Arras and carry'out necessary stances practicable. ; reconnaissances south and south-westwards, . In t…

-SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON~GAZETTE; 17 OCTOBER, 1941 south-west was' entirely impossible until the •covered" had -already far e'xceeded the estimated situation had been retrieved on the front of the life of the tracks which were now beginning to French ist Army. break through wear. It v/as clear therefore that the attack of 33. 5th Division was therefore "ordered .to Frankforce would not maintain its momentum join 5oth Division in the Vimy area, and its .unless it was reinforced and supported by the commander, Major-General Franklyn, was placed French on its left. • During 22nd May, therefore, in command of all th…

' SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 Carvin, and on the following day isgth Infantry near Maulde on the front of ist Division a Brigade of the same division joined the force. number of enemy had crossed the river dis- On 2ist May I27th Infantry-Brigade rejoined the guised as refugees, but had been detected and 42nd Division and the sector from Millonfosse driven out with the bayonet. The Corps Com- to St. Amand was handed over to the French. manders all felt that they could hot how hold Already on 2oth May, I had ordered Major- on for more than .twenty-four hours. We General Curtis, Commanding 46t…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 5919 On return from the meeting, orders were issued evacuation was carrie.d out under the orders of to implement these decisions, and that evening the War Office, being completed on the night I moved my command post to the Chateau de of 23/24th May. Premesques, midway between Armenti&res and Lille. The Administrative Situation. 37. During the whole of this period I had The final severance of the L. of C. and the invest- been kept in the closest touch with the adminis- ment of Boulogne. trative situation by the Quarter-Master-General 36. During the gist May the enemy penetra- (Lieutenant-General W…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 5921 as it turned out, fatally injured in a motor These moves left only four divisions on the accident returning from the conference which he frontier defences and made'it possible to with- and I had attended at Ypres on the night of draw the headquarters and Corps troops of 2ist May. General Blanchard succeeded him in 3rd Corps for employment on the Canal line command of the French First Group of Armies, where they were badly needed. This was done and presumably succeeded to the function of at 4 p.m. on 23rd May, leaving ist Corps with co-ordination although this was never officially 42nd and is…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 5923 The remaining infantry brigade of 48th Cavalry Corps for this attack. Therefore, even Division (i43rd) was later placed under 2nd if no British divisions could be made available, Corps, and a pioneer battalion sent to begin the possibility of carrying out the operation preparations for the defence of Ypres in case would not be entirely precluded. I did realise Belgian measures for the purpose should prove however that the French Were unlikely to take inadequate. the offensive unless British support was forth- The Belgians had at this time one division coming. in reserve between Menin and Ypr…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 5925 makes it impossible to extend our boundaries, was likely to prove an exacting one: work which were notified yesterday, further to the had to begin at once, and my own headquarters right. were fully occupied with the withdrawal of the We must therefore, with regret, say that forward troops. we have no longer any forces available to I therefore appointed Lieut-General Sir Ronald fill the gap in the direction of Ypres. Adam to undertake this duty, and sent with As regards the withdrawal to the Yser the. him my Quarter-Master-General and other idea must be ruled out since it would destroy staff…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 5927 beaches were organised at La Panne, Bray Dunes While at the Bastion, General Koeltz asked and Malo-les-Bains, one being allotted to each me, shortly after n p.m. whether I had yet Corps ; and military beach parties were impro- heard that H.M. the King of the Belgians had vised on each Corps beach. They carried on asked for an armistice from midnight that without naval assistance for two days, but were night. This was. the first intimation I had hampered by a.shortage of small boats and by a received of this intention, although I had lack of experience in their use. The troops were already fo…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 5929 I communicated the gist of this report to the The arrival of these troops, though welcome C.I.G.S. and I asked that H.M. Government from-so many points of view, raised the question should consider the policy to be followed in the of embarkation in an acute form. Admiral Abrial event of a crisis arising, as well it might. had apparently received no orders from his In reply, I received two telegrams which Government that the whole of the British troops .read:— were to be embarked, and he professed great ". . . . H.M. Government fully approve surprise when he heard of my intentions. He ypur wit…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 5931 SOME LESSONS OF THE CAMPAIGN Our anti-tank armament was more ample than that of the French, but did not extend further The importance oj equipment; the time factor; back than the division. No guns were available liaison; dejence in depth; the employment for the defence of Corps or rearward areas or for of air forces; river crossing and demolitions ; the three " Pioneer " divisions, except by with- signal communications; traffic control; drawing weapons from the formations to which security; supply and transport; the behaviour they had been allotted in War Establishments. of the troops. These…

17 OCTOBER, 1941 5933 creation of a road control organisation under APPRECIATIONS the Quarter-Master-General, on the linos of that The Royal Navy; the Royal Air Force; in use in the French Army, had already been Commanders and Staffs submitted, but unfortunately too late for more than preliminary results to be achieved. The Royal Navy. 70. I have already referred to the embarkation Security. of the Force from Dunkirk and its transport to 67. Akin to the foregoing problem is that of England which evoked the wholehearted admira- security/ Until loth May the work of the tion of the Army. The operation was carried ou…

5902 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 The fortifications of the Maginot Line in the under my command from the dates of the dis- sector concerned continued to be manned by embarkation of their ground units. Later other French fortress troops, the British battalions units were added, and the Air Component now being disposed in depth in advance of the comprises, in addition to Headquarters, one fortified line. The enemy positions were on the Fighter Group Headquarters, eight Wings, a average one thousand five hundred yards distant Communication Squadron, and certain adminis- from our foremost posts…

5904 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 The initial scheme provided for the formation The Welfare of the Force of temporary maintenance dep&ts near the ports 23. The health of the Force has been good of Brest and Nantes, but it was soon evident and the number of troops in the care of medical that, with so long a line of communication, units has never exceeded 2-8 per cent, of the an advanced base was required. strength of the Force, despite the unusually The use of the port of Havre had at first severe weather conditions in December and been considered undesirable owing to certain January. geograp…

5906 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 SECOND DESPATCH f (Covering the period from ist February, 1940, to 3ist May, 1940, with an Appendix covering operations of ist Corps from 6 p.m. 3ist May, to midnight 2nd/3rd June). | i. The narrative portions of this despatch have been compiled from the war diaries and other records of the General Staff at G.H.Q. These have been supplemented by war diaries, including those of the Swayne Mission, and by diaries, notes and records made by various commanders and staff officers at the time, or within a few days of their arrival in England. The records of the Ge…

5908 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 There were also deficiencies in technical units, including anti-aircraft. My Adjutant- apparatus for light anti-aircraft requirements, General's branch, in conjunction with the such as Kenison Predictors, signal lights, Adjutant-General's branch at the War Office, technical and specialised vehicles of many had in hand plans for the more economical use types and a number of smaller items. The same of man-power, the elimination of fit men from difficulties in provision of equipment were no sedentary or base duties and the reduction of doubt the cause of delays…

5912 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 I visited H.M. the King of the Belgians and By the night of i5th May the movements General Van Overstraeten and reached agree- envisaged in Plan D were all running ahead of ment that the Belgian ist Corps should be schedule. 4th Division was moving into Corps withdrawn from the area of 2nd Corps and that reserve behind 3rd Division; 5th Division was the left boundary of the B.E.F. should be moving on to the Senne in place of 5oth Division adjusted so as to allow the Belgians the use of as originally planned, and the latter was now the road Vilvorde-Alost for…

5920 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 port could not be worked for military require- execution has hope of restoring the situation. ments at short notice. A certain amount of Weygand reports French VII Army is advanc- rations and small arms ammunition was sent ing successfully and has captured Peronne, by air up to 23rd May, but from then onwards Albert and Amiens. While realising fully it became impossible for aircraft to land. On dangers and difficulties of your position which 23rd May therefore, on the advice of the Q.M.G., has been explained to Weygand it is essential I decided to place the…

5922 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 2qkh May. Preparations for counter attack and the Admiral du Nord, Admiral Abrial, whose strengthening of canal defences. command included Boulogne, Calais and 40. During 24th May, I had simultaneously Dunkirk. Under his authority the command to prepare for a counter-attack southwards on of military forces in these areas was assumed on the 26th and also to press forward with the 24th May by General de Corps d'Arme'e Fagalde, strengthening of the canal line. commanding the French i6th Corps which up To make the detailed arrangements for the to now had been fi…

5924 SUPPLEMENT TO .THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 some sectors were held jointly with the French. I replied that a plan for withdrawal north- The virtual closing of Dunkirk as a port of westward had been agreed with the French entry was making the supply situation ever tha't morning; I added that the news from the more difficult, and the ammunition situation Belgian front was disquieting,' and concluded permitted only of very restricted expenditure. by saying:— . . . " I must not conceal from you that The Plan for Withdrawal. a great part of the B.E.F. and its equipment will'inevitably be lost even in best…

5926 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 at the time they had nothing available save their homes in northern France before the French the 68th Division and the regional troops, Government put into operation the plans they they did not demur. had made. The French organisations were not However, so far as I am aware, no action was available and no British troops could be spared ever taken in this respect. to control the traffic. The refugee problem had therefore become increasingly acute, and the Description of the Dunkirk Perimeter. tide which at first set westwards from Belgium 48. The British sect…

5928 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 ist and 2nd Corps were to withdraw on the . on the historic ground of the Ypres-Comines night of 28th/29th May to a horse-shoe position Canal, Zillebeke and the eastern outskirts of on the line Proven-Poperinghe-Ypres-Bix- Ypres, and on these positions, the infantry, well schoote, with outposts on the line Ypres- supported by the artillery, had stubbornly held Godevaersvelde. The position of 3rd Corps was their ground in the face of strong and deter- more difficult and obscure. 2nd Division, now mined attacks by the enemy. reduced to less than the strength o…

5930 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 On the evening of 2gth May, therefore, the -I judged that it would be imprudent to con- organisation of the perimeter was complete, and tinue to maintain our position on the perimeter Sir Ronald Adam's task was successfully outside the permanent defences of Dunkirk accomplished. He himself embarked that night. for more than twenty-four hours longer, and I By 3oth May, there remained in the area, at therefore decided to continue the evacuation an estimate, 80,000 British troops for evacuation by withdrawing 2nd Corps on the night of and I had now to complete…

5932 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 The liaison with flanking French formations breaking up formations of enemy aircraft. But was carried out by the exchange of bilingual being purely defensive, it can never prove the liaison officers. I was particularly fortunate in complete antidote to 'enemy bombers and recon- the French officers who were attached for these naissance aircraft, even when available in duties from neighbouring formations. sufficient strength. A commander must have at his call sufficient fighters to intercept and attack I would also like to take this opportunity of the enemy. r…

5934 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 of my three Corps. Lieut.-Generals Sir Alan Honours and Awards. Brooke, M. G. H. Barker and Sir Ronald Adam, 73. I am submitting separately the names of Bart. The sudden turn of events on iyth May officers and other ranks whom I wish to recom- threw a violent and unexpected strain on the mend for reward or to bring to your notice for Commander, Lines of Communication Area (the gallant or distinguished service. late Major-General P. de Fonblanque), and I wish to record my sincere appreciation of his I have the honour to be good and devoted work during the tim…