TNA ADM 199 790

46
50
At 1800 approximately Lord Gort ambarked at La Panne for
U.K.
At 1937 the following signal was made:-
"As it is vital to carry on the evacuation of troops throughout every available moment day and night it is intended to place two white lights at eastern and western pier head as a guide to ships in the hours of darkness. It is requested that all H.M.
ships and other vessels who are likely to enter port to-night be warned accordingly"
At 1945 a further signal was made:-
"Slow British progress in the port due to shelling, bombing, and wounded and French troops using quay.
Weather fine and clear, sea moderate, good prospects for night embarkation from beaches."
I returned Dunkirk with General Alexander and discovered at totally different instructions had been given to General exander by Lord Gort and by Lord Gort in writing to Admiral rial and General Fagalde.
Lord Gort had told the French authorities that General assist exander would hold the "PERIMETER" for the French to embark id that he was to place himself and his divisions under eneral Fagalde's orders. General Alexander, however, was told
Lord Gort in my hearing that he was to do nothing to imperia is army and was ultimately responsible for their safety and vacuation.
I suggested to General Alexander that he should at once eturn to La Panne before the telephone was cut off to telephone o the Secretary of State for War, and to get the matter cleared p. This he did. The Secretary of State instructed General lexander to act on his own discretion and to proceed with the evacuation.
Admiral Abrial asked me to take charge of the British and
French embarkation, which I did. I also asked for French officers to assist, and they were provided.
The following signals were despatched:-
2028. "I have felt it necessary for the operation to

47
-3-
51
"disregard your verbal instructions to return home, and hope you will approve. with the approval of
Lord Gort I have returned here as S.N.O. Dunkirk and to assist the British Commander"
At 2353 the following signal was made:-
"In view of the decision request maximum number of transports and air protection to-morrow Saturday, and particularly air and sea protection for the following day, when enemy will have no other occupation.
Unfortunately some hours are passing to-night without a single ship entering Dunkirk for French or ourselves."
Shelling took place all night during embarkation causing some casualties on the beach.
BRAY
La Panne was evacuated and troops fell back on Bire,Demis
A situation report was made as follows:-
"No ships entered between 2230 and 0400, Unsuccessful dive bombing attack has just taken place. British fighters arrive. Smoke covers pier. Embarkation re-commenced. Reported heavy shelling of beaches and an improvised pier smashed. Please despatch by M.T.B. morphia and field dressings.
Saturday 1st June.
0715.
"Attended meeting of French Staff at Malo Barns.
Witnessed very heavy dive bomging on ships off shore.
Discussed evacuation and arranged that more ships should be given to the French.
At 0910 a further signal was made reading:-
"Ships are urgently required."
Much bombing had taken place for rest of day. H.M.S.
Keith and Ivanhoe were bombed and H.M.S. Mosquito on her way to entering the port was bombed and sunk. H.M.S. Worcester sailed and received such heavy bombing that I gave orders that no more ships were to sail in daylight and requested that henceforth none should arrive before dark.
At 1841 the following signal was received from C.I.G.S
for Senior Officer:-
"We do not order any fixed moment for evacuation. You:
are to hold on as long as possible in order that the

48
52
"maximum number of French and British may be evacuated.
Impossible from here to judge local situation. In close co-operation with Admiral Abrial you must act in this matter on your own judgment.
At 2315 I made the following signal:-
"Withdrawal now proceeding according to plan. Shall have certain reserves here to-morrow to assist French.
Intend to complete evacuation to-morrow by midnight.
A motor boat was sent to the mouth of the harbour at dusk and allocated berths to the ships as they entered, the requisite number of the personnel vessels being sent to the embarkation pier in the Western harbour to embark French troops.
A good number of ships entered harbour and embarked troops, and the seamanship displayed by destroyers, sloops and transports was most praiseworthy under exceedingly difficult conditions.
I gave orders to evacuate a large proportion of naval personnel during the night.
the final
All those that did remain until, withdrawal had performed their duties magnificently.
Suriday 2nd June.
0800/2 - from SIN.O.Dunkirk.
"Request again maximum number of transports for British and French. At 2130 June 2nd it is intended that all
British shall be evacuated by midnight. Request
M.A.S.B. at 2300.
At 0405 - from S.N.O.Dunkirk.
"Admiral, an Nord requess that block ships will arrive at
6300 to-morrow night. He will signal if their placing is to be postponed.
At 0730 - from S.N.O. Dunkirk:-
"Wounded situation acute. Hospital ships should enter during day. Geneva Convention will be honourably observed. It is felt that the enemy will refrain from attack (This signal was made "en clear")
At 0830 - from S.N O. Dunkirk:-
"About 5000 British remain. Bofors ammunition short.
Sporting chance of embarking to-night. Maximum number of fast motor boats at 2130 at inner end of Long Pier would assist. Early this morning the drifter Lord Cava our depot ship, was sunk by shell fire.

49
53
-5-
As it had been decided to cease evacuating troops in daylight, there remained little to do except to prepare the maximum staff to-night.
The following signal was made at 1435:-
"Please direct proportion of shipping to the French.
Arrangements of embarkation in the Novul D'Avant Port."
1536/2. From S.N.O. Dunkirk.
"Situation of wounded desperate. Shortgge of medical stores and accomodation. Demand two hospital ships forthwith:
At 1538/2 the following situation report was made:-
"French still maintain front line except for area east of Bergues where the Germans have penetrated two miles on a two-mile front. Counter attack being made at 1500. In port no movement. Present situation hopefuls
At dark vessels of all kinds arrived and were berthed alongside the eastern arejon the French jettys and further up the harbour. Berthing was carried out by an officer with a loud speaker at the pier head.
At 2230 the last of the B.E.F. started down the quay.
and were safely embarked by 2250 at which time I made a signal as follows:-
"Operation completed. Returning to Dover." I then embarked in a M.T.B. and left for Dover.

50
54
MENTA STEAT
Bennot details
After my return from G.H.Q. on the 31st May was closely associated with General Alexander who mained in command of British Troops. He was a tower strength and delightful to work with at a very fficult time when it did not seem probable that we should acceed in getting away the last of the British Expeditiony Force. Although my report does not make it clear,
1 signals from S.N.O. Dunkirk referring to military tters were made with his concurrence and approval.
He finally left Dunkirk with Admiral Wake-Walker
If totos a M.T.B. at 2130 on 2nd June. shipe aloughtda, the monation have bons achieved. They owner, surned their attentive N lyby MT 9a seabes, and on una day (Xist), M Issue the 100 beauting m/o on of the as lenst 2b boning - apapped. NR Lurgi couck name braths 13 N MAS time ma vote being sollowish east this 100000 to aux that mrs
S of the address the harry attucks os shine as
DD all use wring
9d the lest day, they expense ISSUE 1008 9a turn to the burbing of MAR 10a and bistin.
toway fighters sere considerally to depting that burbors. AS Main - eno a gross assisted of verify birth Eat du Se 142 3,000 and
Visa often directions No how 17 or assessed WAS provent not. Then 002° ass - Protection 4d 3450
equiptly the leister. examal ftes - das

55
APPENDIX I.
ACTIVITY OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT.
As the enemy aircraft seemed to work in distinct phases, I think it will be as well to devote an Appendix to their operations.
On our arrival, they were chiefly occupied in wrecking Dunkirk and the port. It was quite out of the question to use the harbour at all, and my first reaction was that evacuation would have to be done from the beaches.
It soon became obvious, however, that they were not including the pier in their attentions. At times they were held off by & fine morning mist which sometimes persisted until afternoon. At them times, when the wind was favourable, a heavy pall of smoke from burning oil tanks, to the westward, largely obscured the pier. During the morning they made attempts to machine gun the beaches, but were held off by anti-aircraft fire. The beaches were also bombed but only for a brief period. Had they persisted, they would have inflicted terrific losses on us, for there were seldom less than 10,000 troops on the beaches. They later attacked the pier, with dive bombers, sunk three ships and damaged the pier. Had they persisted in these successful attacks on the pier and ships alongside, the evacuation could never have been achieved. They soon, however, turned their attention to ships lying off the beaches, and on one day (31st), no less than 100 bombing attacks were made on ships within two miles of the pier.
Happily, at least 24 bombs were dropped on one large wreck and many bombs on other wrecks. By this time also, Bofors guns were being collected and this seemed to make them more any of attacking the pier. The heavy attacks on ships at sea compelled me to stop all sailings and arrivals during daylight.
On the last day, they appeared once more to return to the bombing of Dunkirk and its port and bastion.
Enemy fighters were occasionally in evidence escorting their bombers. At times our own fighters gave us a great measure of relief, but the aky is a big place and it was often difficult to know if our aircraft were present or not. When our aircraft did arrive the French, and less frequently the British, opened fire on them.

52
56
APPENDIX II.
OFFICERS WHO PERFORMED VALUABLE SERVICES.
Captain Howson.
Commander Maund
=
Lewis (late P.S.T.O. who joined my party and did very good work).
Bilwood
Henderson
Richardson
+
#
Surtees
X
5
Cotto
+
3
Clouston ieut.Commander Junor aym.Lteutenant Brockett, R.N.R.
Lieutenant Balfour
Commander Commy deut. Corrender Cubison. Otway-Ruthven. of The Drufter Lord Cavan
Commandes Ken.
<
names already given to V.A. Dover for special recognition in the fust dispatch - but all the remainder an northy of mention but particularly those I have underlined.

53
Ratings in the ampinal % 57
draps from Chatham
PENDIX III.
LIST OF FATINGS AT DUNKINK 1350 PERFORMED
VALUARIN SERVICE.
Last to Syacunto.
Yoo. of Sign.
Piper
A.B.
Cox
#
Rose
*
Burrown
#
Funner
#
others morthy of Mention.
Signal staff.
Signalman
Waters
If
Jones
*
Milhoron
#
Binands
Pier Party.
P.O.
Topledgh (Toplay)
A.D.
Hoore
SEX.22139.
L.B.
A/P.O.
B.W. Sydekett
JX.12546
JX.152505
1,3.
A.B.
J.W.Sun.es C.A. Hall (J.43b42)
3.21047
Signature
E.Robincon
ESD.1704
JX.129630
A.D.
R.Lancaster
A.B.
C.L.Fletcher
D.941
1.3.
T.D.D. Bones
JX.145092
Ord.Sea.
F.V. GARROTT
JX.172487
L.Sea.
H.J.Spanton
J.114468
A.B.
John Doig
SSX.20706
R.Fletcher (J.99712)3.25221
A.B.
Benches.
1.3.
C.Fonter
D.112
4
0.3. Mixon
25222
18
R.W
JX.144642
J.L.Francer
88/X.24037
#
S.L.Parker
P.O. 3.84930
P.O.
sto.
9.Coltmnn
KX.88357
Headoughters, Degnatah Riders. etc.
1.B.
Owen
J.L. Turner
Hiller.
Commidors ano; these will possibly be already covered in the
Gosto and surteen rocommendations yet to above list.

Appendix 5. 61
I enclose these rewarks by bar. Richardson who placed in change ofthe BRAY beaches
SITUATION ON THE BRACHES.
At about 1980 on Monday 27th I met the Captain of the WOLFHOUND ashore and he told me that our instructions from the Senior Naval Officer were to proceed to the beaches.
of
I proceeded in close company with Lieutenant
Commander Dowling and his platoon. En route we met the head of the Army who were proceeding in the same direction.
3.
We arrived on the beaches after about 1 hour's march. During this march there was continuous bombing.
4.
On arrival at the beaches it was apparent that the first flight of the Army were showing signs of lack of discipline and for about 80 minutes we had a difficult time to restore order.
5.
I ordered the soldiers in my vicinity to sit down and at the same time placed my platoon a cross the road to prevent any more men coming on the beaches. I then called for
Army Officers to assist me and about 7 or 8 approached me.
6.
1 divided the soldiers up into parties of 30
and placed them under the care of an Army Officer or an Able
Seaman and dispersed them at intervals along the beaches in the direction of Dunkirk.
7.
Aa each party arrived on the road leading on to the beach they were net by seamen who marshalled them into and parties of 50/then led them on to the beaches.
8.
Quiet was then maintained and the embarking in boats commenced.
9.
At about 2100 Commander Clouston sent a message to say that large parties could be taken off at Dunkirk and accordingly/

58
62
accordingly parties of approximately 500 at a time were sent off in that direction.
10.
It was low water and embarkation in small boats was not an easy matter. Continuous air-bombing and machine-gunning from aircraft took place throughout the night but it seemed, by the Grace of God, that the smoke cloud over Dunkirk saved the beaches from being bombed, the main bombing being over the town and dockyard of Dunkirk and the town of St Malo.
11.
Embarkation continued throughout the night and in the early hours of the morning but during the forenoon the arrival of soldiers abated until there were only sailors left on the beach approximately 1 mile to the eastward of Dunkirk.
12.
I proceeded in close company with Commander Ken and
Lieutenant Commander Dowling with our platoons to Dunkirk. On arrival 1 reported to Captain Tennant who told me he wished a party to proceed to Bray de la Plage to embark 5,000 soldiers.
Volunteers were called for and Commander Ken and I
proceeded there by lorry (2 Commanders and 16 men).
13.
We arrived at approximately 1700 and found about 30,000
soldiers awaiting embarkation stretching from Bray to the eastward.
It was raining and conditions were most unpleasant for us but the other side was that we got no bombing during the night.
14.
At about 0130 (Wednesday 29th) a high wind had got up which made it obvious to me that embarkation from the beaches would be impossible or at any rate very inefficient. I therefore lined up the soldiers and sent them to Dunkirk in parties of 1,000
at varying intervals. 1 must have sent off 20,000 in the direction of Dunkirk.
15.
Later in the day the weather improved but there was a most lamentable lack of small boats.
16./

59
63
3/w May
AS about 0300 11 988 impossible to carry out
16.
At about 1200 Commander Ken and I motored into embarkation es the bonches.
Dunkirk to report progress as embarkation on our beach was
85.
vere showing signs of extreme exhaustion and then impossible. On our return our lorry was heavily machine
80 it 989 impossible to communicate with the Senior Navel Officer gunned and hit. At this period a heavy bombing attack took we decided to take over * shaler that the had salved and to go place on the Fleet and beaches.
to the bearest to report to the Senior Seval officer
17.
On return to our headquarters (a lorry) we decided
25.
We wasted vater and 0750 put to 00, to make contact with General H.Q. but unfortunately our car
There me very heavy surf running and se had only an uneven set broke down and we had to walk back 5 miles.
of sers, voge arutches and only an 062 to by.
18.
During the night another naval embarkation party
17.
We approached two destroyers but they both 201 underesy.
arrived on the beach to the eastward which reduced the
Tea other destroyers passed de at but paid no limits of our beach.
stiention to us.
19.
Early on Thursday morning 30th I proceeded to
28.
an hour if appeared the
Brigade H.Q. and offered the suggestion that piers be built
Margate the the Consumin to take 12 to the by running lorries out to sea. This was quickly done and was nearest destroyer at this time.
successful.
returning to 80 we case back with him
20.
I then drove Colonel Whitten and Colonel Mackenzie
19,
US28 and into Dunkirk to see Captain Tennant and then drove them back were salses within five minutes of being inboard the lifeboat.
to Brigade H.Q.
1 the or Staff
21.
During the afternoon and dogwatches the French poured Daven and into reported our beaches our return. but no boats arrived within 11 miles
1 usa ordered to return to Chather with by party, of our H.Q.
22.
During the last dog the Germans directed mon $
accurate artillery fire on our beach. This fire continued throughout the night and our lorry was hit. The beach was completely evacuated by allied soldiers.
23.
We had however taken up quarters in a water-boat that was ashore at low mter. No boats had now been in for
16 hours on our beach.
24.
During the night the weather became bad once more -
and a heavy surf was running.
At/

60
64
Personal 3184 semark by Ca Richardin
At about 0300, it was impossible to carry out embarkation on the beaches.
25.
Our men were showing signs of extreme exhaustion and as it was impossible to communicate with the Senior Naval Officer we decided to take over a whaler that we had salved and to go to the nearest destroyer to report to the Senior Naval Officer.
26.
Te waited for high water and at about 0730 put to sea.
There was 8 very heavy surf running and we had only an uneven set of oars, rope crutches and only an oar to steer by.
27.
We approached two destroyers but they both got underway.
Two other destroyers passed us at about 7 cables but paid no attention to us.
28.
After about an hour as if from nowhere appeared the
Margate lifeboat. fe asked the Coxswain to take us to the nearest destroyer but all were underway at this time. De was returning to Margate and 80 we came back with him.
29.
The men in my party were completely exhausted and were asleep within five minutes of being onboard the lifeboat.
30. On arrival at Margate I phoned the Chief of Staff at Dover and reported our return.
31. I was ordered to return to Chatham with my party.
(1)

65
Personal remarks by Ca Richardson
Criticisms.
The points that I would like to bring home in the way of general criticism are:-
(3)
(1) When being bombed in daylight and at night it is apparently the Army training for the men to lie over on their faces in the a huddled heap and to await the completion of the air raid.
I consider that if one lies over on one's face during an air
No.
raid, one gets the impression that the bombs when falling with very horrid shrieking noises are each and all coming to land right in the small of one's back. There is little doubt that the Army were considerably cowed by the bombing and I do feel that this form of inactivity during a raid is paychologically bad. I would have thought it better that the men be trained to stand up and take cover and loose off their rifles and anyhow look at the bomber, especially by day. It appeared to us obvious which aircraft was going to be anywhere near us and which was going to be miles away, while to watch the Army lying down with their faces to the ground with the bombs shrieking, one could see that they were going through a tricky time by being in such a position. I saw no sign, except in one very isolated case, of any of the Naval ratings being at all genuinely upset by the bombing. Machine-gunning, though, was quite embarrassing.
(2)
I thought the pom pom fire of the Fleet and 4" barrage fire to be most effective and consistent. The absence of fighters was a source of great discussion and in many cases bitter words. Although the reason for the absence of fighters has been explained by the Prime Minister, I do feel that it is psychologically right to have a few bombers directly over the mentaking part in such an operation. There is no doubt that when fighters were present bombers did not come, but as soon/

manding Officer H.M.S. Saltash.
Dyram 91.
The 4th.1039.
Brulohing by
M.S.F. Vice adminar, Dover
"
71
Sir,
During the operations off Dunkerque the
329
ng Officer and men have shown perseverence and courage, the honour to submi t their names so that suitable action taken.
Join ieutenant Williams R.N.R., First Lieutenant of Saltash. H.M.S.
0011 the night of Friday, May 31st,he was loaned to H. Hebe was not required. On his way back in a motor boat he went other to pick up soldiers, not finding any he took two sailors lacking a whaler behind them,he made his way along the beach nick ame im Danna WAS hains hombarded the mmander in chief more
Dynamo go. 67
in on operations carried out By M.B. Honderung
C Dutch schoole).
n 26 may and 5 June 1940.
anchaed at sheerness waiting for orders
Sailed from Sheerness arrived and anchored on Deal.
ordered to Junkirk in company with 5 other Schools on Eastern entrance to I unkink roads.
ships harsing advised us that Dunkirk had fallen. Senior officers schoote developed engine
Grouble ordered Hondsrug to take him in low
Readed away drom unkink
Sliphed tow as S.O.S engine now working and schools ordered Crack to Deal german seaplane, machine gunned and
Comled us no damage, Put rather unpleasant as we had no gans to return fire.
anchored GM Dear.
ordered to Dunkink have uh and proceeded.
on Dunkink harbour made for beaches
Saw move teashing from beach and ran verset hand up on sand. Embarked troops

From: Commanding Officer H.M.S. Saltash.
Dyram 91. Blulol by
Date: June 4th.1039.
is
71
11149
To; Sement Space M.S.F. Vice adminar, Dover
Sir,
During the operations off Dunkerque the following Officer and men have shown perseverence and courage,
I have the honour to submit their names so that suitable action may be taken.
1. Lieutenant T,E. Williams R.N.R., First Lieutenant of Saltash. H.M.S.
On the night of Friday, May 31st, he was loaned to H.M.S.Hebe but he was not required. On his way back in a motor boat he went in shore to pick up soldiers, not finding any he took two sailors and, pullading a whaler behind them, he made his way along the beach nick Danna was haina hombarded the
To: Commander in chief more
Dynamo go. 67
Rehart on operations carried out By M.B. Honderung
(Dutch schoote).
Between 26 may and 5 June 1940.
26 anchaed at sheerness waiting for orders
24"
300 Sailed from Sheerness
000 arrived and anchored on Ifeal.
500 ordered to Junkirk in company with 5 other Schools
300 on Eastern entrance to unkink roads.
ships harsing advised us that Dunkink had fallen. Senior 6 Hiers schoote' developed engine trouble ordered Hondsrug to take him in low
Readed away drom Dunkink
28
345 Slithed tow as S.O.S engine now working and schools ordered Crack to Deal
430 german seaplane, machine gunned and
Comled us no damage, Put rather unpleasant as we had no gans to return fire.
000
anchored GH Dear.
815
ordered to Dunkink have wh and proceeded.
330 on Dunkink harbour made for beaches
29
200 Saw more thashing open beach and nan verset hand up on sand. Emparked troops

Form: Commanding Officer H. Saltash.
Dysams 91. Blulol by
Date:June 4th.1039.
is
71
114g
P; Seven M.S.F. Vice adminar, Dover
Sir,
During the operations off Dunkerque the ollowing Officer and men have shown perseverence and courage, have the honour to submi t their names so that suitable action ay be taken.
Lieutenant T,E.Williams R.N.R.,First Lieutenant of Saltash. H.M.S.
On the night of Friday, May 31st, he was loaned to H.M.S.Hebe
Out he was not required. On his way back in a motor boat he went shore to pick up soldiers, not finding any he took two sailors nd, pullading a whaler behind them,he made his way along the beach mink ame un Danne was haine hombarded the
2/
68
another Schoote on shore came in alongside
Found moheller had hicked wh nohe and engines would not turn ScRoole Bornrit towed us ON and back to Deal roads.
arrived and anchored disembarked troohs.
30"
00
after several attempts to clear screwohom heart asked SNQ Ramsgate it we might be towed in and beached This was approved.
1000 arrived Ramsgate hut vessel on Hand
231
200 Shih dry. cleared screw
730 Proceeded to Dunkink
500
arrived on beaches. heavy bombing.
300
no Goats available to bring men ON, sobeached shin but troops would not wade out so backed on and anchored
300
Embarked about 100 French troobscrom is mata boat.
000
Cruised along beaches. and then made for harbour entrance.
130
Secured alongride Preakwater. embarked hoops, heary Combing going on cleared harbour. we were able to machine gun low deying german heave troops assisting

Prom: Commanding Officer H. Saltash.
Depairs 91. Bruloling by
Date:June 4th.1039.
o; Sement space M.S.F. Vice adminar, Dover
"
71
Sir,
During the operations off Dunkerque the ollowing Officer and men have shown perseverence and courage,
If have the honour to submit their names so that suitable action ay be taken.
Lieutenant T,E.Williams R.N.R., First Lieutenant of Saltash. H.M.S.
On the night of Friday, May 31st,1 he was loaned to H.M.S.Hebe but he was not required. On his way back in a motor boat he went shore to pick up soldiers, not finding any he took two sailors nd, pullading a whaler behind them, he made his way along the beach nick ame Danna was haine hombarded the
3/.
-
69
with Bren guns arrived Ramsgate and disembarked troops
Proceeded Dunkink Combed on several occasions no damage.
Entered harbour embarked French trooks harbour being shelled and bombed
, cleared harbour
2"
10
arrived Ramsgate disembarked hooks and anchored ON waiting for aders.
3"
10
Hore wh and proceeded Dunkink in company with three other schootes
45
arrived alongside Jetty at Past and embarked French troops
'+
000 serv Dunkink and proceeded.
530 arrived Ramsgate after thick too tor east three hours a hassage, diseimbarked troops.
1630 anchaed ON and rested crew
615 ordered to Fillury home, rh and proceeded
200 arrived Sanding stage es
00 Pilor exanded and vessel proceeded to surrey commercial Dock

Tom: Commanding Officer H. Saltash.
Dysams 91. Brulohing by ate:June 4th.1039.
0; Semon spece M.S.F. Vice adminar, Dover
"
71
Sir,
During the operations off Dunkerque the following Officer and men have shown perseverence and courage,
⑉ have the honour to submit their names so that suitable action ay be taken.
Lieutenant T,E.Williams R.N.R.,First Lieutenant of Saltash. H.M.S.
On the night of Friday, May 31st,he was loaned to H.M.S.Hebe but he was not required. On his way back in & motor boat he went texin shore to pick up soldiers, not finding any he took two sailors and, pullading a whaler behind them,he made his way along the beach
CAR he could nick amv un La Panpe was being bombarded the
41.
-
66
70
10
Secured to Quelee Dock - haid off shin returning all stores and crew to chatham.
P.O.(T). amb Potts /J.92816 showed great coolness getting men under cover when shih was gunned and Combed on 28' may.
and was a tower astrength during the whole operation.
THenny
7.- JUN 1940
.
*
THE NORE
Sient. R.N.R.
6 may 1940.
Times given in this report are approximate.
Total number or men landed about 1500
in town expective hassages drom Dunkink

Dysam
91.
From: Commanding Officer H.M.S. Saltash.
Bhulo
Date:June 4th.1039.
To; Seven Spece M.S.F. Vice adminar, Dover
"
71
1149
Sir,
During the operations off Dunkerque the following Officer and men have shown perseverence and courage,
I have the honour to submit their names so that suitable action may be taken.
1.
Lieutenant T,E.Williams R.N.R.,First Lieutenant of H.M.S.
Saltash.
On the night of Friday, May 31st, he was loaned to H.M.S.Hebe but he was not required. On his way back in a motor boat he went in shore to pick up soldiers, not finding any he took two sailors and, pullading a whaler behind them,he made his way along the beach to see if he could pick any up.La Panne was being bombarded the whole time he was ashore. He knew that I thought he was aboard 'Hebè and that the C.O.of 'Hebe' thought he was aboard me so that he could not expect any ship to wait for him;both pontcons were destroed while he was ashore. Eveentually he turned to 'Hebe' and when he came, back to me on Sunday night was perfectly ready and fit for more.
He franch only dead men & must have been ashise two hours
While Saltash was rescuing survivors from S.S.
Brighton Queen,and was in a precarious position alongside her bridge and on her deck and might have had to move any time (there was also summarke of small air attack) intermitted sumbing - gunning
2. Brian Sto.1.,C/KX79268.,stripped and swam with a line to two men a mile away, finding the line a hindrance he discarded it, and, unaided, rescued these two men.After a short rest he continued to swim out lines to men closer to the ship. Bombing and machine gunning
Was going on in close proximity to Maughan.
3. Frederick HUTTER, X7183. with the aid of two or three untrained assisstants, succoured ninety (98), repeat(98), casualties, ten of whom required artificial respiration, several of the others were serious casualties. There was no medical Officer on board and only two men of the 98 died. Hutter worked till he collapsed.
4. Receive, Thomas CRANSTONE a.B.,B22751(R.F. swam out with a line and orders to sh ps skiff which WAS in difficulies rescued this party and a party on a Neither party could have reached the ship unaidad for some time. Distance swum about 200 yards.
Y.R.Jah.
Liautenant-Commander in Command.
VICE ADMIRAL
8-JUN 1940
+
DOVER

Dynamo 93
72
SECTION
NOD
and Juno 1940.
sir,
I regret to have to report the loss of thereise
BRITHER by enemy action at 1013 let June 1940 off the Bolgian coast. The circumstances are as follows.
at about 0315 while embarking British troors off
DEPARTMENT I TRUE attacked by a squadron of nine German JUNKSHS
dive bombers. They approached from astern and on eighting 1 went full speed shoul 13 boilors connected, and as the Dombo were released turned hard to port. as far as I could judge such aircraft released a pattern of five bombs one being & large "B" type and four smaller bombs with slight delay action. one of the latter exploded at the after end 02 HOW boilor room on the port side and siereed blew anay the bulkhoad vioroing both main and auxiliary stoam linou and main oil fuol supply. «11 engine room and boilor room personnel were killoi. About six of the "B" type bonds than exploded underneath the ship flooding the after cagazine and shell room and probably the gland conpartments and storo rooms just forward of this position. The uppor dock and sideo of the ship crecked right across in the vioinity of the suimast. This 18
& general line of mouthous in dostroyers.
In order to precerve stability the torpedoes and death charges were jottluoned and the ship floated confortably with little increase in drought. I invected ongine room and No.3
doilor room and found that a Joall acount of nuter was making its very through shrapnol holos. Those were plugged and colligion not placed over the norst louks. It WILL found imposible to got steam to the enginos unl the ship thereafter remined imobile.
1.
fforts were now made to sond out measages for assistance. is tug who had been attending on Hamada "KEITH" passed no a 013nal telling DD to sink to which I replied that I
was out of action und required imediate assistance. I also requested him to inform The Ylag officer Commending, Dover to this effect. Due then dies peared. Signals for assistance were also made by using type & II with battory nover. It is
Coubtful whether any of these measuges more received owing to very heavy traffic at the time and comparative woukness of by signals.
5.
a Bolgiun fiching smock under French colours was soon in the distunco and the notor boat TRIO dearatched to susson her to our assistance. She WELL is JULIA AMOUNT of Card and after
JONE offorts a tow was pussed and corse set to open from the coast.
This ha hardly been accomplished before & second attack devollopped at about 0945. This consisted of lovel bumbing from about 0000t.
such bomber acting independently. about hulf a squalron of 18
carried out the attack. Considering the ship WAS & stationary targot and there was little wind these attacks were Dourly carried C
out and no bumbo hit. This may have been due to pon pon fire is which Hunner 12 new in charge. Unfortunately this gallant officer WAS killed at his post by machine run bullets which were fired continuously us the bombers pussed overhead.

69
73
SECR &
PAge
8.
6.
second attempt TRU now David to tow the ship clear but little progress had been made before a third attack developped at about noon, carried out by 8 equairon of:
dive Dombers. By this time nearly all amunition TRIS expenied and the 4.7 guns were firing in the hope of keeping the enemy at a listance. The Germans however, cade 8 determined diving attack which was well prossed home to about 400 feet.
The ship WAS completely smotherou 00 hits and near misses some of which were of the "B" bomb type. The ship immidiately bogan to settle and I gave the order to abanlon ship. Thanks to the adequate preparations cade by if First ideutenant, Lieutonant-
Commander Moding there TIBUDS plenty of boats and carley floats ready for survivors. fter collecting all strey swimers the boats and floats pullod out to sea. LE JOLIE
picked up 8 officers an: 71 ratings and How.3. WHIT HALL" 20
officers and 52 ratings. One wholer and the notor boat had proceeded to far over the shocls which run parallel to the count for to piok them up.
7.
cank in about 4 fathers of wator in approximate youition with hor uppor Cook smash. Although the sodio and V.C.-V.F.
gear and all important documents had been destroyed I =
anxious to complete the destruction of the vessel. accordingly
I requested the Captain of to fire suns and torpeloss. This W&J done and the ship 180 left on fire forward.
It 10 not certain whether any of the torredoes hit and I
consider further destruction advisable. 1 intimated this in &
signal time.: 40 6/1 to the log Community:over despatched DO a secret Sand coosego.
8. the first attach I ordered the destruction of all Signal when the chip TXC rendered imobile after
Publications except the Fleet Signal Book bridge machine and current naval Syko card. This was done by Sub-
Lieutenant who burnt then in the two galleys.
All Confidential Books prefixed 10' more dumped overboard in a weighted sack except those out on loan to officers SS these could not be got at due to damage aft. The Asdic gear in the cabinet and on the bridge was diamentied where possible and thrown overboard and the remainder smashed The oscillator was removed and brought on the upper dock anidships 80 the finel attack developped. It is not known for certain whether the oscillator slid overboard when the ship sant. lenterns wore unshippod and thrown overboard.
9. on the bridge: C.B. _018 - and certain charge documents in the
The following books and documents were left
Captain's springback and the Meet Signal Book. The bridge was burning fiercely when last seon and it can be confidently stated that these documents and papers more lestroyed.
I would like to emphasise that the older
10. doctroyers with pan point using belted ammunition and 4.7° Guns with only 30 degrees elevation are no match for a determined air attack. Cur Lowis guno had also been recently surreniored.
when shipo of this type are operating within range of energy air attack losses must be expected unless adequate fighter protection is afforded. In all the enemy launched four big uir attacks at about hourly intervals during the forenoon of the 1st June. The first, secon: and fourth of these were unoppeced apparently unopposed by any British Aircraft

70
74
SECRET.
Page 3.
.II
apparently unopposed by any British ircraft. On the third occasion on intense air buttle could be heard in progreso above the clouds and no effective bombing took place. I would also like to state that from my observation the onemy aircraft ovon when opposed wore always more numerous than our own and in the subsequent air buttles our fighters although outnumbered fought most courageously and effectively but gonerally lost moro planes than the enomy. From our of flow the B.B.C.
Bulletins describing the air actions off unkirs entiroly microprosont the true ISA betab MAINT
28
BID to Justi and
11.
The courage and production and non The a great inspiration to 28 during the four hours while the ship drifted without help under the threat of destruction.
Their cheorfulnoss and efficiency under these trying conditions was extraordinary. That GO for wore lost mas almost mireculous but my DO put down to SOMO extent to the trained courage of the ship's company who fought their guns shore possible and took cover when they could not otherwise Do of uso. It is cost lifficult shoro all conducted themolves valiantly to choose those specially conspicuous for their behaviour, but those I
append a lict of those specially morthy of contion.
12. The following Aprondicco are attached:- 10
<ppenliz I:- Verbutim statement by various officers and ratings appendix Ii:-
List 02 known survivors and known killed.
appondix 111-
wist of officers and con specially mentioned.
prondix IV:-
Cosy of prolininary report sent to the 145
Officer Commenting - ovor.
I have the honour to Do, ir, your obsdient servent,
The Commander in Chief,
Commender, estorn prosches.
Royal Navy.
Copies to:- The Officer Commending, lover.
03 tuin (U), 19th -estroyer Totillo.
Captain 1.1, Flymouth.
COMMANDER-1
*
3- JUN 1940
*
WESTERN
APPROACHES
P.T.O...

II.
No. M. 595/199.
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING, DOVER.
Forwarded for necessary action, please
2.
has not yet been received.
With reference to paragraph 12, Append
3. A report dated 4th June, 1940, from Lie
---
Commander W.G. Boaks, R.N., the First Lieutenant o ship, is also attached.
Plymouth.
6th June, 1940.
ADMIRAL
COMMANDER-IN-
VICE ADMIRA
8- - JUN 1940
OVER

75
5.
2nd June. 1940.
APPENDIX I.
Inquiry into the loss of H.M.S. Basilisk.
1. P.O. Tel Covington
Syko Machine and operating signals left in office.
All W/T books burnt including Syke cards burnt except Naval Syko 1st June.'1/1 sets not wrecked.
Several BR S burnt.
Communications.
Immediately after lights failed, connected up
4A to 51 ariel from Whalers davits to masthead.
Endeavoured to get into communication with Dover forces and W/T-Set appeared to be working efficiently.
Appeared to be to much traffic in air my signals Jammed.
Very Good reception. Found by still remaining of main aeriel; disconnected 11 from all other legs and then ran lead from seriel connection inedde office to the 4H.
reture set and again tried to got Dover forces and
Dover W/T. Reception throughout good until time of abandoning shin. Finding Dower to WI not sufficier:
connected up 100 7. receiving lattery in series making
220V but gunfire from ship kept loosening contacts.
Signals appeared to be going out alright.
First: message sent out in Nyko 18 Have been hit broadcasting at regular intervals.
2nd. attack made "Help Bray" several times.
Last signal made "Send tuge require immediate assistance officer " ( in Nyko ). Possible non reception was probable due to loss of powerin load and jamaing due go heavy traffic ( Dover 1/2. Travlers on 3/2 and shipe in vicinity all broadcasting ).
Had It been possible to get 51 working could have got signal through. Heavy fuses in office after 3rd. bombing could not get at tyke machine and operating signals.
2. C.E.R.A. Yestlake.
Tent into Engine Room as soon as atem had cleared, opened all boiler Safety Valves. Found both
C.E.R.A's Griffiths and Sto. Futt in front of the throttle killed. Platform generally wrecked, particularly Port aide, Bulkhead to after R. blown aray ( from B.R. into B.R. ). Main and insillary Steem lines pierced ( Port side ) Shut off Bulkhead Valves.
Plugged water pouring in through rivet holes. Shut off remainder of Auxillary Bas Cooks, 1.0. stopped all leaks.
3. Cheir Stoker Ricketts.
Forward supply party. Went down after B.R.
after steam cleared.
Found oil pump of port after fan and steam pipes port aldo blown away.
Found I Stoker hanging on ladder (Sto. Mandon )
1 P.O.in bilges
(Sto. P.O. Lowry)
2 in front of beilers, all killed
( P.O. Mahonay di Sto,Wormold)

72
76
(Cheif Sto. Ricketts continued)
After boiler Port side completely wrecked.
Shut off oil supply coming out of main line, shut off after strainer; main oil line carried away.
All emergency valves shut off and S.V's opened.
4. P.O. Cast.
ATI lights in ship out after 1st. Salvo.
went down to L.P. room to make sure battery was still on. dont art and found dynamos out of action.Sent hand to switch in Oldham Iame previously placed tall in place and all worked)
Joined up with party under Cummer(1) and jettisoned torpodoes and derth charges (Torpedoes fired with air levers forward )
Scuttling charges placed on foremost end of
E.R. bulkhead Starboard aide against ships side under
Water Level, consisted of 11 1b T.N.T. 2 primers and
2 detenators, Bickford fuse.These 17020 not fired in the and.
5.P.O.Robinson.
Q. There were you stationed during 1st air attack?
A.71th "A" gun.
A.Then you called for volunteers (after Capt. went)
Q. /hen did you go to Pom-Pom 9
What was ultimate reason why Tom-Tom would not fire?
A.Crdinary cartridge Jam which took 3 nine. to clear.
Q.018 you remain at Pom-Pome after I left?
A.No I went up to "A" gmn.
C.Sho stayed behind.
A.I./3ea. Peperall.
6. Yes. Bunkin.
All S.P's put in weighted Sag and given to
8.00 for destruction.
F.S.B. left on bridge on orders of Captain
All Signal loga left on bridge ( Including A, AZ,02,
V.C. 7.7. lanterna taken down and thrown overboard.
etc. all in wh alhouse )
Selector boxes loft intect.
when (a) realized it was Balanander called with her pendante
Communications:- Called LAP in direction of tug and Salamander
Called for about 20 mins. with Aldia. Tug
She was facing towards Baniliak but did not called answer.
and made "Go and deatroy Keith" Basilisk made "," Could see he would not read Basilisk, made Basilisk and made The still made 114 Basiliak ao decided 15 to read and his sink measage Keith by:- gunfire by firing at by Water to watch you sink.Jorry to trouble
Proceed Lovel and deatroy Amito cabinet D.19, you." standing
Made following signal.
Bas. I am out of action.
Tug. Sink her with torpedoes.
Bas. T have Jettisoned torpedoes.
Tug. Bas. I Sink have her no by depth depth charges, charges. I am out of action, require immediate assistance and tug.
Tugesave "R"

73
77
About 15 to 20 minutes called up tug and made
" Pass following information to V.A.Dover 1 Basilisk out of action require imediate assistance and tug'
Tug made mgth After that another high bonbing raid and tug was not seen again.
Fired two white rockets.
7. i/Sea. helan.
Where were you in first attack?.
A.In charge of Fore Supply on T.D.
What 8. happened there?
A.No trouble in supply except lights out and torches.
:- hat about Cldham lamps?
A.Mag. crew said they were out of action.
g.What did you do after that:
to Continued fore supply until going forward to assist in getting out tow. Supply parties continued fusing and supplying shells to guns. H.R.shells expended
S.A.P. suplied. Last WO are untilorder order given to destroy Asdic gear.
in Then what did you do?
1. Took A/S parts down to cabinet Unshipped all portable gear took it up on upper deck and smashed
1t Seyond recognition and then threw it overboard.
Stuff unable to unship amashed with a crowbar.
Unshppped oscillator and took on unper deck left it by guard rail on iron deck anidships, when ship listed over it was below water and cannot say whether it definately went over the side, but beleive it must have elid over ships side.
A/S gear on the bridge unshinped and destroyed returned to N.D. and watted outside 7.8. until abandoning ship.
8.P.O. Bradley.
B. here were you in the first attack?
A.At director - firing continued until bombers disappeared - went round ship to find where she was taking in water.
Found several small holes on the Port side abreast the 74% -inserted wooden plugs in those within reach then finding she was holed below...
placed collision mat.
ont in fobastle for tom forward.
At "A"X gun for 2nd. raid.
2nd. attempt to tow forward.
abandoned this for 3rd. air raid on focasle for this.
Assisted with supply until 1 went to T.S. and saw clock smashed before abandoning ship.
9. 1.0. Fraking.
In T. for 18% raid, passed orders from
Gontrol officer to guns.
1st. bomb put out all lights. Switched on get into communication with the bridge 80 challenged secondary lighting and remained in 2.8. Could not bridge through "B" gun and found "X" bridge still correct. Then I went on fo'castle to prepare to tow.
2nd. raid went downto T.S. again. Then I arrived hitmore and Ferryweather hal broken un F.C. table.
Remained there during bombing, on fo'castle again for 2nd. tow forward. ent down below for 3rd. raid.
ent up on fo' tle and abandoned ship.

78
Page 4.
10.A.B. hitmore and Merryweather lut canvas cover over top and smashed Hels on top, Transmission panel and power supply, enstated with jottisoning torpodoes. unashed table after firing terporios, and depth charges.
Torpolors Galia gave onler to Grash table.
Madala Rogers.
In for 1st. attack. Starped there mt11 finished firing 11.70
In between attacks jettisoning heavy gear accomodation Inddors and everthing heavy TO could got hold of. Potwern was working 1th Donts alongetile sun-lying geen ml dropping bonts estern and heisting out inrloy floats.
12. Street.
1st. attack at the shoe) earrying out help and teletoph orders. tayed up there untill no further use navigationally Inched wheel hard a Fort.
ent round eas deck, everything in darkness down there for 2nd. attack. Cook over supply party from
L/S. and supplied Delaire to guns and FormDom ammition
Helped to put 1.B. Riddle in Feil Robertson and saw 1st. Meut. about putting him in R.B. and R.Davies
Tont aft to obey pipe 13. Volunteero to street from aft lay net in
Cleared tiller flat: l'aveton, Frost )took cover for final attack and theirabandened ship L/S helan exceptionally good with anyly parties. No lights all done with torches.
token Harcer worked very wall with supply parties
A.B. passed up amitition from shall POOR.

79
Ing N. into the lots
Jilisk,
1. Lieut. E. Troweeks.
When we were bombed I was taking cover in after lobby, then proceeded to E.R. hatch but could not get below because of steam, was joined by C. Sto. Ricketts and C.E.R.A.,
Testlake, gave orders to shut off all boiler room emergency valves and then safety valves and shut main steam bulkhead valve on deck. As soon as possible E. Room and after boiler room were entered.
Attention first given to casualties but all bar one were dead.
First thought possible to get some part of machinory going but not possible. Concentrated on leaks. Bomb dropped port fore side wells bulkhend and stove in boiler room bulkhead.
Disabling port fan, engine, oil full pump, number three boiler, port circulator, main and reserve foed tanks and all pipes and leads adjacent were pierced and broken.
Leak at after end of 3.R. oil fule tank plugged.
Efforts made to run petrol dynamo for W/T but the magneto connection broke, Hands were told off to get hand steering in use. P.O. of fore boiler room reported no damage after first raid although C. Sto. reported oil suction line pierced and shut off.
2. Sub. Lieut. Jeaves.
During the first attack I was on the bridge as
Officer of the Watch and remained there for some time afterwards while the Captain went off to the engine and boiler rooms.
On the Captain's orders I went aft to the after steering compartment to see whether it was possible to steer by hand.
This was 30, and leaving a Leading Stoker and two or three hands I returned to the bridge as the ship was being taken in tow.
When the second attack took place I was in the fore and aft passage below the wheelhouse for some time and eventually went into the Petty Officers' Mess to try and assist the foremost supply party.
After the attack, on the First Lieutenant's orders,
I placed charts in the whaler and a small private motor boat and unshipped the steering compass from the wheelhouse, and put it in the whaler. I then went aft to continue connecting up to steer by hand. To do this it was necessary to clear a good deal of gear out of the compartment. This took about half an hour. By this time another attempt was being made to take the ship in tow, so I recovered the charts from the motor boat, and went up on the bridge.
When the ship was attacked for the third time I again went down to the fore and aft passage beneath the wheelhouse, where 1 stayed till the order abandon ship was given. Of the two charts containing confidential matter concerning minefields in the Dover area, one was destroyed and the other left in the whaler which has not yet returned.
The Fleet notices to Marines were thrown overboard in mid-channel. Fleet charts were left in their folios in the
Charthouse.

76
80
Sub-Lieutenant Ellis.
3. Went on bridge at 0815 to relieve D.O.W., but was ordered to clear the bridge during attack. Stayed in Wheelhouse during first dive bombing attack. Went on bridge oafterward and was given orders to destroy certain S.P's.
Burnt S.P. 02176 (convoy reciphering table), all SP's
'C' series and recognition forms from safe in chart house.
Went down to W/T office and got current recording and recyphering tables from P.O. Tel. and burnt them in forward galley. Gave orders to rig jury aerial and endeavoured to establish commmunication.
Went aft and inspected for'd cabin flat. Badly damaged by "B" bomb, so secured the batch. Opened hatch to
Captain's Day cabin and got next lot of recognitions S.P's (D)
series and addendum No. I to Anglo-French code. Burnt them in forward galley. Gave-orders for all S.P's to be taken to forward galley, (W/T & V/S department). Cleared remainder of books from safe in Chart house and took them to after galley.
Burnt Naval Cypher and Decypher and Table of Masthead heights,
Air Defence instructions, Table of Lettered Co-ordinates.
Threw Indicator Discs over the side over as wide area.
Collected all notes in contingent account from safe in Captaini cabin.
Went to forward galley, and commenced burning all the
S.P's. Took cover by forward galley during second attack.
Continued burning all S.P's after second attack.
When all these had been burnt, took a weighted sack aft and opened up hatch to Captain's Day cabin.
Took out all C.B's, prefixed 0 and as many more besides as could be carried. Filled the sack by the after screen and started to take it forward to galley to burn if possible.
During third attack was by foremost funnel starboard side.
After this was over collected all C.B's which had been got up and put them in weighted bag and threw overboard starboard side. Order abandon ship had been given so went over and took charge of carley float. Collected as many hands from the water as the float could support and paddled to the Tolie
Mascotte about È mile from the ship.
All safes were locked after books were taken from them and keys thrown overboard in the middle of the Dover Straits.
The VC-VF lanterns were got down and thrown overboard.
Following is at list of books destroyed:-
All SP's ordered to be carried by ships operating off Dutch and
Belgian coasts (except P.S.B. which is thought to have been burnt when bridge caught fire.
'D' Series Recognition S.P's.
Anglo French Code and Decode (and Addendum N.1).
Anglo-French War W/T call Signs.
Operating Signals (bridge copy).
Pendant list & Signal letters.
Cypher log and some 'S' series.
Home Fleet War Communication orders.
C.B's - Those previously mentioned.
Certain CB's were out on loan to A/S Control Officer and these were locked away in his cabin, they included:-
Handbook of the set.
Operating procedure for surface craft.
A/S manual.

17
Page 3.
81
Lieut, Cdr, W.G. Boaks.
4.
With after guns until motor boat lowered and then went forward to make quite sure coxswain of boat (Hicks) understood his orders reference embarking troops and collection of drifting boats, Just as we got the beat clear I heard a bomb whistling down and dived under Pom-Pom platform. About six, possibly more, bombs dropped, one of which was presumably the one that went through the engine room - this very seriously wounded and burnt one rating and seriously burnt another but I escaped the full force of the back flash although thrown heavily against Pom-Fom deck overhead and almost knocked out.
I then went to the bridge to see what the position was there, but there were no casualties there and 1 then went aft to the after guns to find en route that deck was buckled by mainmast.
The after magazine and shell room were flooding and decided to close down. I then went down to my cabin and passed up about eight spare torches (placed there for use in disembarking troops previous day - night) as all lights were out and being daylight few were carrying torches on them. 1 found general chaos in Captain's Cabin flat and sent extra hands down to resecure deadlights as this compartment being next to the buckled part was rather important.
I then went forward to supervise tow forward. In the midst of this another heavy attack was made and most hands took shelter, some in forecastle locker. I then found all but three of the cordite rounds from "A" gun had been jettisoned and in view of the nature of the attack ordered these three to be thrown overboard. After this attack we came out and then started to provide cordite again. I then went aft to see what damage bad been done during which the fishing drifter returned and I again went forward to rig дем tow lines and also ordered individual hands to turn out and lower boats and carley floats into water as by then it was known ship could not move and drifter could not have towed faster than say four knots. I also placed one hand with a lead line aft to keep check on amount of water ship was in from point of view of grounding and stationed hands ready to cast off boats' painters should ship sink without warning.
Then to the forecastle to get up the after hemp and also 3/2" wire during course of which the third attack developed and I went aft to the after guns and with one round of cordite from forward fired the remaining round in Y gun myself at a passing bomber but not enough aim off in field of view to hit even with full deflection. After firing this round I went forward and noticed that X gun had a round left but was unable to fire as recoil cylinder had been emptied in preparation for firing and tearing gun out of mounting overboard. This cylinder was refilled but on going forward I discovered that the crack in deck appeared to have widened and gave orders that after guns were on no account to be fired in view of probable breaking off of after end. I then ordered every possible container of water to be filled from only remaining water left in hot water tank in galley and tore up soldiers ground capes to provide covers to prevent loss or contamination of this water. Boats' anchors were then placed in spare boats alongside and ears provided, sailing gear placed in whaler, after steering compase unshipped and placed in spare motor boat, torches distributed to boats, the after lifebuoy flare placed in whaler for possible use. After steering party detailed and party to clear the flat of weeckage. I then went forward for third time to take in tow during which the fourth attack developed - dive bombing - and upper deck was cleared.

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4. (contd.).
On completion when ship had been struck and water was level with waist the question of scuttling ship came up but
Captain decided this was unnecessary and order was given to abandon ship. I reached one of the spare Army boats two hundred yeard away and after collecting survivors to limit of boats capacity went to drifter. After collecting all but two floats we went off to head off & destroyer for the remainder.
Particular merit:-
A.B. Rawstron - courage, example & cheerfulness.
A.Bis Glover and Ord. Sea Mullins - courage de cheerfulness.
P.O. Robinson took charge well on forecastle.
A.B. Davis. Torp. although badly burned took a lively interest in remaining action taken.
Lieut. Sowry AC for tenacity of purpose with French drifter resulting in the recovery of seventy survivors and message passed to destroyer for remaining fifty.
5.
Surg. Lieut. A.M. McHaffie.
1st. Attack. In Sick Bay 16 which was reduced to chaos from concussions. Casualties arrived after attack.
Soldier complaining of burns of arms.
Stocker complaining of burns of face.
2xStwaker Terpedoman complaining of extensive surface burns of face, scalp, neck and both eyes.
Another rating complained of splinter wound of left arm.
L.S.B.A. reported A.B. Riddle lying under Pon-Pom platform. When
I arráved there I found him complaining of fracture of left feaur and very extensive burns of face and shoulders - Dressed him and then went down into engine room where I saw two BRA's dead.
Griffeths& Grifftchs& Putt (stoker) was also dead.
L.S.B.A. reported four dead in boiler room.
2nd. attack. Ordered to clear upper deck - and I went to port side alley way. Saw Mr. Francis of Pom-Pom platform and one rating. He called for rest of crew and I passed on call to ratings in fore meas deck. No hands came forward. Saw Captain climbing on to platform followed by rest of crew. Was called by
Captain to attend to Mr. Francis and I went on to Pom-Pom platform and found Mr. Francis unconscious - splinter through lungs. Gave
1/6th. morphine.
3rd. attack. Was still on Pom-Pom platform until shortly after attack when Mr. Prancis died.
During interval between 3rd. and 4th. attacks.
Evacuated wounded into water boat lying in water amidships on starboard side. Was helped in this by L.S.B.A and Coxswain.
Orders to do so were given by First Lieutenant.
4th. attack. Most of herew of motor, boat boarded ship including all
Robertson stretcher a no on forecastle of motor boat - two ratings wounded except A.B. Riddle who was comatose and lying in remained in boat.
Bomb hit water 10 yards off motor boat and wave upset and smashed boat against ship's side upsetting all within - Riddle disappeared before I could get to him and I lost sight of other members of boat's crew.
Ship by this time WELLS being abandoned.

page 5.
83
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
ship 6. was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though it, ordering & torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off during attack. Complete Jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S fannel. Tas ordered by 1st. Lieut. to load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned, threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
bridge 7. on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F - load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60° and at no time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were passing 12 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. A wire was passed and made fast round a stout bean in the smack, which carried away some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongside the forecastle bowe pointing aft. At this point second bombing attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile, the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to taking up the slack too vaolently. This was due to the language difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the only other man on board the smack being an R.A.P. pilot. A
further bombing attack started, the final one, and I again stood off from the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship and I picked up all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and some men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men aboard, Whitehall appeared in the distance and we made out to intercept her, using the smack's airen and the French ensign half way up the foremast. We met her about 12 miles away and passed information to her and requested her to collect men from remaining boats. I then set out on a course for England and in mid-chainel we transferred everyone to H.M. Trawler Olvina.

so
84
Page 6.
Leading Seaman Wohdhouse.
Motor hoat.
Whilst pushing the towing vessel into position, the bombing formation came over. I let go and sheered off, the first salvo lifting the boat almost out of the water.
Messerschmidt fighters attacked us with machine gun and cannon (Bombs were also dropped) for just a few minutes short of an hour. L.S. Hicks watched their flight and gave me helm and engine orders, the boat not being hit though a couple of cartridge cases dropped into us. We found ourselves out of sight of the ship, had a little council of war, and decided, knowing the ship was out of wireless communication to make Dunkirk for help. We headed west, and not far outside the harbour two troopships were bombed and sunk. We picked up what we considered a safe complement, tried to get in touch with a vessel to assist Basilisk.
In t.is were not successful and were told to make England.
We drew a rough chart and set our course, arraving
Ramsgate roughly eight hours later. I then turned over the boat to the Naval authorities. We reported that Basilisk was badly hit and were assured that help had been sent.

13
85
APPENDIX II.
H.M.S. S. "BASILISK" - CASUALTIES.
ANCIS, B.G.
Gumer (T).
IFFITH, John B.
C.E.R.A.II. Pens. No.13060.
IFFITHS, Edward.
СЕРАП, D/MX.47570.
WRY, Harry P.
S.P.O., D/K.60918.
HONEY, Herbert J.
S.P.O., Pens. No.22271.
ANION, Thomas
Stolexe In R.F.R.B.12894.
TTT, Richard F.
Stoker I., D/KX.89644.
DUTE, Frederick W.
AoBo, ReF.R.D.801.
ORMALD, Stephen
Stoker I, R.P.R.B.12968.

82
86
SURVIVORS OF H.M.S. "BASILISK",
BAKER, Walter T.W.
Ldg. Stoker Pens. R.F.R.
NOON, Robert
Stoker.
WESTLAKE, S.A.T.
Pens. C.B.R.A.
KAYE, Fredk. Lecnard
Ldg. Stcker R.F.R.
WILLCOCKS, Edward Stuart
Chief Amourer.
HOUGHTON, Lecnard
Sto. R.F.R.
GREEN, Albert G.
Sto. R.F.R.
CUNINGHAM, Joseph H.
Pen. P.O. Stoker.
RICHARD, Frederdok H.
Ldg. Std.
KINGSTON, Thomas J.
Stoker In
ROWLES, Francis S.
Lag. Sto.
COVELL, D.C.
E.R.A.2.
RISHARDSON, Joseph
B.R.A.5.
BLIGHT, Lealic Roy
B.A.S.
COULTON, Arnold
B.R.A.S.
HAWKER, Walter
Stoker.
SMALL, St ephan
Stcker I.
NICHOLLS, Reginald Willo
Statem I.
HARRIS, Alfred
Stoker I.
CLAUGHTON, Harry
Statem I.
SMALES, Ronald
Stoker
FOLEY, Alfred
Sy.P.O.
HODSDON
A.B.
Resert
Liga C (0).
JONES, Summel
L.S.B.A.
CARR, Fredk J.
Ldg. Stoker.
RICKETTS, John C.
Ch. Stcker.
EVANS, Thomas
P.O. Std.
ELLIS, Cacage
Ldg. Stoker.
PEARN, Kenneth C.
L.S.A.
TRELOAR, Hosto
Stoker I.
GOULD, Norman
Ocok.
LLOYD, James Jo
States I.
STYLES, Charles W.
S.P.O.
HOLDER, William G.H.
P.O. Clc.
DANE, Alan
Std.
INDIES, Jade
Stoker I.
SKONE, Leslte J.
Stoker I.
ARSTALL, Caorge R.
BaRada
HOBSON, Tem O₂
Stoker.
MERCER, Alfred
Stokler.
CRIPFITHS, Wello Charles
Stemard
BOMKER, Francis S.D.
Sto. P.O.
ROGERS, Stanley
P.O.
BRADLEY, W.B.G.
P.O.
STRAD, John A.
AaB., R.F.R.
PEELEY, S.
A.B.
PAIRFOUL, S.
A.B.
CORK, J.
A.D., R.F.R.
ATKINSON, God.
A.B.
WILSON, Win. H.
Sea. R.N.R.
BLIES, John
A.B.
THOMAS, Lealis
A.B., R.NaR.
TOMLINSON, Edward
Sea., R.N.R.
Phillips, Edward
Sea., R.N.R.
BRENTON, Sydney c.
Yes.
HUCHES, Edward J.
A.B.
WHREAN, John
Ldg. Sea.
PERGUSON, Jumes
A.D.
PAIRBAIRN, Paul
A.B.
CROCKER, Ronald J.
Sig.
PAYNE, Gilbert P.
Ord. Sea., R.N.V.R.
A.B.
DARK, Wm.

83
87
PAGE 2.
SURVIVORS OF H.M.S. "BASILISK".
PEARSE, Arthur D.
A.B.
SPARROW, Charles A.
A.B.
ROBINSOW, William E.
P.O.
JOHNS, William H.
A.B., Pens.
SHITH, Harold
A.B.
BROOKES, Ben
A.B.
BEERY, D.
A.B.
HARRIS, Douglas P.
A.D.
WILKINS, Joseph Do
A.B., R.F.R.
SMITH, Kennoth E.
Tal.
ROCERS, William J.
N/We Sig.
INSURED, Wilfred B.
Ldg. Sign
EATON, Richard
A.B.
JOHES, Clifford
A.B.
ERSKINE, Summel
A/P.O.
WALTERS, C.
A.B.
PATIENCE, John
A.B.
SMITH, Marida
Ord. Sea. R.H.V.R.
smos, C.H.
4.2, R.P.R.
COVINGTON, Henry
P.O. Tal.
CAST, Robert X.
P.O.
THBLIN, Charles
4.2.
PERRETT, Vivian As
Code Sea. P.N.V.R.
ROBINSON, V.P.
Sea. R.N.R.
NEISON, David
A.B.
COLIMAN
A.B.
NICHOLAS, James
Seeman, R.H.R.
MICHAN, Renald R.
Card Sea. R.N.Y.R.
DESTRY R.P.
Idg. Sea.
JEFFERY, Stephen R.
A.B.
EVANS, George S.
A.B.
WILLIAMS, Thomas Jake
A.B., R.P.R.
ASHICRATH, Sidney
Stige R.P.R.
BRADLEY, Jenah
A.B. R.F.R.
RAWSTRON, Homoe
A.B.
HAYWARD, Jos.H.
A.B., RePuRe
DESTITT, Spender If.
A.B., R.P.R.
WHITMORE, Charles H.
A.B., R.P.R.
GLOVER, James I.
A.D.
ROWE, Leceard
Orde Sec., R.N.V.R.
DOND, Alfred 9.
And
MERRYWEATHER, George P.
A.D.
0'CONNOR, Harry
Crd. Sea. R.M.V.R.
RELSHAW, Ement
4.3., R.F.R.
WARD, H.
Sea., R.N.R.
BINNER, Sydney V.
A/P.O. Tel.
TRUEY, Walter
Ldg. Tel. R.F.R.
MANSTON, Arthur 2.
A.B., R.P.R.
DAVIES, Thomas B.
AaBo, R.P.R.
HAHCOCK, Themas H.Ao
Orde Sca., R.N.V.R.
STREET, Thomas G.
C.P.O. Pens.
HICKS
Ldg. Sea.
PAPERRENT
Ldg. Sea.
WOODHOUSE
Ldg. Sea.
BRATTHWAYE
Stoker.
DOYLE
Sen. R.N.R.
WILLIS
д.В.
ALDERSON
A.B.
WOOD
Laiga Sea.
TRYDAIS
A.B.
MIRIFORD
A.B.
FROST
A.B.

--- 84
88
PAGE 3.
SURVIVORS 07 H.M.S. "BASILISK".
WAILIS
Telegraphist.
PITTARD
Ord. Sea.
OWEN, C.
A.B. (Landed at Dover).
SMART
Ldg. Stc. (In hospital at Dover).
DAS, J.
A.B. (In hospital at Dever).
ADAMS, T.
Card Sea. (In hospital at Dever).
Commander No Richmond,
It. Cir. T.G. Boaks.
Lt. (E) Transaks.
Lite J.M. Somy, R.N.V.R.
Sub. Lit. P.D. de B. Jeayes.
Sub. Lt. W.H. Kilis.
Sub. Lite Galbraith.
Surg. It. MoRaffie, R.N.V.R.
Midnhipman Io Melivoy, R.N.R.

89
H.I.S. "BASILISK" - REPORT 07 LOSS BY STREETY ACTION.
APPRIDIX III - SPECIAL LEITIONS.
Sr. E.G. FRANCIS, Gunner (T) Retired.
This Officer was killed in action while controlling the pom pom guns during the second attack. He had particularly interested himself in the training and fighting of these guns and displayed great zeal in maintaining their efficiency.
During the whole of his service in H.I.S. "BASILISK" Hr Francis showed quite exceptional ability and cheerfulness and contributed in no small measure to the fighting efficiency of the ship.
He died at the special post of danger which he had himself selected while controlling and encouraging his guns'crews, and it was largely due to his efforts that the second attack was made abortive. I consider him worthy of high recognition for the greatest coolness, courage and tenacity of purpose under a rain of bombs and machine gun fire.
Chief E.R.A. Edward GRIFFITHS, O.N. MX47570.
I vish to place on record 8 very special tribute to the late Chief S.R.A. Griffiths, apart from the fact that he died at his post, for his general bearing and conduct since the beginning of hostilities. He not only worked hard but always intelligently and was a really gifted Destroyer Chief S.R.A.
I have already had occasion to mention this rating in despatches in March 1940.
Lieutenant-Commander V.G. BOAKS, R.H.
As first Lieutenant of the ship, this Officer set at fine example of leadership and cheerful courage in cost adverse circumstances. A bomb from the first attack burst near hin singsing his hair and eyebrows, but he carried on with his duties without a thought for himself. He concentrated on making the ship as watertight as possible by stopping up leaks and placing collision nat, and in this he succeeded admirably. Later he provisioned and equipped the extra boats lying off and was largely responsible for enabling every man alive to get away safely when the ship sank. He also visited run quarters and supply parties during action and kept them going.
During nine months of arduous sea-going, Lieutenant-
Commander Boaks has been a great stand-by to me and I consider this final example of his worth is a suitable moment for some form of commendation.
Able Seamen Richard MUNFORD, J.97179 and Herbert A. ALDERSON, J.100085.
Able Seaman Alderson was gunlayer and Able Seaman Liumford was the trainer at B gun where I apent most of my time after the engines became useless. From my personal observation their coolness and bearing were marvellous. Able Seaman liumford particularly, kept & smiling face and cheerful conversation which was most heartening to all. They fought their gun to the last although they knew the task was hopeless.
Able Seeman

86
Dynam 93.
90
SECTION
,VCD
and Juno 1940.
Sir,
BASILISK
I regret to have to report the loss of by enemy action at 1033 Lst June 1940 off the Bolgion coast. The circumstances are as follows.
at about 0315 while enbarking British troors off
I TRUE attacked by B squadron of nine German JUNKINS
dive bombers. They approached from estern and on sighting 1 vent full speed ahout 13 boilors connected, and as the bombu were roleased turned hard to port. as far as I could judge each aircraft released a pattern of five bombs one being & large "B" type and four smaller bombs with elight dolay action. one of the latter oxyloded at the ufter ond of 10.00 boilor room on the port side and storess blow away the bulkhoad pioroing both nain and auxiliary steam linos and main oil fuol supply. all engine room and boilor room personnel were killet. about six of the B type bonds then exploded underneath the ship flooding the after magazine and shell room and probably the Fland compartments and storo rooms just forward of this position. who upper lock and sideo of the ship cracked right coross in the vioinity of the minnest. This is is general line of contract in dostroyers.
In order to precerve stability the torpedoes and le charges jottluonod und the ohi floated confortably with little incroase in draught. I invested ongine room and No.3
boilor room and found that a mall amount of nuter was making its way through shraphol holos. These were plussed and colligion net placed over the morst looks. It WAS found incosible to got stean to the engines und the unin thoroafter remined imobile.
1.
fforts were now made to send out medicares for undistance. A tug who had been attending on Hamada "K"ITH" passed no a signal tolling DD to sink to which I roplied that I
was out of action and required imediate assistance. I also requested him to inform The YIng -fficer Commanding, Pover to this effoct. Suc then dion geared. Signals for assistance were also nido by using type 6 4 with battory power. it 18
Coubtful whether any of these sessuges nore received owing to very heavy truffic at the time and comparative noukness of by cignals.
8.
Solcion flohing smok under French colours was seen in the distance and the notor boat TRAD desrutched to suston hor to our addistance. she WALL is JUNIA of CAN and after
JOLIO offorto a tow WHO pussed and corse set to open from the coast.
This he hardly been accomplished before & second attack devolloyped ut about 0945. This consisted if lovel bumbing from about 6, 10000.
sach bomber acting independently. about hulf a squalron of 18
curried out the uttuck. Considering the ship was 8 stationary turget and there was little wind these attacks were poorly curried C
out and no bumbu hit. This say have been due to pon pom firo if which vunner in Best in charge. Unfortunately this
Callant officer WBS killed at his post by machino cun bullets which
LOTO fired continuously 40 the bombers passed overhead.

87
91
SECE
P6CO
6.
second attempt TRU now carlo to tow the ship clear but little progress had been made before & third attach developped at about noon,carrisi out by S squairon of MICHI
live bonbers. By this time nourly all scrumition TRIS expenied and the 4.7 gans were firing in the hope of Leopin; the enemy at B intunce. the German, honever, & determined diving attack which was well prosued home to about 400 feet.
The ship TRAG completely scotherol By hits and near nisses S000
of which were of the 3 boob type. The ship impediately bogan to settle and I gave the order to abanton ship. Thanks to the aloquato preparations code by if First Lieutonant, Licutenant-
Communier there 1800 plenty of boats and carley floats realy for survivors. fter collecting all strey swimers the boats and floats pullod out to sou. LES JONES
pickod up C officers an: 71 ratings and SHIP HALL" 2
officers and BC ratings. One shalor and the motor boat had processed to: for over the should which run parallel to the count for to piot: them up.
7.
not in about 4 fathers of mator in sperazizate with hor upsor look smosh. the Notto and V.C.-V.P.
coar and all important documento had been I =
anxious to complete the destruction of the vessel. accordingly
I the Captain of to fire guns and torpeloss. This wes done and the ship TOJ left on fire formari.
It is not certain whether any of the torredoeu hit and I
consider further destruction advisable. 1 intimated this in a airmal time 10 6, to the 110g Community: over doupatchol 30 a secret hert coorago.
8.
-hen the chip - 1-obile after the first attack 1 ordere_ the dectruction of all signal
Publications except the flect signal Dook bridge COST2-20
mohine and current naval iyko card. This was Lono by STID-
Lieutenant who burnt then in the two galloys.
All Confidential Books prefixod for more dumped overbourd in a weighted snok except those out on loan to officers SD these could not be COD at due to damage aft. The sale gour in the cabinet end on the bridge was dispential where possible and thrown overbour. and the remainder smoked. The oscillator T80
removed and brought on the uppor dook anidshipu as the final attack developped. It is not known for certain whether the oscillator alid overboard when the this san. lenterns were unshippod and thrown overboard.
D.
The following books and documento were left on the bridgo: C.D. 2010 WE and cortain charge locuments in the
Coptain's springback and the Most Signal Book. The bridge TRAD
burning fiercely when last seen and it can be confidently stated that these locumento and purara more lectroyed.
10.
I mould 11kc to englusise that the older
Soutroyers with DOC 2023 using belted amunition and 4.7° Dana with only 30 degrees elovation are no match for a determinel air attuck. our Lawis guna had also been recently surrenCored.
when shipo of this type are operating within range of enecy air attack logues must be expected unless alequate fighter protoction is afforiat. In all the enemy launched four big win attache at about hourly intervals during the forenoon of the 1st June. The first, secon: and fourth of these were unoppeced apparently unopposed by any British Aircraft

88
92
SECRET.
lace 3.
apparently unopposed by any British iroraft. On the third
000usion un intenso air buttle could be heard in progress above the clouds and no effective bombing took place. I would also like to state that from my observation the onery aircraft even when opposed word always more miserous than our own and in the cubsequent air buttles our fighters although outnumbered fought most courageously and effectively but concrully lost moro planes than the enomy. From our point of view the B.B.C.
Aillotins secoribing the air sotions off unkir: entirely microprosent the truo situation.
11.
The courage end Deheviour of I? officers and non The a great inspiration to 8 Curing the four hours while the ship drifted without help under the threat of destruction.
Their checrfulness and efficionay under these trying conditions
W&O cxtruordinary. That GO for were lost TREE alcost miraculous but IV DO put domn to SOZO extent to the trained courage of the ship's COMPANY who fought their gans mhore possible and took cover when they could not otherwise Do 02 uso. It is cost difficult shore all conductod themolves valiantly to choose those specially conspicuous for their behaviour, but these I
appond of lict of those specially worthy of contion.
12.
The Collowing promitions are attached:-
spronliz I:-
Verbutim statement by various officors and ratings appondix In:-
List of known survivoru and known killed.
pronlix 111.
Lict of officers and men specially mentioned.
prondix IV:- Copy of prolicinary report sent to the 145
Officer Communin -ovor.
1 have the honour to DO,
4r, your obsident servent,
(Nd.)
The Commander in Chief,
Commander, ostorn peronches.
Royal Savy.
Copios to:- The 20g Officer Commenting, over.
Co tuin 19th outrayer Notilla.
Captain (-), flymouth.
COMMA DER-18-CHERS
3- JUN 1940
WESTERN APPROACHES
VICE ADNIRAL
JUN 1940
.
DOVER

89
93
2nd June. 1940.
APPENDIX I.
Inquiry into the loss of H.M.S. Basilisk.
1. P.O. Tel Covington
Syko Machine and operating signals left in office.
All W/T books burnt including Syko cards burnt except Naval Syko 1st June.'T sets not wrecked.
Several BR's burnt.
Communications.
Immediately after lights failed, connected up
4H to 51 ariel from Whalers davits to masthead.
Endeavoured to get into communication with Dover forces and W/T-Set appeared to be working efficiently.
Appeared to be to much traffic in air my signals jammed.
Very Good reception. Found by still remaining of main aeriel; discomected it from all other legs and then ran lead from aeriel connection inside office to the 4H.
Nature sat and again tried to get Dover forces and
Dover W/T. Reception throughout good until time of abandoning shin. Finding nower to 4H not sufficier^
connected up 100 7. receiving battery in series making
220V but gunfire from ship kept loosening contacts.
Signals appeared to be going out alright.
First message sent out in Tyko 19 Have been hit"
broadcasting at regular intervals.
2nd. attack made "Help Bray" several times.
Last signal made "Send tuge require immediate assistance officer " ( in Nyko ). Possible non reception was probable due to loss of powerin lead and jamming due to heavy traffic ( Dover 1/2eg Trawlers on 2/1 and ships in vicinity all broadcanting 1.
Had it been possible to get 51 working could have got signal through. Heavy funes in office after 3rd. bombing could not get at Syke machine and operating signals.
2. C.E.R.A. Vestlake.
Vent into Engine Room an soon as steam had cleared, opened all boiler Safety Valves. Found both
C.E.R.A's Griffiths and Sto. Futt in front of the throttle killed. Platform generally wrecked, particularly Port side, Bulkhead to after MR. blown away ( from B.R. into S.R.:. Main and luxillary Steam lines pierced ( Port side ) Shut off Bulkhead Valves.
Plugged water pouring in through rivet holes. Shut off remainder of Auxillary Bea Cocks, 1.0. stopped all leaks.
3. Cheif Stoker Ricketts.
Forward supply party. Vent down after B.R.
after steam cleared.
Found oil pump of part after fan and steam pipes port side blown away.
Found 1 Stoker hanging on ladder (Sto. Manion )
1 P.O.in bilges
(Sto. P.O. Lowry)
2 in front of boilers, All killed
( P.O. Mahonay & Sto,Wormold)

,90
94
Page 2.
(Cheif Sto. Ricketts continued )
After boiler Port side completely wrecked.
Shut off oil supply coming out of main line, shut off after strainer; main oil line carried away.
All emergency valves shut off and S.V's opened.
4. P.O. Cast.
All lights in ship out after 1st. Salvo.
went down to L.P. room to make sure battery was still on. Tent aft and found dynamos out of action. Sent hand to switch in Oldham lamms previously placed tall in place and all worked)
Joined up with party under Gumer(1) and jettisoned torpedoes and denth charges (Torpedoes fired with air levers forward )
Scuttling charges placed on foremost end of
E.R. bulkhead Starboard side against ships side under
Water Level, consisted of 11 1b T.N.P. 2 primers and
2 detonators, Bickford fuse.These were not fired in the end.
5.P.O. Robinson.
Q.Where were you stationed during 1st air attack?
A.With "A" gun.
A.Then you called for volunteers (after Capt. went)
Q.When did you go to Pom-Pom?
Gelhat was ultimate reason why Port-Pom would not fire?
A.Crdinary cartridge Jam which took mins. to clear,
Q.D10 you remain at Pom-Pome after I left?
A.No I went up to "A" gunn.
Q.Who stayed behind.
A.L/Sea. Peperell
6. Yeo. Sunkin.
All S.P's put in weighted bag and given to
All Signal loga left on bridge ( Including A, AZ,02,
P.S.B. left on bridge on orders of Captain.
S.C. for destruction.
V.O. etc. V.F. lanterns taken down and thrown overboard.
all in whrelhouse )
Selector boxes left intact.
Communications:- Called AMA-P in direction of tug and Salamander her when facing towards Basiliak but did not called
(a) realized it was Salamander called with answer. pendants
Called and made "Go and destroy Keith" Beailisk
She was for about 20 mins. with Aldia. Iug
Basilisk "g" and made JAA-P. Tug still made Baailisk, AAA Basilisk 80
made made Could see he would not read decided to read and his sink message Keith by:- gunfire by firing standing at
" Proceed Lovel and destroy Andic cabinet D.19, you."
by Water to watch you sink her.Sorry to trouble
Made following signal.
Bas. I am out of action.
Tug. Sink her with torpedoes.
Bas. 1 have jettisoned torpedoes.
Tug. Bas. Sink have her no by dopth depth charges, charges. I am and out tug. of action, require I immediate assistance
Tug,gave "R"

92
96
Page 4.
.A.D. hitmore and Merryucather but cenvas cover over top and snashed Stals
OF top, Transmission panel and power supply, sendated with jotticoning torpoûces. Unanlied table after firing
Perpoiloes, and dopth charges.
Perpedors Online gave order to grash table.
Rogers.
In 2.3. for 1st. attack. Stanped there until finished
Aring 11.70
In between attacks jettisoning heavy gear recedation ledders and everthing heavy 76 could not hold of. Datworn attacks TOB working with boats longaido supplying gear and dropping honts estern and
Stating out inview Moats.
P. C.P.O. Street.
1st. attack nt the wheel carrying out hele and teletaph orders. tayed no there untill no further se navigationally Inched wheel hard a Cort.
ent round eas deals, everything in durkness own there for 2nd. attack. Took over supply party from supplied to gune and Pan-Dom munition
Telped to put 1.B. Riddle in Feil Robertoon and aw 1st. Lieut. about putting him in N.B. and A.R. Davies ent aft to obey pipe " Volunteers to steep from aft ay nft "
Cleared tiller flat ( "awaton, Front )took cover or final attack and thenabandoned ship L/S helan xceptionally, good with anyly parties. No lights all
Jone with torches.
toker Mercer worked very well with supply parties
.B. W.Jones passed up BET unition from shell room.

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1. Lieut. E. Treweeks.
When we were bombed I was taking cover in after lobby, then proceeded to E.R. hatch but could not get below because of steam, was joined by C. Sto. Ricketts and C.E.R.A.,
Westlake, gave orders to shut off all boiler room emergency valves and then safety valves and shat main steam bulkhead valve on deck. As soon as possible 3. Room and after boiler room were entered.
Attention first given to casualties but all bar one were dead.
First thought possible to get some part of machinery going but not possible. Concentrated on leaks. Bomb dropped port foro side G.R. bulkhead and stove in boiler room bulkhend.
Disabling port fan, engine, oil full pump, number three boilor, part circulator, main and reserve food tanks and all pipes and leads adjacent were pierced and broken.
Leak at after end of B.R. oil fulls tank plugged.
Efforts made to run petrol dynamo for W/I but the magneto connection broke. Hands were told off to get hand steering in use. P.O. of fore boiler room reported no damage after first raid although Ch. Sto. reported oil suction line pierced and shut off.
2. Sub. Lieut. Jeaves.
During the first attack I was on the bridge as
Officer of the Watch and remained there for some time afterwards while the Captain sent off to the engine and boiler rooms.
On the Captain's orders I went aft to the after steering compartment to see whether it was possible to steer by hand.
This was 30, and leaving a Leading Stoker and two or three hands I returned to the bridge as the ship was being taken in tow.
When the second attack took place I was in the foro and aft passage below the wheelhouse for some time and eventually went into the Petty Officers' Meas to try and assist the foremost supply party.
After the attack, on the First Lieutenant's orders,
I placed charts in the whaler and a small private motor boat and unshipped the steering compase from the wheelhouse, and put it in the whaler. I then went aft to continue connecting up to steer by hand. To do this it was necessary to clear a good deal of gear out of the compartment. This took about half an hour. By this time another attempt was being made to take the ship in tow, so I recovered the charts from the motor boat, and went up on the bridge.
When the ship was attacked for the third time I again went down to the fore and aft passage beneath the wheelhouse, where I stayed till the order Shandon ship was given. or the two charts containing confidential matter concerning minefields in the Dover area, one was destroyed and the other left in the whaler which has not yet returned.
The Fleat notices to Marines were thrown overboard in mid-channel. Fleet charts were left in their folios in the
Charthouse.

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98
Sub-Lieutenant Ellis.
3. Went on bridge at 0815 to relieve 0.0.W., but was ordered to clear the bridge during attack. Stayed in Wheelhouse during first dive bombing attack. Went on bridge cafterward and was given orders to destroy certain S.P's.
Burnt S.P. 02176 (convoy reciphering table), all SP's
'C' series and recognition forms from safe in chart house.
Went down to W/T office and got current recording and recyphering tables from P.O. Tel. and burnt them in forward galley. Gave orders to rig jury aerial and endeavoured to establish communication.
Went aft and inspected for'd cabin flat. Badly damaged by "B" bomb, so secured the hatch. Opened batch to
Captain's Day cabin and got next lot of recognitions S.P'S (D)
series and addendum No. I to Anglo-French code. Burnt then in forward galley. Gave orders for all S.P's to be taken to forward galley, (W/T & V/S department). Cleared remainder of books from safe in Chart house and took them to after galley.
Burnt Naval Cypher and Decypher and Table of Masthead heights,
Air Defence instructions, Table of Lettered Co-ordinates.
Threw Indicator Discs over the side over a wide area.
Callected all notes contrigent account from safe in Captain's Cardine
Went to forward galley, and commenced burning all the
S.P's. Took cover by forward galley during second attack.
Continued burning all S.P's after second attack.
When all these had been burnt, took a weighted sack aft and opened up hatch to Captain's Day cabin.
Took out all C.B's, prefixed 0 and as many more besides as could be carried. Filled the sack by the after screen and started to take it forward to galley to burn If possible,
During third attack was by foremost funnel starboard aids.
After this was over collected all C.B's which had been got up and put them in weighted bag and threw overboard starboard side. Order abandon ship had been given so went over and took charge of carley float. Collected as many hands from the water as the float could support and paddled to the Jolie
Mascotte about 2 mile from the ship.
All safes were locked after books were taken from them and keys thrown overboard in the middle of the Dover Straits.
The VC-VF lanterns were got down and thrown overboard.
Following is & list of books destroyed:-
All SP's ordered to be carried by ships operating off Dutch and
Belgian coasts (except P.S.B. which is thought to have been burnt when bridge caught fire.
'D' Series Recognition S.P's.
Anglo French Code and Decode (and Addendum N.1).
Anglo-French War W/T call Signs.
Operating Signals (bridge copy).
Pendant list & Signal letters.
Cypher log and some 'S' series.
Home Fleet War Communication orders.
C.B's - Those previously mentioned.
Certain CB's were out on loan to A/S Control Officer and these were locked away in his cabin, they included:-
Handbook of the set.
Operating procedure for surface craft.
A/S manual.