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TNA Unclassified 1

TNA Unclassified 1
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TNA Unclassified 1

A working collection of Operation Dynamo source material whose definitive National Archives catalogue reference is still being identified.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
Unclassified 1

Source: The National Archives, Kew, Unclassified 1. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Showing only pages tagged with the vessel name Major. Tags are exact matches from this collection’s OCR tag index. Clear vessel filter ×

9 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.

List page 1 of 1 Showing document pages 68–554 of this collection
Page ImageOCR textOCR tags
68 Page 68 Log in to enlarge

From Lieut: WykehamN Martin.
Dynam.
223.
A14/0/1352
1352
1st Lieut: of "Alice', D.B.2.
15
Date
7th June 1940.
TO V.A. Dover.
Report on Dynamo Operation.
15
Alice left Southampton at 2030/26/5/40
and at Dover was directed to beach herself at
La Panne, to fac litate unloading of cargo of
250 tons of provisions.
This operation was carried out at
0800/28 by Alice and Kaap Falga, the former having rescued Pilot Sergeant T.BOYD, 516716
of 213 Fighter Squadron, who had descended by parachute.
Two hours later he was transfered to Able Tasman, also beached at La Panne as it was thought that she would be the first to return, Alice and Kaap Falga having received orders to refloat as soon as possible and beach themselves again after dark at Bray Beaches, there to land some provisions and evacuate soldiers before daylight.
Lieut: Slater (C.O. Alice ) and Lieut
Beale (C.O. Kaap Falga) landed to make definità arrangements with G.H.Q. for the evening's operation.
Whilst they were ashore four bomb and Machine gun attacks were carried out against the three ships beached and the Military ashore
About 1400/29 Major P.De Havilland, of at unea
G.H.Q. four soldiers, himself being wounded, with instructions
(D.A.Q.M.G.) arrived on board Alice with
29
for to try and get in touch with a destroyer cut
28
22, immediately, me as his communications had been the and he wished to report to the War Office seriousness of the situation.
stated that Germans would be occuppying evening
Dunkirk and He advancing along the coast that due to the capitulation of Belgian Troops for told him of the intentions he had the evening evacuation Beaches, where the provisions were
I and he told me that troops falling just come back from on Bray La Panne, and that were no longer He also required mentioned there. that Zudycote the beach Channel. at Bray was under fire as was the he said
Two naval leg. and one had taken been to hit Military one hospital I came to the
From his Lieut: Slater Falga)
description (Alice)
who conclusion was KIlled that and it Lieut: was Beale wrong; (Kaap since on June6th he who me I spoke that was wounded. Lieut to Lieut Beale Slater were was I was made also over to unharmed. the refloat and phone, splinters Alice, and from assured but aircraft due Efforts lubrication system of the engine,

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II.
16
hoping bullet holes therby I gave when to flood orders the to engine flood of
I the tide rose.
recognition signal the tables and the route the secured the charts and burnt boarded KaapFalga where I took over command before giving order to abandon ship, order, then refloating Kaap Falga.
from Liett Culmer R.N.V.R. who had succeeded in
It was now about 1630/29 and there was no sign of life on the beaches as everyone was still taking cover due to aidcraft overhead.
We proceeded due north from La Panne over the sandbanks into Nieuport Roads, as I
had been imformed by Major P.De Havilland that the Zudycote Channel was under fire.
The presence of enemy sircraft overhead prevented the destroyers sighted from stopping to receive our message. The destroyers were, however, steaming in the direction of Dunkirk,
Which I assumed to be in German Hands and I
assumed that they had somehow heard of the fall of
Dunkirk. and were on their way to Bombard.
I then decided not to return to Bray
Beaches that night, because:-
1. According to my imformation there would be no troops there to receive our stores.
2. If they wanted food at La Panne the
Alice was still aground with 250 tons aboard, which I was unable to destroy by fire due to the proximity of the Able Tasman with munitions aboard.
3. Major De Havilland's message was still underlivered.
,Kaap Falga had a deck cargo of over 20 tons and the crew of Alice and the other four soldiers took up nearly all the available space.
Kaap Falga reported arrival in Downs at
0300/29th through H.M.S. Holdfast on examination service.
NO orders were received and about 1200/31
I steamed Kaap Falga to Dover, where I reported to the Dynamo Operation Room.
It was decided to unload Kaap Falga, which operation was completed by 0900/1st fell June.
During the unloading one Army Stevedore off the jetty in the dark and was drowned.
( A separate report has already been made.)
stand At Dunkerk leaving there not later
1600/1 KaapFalga was ordered to than 0300/2 by to go to this was the last night throttle of evacuation.
After as two hours funning at I to the had to be evacuated due a hot leading off the led close past the ready be used use fuel asphyxiating silencer. This pipe was engine room fumes and gmoke coming from red pipe tanks and and since pump it only slow speed fire. could
2130/1 Ship remained at anchor all effect night repairs even if owing to the serious anchored danger off Ramsgatea of at about as expert and aid could be obtained to Dunkirk by 0300/2.
it was now impossible to reach I reckoned KaapFalga capable officers to block of the from The I maintaining sailed maximum for speed was Dover 5 imformed next knots. 50 empty to afternoon 70 ship. me degrees that were Engineer not the badly wishing engine, centigrade which above was normal, and the silencer that coked up'.
Kaap Falga was not therefore employed

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21
19
FICER-THOMARGE
Lieut. H.R.Wykeham-Nartin, R.N.
( 1st. Lieut. 'Alice')
31 MAate 1940
"
29/5/40
OUTHRMETO
F.O.I.C., Southampton,
Report
Dynamo Force 28/5/40 (Dutch vessels 'Alice', 'Caap Falga',
(store ships) and'Able Tasman' (aminition ship)
Proceeded from Southampton 26/5/40 and thence received instructions at Dover to proceed to La Panne and beach these ships to facilitate unloading cargo. This operation was carried out at
0800 28/5/40 by 'Alice' and 'Caap Falga', the former having rescued aSgt. Pilot who had descended from a disabled Spitfire by parachute, (Lt.Com. Crick) arrived earlier at 0600 when It.
he was afterwards transferred to 'Able Tasman'.
Com. Crick landed to report to G.H.O. He returned at 0900 with orders to refloat 'Alice' and "Caap Talga' and send then to Beary
Beaches where provisions were required and certain Army units were to be evacuated.
ded Falga to R.N. (Capt. requirements from G.H.O. and request
Lt.Sclater of'Alice) and Lt. Beale (Capt. of *Caap being inadvisable might be to sent beach to their ships again owing to the appares that boats acertain definite 'Alice'and'Caap Falga' at Bray Beachi
Meanwhile enemy attacks were made on these ent existance of aircraft there.
ships and the four bomb and machine-gun after which Major P.de Havilland soldiers, with with to report the situation that the arrived the on instructions to try and get to ashore, board 'Alice' with four in
Genermans were his communications Dunkirke and, that forces at a destroyer immediately having been cut. He stated Bray
Beaches were advancing from on La Panne and that provisions evacuation were was no longer required falling or bach possible to land as complete
.00
He reported anticipated had been killed near him taken and to that the
Lt. Beale had that been Lt. wounded Sclater in the leg and had been
Military Hospital
The
See/over.

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25
First Lieut. then abandoned Alice and took his crew and Major De Haviland (wounded)
and 4. soldiers to Kaap Falga where 1st. Lieut. Alice took command. Major De.
Havilland of G.H.Q came on board with instructions for Kaap Falga to go to sea
25
and try and intercept a destroyer so that he could report by m/t to the War Office the seriousness of the situation. No. Destroyer would stop so Kaap Falga returned to the Downs and reported arrival. Then to Dover where stores were cleared by 09.00
1st. Kaap Falga's engines were badly coked up and in attempting to return to
Dunkirk at 22.00 1st. they overheated to such an extent that the Ship could not make suffient speed to reach Dunkirk by 03.00 2nd. the latest hour that ships had been ordered to stay off Dunkirk.
Due to the possibility of this defect Kaap Falga was not used on the night of June 2nd.
the last night of the evacuation.
Sailed for Poole 14.30/3 arrived 12.00/5
PACIFIC
A
Lieut.Comdr. C.J.Skrine R.N. Lieut. Triscott R.N.R.
Sat.25th. May Crews for Dutch Skoots proceeded from ortsmouth to Poole where they arrived about noon and were detached for these vessels.
Pacific proceeded at 14.00 leaving discharged dutch crew at Brownses Island. Was ordered to anchor at Yarmouth for the night.
Sun. 26th. May. Weighed at 0.430 and proceeded for Portsmouth Harbour at 09.3.0
Being Senior officer of the Party I went ashore and arranged for stores and swinging etc. No sailing orders were obtainable until about 19.00 when we were ordered to complete swinging as soon as possible and sail at once for Newhaven. Accordingly sailed at dark with Amazone Atlantic Zeus & Pascholl in company (wega and San Antonio)
has broken down)
Monday 27th. May. Arrived off Newhaven at 04.00 and was ordered to anchor outside
Lay at anchor all day awaiting orders. At dark received orders to sail for downs in company with a party of skoots that had previously arruved Newhaven. Weighed and
Proceeded
Tues. 28th. May Arrived Dover about 08.00 and berthed alongside 09.00. Went ashore and having ascertained the possible nature of the operation made arrangements for sandbags first aid outfits etc., to be supplied to my party of Skoots by noon
However an air raid warning intervened and none of these stores had been received
13.00 received orders to sail forthwith. Sailed about 13.00 and took over a large lifeboat at sea from one of the slower skoots who was dropping behind. Pacific gradually overhauled the other four skoots and I think was the first of this party to reach La Panne.
From No. 6 E Buoy we proceeded at slow speed 180° straight for the beach where in answer to our hail a shout was raised by the soldiers on the beach. The intention waswas to turn to Port and anchor off. However partly due to the fact that the larger ships were closer in than I anticipated but mainly due to my leadsman failing to obtain any sounding at all we grounded on a bank of sand before we had turned
90° This occured at 23.00 We sent the large Lifeboat ashore with 3 of our 5 hands and instructed them to take off men to other ships as with the wind blowing inshore it was not certain that we should get off, With the remaining two hands we laid out a kedge on our Port quarter. By going full astern and heaving on the kedge we got afloat when the tide rose at 02.00
29th. May. The ships lifeboat and skiff was then sent inshore and 1 officer and
7 men were brought off to Pacific before the boats lost touch with her in the dark
They did howver bring several par ies off to other ships. Verbal orders had been received before leaving Dover to leave shore before03.30 being anxious to recover boats and men Pacific remained inshore till daylight finally sailing at 04.30
when it seemed liekly that the boats and crews had been embarked by other ships.
Rerurned to Dover by route Y arriviving about 16.30 and disembarked troops. No orders were immediately available but verbal orders were subsequently received to embark water and provisions and sail about 22.00 Application was made for the balance of complument and I was informed that I should be sent 3 hnds from
Montvera. These did not arrive until 02.40 at which time Pacific sailed for Dunitirk.
30th. May. The morning of 30th May was misty at about 08.20 when crossing Le Dyck bank there was a violent underwater explosion about two cables on the Starboard bow
No aircraft was about and it is supposed that it was a torpedo which had exploded on the Bank. No vessel was in sight Arrived off the beach 09.00 about 1 mile E
of Dunkirk and anchored close in. We had no boat of our own but collected two from a skoot that was just leaving, conditions as regards surf were pretty good but boats very waterlogged and no boat was obtainable all day. By 16.00 my crew were exhausted by pulling those boats in and out from the hore all as I had 30 Officers and 620
men aboard I decided to sail. We might have had many more in half the time if a motor boat had been available. Accordingly sailed at 16.00 When crossing the
Inner Ratel Bank was attacked by by two of a flight of three fighters with machine guns. They scored a few hits on the ship and injured nobody. Had nothing but a pistol with which to reply.

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II.
62
(NARRATIVE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER H.M.S. FRISO DURING
61
OPERATION DYNAMO)
Friday 31st May (contd) During the moráing one of the Beachmasters came off to me and endeavoured to persuade me to beach the ship so as to lead quicker, pointing out that two other smaller skoots
(HEBE & SURSOM CORDA) were doing so very successfully. As it was now a falling tide with an onshore wind I refused. For this I
was later very glad as both other skoots shor tly afterwards became stuck on the beach and were unable to get off. (HEBE came off at the next high water. During the forenoon I hailed a large motor driven pleasure boat, got him alongside me and transferred
250 men to him. By about 1230 I had onboard 648 men and space was extremely cramped. I had delayed my departure hoping that a destryyer or other fast craft would appear and take my load from me so that I could fill up again. However as another skoot appeared
I slipped my anchor (the capstan being again defective) and sailed.
Just as I was about to leave Dunkirk Roads I was hailed by a Fleet
Minesweeper and ordered to tow a Drifter full of troops to Dover.
By 1330 the Drifter was in tow and we were proceeding at about
5 knots. At approximately 1400 a Heinkel appeared out of the low cloud and at a height of 350 feet released a large bomb, probably
500 lbs, and as he passed over he opened fire with machine guns.
The bomb fell on my Port quarter between me and the Drifser.
Luckily the Bomb exploded below the surface and beyond violently shaking both ships no xjer major damage was done. The force of the explosion caused my compass to jump out of its gimbals.
Certain damage was dome to Auxiliary Machinery in the Engine Room.
After we had been proceeding for about half an hour we were shelled by the Nieuport Battery. As the third salvo straddled us I decided to risck the navigational dangers and cut across the snadbanks so as to present the minimum target and to open the range as fast as possible. Luckily the Enemy never found the range again. Thick fog was encountered at about 1830.
On making the North Goodwin Light Vessel I discovered that the Shaking up had caused a 30 dgree error in the compass.
During the oassage through the Downs the tow parted on several occasions due to the wash of fast moving vessels.
At about 0100 on Saturday 1st June I was about 1
cable from the entrance to Dover Harbour when I was bombed again.
This time it was only a very small bomb, which although a very near miss only wetted the troops on the port side aft. There were no casualties from machine gun fire. At 0130 I secured alongside Admiralty Pier Dover. At 0230 we shifted billet and secured for the night for which I was very grateful as we had been running continuously for over three days and I had had no to the Engine and provisions and water were embarked. At sleep for 90 hours. On Saturday temporary repairs were effected 1700
I proceeded to Ramsgate with HEBE in company arriving Harbour. at 2000, where as I could not anchor I secured in the Inner
On Sunday and Monday 2nd & 3rd June respectively permanent repairs were effected to the Engine and Capatan. were When all skoots were brought to immediate notice in case they required again it was decided that FRISO was not sufficiently reliable and so was left in the Inner Harbour.
I cannot speak too highly of my crew who worked without break. The 0 nly men being onboard at the were continuously, and on Friday were in the Boats for 7½ time hours my First a Lieutenant one seamen and the E.R.A. and myself.
I have the honour to be,
VICE ADMIRAL
Sir,
0JUN1940
Your obedient servant,
*
*
DOVER
B
Gene Lymmus.
Lieutenant.
To the Vice Adminal
Royal Navy.
Dorn.

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289.
-
83
NARRATIVE OF DUTCH BOAT "JAVA"
26th May - 4th June, 1940.
0645, 27th May, the crew of D.B.22 under the command of
Lieut-Commander Drake, RND left Chatham Barracks and travelled via
Portsmouth to Southampton, joining "Java" that evening. The vessel was then under repair, with orders on completion to load ammunition in the River.
On the afternoon of 29th May those orders were cancelled and we were instructed to fuel and proceed light to Dover.
Accordingly about 1700 with Main and Auxilliary machinery persuaded to function by Diesel experts from the shore "Java" left dock and proceeded down the Solent to Hamble.
At 0400 on 30th May our troubles started. Our final air pressure started the Main Engine and we left with the handicap of being able neither to stop or go astern as the belt driving our
Auxilliarys parted immediately. Eventually our Auxilliary
Diesel was started and ran all day for light and air with the result that shortly before arrival at Dover our E.R.A. collapsed owing to fumes. As our Windlass gear was already out of action the ship was allowed alongside and on the morning of 31st May
"Sandhurst" was notified of our defects. By this time our
Auxilliary engine also had ceased running.
The Main belt was renewed, but as regards the other and major defects, notably our Ballast Pump, it was pointed out that as they would take several hours to complete and we were under
1 hours' notice for sea, it was not worth starting on them.
On Saturday morning, 1st June Lieut-Commander Drake was taken ill and detained sick in "Sandhurst".
I received orders that afternoon to proceed to Dunkirk to arrive at 0200 on 2nd June and left at 1945, steaming 10 knots with neither Auxilliary nor Anchor gear working. My confidence in our new belt was apparently misplaced as being too slack it failed to drive the Compressor. This lack of air and consequent inability, if stopped, to restart, either ahead or astern, might have led to complications if, at midnight, 16 miles off Dunkirk,
No.3 Cylinder had not commenced to seize, shedding bolts from the Crankcase which my Engineroom staff eventually held in place with wedges. But our speed was down to 5 knots making an 0200
arrival impossible and I had no choice but to put about, but a for minuteslater however presumably with the Engine cooling, some higher revolutions were obtained, and I receeded another 5 miles towards the shore. Again however the Engine failed and it was only at slow speed and with great care that it could be kept moving at all. Considering further progress unwise I cruised in the neighbourhood until daylight and then made the best of my way home, berthing in Dover about 1015, 2nd June. Here repairs were considered impossible and on Tuesday, 4th June I was towed by "Gorecht" to Sheerness and on the following day by "Bornrif"
to Tilbury, thence the following morning to Surrey Commercial Docks
ADNIRAL
Havri
DOVER 14JUN 1940
ft. R.N.V.R.

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"VREDE"
Page 8.
150
144
From
8. On-closing the Naval Control Service cutter off Southend
Route Instructions and Sailing Orders were received to arrive off Marte les Bains, 5 miles East of Dunkirk, not before 2300.
As there was time in hand "Vrede" was anchored in the Downs in company with several other commandeered schoots at 1830.
9. I was informed by the Commanding Officer of "REIGER" that the
N.C.S. trawler off the North Goodwin Light Vessel had told him to turn back, the trawler having been told by another schoot that Dunkirk was in enemy hands. The B.B.C. news bulletin gave no guidance, nor could I get any information from other ships present, so I eventually sailed with "Reiger" at 1400
with the idea of complying with sailing orders if the situation permitted.
IO. Owing to the darkness and to the failure of several light buoys "Vrede" took the ground at the inshore end of the
ZUYDECOOTE PASS. Attempts to refloat her proving abortive it was decided to wait for the flood tide.
II. During this time many ships were seen entering and leaving within two cables of where "Vrede" lay aground and at 0030 &
large merchant ship was seen to encounter two ships leaving.
This first ship blew three short blasts and went astern. Shortly afterwards there was a dull explosion, without any flame,and when the resultant water and spray subsided nothing could be seen of the ship. As it was impossible to assist from where
"Vrede" lay aground, and as other vessels were in the vicinity, no action was taken.
I2. At 0400 "Vrede" was refloated by the tide and allowed to drift to a safe anchorage where the air bottles might be recharged. While at anchor an unidentified destroyer approached and hailed an order to proceed inshore to the beach as soon as possible and embark troops.
IS. At 0500 "Vrede" was anchored as close inshore as the shelving nature of the beach permitted. Both dinghies were lowered and sent to cooperate with several motor launches which proved to be
Margate pleasure boats manned by their Margate crews. These men were absolutely tireless and cheerful under the most trying conditions, receiving troops from the dinghies and ferrying them to the ships. In thes manner some 150 officers tiredbut cheerful officers and men were embarked, including a Belgian major with whom we had some difficulty owing to the impossibility of drying his corsets. The motor launches were withdrawn by other authority at about 0930 and as one of the dinghies had been wrecked and it was impossible to get nearer to the beach than about 3/4 mile I decided the operation could best be served by embarking troops from Dunkirk, whence many other ships were proceeding.
I4. I entered Dunkirk harbour at I030 Wednesday 29th. May and secured alongside the eastern breakwater. Approximately 500
troops, our full capacity, were embarked during which operation several minor bombing attacks took place, none of which obtained hits nearer than the central pier.
I5. As only

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260
650 Troops.
June.
246
ntd)
At 2000 received orders Dover Most Secret Memorandum No.
A.14/0/40.) to proceed to vicinity of Bray to lend support and covering fire. Owing to low visibility and necessity for oiling before starting "Locust" was one hour late in position. Took ship close inshore but coast was very misty and no targets could be seen. Heavy small arm firing was heard in Bray, which was also being shelled from apparently the village of Furnes. After some waiting "Locust" was fired at by machine guns from a position approximately half way between the foreshore and Adinkerke. This was replied to by 0.5 machine gun fire from "Locust". Further fire was directed at the ship from the direction of La Panne, and this was answered with 4" H.E.
I then attempted to silence shore batteries which were shelling
Bray from Furnes, and 30 rounds of 4" H.E were fired. This apparently achieved some result as the firing died down, and several explosions causing fires were observed.
June. 0300. Ceased firing and proceeded.
0350. Tug "Fossa" signalled she was ashore and required assistance. In attempting to close, "Locust" took the ground but same off again, and I decided it was impracticable to close "Fossa".
A Motor Landing craft was therefore hailed and brought alongside induth and her troops, 51 in mumber were transferred to "Locust", and the theathear
M.L.C was sent to rescue the crew of the Tug, and any troops she may had on board.
0450. Proceeded, and at 0545 overtook a small armed yacht in the charge of a Major R.A, who had 28 mén with him. Party was transferred to "Locust", and Major gave information that covering fire of "Locust" had been effective.
1005. Arrived Dover, and disembarked 79 Troops.
1820. Slipped and proceeded to Dunkirk Harbour.
2223. Went alongside East Mole, Dunkirk and commenced embarkation of British Troops.
2302. Sailed with 650 British and 70 French Troops.
June.
0408. Arrived Dover.
1845. Slipped and proceeded.
2300. Anchored off Dunkirk Mole and commenced embarking troops from Motor boats.
June. 0015. Demolition party consisting of Lieutenant Holdsworth and
6 men left by Motor boat for wreck of "Mosquito". On arrival it was found that the wreck was submerged to the level of the battery deck, and despite repeated efforts of Lieut. Holdsworth who attempted to enter the Captain's Quarters, the forward charge had to be placed in the wheelhouse. The after charge was placed in the after magazine. The demolition party were working under great difficulties due to the movement of the wreck in the swell, and to the darkness, and great initiativewas displayed by P.T.O. Lieut.

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472
an open with soldiers was off hailed. He reported having picked with during daylight. boat in tow About half-way across a French trawler boat up for h ich Dunkirk and it was thought this might the be the boat we were searching. To make sure we barge with set were found approximately three miles from proceeded to sail Dunkirk where хихария two open boats and a Thames the coast. The first open boat yielded five Spanieards, the second one about 6 soldiers, Belgian, French and English. We then went alongside the Thames barge at approximately 1330.
This was found to contain about 220
soldiers including two Colonels and a Major of Artillery, and various wounded. They were endeavouring to sail to England but had made approximately three miles in 10 hours, see note below.
Motor-mechanic Whittaker fitted a new piston to the air compressor motor while the 1st Lieut. and myself trimmed the sails.
They had no charts on board. The air compressor motor was made to run but all efforts to start the diesel failed.
I then left my lst.Lieut., SublLieut. Dehammel with instructions to sail the barge to Dover,and proceeded along the coast having opened up the distance to search for the "Girl Gladys".
About two miles to the east I found an open boat containing 18
soldiers who were embarked, after which we approached to withing approximately three miles of the coast slightly to the eastward of La Panne. Visibility was good and no sign of the drifter could be seen, the search was therefore abandoned and course was set to intercept the Thames barge.
At approximately 1720 when out of sight of land we were attacked by eight six or eight dive-bombers, 20 to 30 bombs were dropped and fell at distances varying from 10 to 50 yards of the ship.
The bombers appeared to attack in pairs out of the sun and having released their bombs continued their dive firing machineguns.
Course was altered frequently in an endeavour to miss the bombs.
Some appeared to explode after entering the water, some on striking the surface and a certain appeared not to explode at all.
One exploded under the bow right ahead and the ship passed through the splash. A certain amount of discomfort was experienced by myself and members of the crew who were exposed. to the splash in the x eyes for the next twelve hours or 30.
Able-Seaman Power was wounded in the leg when manning the port turrett also one of the soldiers in the fore peak. As I now had wounded on board I considered it advisable to return to Dover forthwith and to ask for assistance for the barge. A tug was sent out at approximately 2100 and found the barge sailing well about 10 miles from Dover. I consider Sub Lieut, DeHammel performed a very creditable operation. The bombing to which the ship had been subjected had caused leaks to the hull and the petrol tank and the ship was not used again for that night's operation.
on passage to Dunkirk.
0115 Arrived Dunkirk and embarked C.O's of block-ships and Captain Dangerfield.
Carried out reconnaissance of the harbour.