TNA ADM 199 790

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 104.

page 5.
97
101
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
6.
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though
ship was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with
it, ordering a torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth
charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but
hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went
aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all
hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist
with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near
water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who
knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off
during attack. Complete jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who
declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S Pannel. Tas ordered by 1st. Lieut. to
load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just
reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and
inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned,
threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then
jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
7.
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the
bridge on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F - load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60° and at no
time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during
this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no
executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the
motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were
passing 18 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. A wire was passed
and made fast round a stout beam in the smack, which carried away
some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the
foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack
veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor
boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other
quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the
smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongside
the forecastle bows pointing aft. At this point second bombing
attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile,
the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was
over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to
taking up the slack too vaolently. This was due to the language
difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the
only other man on board the smack being an R.A.F. pilot. A
further bombing attack started, the final one, and I again stood
off from the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship
and I picked up all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and some men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men aboard, Whitehall appeared in the distance and we made out
half way the foremast. We met her about 12 miles away and
to intercept her, using the smack's siren and the French ensign
passed information up to her and requested her to collect men from
mid-chai.nel we transferred everyone to H.M. Trawler Olvina.
remaining boats. I then set out on a course for England and in