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TNA / ADM 199 790

TNA ADM 199 790

TNA ADM 199 790
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 790

Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, dating from 1940.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 790
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/790. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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List page 1 of 1 Showing document pages 755–755 of this collection
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264
276
have off a the few boats. At this time I got a signal
I at this part of doing the essential work and that there were
I was beaches were to proceed to Dunkirk but that as many men and coast to be evacuated I decided to ignore the signal, proceed with the evacuation. There were at and/cross arrived. The embarkation arrangements were first no other channel transports boa on the beach but later a paddle minesweeper most inadequate the other only about 3 power boats of doubtful efficiency were present and boats consisted of a few service boats mercantile between the loto It was only due to the magnificent work of the boats and Royal Engineers Ferry Boats do with very few seamen ratings
Army units at this part of the beach who were admirably led by their
Officers. that embarkation was able to proceed at any sort of speed, although the work of the naval officers 10 were present in few power boats available was beyond praise. These appeared to be no centralised control either of boats or beach. During the afternoon and evening there was a certain amount of enemy air activity but enemy planes always moved away when A/A fire was brought to bear on them, and there were frequent visitations by British
Fighters which appeared to have an excellent deterrant effect. No bombs were dropped in my vicinity.
At about 2000 a short but heavy artillery fire was brought to bear on the part of the beach near to Dunkirk and many men started to swim out to the ships or come out in very inadequate boats.
I weighed anchor in the "Royal Eagle" - as the tide was approaching high tide and proceeded as close in shore as possible to pick up these men. At about 2200 when no further men were coming to the ship and "Royal Eagle" was packed to nearly full capacity - 1.e. every covered in part of ship full and men also on the upper deck forward and aft, I decided to weigh and proceed to Sheerness rather than
Margate on account of the ships requirements in oil and water which at Margate would have taken too long to complete. I consider now that on this day I committed a serious error of judgement as in view of the poor embarkation facilities I should have ordered "Royal
Eagle" to ground herself in shore at low water and fill up my boats running between the ship and shore on a line and then have floated off and proceeded as the tide rose, or alternatively I might have grounded /Royal Eagle" to form a pier to facilitate embarkation by other ships when they arrived. I consider now on looking back that the provision of some sort of pier should have been a matter of primary importance.
In view of the shelling of the beaches from the Westward I
decided to proceed back by route "y" particularly as this was the only route known by experience. Shortly after leaving a report was received of M.T.B.'s off Bray but I then considered that it was too late to turn back. After passing Middelkerke Buoy the ship was attacked by an aircraft firing machine gun but I gave orders that no firing was to take place so that thereshould be less chance of giving away 10 ships position to M.T.B. The ship was not hito
During the night I passed three small dark vessels which I believed were French Torpedo Boats. I did not challenge but kept guns trained on them. About 0230 on 31st May there were signs of firing about
10 miles astern and about five minutes later a tremendous column of flame rose from the water. I consider now that I was to blame in using route "Y" and that I unduly hazarded the ship by so doing.
On arrival at Sheerness at 0600 I found that in response to my request possible arrangement had been made for the reception the of the every and the cleaningofuelling and provisioning of hours ships working under conditions of high tension and ship. The troops company had had practically no sleep for about 48
been discomfort was very much appreciated. I cannot speak extreme and had been and the fact that such excellent arrangements had ships highly company. of the On both nights the whole of the ships accomodation too made by Shearness spirit and sense of duty shown by the officers and

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 755.

264
276
have off a the few boats. At this time I got a signal
I at this part of doing the essential work and that there were
I was beaches were to proceed to Dunkirk but that as
many men and coast to be evacuated I decided to
ignore the signal, proceed with the evacuation. There were at
and/cross arrived. The embarkation arrangements were
first no other channel transports boa on the beach but later a paddle minesweeper
most inadequate the other only about 3 power boats of doubtful efficiency were
present and boats consisted of a few service boats mercantile
between the loto It was only due to the magnificent work of the
boats and Royal Engineers Ferry Boats do with very few seamen ratings
Army units at this part of the beach who were admirably led by their
Officers. that embarkation was able to proceed at any sort of
speed, although the work of the naval officers 10 were present in
few power boats available was beyond praise. These appeared to be
no centralised control either of boats or beach. During the
afternoon and evening there was a certain amount of enemy air
activity but enemy planes always moved away when A/A fire was brought
to bear on them, and there were frequent visitations by British
Fighters which appeared to have an excellent deterrant effect. No
bombs were dropped in my vicinity.
At about 2000 a short but heavy artillery fire was brought to
bear on the part of the beach near to Dunkirk and many men started
to swim out to the ships or come out in very inadequate boats.
I weighed anchor in the "Royal Eagle" - as the tide was approaching
high tide and proceeded as close in shore as possible to pick up these
men. At about 2200 when no further men were coming to the ship
and "Royal Eagle" was packed to nearly full capacity - 1.e. every
covered in part of ship full and men also on the upper deck forward
and aft, I decided to weigh and proceed to Sheerness rather than
Margate on account of the ships requirements in oil and water which
at Margate would have taken too long to complete. I consider now
that on this day I committed a serious error of judgement as in
view of the poor embarkation facilities I should have ordered "Royal
Eagle" to ground herself in shore at low water and fill up my boats
running between the ship and shore on a line and then have floated
off and proceeded as the tide rose, or alternatively I might have
grounded /Royal Eagle" to form a pier to facilitate embarkation
by other ships when they arrived. I consider now on looking back
that the provision of some sort of pier should have been a matter
of primary importance.
In view of the shelling of the beaches from the Westward I
decided to proceed back by route "y" particularly as this was the
only route known by experience. Shortly after leaving a report was
received of M.T.B.'s off Bray but I then considered that it was too
late to turn back. After passing Middelkerke Buoy the ship was
attacked by an aircraft firing machine gun but I gave orders that
no firing was to take place so that thereshould be less chance of
giving away 10 ships position to M.T.B. The ship was not hito
During the night I passed three small dark vessels which I believed
were French Torpedo Boats. I did not challenge but kept guns trained
on them. About 0230 on 31st May there were signs of firing about
10 miles astern and about five minutes later a tremendous column of
flame rose from the water. I consider now that I was to blame in
using route "Y" and that I unduly hazarded the ship by so doing.
On arrival at Sheerness at 0600 I found that in response to my
request possible arrangement had been made for the reception the
of the every and the cleaningofuelling and provisioning of
hours ships working under conditions of high tension and
ship. The troops company had had practically no sleep for about 48
been discomfort was very much appreciated. I cannot speak
extreme and had been and the fact that such excellent arrangements had
ships highly company. of the On both nights the whole of the ships accomodation
too made by Shearness spirit and sense of duty shown by the officers and