TNA ADM 199 790

142
147
0415. Overtook a Royal Engineers' ferry in command of Lieutenant
T. Ponsonby, R.N.V.R., loaded with troops, and this Officer considering his services would be more useful at Dunkirk, he returned there having landed the troops he had rescued on board my ship.
24. 0660. Enemy aircraft sighted, but whether from prudence and the fact that we were now able to bring into action 14 Bren guns and hundreds of rifles in addition to our own armament, no direct attack on us was made.
25, 1100. Arrived off Harwich and 1130 safely moored at Parkstone
Quay where disembarkation of the troops was speedily accomplished and the four cutters returned to base.
26. In concluding my report I would like to say that the behaviour of Officers and ratings of all ranks was worty of the highest praise and I consider the tireless efforts and entire disregard of personal safety shown by the undermentioned are worthy of special mention.
1st. Lieutenant. Sub Lieut. H. Astbury, R.N.R.
Navigator.
Lieut. P.A. Smyth. R.N.R. (7.124).
Sub.Lieut. C.O. Poynton, R.N.V.R.
(E)Lieut. T.N. Boalch. R.N.R. (T.124)
(E)Sub.Lieut.H.G. Webster,R.N.R. (T.12h)
W.Walker, P.O.,R.M. D/J112557.
W.Matthews, P.O.,R.N.R., X.10066B.
#,Hodgeon,L.Sea. R.N.R, X9915B.
T.Wilson, R.F.R., J106181.
A.Bishop,L.Sea., R.N. D/JX133314.
J.White,A.B. R.N., D/J9h8hh.
M.Johnson, A.B., R.N. D/S.S.X.234063.
A.Denley,A.B. R.N., W/J.X.151223.
T.Carr, Stoker, (T.124)
C.Walker, Stoker, (T.12h).
F.Dunn, Chief Stwd. (1.124)
W.Z.Oriffin,R.W. S.B.A. X.6905.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
COMMANDING OFFICER.
VICE ADMIRAL
JUN
*

Dynam 103 814/0/1152 B14/0
1156
...Vice Admiral Dover.
148
From. Commanding Officer H.M.S.Shikari.
Date.7th June 1940.
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS;
The following is submitted in accordence with Signal
2001/4/40.
Tuesday 28th May.
Returned from night Convoy to Cherbourg at 1400.
Landed S.P's and fuelled. 1430 Sailed independently for
Dover at 28 knots. 1930 Arrived off Dover. Instructed to join Malcolm. 2000 Sailed under Captain D.16's Ordersto carry out evacuation.
Wednesday 29th May.
0100 Arrived off Beach at La Panne. Commenced work, using Motorboat and Whaler. Heavy Surf running.
Whaler capsized owing to military rushing boat in the
Surf. With daylight evacuation speeded up and this Y88
greatly assisted by Naval Landing Graft. As in subsequent work, drifting boats were being towed in by the Motorboat with Boatkeepers from Shikari. Kedge anchors were used when Surf was heavy and boats veered to the shore.
During all operations, hands not required at the Guns were in boats or assisting to embark the military. Supply
Parties only closing up when the Guns fired. 1215. Ship full. Returned to Dover. Disembarked troops, fuelled.
1745. Left Dover for La Panne. Many bombing attacks on
Ships in vicinity, when near Dost Dyok buoy. Closed
Paddle Steamed "Gracie Fields* who had been hit, but as sufficient craft were available to take off her troops, proceeded. Zig-Zagging at high Speeda was employed whenever bombing attacks took place or were threatened.
Thursday 30th May.
Ran aground on approaching the Coast but got off on the rising tide, three hours later, at Dawn. Contin
-ued embarking troops. 0800 Full. Returned to Dover. On passing Nieuport Bucy came under fire from a battery behind Nieuport for seven minuted. It is thought that the fire was controlled by an observation Baloon over
Nieuport. This fact was reported by signal but the
Baloon was up for the next few days. No hita were registered. Smoke screen and Zig-Zagging was commenced after the first Salvo. 1300. Arrived Dover. Disembarked.
Many of these troops from the Beaches had only Half
Kits and were wet through. The Ship's Company did all they cuold for the Soldiers and now in consequence have deplated Kits, The Coxswain, his Staff and the
Cooks and Stewards did Great work in supplying the
Soldiers with food and drink, under most trying circumkeep the Galley fire going when steaming at high speeds.
stances; especially as in Shikari it is impossible to
A burst steam pipe to one of the oil fuel pumps necessitated proceeding to & buoy while Sandhurst made repairs. This was rapidly done. 1930. Ready for sea again. Sailed for La Panne. Gyro Compass failed when approaching Dunkirk by "X" Route for the first time.
2230 Darkness slowed down evacuation considerably, close and our boats took Soldiers to light draught Ships This inshore when uncertain of Shikari's position.
added considerably to the time spent off the Beaches.

( Cont: )
Friday 31st May.
149
0400. R.A. ordered Shikari to Dunkirk. Proceeded alongside East Jetty and very soon had the Ship full.
During this operation there was a bombingbattack, which was most inaccurate due to heavy A.A.fire. 0520. Sailed for Dover Disembarked. 0930. Sailed for La Panne. Near
No 6 W. Buoy of the Dunkirk Channel, came under fire from shore battery to the West of Dunkirk. Fire was returned. During the whole time embarkation was taking place, the Nieuport batteries were firing at the Ships.
When straddled moved West towards Bray, the Motorboat and tow filling up small craft in thier vicinity, before rejoining Shikari at Bray. Beaches Shelled. 1800. Bombers attacked. A.A. Fire was opened. This continued until dark and rather disorganised embarkation. Our boats were asked for to bring off Lord Gort's luggage. The embarkation speeded up under cover of darkness.
Staurday 1st June.
At dawn shelling was resumed with greater intensity. 0600. Though reported nearly full, Shikari was ordered to complete to full capacity at Dunkirk, This was done. 0620 Sailed with other Ships for Dover. Used
Smoke Screen and only & few shots were fired at us off
No.6.W. buoy. On the voyage, had several attacks from the air. Enemy aircraft being engaged by our fighters.
1000. Arrived Dover, Disembarked troops. Each batch had several stretcher cases which lengthened the disembarkation. From today Saturday 1st June, no more day evacuation was attempted, owing to shelling and bombing. The troops today were part of General Piroux's army. Oiled and ammunitioned Ship. 2130. Sailed for
Dunkirk, arriving at 0225.
Sunday 2nd June.
0200. Ship full. Returned to Dover. Most of the voyage was under cover of darkness, and there was no trouble. 0540. Arrived Dover. Disembarked troops. Scaling ladders were supplied. 1845. Sailed under orders of
Sabre for Dunkirk. The shore batteries opened fire as we rounded No Buoy. Under cover of a smoke screen no hits were obtained. Fire was returned at the flashes seen. 2200. Ship full. Sailed for Dover. Though unable to see Aircraft, they were heard and flares were seen.
Probably Mine Laying.
Monday 3ed June.
0130. Secured and disembarked troops.1800. Captain
Dangerfield and his Staff arrived onboard. Sailed for
Blockships. A conference of C.O.'s was held in Shikari.
the Downs and anchored for two hours near the three
2030. Sailed for Dunkirk. Speed 7 knots. Acted as off guide for the Route "2" was used. arrived near Dunkirk Dask. No entrance. 0230. Ordered to weigh
Calais at Blockships. fire from the shore. 0130. Anchored by Captain harbour who had transfered to an M.T.B.
Shikari led Dangerfield the Blockships to the entrance. On weighing,

145
Monday 3ed June (Cont:)
150
a Mine blew up on our port bow and soon after the leading
Blockship following in our wake, blow up, presumably
Mined. M.T.B. picked up survivors. The remaining two
Blockships carried on with thier job. Shikari, in waiting, proceeded alongside and embarked 400 troops, French, who had been left after the last Ship evacuating had sailed. Among these troops was General Bathelemy, commanding the Flanders Garison, who stated that 12000still remained in Dunkirk. This was reported. By this time it was light and firing at the Jetty had Commenced, one shell hitting the Jetty, causing many casualties.
0340. Ordered to withdraw by Captain Dangerfield. An uneventful passage. 0645. Arrived Dover. Disembarked troops. 0950. Recieved signal to return to Home Ports.
1130. Proceeded to Plymouth under orders of Captain D.
Codrington. 2100. Arrived Devonport.
Commanding Officer
H.M.S.Shikari.
JUN 1940
.
*
DOVE E R

Dynam 106.
153
Bin/o
H.M.S. "Fangbourne"
À
158
At Sea.
5th.June 1940.
Sir,
1 have the honour to forward the following narrative in accordance with your signal 2049/4/6.
At approximately midnight on Sunday 26th. say, H.M.S.
Dynamo 19th 3/1/20163 146 91163
SECURES CLOSE,
HIGHTOWN,
151
From
Lt.-Commander H.O.Boys-Smith, R.N.R.
To
Commander-in-Chief, Nore.
Date.
June 7th, 1940.
Submitted:
As instructed by Commodore.N.Farracks, Chatham, a summarized report of the part taken by ships and craft under my command during the evacuation of Dunkirk is herewith enclosed.
An extra copy is attached for transmission to
Commander-in-Chief, Nore, If desired.
I have made no other reports, and have sent no copies of this report to any other authority.
H.G. Hay&funith
Lieut.-Commander, N.N.R.
MIRAL
N 1940
*
R MBA04 E

Dynam 106
153
H.M.S. *Pangbourne*
158
At Sea.
5th.June 1940.
Sir,
1 have the honour to forward the following narrative in accordance with your signal 2049/4/6.
At approximately midnight on Sunday 26th. May, H.M.S.
remainder of the
5th.4.S.
147
SLYDLE'S-CLOSE,
152
HIGHTOWN,
RINGWOOD.
From Lieut.-Commander H.G.Boys-Smith, R.N.R.
To
Vice-Admiral, Dover.
Date June 7th, 1940.
Subjet:- Summarized report of part taken by ships and craft under my commend during the evacuation of
Dunkirk.
th a.m.
Joined Dutch Scoot "Trente" at filbury in command.
Sailed p.m. for Shoerness where vessel 403 prepared for operations.
th p.m.
Sailed from Sheerness direct for Dunkirk beaches via Rest Bindar Buoy in company with other "scoots".
3th 6330
When approaching Beaches was turned back by
Naval M.L. with orders to return to Ramagate. Half an hour later was attacked by one salvo of bomba and machine gun fire by a German comber which appeared to be returning from the direction of England. Arrived
Ramsgate 8.m. same day.
18th p.m.
Sailed for Dunkirk via Buoys U, V, 1, and 6 West.
Dunkirk harbour entrance was reached just before midnight.
A full load of British troops was ferried off in drifters
(380). Ship sailed immediately by same route. Fierce fires were blazing all over Dunkirk, lighting up the sea. Continuous distant firing was heard. Local

H.M.S. *rangbourne*
158
At Sea.
5th.June 1940.
Sir,
1 have the honour to forward the following narrative in accordance with your signal 2049/4/6.
At approximately midnight on Sunday 26th. say, H.M.S.
of the
Sthen.s.
2
148
153
conditions quiet.
a.m.
Arrived Ramsgate and disembarked troops. Sailed immediately for La Panne beaches via Test Hinder Buoy.
afternoon. When several miles from coast many Terman bombers were encountered. Bombs were dropped but utesed. Ships two Lewis @ guns in constant action. Although ineffective in fact, this gunfire probably kept them ups machines up. Many ships in vicinity being bombed. Some
British fighters sighted. then nearer to shore the
Paddle Steamer "Gracie Fields" was sighted homeward bound packed with approximately 800 troops. aftnessed a bomb attack on her during which & direct bit Y&S
secured amidships. Nent to render assistance. "Gracie
Fields" was unable to stop her engines. Upper deck enveloped in clouds of steam. Operation of going alongeide had to be performed whilst both ships more proceeding shead. Secured alongside. Terrible mortality and shambles on board. Transferred as sany injured and others as "Twente" would hold. During operation another scoot secured alongaide opposite side of "Gracie Fields" and took off remainder. Cost off and proceeded full speed to Hamsgate. Arrived dawn,
May 30th. Disembarked wounded and other troops.

e/172
H.M.S. Pangbourne"
158
At Sea.
5th.June 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward the following narrative in accordance with your signal 2049/4/6.
At approximately midnight on Sunday 26th. May, H.M.S.
with the remainder of the 5th.m.s.
149
3
154
Entire Ship's Company of "Twente" relieved for
24 hours 88 sleep had been unobtainable for 3 nights and
2 days running. "Twente" sailed immediately with relief crew.
st. a.m.
"Twente" unaccountably not returned. Took cormand of two Army Metor Launchee, "Kestrel" and "Grouse" instead, and seiled for Dunkirk Beaches via U, 1, and * bucys.
Embarked a full load of French troops during afternoon.
Slow process. Motor Launches' dinghy *** used to begin with but capsized. Slight swell. Troope then boarded a grounded craft whilst Motor Launches were manosuvred alongside seaward and of this. Considerable air activity and bombing throughout operations. Returned immediately to Ramsgate.
Whan off Goodwin Sands Launon I HAS In, "Kestrel", began to sink. "Grouse" came alongaide and took off some men. By hard baling and slow speed Ramagate was somehow reached at midnight. Investigation and repairs immediately put in hand. (Patent self-baling device responsible for leak).
1st. Noon.
"Kestrel" fit for gea. Left for Dunkirk Baaches via U, V, and * buoys. On approaching Dunkirk at 1530
most intense air activity was observed. Sky filled with German bombers and shall bursts. Beach was reached

H.M.S. "Pangbourne"
158
At Sea.
5th.June 1940
Sir,
I have the honour to forward the following narrative in accordance with your signal 2049/4/6.
At approximately midnight on Sunday 26th. May, H.M.S.
with the remainder of the 5th.m.8.
150
4
155
at 1600. Dive bombers everywhere and shells falling on beach. Although attack after attack TSS made by bombers on various ships relatively ****** few hits appeared to be secured. Motor Launch having lost dinghy on previous day I went alongside an abandoned wreck. One of the wreck's boats was swung out, lowered, and taken in too by Launch. French troops were ferried to the Launch in this boat by Launch crew. Conditions (other than state of sea which was good) were shocking as German planes were flying low, dropping bombs and using machine-guns.
Operation delayed 89 great difficulty was experienced in rersuading some of the Frenchmen to ambark. So far as I could understand, their units were incomplete and they were unwilling that part of a unit should embark without thefrest. At one point on the beach there were at least 2,000 men, none of whom would embark. The rowing boat bad to be pulled back to the Launch and towed further Rest where 8 fresh start me made. Eventually
& full load was obtained and we sailed for Hamagate by the same route. Throughout the first part of the return journey repeated bombing and machine gun attacks were made. On one occasion a salvo of 6 bombs was released so low that they were plainly visible as they left the racks. They all fell close together near the Launch but all failed to explode. Several machine gun bullets

H.M.S.
"Pangbourne"
15
At Sea.
5th.June 194
Sir,
I have the honour to forward the following narrative in accordance with your signal 2049/4/6.
At approximately midnight on Sunday 26th. May, H.M.S.
with the remainder of the 5th.m.s.
151
5
156
passed right through the Launch but only one soldier was wounded (slightly).
When about half say across to Ramsgate a trawler signalled that her engines had broken down owing to &
bomb attack. Ment and **** spoke another trawler and told him to take her in tow. On another occasion a flottila of life boats was met which reported having been machine-gunned outward bound. Many wounded were on beard.
This afternoon was much the moret day experienced during the whole evacuation. The last bombing attack
I witnessed in the distance was made when my launch ***
approaching the.Goodwin Lt.-V.
Very few British fighters were seen during the day and the German bombers appeared to do much as they pleased.
Ramagate was reached at 2230.
2nd.
Commandeered a large fast Dutch Netor Launch on the everning of this day, and sailed for Dunkirk harbour at
2000 hrs. via U, V, and 1 buoys. On srrival found the port of Dunkirk under heavy and quite contiruous shell fire. Proceeded inside and secured alongside Eastern
Arm. Mole was being plastered with shells and many dead Frenchmen were lying about. No sign of troops.
Sent one of crew to tastes inshore end of mole to investigate. He returned with 30 Frenchmen ( all he could

rangbourne"
15
At Sea.
5th.June 194
Sir,
I have the honour to forward the following narrative in accordance with your signal 2049/4/6.
At approximately midnight on Sunday 26th. May, H.M.S.
with the remainder of the 5th.m.s.
6
157
find) and a report that all British had left. These
Frenchmen refused to come in so small a blacks craft and insisted on boarding a large ship which was also alongside f the mole.
à Pritish Naval officer apparently in charge of embarkation on mole informed 70
that there were no more troops to come and that 1 cust return empty. I took on board a Frenn gun which 108
lying on the Tole and returned to Ramsgate.
It was afterwards learnt that although there were no more troops to come in the area that night, therewore some more further from the port who succesded later in reaching the port and were embarked the following night by other ships.
rd. a.m.
Returned Remagate arriving dawn.
th
Re-assumed cormand of Dutch Scoot "Ixente" and sailed to Tilbury and Surrey Commercial Cooks.
ith
Handed ship over to Pook authorities and returned with Ship's Company to Chatham Perracks.
Lieut.-Commander, R.N.B.

'yangbourne"
158
9
At Sea.
5th.June 1940.
Sir, in accordance with your signal 2049/4/6.
I have the honour to forward the following narrative midnight on Sunday 26th. day, H.M.S.
with the remainder of the 5th.w.s.
North Shields, and proceeded to Harwich, arriving at about less "Saltash" slipped from Union Sharf,
2300 Monday 27th.May. The ship coaled and provisioned S.D.
Tuesday 28th. May, and proceeded to the beach east of Dunkin at 1200. On arrival off the beach Fangbourne vas ordered into Dunkirk harbour, and secured al ngside the last mole at 2145. Some difficulty was experienced in getting along)
side properly as a wire cable vas discovered across the stem which prevented the ship going ahead far enough to clear the Gossamer, who was secured alongsidein the next berth to
Fastward seaward. Pangbourne's stern ma thus outside
Gossamer's stem which meant that embarkation of troops could only take place over the lower bridge and & ladder on the forecastle.
When about & hundred to & hundred and fifty troops had embarked Commander.Clouston R.N. who vas
N.O.I.C. on the jetty informed ae that an unknown number of badly wounded were isolated on & jetty the other side or the entrance about one and a half siles further up, and asked ae if I could go and collect them. 1 pointed out the presence of the wire across my bow, but he assured Be that the centre of the channel was clear, as he had just seen some French destroyers go ug. 1 backed out clear and proceeded as directed, turning before going alongaide.
In this 1 was assisted by thelight of blaming buildings although the wharf itself was in deep shadow. Un securing alongside 1 found about one thousand troops including a large number of stretcher cases and saveral hundred walking cases.
Owing to th a tide being low and still abbing it was necessary to rig wooden gangways from the boatdeck to the wharf, and the stretcher cases and walking cases were embarked by this mathod. It soon became apparent that we could not accomodate all the stretcher cases:
the quarterdeck. passages, Wardroom etc. were soon full
80 non-wounded were embarked over the bridge forward until the ship was full. The troops on the mole behaved well and carried out instructions, but as there appeared to be very few officers or N.C.Os. ashore to take charge there was, when it became apparent that the entire party could not be taken off, & certain amount of crowding round the gangways.

154
Sheet 2. 159
At 0030 on Wednesday 29th. May I slipped and proceeded down harbour. After rounding No.6E whistle and bell buoy I found myself in among two or three
French destroyers, stopped in the channel, and as a result missed No.13 bouy and went aground on sandbank north of Zuydcoote Pass Engines were put to full astern and the ship slid off into about ten fathoms. In order to ascertain my exact position and wait until unlit bouys could be seen I anchored and very shortly picked up the
Nieuport buoy While waiting the ship was roughly fixed and found to be in position51 degrees 7 minutes 30 seconds
North, 2 degrees 28 minutes 48 seconds East, and clear of the channel. I proceeded without further incident to
Margate. Just before dawn gunfire was observed shead and shortly afterwards several destroyers passed ae proceeding towards the French coast. Later passing the Kwiente buoy one sunken destroyer and another badly down by the stern were passed.
At I000 ship secured alongside Margate pier and disembarked troops. Although no exact counting of troops was possible, about 450 in all were landed, including approximately 50 stretcher cases and 100 walking cases.
The arrangements for disembarkation of troops at Margate were most efficient.
At 1107 Wednesday 29th. may slipped and proceeded back to Dunkirk, being joined by Lydd at North Goodwin light vessel. At 1315 Lydd reported & submarine to starboard, although not observed by Pangbourne a warning was broadcast at 1321 Between 1645 and 1715 just off Nieuport bank several air attacks were directed against Pangbourne and all ships in the vicinity. Immediately after this two
British soldiers were picked up in an exhausted condition, apparently having been blown from the deck of some small ship. At approximately 1730 several enemy bombers appeared to be about to attack Pangbourne but passed overhead, and were distinctly observed to attack & hospital ship about a mile on the Starboard beam for & considerable period without registering any direct hits. Just before passing the Nieuport Bank buoy a large lifeboat containing some thirty Belgian soldiers was picked up and the boat taken in tow for use on the beach. On closing the beach 1 was ordered to proceed Alanasise the Clan MacAlister lying at anchor and embark the crew. This ship was on fire aft, and the ammunition round the after gun was continually exploding.
The Master reported to ae that there was no chance of saving the shipas all hoses were out and the steering gear out of action. The crew, including some 30 Lascars, and several
Naval ratings, - crews of motor boats - were all embarked.
I then proceeded and anchored about half a mile off the beach opposite the Sanatorium. All available boats were lowered and sent inshore in charge of Lieut. Tadman
R.N.R. and Rabbitts, Boatswain R.N.. Between
1860 and 1900 the ship was subjected to numerous low diving bombing attacks, although no direct hits were made there were several near misses. The hull was holed on both sidesabove and below the water line and the D.U. coil cut in several places. It was during this period that all casualties occurred, resultang in the death of of seven the ratings and six Belgian soldiers, and wounding seven

160
Sheet 3.
and wounding of seven a lull in the bombing attacks the cable was slipped, and ratings and two officers, and two Belgian soldiers. During the capstan being out of action, and Lthe ship got under way, the troops by this time coming off in various boats were picked up, and the boats abandoned as they were holed and boats' falls shot away. As both compasses were out of action I decided to get clear of the sandbanks before dark.
During the above attacks fire was opened on the bombers, but one near miss aft wounded or killed the 12 pdr. gun's crew. The majority of Lewis gun pans in ready use racks were pierced by bomb fragments and caused several jambs.
The spare I2 pdr. gun's crew was closed up, but by this time the bomners appeared to be concentrating on the harbour although several high bombing attacks were nad along the coast. On clearing the Nieuport Bank the paddle-minesweeper
Gracie Fields asked for assistance. She had suffere direct hits and was out of control, steaming at about six knots with her helm jambed, with 15 degrees starboard wheel on. 1
proceeded alongside and took off about eighty British soldiers. After this, as she appeared to be & danger to navi ation, I took her in tow leaving the ship's company on board. Kellett passed and at ay request led ae as ay compasses were still dead.
At 0130 Thursday 36th. May the Gracie Fields reported that she was sinking. 1 slipped her and went alongside, took off the ship's company, four badly wounded soldiers, and abandoned her and broadcast her approximate position (51 degrees 20 minutes North, 02 degrees 05 minutes
East). By this time Kellett was out of sight and visibility was poor. At 0646 the South Goodwin Light Vessel was sighted and 1 was led into Dover by H.M.S. "Mosquito:
1 secured alongside disembarking jetty at 1000 and landed troops. wounde d and dead.
After disembarkation ship proceeded to Submarine
Basin and was taken in hand for temporary repairs by
Sandhurst, and remained out of action until 20.0 Saturday
Ist. June. By this time the D.O. coil was functioning but the compasses were still out of action. After leaving harbour 1 was ordered to roceed in company with Halcyon and ordered her to rendezvous at North Goodwin. On arrival at North Goodwin 1 patrolled in the vicinity, but saw no sign of Halcyon, and I heard on return that she had not left harbour. AS all ship ing going towards the beaches had now ceased, 1 decided to proceed to the eastward with
& view of assisting any ships returning in difficulties.
T buoy was passed at 0532 and course altered to westward.
off. buey. Off S buoy A/V Stella Regal closed and transferred 23 British troops whom she had picked up some time previously. Returned to Dover by 1030 and landed troops. At 2000 proceeded to Dunkirk in company with
Halcyon and Speedwell by West Fass, entering the breakwater at 0030 Monday June 3rd. On entering Iwas ordered by R.A.D. to wait outside as there were no troops waiting embarkation.

156
161
Sheet 4. & final embarkation.
At 0200 a lifeboat with 43 French troops and 4 Officers came alongside and embarked. They stated that they were from a French vessel which had run aground on & sandbank.
Whilst getting this party inboard I was ordered by R.A.D to *
return to England. As Albury was leaving harbour at this time I followed her out clear of the channel and then proceeded to Folkestone and disembarked troops, then proceeded to Dover and coaled as I had only 15 tons of coal remaining. Owing to being unable to leave Granville
Dock until 2130 Pangbourne did not take part in any further operations.
1 have the honour to be Sir,
Your Obsdient Servant
VICE ADMIRAL
Commander R.N.
9- JUN 1940
*
*
DOVER

SECRET
Dyram. 10%
157
SECRE
à
Commanding Officer, Saltash.
Alulol
M
6.6.40.
162
Senior Officer, 5th. M.S.P. Vice admunt. Dover.
ERENCE.
Report on proceedings from N. Shields (29th. May)
to Sheerness (3rd. June)
th. May.
1.
A.M. Compasses were adjusted badly and at 1230
on the 29th. I sailed from the Tyne (encountering fog the whole way) to Harwich.
2.
NE
At 2025 and in approximate position 539 561' N.
0 19' B. four sharp jars were felt and it vas though that the vessel had hit a wrsck. Twenty minute later five more jars were experienced and an explosion heard. Two vessels were in the vicinity, one making Pt. 68 on her syren, and I decided that th bumps were probably due to patt This CI depth char
RWICH.
fired by these vessels. On passage my compass showed itself very inaccurate.
oth. May.
3.
At 1300 on 30th. I arrived off Harwich; my identi fication signal, altho correct, was not accepted for about twenty minutes - reason not
ARWICH.
known. Coal and provisions were taken on Doard, ship was swung to obtain new deviation card. Tracks to Dunker ue were put on the charts, but no orders were received until 8225. At 2227'I sailed for
La Panne. No communication I operational orders were received, so WT watch was kept on 138 KCS and routin
4.
The weather Yes very thick, but the trawler in position 51° 47' N. 10 481' 8. at the bedd in the channel was sighted. About ten minutes later
1st. May.
orders were received from Harwich to use
QZS 33. The obvious intention of this order was to
DST IN
avoid using the direct channel. This necessitated using Kn ek Deep channel, in By opinion, and
NOCK DEEP.
extremely hazardous navigational passage at night and in thich wea her, especially as ay COR ass still appeared inac urate. I proceeded down the Xn CK
Deep taking continuous soundings. Eventually I ran into shallow water and tried every Lirection until I
ran into 22 fathoms, could not et out. At daylight a buoy was sighted (ny deviations were still erratic, but the eather had cleared considerable)
5.
About 1000 vessel was off La Panne and about the same time.Dover's orders were received to
A PANNE
programe accordingly. At this time not rendeavous at position W. at 2200 and I to had amend andtwas expecting to meet M.S. 5 and the rest the appreciated that shi S were working independently of
Flotilla; it also med that there would not be time

2
163
into tugs there (I did not know that ships were going to embark troops and return to Margate, discharge them alongside the Pier - according to the chart there is not
ERQUE
enough water) and return to position W. by 2200. I
turned West again, but there seemed there would be a waste
S.
of time so, I decided to turn East again and eport myself
Panne) and assist in embarking troops aboard other ships.
to "HEBE" (who had informe me me was Senior Office, La
Circumstances made it necessary to embark 100 troops aboard myself, no opportunity arising to put them aboard any ot er ships.
6.
Later I was ordered to proceed in execution of previous orders (I left one boat with "HEBE"). Just Test of Bray
I passed the Admiral and reported to him that I had 100
KERQUE
troops on board. He told me to join him and I followed
DS.
him back to La Panne. While lying off there a further raid commenced and he ordered ne to 80 West at full speed.
It was during this raid that one aeroplane ms brought down by the 12 pdr. gun at maximum range. The raid was nearly over and the Admiral out of sight by the time I was
West of Dunkerque, SQ I returned to look for him and was told to return to La Panne, and embark troops after dark.
7.
At La Panne an B.N.V.R.Signalman reported to no that
"HEBE" wanted an officer badly, the wording of the signal sounded as if the Commanding Officer wanted someone capable of relieving him for a period. This appears to have been wrong, and may have originated in at verbal
KERQUE
message from the C.O. or the Commodore of the motor boat alongside. At any rate, I sent over my 1st. Lieutenant,
ADS.
he found he was not required in "HEBE", SO took the motor boat ashore to look for more troops. Finding none, he, with the aid of to sailors, walked along the beach pulling the whaler with them to see if they could find any. The whole time the place was being bombarded. ("HEBE" was signalling at times with a bright light) He eventually returned to "HEBE". I consider his actions worthy of reward, as he could eatly have rned to no at once.
8.
In the meantime I had taken a further 300 or SO troops on board and was nearly full and, as the difficers amongst
IKERQUE
them told me there were no further troops on 8 org, I
ADS.
reported this to "HEBE" and was told to return to Marcate;
not knowing my 1st. Lieutenant was assore, but thinking him in "HEBE", I did SO.
9.
I had now been between Dunkerque and La Panne for about steamer when she was being shelled and during frequent air
13 hours, several times passing the burning Clan Line raids. Ships company had been continuously at action they had been courously employed almost continuously stations, or takins on troops, without proper food; also since leaving the Tyne 60 hours before but, as yet, showed only officers were myself, Lieutenant R.N.V.R., Sobey R.N.R., and no signs of strain. I was short of two H. seamen and the
Temporary is surficiently experienced to be left as 0.0.7,,
Lieutenant A.R.Patton, who, as yet, except not under the most favourable conditions, and the

159
3
164
Engineer left. Officer. There was very little H.A. ammunition t.June. 10. Immediately were dischar ed at Margate I
sailed again for Dunkerque. On the way there I passed
H.M.S.HAVANT, in distress behind Dyke Shoal. "HAVANT"
was on fire for'd SO I jettisoned my depth charges, placed
ARGATE
my stern under her bows and took er in to: on my sweep wires. Only very slow speed could be made as her helm
UNKERQUE.
WAS over and she paravaned over to the side and pulled my stern over. During this time the ship was subject to frequent and savy bombing and machine gun attacks -
at one time there very 40 aircraft OV rhead. Many salvoes of bombs fell near to the shipp mostly on the starboard quarter and port bom, some were within 30 feet of the
M.S.
ship. Most of the bombs were small but some were large.
AVANT.
Splinters from the bonbs and sprayfrom their splach fell on board fret uently. It Was very nociteable that nearly all the splinters were very small and far too light to do damage, although the force of the explosion burst open the wheelhouse doors and shattered the windows which are protected by splinter mats. I believe most of the larger splint THE passed ever the ship, there trajectory presumeably being nearly vertical on bursting, them fanning out and coins further than the light ones. This
Dombing completely upsat ay compass. Machine run attacks
Mere also experienced, also from the starboard quarter and port bow. These were attempts to rake the ship fore and aft, but were all aimed too hi h; very faw bullets were found on board fterwards, all being ni ses over.
The enemy made three mistakes during each attack.
1. He estimated the course Oil & line through "HAVANT"
and "SALTASH". Actually "HAVAME" was abo 10°
on the quarter.
2. its over estimated the speed.
3. He over estimated the hight of our decks above water.
Had he been correct in 1. he would a Ve scored nany hits with bombs, and if correct in 8. would have caused many casualties on deck. No casualties were xperienced and no major damage was done. During this time I believe the "HAVANT" was also subjected to attack. I had now only two round of H.A. high explosive left, a few shrapnel and six pans of lewin gun ammunition. 4 in. L.A. sun was used against low flying aircraft, but without any noticeable affect. 12 pdr. and levis gun seemed to disturb the enemy.
11.
Later the Commanding Officer of H.M.S.HAVANT decided to abandon ship, as sue appeared to be codus to turn over at any moment. In my judgment, also, she was bound to had several large holes in her side near the deak level.
capsize shortly and then would inevitably sink, as she channel and sink in a dangerous position, or, more
As, after capsimin and micht possibly drift towards the

160
165
4
probably towards the where she might have bean salved by the enemy 11 she sank in shoul water, I asked the Commanding Officer 11 I should ink ser where she was.
He agreed and I cut my sweep wires and sunk er.
12. Five minutes after this the "SCOTIA" and RIGHTON
QUEEN" were sunk. I made a report and proceeded to rescue survivors. My whaler had been damaged and I only had a skiff left. One bunch of survivors were picked U. and
I then put the ship alongside bridge and must of the
"BRIGHTON QUEEN" and artially on er deck, and took off men clincin to her. These nen were mostly French
HTON
Colonial troops and must reluctant to let 80 of what
N.
support they had, it was sometimes necessary to make a line fast to them and pull then off. A carley float and skiff were used to assist in resoue work, no other boats were available. Thile "SALTASH" YRS alongable and on board "BRIGHTON QUEEN" she burped & little on the bilge, but it is not believed that my damage was done. German aircraft bombed and machine gunned men in the water.
my shift was machine gunned.
13.
The work of S.B. 1.Hutter at this time is worthy of mention. He, with the uld of untrained assistants, including Ldg. Sto. Crowley, dealt with 98 casualties,
CUE.
including 10 recussitation cases and only 3 died. He worked most successfully until 10 collepsed. Also worthy of mention is B. Gaughan, Sto. 1. who sma about I mile from the ship, when the ship might easily have had to leave him.
14.
I had picked up 350 to 400 survivors by now, many of them serious casualties, there were no more survivors in
SCUE.
the water SQ I returned to Margate. On the return journey
I closed three trawlers and took on board the Commanding
Officer and crew of M.T.B. 175, these included three serious casualties and one dead rating. I took the M.T.B
in tow and arrived at Margate at 1855.
15.
About 2000 I left the Pier and about 2200 sailed again for Duskerque with boats in tow, one motor boat and the small skiffs. I bad SOMO difficulty with the tow which
VD
MARGATE
light buoy I ran into thick smoke (from Dunkerque) my delayed no about half an hour. Before getting to the greeen
UNKERQUE
being very unreliable, I had to rely very much on compass hand lead (all the tubes for the machine slow had and been I used the in Knock Deep) which made y progress got
1 far Sast.
16.
Orders for this ni that all sweepers had to be lear at 0400. About 0200 I heard The buoy other and by 0500 and the destroyer evacuation the whistle would
UNKERQUE
commence was off the Breakwater at Dunkerque. I followed them at 0245 passed no on the may out, the 30 orders about being as I
did not 0300, even 11 I had an empty having seen sweepers feel Justified in breaking ship. Daring the clear by journey a small craft reported found an object a which mine, return back along ner course and investigation, proved
I turned for a mine, but on closer handles. These broken
I mistook kitchen utensil with broken small craft as horns.
to handles be a may have appeared to the end. June. 16. I anchored at Margate about 0800 and was toldito wait instructions.
I understood that this was the final

166
:-
5
167
evacuation I did not trouble to make any special signal about shortage of coal. Myself, my officers and men had all been continuously on service for several days now, officers being only myself Lieutenant Sobey R.N.R. and
ATE.
Temporary Lieutenant Patton, R.N.V.R. Later, order for this night were received. I weighted and proceeded to
Sheerness at maximum speed for coal. There was just time if the orders were similiar to the previous night.
17.
There was a trawler alongside the coal hulk when I
arrived but she moved CII, never the less, this, and
ERNESS.
tiredness af myself, officers and men delayed ne an hour.
(myself and all officers and men were extremely near collapse now) My 1st. Lieutenant joined re is I was sailing out of harbour.
18.
Shortly after this orders were received to be in position
ERNESS
at Dunkerque at 2100, instead of 0100 as I had hoped. This
ILED AND
was impossible, but thinking that I mint be of use for
TURNED.
rescue work outside If there was any Dombins, I sailed and reported the position. ordered back to harbour.
19.
Monday, 3rd. I arranged for compass adjustment. Time stated was 1500, I went to the svindin bucy at 1330 hopin d. June.
that the time might be advanced, anyhow, I should De no worse off - I still had no H.A. ammunition. While going to the buoy a boiler feed check valve Joint blew puttine one bother out of action for several hours, but I decided
IRERNESS
to start on one boiler, hoping for the second one before
STURNED. LILED AND
arriving at Dunkerque. No further orders were received and in position then, outting that boiler permanently swing was commenced. The boiler stop valve spindle seized out a of action. My Ldg. Tel. reported sick (mental) and, this,
I expect, accounted for By not having received orders earlier.
I considered I ni be as useful as smaller craft, even he with transmitted one Do Ter, to me. 80 Comundore sailed and III Charge for canc orders my to Sailing.
20.
With him very highly of mention. He had 1230 been charge to the 5dg. Tel. and his breakdo 1b n - I
consider on watch and watch since Wednesday, down and 9th. dec in ILLS watch below and his breaking was not surgri due.
21.
also like to mention continuous and Lieutenant unstinted
H. lork Sobey, on R.N.R. Temporary hard Lieutenant at it all Patton, call. R.N.V.R., invaluable MR.J.T.
I should the par. of DX or or three the officers. time and an navisator, most of the the and ready soin to any in spite of to cyphering old Doine too. uble and his department
22.
completion of this/eratio Officer I discovered and ay in been ding atch on new while we had when been ordered to set watch after on the time KCS stated to order
Lds. Tel. that on 156 ROS. (Dover 500 (and this port wave) exce 1700 for kcs
MIRAL
*
1940
JUN
commence. No that this is the late and none at all was not received orders were received probable reason why all kcs.
the time until 4 hours to set watch on 1700
9.
and I consider orders were received with the Force. for operational the first day (Friday) I was your

CONFIDENTIAL
Dynams 108
B14/0/
1173
167
H.M.S.SCIMITAR
8th June 1940
H.M.S.SCIMITAR...REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
Sir,
Ihave the honour to report on the proceedings of H.M. ship under my command between 26th May and 4th June as follows.
2. I received orders to sail for Dover at noon/28th and I arrived at Dover at about 2000 28th May. At about 2100 I
was ordered to leave under the orders of Captain (D) 16 in
"Malcolm". On arrival at Bray at about 0130 I was ordered to proceed a mile to the eastward and send in boats. My motor boat with whaler in tow proceeded inshore under Lieutenant J.R.G
Trechman and embarked troops. After about two hours my whaler was swamped inshore due to being rushed by troops. My motor boat continued to assist in towing and I embarked troops from various other boats. Later I secured another whaler and embarkation proceeded more rapidly.
3. At about 1230/29 I considered the ship was full
(about 350 troops) and I was ordered to return to Dover. I
sailed by route Y in company WIth "Shikari". I arrived at Dover at about 1630/29 and disembarked troops and then proceeded to oil.
4. I sailed for Dunkirk again at about 2000/29, starting via route Y, joining "Worcester" and then proceeding via route X to the beaches East of Bray. Good progress was made during the night embarking troops using our own motor boat and captured whaler and various other boats. In the morning I had
350 troops on board and proceeded via route X leaving my motor boat and whaler inshore under the command of Hidshipman Ball
R.N.R. Fog patches were encountered on the way back and I
arrived at Dover at about 1000/30.
5. After disembarking troops I sailed again at about
1130 and was ordered to go to Dunkirk harbour via route 8. I
arrived and went alongside at about 1330/30 and embarked about
500 troops very quickly. I returned via route $ being shelled and bombed off Calais. The shelling was of small calibre but fairly accurate; no damage was sustained. I arrived at Dover at about 1630/30 and disembarked troops.
6. I sailed again about 1830/30 for La Panne via route X. Near Dunkirk 1 sighted my motor boat and recalled it.
After waiting sometime at La Panne, where there were several other ships, I was ordered by "Worcester" to go to Bray. I collected a string of derelict boats and sent them in my motor boat under Sub Lieutenant Coldwell. Good progress was made in embarking troops and at about 0600/31 I had 500 on board and sailed after transferring my motor boat and string of other boats to the trawler "Olvina". I proceeded via route X to Dover in company with "Harvester".
7. I arrived at Dover at about 0930/31 and after disembarking troops sailed again about 1030. Whilst proceeding possible to the starboard hand buoys and just reached the through the Downs at 25 knots, I was navigating had as close as
N.W. Goodwin buoy when I was overtaken by Icarus, who out across close, and although I altered towards to starboard him. I as soon both and buoy went hard a starboard when he was with abreast me as the very would allow, I was drawn in about stopped but I sucked over and hit his stern line my stem. I found that was bows were crumpled in on the water collision with bulkhead. & definite
However of after the operation, I thought 10. I go on speed, rent allowing securing & collision mat, could at slow extreme my water pressure on to the in view of the urgenoy and proceeded at 8 knots, later at
The reasons

163
SCIMITAR REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
168
PAGE 2
*
The reasons for this collision and as report on the damage sustained have been more fully reported to Capatin (D) 16.
8. I arrived at Dunkirk at about 1300/31 and was ordered to go to Bray beaches. I spent this afternoon and evening in company with "Vivacious" and "Shikari" off Bray under intermittent bombardment and bombing during which no damage was sustained. During one bombing attack at sbout 1700(?) an aircraft was shot down; it is thought that this was from "Scimitar's" A
gun. I myself was watching A gun bursts, which appeared close to the target and at the moment the aircraft caught fire a burst from A gun appeared nearly in line. The aircraft fell in the sea and was obviously a total loss. During this period no troops were embarked as I had no boats and no other boats come near.
There seemed to be trouble in embarking due to choppy water.
9. At nightfall/31 the weather improved and troops were very quickly embarked, principally from the "skoot" "Hilda"
which was doing excellent work. I sailed at about 2300 with
500 troops, proceeding at 8 knots. During the passage numerous aircraft were heard but no attacks were made. A slight collision occurred with an unknown trawler, in which my port propellor guard was damaged. I arrived at Dover at about 0600/1 and after disembarking troops proceeded to oil. A further examination of the damage was made.
100 At 1000/1 I was ready and was orderedato proceer to Dunkirk again, but when near the North Goodwin L.V. I was ordered to return. At this time I had just sighted Prague in difficulties 80 I went to his assistance. Re asked me to take some of his troops 80 I went alongside while under way and embarked 500. I then stood by while he proceede through the Downs and at about 1530/1 I arrived at Dover and disembarked troops subsequently proceeding to a buoy.
11. At 0600/2 I proceeded to Sheerneas to disembark ammunition, thence to London for repairs by Messrs
Harland and Wolff. Repairs are expected to take 14 days.
12. "Soimitar" being short handed compared to other destroyers, all ratings had to work very hard and it was noteworthy that Engine room ratings not only steamed the ship with full also assisted on deak in embarkation etc. Nearly all seamen took efficiency and took their place at ammunition supply parties, but part as boat's crews at one time or another, using skill and determintion inxtrying conditions. The following are considered
Midshipman M.J.BALL R.N.R.,.for taking adminate charge with of the boats particularly worthy of mention or award.
in bombing etc. for & day ship absent.
A.B.
P/J
96339.
for taking charge of his gun's crew
G.PASMORE
well, and skill in shooting down an enemy
P/K 61614 aircraft For long and untiring it work as driver
Stoker in TYLER the motor and keeping running nearly continuously for 3 days.
I have the honour to be
Sir
The Vice Admiral your obedient servent
DOVER
Two copies to
Strants
The Captain (D)
16th D.F.
Lieutenant in Command
ADMIRAL
9-JUN 1940
DOVER

Dynams 109.
-tbs
66.
*
170 71
164
cer H.M.S. Sutton.
FOR INFORMATION
169
1.
No. 5/19.
AND
18 Admiralty.
ANY ACTION NECESSARY.
or of Minesweeping.
M.S.
ets on
.D.M.S.
/s 1
Magnetic Material
/s S 2
and
Moored Material
/s 3
Operational Magnetic dng
/s 4
Operational Moored n is forwarded herewith
/s 5
Personnel
40.
P.
10y.
S 6
Intelligence
Department. A copy of
10
S 7
Charts and Searched Channels ecretary Bab th.
ffice
(Tomphy
P.miembe. I.ve iew be.
acks.
ler in Command.
ALL Talbert C.S. Gower, O.N. C/JX 139945, as this ratings department, communications, some sental on equipe continually maintained.
ra*ley. Dalla C/JR 93287.
20 12 last für Antinually in char a of the boat work. Due to
THIS avoids. none alosasm cuare lost or damaged, and his coolness and and LORIES encouragement to the troopa and season ubsed S is enjur sends at have boat during the whole period. Due
0.050 USE De MEAA 002, 0.8. FAX 80017.
INSTITUTE ed the engine, often under fire, the thes is does goat Beaches were far in excess of what
IN filed different ODNE difficult weather conditions.

Libb!
Dynams 109.
-tbs
170 71
From:-
Commanding Officer H.M.S. Sutton.
Date:-
June 19th. 1940.
No. 5/19.
To
:-
Secretary to the Admiralty.
Copy to Director of minesweeping.
ints
Ion
M
sand raing
The Narrative of Dunkirk Operation is forwarded herewith rip, in accordance with C.A.F.O. 1045/40.
eney.
the
This may be of interest to D.M.S. Department. A copy of in the narrative is forwarded herewith.
COMMANDING OFFICER
re/ampy
19 JUN 1940
10
*
H.M.S. "SUTTON"
I.ve iew be.
stacks.
the
Commander in Command.
V.A. Dare
18
15"
in the efficiency of this ratings department, comunications, come relegraphist Albert Cash Gower, O.N. C/JX 139945, unt vital importance were continually maintained.
Actty This Officer Harold Beasley, continually Dalla C/JA in char 93287. 0 of the boat work. Due to his good rating was almost boats were lost or damaged, and his coolness and courage under seamanship Tige were no of great encouragement to the troops and season under him.
This Petty Officer Albert of the motor boat during often under period. fire, Due
Acting Fet George Dollery, Valla FAX the 80017. whole to the rating was engineer which he ran the engine, of shat the number efficient manner evacuated in from the beaches were far conditions. in excess might have of troops been expected under the difficult weather

166
171
H.W.S. "Sutton"
6th June 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward herewith my narrative of the events for the period May 26th to June 5th inclusive, covering the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk and the neighbouring beaches.
I have pleasure in informing you that Hallo hip under by command sustained superficial damages only, and no casualties.
I would especially like to bring before your notice the following officers and men.
(mail)
Lieut (3) Richard llegarty, Royal NAVYA As engineer officer of the ship, he maintained his department in an exceedingly high state of efficiency.
On several occasions when high speed was required, he produced revolutions in excess of the full speed revolutions on trials, when the ship was built, twenty four years ago, The noral of, his department could not have been higher, and the whole ingine Room department, when not below, were continually assisting in embarking and diambarking troops. This officer is over So years of age.
Sub Lieutenant William Cooffrey Hewett, Royal Kaval Volunteer Reserve(Tim)
This officer was almost pntimally in charge of the boat work on the beaches, frequently under machine gun and shell firs, and bombing attachs.
No showed great coolness and courage in encouraging and organising the troops, and it was entirely due to his fine seasonship, no boats were lost. In addition to any recognition you may are at to seard him, 1
would strongly recommend him to be promoted to Temporary L'eutenant for which rank I understand he 1a eligible.
Sub-Lieutenant John Valcoln Hay, Royal Navy.
This officer an Navigator was of the greatest nacistance to be on the bridge, and coolness in carrying out Daily his duties under fire, Due showing to him courage the difficulties of navi_ation, in - lighted and charted, shoul waters,were overcome. for one period he 188 36 hours on the bridge without a break.
Leading Albert C.S. Cower, O.N. C/JX 139945,
Due to the Telegraphist efficiency of this ratinga department, communications, come of vital importance were continually maintained.
Petty This Officer Harold Beasley, continually Date C/JH in charge 93287 of the boat work. Due to his good rating was almost boats were lost 0.7 damaged, and his coolness and seamen and courage under seamanship Time were no of great encouragement to the troopa under him.
This to rating Petty was Officer engineer Albert of which George the motor he Dollery, ran boat the during Walls ongine, FAX the often 80017. whole under pariod. of fire, what Due the might have of troops been expected under the difficult weather number the efficient manner evacuated in from the heaches sere far in conditions. excess

(1).
168
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS 26th. MAY TO 5th. JUNE 1940, EVACUATION
173
OF BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FROM DUNKIRK AND BEACHES TO
THE EASTWARD BY H.M.S.SUTTON. FOURTH MINESWEEPING FLOTILLA.
Sunday 26th. May. Raised steam and unlocked from Royal Dook,
Grimsby. Sailed at 1900, Salemander and Fitaroy in
Company+ sea. Sutton as Senior Officer. Fresh S.W.Wind, slight
Oh passage several Aircraft seen and heard, mostly friendly. Passed by Galates and destroyers.
Monday 27th. May Light breeze, calm sea, naximm visibility.
Anchored in Downs by orders of V.A.Dover at 1600.
Skipjack and Halcyon anchored near by. Destroyers full of Troops continually passing at high speed.
Tuesday 28th. May. Calm, some rain, visibility one mile.
1545, Weighed and proceeded to Dunkirk, Fourth M.S.F. in company with Salam Skipjack, later joined by Haloyon.
1730, steering jemmed, reduced speed and proceeded under hand steering+
1750, 5th. M.S.F. coming up eatern, steering repaired, proceeded at 15 knots.
1825, Kwinte Bank Buoy aboam. Ship sinking in visinity, rejoined 4th. M.S.F. Hurricanes passing overhead.
2030, more Hurricanes, sighted Dunkirk fires 10 miles, weather clearing, Fiteroy detached to investigate boat.
2050, turned towards beaches and proceeded East, parallel.
Observed large numbers of troops at intervals along beach near Dunkirk, with more scattered and decreasing groups towards la Panne+ Desultory gânfire. No aircraft in sight.
2125, anohored off beach about four miles East of Dunkirk, in four fathoms. No troops visible, owing to moke and approaching darkness. Motor boat and whaler sent schore to contact troops. Troops appeared from send dunes in disorganised parties, mostly ReA.S.C. and R.B's who had lately been engaged on demolition of bridges, ammunition dumps and railheads. Troops were rather shaken by constant air attacks, with machine guns. They had been waiting on the beaches for 30 hours before contacting ships. Tery oritical of lack of Allied air support during whole of retreat, but were cheerful and disciplined. Rather exhausted after forced marches of 20 to 30 miles. 0.0. reported no embarkation organisation or control ashore. The clean shaven and comparatively fresh appearance of the troops and the condition of their aquipment, contrasted increasingly as the evacuation progressed, with the evidences of strain shown by Ships companies of H.M.Ships.
10stroops embarked batween 2130 and 0200, in batches of 25, mostly with rifles and equipment. Beach good for embarimtion, shelving sand and oalm weather.
Wednesday 29th. May* 0300, Moved to another position further East and after dragging anchor into shallow water where line by now commenced bringing off troops but motor boat broke down, a considerable surf was running, managed to Embarked get a into a Dutch scoot, of Leicestershire and was towad back Regiment. to ship. COMMANDING OFFICER
miles 0730, off shore, and disembarked all troops, detachment proceeded alongaide Calcutta, who was anchored Salamander
19 JUN 1940
following.
H.M.S. "SUTTON"

169
(2)
. 174
0830. Returned to beaches, contacted 350 troops of R.A.S.C.
and R.A.O.C. detachments, including Montenant Colonol and officers. with ascistance of 150 troops, large ship's lifebout was pulled down boach and successfully floated to accident embarlextion, but after removing good, dr take did not give sufficiont bucyancy to componsate for stove in gerboard stroke.
Scarlous lack of boats, reducing omborization rate to about 30 por hour with own bonts only. 227 troops orderhod remainder being cont off to Salamonder and dostroyers. Somo difficulty exporienced through persistent attempts of Large masses of French troops to intercept boats and domand passage Assisted by British troo a in heading off French submers by riflo fire from 50 yurds further along beach. Dunkirk burning with much molio. Miximm visibility, slight cloud. No. R.A.F. support aighted all day.
2600. Lovel bonbing attack on Sutton, Solvenndor, Grogliound and paddlors from 5000-10000 foot. Coo solvo pattom bombo without result. One salvo of H.S. straddling Station and paddlors, no lite.
One dive borbing attack on Suttom and Creyhound, noor nice started fire in Greyhound sundships. One line of 5 bombo aloco to G.H.).
on DOB front, on a line starting from centre of the town down beach and into don, final too bombo fulling such aldo of Service.
Comperitivoly mll bombo used, with incondinres, 000
of which got light to a drifter cable from Strtton which was sunk by paddlors gunfire. To R.A.P. support visible. for smll machine gun hits on Strtton. Greyhound budly damaged by bember and riddled with mahine on fire.
1706. Procoeded Dover, leaving La Panno during further air redd of Issu intensity, in company with Sulamander. No R.A.F. support visible on passage.
2300. Arrived off Dove, only, what. feld in progress, unchored
Chocrved plane at about 1500 foot drop three mignatic nines about
2 cables ahoad, coundo of nines strilling mor clearly andible.
Parashutos soon by several separate observers. signalied position of mines to V.A. Dovor.
mursday 30th. May. 0600. Proceeded into Dover, discharged troops.
1052. Proceeded Sheernues with one boilor. Drove fires in other boiler to make repairs to birlowork, damgod by bunb explosion.
1632. arrived Shoomoos, orderlood coal and ammittion.
riday State My. 0205. Left Shoorness in company with Lydd and Booo.
0400. Companyee maddenly produced a and 30 degrees of devintion,
Rose assumed load of dividion, Inter company dovintion improved and Subton responsed Lead.
0812. Arrived proceeded cust puballol to bonches passing
4 planes wrocked on he boach weat of two with Prench markings. 29. Passed Dunkisk harbour 1 cuble. Harbour fires. wall intect and little damage apparent from counard except Imgo
Continued DOID from bouch close work of
0835. high Hurricanes One 0.230 ship ounls alenguide cust plur of Dunicipt. 2
Sinfire, and Spitfires overhead, processing home of harbour, at
Fearch spood. and several cargo ships must court cast. continued groups Long column on the bonoh. Combinuous column about 1 wills dectroyers of troops surehing into Dunisive from long along bouch cast of
3 milon off is punno. wind Items force In frushering, troops with DOG
0906. slight Anchored but considerable mall.. Consenced loading
COMMANDING OFFICER
19 JUN 1940
H.M.S. "SUTTON"

170
. 175
(3)
Motor boat towing vhaler and too essy pontecns. lines provious day plar had boon constructed by driving art Lorries at obb tido in line and securing plants on top, considerably oxpediting loading of bonto, though embaritation ruto was closed considerably by Lock of control at shoro and of plar to novo troops along and by natural reluctance of troops to venture along pier without being relieved of part of their heavy equipment. Somo difficulty experienced in loading too of 4 boato without smaching up ageinst plane in swall, and in hendling pontome in for in provailing conditions which tended to reduce emborketion rate. Bonto available quito inadequato, largo open notor beach borto required, together with vencol. enchored or our whord of pier to give a 100 if necessary with oil slide provided. During enbortation
Sutton collected coldiers from overtumed pontoon. Allowed to bronch in swell. Three believed dramed mainly the to lack of foresight of shore authorities in allowing troops to emback with full equipment and overcoats in detoriorating weather conditions. 120 tecago omberked montly 3,S,,
ReAdy RAIS.C. with a for infortaynen ml guards, moralo very good but very critical of Lock of R.M.P. support and Solgium treathory bohind lines.
Country code to be filled with adoo, night poultions during retreat soon to be signatted by flamlight to plened, banbed within half on hour of being ontablished. Surgelning apood of advance of Commo against positions being propared and against (ive boolding also
Important factors.
1137. Walghed enchor and discharged tedogo alonguide lydi, 1SA8
and DOB Ancreasing alightly, rather low cloud.
1190. Proceedod North Goodsin 60, Voccal to and the for nomb readeavous. tydd and Room procession to Mergabo to Mocharge treaps.
1530. Anchored où North Goodidn St. Voncol.
1055. Weighod and proceeded to Dunkiris in company with Riger.
Passed great number of mall creft, 00 will 00 Controyors and paddlors.
2115. Pessod Dunitize Herbour docume 1 cable. Heavy genfire from boach about 2 milos word of Herboury apparently enemy chelling tom.
Pires in Dunident more expensive.
2147. Anchored off bonch between La Pomo end No algn
2235. Boat from shore reported troops further to content, only or bonto an expected.
boat available nun aground. Moved 1 allo customerd.
Security 194 June 0200: No troops yet contrated, to bonto except
Subton's available. Several minolaying aircraft overhood, observed parechuto minos deconding about 3 cables should and 1 cable astern.
Mines reported dropped all over folrway.
0190. Commenced loading broops with our oun notor bont and wholer
Troops ship's Refe and infentryment Including guards, 3. Yorks., after and lifeboat found off booth. Lator contated by motor yacht. and mohine montly detechment. No. RedePe before or One dram.
Opened gun occapional aircraft at drum. whilet lovel bombing fire on at about 9000 foot followed by mechino gunding in omborizing boing halped over the aldo. This heavy gun attack wounded from postecns alongaide, 000 commity mechino receiving wounds attack undoubtodly but would ted Lowis gun and Bron toxido manned Bron the back whilet have boon prossed home country the
Bin ships defence 4.0. for the largo chip's lifebook breings 1940
for concernte Dotachment of low flying.
M.M.S. "SUTTON"

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- 176
droreft, but this was doclined in order to utilice medium space for exharkation, No. mobinon observed engineing enemy at any
Line, Bettery of too guns balioved French 5.7° firing continually on boach perallol with Button. Observed heavy and socurate shalling of La penno beachen ml med. street ml plor constructed previous day from lorries.
0600. Weightd and proceeded, looking Roads alore Inchoro to roduce possibility of mountering negotão minos 3rdd during right.
1130. Alongoido at Dovor, discharged troops,
1810. Proceeded from Dover in company with Rigor,
2121, Persod Dunkirit Hurbour and arrived off beach, not by
R.A. Dovor in C.M.B. and ordered to proceed into to lond of pier. Procosded into Dunisisit Herbour and mão first at commed and of casto: plor by shore instructions.
Emberied 725 troops with too brown, about 000 third Fronch.
Enemy artillery very active and apparently still concentrating on book area of Plan alightly damgod. Herbour IDON all quit, emberitation completed in about an hour and a half without incident, but bombed about twenty nimites after Subton's departure by about 50 dircraft.
Sundey 2nd June 1207. Proceeded ours of herbour for Dover, with spood reduced to minduise Hoting when turnings trage below telened to reduce Mobing and horbs crouning in. When above of TO Duog received report that magnetic mines had been ledd recurd boy. You Just aboves of W bucy, report again received that mines had been laid in to vicinity.
AV bucy whole routo reported mind. Lator received report that Dovor was being redded and minon droppod off ontrance.
0306. At North Cooldin 1/4. Vessel aircraft apparently may peosod close elongaido flying Low byb premishly fulled to observe chip in
0432. Intered Dover Herbour and secured alongride which ap&to of exceptional phomhoressence.
had 45 killed and many injured in bonking mid as Ducklare shobtly after
Subton laft. 7 survivors of Ked th also and alongedde with Captedn
D 19 in mall motor bergo, must in - raid.
Monday 3ml June. 2010. Procooded from over for unide, having embasked medical officer and orderly.
2052. Passing through the Dome, ongines developed food tank trouble, reduced apood. While attempting temporary repaire weather thinkend regidly visitdlity to half a ceblo. Found impossible to arrive at Duricisis reducing Doon enough for embasisation, in addition to unrellability of enginee
2230. Signal modo stating discumpteness and decision to roturn to for menocuvring required no Dunicisit.
to Domo to affort repairs. In turning in very thick fog return, doctroyer gooral où considerable apood distant, yords.
2346. Anchorod of North Cooldrán Lo. Voncol.
0527. Visdbility improved, proceeded to Dovor.
Sunday 4th June.
0720. Medo famb alongeddo Nigor. Received signal, operation corpleted completed
COMMANDING OFFICER
19 JUN 1940
H.M.S. "SUTTON"

Depears 109
814/04
4
1176
- 179
HolleS."Sutton"
6th June 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward herewith ay narrative of the events for the period May 26th to June 5th inclusive, covering the evacuation of heaches the British Expeditionar: Force from Dunkirk and the neighbouring
7772
nd
.
177
178
the
50
have
FACTORS ASSISTING THE EVACUATION.
is.
Discipline and coolness of troops under fire on beach and in underdler conditions in boats throughout ovacuation.
2.
Life saving note rised along ship's rideo.
Transly
3.
Assistance of Amy Bren Guns and gummers against 100->
flying dx attack,
4.
Calm weather and poor viribility.
5.
Presence of HA Light Cruiser "Galcuttia",
6.
Excellent physical condition of majority of troops.
7.
Namel state in which all piers ab Dunkirk more allowed to readn, which was invaluable in assisting embarkation of Troops into ships.
1
COMMANDING 19 JUN 1940
OFFICER
he
H.M.S. SUTTON
H.M.S

Dynam 109
B14/0
,17.4
1176
- 179
H.M.S."Sutton"
6th June 1940.
ir,
Is the the period May 26th to June 5th inclusive, covering the the events
I have the honour to forward herewith my narrative of aches British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk and the neighbouring evacuation
173
sand
FACTORS OBSTRUCTING THE AVACUATION.
178
Low embarkation rate off beaches - at times loss than 30 per hour
Ing caused by lack of control ashore for first for days; and absence of suitable boats.
No ship to boach commission to expediate loading, resulting in casualties caused by ships lying off beaches for hours in day light.
No Medical Officers at beginning for attending committies.
Apparently no R.A.F. protection whatever against loval booking and more particularly, dive boobing and machine gunding, except for last two days and a for short periods previously. This lowored troops morale considerably.
7m/y)
Only one pier, built from lorries end to end, at gosition nost open to enemy shell fire.
Sandbar off beaches proventing close approach, counting troops to healtate to cross relatively deep unter with full equipment to reach larger boats.
HA arramont consisting of 12 pdr. and Louis gino quito inadequito to produce barrage fire, or to discourage high or low flying attack.
S.
No initiative shown by Assy Staff in bringing into u.s. local boata on boach.
9.
Laok of foreaight ahown in allowing troopa to ambark with overcoate, packs, full equipment and rifles, (not hold, but worn) cansing hositation on insocure pior, and difficulty in embarking into boats off beaches.
10. Insurricient boats at all times, and too for motor beach boats and shallow draft pontoons.
11, No apparent stops taken by Army to provent low flying maching gunning off beaches by mounting Bron guna which ware available.
1
3
COMMANDING OFFICER
19 JUN 1940
H.M.S. SUTTON"

Depress 109
B14/0
1176
- 179
IlelleS. "Sutton"
6th June 1940.
ir,
I have the honour to forward herewith ay narrative of the events
Is the period lay 26th to June 5th inclusive, covering the evacuation aches. the British Expeditionar Force from Dunkirk and the neighbouring
I have pleasure in informing you that Hello Ship under by command stained superficial damages only, and no casualties.
I would especially like to bring before your notice the following
Ticers and men.
(ince)
ent (3) Richard Hegarty. Royal Navy engine officer of the ship, maintained his department in an exesedingly high state of efficiency.
n several occasions when high speed was required, he produced evolutions in excess of the full speed revolutions on trials, when the hip was built, twenty four years ago. The noral 05 his department ould not have been higher, and the whole ingine Room department, when ot below, were continually assisting in embarking and disembarking roops. This officer is over of age.
ub-Lieutenant William Cooffrey liewett, Royal Haval Volunteer do officer ms almont continually in charge of the boat work on the eaches, frequently under machine gun and shell firs, and bombing attacks.
D showed great coolness and courage in encouraging and organising the roops, and it was entirely due to his Nno seasonship, no boats were est. In addition to any recognition you say see fit to award him, 1
ould strongly recommend him to be pronoted to l'emporary Moutenant for which rank I understand he 10 eligible.
ub-lieutenant John Nalcolm Hav. Royal Navy, his officer as Navigator wan of the greatest assistance to be on the ridge, showing and 00010000 in carrying out his duties under ire. Due to him courage the difficulties of navi_ntion, in lighted and charted, shoal waters,were overcome. for one period he was 36 hours on the bridge without a break.
Leading Telegraphist Albort C.S. Cower, O.B. C/JX 139945.
are to the efficiency of this ratings department, communications, some of vital importance were continually maintained.
Fetty This Officer Harold Beasley, O.N. C/JR in charge 93287, of the hoat work. Due to his Good rating was almost boats continually were lost or damaged, and his coolness and courage under seamanship Tige were no of great encouragement to the troops and season under him.
Acting Fet Albort Seorge Dollery, Valla 1/18 80017.
This Fetty Officer of the notor bont during the often shole under period. fire, Due the number the efficient nannor in from the beaches were far conditions. in excess of to rating ma engineer which he ran the engine, what night have of troops been expected ovacuated under the difficult weather
Yuanco

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177
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS 26th. MAY TO 5th. JUNE 1940, EVACUATION
182
OF BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FROM DUNKIRK AND BEACHES TO
THE EASTWARD BY H.M.S. SUTTON, FOURTH MINESWEEPING FLOTILLA.
Sunday 26th. May. Raised steam and unlocked from Royal Dock,
Grimsby. Sailed at 1900, Salamander and Fitzroy in
Company. Sutton as Senior Officer. Fresh N.W.Wind, slight sea.
On passage several Aircraft seen and heard, mostly friendly. Passed by Galatea and destroyers.
176
H.M.S.SUTTON.
181
CONFIDENTIAL
c/o G.P.O.London.
6th. June. 1940.
Mr. Thompson.
The Staff Superviser. N.A.A.F.I.
Claygate, Surrey.
Copy to:- Mr. Shed.
District Area Manager. N.A.A.F.I.
Humber Area. Grimsby.
Sir,
I wish to bring to your notice the conduct of one of your employees, Mr. C.M. Cealworth, who is Canteen Manager of this
He has only recently joined, and has been in the ship during the operations off Dunkirk and beaches, while evacuating the B.E. Forces.
In this operation this ship was instrumental in evacuating about I600 Officers and men. During the whole period of eight days, he was continually helping the Ship's Staff in the Galley and elsewhere, keeping the Troops supplied with hot soup, tea, and food. As many of them were wet through, and exhausted, his work was invaluable.
I cannot speak too highly of him, and any preferment you can offer him, will be soundly endorsed by myself.
Yours faithfully,
Greuville. M. Temps.
COMMANDING OFFICER
Commander in Command.
*
5 JUN 1940
*
H.M.S. 4 "SUTTON"
H.M.S.Sutton.

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177
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS 26th. MAY TO 5th. JUNE 1940. EVACUATION
182
OF BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FROM DUNKIRK AND BEACHES TO
THE EASTWARD BY H.M.S. SUTTON, FOURTH MINESWESSPING FLOTILLA.
Sunday 26th. May. Raised steam and unlocked from Royal Dock,
Grimsby. Sailed at 1900, Salamander and Fitzroy in
Company. sea. Sutton as Senior Officer. Fresh N.W.Wind, slight
On passage several Aircraft seen and heard, mostly friendly. Passed by Galatea and destroyers.
Monday 27th, May. Light breeze, calm sea, maximum visibility.
Anchored in Downs by orders of V.A.Diver at 1600.
Skipjack and Halcyon anchored near by. Destroyers full of Troops continually passing at high speed.
Tuesday 28th. May. Calm, some rain, visibility one mile.
1545, Weighed and proceeded to Dunkirk, Fourth M.S.F. in company with Salam Skipjack, later joined by Halcyon.
1730, steering jammed, reduced speed and proceeded under hand steering.
1750, 5th. M.S.F. coming up astern, steering repaired, proceeded at 15 knots.
1825, Kwinte Bank Buoy abeam, Ship sinking in vicinity, rejoined 4th. M.S.F. Hurricanes passing overhead.
2030, more Hurricanes, sighted Dunkirk fires 10 miles, weather clearing, Fitzroy detached to investigate boat.
2050, turned towards beaches and proceeded East, parallel.
Observed large numbers of troops at intervals along beach near Dunkirk, with more scattered and decreasing groups, towards la Panne. Desultory gunfire. No aircraft in sight.
2125, anchored off beach about four miles East of Dunkirk, in four fathoms. No troops visible, owing to smoke and approaching darkness. Motor boat and whaler sent ashore to contact troops. Troops appeared from sand dunes in disorganised parties, mostly R.A.S.C. and R.B's who had lately been engaged on demolition of bridges, amunition dumps and railheads. Troops were rather shaken by constant air attacks, with machine guns. They had been waiting on the beaches for 30 hours before contacting ships. Very critical of lack of Allied air support during whole of retreat, but were cheerful and disdiplined. Rather exhausted after forced marches of 20 to 30 milsa. 0.0. reported no embarkation organisation or control ashore. The alean shaven and comparatively fresh appearance of the troops and the condition of their equipment, contrasted increasingly as the evacuation progressed, with the evidences of strain shown by Ships companies of H.M.Ships.
10 troops embarked batween 2130 and 0200, in batches of 25, mostly with rifles and equipment. Beach good for embarkation, shelving sand and calm weather.
Wednesday 29th. May. 0300. Moved to another position further East and after dragging anchor into shallow water where line by now commenced bringing off troops but motor boat broke down, considerable surf was running, managed to get Embarked a small into a a Dutch scoot, and was towed back to ship.
detachment of Leicestershire Regiment.
0730, miles off shore, and disembarked all troops, proceeded alongside Calcutta, who was anchored Salamander some following.

(2)
0830. Returned to beaches, contacted 350 troops of R.A.S.C.
and R.A.O.C. detachments, including Lieutenant Colonel and officers. With assistance of 150 troops, large ship's lifeboat was pulled down beach and successfully floated to assist embarkation., but after removing gear, air tanks did not give sufficient buoyancy to compensate for store in garboard strake.
Serious lack of boats, reducing embarkation rate to about 30
per hour with own boats only. 227 troops embarked, remainder being sent off to Salamander and destroyers. Some difficulty experienced through persistent attempts of large masses of
French troops to intercept boats and demand passage. Assisted by British troops in heading off French Swimmers by rifle fire from 50 yards further along the beach. Dunk rk burning with much smoke. Maximum visibility, slight cloud, No R.A.F. support sighted all day.
1600. Level bombing attack on Sutton, Salamander, Greyhound and paddlers from 5000-10000 feet. One salvo pattern bombs without result. One salvo of H.E. straddling Sutton and paddlers, no hits.
One dive bombing attack on Sutton and Greyhound, near miss started fire in Greyhound amidships. One line of 5 bombs close to G.H.Q.
on sea front, on a line starting from centre of the town down beach and into sea., final two bombs falling each side of Sutton.
Comparitively small bombs used, with several incendiares, one of which set light to a drifter 1 cable from Sutton which was sunk by paddlers gunfire. No R.A.F. support visible. Few small machine gun hits on Sutton. Greyhound badly damaged by bombs and riddled with machine gun fire.
1706. Proceeded Dover, leaving La Panne during further air raid of less intensity, in company with Salamander. No R.A.F. support visible on passage.
2300. Arrived off Dover, calm, mist, Air raid in progress, anchored.
Observed plane at about 1500 feet drop three magnetic mines about
2 cables ahead, sounds of mines striking water clearly audible.
Parashutes seen by several observers. Signalled position hursday 30th. May. 0600. Proceeded into Dover, discharged troops.
of mines to V.A.Dover.
1052. Proceeded Sheerness with one boiler. Drew fires in other boiler to make repairs to brickwork, damaged by bomb explosion
1632. Arrived Sheerness, embarked coal and ammunition.
riday 31st May. 0205. Left Sheerness in company with Lydd and Ross.
0400. Compasses suddenly produced 20 and 30 degrees od deviation,
Ross assumed lead of division, later compass deviation improved and Sutton re-assumed lead.
0812. Arrived Dunkirk, proceeded east parallel to beaches passing
4 planes wrecked on the beach west od Dunkirk, two with Franch markings. 0829. Passed Dunkirk harbour distant 1 cable. Harbour wall intact and little damage apparent from seaward except huge fires.
Continual gunfire, some from beach close west of Dunkirk.
0835. Hurricanes and Spitfires overhead, proceeding homewards at high speed. One cargo ship sunk alongaide east pier of harbour, 2
French destroyers and several cargo ships sunk east of Dunkirk.
Long columns of troops marching into Dunkirk from east, scattered groups on the beach. Continuous column about 1 mile long along
0906. Anchored off La Panne. Wind N.W. force 3, freshening, sea beach 3 miles east of Dunkirk.
slight but considerable swell. Commenced loading troops with

179
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Motor boat towing whaler and two army pontoons. Since previous day pier had been constructed by driving out lorries at ehb tide in of line and securing planks on top, considerably expediting loading boats, though embarkation rate was slowed considerably by lack of control at shore end of pier to move troops along and by natural reluctance of troops to venture along pier without beding relieved of part tow of their heavy equipment. Some difficulty experienced in loading pontoons in tow in prevailing conditions which tended to reduce embarkation of 4 boats without smashing up against pier in swell, and in handling rate. Boats available quite inadequate, large open motor beach boats required, together with vessel anchored hocadside or sunk athead of pier
Sutton collected soldiers from overturned pontoon. Allowed to broach in to give a lee if necessary with oil &td provided. During embarkation awell. Three believed drowned mainly due to lack of foresight of shore authorities in allowing troops to embark with full equipment and overcoats in deteriorating weather conditions. 120 troops embarked mostly R.B.,
R.A., R.A.S.C. with a few infantrymen and guards, morale very good but very critical of lack of R.A.F. support and Belgium treachery behind lines.
Country said to be filled with spies, night positions during retreat seen to be scignalled by flashlight to planes, bombed within half an hour of being established. Surprising speed of advance of Germans against positions being prepared and defencelessness against dive bombing also important factors.
1137. Weighed anchor and discharged troops alongside Lydd. Widd and sea increasing slightly, rather low cloud.
1150. Proceeded North Goodwin Lt. Vessel to await time for next rendezvous. Lydd and Ross proceeded to Margate to discharge troops.
1538. Anchored at North Goodwin Lt. Vessel.
1855. Weighed and proceeded to Dunkirk in company with Niger.
Passed great number of small craft, as well as destroyers and paddlers.
2115. Passed Dunkirk Harbour distant 1 cable. Heavy gunfire from beach about 2 miles west of Harbour, apparently enemy shalling town.
Fires in Dunkirk more expensive.
2147. Anchored off beach between La Panne and Dunkirk. No sdgn of boats as expected.
2235. Boat from shore reported troops further to eastward, only boat available run aground. Moved 1 mile eastward.
Saturday 1st June 0100: No troops yet contacted, No boats except
Sutton's available. Several minelaying aircraft overhead, observed parachute mines decending about 3 cables ahead and 1 cable astern.
Mines reported dropped all over fairway.
0130. Commenced loading broops with our own motor boat and whaler and ship's lifeboat found off beach. Later assisted by motor yacht.
Troops mostly R.A. and infantrymen including guards, 3. Yorks., and machine gun detachment. No. R.A.F. assistance before or after dawn.
Opened fire on occasional reconnaisance aircraft at dawn. One level bombing attack at about 5000 feet followed by machine gunning whilst in the back whilst being helped over the side. This machine gun attack embarking wounded from pontoons alongaide, one casualty receiving wounds undoubtedly would have been pressed home causing very heavy casualties but for concentrated Lewis gun and Bren gun fire from troops, who manned ships M.G. armament. Detachment of Guards also offered to provide Bren gun defence for the large ship's lifeboat against occasional low flying.

180
184
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aircraft, but this was declined in order to utilise maximum space for embarkation. No R.A.F. machines observed engaging firing continually on beach parallel with Sutton. Observed enemy at any time. Battery of two guns believed French 5.7"
heavy and accurate shelling of La panne beaches and main street and pier constructed previous day from lorries.
0600. Weighed and proceeded leaving Dunkirk Roads close inshore to reduce possibility of encountering numerous magnetic mines laid during night.
1130. Alongside at Dover, discharged troops.
1810. Proceeded from Dover in company with Niger.
2121. Passed Dunkirk Harbour and arrived off beach, met by
R.A. Dover in C.M.B. and ordered to proceed into Dunkirk to load at eaatern pier. Proceeded into Dunkirk Harbour and made fast at seaward end of eastern pier by shore instructions.
Embarked 725 troops with two brows, about one third French.
Enemy artillery very active and apparently still concentrating on back area of Dunkirk. Pier slightly damaged. Harbour area all quiet, embarkation completed in about an hour and a half without incident, but bombed about twenty minutes after Sutton&s departure by about 50 aircraft.
Sunday 2nd June 1207. Proceeded out of harbour for Dover, with speed reduced to minimise listing when turning, troops below trimmed to reduce listing and boats sming in. When abeam of FG Buoy received report that magnetic mines had been laid round bucy. When just abeam of W buoy, report again received that mines had been laid in the vicinity. A V buoy whole route reported mined. Later received report that Dover was being raided and mines dropped off entrance.
0306. At North Goodwin Lt. Vessel aircraft apparently enemy passed close alongside flying low but presumably failed to observe ship in spite of exceptional phospherescence.
0432. Entered Dover Harbour and secured alongaide Worcester which had 45 killed and many injured in bombing raid on Dunkirk shortly after Sutton left. 7 survivors of Keith also arrived alongside with Captain D 19 in small motor barge, sunk in same raid.
Monday 3rd June. 2010. Proceeded from Dover for Dunkirk, having embarked medical officer and ordely.
2052. Passing through the Downs, engines developed feed tank weather thickened rapidly reducing visibility to half a cable.
trouble, reduced speed. While attempting temporary repairs
Found impossible to arrive at Dunkirk soon enough for embarkation, in addition to unreliability of engines for manoervring required
2230. made stating circumstances and decision thick to return to at Dunkirk.
to Downs Signal effect repairs. In turning in very fog return, destroyer to passed at monsiderable speed distant Vessel. 5 yards.
2346. Anchored at North Goodwin Light
Tuesday Sunday 4th June.
0517. 0720. Made fast alongside Niger. Received Signal, operation
Visibility improved, proceeded to Dover.
completed satisfactorily.
Sunville. M. Temple
Act Come) Royal Navy.
Commander officer. H.M.S. Sullon.

181
83
185
9L11/6
PACTURE OBSTRICTIONS THE EVACUATION, subarkation rate off Seaches at The less than 30 hear
17
by lack of control ashore for first for days) sait
FACTORS ASSISTING THE EVACUATION.
beach communication to expediate Londing, resulting
L.
Discipline and coolness of troops under fire on beach and in unfamiliar conditions in boats throughout evacuation.
Officers at beginning for attending menalties.
2.
Life saving nets rigged along ship' sides. time beating end particularly, dive boxinding and nachine guaraing, arought for last and 5. for short periods previously. This its
3.
Assistance of Army Bren Guns and gunners against lowin flying air attack.
pier, duilt from lorries end to only at fire,
4.
Calm weather and poor visibility.
beaches proventing alose approach, seasing thougs to and orces relatively deep water with full to
5.
Presence of HA Light Cruiser "dalcutta".
ing
6.
Excellent physical condition of majority of troops.
or to Low
P,
7.
Normal state in which all piers at Dunkirk were allowed ay.
to remain, which was invaluable in assisting embarkation of Troops into ships.
e
En allowing troops to embark equipment and rifles, (not hald, but on insecure pier, and difficulty in embarking bode boats at all times, and too fee estate bones beate
(Tompy portoons.
stope use by the to Low flying acks.
Bron
COMMANDING OFFICER
Greurille. M.
6 JUN 1940
Act. Cand Rozal Navy.
H.M.S. "SUTTON"
Lugo to the 01/101ency of this ratings department, communications, DOMO
of vital importance were continually maintained.
Potty Officer Harold Beasley, DaNa C/JX 93287.
his good rating was almost boats were lost 0.0 damaged, and his coolness and
This continually in char a of the hoat work. Due to courage under seamanship five were no of great encouragement to the troops and seamen under him.
Acting Fetty Albert George Dollery, 0.11. I/X 80017.
This officer of the motor boat during the whole period. Due to the rating was engineer which he ran the ongine, often under fire, the night have of troops been expected under the difficult wenther conditions.
number efficient manner evacuated in from the beaches were far in excess of what

$3
182
FACTORS OBSTRUCTING THE EVACUATION.
186
1176
Low caused embarkation lack rate off beaches - at times less than 30
37
of suitable boats.
by of control ashore for first few days; and per absence hour ni
No casualties ship to beach communication to expediate loading, resulting in caused by ships lying off beaches for hours in daylight.
3.
No Medical Officers at beginning for attending casualties.
4.
Apparently no R.A.F. protection whatever against level bombing and more particularly, dive bombing and machine gunning, except for last morale considerably.
two days and a few short periods previously. This lowered troops'
nts on
5.
to enemy shell fire.
Only one pier, built from lorries end to end, at position most open
6.
Sandbar off beaches preventing close approach, causing troops to and hesitate to cross relatively deep water with full squipment to reach larger boats.
wing
7.
HA armament consisting of 12 pdr. and Lewis guns quite inadequate to produce barrage fire, or to discourage high or low flying attack.
8.
ip,
No initiative shown by Army Staff in bringing into use local boats noy.
on beach.
9.
he
Lack of foresight showsh in allowing troops to embark with overcoats, packs, full equipment and rifles, (not held, but worn) causing n
hesitation on insecure pier, and difficulty in embarking into boats off beaches.
10.
Insufficient boats at all times, and too few motor beach boats and
(Tompy di shallow draft pontoons.
11.
tacks.
No apparent steps taken by Army to prevent low flying machine gunning he off beaches by mounting Bren guns which were available.
Eneuville. M.
Hcb Comer. Rozal Nan,
COMMANDING H.M.B. SUTTONS 1940
OFFICER #
1
USED
department, communications, of vital importance were continually maintained.
Potty Officer Beasley, Calla C/JR 93287.
his good was almost boats were lost 02 dissaged, and his coolness and
This rating Harold continually in char 8 of the heat work. Due to under him.
courage under seamanship Tipe were no of great encouragement to the troops and season
This Acting Pet Petty Officer Albert of the Deorge motor Dollery, boat during Walls 1/11 the whole 80017. period. Due to the rating was engineer which he ran the engine, often under fire, the number efficient manner in from the beaches were far in excess of what might have of troops been expected evacuated under the difficult weather conditions.

Dyram. 109
B14/0/176
183
187
H.H.S. "Sutton"
6th June 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward herewith ay narrative of the events or the period May 26th to June 5th inclusive, covering the evacuation
$ the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk and the neighbouring eaches.
I have pleasure in informing you that Hollo Ship under by command ustained superficial damages only, and no casualties.
I would especially like to bring before your notice the following fficers and men.
(Rac)
deut (3) Richard Hegarty. Royal Navy NAVY A engineer officer of the ship,
10 maintained his department in an exceedingly high state of efficiency.
in several occasions when high speed was required, he produced evolutions in excess of the full speed revolutions on trials, when the ship was built, twenty four years ago. The noral 05, his department could not have been higher, and the whole Engine Room department, when ot below, were continually assisting in embarking and disembarking croops. This officer is over 50 years of age.
Sub-lieutenant William Cooffrey Hewett, Royal Naval Volunteer
This officer WAS almost continually in charge of the boat work on the eaches, frequently under machine gun and shell fire, and bombing attacks.
to showed great coolness and courage in encouraging and organising the troops, and it was entirely due to his fine meananship, no boats were lost. In addition to any recognition you say coo fit to award him, 1
would strongly recommend him to be promoted to Temperary Seutenant
.N.V.R. for which rank I understand he is eligible.
Sub-Lieutenant John Malcolm Hay, Royal Navy.
bridge, as Navigator and 00010000 in carrying out Daily his duties under
This officer Navi wan of the greatest assistance to ne on the fire. Due showing to courage difficulties of in lighted and charted, shoal him waters the were overcome. For one period he was 36 hours on the bridge without a break.
Leading Albert C.S. Gower, C.N. C/JX 139945,
Jue to the Telegraphist efficiency of this ratings department, communications, some of vital importance were continually maintained.
Potty Beasley, Dalla C/JR 93287
his rating was almont boats were 10st 02 dissaged, and and
This Officer Harold continually in char 0 of the and hoat his work. coolness Due to courage good under seamanship five were no of great encouragement to the troops seasen under him.
Acting,Fetty Stokes officer Albert the George notor Dollery, bont during 0.8. I/IX the whole 80017, period. Due the
Thin to rating was engineer of he ran the engine, often under fire, what number the efficient manner in which from the beaches were far conditions. in excess of might have of troops been expected evacuated under the difficult weather

(I).
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS 26th. MAY TO 5th. JUNE 1940, EVACUATION
190
OF BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FROM DUNKIRK AND BEACHES TO
THE EASTWARD BY H.M.S.SUTTON. FOURTH MINESWEEPING FLOTILLA.
Sunday 26th. May. Raised steam and unlocked from Royal Dock,
Grimsby. Sailed at 1900, Salamander and Fitzroy in
Company. sea. Sutton as Senior Officer. Fresh N.W.Wind, slight
On passage several Aircraft seen and heard, mostly friendly. Passed by Galatea and destroyers.
Monday 27th. May. Light breeze, calm sea, maximum visibility.
Anchored in Downs by orders of V.A.Dover at 1600.
189
H.N.S.SUTTON.
e/o G.P.O.London.
NFIDENTIAL
6th. June. 1940.
Mr. Thompson.
The Staff Supervisor. N.A.A.F.I.
Claygate, Surrey.
Copy to:- Mr. Shed.
District Area Banager. N.A.A.P.I.
Humber Area. Orimaby.
Sir,
I wish to bring to your notice the conduct of one of your employees, Mr. C.//.Cetelworth, who is Canteen lanager of this ship.
during the operations off Dunkirk and beaches, while
He has only recently joined, and has been in the ship evacuating the B.R.Forces.
about 1600 officers and men. During the shole period
In this operation this ship was instrumental in evacuating of eight days, he was continually helping the ship's Staff with in hot soup, tes, and food. As many of them were eat through, the Galley and alsowhere, keeping the Troops supplied and exhausted, his work was invaluable.
1 too highly of him, and any preferment you can cannot offer him, speak will be soundly endorsed by myself.
Yours faithfully.
OMMANDING OFFICER
Greuville. M. Temas.
6 JUN 1940
*
Commander in Command.
'S'W'H
H.H.S.Sutton.

(I).
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS 26th. MAY TO 5th. JUNE I940, EVACUATION
190
OF BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FROM DUNKIRK AND BEACHES TO
THE EASTWARD BY H.M.S.SUTTON. FOURTH MINESWEEPING FLOTILLA.
Sunday 26th. May. Raised steam and unlocked from Royal Dock,
Grimsby. Sailed at 1900, Salamander and Fitzroy in
Company. sea. Sutton as Senior Officer. Fresh W.Wind, slight
On passage several Aircraft seen and heard, mostly friendly. Passed by Galatea and destroyers.
Monday 27th. May. Light breeze, calm sea, maximum visibility.
Anchored in Downs by orders of Dover at 1600.
Skipjack and Halcyon anchored near by. Destroyers full of Troops continually passing at high speed.
Tuesday 28th. May. Calm, some rain, visibility one mile.
I545, Weighed and proceeded to Dunkirk, Fourth M.S.F. in company with Salam Skipjack, later joined by Halcyon.
1730, steering jammed, reduced speed and proceeded under hand steering.
I750, 6th. M.S.F. coming up astern, steering repaired, proceeded at I5 knots,
I825, Kwinte Bank Buoy abeam, Ship sinking in vicinity, rejoined 4th. M.S.F. Hurricanes passing overhead.
2030, more Hurricanes, sighted Dunkirk fires IO miles, weather clearing, Fitzroy detatched to investigate boat.
2050, turnedtowards beaches and proceeded East, parallel.
Observed large numbers of troops at intervals along beach near Dunkirk, with more scattered and decreasing groups towards la Panne. Desultory gunfire. No aircraft in sight.
2125, anchored off beach about four miles East of Dunkirk, in four fathoms. No troops visible, owing to smoke and approaching darkness. Motor boat and whaler sent ashore to contact troops. Troops appeared from sand dunes in disorganised parties, mostly R.A.S.C. and R.E's who had lately been engaged on demolition of bridges, ammunition dumps and railheads. Troops were rather shaken by constant air attacks, with machine guns. They had been waiting on the beaches for 30 hours before contacting ships. Very critical of lack of Allied air support during whole of retreat, but were cheerful and disciplined. Rather exhausted after forced marches of 20 to 30 miles. Reported no embarkation organisation or control ashore. The clean shaven and comparatively fresh appearance of the troops and the condition of their equipment, contrasted increasingly as the evacuation progressed, with the evidences of strain shown by Ships companies of H.M.Ships.
103 troops embarked between 2130 and 0200, in batches of 25, mostly with rifles and eqipment. Beach good for embarkation, shelving sand and calm weather.
Wednesday 29th. 0300. Moved to anothe position further East commenced May. bringing off troops but motor boat broke down, and after dragging anchor into shallow water where by now a considerable surf was running, managed to get a line into a Dutch scoot, and was towed back to ship. Embarked small detatchment of Leicestershire Regiment.
0730, proceeded alongside Calcutta, who was anchored Salamander some miles off shore, and disembarked all troops, following.

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0830. Returned to beaches, contacted 350 troops of R.A.S.C.
and R.A.O.C. detachments, including Licutenant Colonel and officers. With assistance of I50 troops, large ship's lifeboat was pulled down beach and successfully floated to assist embarkation, but after removing gear, air tanks did not give sufficient buoyancy to compensate for store in garboard strake.
Serious lack of boats, reducing embarkation rate to about 30
per hour with own boats only. 227 troops embarked, remainder being sent off to Salamander and destroyers. Some difficulty experienced through persistent attempts of large masses of
French troops to intercept boats and demand passage. Assisted by British troops in heading off French swimmers by rifle fire from 50 yards further along beach. Dunkirk burning with much smoke. Maximum visibility, slight cloud. No R.A.F. support sighted all day.
1600. Level bombing attack on Sutton, Salamander, Greyhound and paddlers from 5000-I0000 feet. One salvo pattern bombs without result. One salvo of H.E. straddling Sutton and paddlers, no hits.
One dive bombing attack on Sutton and Greyhound, near miss started fire in Greyhound amidships. one line of 5 bombs close to G.H.Q.
on sea front, on at line starting from centre of the town down beach and into sea, final two bombs falling each side of Sutton.
Comparitively small bombs used, with several incendiares, one of which set light to at drifter 1 cable from Sutton which was sunk by paddlers gunfire. No R.A.F. support visible. Few small machine gun hits on Sutton. Greyhound badly damaged by bombs and riddled with machine gun fire.
I706. Proceeded Dover, leaving La Panne during further air raid of less intensity, in company with Salamander. No R.A.F. support visible on passage.
2300. Arrived off Dover, calm, mist. Air raid in progress, anchored.
Observed plane at about 1500 feet drop three magnetic mines about
2 cables ahead, sounds of mines striking water clearly audible.
Parashutes seen by several separate observers. Signalled position of mines to V.A. Dover.
Thursday 30th May. 0600. Proceeded into Dover, discharged troops.
1052. Proceeded Sheerness with one boiler. Drew fires in other boiler to make repairs to brickwork, damaged by bomb explosion.
1632. Arrived Sheerness, embarked coal and ammunition.
Friday 31st May. 0205. Left Sheerness in company with Lydd and Ress.
0400. Compasses suddenly produced 20 and 30 degrees of deviation,
HOSS assumed lead of division, later compass deviation improved and Sutton re-assumed lead.
0812. Arrived Dunkirk, proceeded east parallel to beaches passing
4 planes wrecked on the beach west of Dunkirk, two with French markings. 0829. Passed Dunkirk harbour distant I cable. Harbour wall intact and little damage apparent from seaward except huge fires.
0835. Hurricanes gunfire, and Spitfires overhead, proceeding homewards at
Continual some from beach close west of Dunkirk.
high speed. One cargo ship sunk alongside east pier of harbour, 2
French destroyers and several cargo ships sunk east of Dunkirk.
Long columns of troops marching into Dunkirk from east, scattered groups on the beach. Continuous column about I mile long along beach 3 miles east of Dunkirk.
0906. Anchored off La Panne. Wind N.W. force 3. freshening, troops sea slight but considerable swell.. Commenced loading with

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102
(3)
Motor boat towing whaler and two army pontoons. Since previous day pier had been constructed by driving out lorries at ebb tide in line and securing planks on top, considerably expediting loading of boats, though embarkation rate was slowed considerably by lack of control at shore end of pier to move troops along and by natural reluctance of troops to venture along pier without being relieved of part of their heavy equipment. Some difficulty experienced in loading tow of 4 boats without smashing up against pier in swell, and in handling pontoons in tow in prevailing conditions which tended to reduce embarkation rate. Boats available quite inadequate, large open motor beach boats required, together with vessel anchored broadside or sunk at head of pier to give a lee if necessary with oil slick provided.
During embarkation, Sutton collected soldiers from overturned pontoon. allowed to broach in swell. Three believed drowned mainly due to lack of foresight of shore authorities in allowing troops to embark with full equipment and overcoats in deteriorating weather conditions. I20 troops embarked mostly
R.E., R.A. R.A.S.C. with a few infantrymen and guards, morale very good but very critical of lack of R.A.F support and Belgium treachery behind lines. Country said to be filled with spies, night positions during retreat seen to be signalled by flashlight to planes, bombed within half an hour of being established.
Surprising speed of advance of Germans against positions being prepared and defencelessness against dive bombing also important factors.
II37. Weighed anchor and discharged troops alonside Lydd. Wind and sea increasing slightly, rather low cloud.
II50. Proceeded North Goodwin Lt Vessel to await time for next rendezv ous. Lydd and Ross proceeded to Margate to discharge troops.
1538. Anchored at North Goodwin Lt Vessel.
I855. Weighed and proceeded to Dunkirk in company with Niger.
Passed great number of small craft, as well as destroyers and paddlers.
2115. Passed Dunkirk Harbour distantI I cable. Heavy gunfire from beach about 2 miles west of harbour, apparently enemy shelling town. Fires in Dunkirk more extensive.
2147. Anchored off beach between La Panne and Dunkirk. No sign of boats as expected.
2235. Boat from shore reported troops further to eastward, only
Saturday Iss Junable roo. Saturday Isavailable.com No troops yet contacted. No boats except aground. Moved 1 mile eastward.
Sutton's available. Several minelaying aircraft overhead, observed parashute mines descending about 3 cables ahead and I cable astern. Mines reported dropped all over fairway.
0130. Commenced loading troops with own motor boat and whaler and ship's lifeboat found off beach. Later assisted by motoryacht.
Troops mostly R.A. and infantrymen including guards, E. Yorks.
and machine gun detachment. No R.A.F assistance before or after dawn. Opened fire on occasional reconnaisance aircraft at dawn.
One level bombing attack at about 5000 feet followed by machine gunning whilst embarking wounded from pontoons alongside, one casualty receiving wounds in back whilst being helped over the side. This machine gun attack undoubtably would have been pressed gun and causing Bren fire from troops, who manned ships L.G. armament.
home very heavy casualties but for concentrated Lewis
Detachment of gun Guards also offered to provide Bren gun defence for the large ship's lifeboat against occasional low flyiing

189
193
(4)
aircraft, but this was declined in order to utilise maximum space for embarkation. No R.A.F. machines observed engaging enemy at any time. Battery of two guns believed French 5.7"
firing continually on beach parallel with Sutton. Observed heavy and accurate shelling of La panne beaches and main street and pier constructed previous day from lorries.
0600. Weighed and proceeded, leaving Dunkirk Roads close inshore to reduce possibility of encountering numerous magnetie mines laid during night.
II30. Alongside at Dover, discharged troops.
I8I0. Proceeded from Dover in company with Niger.
2I2I. Passed Dunkirk Harbour and arrived off beach, met by
R.A. Dover in C.M.B. and ordered to proceed into Dunkirk to load at eastern pier. Proceeded into Dunkirk Harbour and made fast at seaward end of eastern pier by shore instructions.
Embarked 725 troops with two brows, about one third French.
Enemy artillery very active and apparently still concentrating on back area of Dunkirk. Pier slightly damaged. Harbour area all quiet, embarkation completed in about an hour and at half without incident, but bombed about twenty minutes after Sutton's departure by about 50 aircraft.
Sunday 2nd June I207. Proceeded out of harbour for Dover, with speed reduced to minimise listing when turning, troops below trimmed to reduce listing and boats swung in. When abeam of
FG buoy received report that magnetic mines had been laided round buoy. When just abeam of Y buoy, report again received that mines had been laid in the vicinity. A 7 buoy whole route reported mined. Later received report that Dover was being raided and mines dropped off entrance.
0306. At North Goodwin Lt Vessel aircraft apparently enemy passed close alongside flying low but presumably failed to observe ship in spite of exceptional phospherescence.
0432. Entered Dover Harbour and secured alongside Morcester which had 45 killed and many injured in bombing raid on Dunkirk shortly after Sutton laft. 7 survivors of Keith also arrived alongside with Captain D I9 in small motor barge, sunk in same raid.
Monday 3rd June. 2010. Proceeded from Dover for Dunkirk, having embarked medical officer and orderly.
2052. Passing through the Downs, engines developed feed tank trouble, reduced speed. While attempting temporary repairs weather thickened rapidly reducing visibility to half a cable.
Found impossible to arrive at Dunkirk soon enough for embarkation, in addition to unreliability of engines for manoeuvring required at Dunkirk.
2230. Signal made stating circumstances and decision to return to Downs to effect repairs. In turning in very thick fog to return, destroyer passed at considerable speed distant 5 yards.
Sunday 46. June
Anchored at North Goodwin Lt Vessel.
0517. Visibility improved, proceeded to Dover.
0720. Made fast alongside Niger. Received signal, operation completed satisfactorily.
Greenille. M. Tenna
Act Cand. Rozal. Navy
Commander office. H.M. S. Sallin

190
FACTORS OBSTRUCTING THE EVACUATION.
194
1.
Low embarkation rate off beaches - at times less than 30 per hour caused by lack of control ashore for first few days; and absence of suitable boats.
2. No ship to beach communication to expediate loading, resulting in casualties caused by ships lying off beaches for hours in daylight.
3.
No Medical Officers at beginning for attending casualties.
4.
Apparently no R.A.F. protection whatever against level bombing and more particularly, dive bombing and machine gunning, except for last two days and a few short periods previously. This lowered troops'
morale considerably.
5.
Only one pier, built from lorries end to end, at position most open to enemy shell fire.
6.
Sandbar off beaches preventing close approach, causing troops to hesitate to cross relatively deep water with full equipment to reach larger boats.
7. HA armament sonsisting of 12 pdr. and Lewis guns quite inadequate to produce barrage fire, or to discourage high or low flying attack.
8. No initiative shown by Army Staff in bringing into use local boats on beach.
9.
Lack of foresight shown in allowing troops to embark with overcoats, packs, full equipment and rifles, (not held, but worn) causing hesitation on insecure pier, and difficulty in embarking into boats off beaches.
10. Insufficient boats at all times, and too few motor beach boats and shallow draft pontoons.
11, No apparent steps taken by Army to prevent low flying maching gunning off beaches by mounting Bren guns which were available.
Greurille. M.
COMMANDING OFFICER
6 JUN 1940
*
*
Acl. Canit. Royal Navy.
H.M.S "SUTTON"

191
195
FACTORS ASSISTING THE EVACUATION.
1.
Discipline and coolness of troops under fire on beach and in unfamiliar conditions in boats throughout evacuation.
2.
Life saving nets rigged along ship's sides.
3.
Assistance of Army Bren Guns and gunners against low-flying air attack.
4.
Calm weather and poor visibility.
5.
Presence of HA Light Cruiser "Calcutta".
6.
Excellent physical condition of majority of troops.
7.
Normal state in which all piers at Dunkirk were allowed to remain, which was invaluable in assisting embarkation of troops into ships.
COMMANDING OFFICER
*
6JUN 1940
*
Eminille. M. Tenth.
H.M.S. 4 SUTTON
Ad. Comes. Royal Navy.

52 Prines
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H
126197
85a-1.
take
XI.
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ion
M012022 M012022/40. / 40.
by boacuation of B.E.F from Dunkiik
26-May -5th - June 1940.
Narrative of events from
Ft
UL
HMS. "Sutton"
Commendation of officer and min.
1940.
Degan
1
i 1
in
30-6449
Sta.47/33.