TNA Unclassified 1

SECRET
Dynam 22 A14/0/1352 3 3
From.. Lieutenant Commander T.G.P. Crick, Royal Navy.
in 'Caloutta" for passage.
Date.. 29th May 1940.
To
.. The Vice-Admiral, Dover.
Submitted:-
As the Senior Officer of H.M.Ships"Abel Tasman",
"Alice" and "Kaapfalga" (Dutch barges), I have the honour to make the following report on operations at La Panne on
28th May.
2.
"Abel Tasman" was loaded with ammunition,
"Alice" and "Kaapfalga" with provisions. The destination of La Panne was received at Dover at 1900 on 27th May and ships sailed forthwith.
3.
On arrival at about 0500 ships were beached shortly after high water. A number of H.M. Ships were in the process of evacuating troops.
I proceeded ashore to make arrangements with the Military for unloading. It was extremely hard to get any information at all or to understand the situation.
After 2½ hours search I was able to locate G.H.Q. and reported to General Adam, who was in command of the Adam force. He stated that it was of paramount importance to evacuate as many troops, on the beaches between La Panne and Dunkirk. I accordingly made those arrangements. There was great air activity all day and at about 1400 approximately
6 bombers commenced a wave of attacks with bombs and machine-gun on the three ships and the personnel in general on the beach.
The Military were about to commence embarking. I had left orders that in the event of attack the crew were to take cover on the beach, or elsewhere than on board, where there was still a quantity of ammunition. Immediately after, the second attack, I went on board "Abel Tasman" to see that my orders had been carried out. The crew of 9 were extremely young and 6 of them had not been to sea before. I found one rating on board and got him ashore. There was only time to take cover under the ship closewto the keel. I was wounded in the foot by a machine-gun bullet during one of the attacks.
When the attacks were over my wound was dressed on the beach. I was in considerable pain and did not feel that I could adequately perform the duty of getting my ship back to Dover. I therefore turned over to the next Senior
C.O.. Later on I learned that my 1st Lieutenant had been very badly wounded. I therefore determined to return to
Dover. I was feeling much better after receiving proper medical attention. Ships were due to sail at 1700, and I
felt that I could carry out the navigation with one of the
1st Lieutenants in charge of the ship and that by stationing the the ship with the sole Officer astern in the line that three ships would return.to Dover with the troops.
Accordingly I was carried down to the beach had sailed. I could get no answer from the remaining at 1630 by the military, only to find that two of the ship ships as by possible after the bombing was over and as hailing. Apparently it had been decided to there sail as were soon

II.
16
hoping bullet holes therby I gave when to flood orders the to engine flood of
I the tide rose.
recognition signal the tables and the route the secured the charts and burnt boarded KaapFalga where I took over command before giving order to abandon ship, order, then refloating Kaap Falga.
from Liett Culmer R.N.V.R. who had succeeded in
It was now about 1630/29 and there was no sign of life on the beaches as everyone was still taking cover due to aidcraft overhead.
We proceeded due north from La Panne over the sandbanks into Nieuport Roads, as I
had been imformed by Major P.De Havilland that the Zudycote Channel was under fire.
The presence of enemy sircraft overhead prevented the destroyers sighted from stopping to receive our message. The destroyers were, however, steaming in the direction of Dunkirk,
Which I assumed to be in German Hands and I
assumed that they had somehow heard of the fall of
Dunkirk. and were on their way to Bombard.
I then decided not to return to Bray
Beaches that night, because:-
1. According to my imformation there would be no troops there to receive our stores.
2. If they wanted food at La Panne the
Alice was still aground with 250 tons aboard, which I was unable to destroy by fire due to the proximity of the Able Tasman with munitions aboard.
3. Major De Havilland's message was still underlivered.
,Kaap Falga had a deck cargo of over 20 tons and the crew of Alice and the other four soldiers took up nearly all the available space.
Kaap Falga reported arrival in Downs at
0300/29th through H.M.S. Holdfast on examination service.
NO orders were received and about 1200/31
I steamed Kaap Falga to Dover, where I reported to the Dynamo Operation Room.
It was decided to unload Kaap Falga, which operation was completed by 0900/1st fell June.
During the unloading one Army Stevedore off the jetty in the dark and was drowned.
( A separate report has already been made.)
stand At Dunkerk leaving there not later
1600/1 KaapFalga was ordered to than 0300/2 by to go to this was the last night throttle of evacuation.
After as two hours funning at I to the had to be evacuated due a hot leading off the led close past the ready be used use fuel asphyxiating silencer. This pipe was engine room fumes and gmoke coming from red pipe tanks and and since pump it only slow speed fire. could
2130/1 Ship remained at anchor all effect night repairs even if owing to the serious anchored danger off Ramsgatea of at about as expert and aid could be obtained to Dunkirk by 0300/2.
it was now impossible to reach I reckoned KaapFalga capable officers to block of the from The I maintaining sailed maximum for speed was Dover 5 imformed next knots. 50 empty to afternoon 70 ship. me degrees that were Engineer not the badly wishing engine, centigrade which above was normal, and the silencer that coked up'.
Kaap Falga was not therefore employed