Ministry of Transport records containing a Dynamo vessel list and reports from masters and crews engaged in the evacuation, covering 1940–1947.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, MT 40/66. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.
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STATE COPY. Po data and 97 ing Frigue the only casualty School Road, 6, School Terrace, ODL throughout leg all injury of these through bomb ONCHAN. Roy Motion and J. Cowell who were members of the Lewis and 22nd August, 1940. R. W. to the ship by the Southamoton 106 won't OAL General Manager, the enemy Cannell, Esq., in very exposed and VIUS board landed, I reported the fact to the Embark- on On Isle of Man Steam Packet Co. Ltd. aure that every ation Officer in charge of the jetty, I then suggested to him 215 Dear Sir, or we to tow by the steamer "FENELLA" during the evacuation of Dunkirk. I beg to submit the following report of the part played At about 8.00 a.m., Tuesday, 28th May, I received a signal from the Shore Signal Station to enter Dover Harbour for orders and to obtain fuel oil. We berthed alongside Government Quay at about 9.00 p.m. and at 10.30 p.m. received orders that I was to proceed alongside the oil store ship anchored in the harbour at 12.30 a.m., Wednesday, fill up with oil, then proceed for Dunkirk to embark troops. We left the berth as ordered but when about to berth alongside the Oiler, I was hailed by an Officer on board and told that we were to anchor as they were not ready to receive us alongside. They were busy oiling H.M. Destroyers at this time and we did not get alongside until After berthing along- side, we found that the oiler's pipe connections were not suitable and would not couple up with our connections. This meant that we could not take in any oil, and as there was a continual stream of vessels coming into the Port, requiring oil and water, it seemed to me that we would stand a poor chance of getting any oil that day, and as my Officers and crew were anxious to make the trip to Dunkirk, I consulted with the Chief Engineer and asked him if he considered we could do the trip, there and back, with what oil he had on board, and he told me that providing we steamed at a slightly reduced speed we might just be able to manage. I then consulted the Chief and Second Officers and we decided to proceed immediately. We arrived off Dunkitk at about 1.00 p.m., but we were delayed from entering the Port to avoid a heavy bombing raid which was then in progress. When this was over, we berthed on the east side of the East jetty and commenced to embark troops and stretcher cases and continued to do so throughout the afternoon, the embarkation being slowed up considerably by continuous heavy bombing attacks. We had between six and seven hundred troops on board when the enemy dive bombers scored a direct hit on "FENELLA's promenade deck, doing considerable damage, at about 5.00 p.m. They also scored a hit on the jetty causing it to split in two, parts of the concrete being blown through the ship's side below the water line and into the engine room which immediately began to flood with water. Another bomb fell between the ship and the jetty, the force of the explosion blowing out the oil cooler from the ship's side and completely wrecking almost every pipe and pump in the engine room, rendering the engines useless. I inspected the damage in company with the Chief and Second Officer - the ship was listing badly - fortunately inclining towards the jetty - and was rapidly making water. Our examination of the damage proved that the ship was doomed and the only course open was to disembark all troops and abandon ship. I instructed the O.C. troops to this effect. As the jetty abreast of gangways had been blown away, the only method of disembarkation was to climb over the rails on the forecastle head which fortunately was level with the jetty. The enemy was particularly active at this time and several times his bombing and machine-gunning held up the disembarking of the troops, but owing to the skilful handling of my Chief and Second Officers, all troops and stretcher cases were safely disembarked, 1.