TNA ADM 199 790

95
3.
09
it, Cdr. V.G. Boaks.
With after guns until motor boat lowered and then went ward to make quite sure coxswain of boat (Hicks) understood orders reference embarking troops and collection of drifting is, Just as we got the beat clear I heard & bomb whistling a and dived under Pom-Pom platform. About six, possibly more,
DS dropped, one of which was presumably the one that went ough the engine room - this very seriously wounded and burnt rating and seriously burnt another but I escaped the full
CO of the back flash although thrown heavily against Pom-Pom
: overhead and almost knocked out.
I than went to the bridge to see what the position was
0, but there were no casualties there and I than went aft to after guns to find en route that deck was buckled by mainmast.
The after magazine and shell room were flooding and ided to close down. I then went down to my cabin and passed about eight spare torches (placed there for use in disembarktroops previous day - night) as all lights were out and go daylight few were carrying torches on them. I found eral chaos in Captain's Cabin flat and sent extra hands down resecure deadlights as this compartment being next to the cled part was rather important.
I then went forward to supervise tow forward. In the st of this another heavy attack was made and most hands took
Iter, some in forecastle locker. I then found all but three the cordite rounds from "A" gun had been jettisoned and in
V of the nature of the attack ordered these three to be thrown rboard. After this attack we came out and then started to wide cordite again. I then went aft to see what damage had a done during which the fishing drifter returned and I again c forward to rig now tow lines and also ordered individual is to turn out and lower boats and carley floats into water by then it was known ship could not move and drifter could not a towed faster than say four knota. I also placed one hand a a lead line aft to keep check on amount of water ship was in a point of view of grounding and stationed hands ready to cast boats' painters should ship sink without warning.
Then to the forecastle to get up the after hemp and
D 35th wire during course of which the third attack developed
I went aft to the after guns and with one round of cordite
II forward fired the remaining round in Y gun myself at at sing homber but not enough aim off in field of view to hit a with full deflection. After firing this round I went forward noticed that X gun had a round left but was unable to fire as oil cylinder had been emptied in preparation for firing and ring gun out of mounting overboard. This cylinder was re-
Led but on going forward I discovered that the crack in deck eared to have widened and gave orders that after guns were on account to be fired in view of probable breaking off of after
I then ordered every possible container of water to be
Led from only remaining water left in hot water tank in galley tore up soldiers ground capes to provide covers to prevent
3 or contamination of this water. Boats' anchors were then ced in spare boats alongaide and cars provided, sailing gear bed in whaler, after steering compase unshipped and placed in re motor boat, torches distributed to boats, the after lifeflare placed in whaler for possible use. After steering y detailed and party to clear the flat of weeckage. I then forward for third time to take in tow during which the fourth ok developed - dive bombing - and upper deck was cleared.

95
Page 3.
09
Lieut, Cdr. N.G. Boaks.
4.
With after guns until motor boat lowered and then went forward to make quite sure coxswain of boat (Hicks) understood his orders reference embarking troops and collection of drifting boats, Just as we got the beat clear I heard & bomb whistling down and dived under Pom-Pom platform. About six, possibly more, bombs dropped, one of which was presumably the one that went through the engine room - this very seriously wounded and burnt one rating and seriously burnt another but I escaped the full force of the back flash although thrown heavily against Pom-Pom deek overhead and almost knocked out.
I then went to the bridge to see what the position was there, but there were no casualties there and 1 than went aft to the after guns to find on route that deck was buckled by mainmast.
The after magazine and shell room were flooding and decided to close down. I then went down to my cabin and passed up about eight spare torches (placed there for use in disembarking troops previous day - night) as all lights were out and being daylight fow were carrying torches on them. I found general chaos in Captain's Cabin flat and sent extra hands down to resecure deadlights as this compartment being next to the buckled part was rather important.
I then went forward to supervise tow forward. In the midst of this another heavy attack was made and most hands took shelter, some in forecastle locker. I than found all but three of the cordite rounds from "A" gun had been jettisoned and in view of the nature of the attack ordered these three to be thrown overboard. After this attack ao came out and then started to provide cordite again. I then went aft to see what damage had been done during which the fishing drifter returned and I again went forward to rig now tow Lines and also ordered individual hands to turn out and lower boats and carley floats into water as by then it was known ship could not move and drifter could not have towed faster than say four knots. 1 also placed one hand with a lead line aft to keep check on amount of water ship was in from point of view of grounding and stationed hands ready to cast off boats' painters should ship sink without warning.
Then to the forecastle to get up the after hemp and also 3½ⁿ wire during course of which the third attack developed and I went aft to the after guns and with one round of cordite from forward fired the remaining round in Y gun myself at a passing bomber but not enough aim off in field of view to hit even with full deflection. After firing this round I went forward and noticed that X gun had a round left but was unable to fire as recoil cylinder had been emptied in preparation for firing and tearing gun out of mounting overboard. This cylinder was refilled but on going forward I discovered that the crack in deck appeared to have widened and gave orders that after guns were on no account to be fired in view of probable breaking off of after end. I then ordered every possible container of water to be filled from only remaining water left in hot water tank in galley and tore up soldiers ground capes to provide covers to prevent loss or contamination of this water. Boats' anchors were then placed in spare boats alongside and cars provided, sailing gear placed in whaler, after steering compasa unshipped and placed in spare motor boat, torches distributed to boats, the after lifebuoy flare placed in whaler for possible use. After steering varty detailed and party to clear the flat of weeckage. I then went forward for third time to take in tow during which the fourth attack developed - dive bombing - and upper deck was cleared.

100
4. (contd.).
On completion when ship had been struck and water was level with waist the question of scuttling ship came up but
Captain decided this was unnecessary and order was given to abandon ship. I reached one of the spare Army boats two hundred yeard away and after collecting survivors to limit of boats capacity went to drifter. After collecting all but two floats we went off to head off a destroyer for the remainder.
Particular merit:-
A.B. Rawstron - courage, example & cheerfulness.
A.B!s Glover and Ord. Sea Mullins - courage & cheerfulness.
P.O. Robinson took charge well on forecastle.
A.B. Davis. Torp. although badly burned took a lively interest in remaining action taken.
Lieut. Sowry - for tenacity of purpose with French drifter resulting in the recovery of seventy survivors and message passed to destroyer for remaining fifty.
5, Surg. Lieut. A.M. McHaffie.
1st. Attack. In Sick Bay - which was reduced to chaos from concussions. Casualties arrived after attack.
Soldier complaining of burns of ares,
Stocker complaining of burns of face.
2x2xwaker Torpedoman complaining of extensive surface burns of face, scalp, neck and both eyes.
Another rating complained of splinter wound of left arm.
L.S.B.A. reported A.B. Riddle lying under Pom-Pom platform. When
I arráved there I found him complaining of fracture of left femur and very extensive burns of face and shoulders - Dressed him and then went down into engine room where I saw two RRA's dead.
Griffeths& Griffiths& Putt (atoker) was also dead.
L.S.B.A. reported four dead in boiler room.
2nd. attack. Ordered to clear upper deck - and I went to port side alley way, Saw Mr. Francis of Pom-Pom platform and one rating. He called for rest of crew and I passed on call to ratings in fore meas deck. No hands came forward. Saw Captain
Captain to attend to Mr. Francis and I went on to Pom-Pom platform climbing on to platform followed by rest of crew. Was called by and found Mr. Francis unconscious - splinter through lungs. Gave
1/6th. morphine.
3rd. attack. Was still on Pom-Pom platform until shortly after attack when Mr. Francis died.
Evacuated wounded into Mater boat lying in water amidships on
During interval between 3rd. and 4th. attacks.
starboard side. Was helped in this by L.S.B.A and Coxawain.
Orders to do 80 were given by First boat Lieutenant.
wounded Riddle who was comatose and lying boat - in
4th. attack. Most of screw of motor, boarded ship including all
Robertson except stretcher A.B. a ma on forecastle of motor two ratings remained in boat.
and smashed Bomb against ship's side upsetting all within other - Riddle hit water 10 yards off motor boat and wave upset disappeared boat before I could get to him and I lost eight of menbers of boat's crew.
Ship by this time was being abandoned.

page 5.
97
101
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
6.
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though ship was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with it, ordering a torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off during attack. Complete jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S Pannel. Tas ordered by 1st. Lieut. to load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned, threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
7.
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the bridge on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F - load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60° and at no time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were passing 18 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. A wire was passed and made fast round a stout beam in the smack, which carried away some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongside the forecastle bows pointing aft. At this point second bombing attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile, the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to taking up the slack too vaolently. This was due to the language difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the only other man on board the smack being an R.A.F. pilot. A
further bombing attack started, the final one, and I again stood off from the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship and I picked up all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and some men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men aboard, Whitehall appeared in the distance and we made out half way the foremast. We met her about 12 miles away and to intercept her, using the smack's siren and the French ensign passed information up to her and requested her to collect men from mid-chai.nel we transferred everyone to H.M. Trawler Olvina.
remaining boats. I then set out on a course for England and in

98
Page 6.
102
Leading Seaman Wordhouse.
Mator boat.
Whilst pushing the towing vessel into position, the bombing formation came over. I let go and sheered off, the first salvo lifting the boat almost out of the water.
Messerschmidt fighters attacked us with machine gun and cannon (Bombs were also dropped) for just a few minutes short of an hour. L.S. Hicks watched their flight and gave me helm and engine orders, the boat not being hit though a couple of cartridge cases dropped into us. We found ourselves out of sight of the ship, had & little council of war, and decided, knowing the ship was out of wireless communication to make Dunkirk for help. We headed west, and not far outside the harbour two troopships were bombed and sunk. We picked up what we considered a safe complement, tried to get in touch with a vessel to assist Basilisk.
In this were not successful and were told to make England.
We drew a rough chart and set our course, arraving
Ramsgate roughly eight hours later. I then turned over the boat to the Naval authorities. We reported that Basilisk was badly hit and were assured that help had been sent.

99
103
APPENDIX II.
H.M.S. "HASILISK" - CASUALITIES.
FRANCIS, B.G.
Gummer (T).
CRIFFITH, John B.
C.B.R.A.II. Pens. No.13060.
CRIFFITHS, Edward.
C.E.R.A.I., D/ML.47570.
LOWRY, Harry P.
S.P.O., D/K.60918.
MAHONEY, Hurbert J.
S.P.O., Pens. No.22871.
MANION, Thomas
Stoker L. R.F.R.B.12894.
PUTT, Richard y.
Stcker I., D/KI.89644.
RIDDLE, Frederick W.
A.B., R.F.R.D.801.
WORNAID, Stephen
Stoker L, R.P.R.B.12968.

100
104
SURVIVORS OF H.M.S. "BASILISK".
BAKER, Walter T.W.
Ldg. Stoker Pens. R.F.R.
NOON, Robert
Stoker.
WESTLAKE, S.A.W.
Pens. C.B.R.A.
KAYE, Predk. Locnard
Ldg. Stoker R.F.R.
WILLCOCKS, Edward Stuart
Chief Amounter.
HOUGHTON, Lecnard
Sto. R.F.R.
GREEN, Albert G.
Sto. R.P.R.
CONINGHAM, Joseph H.
Pen. P.O. Stcher.
RICHARDS Frederick H.
Ldg. Std.
KINGSTON, Thomas J.
Stoker I.
ROWLES, Franods S.
Ldg. Sto.
COWELL, D.C.
3.B.A.2.
RISHARDSON, Joseph
E.R.A.5.
BLIGHT, Lealic Roy
B.A.S.
COULTON, Amold
B.R.A.S.
HAWKER, Walter
Stoker.
SMATE, St ophen
Stoker I.
NICHOLIS, Regirald the
Stolene I.
HARRIS, Alfred
Stoker I.
clauchton, Harry
Stoker I.
SMALES, Ronald
Stoker
FOLEY, Alfred
Sy.P.O.
HODSTON
A.B.
MotNoy, Imagi
Ldg. CIty (0).
JONES, Samuel
L.S.B.A.
CARR, Fredk. J.
Ldg. Stoker.
RICKETS, John C.
Ch. Stcher.
EVANS, Thomas
P.O. Std.
ELLIS, Caorge
Ldg. Stoker.
PEARN, Kenneth 0.
L.S.A.
TRELOAR, Weste
Stoker It
COULD, Horman
Cook.
MOYD, James J.
Stoker I.
STYLES, Charles V.
S.P.O.
HOLDER, William C.H.
P.O. Olc.
DANE, Alan
Std:
Stoker I.
INDINS, Jade
SKINE, Leslie J.
Stoker I.
ARSTALL, Carrge R.
BaRado
Stoker.
HOBSON, Tem On
LERCER, Alfred
Stolyier.
GRIMPITHS, Wello Charles
Steward.
FORKER, Francis S.D.
Sto. P.O.
P.O.
ROGERS, Stanley
P.O.
BRADESE, W.S.C.
A.D., R.F.R.
STEAD, John Д.
A.B.
PERLEY, S.
A.B.
PAIRNOUL, 8.
A.B., R.F.B.
COMIC, J.
A.B.
ATKINSON, God.
Sex. R.N.R.
WILSON, Will. H.
A.B.
BLUES, John
4.9., R.NaR.
THEMAS, Leslie
Sea., R.N.R.
TOMLINSON, Edward
Sear, R.N.R.
Phillips, Edward
Yes.
BRENK W, Sydney C.
A.B.
HUCHES, Edward J.
Ldg. Sen.
WHELAN, John
A.B.
PERGUSON, James
A.B.
RATHBAIRN, Paul
Sign
CROCKER, Ronald J.
and Sea., R.N.V.R.
PAYNE, Gilbert P.
A.B.
DARK, Win.

- 102
106
PAGE 3.
SURVIVORS OF H.M.S. "BASILISK".
WALLIS
Telegraphist.
PITTARD
Ords Sea.
CHEN, C.
A.B. (Landed at Dover).
SMART
Ldg. Stc. (In hospital at Dover).
DAAS, J.
A.B. (In hospital at Dover).
ADAMS, The
Orde Sea. (In hospital at Dover).
Commander Mo Richmond,
Lt. Car. F.C. Bcaks.
Lt. (E) Treaseks.
Lt. J.H. Screey, R.N.V.R.
Sub. Lt. P.E. de B. Jeayes.
Sub. Lt. W.S. Kilis.
Sub. Lt. Calbraith.
Surg. Lt. MoHaffie, R.N.V.R.
Midshipman I. MeRvoy, R.N.R.

103
107
H.II.S. "BASILISK" ⑉ REPORT OF LOSS BY ENELY ACTION.
APPENDIX III - SPECIAL LETTIONS.
Mr. E.G. FRANCIS, Gunner (T) Retired.
This Officer was killed in action while controlling the pom pom guns during the second attack. He had particularly interested himself in the training and fighting of these guns and displayed great zeal in maintaining their efficiency.
During the whole of his service in H.H.S. "BASILISK" lir Francis showed quite exceptional ability and cheerfulness and contributed in no small measure to the fighting efficiency of the ship.
He died at the special post of danger which be had himself selected while controlling and encouraging his crews, and it was largely due to his efforts that the second attack was made abortive. I consider him worthy of high recognition for the greatest coolness, courage and tenacity of purpose under a rain of bombs and machine gun fire.
Chief E.R.A. Edward GRIFFITHS, O.N. MX47570.
I wish to place on record a very special tribute to the late Chief E.R.A. Griffiths, apart from the fact that be died at his post, for his general bearing and conduct since the beginning of hostilities. He not only worked hard but always intelligently and was a really gifted Destroyer Chief S.R.A.
I have already had occasion to mention this rating in despatches in March 1940.
Lieutenant-Commander V.G. BOAKS, R.N.
As first Lieutenant of the ship, this Officer set a fine example of leadership and cheerful courage in most adverse circumstances. A bomb from the first attack burst near him singeing his hair and eyebrows, but he carried on with his duties without a thought for himself. He concentrated on making the ship as watertight as possible by stopping up leaks and placing collision mat, and in this he succeeded admirably. Later he provisioned and equipped the extra boats lying off and was largely responsible for enabling every man alive to get away safely when the ship sank. He also visited gun quarters and supply parties during action and kept them going.
During nine months of arduous sea-going, Lieutenant-
Commander Boaks has been a great stand-by to me and I consider this final exation. of his worth is a suitable moment for some form of
Able Seamen Richard MUMFORD, J.97179 and Herbert A. ALDERSON, J.108085.
was the trainer at B where I spent most of my time after the
Able Seaman Alderson was gunlayer and Able Seaman Liumford engines became useless. gun From my personal observation their coolness kept were and cheerful conversation which was most and bearing marvellous. Able Seaman Humford particularly, heartening ing all. face They fought their gun to the last although they task was hopeless.
Able Seaman

H.M.S. "BASILISK" - REPORT OF LOSS BY
HOITOA Yo HaOJ APPENDIX III - SPECIAL MENTIC
SHORTING JAJOR98 - III (CONTINUED)
(T) TAXIU SIGNAT
Able Seaman Horace RAWSTRON, R.N. J.106622.
Able Seaman Edward R. TOMLINSON, R.N.R. 19810A
atm
Able Seaman Ernest BELSHAW, R.F.R. B.14173.
Ordinary Seaman Thomas V.H. HANCOCK, R.N.V.R. [BSS teem BD/X1767
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104
108
COPY.
Slade Farm,
Slade Cross,
Bovey Tracey,
Devon.
4/6/40.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report as
First Licutenant, H.M.S. "Basilisk".
The general conduct of affairs during the combat between large numbers of enemy bonbars and H.M.S. "Basilisk"
off Dunkirk on 1st of June has been dealt with by my Commanding
Officer but the following can hardly be forwarded by the same channels.
As the next senior officer ouboard I was most impressed with Commander H.Richmond's conduct throughout this harassing period and I feel that his efforts to keep up the morale of the ship's company should not pass without notice.
Every effort was made to get the ship towed back to
Dover by the French fishing drifter "Jolie Mascotte" but although taken in tow two or three times the attentions of the energy bombers made it necessary to slip tow twice and the last of many salvos striking the ship sunk it and attempt was abandoned.
The foremont guns continued firing to the last although only using S.A.P.shell in order to keep up the morale of the ship, this by order of Commander Richmond.
Firing at the after guns was stopped by my orders after one round due to the possibility of the shock breaking aff after end of ship near mainmaat where 11 was badly buokled and splitting more with movement of the ship.
Abandon ship was ordered only after ship was sinking but period in between was devoted to the destruction as
C.B.'s, A/S gear and F.C.C., etc.
I have the honour to DO₂
Str,
Your obedient Servant,
(signed) W.G.BOAKS,
Lieutemant Commender,
Royal Navy.
To:-
Comman der-in-Chief,
Western Approaches,
Plymouth.

109
COPY.
Slade Farm,
Slade Cross,
Borry Traccy,
Deven.
4/6/40.
sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report as
First Lieutenant, H.I.S. "Basilisk",
The general conduct of affairs during the combet between large numbers of onemy bonbers and H.M.S. "Basilish"
off Dunkirk on 1st of June has been dealt with by by Commending
Officer but the following can hardly be forwarded by the sexe channels.
As the next senior officer amboard I 180 most impressed with Commander N.Hichmond's conduct throughout this havassing period and I feel that his afforts to keep to the morale of the ship's conceny should not pass without notice.
Every offort vas made to get the ship lowed back to
Dover by the French fishing drifter Volia liascotte" but although taken in for two OF three thes the attentions of the energy bombers made 11 necessary to slip tow twice and the last of many salvos striking the ship suite 10 and attempt the abandoned.
The foremont gime continued firing to the last although only using S.A.P.shell in order to keep by the morals of the ship, this by order of Commender Richmond,
Firing at the after gas was stopped by my orders after one round due to the possibility of the shoot breaking are after end of ship need mainment where 11 was baily buddled and aplitting more with movement of the ship.
Abandon ship was ordered only after ship was sinking but period in between was devoted to the destruction of
C.B. B₂ A/S gear and P.O.C., etc.
I have the homour to be,
Sir,
Your obsdient Servent,
(signed) W.O.BOAKS,
Licutenant Commender,
Royal Havy.
To Im
Commander-in-Ohier,
Western Approaches,
Plymouth.

Dyusum 93
106
110
SECTION
DEVONUES, and Juno 1940.
Sir,
I regret to have to report the loss of Hellows by enemy action at 103 lat June 1940 off the Belgian coast, The circumstances are 68 follows.
at about 0815 while embarking British troors off
EASURES I TRIC attacked by a squadron of nine German JUNKARS
dive bombers. They approached from astern and on sighting I went full speed shoul 13 boilors connected and as the bombu were released turned hard to port. 43 far as I could judge such aircraft released & pattern of five Dombs one boing a large "B" type and four smaller bombs with alight delay action. une of the latter exploded at the ufter end of 40.3 boilor room on the port side and storeed blew away the bulkhoad pieroing both main and suxiliery steam linou and main oil fuel supply. +11 engine room and boilor room personnel were killed. About six of the "B" type bomba then exploded underneath the ship flooding the after magazine and shell room and probably the gland compartments and store rooms
Just forward of this position. The uppor deck and older of the ship cracked right across in the vicinity of the minnest. This is a gonoral line of neukness in dostroyers.
In order to precerve stability the torpedoes and depth charges were jottluoned and the ohio floated confortably with little increase in drought. 1 increated ongine room and Ro.3
boiler room and found that a small amount of nuter was making its way through shrapnel holos. These were plugged and collision eat placed over the norst lonks. It WELL found impossible to got steam to the enginee and the ship thereafter remined imobile.
4.
fforts were now made to send out messages for assistance. a tug who had boon attending on Hahada "K-ITH" passed me a signal triling DO to sink to which I replied that I
was out of action and required immediate addistance. 1 aluo requested him to inform The Ylag officer Commanding, Nover to this effect. Tue then dion peared. Jignals for assistance were also mudo by using type 4 4 with battory power. It is doubtful whether any of these seauages were received owing to very heavy traffic at the time and comparative meukness of by cignals.
5.
a Belgiun fishing smook under French colours was seen in the distunce and the notor boat TRIO desputched to her to our assistance. she WAS 43 JULI- of Could and after
DOBB efforts a tow WELD passed and corse not to open from the coast.
This ha: hardly been accomplished before & second attack devellopped ut about 0945. This consisted of lovel bumbing from about S, 10000.
each bomber acting independently. about hulf 5 squairon of 18
curried out the attack. Considering the ship was a stationary target and there was little wind these attacks were pourly curried C
out and no bumba hit. This may have been due to pon pom fire if which Hunner (2) 183 in charge. Unfortunately this gallant officer WBG killed at his post by machino [un bulleta which wore fired continuously as the bonbers pussed overhead.

108
112
SECRET.
Inco 3.
apparently unopposed by any British iroraft. On the third occasion un intense air buttle could be heard in progress above the clouds and no effective bombing took place. I would also like to state that from my observation the onemy aircraft even when opposed wore always more numerous than our own and in the subsequent air buttles our fighters although outnumbered fought most courageously and effectively but generally lost more planes than the onomy. From our point of view the B.B.C.
Bulletins describing the air actions off Dunkirs entirely microprosentation truo libuation.
11.
The courage and wedffiders and non The C great inspiration to 20 during the four hours while the ship drifted without help under the threat of destruction.
Their checrfulness and efficioncy under these trying conditions was extruordinary. That GO for wore lost was almost miraculous but may be put down to some extent to the trained courage of the ship's company who fought their gane where possible and took cover when they could not otherwise be 02 uso. It is cost lifficult where all conducted themolves valiantly to choose those specially conspicuous for their behaviour, but these I
appoil a list of those specially worthy of contion.
12.
The following promitions are attached:-
Appendix I:- Verbutin statement by various officers and ratings appendix Ii:-
List of known survivoru and known killed.
appondix 111.
-ist of officers and mon specially mentioned.
prondix IV:-
Copy of proliminary report sent to the leg
Officer Communing over.
I have the honour to be, ir, your obsdient servant,
(Cite)
The Commander in Chief,
Commender, western pproaches.
Royal Navy.
Copies to:- The ACE Officer Commending, lover.
Ca tain (2), 19th -outroyer lotillo.
Captain Plymouth.
*
*
WESTERN AFPROACHES
P.T.O...

II.
No. M.595/199.
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING. DOVER.
Forwarded for necessary action, please.
2. With reference to paragraph 12, Appendix IV
has not yet been received.
3. A report dated 4th June, 1940, from Lieutenant
Commander W.G.Boaks, R.N., the First Lieutenant of the
- ship, 1s also attached.
Plymouth.
6th June, 1940.
ADMIRAL
VICE ADMIR
8- JUN 1940
*
OVER
st

109
ILM.S.
113
2nd June. 1940.
APPENDIX I.
Inquiry into the loss of H.M.S. Basilisk.
1. P.O. Tel Covington office.
Syko Machine and operating signals laft in
All W/T books burnt including Syko cards burnt except Naval Syko 1st June. 7/I sets not wrecked.
Several BR's burnt.
Communications.
4H to 51 ariel from Whalers davits to masthead.
Immediately after lights failed, connected up
Endeavoured to got into communication with Dover forces and W/T.Set appeared to be working efficiently.
Appeared to be to much traffic in air my signals Jammed.
Very Good reception. Found by still remaining of main aeriel; discomected it from all other legs and then ran lead from aeriel connection inside office to the 4H.
Retune sat and again tried to get Dover forces and
Dover W/T. Reception throughout good until time of abandoning shin. Finding nower to 48 not sufficiert connected up 100 V. receiving battery in series making
2207 but gunfire from ship kept loosening contacts.
Signals appeared to be going out alright.
First message sent out in Nyko Have been hit"
broadcasting at regular intervals.
2nd. attack made "Help Bray" several times.
Last signal made "Send tuge require immediate assistance offerey " ( in Nyko ). Possible non reception was probable due to loss of powerin load and jamming due to heavy traffic ( Dover The Trawlers on R/T and ships in vicinity all broadcanting 1.
Had 1t been possible to get 51 working could have got signal through. Heavy funes in office after 3rd. hombing could not get at Syko machine and operating signals.
2. C.E.R.A. Yestlake.
Vent into Engine Room as soon as steam had cleared, opened all boiler Safety Valves. Found both
C.E.R.A's Griffiths and Sto. Futt in front of the throttle killed. Platform generally wrecked, particularly Port side, Bulkhead to after The blown away ( from B.R. into S.R. ). Main and luxillary Steem lines pierced ( Port side ) Shut off Bulkhead Valves.
Plugged water pouring in through rivet holes. Shut off remainder of Auxillary Sea Cocks,i.e. stopped all lenks.
2. Cheif Stoker Ricketts.
Forward supply party. Vent down after B.R.
after steam cleared.
Found oil pump of part after fan and steam pipes port aide blown away.
Found 1 Stoker hanging on ladder (Sto. Manion )
1 P.O.in bilgas
(Sto. P.O. Lowry)
2 in front of boilers, all billed
( P.O. Mahonay & Sto,Wormold)

110
114
(Cheif Sto. Ricketts continued )
After boiler Port side completely wrecked.
Shut off oil supply coming out of main line, shut off after strainer; main oil line carried away.
All emergency valves shut off and S.V's opened.
4. P.O. Cast.
All lights in ship out after 1st. Salvo.
went down to L.P. room to make sure battery was still on. Yent art and found dynamos out of action.Sent hand to switch on Oldham Issume previously placed tall in place and all worked)
Joined up with party under Cummer(1) and jettisoned torpodoes and denth charges (Torpedoes fired with air levers forward
Souttling charges placed on foremost end of
S.R. bulkhead Starboard side against ships side under
Water Level, consisted of 11 13 T.S.T. 2 primers and
2 detenators, Bickford fuse.These поро not fired in the and.
5.P.O.Robinson.
Q.:/here were you stationed during lat air attack?
A.With "A" gun.
Q.7hen did you go to Pom-Pom?
A.When you called for volunteers (after Capt. went)
Callhat was ultimate reason why Pon-Pom would not first
Actrdinary cartridge Jam which took 3 nine. to clear.
Q.D1a you remain at Pom-Pome after I left 1
A.No I went up to "A" gunn.
Calho stayed behind.
A.L/3ea. Peperell.
6. Yes. Bunkin.
All 9,3'g put in weighted Sag and given to
9.0. for destruction.
F.O.B. left on bridge on orders of Captain
All Signal logs left on bridge ( Including 4, AZ,02,
V.O. V.F. lanterns taken down and thrown overboard.
etc. all in whrelhouse )
Selector boxes left intact.
when realized 10 was alamander called with her persiante
Communications:- (a) Called LA-P in direction of tug and Salamander
Called about 20 mina. with Aldia. Sug
She was facing towards Basiliak but did not called answer.
made "Q" and made THE still made 111 Basillak
Basilisk for and made "Oo and destroy Keith" Basilisk made Could see ha would not read Basiliak, do decided " to read and his sink message Keith by:- gunfire by firing at by Water to watch ovel you sink her.Torry to trouble
Proceed and destroy Andia cabinet you." standing
Made following signal.
Bas. I am out of action.
Tug. Sink her with torpedoes.
Bas. 1 have jettisoned torpedoes.
Tug. Bas. Sink her no by depth depth charges, charges. I am and out tug. of action, require I have immediate assistance
Tug,gave "R"

115
" Pass following information to V.A.Dover 1 Basilisk made
About 15 to 20 minutes called up tug and
Tug made myth After that another high bombing raid out of action require irmediate assistance and tug' e and tug was not seen again.
Fired two white rockets.
7. L/Sea. helan.
8. There wore you in first attack?.
A.In charge of Fore Supply on T.D.
8. hat happened there?
A.No trouble in supply except lights out and torches.
:- hat about Oldham lamps?
A.Mag. crew said they were out of action.
Q. What did you do after that:
As Continued fore supply until going forward to assist in getting out tow. Supply parties continued fusing and supplying shells so guns. H.R.shella expended
S.A.P. suplied. Last to did untilorder order given to destroy Asdic gear.
Q. Then what did you do?
a. Took A/S parts down to cabinet Unshipped all portable gear took it up on uppor deck and smashed
It Seyond recognition and then threw it overboard.
Stuff unable to unship smashed with a crowbar.
Unshppped oscillator and took on upper deck left it by guard rail on iron deck anidships, when ship listed over it was below water and cannot say whether it definately went over the adde, but beleive it must have slid over ships side.
A/S gear on the bridge unshipped and destroyed returned to N.D. and watted outside 7.S. until abandoning ship.
8.P.O. Bradley.
in here were you in the first attack?
A.At director - firing continued until bombers disappeared - went round ship to find where she was taking in water.
Found several small holes on the Port atde abreast the The -insorted wooden plugs in those within reach, then finding she was holed below placed collision mat.
ent in fobastle for tom forward.
A$ "A"X gun for 2nd. raid.
2nd. attempt to tow forward.
abandoned this for 3rd. air raid on focasle for this.
Assisted with supply until 1 want to T.S. and BRIT clock smashed before abamioning ship.
9. P.O. Frekine.
In Town for 100 raid, passed orders from
Control officer to guns.
1st. lighting and remained in T.O. not bomb put out all lights. Switched Could on
Fet into through "B" gun and found "X" bridge to secondary communication with the bridge 80 challenged still bridge Then I went on fo'castle to hen prepare I arrived tow.
correct. 5.8. F.C.
Whitmore on for 3rd.
2nd. raid broken fo'castle up again table.
Remained tow forward. ent down below ship. raid, for ent 2nd. up on tle and abandoned

112
116
Page 4.
10.A.B. hitmore and Merryweather lut canvas cover over top and anashed Hols on tcp, Transmission panel and power supply, assisted with Jettisoning torpedoes. Smashed table after firing torpodoes, and dopth charges.
Torpedoes Galls gave order to Brash table.
11.2.00 Rogers.
In T.S. for 1st. attack. Stanped there until finished firing 4.7s
In between attacks jettisoning heavy gear accomodation ladders and overthing heavy TO could get hold of. Between attacks was working with boats alongaide supplying gear and dropping heats astern and hoisting out Jarley floats.
12. O.P.O. Street.
1st. attack at the wher2 carrying out help and teletaph orders. stayed up there untill no further use navigationally Inched wheel hard a Fort.
ont round Year deck, everything in darkness down there for 2nd. attack. Took over supply party from
L/S. and supplied Declare to guno and Pom-Pom ammunition
Helped to put A.B. Riddle in Noil Robertson and saw 1st. Lieut. about putting him in N.B. and 1.8. Davies
Tent aft to obey pipe " Volunteers to steer from aft lay aft "
Cleared tiller flat ( "swaton, Frost )took cover for final attack and thenabandened ship L/C helan exceptionally good with empoly parties. No lights all done with torches.
stoker Hercer worked very well with supply parties
A.B. passed up amunition from shall room.

117
Ing. EX into the loss G.:
Jilist
1. Lieut. E. Treweeks.
When we were bombed I was taking cover in after lobby, then proceeded to E.R. hatch but could not get below because of steam, was joined by C. Sto. Ricketts and C.E.R.A.,
Westlake, gave orders to shut off all boiler room emergency valves and then safety valves and shut main steam bulkhead valve on deck. As soon as possible 3. Room and after boiler room were entered.
Attention first given to casualties but all bar one were dead.
First thought possible to get some part of machinory going but not possible. Concentrated on leaks. Bomb dropped port fore side Z.R. bulkhead and stove in boiler room bulkhend.
Disabling port fan, engine, oil fule pump, number three boilor, port circulator, main and reserve feed tanks and all pipes and leads adjacent were pierced and broken.
Leak at after end of S.R. oil fule tank plugged.
Efforts made to run petrol dynamo for W/T but the magneto connection broke. Hands were told off to get hand steering in use, P.O. of fore boiler room reported no damage after first raid although C. Sto. reported oil suction line piereed and shut off.
2. Sub. Lieut. Jeaves.
During the first attack I was on the bridge as
Officer of the Watch and remained there for some time afterwards while the Captain went off to the engine and boiler rooms.
On the Captain's orders I went aft to the after steering compartment to are whether it was possible to steer by hand.
This was so, and leaving a Leading Stoker and two or three hands I returned to the bridge as the ship was being taken in tow.
When the second attack took place I was in the fore and aft passage below the wheelhouse for some time and eventually went into the Petty Officers' Meas to try and assist the foremost supply party.
After the attack, on the First Lieutenant's orders,
I placed charts in the whaler and a small private motor boat and unshipped the stearing compass from the wheelhouse, and put it in the whaler. I then went aft to continue connecting up deal of out of the compartment. This took about half an to steer by hand. To do this it was necessary to clear a good hour. By gear this time another attempt was being made to take the ship in tow, so I recovered the charts from the motor boat, and went up on the bridge.
went down the fore and aft passage beneath the wheelhouse,
When the ship was attacked for the third time I again where I to till the order Shandon ship was given. or the two charts stayed containing confidential matter concerning other left minefields in the in the Dover area, one was destroyed and the whaler which has not yet returned.
in mid-channel. The Fleet charts were left in the
Fleet notices to Marines were their thrown folios overboard in
Charthouse.

118
Sub-Lieutenant Ellis.
3. Went on bridge It 0815 to relieve 0.0.W., but was ordered to clear the bridge during attack. Stayed in Wheelhouse during first dive bombing attack. Went on bridge cafterward and was given orders to destroy certain S.P's.
Burnt S.P. 02176 (convoy reciphering table), all SP's
'C' series and recognition forms from safe in chart house.
Went down to W/T office and got current recording and recyphering tables from P.O. Tel. and burnt them in forward galley, Gave orders to rig jury aerial and endeavoured to establish communication.
Went aft and inspected for'd cabin flat. Badly damaged by "B" bomb, so secured the hatch. Opened batch to
Cuptain's Day cabin and got next lot of recognitions S.P's (D)
series and addendum No. I to Anglo-French code. Burnt them in forward galley, Gave orders for all S.P's to be taken to forward galley, (W/T & V/S department). Cleared remainder of books from safe in Chart house and took them to after galley.
Burnt Naval Cypher and Decypher and Table of Masthead heights,
Air Defence instructions, Table of Lettered Co-ordinates.
Threw Indicator Discs over the side over as wide area.
Callerted all notes from size in Captains exting
Went to forward galley, and commenced burning all the
S.P's. Took cover by forward galley during second attack.
Continued burning all S.P's after second attack.
When all these had been burnt, took a weighted sack aft and opened up hatch to Captain's Day cabin.
Took out all C.B's, prefixed 0 and as many more besides as could be carried. Filled the sack by the after screen and started to take it forward to galley to burn if possible.
During third attack was by foremost funnel starboard side.
After this was over collected all C.B's which had been got up and put them in weighted bag and threw overboard starboard side. Order abandon ship had been given so went over and took charge of carley float. Collected as many hands from the water as the float could support and paddled to the Tolie
Mascotte about & mile from the ship.
All safes were locked after books were taken from them and keys thrown overboard in the middle of the Dover Straits.
The VC-VF lanterns were got down and thrown overboard.
Following is & list of books destroyed:-
All SP's ordered to be carried by ships operating off Dutch been and
Belgian coasts (except F.S.B. which is thought to have burnt when bridge caught fire.
Anglo French Code and Decode (and Addendum N.1).
'D' Series Recognition S.P's.
Anglo-French War W/T call signs.
Operating Signals (bridge copy).
Pendant list & Signal letters.
Cypher log and 'S' series.
Home Fleet War
C.B's - Those out on loan A/S Control included Officer:- and these Certain were CB's locked were away in his cabin, they
Operating procedure for surface craft.
Handbook of the set.
A/S manual.

119
Page 3.
Lieut. Cdr. W.G. Boaks.
4.
With after guns until motor boat lowered and then went forward to make quite sure coxswain of boat (Hicks) understood his orders reference embarking troops and collection of drifting boats, Just as we got the beat clear I heard & bomb whistling bombs dropped, one of which was presumably the one that went down and dived under Pom-Pom platform. About six, possibly more, through the engine room - this very seriously wounded and burnt one rating and seriously burnt another but I escaped the full force of the back flash although thrown heavily against Pom-Pom deck overhead and almost knocked out.
I then went to the bridge to see what the position was there, but there were no casualties there and I then went aft to the after guns to find en route that deck was buckled by mainmast.
The after magazine and shell room were flooding and decided to close down. I then went down to my cabin and passed up about eight spare torches (placed there for use in disembarking troops previous day - night) as all lights were out and being daylight few were carrying torches on them. I found general chaos in Captain's Cabin flat and sent extra hands down to resecure deadlights as this compartment being next to the buckled part was rather important.
I then went forward to supervise tow forward. In the midst of this another heavy attack was made and most hands took shelter, some in forecastle locker. I then found all but three of the cordite rounds from "A" gun had been jettisoned and in view of the nature of the attack ordered these three to be thrown overboard. After this attack we came out and then started to probide cordite again. I then went aft to see what damage had been done during which the fishing drifter returned and I again went forward to rig new tow lines and also ordered individual hands to turn out and lower boats and carley floats into water as by then it was known ship could not move and drifter could not have towed faster than say four knots. I also placed one hand with a lead line aft to keep check on amount of water ship was in from point of view of grounding and stationed hands ready to cast off boats' painters should ship sink without warning.
Then to the forecastle to get up the after hemp and also 32 wire during course of which the third attack developed and I went aft to the after guns and with one round of cordite from forward fired the remaining round in Y gun myself at a passing bomber but not enough aim off in field of view to hit and noticed that X had a round left but was unable to fire as even with full deflection. After firing this round I went forward recoil cylinder had gun been emptied in preparation for firing and tearing out of mounting overboard. This cylinder was refilled but gun forward I discovered that the crack in deck no have in view of probable beeaking of after appeared to on going widened and gave orders that after guns off were on filled then remaining water left in hot water to galley end. account I to ordered be fired every possible container of water tank to in be and tore from only ground capes to provide anchors covers were prevent then placed or contamination alongside and cars provided, and gear loss up soldiers of this water. Boats' sailing spare in whaler, torches distributed to boats, After steering placed in spare boats after steering compass unshipped the after placed life- in buoy motor boat, whaler for possible use. of weeckage. I
party flare placed in to clear the flat during which the then went detailed and party time to take in tow deck was cleared. fourth attack forward developed for - third dive bombing - and upper

116
120
4. (contd.).
On completion when ship had been struck and water was level with waist the question of scuttling ship came up but
Captain decided this was unnecessary and order was given to abandon ship. I reached one of the spare Army boats two hundred yeard away and after collecting survivors to limit of boats capacity went to drifter. After collecting all but two floats we went off to head off a destroyer for the remainder.
Particular merit:-
A.B. Rawstron courage, example & cheerfulness.
A.B!s Glover and Ord. Sea Mullins courage & cheerfulness.
P.O. Robinson took charge well on forecastle,
A.B. Davis. Torp, although badly burned took a lively interest in remaining action taken.
Lieut. Sowry - for tenacity of purpose with Franch drifter resulting in the recovery of seventy survivors and message passed to destroyer for remaining fifty.
5. Surg. Lieut. A.W. McHaffie,
1st. Attack. In Sick Bay - which was reduced to chaos from concussions. Casualties arrived after attack.
Soldier complaining of burns of arms.
Stocker complaining of burns of face.
Torpedoman complaining of extensive surface burns of face, scalp, neck and both eyes.
Another rating complained of splinter wound of left arm.
L.S.B.A. reported A.B. Riddle lying under Pom-Pom platform. When
I arråved there I found him complaining of fracture of left feaur and very extensive burns of face and shoulders - Dressed him and then went down into engine room where I saw two BRA's dead.
Griffiths& Griffeth& Putt (stoker) was also dead.
L.S.B.A. reported four dead in boiler room.
port side Saw Mr. Francis of Pom-Pom platform call and
2nd. attack. Ordered to clear upper deck - and I went to one alley He way. called for rest of crew and I passed on to
Captain on to platform to Mr. Francis and I went on to platform Gave climbing in fore mess followed by rest of crew. Pom-Pom Was called by ratings rating. deck. No hands came forward. Saw Captain and found to Mr. attend Francis unconscious - splinter through lungs.
1/6th. morphine,
3rd. attack. Was still on Pom-Pom platform until shortly after attack Mr. Francis died.
Evacuated During into water boat lying in and amidships Coxswain. on when interval between 3rd. and water 4th. attacks.
Orders to do side. so were given by First bow starboard wounded Was helped in this Lieutenant. by L.S.B.A
4th. attack. Most of Norew of motor, boarded ship lying including in all
Robertson wounded except stretcher A.B. a Riddle me on boat - two ratings remained in and Bomb hit water ship's side upsetting lost sight of other Riddle boat. 10 yards off motor boat all and within wave upset -
disappeared smashed before boat against I could get to him and I
menbers of boat's crew.
Ship by this time was being abandoned.

page 5.
121
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
6.
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though ship was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with it, ordering a torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off during attack. Complete Jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S Pannel. Tas ordered by 1st. Lieut. to load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned, threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
7.
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the bridge on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F. load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60 and at no time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were passing 18 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. À wire was passed and made fast round a stout beam in the smack, which carried away some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongaide the forecastle bows pointing aft. At this point second bombing attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile, the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to taking up the slack too vaolently. This was due to the language difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the only other board the smack being an R.A.P. pilot. A
further man on attack started, the final one, and I again stood off from bombing the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship and I picked all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and up men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men Whitehall some appeared in the distance and we made out half the foremast. We met her about 12 collect away and to intercept aboard, her, using the smack's siren and the miles French ensign remaining boats. I then set out on a course Trawler England Olvina. and in passed way information up to her and requested her to for men from mid-cha.nel we transferred everyone to H.M.

118
Page 6.
122
Leading Seaman Wordhouse.
Mator boat.
Whilst pushing the towing vessel into position, the bombing formation came over. I let go and sheered off, the first salvo lifting the boat almost out of the water.
Messerschmidt fighters attacked us with machine gun and cannon (Bombs were also dropped) for just a few minutes short of an hour. L.S. Hicks watched their flight and gave me helm and engine orders, the boat not being hit though a couple of cartridge cases dropped into us. We found ourselves out of sight of the ship, had a little council of war, and decided, knowing the ship was out of wireless communication to make Dunkirk for help. To headed west, and not far outside the harbour two troopships were bombed and sunk. We picked up what we considered a safe complement, tried to get in touch with a vessel to assist Basilisk.
In this were not successful and were told to make England.
We drew a rough chart and set our course, arraving
Ramsgate roughly eight hours later. I then turned over the boat to the Naval authorities. We reported that Basilisk was badly hit and were assured that help had been sent.

1237
APPENDIX II.
H.M.S. "BASILISK" - CASUALITIES.
FRANCIS, B.G.
Gurmer (T).
CRIFFITH, John B.
С.Б.К.А.П. Pens. No-13060.
CRIFFITHS, Edward.
C.B.R.A.I., D/WX.47570.
LOWRY, Harry P.
S.P.O., D/K.60918.
MAHONEY, Herbert J.
S.P.O., Penso No.22271.
MANION, Thomas
Stoker Io, R.P.R.B.12894.
PUTT, Richard F.
Stoker I., D/KL.89644.
RIDDLE, Frederick W.
A.B., ReF.R.D.801.
WORMALD, Stephen
Stoker L, R.F.R.B.12968.

120
124
SURVIVORS OF H.M.S. "BASILISK".
BAKER, Walter T.W.
Ldg. Stoker Pens. R.F.R.
NOON, Robert
Stoker.
WESTLAKE, S.A.W.
Pens. C.B.R.A.
KAYE, Fredk. Lecnard
Ldg. Stoker R.P.R.R.
WILLCOCKS, Edward Stuart
Chief Armourer.
HOUGHTON, Lecnard
Sto. R.F.R.
GREEN, Albert G.
Sto. R.F.R.
CUNINGHAM, Joseph H.
Pen. P.O. Stoker.
RICHARD, Fredarick E.
Ldg. Std.
KINGSTON, Thomas J.
Stoker I.
ROWLES, Francis S.
Edg. Sto.
COVELL, D.C.
B.B.A.2.
RISHARDSON, Joseph
E.R.A.5.
BLIGHT, Leslie Roy
B.A.S.
COULTON, Arnold
B.R.A.S.
HAWKER, Walter
Stoker.
SMALL, St sphan
Stoker I.
NICHOLIS, Reginald Mr.
Stoker I.
HARRIS, Alfred
Stoker I.
CLAUGHTON, Harry
Stcker I.
SMALES, Ronald
Stoker
FOLEY, Alfred
Sy.P.O.
HODSDON
A.B.
Na WOY, Senest
Ldg. & (0).
JONES, Samuel
L.S.B.A.
CARR, Fredk. J.
Ldg. Stoker.
RICKETTS, John Co
Ch. Stcker.
EVANS, Thomas
P.O. Std.
ELLIS, Caorge
Ldg. Stoker.
PEARN, Kenneth C.
L.SaA.
TRELOAR, Wasto
Stoker I.
COULD, Norman
Cook.
LLOYD, James J.
Stoker I.
STYLES, Charles W.
S.P.O.
HOLDER, William G.H.
P.O. Clc.
DANE, Alan
Std.
INCLES, Jade
Stoker I.
SKONE, Leslte J.
Stoker I.
ARSTALL, Carrge R.
B.R.A.
HOBSON, Tom Do
Stoker.
MERCER, Abired
Stolpier.
GRIFFITHS, Wollo Charles
Steward.
BONKER, Francis SaD.
Sto. P.O.
P.O.
ROGERS, Stanley
P.O.
BRADLEY, V.E.G.
AaB,, R.F.R.
STEAD, John A.
A.B.
FEELEY, S.
A.B.
PAIRFOUL, S.
A.B., R.F.R.
CORK, J.
A.B.
ATKINSON, God.
Sea. R.N.R.
WILSON, Will. H.
A.B.
BLUES, John
A.B., RaNaRa
THOMAS, Leslie
TOMLINSON, Riward
Sea., R.N.R.
Sea., R.N.R.
Phillips, Edward
Yeo.
BRENTON, Sydney C.
A.B.
HUCHES, Edward J.
Ldg. Sea.
WHELAN, John
A.B.
FERGUSON, James
A.B.
PAIRBAIRN, Paul
Sig.
CROCKER, Ronald J.
and Sea., R.N.V.R.
PAYNE, Gilbert P.
A.B.
DARK, Wills

121
125
PAGE 2.
SURVIVORS OF H.H.S. "BASILISK".
PEARSE, Arthur D.
A.B.
SPARROW, Charles A.
A.B.
ROBINSON, William E.
P.O.
JONES, William H.
A.B., Pens.
SMITH, Harold
A.B.
BRCOKES, Ben
A.B.
BREBY, D.
A.B.
HARRIS, Douglas P.
A.B.
WILKINS, Jeseph D.
AuBer R.F.R.
SLYAH, Kennoth E.
Tal.
ROGERS, William J.
VIA3. Sig.
WESTERN, Wilfred B.
Ldg. Sig.
EATON, Richard
A.B.
JOHES, Clifford
A.B.
KPSKTHE, Summel
A/P.O.
WALTERS, G.
A.B.
PATIENCE, John
A.B.
SMITH, Harida
Ord. Sea. R.H.V.R.
SYLES, G.H.
A.B., R.P.R.
COVINGTON, Henry
P.O. Tal.
CAST, Robert K.
P.O.
EMBLIN, Charles
4.3.
PERRETT, Vivian A.
Cord. Sea. R.N.V.R.
ROBINSON, W.P.
Sea. R.H.R.
HEISON, David
A.B.
COMMAN
A.D.
NICHOLAS, James
Seaman, R.N.R.
MULLIN, Renald Rs
Orde Sea. R.N.V.R.
DATE ReF.
Ddg. Sea.
JEFFERY, Stephen R.
A.B.
EVANS, George S.
A.Ba
WILLIAMS, Thomas JaKe
A.B., R.P.R.
ASHWORTH, Sidney
Stige R.F.R.
A.B. R.F.R.
BRADLEY, Jenah
A.B.
RAWSTRON, Horace
A.Ba, R.F.R.
HAYWARD, Jos.H.
A.B., R.P.R.
DREVITT, Spender 11.
A.D., R.F.R.
WHITMORE, Charles E.
A.D.
GLOVER, Jomes I.
Orde Sea., R.N.V.R.
ROWE, Lecnard
And
EOND, Alfred S.
A.B.
MERRYWEATHER, George P.
Orde Sea. R.H.V.R.
0'CONNOR, Harry
ДеВа, R.F.R.R.
PERSHAW, Emest
Sea., R.N.R.
WARD, H.
A/P.O. Tel.
BIRNER, Sydney V.
Ldg. Tal. RaPaRe
DRURY, Walter
A.B., R.F.R.
MANSTON, Arthur I.
A.D., R.F.R.
DAVIES, Thomas B.
Ord Sea., R.N.V.R.
HANCOCK, Thomas
C.P.O. Pens.
STREET, Thomas G.
Leg. Sea.
HICKS
Ldg. Sea.
PEPPERELL
Ldg. Sea.
WOODHOUSE
States.
BRATTHWATTE
Sen. RaNaRa
DOYLE
A.B.
WILLIS
A.8.
ALDERSON
Ldg. Sen.
WOOD
A.B.
BRYDALE
A.B.
MUMBORD
A.B
FROST

122
126
PAGE 3.
SURVIVORS OF H.M.S. "BASILISK"..
WALLIS
Telegraphist.
PITTARD
Ord. Sea.
OWEN, C.
A.B. (Landed at Dover).
SMART
Ldg. Sto. (In hospital at Dover).
DAAS, J.
A.B. (In hospital at Dover).
ADAMS, We
Cardo Sea. (In hospital at Dorear).
Commander No Richmond,
Lite Cor. HoGe Boaks.
Lt. (E) Treweaks.
Lt. JoHn Sorry, RoNoV.R.
Sub. Lt. P.E. de B. Jeayes.
Sub. Lt. W.H. Kills.
Sub. Lt. Calbraith.
Surg. Lt. McHaffie, RoNoV.R.
Hidshipman Io McEtroy, R.N.R.

123
127
H.I.S. "BASILISK" - REPORT OF LOSS BY ENSLY ACTION.
APPENDIX III - SPECIAL MENTIONS.
Mr. E.G. FRANCIS. Gunner (T) Retired.
This Officer was killed in action while controlling the pom pom guns during the second attack. He had particularly interested himself in the training and fighting of these guns and displayed great zeal in maintaining their efficiency.
During the whole of his service in H.H.S. "BASILISK" Ir Francis showed quite exceptional ability and cheerfulness and contributed in no small measure to the fighting efficiency of the ship.
He died at the special post of danger which he had himself selected while controlling and encouraging his guns crews, and it was largely due to his efforts that the second attack was made abortive. I consider him worthy of high recognition for the greatest coolness, courage and tenacity of purpose under a rain of bombs and machine gun fire.
Chief E.R.A. Edward GRIFFITHS, O.N. LIX47570.
I wish to place on record a very special tribute to the late Chief B.R.A. Griffiths, apart from the fact that be died at his post, for his general bearing and conduct since the beginning of hostilities. He not only worked hard but always intelligently and was a really gifted Destroyer Chief B.R.A.
I have already had occasion to mention this rating in despatches in March 1940.
Lieutenant-Commander V.G. BOAKS, R.N.
As first Lieutenant of the ship, this Officer set a fine example of leadership and cheerful courage in most adverse circumstances. A bomb from the first attack burst near him singeing his hair and eyebrows, but he carried on with his duties without a thought for himself. He concentrated on making the ship as watertight as possible by stopping up leaks and placing collision mat, and in this he succeeded admirably. Later he provisioned and equipped the extra boats lying off and was largely responsible for enabling every man alive to get away safely when the ship sank. He also visited gun quarters and supply parties during action and kept them going.
During nine months of arduous sea-going, Lieutenant-
Commander Boaks has been a great stand-by to me and I consider this final example of his worth is a suitable moment for some form of commendation.
Able Seaman Richard HUMFORD, J.97179 and Herbert A. ALDERSON, J.108085.
Able Seaman Alderson was gunlayer and Able Seaman liumford was the trainer at B gun where I spent most of my time after the engines became useless. From my personal observation their coolness kept a smiling face and cheerful conversation which was most and bearing were marvellous. Able Seaman Humford particularly, heartening to all. They fought their gun to the last although they knew the task was hopeless.
Able Seaman

124
128
COPY.
Slade Farm,
Slade Cross,
Bovey Tracey,
Devon.
4/6/40.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report as
First Lieutenant, H.M.S. "Basilisk".
The general conduct of affairs during the combat between large numbers of enemy bombers and H.M.S. "Bamilisk"
off Dunkirk on 1st of June has been dealt with by my Commanding
Officer but the following can hardly be forwarded by the same channels.
As the next senior officer onboard I was most impressed with Commander.Richmond's conduct throughout this heraasing period and I feel that his afforts to keep mg the morale of the ship's company should not pass without notice.
Every effort was made to get the ship towed back to
Dover by the French fishing drifter "Jolie Mascotte" but although taken in tow two or three times the attentions of the enemy bombers made it necessary to slip tow twice and the last of many salvos striking the ship sunk it and attempt was abandoned.
The foremost guns continued firing to the last although only using S.A.P.shell in order to keep up the morale of the ship, this by order 01° Commander Richmond.
Firing at the after guns was stopped by my orders after one round due to the possibility of the shock breaking off after end of ship near mainmast where 11 was badly backled and splitting more with movement of the ship.
Abandon ship was ordered only after ship was sinking but period in between was devoted to the destruction or
C.B. S, A/S gear and F.C.C., etc.
I have the honour to DO₂
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(signed) W.G.BOAKS,
Lieutemant Commander,
Royal Navy.
To:-
Commander-in-Chief,
Western Approaches,
Plymouth®

COMPIDENTIAL,
Dynams 97 BWO/S
*
129
CONFIDENTIAL
H.F.S. "SALANAIDER",
To: V.A. Dover.
7th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to report, in accordance with your
No.B14/0/1101/40 of 4th June, 1940, the following report of proceedings of H.E.S. "SALAMATER" from 26/5 to 1/6/-
At 2000/26/5 I laft the Humber under the orders of SUTTON in company with SUTTON and FITEROT.
Arrived and anchored in Doma at 1510/27/10.
At 1540/28/5 weighed and proceeded under of orders of SUTTON
in company with SUTTON and FITEROT via R.S. & it Theys to Duskirk Roads,
Rendezvous-ed with HALCTON and SEIPLACE by S. Bugy and proceeded in company, anchoring off la Panne at 2130.
Uning notarboat and shalers embarited 150 DER during the night,
In the morning I was ordered by CALCUTTA to close her and tranafer to here military personnel as she could get no closer to the shore,
At 0705/20/5 I weighed and proceeded alongaide GALCUTTA and at 0900 I transferred troops.
Proceeded back to La Fame and began loading troops using own boats and mall share pulling boats. A bombing attack by Junkare 87
was carried out in the foremoon and GREYHOUND, as will as several mall ships, was hit about one cable from 16.
At 0730 1730 1 weighed and proceeded via Dustribe Toada and another high banking attack - carried out. Observed Danielity and neighbouring beaches to be subjected to heavy bunbing attacks.
Proceeded via 44 " Duys in company with SETTON, arriving and anchoring off Dover in thick weather at 2320.
Reported magnetic nines laid by aircraft during night vide my
Signal to Value Dover 2345/29/5.
At 0600/30/5 weighed and proceeded alongable Admiralty Pier and store at ship 0.740 at discribarked Eastern Arm. 289 At 1610/30 allyped and progeeded to Dustribe
1
receaded to insumition ship and
Roads via U, V. à The Dugya and anahored are Dray by 2100/30/5,
Staff Officer and them transferred motorboat to TOASTS who no powerboat.
SHIRARI for two Staff Officers. labarked Holden had and another
Imbarked 397 men during the night and vas ordered to close
Proceeded to Dover via 1, V. & 11. Buoys and went alongside
Admiralty Pier at 0810/31/5.
Disembarked personnal, proceeded and secured to Saatern Area to ammition ship, etc.
proceeded in accordance with 17 attached narrative of
Commis, dated June, 1940.
VI
1 have the honour to bo,
8-JUN 1940
Bir,
Your obsident servant,
DOVER
L.7.S.Ede Liene. Car
RM

126
CONFIDENTIAL.
130
To: The Admiralty.
via: V.A. Dover.
H.M.S. "SALANDER".
Copies to: F.O., London.
5th June, 1940.
M.S.4.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following narrative of events which took place on Friday, 31st May, and Saturday, 1st June, 1940.
At 1800/31/5 I left Dover in company with HALCYON and SKIPJACK
to rendezvous with the remainder of the minesweepers at YY buay by 2200 in accordance with V.A. Dover's 0357/31/5.
Here I took FITZROY under my command and followed astern of the other two groups through Dunkirk Roads, past Dunicirie, to a position off Bray,
I was then ordered by NIGER to anchor one mile to his Eastward, to avoid magnetic mines laid near No.8 Buoy. This was accomplished by 0015/1/6.
The beach at Bray was under shrapnel fire from inland energy batteries, and as no boats closed no I lowered a shaler with a Volunteer crew to land for soldiers (See appendix No.1).
The boat returned in about half an hour with one hand and a message from General Nontgomery to inform all ships that he intended moving Weatward to Dunkirk at once as the beach was becoming untenable.
This message I passed to all ships in V/S to ch.
The pontoon pier had been hit by shell fire and no troops seemed to be embarking at all, so I weighed and kept under way closing the beach as much as I could.
When a little light appeared, however, boats began to above off from the beach and dame to no. RA Dover now ordered all ships to embark men in boats and move Westwards to Dunkirk at dawn. A continual stream of boats came off with military personnel, and by 0600/1/6 I had embarked about 450 men, including 29 wounded of whom 11 were stretcher cases, Attacks by aircraft took place on all ships and salvoes of bombs were dropped, no ships being hit. We were then attacked by front machine gun fire from Messerschmitt 109's, and one casualty was sustained.
L.S.A. Gullett was hit in the hand by a bullet. I then noved Westeard astern of KNITH and SKIPJACK.
At 0820/1/6 an air attack took place on all three ships, and
SKIPJACK was sunk, and KSITH hit and set on fire. KSITH abandoned ship, and I closed her and sent away both whalers as lifeboats. (See appendix
No.2). Whilst resouing survivors I was again attacked by Junkers 87
dive bombers, and a salvo of four bombs fall about 50 feet ahead of the ship. They exploded under water when two bomba were approximately abreast the bridge. The ship lifted bodily and heeled to starboard, and then settled down with a list to part. She then sank about a foot, suddenly.
I feared she was in danger of sinking, so I ordered the S.P's on board to be jettisoned. This was done in a weighted bag. (See appendix No.3)
I stopped engines and waited reports from the Singineer Officer and Recutive
Officer.
The Engineer Officer and First Lieutenant ascertained that the forward, was and had flooded compartments amidahips In comprising about the cold and ship still seaworthy, although she had gained about 1 foot of draught hour rooms, steam WILLS gunners got on main engines again. (See Engineer Officer's
0001 stores and canteen store. attached a quarter of an report).

127
131
CONFIDENTIAL
A further air attach now took place, and a salvo of bombs fell on the port quarter about fifty yards astern. A heavy concussion vas felt. I then decided to proceed as far as possible whilst the fan engines could be kept running. I left the whalers to assist picking up survivors from KNITH and taking them to a tug standing by. I saw
Captain D 19 on the bridge of this tug, and he saked = to fire H.E. at the Andic dome of the KEITH which was listed heavily to part. Having none left I fired two rounds of S.A.P. and destroyed her done.
Having now 480 men in addition to my ship's company, I
proceeded at full available speed to return via Dunleirk and T, T. and U
buoys. We were again attacked by aircraft off 1 bucy, but a combined
0.5" and Lewis Gun fire of the ship's company, and Bren gan and rifle fire of the soldiers on board, kept the nachines from pressing home their attack, and no further damage was sustained, 219 rounds of 4" H.R.R.A.
were fired in all during the morning and forenoon.
One fan engine now finally broke down, and we proceeded on one boiler at about 7 knots, reaching Dover at 1530/1/6.
The behaviour of the ship's 00 pany was exemplary, and the morale of the soldiers in unusual circumstances was beyond praise,
I further beg to report that of the eight ratings who formed the lifeboats' area five are still missing, as noted in appendix 2, and I especially wish to call attention to the behaviour of the ratings mentioned in Appendix 4.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
L.7.S.De
Ideutenant Commander,
Commanding Officer.
H.M.S. "SALGANDER".

128
CONFIDENTIAL
133
H.M.S. "SALANANDER".
5th June, 1940.
Appendix No.3 (cont.)
Recoding Table and Anglo French call signs,
Register Form R.
Appendix No.44
Ratings specially mentioned.
Leading Signalman Thomas D/JX 135962
For coolness, complete calmess and clear thinking when under fire,
Officer's Steward Fairlamb D/IX 21392
For his care of the wounded, including some very bad stretcher cases,
4,3, Beryon D/JX 112424
For his consistent work in shalers both under fire and in lifeboat.
O.P.O. Hoare D/J 109667
For keeping supplies of food going for passengers and ship's company during are aments he 185 relieved from the wheel, which be took practically over the shole operation.
E.R.A. C.H. Andrew X 28768
Leading Stoker 4 Hussey D/XX 62678
-----
is quoted in
Stoker Patty Officer ", Rechford TXSCE 61034
attached Engineer
Stoken H.Rogera D/YX 82058
Officer's Report.
Stoker H.J. Thompson D/XX 93732
All my officers behaved with great coolness, especially lbr. T.J.
Reynolds, Comissioned Engineery of the-Royal Havy,
L.7.S.Sde
Ideutanant Communder.
Commanding Officer,
H.M.S. "HALDANDER".

128
CONFIDENTIAL
133
H.M.S. "SALANANDER".
5th June, 1940.
Appendix No.3 (cont.)
Recoding Table and Anglo French call signs,
Register Form R.
Appendix No.4.
Ratings specially mentioned.
Leading Signatman Thonas D/JX 135962
For coolness, complete calimess and clear thinking when under fire,
Officer's Steward Yairlamb D/IX 21392
For his care of the wounded, including some very bad stretcher cases,
A.B. Benyon D/JX 112424
For his consistent work in whalers both under fire and in lifeboat.
C.P.O. Hoare D/J 109667
For keeping supplies of food going for passengers and ship's company during off moments he 185 relieved from the wheel, which he took practically over the whole operation.
R.R.A. C.H. Andrew X 28768
Leading Stoker 4. Hussey D/KX 62678
La (gioted in
Stoker liability Officer it Rechford TEXX 61034
attached Engineer
Stoker H.Rogers D/EX 82058
Officer's Report.
Stoken H.J. Thompson D/ICC 93732
All officers behaved with great coolness, especially Its. T.J.
Reynolds, Commissioned my Engineery of ahe-Noyal Nawy.
L.7.S.Sde
Lieutenant Commander,
Commanding Officer,
H.V.S. "SALAMANDER".

129
CONFIDENTIAL
134
H.M.S. "SALAMANDER".
5th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to report the action taken to remendy urgent defects sustained during enemy air attack on the 1st June, 1940.
The defects were caused by delay action bombs, exploding near the part side of the ship in the region of 34 station. At the time of the occurrence the whole of the messdecks and vaists were arowded with soldiers standing up, and a number of wounded were on stretchers on the mess tables. Approximately 450 soldiers were on board, including about
20 stretcher cases. This rendered passage between the Engine Room and
Boiler Rooms extremely difficult.
The first effect was to throw the ship heavily to the starboard side, at the same time apparently lifting her out of the water about two feet. She then rolled to part, and eventually took a alight list to part.
The effects on the machinery were as follows: The steam dynamo came aff the board, putting the ship in darkness, and began vibrating badly. Steps were immediately taken to start the Diesel dynamo and lights were available in less than three minutes. In the meantine steam pressure had fallen, as the forced draught fan in each boiler room had stopped. It WELLS found that both fan oil sumps were aracked badly round the base, and the oil had drained into the fan flate. In addition the impellors were fouling the casings. The fans had been running about half speed at the time, The after fan vas first of all restarted, after shoring it aft with wooden wedges to keep the impellor clear, and a chain of Stokers sent for oil to keep reclenishing the sump to prevent the fan seising up. Steam was raised for alow speed, and the ship got under way about 15 to 20 minutes after the explosion, The cylinder was then shored down from the deck above to keep the crankcase from fracturing completely. A similar action was taken with the forward fan, and afterwards attempts were made to plug the creaks to help stem the flow of oil. Both fans were used for leaving Dunkirk, but when clear of
Dunkink Roads the forward fan was stopped owing to the danger of fire from the quantity of oil flung into the boiler road. The draught marks were sighted as soon as possible, and it was observed that the ship had gained approximately & foot forward, which remained constant. It TRUE
found that compartments forward had taken in small quantities of water, and compartments 32 and 37 had flooded up to the lower deck. In view of the fact that the ship had been under almost continual attack for about three hours, and that this was the third heavy attack in four days at Dunkirk, the morale of the Engine Room ratings was excellent.
The following ratings were exceptionally steady in carrying out their duties:
E.R.A. O.H.Andrew, M 26768. In starting w the Diesel and main engine and restarting the auxiliaries engines when steam was available.
Leading Stoker A, Hussey, D/XX 62678. In assisting B.R.A.Andrew
Stoker letty Officer T.Rochford, D/IX 61034. By restarting steam in the the damaged after fan, and raising after boiler.
Stoker H.Rogers, D/KX 82058. By his coolness in No.1 the Boiler explosion. room when on watch during and after
Stoker H.J. Thompson, D/KX 93732. Consistently duty volunteared watches. to man the whaler during his off

130
135
CONFIDENTIAL
S.A.S. LEW,
The following two soldiers volunteered to go down to the forward boiler room shortly after the explosion and helped to clear the loose gear, such as deckplates, which had been thrown out of place on to the pumps:
9a Ew Play DI 78316 Driver G.Ronson, R.A.S.C.
385379 Private T.Willingale, Loyals.
Drive,
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
2
B.M.B. LID), T.K.Reynolds
Commissioned Engineer,
Can Address,
Royal Havy.
III,
Str,
To,
The Commanding Officer,
H.M.S. "SALAMANDER".
MAME
THE

Dynams 99. B1w/131
1160
136
CONFIDENTIAL
H.H.S. LYDD.
7th June 1940.
To The Flag Officer Commanding,
Dover.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit for your consideration the attached report on Operation DISNAMO as far as it conserned
H.M.S. LYDD, together with apecial nentions of officers and men for meritorious service.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obsident servent..
MAir
LIGUTERANT-COMBANDER IN COMMAND.
VIOE 8- ADMIRA JUN 1940.
DOVER E

132
137
OPERATION 'DINAMO' NARRATIVE OF EVENTS,
At noon on Tuesday the 28th May 1940, H.M.S.Lydd under my command left Harwish in company with the 5th M/S Flotilla arriving off Bray at about 2135. I was there ordered to proceed into Dunkirk harbour to enbark troops. I secured alongside the Eastern jetty and embarked about four hundred, leaving again at 2250.
At 2318 about two miles to the eastward of the entrance a drifter was sighted ahead crossing from port to starboard about twenty yards away, fine on the port bow. The engines were put full speed astern, but it was too late so avoid a X
sollision. The orew of the drifter were taken aboard another drifter, which was close by. IS 18 understood that the drifter in collision with Lydd was the 'Girl pamela' which subsequently sank. No damage was sustained by Lydd.
At 0200 29th May when passing the Kwinke buay, flares were sighted and shouting heard close at hand. The light from an Aldis lamp revealed the bow and storn portions of
H.M.S.WAkeful appearing above water with - alinging to them.
I immediately lowered a whaler and two carley floats. Shortly after this H.M.S. Gossamer, which was close by, ordered no to put ay light out and drop a depth charge. I could not at once comply with the latter order as I was $00 close to the wreck and would have killed the non in the water; I therefore asked what the situation was, to which I received no reply; nor did
I see Gossamer again. I kept the ship moving while the whaler and carley floats were picking up survivors and had just got twenty alongside when H.M.S. grafton appeared. I asked her is she would pick up the rest, and she asked me to circle

133
138
...circle..
Found her in case of meny submarines. It was then discovered from one of the survivors that Wakeful had been torpedoed by an M.T.B., I at once passed this to Grafton and continued circling round.
I had just completed one circle and was heading west with my stern to Grafton, when at about 0307 and explosion occured at her stern. I continued my circle to port and sighted an
M.T.B. about fifty yards away on the starboard bean, steering about south-west and nearly stern on to Lydd. Sub-Lieut. E.H.
Britton R.N. who was on the bridge, opened fire with the starboard pair of Lewis guns and raked her up the stern;
bullets being seen to hit her wheelhouse and superstructure in a cloud of sparks. It was thought that she was disabled. I than closed Grafton with the idea of taking off survivors should she be sinking; but as she appeared to be all right I circled round to starboard to finish off the M.T.B. if she were still afloat. A dark object was sighted ahead in the direction in which the M.T.B. was last seen and fire was opened with Lewis guns and 4inch; Grafton also opened fire. The supposed M.T.B.
was then rammed, as she was hit figures sprang at the ship and it was thought that an attempt was being made to board;
fire was therefore opened with rifles. During this firing A.B.
S.P.Sinelair, O.N. e/JX 152005 who WAS on the Forecastle attempting to repell the boarders was accidentally shot. It is very much regretted that he died about an hour later from his wound. After investigation I have come to the conclosion that the bullet which struck him must have glanced off some portion of the vassel raymad. Two non were taken off her. I
then set course for home, Grafton being apparently well able to look after herself.

134
139
...herself.
IT was then discovered that the Yessel ranned was the drifter 'Comfort' and not he M.T.B.. V.A.Dover was informed of the circumstances as far as I then knew than; I also informed
Jason and Javelin not with shortly afterwards, of diafton's plight. On further questioning the two survivors of the
Comfort, it was ascertained that she had been picking up survivors from the Wakeful, when and explosion threw all on board into the water and disabled the Yessel. Three men managed to scramble back again, of whom two got on board
Lydd and the other who was apparently badly wounded, went down with the vessel when ahe was rammad.
I landed the troops at Ramsgate and returned to Dunkirk by $ X route.
When off Nieuport Bank buay as 1700 a large number of enemy aircraft started dive-bombing ships arriving and leaving, paying particular attention to the hospital ship St.Julien which had repeated attacks made on her.
I arriver off Bray at 1730 and sent boats inshore to embark troops. I did not anchor but lay to off the beach. At about 1745 andurgent call for assistance was received from 3.8.
clan Mee Allister which was on fire aft. I passed this to
Pangbourne who was just arriving, as I had already started embarking troops. panghourne then went alongaide the burning ship.
Embarkation was not such hampered as far as Lydd was conserued by the almos incessant boubing assacks; but 16 was

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was noticed that ships at anchor had heavy boabs directed at them, whereas Lydd who was under weigh was only treated to light stuff. During the embarkation H.M.S. Crested Eagle, which had bombed aft and caught fire, beached herself 01088 by and the troops on board began to jump into the water. Lydd's bosts immediately went to their assistance, picking up a large number, including twenty five very badly burnt and injured non.
Albury arrived shortly after this and her assistance was called for, which was at once rendered.
AS there was no doctor on board it was deemed essential to get the wounded home as quickly as possible, and I laft the scene at 2100, with three hundred troops enboard.
When off the Middelkirke Buoy at 2200 11 was reported to ne that the D.G. cabled had caught fire and had had to be switched off. IT was discovered that They had been pairced by bomb splint
-ters, the steering compase was now so sluggish that the ship had to be steared by a star When visible. Temporary repairs to
D.G. cable were carried out next day.
At 2205 and so 3 was reserved from the Travler TOR BAY 2.
ON closing her it was discovered that all she had wrong was &
foul propeller. I explained about the necessity of getting ay
Wounded home quickly, told her that there were other ships following, continued on ay way, and reported the matter on arrival at Margate.
I arrived at Margate at 0515 30th May, but could not get alongside to disembark until 0855, owing to the large number of ships already there.
I then proceeded to Sheerness to coal and ammunition,

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ammunition sailing again in company with Sutton and Ross at 0230, may 31st arriving off Bray by I route at 0915.
As there were no enemy aircraft in the visinity, I anchored.
Troops were embarked and at 1130 Sutton and Ross transfered their troops to ae and all proceeded to Margate where I dis-
-embarked five hundred.
At 1915 I proceeded towards the rendesvous off 1 buoy, being ordered at 2145 to assist Tug St.ABBS, one of whose tow of three
Thanes barges had broken adrift. I picked up this barge and towed her to Dunkirk, arriving at 0330, tat June. At about this time a vessel which was unidentified was seen to blow up, presumeably on a magnetic mine, in the neighbourhooh of the whistle buoy off Bray.
About two hundred and fifty troops had been embarked when at message was brought off from the Brigadier to say that he had stopped embarkation from the beaches, which were being shelled, and was retiring on Dunkirk. I passed this message so Kwith.
During the embarkation low flying aircraft sachinegunned boats and ships. Several hits were registered on one machine, which was afterwards seen to creat on the sand dunes, by &
Bren sug in Lydd fired by one of the troops embarked. Another machine was also thought to have been his by the starboard pair or Lowis guns fired by ord.Sea. N.F.R. Duxbury, O.N.O/JX 173054.
At 0625 I proceeded by route X to Dover= arriving at 11299.
On the way enemy bombors appeared but after a few SALYOB were driven off by our fighters who were seen to bring down two.
a
At 1920 I again proceeded by route X to Dukirk, anchoring in the roads about half a mile east of the harbour entrance at
2350. The beach and roads wro being should, and there and ns appear to be much boat traffic. I sent the motor boat inshore

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inshore and it brought off the Brigadier of the Brigade 1
then embarking, who asked that a asssage from the acting 6-in-C
might be sent to V.A.Dover asking that the embarkation should be diverted to the beach, as French soldiers were causing congestion at the piers. It was also stated that the rearguard
B
would arrive about 0330. I informed V.A.Dover and all the form at Dunkirk of this by W/T. The difficulty at the beach appeared to be lack of boats. With Kydd's boats about two hundred were embarked by 0245, 2nd June.
Having received no reply to ay signal, I again read V.A.
Dover's signal ordering withdrawal before 0300, and saw that it referred only to Mineswespers. I therefore assumed that the destroyers were earrying on $111 a later hour, advithdrew, pagaing the harbour entrance as 0300. owing to smoke hase it was impossible to see now many other sraft vere still off the beach.
At 0320 V.A.Dover's signal was received ordering the
Ninesweepers to renain if necessary after 0300, by which time
I had nearly reached 1 buoy and therefore continued on my course arriving at Margate shortly after 0600.
The D.G.soil was again found to be defective, which prove fusted the ship taking part in any further operations. This has since been Sumporarily repaired at Cheerness.
The only other damage received apart from a fews minor splintor holes and dents, was & hole som in the bow plating and the port hawse pipe fractured when the Comfort was ramai.

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE.
Where all did their duty to their utmost capacity in spite of severe fatigue, it is very difficult to single out any officer or man for special nention; I would, however, like to put on record the following:-
(1) The excellent First Aid given to the wounded by my
First Libutenant
Lieutenant John Anthony Hodnet HAMER R.H.
when no Doctor was on board. I a quige certain that a number owed their lives to him.
(2) The excellent work done by
Sub-lieutenant Edwin Michael BRITTON" R.N.
who was in charge of Lydd's boats, in bringing off from the beaches & very large number of troops, nost of the time under heavy shell fire and bombing and sachine gun attacks.
Aveng ratings the following deserve nontion:-
(1) ordinary Seases VIDRIAM Fielding Richards DUXBURY"
0.No.G/JX 173054, for accurate shooting with the Starboard Lewis gun, crusing as ensuy airoraft which vas machine gunning a bostload of troops to year off hurredly with probable damage to itself.
(2) Able Seaman Fred dankwell, 050.0/J and stall 91927, for showing initiative, resource when in charge of the whaler and carley float. In a choppy sea, strong tide and pitch dark night, and with a broken rudder he succeeded in getting alongaide the wrock of H.M.S.Wakeful and brought off twenty survivers.

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE. (continued).
(3) Sto.1. Joseph FoodSwiss ROADLEY, O.N. C/SX 94432.
For ably assisting Lieut.Hear in his case of the wounded in addition to his boiler room watchkeeping duties; continuing to Nort until overcome by sheer exhaustion and nervous strein.
(4) P.O. Prodrick Harold KING, O.H. G/J 100181., for keeping the anti-sireraft spearms in an efficient state do that no delays or jamba occured.
(5) Ldg.Sto. Raymond Persival John JRMETT, O.N. 0/3% 85935.
for keeping the twenty year old angine of Aydd's motor boat in efficient running order, Bo that no breakforms of any sors occured as any time daring ambarkation.
MAIN
IN CONSTAND.
E.H.S. LYDD.
7ah June 1940.

Dynamic 100,
B14/0/
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COMMANDENCE SNAAPSON,
8th, MINESWEEPING FLOTILLA,
THE FLAG OFFICER IN CHARGE,
4th, June. 1940.
HARWICH.
Copy 45 Vice adminal sove
Sir, re; Evacuation of troops from Dunkirk.
I have the honour to present my report of the part taken by
Dunkirk. H.M.S. "Snaefell" in connection with the evacuation of troops from
1. 30/5/40. Departure from Harwich 1345 under the orders of the
Senior Officer M/S 8,H.M.S. "Olen Gower". It was decided at 1800
that, having encountered fog, the three ships of the Flotillashuold proceed independently and take such action as was found necessary on arrival at our destination.
2. 2102. Arrived off Dunkirk. It was apparent that the enemy was taking steps to prevent the accomplishment of the effort being made to rescue our comrades of the Army. Repeated bombing attacks were made on us by many aircraft.
3. 2120. "Snaefell" in action. Our gunnery was excellent and although bombs were dropped ahead and astern of the ship no damage was sustained, despite the fact that I was unable to nanoeuvre the ship owing to the many wrecks in the narrow channel.
4. 2140. Enemy aircraft again made a bombing attack. "Snaefell"
promptly replied, and aided by the gunfire of other H.M. vessels in the vicinity, the enemy was driven off.
5. 2200. The tode now being 2 hours ebb, I decided that any effort to beach my ship was too hazardous, accordingly ship was anchored in 4 fathoms off La Panne, 8 miles east of Dunkirk.
6. Ships lifeboats were immediately lowered and manned by eager volunteers from the ship's company for embarkation of the troops now seen on the beaches, and aided by several small sraft, tired and wet soldiers of all ranks were ferried in safety to the ship.
7. Throughout this operation the enemy was firing along the whole stretch of beach, Several soldiers were found wounded but their courage never wavered and, although their disabilities in many cases hampered the efforts being made to resoue them, all were safely brought on board.
8. The Wardroom was converted into a stok bay and here first aid was efficiently rendered by Sick Berth Attendant V.S. Griffin of
H.M.S. "Glen Gower" whose services were made available to me by the Senior Officer.
9. Problems were now encountered. The continuous stream of Officers and men arriving with their aquipment, wet and tired, all deairous of shedding their garments and to find a place to rest their weary bodies, was overcome by the skeleton crew on board, first by providing them from shipa stores with hot food and clothing and turning the engine room and boiler room and stokehold into a drying room.

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10. The mess decks of Petty Officers, Seamen, Stokers were readily turned over to the troops. My own accomodation provided 8
resting place for 15 Officers, the Officers dining room being used for the remainder, about 30 in number. Passages on the lower deck were speedily filled, the uppre deck, minesweeping deck, chart room, being used by the remainder of the troops unable to find covered accomodation.
11. 31/5/40. 0445. My ship now being filled to capacity and observing that other ships which had arrived during the night I
decided to weigh anchor.
12. 0500. Anchor weighed and with all speed course was set for home.
13. 1235. Entered Harwich and at 1305 ship was safely berthed at Parkstone Quay where troops were speedily disembarked.
15. 1330. The ship now presented a scene of desolation, Flanders dirt and sand, discarded clothing was everywhere, but the Military authorities having sent a working party on board, the cleaning process now began, being completed at 1600.
15. The ship's company, Officers and men having had no restsince our departure from Harwich on the 30th May I decided that as much sleep as possible should be obtained 80 as to be fit for another adventure on the following day.
Saturday 1st, June 1940.
16. During the morning fresh provisions, medical supplies, ammunition, etc., were delivered to the ship and, four outters having been provided steps for departure were now made.
17. 1450 Departed from Harwich and with all speed course was set for Dunkirk, towing 4 outters. During the passage over we were this time further encouraged by sighting squadrons of the R.A.P.
planes which evidently kept at bay enemy aircraft for none were encountered.
18. 2145. Arrived off Dunkirk and here our reception was net with bursts of shrapnel from enemy guns, which however fell short.
19. 2145. Anchored 11 miles east of Dunkirk in 4 fathoms.
20. 2200 The 4 cutters and our own lifeboats, manned by the ship's company, now set out for the beach and having landed Lieut.
Smyth steps were taken to round up troops who had secured temporary sanctuary amongst the sand dunes and shattered houses of
Dunkirk.
21. Here my report must emphasize the greatly increasing hazards of our adventure. Through the night the ship was constantly under fire from many guns, and although shalls exploded within 50
yards of the ship no direct hits were accred, although "Snaefell"
bears honoured marks of shrapmel. Ships boats with their crews
Were also attacked, shrapnel spraying them frequently. Several soldiers were slightly wounded.
2nd, June 1940
22. $330. The ship now filled to capacity, bursts of enemy gunfire becoming more unpleasant, my ship's company all safely on board anchor was weighed, and with full speed course was set for home, towing the 4 cutters.