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TNA / ADM 199 790

TNA ADM 199 790

TNA ADM 199 790
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 790

Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, dating from 1940.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 790
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/790. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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190
FACTORS OBSTRUCTING THE EVACUATION.
194
1.
Low embarkation rate off beaches - at times less than 30 per hour caused by lack of control ashore for first few days; and absence of suitable boats.
2. No ship to beach communication to expediate loading, resulting in casualties caused by ships lying off beaches for hours in daylight.
3.
No Medical Officers at beginning for attending casualties.
4.
Apparently no R.A.F. protection whatever against level bombing and more particularly, dive bombing and machine gunning, except for last two days and a few short periods previously. This lowered troops'
morale considerably.
5.
Only one pier, built from lorries end to end, at position most open to enemy shell fire.
6.
Sandbar off beaches preventing close approach, causing troops to hesitate to cross relatively deep water with full equipment to reach larger boats.
7. HA armament sonsisting of 12 pdr. and Lewis guns quite inadequate to produce barrage fire, or to discourage high or low flying attack.
8. No initiative shown by Army Staff in bringing into use local boats on beach.
9.
Lack of foresight shown in allowing troops to embark with overcoats, packs, full equipment and rifles, (not held, but worn) causing hesitation on insecure pier, and difficulty in embarking into boats off beaches.
10. Insufficient boats at all times, and too few motor beach boats and shallow draft pontoons.
11, No apparent steps taken by Army to prevent low flying maching gunning off beaches by mounting Bren guns which were available.
Greurille. M.
COMMANDING OFFICER
6 JUN 1940
*
*
Acl. Canit. Royal Navy.
H.M.S "SUTTON"

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 198.

190
FACTORS OBSTRUCTING THE EVACUATION.
194
1.
Low embarkation rate off beaches - at times less than 30 per hour
caused by lack of control ashore for first few days; and absence
of suitable boats.
2. No ship to beach communication to expediate loading, resulting in
casualties caused by ships lying off beaches for hours in daylight.
3.
No Medical Officers at beginning for attending casualties.
4.
Apparently no R.A.F. protection whatever against level bombing and
more particularly, dive bombing and machine gunning, except for last
two days and a few short periods previously. This lowered troops'
morale considerably.
5.
Only one pier, built from lorries end to end, at position most open
to enemy shell fire.
6.
Sandbar off beaches preventing close approach, causing troops to
hesitate to cross relatively deep water with full equipment to reach
larger boats.
7. HA armament sonsisting of 12 pdr. and Lewis guns quite inadequate to
produce barrage fire, or to discourage high or low flying attack.
8. No initiative shown by Army Staff in bringing into use local boats
on beach.
9.
Lack of foresight shown in allowing troops to embark with overcoats,
packs, full equipment and rifles, (not held, but worn) causing
hesitation on insecure pier, and difficulty in embarking into boats
off beaches.
10. Insufficient boats at all times, and too few motor beach boats and
shallow draft pontoons.
11, No apparent steps taken by Army to prevent low flying maching gunning
off beaches by mounting Bren guns which were available.
Greurille. M.
COMMANDING OFFICER
6 JUN 1940
*
*
Acl. Canit. Royal Navy.
H.M.S "SUTTON"