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440
APPENDIX 5.
RAMSGATE & MARGATE : DYNAMO OPERATION.
R.N.V.R. by arrangement with Rear Admiral A. H. Taylor.
Narrative account prepared by Temp. Lieut. A. Dann,
l
any viling activitien UE IIID OVII particular
unit or section, and only with the passing of time will the
expert be able to piece together the various reports of all who
took part.
This is the story of the small motor-boats and the part
they played, but even here a connected narrativeis difficult,
if not impossible. Each boat with its own tiny crew was thrown
more or less upon its own resources; and upon the fortunes of
war and the initiative of each boat's captain depends the story
each may subsequently tell.
From all around the compass they came. From up the river,
along the coast, from the yachting harbours, the pleasure
beaches, Naval ports and fishing towns - anything that would
'float, move under its own power, and collect a dozen men or so
from the beaches where they waited.
The first assembly to gather at Sheerness was typical of the
whole of this miniature armada. A dozen or so of motor yachts
from 20' to 50' in length; nicely equipped and smartly
maintained by proud individual owners; a cluster of cheap
jobs" mainly the work of amateur craftsmen who had

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441
To present a comprehensive view of the whole of the naval
operations at Dunkirk between May 27th and June 5th is a task
for the historian. No man who took an active part can hope
to describe anything beyond the activities of his own particular
unit or section, and only with the passing of time will the
expert be able to piece together the various reports of all who
took part.
This is the story of the small motor-boats and the part
they played, but even here a connected narrativeis difficult,
if not impossible. Each boat with its own tiny crew was thrown
more or less upon its own resources; and upon the fortunes of
war and the initiative of each boat's captain depends the story
each may subsequently tell.
From all around the compass they came. From up the river,
along the coast, from the yachting harbours, the pleasure
beaches, Naval ports and fishing towns - anything that would
float, move under its own power, and collect a dozen men or SO
from the beaches where they waited.
The first assembly to gather at Sheerness was typical of the
whole of this miniature armada. A dozen or so of motor yachts
from 20' to 50' in length; nicely equipped and smartly
maintained by proud individual owners; a cluster of cheap
"conversion jobs" mainly the work of amateur craftsmen who had
set to work in their spare time to convert a ship's lifeboat
or any old half-discarded hull into a cabin cruiser of sorts
for week-end trips on the quiet waters of the up-river reaches.

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16
hoping bullet holes therby I gave when to flood orders the to engine flood all ballsst the is
I the tide rose.
recognition giving signal the tables and the route the
secured the charts and burnt
boarded KaapFalga where I took over command
before order to abandon ship, order, then
refloating Kaap Falga.
from Liett .Culmer R.N.V.R. who had succeeded in
It was now about 1630/29 and there
was no sign of life on the beaches as everyone was
still taking cover due to aidcraft overhead.
We proceeded due north from La Panne
over the sandbanks into Nieuport Roads, as I
had been imformed by Major P.De Havilland that
the Zudycote Channel was under fire.
The presence of enemy sircraft overhead
prevented the destroyers sighted from stopping
to receive our message. The destroyers were,
however, steaming in the direction of Dunkirk,
Which I assumed to be in German Hands and I
assumed that they had somehow heard of the fall of
Dunkirk., and were on their way to Bombard.
I then decided not to return to Bray
Beaches that night, because:-
1. According to my imformation there
would be no troops there to receive our stores.
2. If they wanted food at La Panne the
Alice was still aground with 250 tons aboard,
which I was unable to destroy by fire due to the
proximity of the Able Tasman with munitions aboard.
3. Major De Havilland's message was still
underlivered.
.Kaap Falga had a deck cargo of over 20 tons
and the crew of Alice and the other four soldiers
took up nearly all the available space.
Kaap Falga reported arrival in Downs at
0300/29th through H.M.S. Holdfast on examination
service.
NO orders were received and about 1200/31
I steamed Kaap Falga to Dover, where I reported to
the Dynamo Operation Room.
which was completed by 0900/1st fell June.
It was decided to unload Kaap Falga,
During operation the unloading one Army Stevedore drowned.
off the in the dark and was made.)
( A separate jetty report has already been
stand to At Dunkerk leaving there of evacuation. later
1600/1 KaapFalga was ordered not to
than 0300/2 by go to this was the last night throttle
as two hours funning at a to
asphyxiating the engine room fumes and gaoke This coming pipe from was a red pipe
After had to be evacuated due
leading off the silencer. close past the ready used use fuel
hot tanks and and since pump it only led slow speed of fire. could be
owing to Ship the serious anchored at danger anchor off Ramsgatea all effect night at repairs about as even if
2130/1 expert and aid remained could be obtained reach to Dunkirk by 0300/2.
it capable to engine, officers was block now which of the from The I maintaining impossible was maximum running for speed to was Dover and 5 imformed I next afternoon empty 50 the reckoned to silencer 70 ship. me degrees KaapFalga that were Engineer not the badly wishing
centigrade
coked up'.
Kaap above Falga normal, was not therefore employed that

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129
114
From :- R.M.Maclean Master S/S King George V
Yes
To
:- Naval Officer in Charge, Ramsgate.
Whilst entering Dunkirk on Saturday June 1st there was
a severe air attack onthe ship. This ship had four Lewis guns
but only three gunners. D.MacKinnor A.B. immediately manned the
seaman to man Lewis gun and show such remarkable coolness
spare gun and blazed away like an expert. For & Merchant Navy
and iniative under a heavy bombing and flying shrapnel was deserving
of all praise.

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130
FOI
Depramo 196.
- BI-II de shall de Deverent firth normal
115
opening outs octo Vd essessed , of obser 0'10"
am and
"LADY OF MANN"
May. 8th 1940.
JI
P.S.T.O. Transport Dover Office
129
114
From :- R.M.Maclean Master S/S King George V
Yes
To
:- Naval Officer in Charge, Ramsgate.
a severe air D.MacKinnor A.B. immediately Merchant Navy the
Whilst attack onthe ship. This ship had four manned guns
entering Dunkirk on Saturday June 1st Lewis there was
but only three and blazed gunners. away like an expert. For a coolness
and seaman iniative to man under a heavy bombing and flying shrapnel was deserving
spare gun Lewis gun and show such remarkable
of all praise.
well
King George IVI
chal org Mule
KGP 15 walk as
kking.
Mastes. Robert McCullum Mchean
5
Ch. officer. Malcoln Black.
"C
Ch.
Enginee,
William he Gregor
1/-
C
He,

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441
To present a comprehensive view of the whole of the naval
operations at Dunkirk between May 27th and June 5th is as task
for the historian. No man who took an active part can hope
to describe anything beyond the activities of his own particular
unit or section, and only with the passing of time will the
expert be able to piece together the various reports of all who
took part.
This is the story of the small motor-boats and the part
they played, but even here a connected narrative is difficult,
if not impossible. Each boat with its own tiny crew was thrown
more or less upon its own resources; and upon the fortunes of
war and the initiative of each boat's captain depends the story
each may subsequently tell.
From all around the compass they came. Prom up the river,
along the coast, from the yachting harbours, the pleasure
beaches, Naval porta and fishing towns - anything that would
float, move under its am power, and collect a dozen men or 80
from the beaches where they waited.
The Meat assembly to gather at Sheerness was typical of the
she tlyuermads. A dozen or so of motor yachts
esquipped and amartly
erund a cluster of cheap
itin supueur craftamen who had
sng tound a ship's lifeboat
a that cruiser of sorts
as 1 cruioze up-river reaches.
anotell.

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MINISTRY OF SHIPPING.
2239) 1/40
In Riggs (7040) STNbls
2000 pads Mail N T5913
MINISTRY OF SHIPPING.
OUT
of
CONFIDENTIAL.
MESSAGE.
DATE
1805/8.
No. 0631
OUT
To
3082180,
DATE 8. 6. 40.
N.O.I.C. RAMSGATE
SENT
C. IN C. NORE 81.
V.A. DOVER 226.
SENT
P/L BY T/P.
more
Prom-
From Admiralty D.S.V.P.
liynes
out
Request names of motor boats released from Dynamo
suitable reasin for the A/P service may be reported as and when
Tag
ready 0222 for service. Crews will be arranged and vessels
visa
should to be sailed for Brightlingses when ready, If. J.I.C.
is requested to report or 1f he is unable to repair any
of the Motor Boats in reasonably short time.
ORR possen.
= 1805/8.
VISIZER,
ESSEDER,
for D.S.V.P. (777)
D.S.V.P. MAINAKH II, BARRIRA,
D. of S.T.
M.O.S.I. ($) :
D.M.S. PANDORA, GAY ORDUADER, D.O.S.T.
M. (2)
Mr. D.H. Edwards
(ASSION) 38556/109 2008 Pede 2008 Pade HW M.P.L.A. 02-2568
A.U.R. LUILIES, State Du Boisson
D.P.S. (2)
Mr. Eaking
D.D.T.M. SIBUAPORE, SHOUL, LADE W.S.T.N.63
Extra copy
LATONA, HABBAYAU, HAIAD MEMBER, DES
RB. 616, HERA, USAUGO, MOTOYA, Lieus,
Commender Dusting should expert at star bourter
have renched Teddington,
for
(3)
D.S.V.F.(S)
D.of S.T. (S.T.N.6B)
T.S.D. (Capt.Oliver)
E.O.S.I.(3)
8.0.%
D.O.S.T.
D.P.S.(2)
Mr. D.H.Edwords.
D.N.S.
N. J.D. walker.
D.D.T.S.
Hr. A.L.Moore.
D.N.C.
Sub the Reg.Bath.
quina longh's
Mr. Du Boisson.
S.T.N.2.
D.N.C.Bath
S.T.N.41.
peo(s) the is alter at put in
S.T.N.63.
Capt. mashleigh.
Extre.
HH/-
can ont item we

Details

II.
16
hoping bullet holes therby I gave when to flood orders the to engine flood of
I the tide rose.
recognition signal the tables and the route the
secured the charts and burnt
boarded KaapFalga where I took over command
before giving order to abandon ship, order, then
refloating Kaap Falga.
from Liett Culmer R.N.V.R. who had succeeded in
It was now about 1630/29 and there
was no sign of life on the beaches as everyone was
still taking cover due to aidcraft overhead.
We proceeded due north from La Panne
over the sandbanks into Nieuport Roads, as I
had been imformed by Major P.De Havilland that
the Zudycote Channel was under fire.
The presence of enemy sircraft overhead
prevented the destroyers sighted from stopping
to receive our message. The destroyers were,
however, steaming in the direction of Dunkirk,
Which I assumed to be in German Hands and I
assumed that they had somehow heard of the fall of
Dunkirk. and were on their way to Bombard.
I then decided not to return to Bray
Beaches that night, because:-
1. According to my imformation there
would be no troops there to receive our stores.
2. If they wanted food at La Panne the
Alice was still aground with 250 tons aboard,
which I was unable to destroy by fire due to the
proximity of the Able Tasman with munitions aboard.
3. Major De Havilland's message was still
underlivered.
,Kaap Falga had a deck cargo of over 20 tons
and the crew of Alice and the other four soldiers
took up nearly all the available space.
Kaap Falga reported arrival in Downs at
0300/29th through H.M.S. Holdfast on examination
service.
NO orders were received and about 1200/31
I steamed Kaap Falga to Dover, where I reported to
the Dynamo Operation Room.
It was decided to unload Kaap Falga,
which operation was completed by 0900/1st fell June.
During the unloading one Army Stevedore
off the jetty in the dark and was drowned.
( A separate report has already been made.)
stand At Dunkerk leaving there not later
1600/1 KaapFalga was ordered to
than 0300/2 by to go to this was the last night throttle of evacuation.
After as two hours funning at I to
the had to be evacuated due a
hot leading off the led close past the ready be used use fuel
asphyxiating silencer. This pipe was
engine room fumes and gmoke coming from red pipe
tanks and and since pump it only slow speed fire. could
2130/1 Ship remained at anchor all effect night repairs even if
owing to the serious anchored danger off Ramsgatea of at about as
expert and aid could be obtained to Dunkirk by 0300/2.
it was now impossible to reach I reckoned KaapFalga
capable officers to block of the from The I maintaining sailed maximum for speed was Dover 5 imformed next knots. 50 empty to afternoon 70 ship. me degrees that were Engineer not the badly
wishing
engine, centigrade which above was normal, and the silencer that
coked up'.
Kaap Falga was not therefore employed