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W. H. Case 7711
CASE 5458.
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VOL. V
RETURN TO
R.O.
Evacuation of Troops from Dunhuh
May- June 1940.
Su Volume I

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Inade W.H.Case 7711
base 545 54
VoL. 5

85.
NOI.
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7th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward herewith my Report of Proceedings in the Dunkirk area between the 27th May,
1940, and the 2nd June, 1940.
The Report has been made dp in the form of a
Daily Log with the more important signals included.
In addition I attach certain Appendices:-
(1) Activity of onemy sircraft.
(11) Officers who performed valuable services.
(111) Ratings who performed valuable services.
(iv) Ratings in the original party.
By good fortune the mission entruated to ne a the first place by the Admiralty and ultimately by ou was completed by 2300 on 2nd June, and I would like
0 record herewith that the chief factors responsible or this successful conclusion were 1-
(a) The ready help we always received from Dover whenever asked for.
(b) The fearlessness and splendid seamanship of destroyers and mineaweepers and nearly all the personnel ships coming to the pier.
(o) The help of Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker in distributing ships between the pfer and the beaches.
(d) The magnificent work of the Officers and men, and particularly of the pier party who worked with little rest for 7 days. or these, none is more deserving of praise than
Commander Clouston.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
*
Your obedient Servant,
(siqued) w Tennant
Captain, R.N.
.B. Ramsay,

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EMBARKATION OF THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Readquarters to the 100al situation.
unday, 26th May, 1940
hrit on firs, the being littered
P.M. of I was given details of arrangements being ade for the provision of shipping for the evacuation of the
.B.F. from Dunkirk and the beaches to the Eastward thereof,
Captain Jeffery, and at 6 p.m. I was ordered by V.C.N.S.
proceed to Dunkirk to take control of the naval shore barkstion parties. The officers and men of my party ty the pier and beaches proceeded direct to Dover.
in left London 8.35 p.m. for the Nore, and explained e Admiralty plan for embarkation to the Commander-in-Chief.
continued my journey to Dover early next morning where IL.O.
ceived my final instructions from V.A. Dover. After going cough the plan for embarkation with him I left Dover in
.S. WOLFHOUND at 1345 with 8 naval party consisting of officers and 160 ratings, plus signal staff. The weather fine and clear.
We proceeded North of the minefield - a voyage some 90 miles - and about half way over the first dive bing attack took place. These attacks continued at about fhour or 40-minute intervals until we reached Dunkirk at ut 1800. There were several very near misses but only to or damage was done to the ship. This was an unpleasant roduction to the war zone, and dive bombing was certainly alarming afloat than ashore, as we were soon to discover.
reaching Dunkirk we turned and proceeded alongside in the dle of a very heavy bombing attack.
I disembarked my party, divided them up into ions and told the officers in charge of each section to them round the port to make them less vulnerable to in the the ing attacks, while I proceeded to the Bastion Naval

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smallest for enery planes.
Headquarters to investigate the local situation.
It heavily to enbark # small
The town was half on fire, the streets being littered and the the beaches with wreckage of all kinds, and every window was smashed.
by The method, however, proved
Great palls of smoke from the oil depots and refineries so that 1t was used enveloped the docks and town itself. On our way up to couling along the beaches the Bastion we had to take shelter from two more raids to the by enemy bombers, the bombs from the last of which fell unpleasantly close. There were a number of British troops in the town and we passed & good few dead and wounded in the streets - - evidently the victims of these air raids.
I held a meeting with Brigadier Parminter, Colonel
Whitfield, Area Commandant, and Commander Henderson, B.N.L.O.
After this meeting the pier and beach parties were at once organised, told off and dispersed.
the
At 1900 I took over as S.N.O. Dunkirk,
2005. The following signal made to V.A. Dover:-
"There
"Port continuously bombed all day and on fire.
Embarkation possible only from beaches East of harbour. Send all ships there. Am ordering
WOLFHOUND to load there and sail."
V.A. Dover had intended to keep a destroyer in day
Dunkirk as W/T link, but I decided on arrival that this was not possible 80 ordered WOLFHOUND to sail.
the the
Night of 27th May.
only
Signal 1958/27 to V.A. Dover:- tobeaches
"Please send every available craft, East Her of Dunkirk immediately. Evacuation tomorrow night is problematical.
The naval party were spread out along the beach to act as police.
Troops in the district were directed to the beach and ordered to disperse along the sands so as to afford

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smallest possible targets for enemy planes.
It was originally decided to embark a small proportion from the East Pier and the rest from the beaches by lighters or barges. The pier method, however, proved so effective as regards speed and order that it was used exclusively, parties of 50 men coming along the beaches to the pier and embarking.
Due to adequate air protection there was comparatively little enemy attack on the area.
During the night there were probably 6000 men embarked and cleared.
Day of Tuesday, 28th May.
Commenced embarkation of B.E.F. from end of Sestern
Mole. The Germans were contenting themselves with bombing the town and port.
Situation Report 0935/28:-
"There are 2000 men on Dunkirk beach and 7000
men in sand dunes for whom I have had no ships.
They are now in need of water and Army cannot supply. Unlimited numbers are falling back on this area and situation will shortly be desperate."
The embarkation was continued throughout the day but few ships arrived except destroyers. The enemy air action was again slight due to adequate air protection and also due to the fact that a heavy pall of smoke from the burning town covered the operation most of the day - the only attacks that occurred were those when our aircraft were some distance off at the further points of their patrol.
During the morning three shells fired from an enemy battery
Southwest of Dunkirk landed near the embarkation point, but did no damage.

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Signal 0840 to V.A. Dover:-
"Evacuation practicable. Vessels urgently required.
In the meantime some destroyers and small craft, including some Dutch Skoots, had arrived off Bray beaches, and I sent an N. M.T.B. down there to supervise the embarkation arrangements. I ordered the Dutch Skoots to enchor as close to the shore as possible and the destroyers to send all their boats to ferry the troops between the shore and the Skoots. AS soon as the skoots were full they went alongside the destroyers to discharge their troops and then returned to their position near the beach. In this way we were able to get some 4000 men away during the afternoon and evening. This operation was continued through the night and it was estimated that a further 3000 men were embarked. On her return the N.T.B. was sent home as she was running short of fuel.
miles AS 1420 heavy bombing on Bray took place and I ordered more troops to march to Dunkirk, During daylight hours probably 18000 troops were embarked from the Santern Hole.
At 1725 the following signal was made to Admiralty:-
"Suggest magnatic mineaweeping of channel being used from Dunkirk is advisable and preferably at night."
1835 signal made:-
Signal sent Pressing for all possible shipping who tever their
"breed" be sent for troops during dark hours."
Night of
88th
May.
Evaquation from the Eastern Arm proceeded steadily, embarkation being at average rate of 2000 an hour. Enemy

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sir action was slight due to our air protection but there was some shelling from the same point as during the day.
There were a good number of ships throughout the night and at times they exceeded the inflow of troops.
The port was now undergoing bombardment and 8
situation report was sent at 2245/28 as follows:-
French General appreciation is that situation in port tomorrow will continue as for today.
Provided aircraft fighters adequate embarkation can proceed full speed. French General assures me no German guns at Gravelines or Gravelines
Beacon and that area is clear of Germans.
It Possibly you will consider further tests of the
West Channel.
French have taken over Belgian line in the vicinity of Mieuport. German guns to Southeast are now shelling Dunkirk but so far of little matter.
Fighter protection has been invaluable and bombing only sporadic. Please inform me for
C. in C. B.B.F. total number of men now evacuated.
Rear personnel, 3 corps, now reaching the beach.
Please pass to
War
Office."
Day of wednesday, 29th May.
0630 Transport NONA QUEEN mined and sunk two miles East of Dunkirk pier. Very heavy explosion.
Situation Report 0709/29 from S.N.O. Dunkirk
"No enery interference at present. Embarkation going at 2000 an hour. This can be kept up provided supply transport is maints ined. Swell prevents use of beach. All ships to Dunkirk.
Enemy air attack would be disastrous. Maximum fighter protection essential. Passenger transport mined and sunk about 2 miles East of
Dunkirk Pier Light."
At 1001 made Situation Report as follows:-
*Embarkation is going on well. Enemy is leaving us alone. The situation ashore is obscure and ominous. I have sent Captain Bush by N.T.B.
with an appreciation.
There is little food or water in Dunkirk. These should be sent as soon as possible, also a staid force for control of traffic. Armies are unable to help or organise anything. Keep on sending any ships Cannot West Channel be used? A good
Medical Officer with Staff should be despatched.
Army unable to provide."

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Embarkation proceeded at rate of 3 to 4,000 an hour.
Troops were now consisting mainly of the Fighting Corps, all the non-combatant troops in the area having been evacuated. The display of this Corps Troops was noticeably superior - - previous detachments had reached the embarkation point in a straggling manner with scarcely any semblance of order. The Corps Troops marched in formation along the beaches, quickly scattering during an air raid, and reforming and continuing afterwards.
It was this order which enabled such a high rate of embarkation to be maintained.
At 1800 I proceeded with Brigadier Perminter by
Motor Boat to La Panne to G.H.Q. to report on the difficult situation vis-a-vis the French over the evacuation. When on board EXPRESS I made a signal to the Admiralty and to
V.A. Dover giving an appreciation of the situation as follows:-
"Bombing of beaches and Dunkirk pier hasnow commenced without opposition from fighters. If they hit
Dunkirk pier embarkation will become very jammed.
Beach at La Panne covered with troops congregating in large numbers. Very slow embarkation taking place from Restern Beach.
The French Staff at Dunkirk feel strongly that they are defending Dunkirk for us to evacuate, which is largely true. To continue evacuation my appreciation is as follows -
The perimeter must be strongly held, food and stores immediately provided, and bombing of Dunkirk pier must be prevented.
There is no other Alternative evacuation to take off mone than a tithe of men now on beach before they are bombed continuously."
In Dunkirk itself we were left in comparative peace by enemy aircraft until the evening. V.A. Dover's 1906/29
received, reading:-
"Evacuation of British troops to continue at maximum speed during the night. If adequate supply or personnel vessels cannot be maintained

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to Dunkirk East Pier destroyers will be sent there as well. All other craft except Hospital Carriers to embark from beach which is extended from one mile East of Dunkirk to one mile East of La Panne.
Part 2 follows."
Part 2 received as follows:-
Whole length is divided into 3 equal ports referred to as La Panne, Bray, Malo, from
East to West with a mile gap between each port. La Panne and Bray have troop concentration points each end and in middle;
Malo at each end. These points should be tended by inshore craft.
Pass this message by V/S to ships not equipped
U/I, as opportunity offers. Destroyer at
Dunkirk pass to S.N.O. Dunkirk."
This was exactly what was required.
In the evening a series of fierce air attacks were made on the Seatern Arm. These resulted in H.N.S. GREMADE
being bombed while embarking troops. It looked for the moment as though she might sink and block the entrance to the harbour but a trawler and drifter were sent to assist her and managed to guide her into 8 pocket to the Westward of the main channel. She burned fiercely for some hours and eventually blew up with a loud explosion.
A trawler was also bombed and sank in the channel in about 50 yards from the East Pier about two cables/from the
Rastern Lighthouse.
The transport FENELLA was sunk while loading at the outside extremity of the Kastern Arm. She was practically fully loaded but the troops were transferred to another ship with very little loss
A troop transport CRESTED KAGLE was bombed and rendered unusable. She drifted down towards Bray where she ran aground. A "J" Class destroyer was bombed off the beaches but was taken in tow by another destroyer.

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Night of May 29th.
Enemy activity was reduced during the night, only two bombing attacks being made. It was intended to recommence embarkation from Eastern Arm under cover of darkness but apparently due to some misunderstanding the only ships that arrived were 4 trawlers and a yacht.
Consequently a great opportunity was missed. Probably
1500 troops could have been embarked had the ships been forthcoming. As & result of the bombing of the Vole referred to above, the pier itself was hit by 8 dive-bomber and severely damaged, but a brow was put in place which permitted the passage of troops.
In reply to V.A. Dover's 2057/29, asking whether the harbour was blocked, I replied at 2150 -
"No. Hope to get 8 good move on tonight but it is doubtful if much more can be done during daylight hours."
Apparently incorrect information as to the blocking of Dunkirk Harbour had been telephoned by Commander Dove from La Panne. This unfortunate incident reduced the shipping entering during the night to a minimum.

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30th may
Passenger transport KING CERT which had been daraged by a near dos Dalla 29th May still alongaide the
Pier at midnight. X BAW the Captain and told him he met go and gave libia the alternative of benching himself on the
Eastern Seich if MA ship was not converthy, or of proceeding to Angland the escare of a bender. 0230 he was observed endeavouring to clear the harbour. It vas subsequently found out that he only about 4 cobles outside the entrance.
At 0039/30 tide the following signal to Dover:-
There 10 3. shortage of chips and boots. I have no destroyers".
There were as air attacks in the early morning
Later, when ships began G arrive and all value quict.
In view or the havy haved presented by
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a mumber of ships boing alongaide the Hole at one this, destroyors were alongable the Piar one at a time.
Arrival of the first destroyer the a signal for en attack by one homber. Newever, the bright sunshine of yeaterday gave my to mist and It ves possible to speed up embarkation without undue risk.
0755 following signal was made:-
"Gront opportunity missed during night when only three drifters arrived. No motor or food yet provided on
Dunicink beach for large meber of troops. Sporadic bombing".
Atchout 0000 store ship arrived with provisions but no water. This anused 80 much congestion on the Pier that in view of the urgant need to nand off every possible man, about half the food had Been unloaded unloading was, after chart the, abondoned and the store ship filled with troops. & certain amount of water vas obtained from destroyers.
One personnel ship arrived about 0920, the first one since the previous day. ther ships (three drifters) filled shortly

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30th May may.
shortly after. Imbarkation proceeded thereafter at a good steady rate.
TV.A.Dover
Following signal was made at 0930:-
"Troops are concentrated in unlinited mubers just
East of Dunkirk Beach, on Bray Beaches and at
La Panne. Please do your best to distrbute. I am getting along splendidly here. Send two hospital ships now. If mist persists I will bring them in on arrival."
At 0943 the following Situation Report was made:-
"Conour are 1700 k/co. I have no M.Y.B. and can only communicate with U.K. by French wireless station,
02 when - destroyers are in sight. If conditions remain as at present a destroyer alongsido continuously for embarkation would be a magnificant holp. The moment hombing starts all met shove off".
At 0950 I made following signal:-
"If this weather persists I want = ship every half an hour".
The whole morning was atoty and 1donl for embaritation that Card ships arrived and BS great opportunity was again lost.
Hospital ships also did not arrive until attermoon and there were over one Shousand wounded waiting for transportation.
At 1600 two destroyers arrived.
At 1700 as COP us sent for 200 to go to G.H.Q. and
I traned over the daties of S.N.O. to Consunder Maund.
Valuey at 1836 following signal was made:-
*Am leaving for G.H.Q. for about two days and I have turned over the job of N.S.O. to Commander Hand who rully understands the estuation and has everything well in hand."
At 1846 following signal TRUE made:-
proceeding steadily despite internittent banbing attacks and bonbardments. Conditions appear favourable for good progress tonight. Request all available cruft may be made available both for Dunkirk and beaches. Number embarked to date only with destroyers 18,000."
At 2025 a situation Report this made as follows:-
thousand troops have been embarked during last hour.
"Despite intense bombardment and air attack four
Dunicirk will be untenable by Friday morning. Embarkation
Every possible effort will be made. I consider will be continued until last moment but depend upon large ships and destroyers at Pier tonight."
AS
********

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30 - 31 may.
As ships had now arrived in good mumbers it was necessary that the rate of embarkation mut in some way be speeded up. The troops coming down the Pier were, therefore, urged to quicken their pace and eventually the thousands of troops, tired and without food and water for days, broke into the double and kept it up the whole length of the
Eastern are for more than two hours. During that period it is entimated that more than 15,000 troops were embarked.
Night 30th 31st Have Shelling was heavy during the afternoon and night and operations were greatly hampered.
However, ships arrived in some misbers and with the cessation in the shelling between 3 and 4 a.m. about ten thousand troops were enbarked. This relieved the congestion on the beaches which had been very great in the evening. In the early morning the beaches were very nearly clear of troops.
I remined at G.H.C. for the night and telephoned the noval situation to the Admirality. I was present with the C.in C. at several meetings, my main object being to explain to the Military that if the evacuation of the B.E.F.
was to be largely accomplished, it could only be done by means of Dunkirk. Even given good weather embarkation from the beaches must be very slow. A destroyer going full out with her boats to the beaches could only embark 600 men in
12 hours, whereas this could be done in 20 minutes at the
Pier.
Some of the O.H.Q. staff expressed disappointment that more could not be done to push on with the embarkation off the boaches in a surf. I was satisfied that when the weather permitted everything possible was being done by the officers I had placed there, but I continually stressed that troops should be moved to Dunkirk and maximum mumbers should also be available to asbark there.
Political
*******

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Political pressure was now being brought to bear
Telday on the C.in C. that the evacuation must be on a fifty-fifty basis with the French. My only stipulation was that at all costs we should be allowed from use of the Eastern area while the French used the part, outer harbour and beaches.
I made a signal to Communder Harmd at Dunkirk to provide personnel for ships for General Laurencie's troops
(some 5,000 in mather) at C.in c's request. I also asked
Admiral Wake-Walker to keep Dunkirk going at 100%.
Little progress you could be unde off the beaches owing to the surf.
is have
G.H.C. informed = that a plan was being worked out for naval co-operation to bonbard advancing German tanks in that Truin troms the later stages. This, however, was never necessary, as
British ships my far as am aware at
1041, - have been continually heavily besbirded end they 020 greatually fining the renge of our londing
I wealt only enter necessary for the Clos of troups,
Continuose and heavy shelling all the number, but the evanuation prosected fairly meedily. At List shipe were in Inrge medere and strong in y protection Rept.
houghting sttack - The only thing necessary was tostep the making AS 1000 a signed tell received from the Air Landson occure as Tovor aching for position or energy bettery. This this Insuire with any certainty as the instity HAS probobity while, - is was to the details or Less Plage Secure Kork
Such, regity SOUR ede to this event. The becaus DIVE between end a great doct issued consente.
tory beirg astacks were delivered during the eventing bast wase consultrated enjoy upon derallet ships in the seartify live buchingt absorble care carried out on the ships Leading bus address insurest. The embarbation proceeded subsidity.

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Friday 31st May. The following signals were mades-
0320. "Request more shipsto load Dunkirk."
0445. "Every available ship will be required at Dunkirk during the next two hours to evacuate rest of army.
0605. "Imbarkation proceeding satisfactorily in spite of bonbardment. I would again stress the need for more ships and constant fighter protection
0638. "Am now receiving a number of Frenchmen. I have raised no objection to their embarking in British ships and an allowing then to do 80.
0940. "Request you will inform me whether troops are now being ordered to earch to Dunkirk from the beaches.
0945. "Sun is now coming through and I have a big target of ships in harbour. Request special air protection for next two hours.
0957. "Lord Gort has agreed that 5,000 Frehe troops should be embarked here this evening after dark in British vessels. Request necessary ships may be sent to arrive at dusk.
1044. "We have been continually heavily bonbarded and they are gradually finding the range of our loading berth. I would rather only enter ships as necessary for the flow of troops.
Continuous and heavy shelling all the morning, but the evacuation proceeded fairly speedily. At last ships were arriving in large numbers and strong a 2. protection kept bomeing attack away. The only thing necessary was tostop the shelling. At 1200 B signal was received from the Air Linison
Officer at Dover asking for position of energy battery. This was not known with any certainty as the battery was probably mobile, but it was in the district of Loon Plage Brouge Kerk
Soch. A reply was made to this effect. The bombardment, novertheless, become more intense and a great deal more accurate.
Very heavy attacks were delivered during the evening but were concentrated chiefly upon derelict ships in the roads. Dive bombing attacks were carried out on the ships loading but without success. The embarkation proceeded smoothly.

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At 1800 approximately Lord Gort embarked at La Panne for the U.K.
At 1937 the following signal was mader-
"As it 10 vital to carry on the evacuation of troops throughout every available moment day and night it is intended to place two white lights at eastern and western pier head as a guide to ships in the hours of darkness. It is requested that all H.M.
ships and other vessels who are likely to enter port to-night be warned accordingly?
At 1945 a further signal was made:-
"Slow British progress in the port due to shelling, bombing, and wounded and French troops using quay.
Weather fine and clear, sea moderate, good prospects for night embarkation from beaches."
I returned Dunkirk with General Alexander and discovered that totally different instructions had been given to General
Alexander by Lord Cort and by Lord Gort in writing to Admiral
Abrial and General Fagalde.
Lord Cort had told the French authorities that General assist in
Alexander would hold-the the "PERISTER" for the French to embark and that he was to place himself md his three divisions under
General Fagalde's orders. General Alexander, however, was told by Lord Cort in my hearing that be was to do nothing to imperia his army and was ultimately responsible for their safety and evacuation.
I suggested to General Alexander that he should at once return to La Panne before the telephone was cut off to telephone to the Secretary of State for war, and to get the matter cleared up. This he did. The Secretary of State instructed General
Alexander to act on his own discretion and to proceed with the evacuation.
Admiral Abrial asked me to take charge of the British and
French embarkation, which I did. I also asked for French officers to assist, and they were provided.
The following signals were despatched:-
2028. "I have felt it necessary for the operation to

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"disregard your verbal instructions to return home, and hope you will approve. with the approval of
Lord Gart I have returned here as S.N.O. Dunkirk and to assist the British Commander?
At 2353 the following signal was unde:-
"In view of the decision request maximum number of transports and air protection to-morrow Saturday, and particularly air and sea protection for the following day, when energy will have no other occupation.
Unfortunately some hours are passing to-night without a single ship entering Dunkirk for French or ourselves."
Shelling took place all night during embarkation causing some casualties on the beach.
BRAY
La Panne was evacuated and troops fell back on
A situation report was made as follows:-
"No ships entered between 2230 and 0400, Unsuccessful dive bombing attack has just taken place. British fighters arrive. Smoke covers pier. Embarkation re-commenced. Reported heavy shelling of beaches and an improvised pier smashed. Please despatch by M.T.B. morphia and field dressings.
Saturday 1st June,
0715.
"Attended meeting of French Staff at Malo Barns.
Witnessed very heavy dive bonging on ships off shore.
Discussed evacuation and arranged that more ships should be given to the French.
At 0910 a further signal was sade reading:-
"Shipe are urgently required."
Much bombing had taken place for rest of day. H.M.S.
Keith and Ivanhoe were bombed and H.M.S.Mosquito on her way to entering the port was bombed and sunk. H.M.S.Worcester sailed and received such heavy bombing that I gave orders that no more ships were to sail in daylight and requested that henceforth none should arrive before dark.
At 1841 the following signal was received from C.I.G.S
for Senior Officer:-
"We do not order any fixed moment for evacuation. You are to hold on as long as possible in order that the

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"maximum number of French and British may be evacuated.
Impossible from here to judge local situation. In close co-operation with Admiral Abrial you must act in this matter on your own judgment.
At 2315 I made the following signal:-
"Withdrawal now proceeding according to plan. Shall have certain reserves here to-morrow to assist French.
Intend to complete evacuation to-morrow by midnight.
A motor boat was sent to the mouth of the harbour at dusk and allocated berths to the ships as they entered, the requisite number of the personnel vessels being sent to the embarkation pier in the Western harbour to embark French troops.
A good number of ships entered harbour and embarked troops, and the seamanship displayed by destroyers, sloops and transports was most praiseworthy under exceedingly difficult conditions.
I gave orders to evacuate a large proportion of naval personnel during the night.
the final
All those that did remain until, withdrawal had performed their duties magnificently.
Suriday 2nd June.
0800/2 - from S1N.0.Dunkirk.
"Request again maximum number of transports for British and French. At 2130 June 2nd it is intended that all
British shall be evacuated by midnight. Request
M.A.S.B. at 2300.
At 0405 - from S.N.O.Dumkirk.
"Admiral du Nord requests that block ships will arrive at
6300 to-morrow night. He will signal if their placing is to be postponed.
At 0730 - from S.N.O. Dunkirk:-
"Wounded situation acute. Hospital ships should enter during day. Geneva Convention will be honourably observed. It is felt that the enemy will refrain from attack (This signal was made "en clear")
At 0830 - from S.N O. Dunkirk:-
"About 5000 British remain. Bofors ammunition short.
Sporting chance of embarking to-night. Maximum number of fast motor boats at 2130 at inner end of Long Pier would assist. Early this morning the drifter Lord Cava our dépot ship, was sunk by shell fire.

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As it had been decided to cease evacuating troops in daylight, there remained little to do except to prepare the maximum staff to-night.
The following signal was made at 1435:-
"Please direct proportion of shipping to the French.
Arrangements of embarkation in the Novul D'Avant Port."
1536/2. From S.N.O. Dunkirk.
"Situation of wounded desperate. Shortgge of medical stores and accomodation. Demand two hospital ships forthwith:
At 1538/2 the following situation report was made:-
"French still maintain front line except for area east of Bergues where the Germans have penetrated two miles on a two-mile front. Counter attack being made at 1500. In port no movement. Present situation hopefull
At dark vessels of all kinds arrived and were berthed alongside the eastern armon the French jettys and further up the harbour. Berthing was carried out by an officer with a loud speaker at the pier head.
At 2230 the last of the B.E.F. started down the quay.
and were safely embarked by 2250 at which time I made a signal as follows:-
"Operation completed. Returning to Dover." I then embarked in a M.T.B. and left for Dover.

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After my return from G.H.Q. on the 31st May
I was closely associated with General Alexander who remained in command of British Troops. He was a tower of strength and delightful to work with at a very difficult time when it did not seem probable that we should succeed in getting away the last or the British Expeditionary Force. Although my report does not make it clear, all signals from S.N.O. Dunkirk referring to military matters were made with his concurrence and approval.
He finally left Dunkirk with Admiral Wake-Walker in a M.T.B. at 2130 on 2nd June.

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APPRODIX I.
ACTIVITY OZ XXXX AIRCRAFT.
As the enemy aircraft secued to work in distinct phases, I think it will be as well to devote an Appendix to their operations.
On our arrival, they were chiefly occupied in wreeking Duniciple and the port. It was quite out of the question to use the harbour at all, and my first reaction was that evacuation would have to be done from the beaches.
It soon became obvious, however, that they were not including the pier in their attentions. At times they were held off by a fine morning nist which sometimes persiated until afternoon. At these times, when the wind was favourable, a heavy pall of smoke from burning oil tanks, to the westward, largely obscured the pier. During the morning they made attempts to machine gun the beaches, but were held off by anti-aircraft fire. The beaches were also bombed but only for a brief pariod. Had they permisted, they would have inflicted terrific losses on us, for there were seldom less than 10,000 troops on the beaches. They later attacked the pier, with dive banbers, ank three ships and damaged the pier. Had they parmisted in these successful attacks on the pier and ships alongside, the evacuation could never have been achieved. They soon, however, turned their attention to ships lying off the beaches, and on one day (31st), no less than 100 bombing attacks vora unde on ships within two miles of the pier.
Happily, at least 2h bombs were dropped on one large wreak and many boobs on other wreaks. By this time also, Bofors guna were being collected and this seemed to make them more any of attacking the pier. The heavy attacks on ships at see compelled IDD: to stop all sailings and arrivals during daylight.
On the last day, they appeared once more to return to the bombing of Dunkirk and its part and bastion.
Energy fighters were occasionally in evidence excerting their bombers. At times our own fighters gave us a great measure of relief, but the sky is a big place and it WELLS often difficult to know if our aircraft were present
OF not. when our aircraft did arrive the French, and less
X
frequantly the British, opened fire on then.
Names already given to special resignition Adv The first disputed but all the Remander are mathy of mention his particularly This have enderlosed.

21
&
25
II XIGNINAV
OFFICERS WHO PERFORMED VALUABLE SERVICES.
Captain Howson.
X
Commission Hand
#
Levis (late P.S.T.O. who joined my party and and very good work).
#
kilwood
#
Honderson
#
Richardson
X #
surteen
X
#
dotto x
#
Clountion
Lieut. Communitor Junes
Paym. Licutenant Broakett, R.N.R.
Licutenant Balfour
Commonder Commy
Lieut. communder cubtoon. of the Drifter Land Cavan
Commander Kerr
X
Names already given to V.A.Dover for special recognition in The first disputch but all the remainder are wathy of mention but particularly Khose / have underlaied.

22
26
APPENDIX III.
LIST OF RATINGS AT DURKIRK WHO PERFORMED
VALUABLE SERVICE.
1. Last to Evacuate.
Yes. of Sign.
Piper
A.B.
Coz
#
Rose
#
Burrows
If
Fermar
=
MeClachlan
2. Others Worthy of Nention.
Signal Staff.
Signalman
Waters
#:
Jones
#:
Mulheron
*
Simonds
3. Pian Party.
P.O.
Topleigh (Topley)
A.B.
Moore
A.B.
Mm.C.Grainger
SSX.22139.
A/P.O.
S.W. Spickett
JY.12646
A.B.
J.W.Swales
JX.152505
A.3.
G.A. Hall (J.434/12)
B.21047
Signature
B.Robinson
ESD.1704
A.B.
R.Isnenster
JX.129630
A.B.
C.L.Fletcher
D.941
A.B.
T.D.D. Somes
JX.145091
Ord.Sen.
P.W. GARROTT
JX.272437
L.Sea.
H.J.Syanton
J.214468
A.B.
John Doig
SSX.20706
A.B.
H.Fletcher (J.99712)B.23221
4.
Benches.
A.B.
C.Foster
D,112
*
G.F. Wixon
25222
#
R.Vey
JX.144541
#
J.L.Francr
98/X.24037
P.O.
S.L.Parker
P.O. J.84930
Sto.
F.Coltmen
XX.88357
5. Headouarters, Desmatch Riders, etc.
A.B.
Owen
J.L. Turnor
Miller.
6. Commendere Cobbo and surtees recommendations yet to come; these will possibly be already envored in the above list.

23
Ratings in the original draft,
27
from Chathan
APPENDIX IV.
54883
R.FOX
Ord.
A.G.HER
Ord.A.B.
D.WARREN
Sig. A.B.
J.NEWMAN
Signate,
716
W.COX
A.B.O.C.
54064
W.J.BRITTON
A.B.O.C.
49391
J.TAYLOR
A.B.S.S.
28528
W.TOWSHY
0.0.355
22473
T.WRIGHT
A.B.R.O.
R.TOWSEN
Ord. A.B.
53288
J.JARMAH
Ord.A.B.
J.HILL
A.B.A.B.
23934
J.RANSONE
A.B.Ses.
28234
C.MeCARTHY
A.B.A.B.
22195
G.W.MARSH
A.B.Sts.
E.BIRD
A.B.L.3.
51675
45375
C.STAINES
A.B.A.B.
W.GRAINGER
A.B.A.B.
22139
24509
H.MILLER
Sig.A.E.
H.LOCKETT
Sig.
1704
28246
E.SPICKNT
P.O.SIS.
44648
M.UTTERIDGE
A.B.
23002
C.COX
A.B.
H.HAWTHORNS
A.B.
51563
A.SCHRIDER
Ord.
28746
A. FRYATE
A.B.
35
21
W.SCOTT
A.B.
88
D.DIWELL
A.B.
1982
R.A.McPHAIL
Ord.
79
M.BROWN
A.B.
2505
J.SWALES
A.B.
A.B.
44
A.CLOKE
3346
D.W.SIMMONS
Sig.
2686
G.PIPER
A/Yeo.
0618
N.BETTS
A.B.
J.S.MoDONALD
A.B.
0937
3872
R.L.LONG
A.B.
47
G.A.HALL
A.B.
8166
H.HALL
A.B.
H.CARNELL
A.B.
6527
J.T.HATES
A.B.
1678
C.WARNER
A.B.
09
M.MoMAHON
Sto.20
12
8152
J.F.QUINN
sig.
P.HAXTER
Sig.
8152
9930
J.P.ACATE
P.O.
3323
W.COWAN
A.B.
5380
B.SARGENT
Ord.
7493
J.ARKER
A.B.
S.GENNER
Ord.
954
3232
R.V.FLEGG
A.B.
J.SHAW
A.B.
5277
A.CRAWFORD
A.B.
633
E.CAIGER
A.B.
097
272
A.BLAKE
A.B.
P.A.ALDIS
A.B.
2
O4
Ernest ROBINSON
sig.
L.WALLSR
Sig.
614
Hernard THOMAS
A.B.
277
E.CRAKER
P.O.
2
A.B.
611
A.BEAR
134
L.A.STANLEY
A.B.

24
6
28
N.K.
Harry FELLOWS
Ord.
X10289
C.PARKINSON
Sea.
SSX16872
A.L.ROSS
A.B.
JX149739
C.STEVENS
A.B.
SBX25386
H.LANDER
A.B.
JX139989
C.S.J.CROOKS
A.B.
JX153719
W.COOPER
Ord.
N.K.
Ralph GILTROW
Ord.
SSX25958
R.G.RICHFORD
Ord.
JX183281
J.MULHERON
Sig.
SBX30605
J.C.GILMOUR
Sig.
J84930
F.W.PARKER
P.O.
B22980
J.M.DERBY
A.B.
JX125868
S.GARDINER
A.B.
J99445
A.CUTHBERT
A.B.
20602A
M.MACDONALD
Sea.
B16585
T.MELDRUM
A.B.
N.K.
Edward LEE
Sea.
JX130159
W.KING
A.B.
SSX21969
G.WINNING
A.B.
JX151088
C.H.REVELL
A.B.
JX146012
F.H.McLOUGHLIN
A.B.
JX154411
W.G.BURROWS
A.B.
JX142009
A.WATERS
Sig.
JX148443
G.FLETCHER
Sig.
J112800
T.TOPLEY
P.O.
JX129630
R.LANCASTER
A.B.
D112
C.NOSTER
A.B.
D941
C.FLETCHER
A.B.
JX153835
S.BENNETT
A.B.
JX153393
E.QUIN
A.B.
SSX4241
I.WARNER
A.B.
JX150166
F.HOULT
A.B.
J112834
B.H.DITTMAN
A/PO.
JX145091
T.D.SONES
A.B.
N.K.
Fredk.W.GARRATT
Ord.
B22835
J.WILLIAMSON
A.B.
N.K.
Henry W.SEYMOUR
Sig.
JX147942
Norman L.SMITH
A.B.
KX85195
J.MILLER
Sto.
JX151699
T.C.SELBY
A.B.
JX156400
F.G.WILLING
Ord.
SSX23939
H.TIMS
A.B.
SSX17084
A.SUTTON
A.B.
N.K.
William L.MeKENNA
Sig.
JX150974
A.CALLANDER
A.B.
JX125074
B.WARNER
P.O.
88X23947
W.BLEYDON
A.B.
JX142857
E.T.HRISTON
A.B.
JX141247
A.READ
A.B.
J111741
A.S.SHARP
A.B.
JX144641
R.H.FRY
A.B.
JX142084
G.PETERSON
A.B.
J99137
A.J.TAYLOR
A.B.
JX155281
P.MULLINS
A.B.
S8X17041
R.D.MACEY
A.B.
S8X31364
E.HANCOCK
0.8ig.
88X31365
N.W.HAYWARD
0.81g.
KX97305
J.MeQUADE
Sto.
88X15130
V.HAMER
A.B.
J114468
H.J.SPANTON
L.S.
SEX21088
Pat.LEMPER
TLX
A.B.
88X26327
J.R.DRYDEN
A.B.
JX129026
A.MOORE
A.B.
N.K.
Mric SILVERTHORNE
Ord.

Appending 5 P, 29 25
inclose there remarks by bdi Richardson
The J that in change 7 the BRAY Wermant beasher
SSX20706
J.STEWART
A.B.
SSX23107
T.FOSTER
A.B.
B25147
H.FINDLEY
A.B.
JX139084
A.WARRINGTON
A.B.
J103642
G.HOLDAWAY
A.B.
N.K.
J.RAWE
Card.
SSX
William M.SMITH
0.Sig.
N.K.
John C.COPSON
0.Sig.
KX88357
T.COLTMAN
Sto.
88X14777
W.C.COX
L.S.
SSX29723
D.McCANN
A.B.
N.K.
B.OWEN
A.B.
N.K.
J.SMANLEY
A.B.
N.K.
William GENERATE
A.B.
397158
T.T.DEARING
A.B.
G.WINDER
A.B.
SSX23772
L.HATHER
A.B.
D434
H.FLESCHER
A.B.
799712
W.THINGAR
Sto.
H.O.B.D.
P.WEIR
A.B.
SSX29728
JX149262
P.HAND
A.B.
R.J.TUCKER
0.31g.
S3X31323
88X30610
S.GIBBARD
0,Sig.
0.AUSTIN
L.A.
JX133281
D.O'PRAY
AB ST.
SEX18097
S8X29299
R.LOWTCAER
A.B.
J11086
A.CANNON
2.0.
W.J.SKINNER
A.B.
S8X26514
I.S.KENT
A.B.
D208
G.W.BOWEN
A.B.
B22367
J113737
G.RICHMOND
A.D.
B20977
J.G.OWN
A.B.
JX129715
C.W.BOWRING
A.B.
B25322
G.F.NIXON
A.B.
KX86044
W.MELROSE
Sto.
D.A.HEARS
Sig.
SSX31365
V.XNIGHT
A.B.
S8X21778
J.L.TURNER
A.B.
88X24057
G.ROSE
A.B.
JX151756
J.KIPLING
0.81g.
JX152103
50/ther
.

Appendix 5 26
I enclose these remarks by bde. Richardson as: 30
sho I placed in charge of the BRAY beaches
Wermant
SITUATION ON THE BRACHES.
10.
At about 1930 on Monday 87th Timet the Captain of the WOLFHOUND ashore and he told me that our instructions from the Senior Naval officer were to proceed to the beaches.
8. proceeded in close company with Lieutenant
Commander Dowling and his platoon. In route we met the head of the Army she were proceeding in the same direction.
3.
le arrived on the beaches after about 1 hour's march. During this march there was continuous bombing.
4. On arrival at the beaches it was apparent that the first flight of the Army were showing signs of lack of discipline and for about 90 minutes we had a difficult time to restors order.
1 ordered the soldiers in my vicinity to sit down and at the name time placed my platoon across the road to prevent any more men coming on the beaches. I then called for
Army Officers to assist Be and about? or 8 approached me.
18.6.
1 divided the soldiers up into parties of 30
and placed them under the care of an Army Officer or an Able
Seaman and dispersed them at intervals along the beaches in the direction of Dunkirk.
11.
Aa each party arrived on the road leading on to the beach they were not by seamen who marshalled them into and parties of 50/then led them on to the beaches.
8.
the Quiet use then maintained and the embarking in boats commenced.
9.
At about 2100 Commander Clouston sent a message to say that large parties could be taken off at Dunkirk and accordingly/

31
accordingly parties of approximately 500 at a time were sent off in that direction.
10. It was low water and embarkation in small boats was not an easy matter. Continuous air-bombing and machine-gunning from aircraft took place throughout the night but it seemed, by the Grace of God, that the smoke cloud over Dunkirk saved the beaches from being bombed, the main bombing being over the town and dockyard of Dunkirk and the town of 8% Malo.
11.
18.
Embarkation continued throughout the night and in the early hours of the morning but during the forenoon the arrival of soldiers abated until there were only sailors left on the beach approximately 1 mile to the eastward of Dunkirs.
12. I proceeded in close company with Commander Ken and
Lieutenant Commander Dowling with our platoons to Dunkirk. On arrival I reported to Captain Tennant who told me he wished a party to proceed to Bray de la Plage to embark 5,000 soldiers.
Volunteers were called for and Commander Ken and I
proceeded there by lorry (8 Commanders and 16 men).
13.
We arrived at approximately 1700 and found about 30,000
soldiers awaiting embarkation stretching from Bray to the eastward.
It was raining and conditions were most unpleasant for us but the other side was that we got no bombing during the night.
14.
At about 0130 (Wednesday 29th) a high wind had got up which made 10 obvious to me that embarkation from the beaches would be impossible or at any rate very inefficient. I therefore lined up the soldiers and sent them to Dunkirk in parties of 1,000
at varying intervals. I must have sent off 20,000 in the direction of Dunicirk.
as
15.
Later in the day the weather improved but there was a most lamentable lack of small boats.
16./

28
22
16.
At about 1200 Commander Ken and I motored into
Dunkirk to report progress as embarkation on our beach was then impossible. On our return our lorry was heavily machine gunned and hit. At this period a heavy bombing attack took place on the Fleet and beaches.
17.
On return to our headquarters (a lorry) we decided to make contact with General H.Q. but unfortunately our car broke down and we had to walk back 5 miles.
18.
During the night another naval embarkation party arrived on the beach to the eastward which reduced the limits of our beach.
19.
Early on Thursday morning 30th I proceeded to
Brigade H.Q. and offered the suggestion that piers be built by running lorries out to sea. This was quickly done and was successful.
20.
I then drove Colonel Whitten and Colonel Mackenzie into Dunkirk to see Captain Tennant and then drove them back to Brigade H.Q.
21.
During the afternoon and dogwatches the French poured into our beaches but no boats arrived within 11 miles of our H.Q.
22.
During the last dog the Germans directed mos to accurate artillery fire on our beach. This fire continued throughout the night and our lorry was hit. The beach was completely evacuated by allied soldiers.
23.
We had however taken up quarters in a water-boat that was ashore at low mter. No boats had now been in for
16 hours on our beach.
84.
During the night the weather became bad once more -
and a heavy surf was running.
At/

29
33
Personal semarks by bour Richardson
31st May
At about 0300,1 it was impossible to carry out embarkation on the beaches.
Like to in the
25. of Our men were showing signs of extreme exhaustion and as it was impossible to communicate with the Senior Naval Officer we decided to take over 8 whaler that #e had salved and to go to the nearest destroyer to report to the Senior Naval Officer.
26. We waited for high water and at about 0730 put to ea.
There was a very heavy surf running and we had only an uneven set to land of oars, rope crutches and only an oar to steer by.
27. We approached two destroyers but they both got underway.
feel
Two other destroyers passed us at about 7 cables but paid no attention to us.
to
28.
After about an hour as if from nowhere appeared the
Margate lifeboat. de asked the Coxewain to take us to the nearest destroyer but all were underway at this time. 4g was returning to Margate and 80 we came back with him.
29. The men in my party were completely exhausted and were asleep within five minutes of being onboard the lifeboat.
30. On arrival at Margate I phoned the Chief of Staff at Dover and reported our return.
31. was ordered to return to Chatham with my party.
(1)
I the you fire of the de film to be met and consistent. The absence of rightere vas a source of discossion and in used issue bitter Although for the aboomes of fighters ball bost explained by the Prine sinister, I to feel that is 16
right to have a Dev bonbers directly over the bising part in such - operation. There 10 no doubs that when eighters vare present bunders are not come, but 02

30
34
Personal remarks by boner Richardon.
Criticisms.
The points that I would like to bring home in the way of general criticism are:-
(1) When being bombed in daylight and at night it is apparently the Army training for the men to lie over on their faces in a huddled heap and to await the completion of the air raid.
I consider that if one lies over on one's face during an air raid, one gets the impression that the bombs when falling with very horrid shrieking noises are each and all coming to land right in the small of one's back. There is little doubt that the Army were considerably cowed by the bombing and I do feel that this form of inactivity during a raid is psychologically bad. I would have thought it better that the men be trained to stand up and take cover and loose off their rifles and anyhow look at the bomber, especially by day. It appeared to us obvious which aircraft was going to be anywhere near us and which was going to be miles away, while to watch the Army lying down with their faces to the ground with the bombs shrieking, one could see that they were going through a tricky time by being in such a position. I saw no sign, except in one very isolated case, of any of the Naval ratings being at all genuinely upset by the bombing. Machine-gunning, though, was quite embarrassing.
(2)
I thought the pom poin fire of the Fleet and 4" barrage fire to be most effective and consistent. The absence of fighters was a source of great discussion and in many cases bitter words. Although the reason for the absence of fighters has been explained by the Prime Minister, I do feel that it is psychologically right to have a few bombers directly over the mentaking part in such an operation. There is no doubt that when fighters were present bombers did not come, but as soon/

is
35
soon as the fighters left, they seemed to know the exact moment in which to approach.
(3)
Lack of satisfactory communication arrangements was most noticeable. There were no portable wireless sets ashore with the beach parties nor were any field telephones supplied by the naval parties. The only method of communicating messages to ships embarking from the beaches was by & written message sent off in a boat.

Dynam. 85. -
Nil
36 32
7th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward herewith my Report of Proceedings in the Dunkirk area between the 27th May,
1940, and the 2nd June, 1940.
The Report has been made up in the form of a
Daily Log with the more important signals included.
In addition I attach certain Appendices:-
(1) Activity of enemy aircraft.
(11) Officers who performed valuable services.
(111) Ratings who performed valuable services.
(iv) Ratings in the original party.
By good fortune the mission entrusted to me in the first place by the Admiralty and ultimately by you was completed by 2300 on 2nd June, and I would like to record herewith that the chief factors responsible for this successful conclusion were:-
(a) The ready help we always received from Dover whenever asked for.
(b) The fearlessness and splendid seamanship of destroyers and minesweepers and nearly all the personnel ships coming to the pier.
(c) The help of Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker in distributing ships between the pier and the beaches.
(d) The magnificent work of the Officers and men, and particularly of the pier party who worked with little rest for 7 days. of these, none is more deserving of praise than
Commander Clouston.
0a
VICE 8- JUN 1940
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
*
*
DOVER
(signed) ww. Tennant
Captain, R.N.
Admirel R.B. Remsay,
".A. Dover.

3B
37
38
EMBARKATION OF THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
the
Sunday, 26th May, 1940
situation.
The the
P.M. I was given details of arrangements being made for the provision of shipping for the evacuation of the
B.E.F. from Dunkirk and the beaches to the Eastward thereof, to by Captain Jeffery, and at 6 p.m. I was ordered by V.C.N.S.
raice to proceed to Dunkirk to take control of the naval shore embarkation parties. The officers and men of my party for the pier and beaches proceeded direct to Dover.
I left London 8.35 p.m. for the Nore, and explained the Admiralty plan for embarkation to the Commander-in-Chief.
I continued my journey to Dover early next morning where I
received my final instructions from V.A. Dover. After going through the plan for embarkation with him I left Dover in
H.M.S. WOLFHOUND at 1345 with a naval party consisting of
12 officers and 160 ratings, plus signal staff. The weather was fine and clear.
We proceeded North of the minefield - a voyage of some 90 miles - and about half way over the first dive bombing attack took place. These attacks continued at about halfhour or 40-minute intervals until we reached Dunkirk at about1800. There were several very near misses but only minor damage was done to the ship. This was an unpleasent introduction to the war zone, and dive bombing was certainly more alarming afloat than ashore, as we were soon to discover.
On reaching Dunkirk we turned and proceeded alongside in the middle of a very heavy bombing attack.
I disembarked my party, divided them up into sections and told the officers in charge of each section to scatter them round the port to make them less vulnerable to bombing attacks, while I proceeded to the Bastion Naval

34
i
38
- 2 -
Headquarters to investigate the local situation.
The town was heardy half on fire, the streets being littered with wreckage of all kinds, and every window was smashed.
Great palls of smoke from the oil depots and refineries enveloped the docks and town itself. On our way up to the Bastion we had to take shelter from two more raids by enemy bombers, the bombs from the last of which fell unpleasantly close. There were a number of British troops in the town and we passed a good few dead and wounded in the streets - evidently the victims of these air raids.
I held a meeting with Brigadier Parminter, Colonel
Whitfield, Area Commandant, and Commander Henderson, B.N.L.O.
After this meeting the pier and beach parties were at once organised, told off and dispersed.
At 1900 I took over as S.N.O. Dunkirk.
2005. The following signal made to V.A. Dover:-
"Port continuously bombed all day and on fire.
Embarkation possible only from beaches East of harbour. Send all ships there. Am ordering
WOLFHOUND to load there and sail."
V.A. Dover had intended to keep a destroyer in
Dunkirk as W/T link, but I decided on arrival that this was not possible so ordered WOLFHOUND to sail.
Night of 27th May.
Signal 1958/27 to V.A. Dover:-
to beaches
"Please send every available craft, East Her of Dunkirk immediately. Evacuation tomorrow night is problematical.'
The navel party were spread out along the beach to act as police.
Troops in the district were directed to the beach and ordered to disperse along the sands 80 as to afford

35
1039
smallest possible targets for enemy planes.
It was originally decided to embark 8 small proportion from the Esst Pier and the rest from the beaches by lighters or barges. The pier method, however, proved so effective as regards speed and order that it was used exclusively, parties of 60 men coming along the beaches to the pier and embarking.
Due to adequate air protection there was comparatively little enemy attack on the area.
to to
During the night there were probably 6000 men embarked and cleared.
Day of Tuesday, 28th May.
then
Commenced embarkation of B.R.F. from end of Restern
Mole. The Germans were contenting themselves with bombing the town and port.
Situation Report 0935/28 Im
There are 2000 men on Dunkirk beach and 7000
men in sand dunes for whom I have had no ships.
They are now in need of water and Army cannot supply. Unlimited numbers are falling back on this area and situation will shortly be desperate."
The embarkation was continued throughout the day but few ships arrived except destroyers. The enemy air to action was again slight due to adequate air protection and also due to the fact that a heavy pall of smoke from the burning town covered the operation most of the day - the only attacks that occurred were those when our aircraft were some distance off at the further points of their patrol.
During the morning three shells fired from an enemy battery
Southwest of Dunkirk landed near the embarkation point, but did no damage.

36
40
there
Signal 0840 to V.A. Dover:-
"Evacuation practicable. Vessels urgently required.
In the meantime some destroyers and small craft, including some Dutch Skoots, had arrived off Bray beaches, and I sent an H. N.T.B. down there to supervise the embarkation arrangements. I ordered the Dutch Skoots to snchor as close to the shore as possible and the destroyers to send all their boats to ferry the troops between the shore and the Skoots. As soon as the skoots were full they went alongside the destroyers to discharge their troops and then returned to their position near the beach. In this way we were able to get some 4000 men away during the afternoon and evening. This operation was continued through the night and it was estimated that a further 3000 men were embarked. On her return the M.T.B. was sent home as she was running short of fuel.
At 1420 heavy bombing on Bray took place and I ordered more troops to march to Bunkirk. During daylight hours probably 12000 troops were embarked from the Eastern Mole.
At 1725 the following signal was made to Admiralty:-
to
Suggest magnetic mineaveeping of channel being used from Dunkirk is advisable and preferable at night.
1835 signal made:-
qual dent Pressing for possible shipping whatever their
"breed" be sent for troops during dark hours.
10
I
have sent
Captain by
N.T.B.
Night of 88th May.
food in
Evaquation from the Eastern Arm proceeded steadily, embarkation force being at average rate of 2000 an hour. Enemy
Cannot
Officer with staff
Army unable to provide."

137
41
air action was slight due to our air protection but there was some shelling from the same point as during the day.
There were 8 good number of ships throughout the night and at times they exceeded the inflow of troops.
The port was now undergoing bombardment and &
the situation report was sent at 2845/88 as follows:-
any
French General appreciation is that situation in port tomorrow will continue as for today.
Provided aircraft fighters adequate embarkation can proceed full speed. French General assures me no German guns at Gravelines or Gravelines
Beacon and that area is clear of Germans.
It
Possibly you will consider further tests of the
West Channel.
French have taken over Belgian line in the vicinity of Mieuport. German guns to Southeast are now shelling Dunkirk but so far of little matter.
Fighter protection has been invaluable and bombing only sporadic. Please inform me for
C. in G. B.S.P. total number of men now evacuated.
Rear personnel, 3 corps, now reaching the beach.
Please pass to War Office.
Day of Wednesday, 29th May.
0630 Transport NONA QUEEN mined and sunk two miles East or Dunkirk pier. Very heavy explosion.
Situation Report 0709/29 from S.N.O. Dunkirk 1-place
No enemy interference at present. Ambarkation going at 8000 an hour. This cen be kept up provided supply transport is maintained. Swell prevents use of beach. All ships to Dunkirk.
Enemy air attack would be disastrous. Maximum fighter protection essential. Passenger transport mined and sunk about 2 miles East of
Dunkirk Pier Light."
At 1001 made Situation Report as follows:-
"Embarkation is going on well. Enemy is leaving us alone. The situation ashore is obscure and ominous. I have sent Captain Bush by M.T.B.
with an appreciation.
There is little food or water in Dunkirk. These should be sent as soon as possible, also a staid force for control of traffic. Armies are unable to help 02 organise anything. Keep on sending any ships Cannot West Channel be used? A good
Medical Officer with Staff should be despatched.
Army unable to provide."

4238
43
Embarkation proceeded at rate of 3 to 4,000 an hour.
Troops were now consisting mainly of the Fighting Corps, all the non-combatant troops in the area having been svacuated. The display of this Corps Troops was noticeably superior - previous detachments had reached the in embarkation point in a straggling manner with scarcely any semblance of order. The Corps Troops marched in formation along the beaches, quickly scattering during an air raid, and reforming and continuing afterwards,
It was this order which snabled such 8 high rate of embarkation to be maintained.
At 1200 I proceeded with Brigadier Parminter by
Motor Boat to La Panne to G.H.Q. to report on the difficult situation vis-a-vis the French over the evacuation. When on board EXPRESS I made a signal to the Admiralty and to
V.A. Dover giving an appreciation of the situation as follows:-
the
"Bombing of beaches and Dunkirk pier hasnow commenced the without opposition from fighters. If they hit
Dunkirk pier embarkation will become very jammed.
Beach at La Panne covered with troops congregating in large numbers. Very slow embarkation taking place from
Restern
Beach.
The French Staff at Dunkirk feel strongly that they are defending Dunkirk for us to evacuate, which is largely true. To continue evacuation my appreciation is as follows -
The perimeter must be strongly held, food and stores immediately provided, and bombing of Dunkirk pier must be prevented.
the
There is no other alternative evacuation to take off mone than a tithe of men now on beach before they are bombed continuously."
very loss
In Dunkirk itself we were left in comparative peace by enemy aircraft until the evening. V.A. Dover's 1906/29
received, reading these bombed the
Evacuation of British troops to continue at maximum speed during the night. If adequate supply of personnel vessels cannot be maintained

39
43
to Dunkirk East Pier destroyers will be sent there as well. All other craft
EAT
except Hospital Carriers to embark from beach which is extended from one mile East
Inemyor Dunkirk to one mile Rest of La Panne.
Part 8 follows."
Scobing being
It intended
Part 8 received as follows -
"Whole length is divided into 3 equal ports referred to as La Panne, Bray, Malo, from daly East to West with a mile gap between each port. La Panne and Bray have troop concentration points each end and in middle;
Malo at each end. These points should be tended by inshore craft.
Pass this nessage by V/S to ships not equipped
I/C, as opportunity offers. or Destroyer at
Dunkirk pass to S.N.O. Dunkirk."
referred so the by a dive-bomber
This was exactly what was required.
In the evening a series of fierce air attacks ere made on the Enstern Arm. These resulted in H.R.S. GRENADE
eing bombed while embarking troops. at It looked for the oment as though she night sink and block the entrance to the
If arbour but 8 trawler and drifter were sent to assist her nd managed to guide her into a pocket to the Westward of information as to the blooking he main channel. She burned fiercely for some hours and by Commader
If ventually blew up with a loud explosion.
1a reduced the
A travler was also bombed and sank in the channel the simimum. in bout 50 yards from the East Pier about two cables/from the astern Lighthouse.
The transport FENELLA was aunk while loading at he outside extremity of the Reatern Arm. She was practically ully loaded but the troops were transferred to another ship
1th very little loss
A troop transport CRESTED EAGLE was bombed and endered unusable. She drifted down towards Bray where she an aground. A "J" Class destroyer was bombed off the eaches but was taken in tow by another destroyer.

40
44
Night of May 29th.
Enemy activity was reduced during the night, only two bombing attacks being made. It was intended to recommence embarkation from Eastern Arm under cover of darkness but apparently due to some misunderstanding the only ships that arrived were 4 trawlers and a yacht.
Consequently a great opportunity was missed. Probably
15000 troops could have been embarked had the ships been forthcoming. AS a result of the bombing of the Vole referred to above, the pier itself was hit by a dive-bomber and severely damaged, but a brow was put in place which permitted the passage of troops.
In reply to V.A. Dover's 2057/29, asking whether the harbour was blocked, I replied at 3150 -
"No. Hope to get a good move on tonight but it is doubtful if much more can be done during daylight hours.
Apparently incorrect information as to the blocking of Dunkirk Harbour had been telephoned by Commander Dove from La Panne. This unfortunate incident reduced the shipping entering during the night to a minimum.

41
30th May 30 Th
45
Passenger transport KING ORRY which had been damaged by a near miss p.m. 29th May, still alongside the
Pier at midnight. I saw the Captain and told him he must go and gave him the alternative of beaching himself on the
Eastern beach if his ship was not seaworthy, or of proceeding wathout Crooks well to England = the escort of a trawler. At 0230 he was
^
observed endeavouring to clear the harbour. It was subsequently found out that he sunk about 4 cables outside the entrance.
At 0039/30 made the following signal to Dover:-
"There is a shortage of ships and boats. I have no destroyers".
There were no air attacks in the early morning
Later when ships began to arrive, and all was quiet. 1 In view of the heavy target presented by a number of ships being alongside the Mole at one time, destroyers were ordered alongside the Pier one at a time.
Arrival of the first destroyer was a signal for an attack by one bomber. Subsequently, however, the bright sunshine of yesterday gave way to mist and it was possible to speed up embarkation without undue risk.
0755 following signal was made:-
"Great opportunity missed during night when only three drifters arrived. No water or food yet provided on
Dunkirk beach for large number of troops. Sporadic bombing".
Attbout 0800 store ship arrived with provisions but no water. This caused so much congestion on the Pier that in view of the urgent need to send off every possible man, about half the foodhad been unloaded.
unloading was, after abandoned and the store ship filled with troops. A certain amount of water was obtained from destroyers.
One personnel ship arrived about 0920, the first one since the previous day. Other ships (three drifters) filled shortly

42
46
30th may shortly after. Embarkation proceeded thereafter at a good steady rate.
IsV.A.,Dorer
Following signal was made at 0930:-
"Troops are concentrated in unlimited numbers just
East of Dunkirk Beach, on Bray Beaches and at
La Panne. Please do your best to distribute. I am getting along splendidly here. Send two hospital ships now. If mist persists I will bring them in on arrival."
At 0943 the following Situation Report was made:-
Concur are 1700 k/cs. I have no M.T.B. and can only communicate with U.K. by French wireless station, or when destroyers are in sight. If conditions remain as at present a destroyer alongside continuously for embarkation would be a magnificent help. The moment bombing starts all must shove off".
At 0950 I made following signal:-
"If this weather persists I want a ship every half an hour".
The whole morning was misty and ideal for embarkation but few ships arrived and a great opportunity was again lost.
Hospital ships also did not arrive until afternoon and there were over one thousand wounded waiting for transportation.
At 1600 two destroyers arrived.
At 1700 a car was sent for me to go to G.H.Q. and
I turned over the duties of S.N.O. to Commander Maund.
Friday at 1836 following signal was made:-
"Am leaving for G.H.Q. for about two days and I have turned over the job of N.S.O. to Commander Maund who fully understands the situation and has everything well in hand."
At 1846 following signal was made:-
"Embarkation proceeding steadily despite intermittent bombing attacks and bombardments. Conditions appear favourable for good progress tonight. Request all available craft may be made available both for Dunkirk and beaches. Number embarked to date only with destroyers 13,000."
At 2025 a Situation Report was made as follows:-
"Despite intense bombardment and air attack four thousand troops have been embarked during last hour.
Dunkirk will be untenable by Friday morning. Embarkation
Every possible effort will be made. I consider will be continued until last moment but depend upon large ships and destroyers at Pier tonight."
As

4743
30 31 may
AB ships had now arrived in good numbers it was necessary that the rate of embarkation must in some way be speeded up. The troops coming down the Pier were, therefore, urged to quicken their pace and eventually the thousands of troops, tired and without food and water for days, broke into the double and kept it up the whole length of the
Eastern STE for more than two hours. During that period it is estimated that more than 15,000 troops were embarked.
Night 30th - 31st May. Shelling was heavy during the
"ternoon and night and operations were greatly hampered.
However, ships arrived in some numbers and with the cessation in the shelling between 3 and 4 a.m. about ten thousand troops were embarked. This relieved the congestion on the beaches which had been very great in the evening. In the early morning the beaches were very nearly clear of troops.
I remained at G.H.Q. for the night and telephoned the naval situation to the Admiralty. I was present with the C.in C. at several meetings, my main object being to explain to the Military that if the evacuation of the B.B.F.
was to be largely accomplished, it could only be done by means of Dunkirk. Even given good weather embarkation from the beaches must be very slow. A destroyer going full out with her boats to the beaches could only embark 600 men in
12 hours, whereas this could be done in 20 minutes at the
Pier.
Some of the G.H.Q. staff expressed disappointment that more could not be done to push on with the embarkation off the beaches in a surf. I WELD satisfied that when the weather permitted everything possible was being done by the officers I had placed there, but I continually stressed the troops should be moved to Dunkirk and maximum numbers shou'
also be available to embark there.
Political

44
Political pressure was now being brought to bear
Triday
The on the C.in C. that the evacuation must be on a fifty-fifty load basis with the French. My only stipulation was that at all costs we should be allowed free use of the Eastern arm while the French used the port, outer harbour and beaches.
0605.
I made a signal to Commander Maund at Dunkirk to for provide personnel ships for General Laurencie's troops
(some 5,000 in number) at C.in C's. request. I also asked
Admiral Wake-Walker to keep Dunkirk going at 100%..
0940, you
Little progress could be made off the beaches owing to the surf.
0945, "Sun 1s BOV coning through have
G.H.Q. informed 100 that a plan was being worked out for hours for naval co-operation to bombard advancing German tanks in
"Lord Goart the later stages. This, however, was never necessary, as far as / am aware. versels. dusk.
Request necessary ships my
1004. "Wo have been continually heavily boxibarded and they are gradually finding the range of our leading berth, would only enter ships 88
necessary for the flow or treops,
Continuous and beary shelling all the morning, but the evamition proceeded fairly speedily. At Last ships were arriving in Large numbers and strong a * protection kept bonging attack away. The only thing necessary use to scop the shelling. At 1800 a signed was received from the Air Lisison
Officer at Dover asking for position of energy battary, This was not known with any certainty as the lettery vas probably mobile, but it vos in the district of Loon Plage larguage Kark regly use and to this affect, The bechardsent, nevertheless, become more intense and a great deal more securate.
Very heavy attacks 1820 delivered during the ovening but were concentrated shiefly upon develist ships in the reads. Dive hombing attacks here carried out 00 the ships loading but without sussess. The embarkation processed easethly.

45
49
Friday 31st May. The following signals were made:-
0320. "Request more shipsto load Dunkirk."
0445. "Every available ship will be required at Dunkirk during the next two hours to evacuate rest of army.
0605. "Embarkation proceeding satisfactorily in spite of bombardment. 1 would again stress the need for more ships and constant fighter protection
0638. "Am now receiving a number of Frenchmen. I have raised no objection to their embarking in British ships and am allowing them to do so.
0940. "Request you will inform me whether troops are now being ordered to march to Dunkirk from the beaches.
0945. "Sun is now coming through and I have a big target of ships in harbour. Request special air protection for next two hours.
0957. "Lord Gort has agreed that 5,000 Freinh troops should be ambarked here this evening after dark in British vessels. Request necessary ships may be sent to arrive at dusk.
1044. We have been continually heavily bombarded and they are gradually finding the range of our loading berth. I would rather only enter ships as necessary for the flow of troops.
Continuous and heavy shelling all the morning, but the evacuation proceeded fairly speedily. At last ships were arriving in large numbers and strong a r protection kept bomging attack away. The only thing necessary was tostop the shelling. At 1200 a signal was received from the Air Liaison
Officer at Dover asking for position of enemy battery. This was not known with any certainty as the battery was probably mobile, but it was in the district of Loon Plage Brouge Kerk
Soch. A reply was made to this effect. The bombardment, nevertheless, become more intense and a great deal more accurate.
Very heavy attacks were delivered during the evening but were concentrated chiefly upon derelict ships in the roads. Dive bombing attacks were carried out on the ships loading but without success. The embarkation proceeded smoothly.