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Details

MOST SECRET
99
PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN FRENCH AND BRITISH
NAVAL AUTHORITIES FOR THE EVACUATION OF THE FRENCH
AND BRITISH ARMIES FROM DUNKERQUE AND VICINITY.
The timing and order in which British and French
troops will be evacuated must be decided by mutual agreement
between Lord Gort and General Blanchard.
20-
Vice Admiral, Dover, will be responsible for
regulating the sailing of French and British vessels to
Dunkerque for loading.
30-
Admiral Abrial ( with Rear Admiral Platon, Governor
of Dunkerque, under his orders) is the only authority in charge
of all arrangements for berthing and loading ships at
Dunkerque and on the coast. Captain Tennant is under
Admiral Abrial orders for arranging for berthing, loading etc.
of British vessels.
400
A French Naval Staff will be placed at Dover, for
handling this side of evacuation, under the orders of
Vice Admiral Ramsay.
5.-
All naval means for evacuation shall be shared between
Dover and Dunkerque.
+
60-
The French Navy will send big transports to
Scuthampton or where necessary to evacuate to France
as
fast as possible, all troops arriving by smaller ships at
Dover and other places in the vicinity. Troops will be sent
by train, when disembarked, to the next port of embarkation.
70-
British and French Admiralty agree that evacuation
will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, without
(a) Adequate air protection.
(b) Re-occupation of the coast from Dunkerque to
Griz Nez, gained by a counter attack OD land
forces combined with a naval operation.
Dover,
27th. May 1940.

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Lieutenant Derek Peel Willan
H.M.S.
you publication in
next
authorised for press
eutenant
Navy, H
Lieut
London gayelte Supplement
H
Me
wahicdrow
čorrectionsindicated below are made in the notification which
appeared The in Supplementary London Gazette No 34925, dated 16th August, 19
1940:-
0
Page 5064.
the heading To be Companions of the Distinguished Service Order.
I Hall
Havy
should
3
Second Sea Lord.
On reading F.O.C.Dover's report quoted in the letter from
the Governor of the Isle of Man, the Admiralty shared the
view of the Governor and no award was made to "Manxman" at
the time (Gasette 16.8.40). Early in January however the
abbed X.
Admirality received from the Ministry of Shipping a copy of a
letter addressed to the Ministry, on 31st December 194.0, by
the Mercantile Marine Service Association. In the light
of this letter it appeared that an injustice might have
been done, possibly through misunderstanding on the part of
the Sea Transport Officer, and F. O.C. Dover was asked to
abbed T.
enquire and report.
abbed 2.
His reply exonerated Captain Cowley and he was avarded a
Mention in Despatches and sent a letter informing him of this
and expressing regret at the misunderstanding. A certificate
of his Mention WD.S also sent to him.
For come months the mistake cost Cantain Cowley not only
his employment but also his reputation. It is hoped that
Lord Granville will now use his great influence in the Isle
of Man to help restore Captain Cowley's good name.
12th May, 1941.
Captain
Transport LevenwoRd.val Navy, H.M.S. Codrington.
Lieutenant Arthur Alan Whitshed Pollard,

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(En clair)
DISTRIBUTION A AND EMPAX.
From: MOROCCO.
FROM TANGIER TO FOREION OFFICE.
Mr. Gascoigne
D. 1.17 p.m. 30th April, 1941.
No. EMPAX.
30th April, 1941.
R. 7.05 p.m. 30th April, 1941.
Depeche Marocaine of 30th April publishes offensive
anti-British article from Vichy. Heading as follows: "A page
of history. The truth on the epio of Dunkirk. Chivalrous
Mr. Churchill claims for the British Army the honour of
co-operating in covering the retreat of Allied troops. 3a
disregards the orders he gave. Admiral Darlan had to intervene
directly with Churchill in order that the British Nest should
not abandon one hundred thousand Frenchmen". Summary of
article as follows:
(Begins): Gaullist propaganda during last for days had
claimed that France should be grateful to her former Allies for
help given latter during tragedy of Dunkisk. During Supreme
War Council held Paris end May, 1940, Churchill had in
chivalrous manner insisted that British troops should fight but side
by execution the British military Commanders Hill had
side with French poilus to cover retreat towards adopted Duskirk
different British help could only be given *as Admiral
in actual tactics. During Supreme Council General much $
stated that General Cort, however, had informed his best Abrial,
Governor of best division. Following day immediately Alexander leaving
possible". Dunkirk, that he would send to latter General
General and his battalion which he embarked complete the
arrived with one duty of defending position. tragedy, To National
precise to French and alone irrefutable today exposé following of Dunkirk new at particulare: Dunking had The
French radio broadcast what conditions French army armies without
assistance covered from British Army, assistance Navy had first refused then
have stated rearguard in and evacuation of Allied which had been promised.
accepted to evacuations. participate Because this It Dunkirk operation
We haveralso stated how British during last 48 is necessary hours in one that of all most 10
will give French you and British THE Prench. repeat
possible difficult light statistics should be of Dankirk AP# I aloguent. 204,000
Darlan operations England. troops British night these 31st May 1st figures which that Darlan beach soldiers June Sands should some had sent Gort (sic). and announced have THE only of THE the I to consider Supreme On and Connoil, telegrams Admiralty had the Alexander arrived to French Impossible request at abandoning 'As varaed 1.45 appoaed and in remain that his During must of on to
THE soldiers Admiral what Dunkirk last THE Churchill in wall and day only of and 224,000 35,000 vigarous night French from
THE sare June/
3rd/4th June. by reason avacuated 3rd/4th
was

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456
7.
426
The "bombardments" continued incessantlyduring the next day
nd more hangars and buildings in the dock area were either destroyed
I set on fire, one of the results being thatthe crews of our ships
entirely disappeared and more often than not were never seen again
702
resumably evacuating themselves in one personnel ship or another as
hese ships were still embarking & certain number of refugees. It was
9615
think on the morning of the 26th that I found the troops who were
lischarging a storeship beating a retreat from an abri in which they had
aken shelter during a raid and which was almost entirely surrounded by
fire. It was the same morning that I found the M.V.Spinnel alongside
hangar which was burning furiously - both the contents and the build-
ng itself. I decided that the vessel must be moved into a safer berth
поілтодото
further along the same quay but clear of flames. The only member of the
rew who could be found was the chief mate (an Irishman)and with the
Assistance of & handful of soldiers and an abandoned R.A.F. lorry we
managed to tow her some 200 yards up the jetty and clear of any danger.
It was during the same day that I was informed that the Tristram look
ates had been so badly damaged that they would have to be removed and
he port would have perforce to become tidal. In view of this added
ifficulty the Amiral du Nord (Admiral Abrial) appointed & port commission
to
onsisting of:-
rench representatives
aptain .Etienne Chiou (?) Chief of Staff to Admiral Abrial
Director of Port
..Delattre
Engineer of the Port.
aptain Kernheis
Police de Navigation
olonel Memel
Representing the Governor of the Town
aptain Ladent
Military authorities.
ritish representatives
BACALIER
Ich
100928

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7.
359
The "bombardments" continued incessantlyduring the next day
and more hangars and buildings in the dock area were either destroyed
or set on fire, one of the results being thatthe crews of our ships
entirely disappeared and more often than not were never seen again
presumably evacuating themselves in one personnel ship or another as
these ships were still embarking & certain number of refugees. It vas
I think on the morning of the 25th that I found the troops who were
discharging a storeship beating & retrest from an abri In which they had
taken shelter during a raid and which was almost entirely surrounded by
a fire. It was the same morning that I found the .Spinnel alongside
a hangar which was burning furiously - both the contents and the build-
ing itself. I decided that the vessel must be moved into a safer berth
further along the same quay but clear of flames. The only member of the
crew who could be found was the chief mate (an Irishman)and with the
assistance of of handful of soldiers and an abandoned B.A.F. lorry we
managed to tow her some 200 yards up the jetty and clear of any danger.
It was during the same day that I was informed that the Tristram look
gates had been 80 badly damaged that they would have to be removed and
the port would have perforce to become tidal. In view of this added
difficulty the Amiral du Nord (Admiral Abrial) appointed a port commissio
consisting of:-
French representatives
Captain Chicu (?) Director Chief of of Staff Port to Admiral Abrial
M.Ktienne
Engineer of the Port.
Police de Navigation
Representing the Governor of the Town
Military authorities.
Captain Ladent
British represented,
3
7.
COI
Vg

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119
ALL QUOTATIONS, CONTRACTS, &C., SUBJECT TO USUAL STRIKE, LOOK-OUT, AND ACCIDENT CLAUSES. 123
BENTLEY'S PHRASE.
CODES:
BOE.
K
TELECRAMS: "KELPY, BELFAST."
57481 (3 LINES)
TELEPHONE: Nos
57484 (TRUNKS)
essq
67
stock
JOHN KELLY LIMITED,
STATION STREET,
COAL IMPORTERS
QUEEN'S QUAY,
AND
STEAMSHIP OWNERS.
BELFAST. 18th September, 1940.
BUOI
BRANCHES,
THE DOCKS, WARRENPOINT,
PM/EK.
GOVERNOR'S PLACE, CARRICKFERGUS,
WHITEABBEY,
54, FOYLE STREET, LONDONDERRY.
307, TOWER BUILDING, LIVERPOOL.
Director of Sea Transport,
Ministry of Shipping, (HO),
W RECEIVE 17/18/19 IDENTIFICATION
LONDON.
Dear Sir,
We thank you for your T.M. 6213/40/STA6 of 15th
inst. acknowledging receipt of the report from the Master of
our S.S. "CLEWBAY" on the part which that vessel played in the
Dunkirk evacuation.
We have just discovered a mistake towards the
end of that report at 2 a.m. 29/8/40. This should read 29th
May, 1940. The vessel commenced discharging at 8 a.m. 30th May
and finished discharging 31st May instead of August.
Yours faithfully,
For JOHN KELLY, LIMITED.
PwCormick
tide was ebb, it being about 21/2 hours after high water.
When I arrived in Dunkerque Roads there were a large
number of other vessels in the vicinity, both large and small.
There was some confusion owing to the heavy bombardment
from the shore and the activity of hostile aircraft.
Just after 11 p.m. I heard the sound of a heavy
collision close to my vessel.
-1-
F.T.O

Details

ALL QUOTATIONS. CONTRACTS, &c., SUBJECT TO USUAL STRIKE, LOCK-OUT, AND ACCIDENT CLAUSES.
114
BENTLEY'S PHRASE.
BOE.
20 Nonday,
K
CODES:
TELEGRAMS: "KELPY, BELFAST."
TELEPHONE: Nos< 57481 (3 LINES)
57484 (TRUNKS)
STATION STREET,
84
JOHN KELLY LIMITED,
COAL IMPORTERS
QUEEN'S QUAY,
AND
STEAMSHIP OWNERS.
BELFAST, 9th September, 1940.
BRANCHES,
WC
THE DOCKS, WARRENPOINT,
GOVERNOR'S PLACE, CARRICKFERGUS,
EK.
WHITEABBEY,
54, FOYLE STREET, LONDONDERRY.
Your ref: T.M.6213/40/.S.T.A.6.
307, TOWER BUILDING, LIVERPOOL.
The Director of Sea Transport,
Ministry of Shipping,
LONDON.
Dear Sir,
In reply to yours of 7th ult. enclosed please
find an account given by the Master of our steamer "CLEWBAY",
of the part that vessel played at the time of the Dunkirk
evacuation.
We trust it will be of value to you in compiling
the records you intend to keep of that outstanding occasion.
Yours faithfully,
For W. Cameron JOHN KELLY, LTD.
MARINE SUPERINTENDENT.
16/17/19
14
RECEIVED
of
1940
Encl.
near bombs exploding everywhere
ashore.
At 12 midnight, high water, I steamed between the piers
to carry out my orders, but no sooner had I got between the piers
and attempting to make fast. when two bombs exploded in the channel
astern of me. One was very close as the rebound of the sea from the
explosion came right over our quarter deck. I remained there for
about 15 minutes thinking still to make a landing and try and connect
with the British Naval authorities, but just as I got alongside the
CONTINUED.