TNA ADM 199 790

Read with much interest.
2.
It is considered that a copy of this report should be forwarded to "SUTTON's" administrative authority if this has not been done.
3.
This paper has been marked to D.M.S.
for D.O.D. (H)
24.6.40.
It is presumed that Vice Admiral Dover will be forwarding his remarks on the original copy of this report. In addition to acting as Senior Officer of the flotilla until
NIGER joined, it is clear that Commander Temple conducted himself throughout this operation in full accord with the traditions of the service.
Reference paragraph 2 of D.O.D. (H) it is proposed that copies of this report should be sent to Flag Officer,
Humber and Commander in Chief, The Nore.
Mom.
M/S 4.
D. M. S.
June, 1940.
The chief points in this interesting report are already dealt with in V.A. DOVER's comprehensive report on
Operation Dynamo, copies of which have been widely circulated.
Direct quotations from this report show that it has passed through V.A. DOVER's hands. A large number of individual ships unjustifiable in the present circumstances to forward copies of reports on this operation are being received and it appears these to all concerned.
Administrative Authority as well as direct to report to hity.
2. Presumably C.O., SUTTON, forwarded his own
DIRECTOR OF TRAINING & STAFF DUTIES
DIVISION.
4. 7. 40.
Note
1w DNAD
23.7.40
Noted.
W.R. flayter
T.N.N.O.
27/7/40

199
HolloS. "Sutton"
MO
. 198
From:-
Commanding Officer H.M.S. Sutton.
Date:-
June 19th. I940.
No. 5/19.
To
:-
Secretary to the Admiralty.
MILITARY BRANCH
1
21 JUN 1940
ADMIRALTY
*
The Narrative of Dunkirk Operation is forwarded herewith in accordance with C.A.F.O. 1045/40.
COMMANDING OFFICER
19 JUN 194L
H.M.S. "SUTTON"
Commander in Command.
number of troops manner evacuated in from the bedohes were far in excess of what to efficient - originer or which the motor he ran boat the during ongine, the often whole under period. fire, Due the might have been expected under the difficult weather conditions.

199
H.N.S. "Sutton"
6th June 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward herewith my narrative of the events or the period May 26th to June 5th inclusive, covering the evacuation
1 the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk and the neighbouring eaches.
I have pleasure in informing you that Hollo hip under by command ustained superficial damages only, and no casualties.
I would especially like to bring before your notice the following fficers and men.
(AM)
Lieut (3) Richard llegarty. Royal Havy As engineer officer of the ship, e maintained his department in an exceedingly high state of efficiency.
on several occasions when high speed was required, he produced revolutions in excess of the full speed revolutions on trials, when the ship was built, twenty four years ago. The noral of, his department could not have been higher, and the whole Engine Room department, when not below, were continually assisting in embarking and disembarking troops. This officer is over 50 years of age.
Lieutenant William Cooffrey Hewett, Royal Naval Volunteer
This officer was almost continually in charge of the boat work on the beaches, frequently under machine gun and shell firs, and bombing attacks.
He showed great coolness and courage in encouraging and organising the troops, and it was entirely due to his fine neamanship, no boats were lost. In addition to any recognition you say see fit to sward him, 1
would strongly recommend him to be promoted to Temporary Moutenant
H.N.V.R. for which rank I understand he is eligible.
This John vas X the greatest assistance to De on the
Nalcolm HAVE Royal Navy.
bridge, officer an Navigator and 00010000 in carrying out his duties under fire. Due showing courage difficulties of navi, ation, in - lighted and charted, shoal to him waters the were overcome. for one period he was 36 hours on the bridge without a break.
Leading Albert Cade Cower, O.N. C/JX 139945,
Due to the Telegraphist efficiency of this ratings department, communications, some of vital importance were continually maintained.
This letty Officer Harold Beasley, continually DaNa C/JA in charge 93287. of the heat work. Due to his rating was almost boats were lost or danaged, to the and troopa his coolness and and courage good under seamanship five were no of great encouragement seamen under him.
Acting States Albert Deorge Dollery, during Dalla 1/18 the 80017, whole
This Petty Officer the motor boat period. fire, Due to the rating was engineer in of which he ran the engine, far often in excess under of what the number efficient nannor from the beaches were weather conditions.
might have of troops been expected evacuated under the difficult

(1).
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS 26th. MAY 20 5th. JUNE 1940, EVACUATION
201
OF BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FROM DUNKIRK AND BEACHES TO
THE EASTWARD BY H.M.S.SUTTON, FOURTH MINESWEEPING FLOTILLA.
Sunday 26th. May. Raised steam and unlocked from Royal Dook,
Grimsby. Sailed at 1900, Salamander and Fitzroy in
Company. Sutton as Senior Officer. Fresh N.W.Wind, slight sea.
On passage several Aircraft seen and heard, mostly friendly. Passed by Galatea and destroyers.
Monday 27th. May. Light breese, calm sea, maximum visibility.
Anchored in Downs by orders of V.A.Diver at 1600.
Skipjack and Halcyon anchored near by. Destroyers full of Troops continually passing at high speed.
Tuesday 28th. May. Calm, some rain, visibility one mile.
1545, Weighed and proceeded to Dunkirk, Fourth M.S.F. in company with Salam Skipjack, later joined by Haloyon.
1730, steering jammed, reduced speed and proceeded under hand steering.
1750, 5th. M.S.F. coming up astern, steering repaired, proceeded at 15 lmots.
1825, Kwinte Bank Buoy abeam, Ship sinking in vicinity, rejoined 4th. M.S.F. Hurricanes passing overhead.
2030, more Hurricanes, sighted Dunkirk fires 10 niles, weather clearing, Fitaroy detached to investigate boat.
2050, turned towards beaches and proceeded East, parallel.
Observed large numbers of troops at intervals along beach near Dunkirk, with more scattered and decreasing groups towards la Panne. Desultory gunfire. No aircraft in sight.
2125, anchored off beach about four miles East of Dunkirk, in four fathoms. No troops visible, owing to moke and approaching darkness. Motor boat and whaler sent ashore to contact troops. Troops appeared from sand dunes in disorganised parties, mostly R.A.S.C. and R.E's who had dumps and railheads. Troops were rather shaken by constant lately been engaged on demolition of bridges, ammunition air attacks, with machine guns. They had been waiting on the beaches for 30 hours before contacting ships. Very oritical of lack of Allied air support during whole of retreat, but were cheerful and disciplined. Rather exhausted after forced marches of 20 to 30 miles. 0.0. reported clean no embarkation organisation or control ashore. The the shaven condition of their aquipment, contrasted increasingly of strain and comparatively fresh appearance of troops as and the the evacuation progressed, with the evidences shown by Ships companies of H.M.Ships.
, of 25, mostly with rifles and aquipment. weather. good
10 troops embarked between 3130 and Beach 0200, in batches for embarkation, shelving send and calm
Wednesday 29th. May* 0300. Moved to another position boat broke further down, East commenced dragging anchor into shallow water to a line now bringing off troops but motor where by and after surf was running, managed get Embarked small into a of Leicestershire Regiment.
a Dutch considerable scoot, and was towed back to ship.
miles following. 0730, off proceeded shore, and disembarked all troops, COMMARDING OFFICER
detachment alongside Caloutta, who was anchored Salamanter some
19 JUN 1940
H.M.S. "SUTTON"

(2)
0830. Returned to beaches, contacted 350 troops of R.A.S.C.
and R.A.O.C. detachments, including Lieutenant Colonel and
202
officers. With assistance of 150 troops, large ship's lifeboat was pulled down beach and successfully floated to assist embarkation, but after removing gear, air tanks did not give.
sufficient buoyancy to compensate for stove in garboard strake.
Serious lack of boats, reducing embarkation rate to about 30 per hour with own boats only, 227 troops embarked remainder being sent off to Salamander and destroyers. Some difficulty experienced through persistent attempts of large masses of French troops to intercept boats and demand passage. Assisted by British troops in heading off French swimmers by rifle fire from 50 yards further along beach. Dunkirk burning with much smoke. Maximum visibility, slight cloud, No R.A.F. support sighted all day.
1600. Level bombing attack on Sutton, Salamander, Greyhound and paddlers from 5000-10000feet. One salvo pattern bombs without result. One salvo of H.E. straddling Sutton and paddlers, no hits.
One dive bombing attack on Sutton and Greyhound, near miss started fire in Greyhound smidships. One line of 5 bombs close to G.H.Q.
on sea front, on a line starting from centre of the town down beach and into sea, final two bombs falling each side of Sutton.
Comparatively small boats used, with several incendiaries, one of which set light to & drifter - cable from Sutton which was sunk by paddlers gunfire. No R.A.F. support visible. Few small machine gunshits on Sutton. Greyhound badly damaged by bombs and riddled with machine gun fire.
1706. Proceeded Dover, leaving La Panne during further air raid of less intensity, in company with Salamander. No R.A.F. support visible on passage.
2300. Arrived off Dover, calm, mist. Air raid in progress, anchored
Observed plane at about 1500 feet drop three magnetic mines about
2 cables ahead, sounds of mines striking water clearly audible.
Parachutes seen by several separate observers. Signalled position of mines to V.A. Dover.
Thursday 30th. May. 0600. Proceeded into Dover, discharged troops.
1052. Proceeded Sheerness with one boiler. Drew fires in other boiler to make repairs to brickwork, damaged by bomb explosion.
1632. Arrived Sheerness, embarked coal and ammunition.
Friday 31st. May. 0205. Left Sheerness in company with Lydd and Ross.
0400. Compasses suddenly produced 20 and 30 degrees of deviation,
Roas assumed lead of division, later compass deviation improved and Sutton re-assumed Lead.
0812. Arrived Dunkirk, proceeded east parallel to beaches passing
4 planes wrecked on the beach west of Dunkirk, two with French markings. 0829. Passed Dunkrik Harbour distant 1 cable. Harbour wall intast and little damage done apparent from seaward except huge fires.
Continual gunfire, some from beach close west of Dunkirk.
0835. Hurricanes and Spitfires overhead, proceeding homewards at the soattered harbour
Long columns of troops marching into Dunkirk from east, beach 3 miles east groups on the beach. Continious column about 1 mildalong of
Dunkirk. 0906. Anchored off La Panne, Wind N.W. force 3, freshening, with sea slight but considerable swell. Commenced loading troops
COMMANDING OFFICER
19 JUN 1940
H.M.S. "SUTTON"

203
(3)
Motor boat towing whaler and two army pontoons. Since previous day pier had been constructed by driving out lorries at abb tido in line and securing planks on top, considerably expediting loading of boats, though embarkation rate was slowed considerablyby lack of control at shore end of pior to move troops along and by natural reluctance of troops to venture along pier without being relieved of part of their heavy equipment. Some defficulty experienced in loading tow of 4 boats without smashing up against pier in swell and in handling pontoons in tow in provailing conditions which tended to reduce embarkation rate. Boats available quite inadequate, large open motor beach boats required, together with vessel anchordd broadside or sunk at Hoad of pior to give a lee if necessary with oil slick provided.
During embarkation, Sutton collected soldiers from overturned pontoon.
Allowed to broach in swell. Three believed drowned mainly due to lack of foresight of shore authorities in allowing troops to embark with full equipment and overcoats in deteriorating weather conditions. 120 trags embarked mostly R.E., R.A., R.A.S.C. with a for infantrymen and guards, morale very good but very critical of lack of R.A.F. support and Bolgium treachery behind lines. Country said to be filled with updes, night positions during retreat seen to be signalled by flashlight to planos, bombed within half nn hour of being established. Surprising speed of advance of Germans against positions being propared and defencelossness against dive bombing also important factors.
1137. Weighed anchor and discharged troops alongside Lydd. Wind and sea increasing alightly, rather Low cloud.
1150. Proceeded North Goodwin Lt. Vessel to await time for next reddezvous. Lydd and Ross proceeded to Margate to discharge troops.
1538. Anchored at North Goodwin Lt. Vessel.
1855. Weighed and proceeded to Dunkirk in company ml. th Higer.
Passed great number of small craft, as well as destroyers and paddlors.
2115. Passed Dunkirk Harbour distant 1 cable. Heavy gunfire from beach about 2 miles west of Harbour, apparently enemy shelling tom.
Fires in Dunkirk more extensive.
2147. Anchored off beach between La Fanne and Dunkirk. No sign of boats as expected.
2235. Boat from shore reported troopa further to eastward, only boat available run aground. Moved 1 mile eastward.
Saturday 1st June 0100. No troops yet contacted. No boats except
Sutton's available. Several minelaying airoraft overhead, observed parachute mines descending about 3 cables ahead and 1 cable astern. lines
0130. Commenced loading troops with own notor boats and whalar reported dropped all over fairway.
Troops mostly R.A. and infantrymen including guards, X Yorks., and machine and ship's lifeboat found off beach. Lator assisted by motor yacht.
gun detachmont. No R.A.F. assistance before or after. dawn. Opened fire occasional reconnaisence aircraft at dawn. One level bombing wounded from pontoons alongaide, one casualty receiving attack wounds in attack on of about 5000 feet followed by machine gunning whilst embarking back whilst helped over the side. This machine gun but undoubtedly for would being been pressed home causing very heavy casualties manned
L.G. concentrated Detachment of Guards also offered to provide low gun have Lowis gun and Bron gun fire from troops, who Bron ships defence armsment. for the large ship's lifeboat against occasional flying
COMMANDING OFFICER
19 JUN 1940
H.M.S. "SUTTON"
to

204
(4)
aircraft, but this was declined in order to utilise maximum space for embarkation. No R.A.F. machines observed engaging enemy at any time. Battery of two guns believed French 5.7"
firing continually on beach parallel with Sutton. Observed heavy and accurate shelling of La ganne beaches and main street and pier constructed previous day from lorries.
0600. Weighed and proceeded leaving Dunkirk Roads close inshore to reduce possibility of encountering mmerous magnetic mines laid during night.
1130. Alongside at Dover, discharged troops.
1810. Proceeded from Dover in company with Niger.
2121. Passed Dunkirk Harbour and arrived off beach, not by
R.A. Dover in C.M.B. and ordered to proceed into Dunkirk to load at eastern pier. Proceeded into Dunkirk Harbour and made fast at seaward end of eastern pier by shore instructions.
Embarked 725 troops with two brows, about one third French.
Enemy artillery very active and apparently still concentrating on back area of Dunkirk. Pier slightly damaged. Harbour area all quiet, embarkation completed in about an hour and a half without incident, but hombed about twenty minutes after Suttonss departure by about 50 aircraft.
Sunday reduced to minimise listing when turning, troops below trimmed received
2nd June 1207. Proceeded out of harbour for Dover, with to speed listing and boats swing in. When aboam of FG When Bucy just report that report again received that mines had been received report the reduce magnetic mines had been laid round bucy. ladd in vicinity. being raided and mines dropped off abeam of W A buoy, V buoy whole route reported mined. entrance. Later that Dover was Goodwin Lt. Vessel adroraft apparently enemy ship passed in
0306. close alongside At North flying low but presumably failed to observe spite of alongside Worcester Dunkirk exceptional which had 45 Sutton laft. 7 survivors of Kedth sunk in same
0432. Entered killed Dover and many injured in boulding raid also on arrived alongaide shortly after with Captain D 19 in mall motor barge, raid.
Monday 3rd June, 2010. Proceeded from Dover for Dunidrk, having embarked medical through the Doma, engines developeé temporary repairs feed tank officer and ordely.
2052. Passing reduced speed. While attempting visibility to half a cable.
if weather trouble, at Dunkirk. a thickened made rapidly stating reducing circumstances of Dunkirk engines soon for in and enough very mancervring decision think for umbarkation, fog to required return to of
2230. to Signal repairs. In turning distant, yards. return,
Downs to effect at sonsiderable spood Vessel.
2346. destroyer Anchored passed at North Goodwin Light
Sunday 4th Visibility June. improved, Niger. procooded to Dover Signal operation COMMANDING COMMA OFFICER
he
19 JUN 1940
H.M.S. "SUTTON"

Duplicate
Dynam ///
414/0/12
-1922
DarD
207
Miniralty, S.V.1.
with information
8th June, 1940.
Rear Admiral, Dover Report of Proceedings, 29th May - 3rd June
Sir, Dentas the
I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations
206
PACTORS INSTRUCTION N SECURITY
205
Low embarkation rate off basehes at the Issue this 30 per hour owned by lack of centrol ashore for first days: und of suitable boats FACTORS ASSISTING THE EVACUATION.
No whip to beach communication to augediate Issuing, resulting in casual 1. asseed by ships lying off banches for hours in deplight.
Discipline and coolness of troops under fire on beach
No That and in unfamiliar conditions in boats throughout evacuation.
Apparently no R.A.Z. protection statement agringt lovel Secting and
2. parLife saving nets rigged along ship' sides. exempt for last two days and This Lowered mozale considerably.
3.
Assistance of Army Bren Guns and gunners against low-
7
Only flying air attack. and to energy should (trs.
the
4. loan Calm weather and poor visibility. to hoodtate to 07083 to largue bosts.
MA 5. amount countating of 12 and Lowin - insidequate to
Presence of HA Light Cruiser "Calcutta".
produce become the, 02 to or Styleg streek.
No 6. billiamive shown by Army staff in local boats
Excellent physical condition of majority of troops.
on bacoh, look 7. of remain, which was invaluable in assisting embarkation of Proops
Normal state in which all piers at Dunkirk were allowed to packs, into ships. worn) emaing Late on Insections plar, and to enharking boats are beaches.
Insurrement bonie and boars shallow
No apparent Likes by stay la flying marking panting are beaches by
COMMANDING
Grenville M. Temple.
CORNAR
19JUN 1940
Ach. Cands. Moyal Navy.
H.M.S. "SUTTON"
the
Commandey office.
HMSSULTION
a

Nil
Implicate
Dynam III
1922
DanD
207
Admirality, S.W.1.
8th June, 1940.
Rear Admiral, Dover. Report of Proceedings, 29th May - 3rd June
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations
206
FACTORS OBSTRUCTING THE EVACUATION.
Low embarkation rate off beaches - at times less than 30 per hour caused by lack of control ashore for first few days; and absence of suitable boats.
No ship to beach communication to expediate loading, resulting in casualties caused by ships lying off beaches for hours in daylight.
No Medical Officers at beginning for attending casualties.
Apparently no R.A.F. protection whatever against level bombing and more particularly, dive bombing and machine gunning, except for last two days and a few short periods previously. This lowered troops'
morale considerably.
i.
Only one pier, built from lorries end to end, at position most open to enemy shell fire.
5.
Sandbar off beaches preventing close approach, causing troops to hesitate to cross relatively deep water with full equipment to reach larger boats.
7.
HA armament consisting of 12 pdr. and Lewis guna quite inadequate to produce barrage fire, or to discourage high or low flying attack.
3.
No initiative shown by Army Staff in bringing into use local boats on beach.
9.
packs, full equipment and rifles, (not held, but worn) causing into
Lack of foresight shown in allowing troops to embark with overcoats, hesitation on insecure pier, and difficulty in embarking boats off beaches.
0.
Insufficient boats at all times, and too few motor beach boats and shallow draft pontoons.
if
1,
No taken by Army to provent low available. flying machine gunning off apparent beaches by steps mounting Bren guns which were by of
Greeville. M. Temple
Ach. Can.d. Rozal Navy.
each
COMMANDING 19 JUN SUTTOIN 1940
OFFICER *
Commander office.
the
"NO
H.M.S. Sulian.
.
H.M.S.

Implicate
Dynam
Nil
///
114/0/1946
-
4902
Roar Admiral, Jamp Dover Report of Proceedings, 29th May - 3rd June
207
Minirality, S.W.1.
8th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations off shore at Dunkirk between Wednesday, 29th May, and Tuesday, 4th June.
2.
Much of this report has had to be completed from memory, and share incident is so crowded it is difficult not to give a confused picture. The picture was, however, confused, and so for as operations off the beaches were concerned organisation was not possible. The most that could be done was to exercise some control and direction.
Narrative
29th May
3.
I sailed at 2000 from Dover in ESK, who had on board 12 small beach parties. These were distributed at the beaches into any craft available and
Commodore Hallett was put into a drifter to take charge off above at Bray and
Commodore Stephenson off La Pame.
30th May
4.
At 0200, 30th May, I boarded HRBS off La Funne and heard the general situation from Captain Dush.
5.
At this time there were a for ships, drifters and other creft off the beaches and embarkation was proceeding alowly with the for boats available.
6.
Daylight showed the beaches block with troops, a mmber of boats broached to. A very for boats, principally whalers, and sloose noter-bonts were bringing off troops.
7.
It was nisty, clouds were low and the sea was calm, but even so there WELLS a stight surf inshare.
8.
It became imadiately obvious to 130 that any large unbarimition from the beaches depended on more inshore boats and crews. The crews were the essential 08 H.M. Ships could not spare non from VA Guns and Amendment and I
signalled to this affect.
who 9. I found was away with the O₂ in 0. at La Fanne, but none the less I was
During the forenoon I want into Dunicis in HERE to see the S.N.O.
formed the opinion that unbarkation from Dunkirk was the only practical plan if able to got into the picture. Finding that the harbour could be used I
large numbers were involved and all my subsequent afforts were directed to that onl. I stressed this view in many signals.
10. the inshore boats and the problem I had to deal with was to control the
At the same the the beaches had to be used to the fullest capacity of shipping available 80 as to balance these two requirements.
half 11, the length of the boach, and touch with Dunkir's involved a close approach
Control was not essy: it was selden possible to DOB more then and V/S. Ships were of tim tied to their position by their heats being early days off the beaches an H.A/S.B. would have inshore, and often these were the only boats available been at involuable. that point. In the
12.
To put the situation that developed into a mutabell, /at the plans made

193
2089
2.
at Bover envianged for mre men being emboxited from the beaches than was in practice possible when the moment arrived, and I had therefore to modify then on the spot to make greater use of Dunicire, and continually adjust the plan and the means to a changing stituation.
13.
During the day of 30th May embortation proceeded slowly there were not enough ships off the benches and at one mement HER was there alone. Hon were coming off in pontoons but there me often no one to take these creft ashore again. During the day lorries voro driven into the BSN to form pders.
14.
There were many wounded on board HKHR, and at 4 Della I decided to sond her home. Captain Bush went in her to strees the vital necessity for boats and crews if any mmbers were to come off from the beaches.
15.
Accordingly I transferred to WINDSOR off Bray at 1600, and at 1630
landed at La Parme to visit the 0.-in-0. It was necessary to vale the last for yards. Captain Tennext was with the C.-in-C. and the situation was discussed.
I stressed my views as to the difficulties of embaritation by boat and the necessity for moving tomoda Dunicirit, but I could not but be more of a relustance on the part of the Army to do 80 and a feeling that the Havy ought to be able to embark large mmbers by boat from the beaches. Arrengments to take off the
C.-in-C. at 1600 on Friday were made, and he informed 30 of the effort of which he had heard from the 1st Sea Lord by telephone, and which was to be made on
Friday night. The details of this 1 received next day at 1000. when Captain
Bush returned in HERE.
16.
At my first attampt to return to KANSER in a pontoon peddled by soldiers the boat swamped in shallow water, but the second attempt with a smaller arew was successful and I got OR board at 2200.
31st May
17.
At 0230 on Friday, 31st May, IS WORDSTER we full to with troops I
transferred to EXPRESS and in her proceeded to Dunicizione at daylight to direct ahiys to where they were most needed.
18.
On this day the breese freshened and being onshore made boat work very difficult. Many boats were broached to and strended at high under so that embarkation from the beaches cuse about to a standatill. I continued to urge movement of troops to Dunkirk and considered the value of basching abive but was tide. very doubtrul that it would be of any use except for a small period of the
19. thereafter BO that my movements should not be haspered by consideration of
At 0645 I transferred to H.M.S. KEITH and kept her free from troops embarkation or wounded more
20. The At these was the provision of larger numbers of small bonts to and
1000 HERE arrived with the plans for the avacuation for Friday night.
crows essence to bring of off the rearguard at 0130 to minasweepers which ware be there about that time.
made 21. During for IDD to get Destroyers, Paddlers, and would have been sent these the day the time of ambarkation WAS advanced other to 2030 cruft and off this
Dunicisk at that time. they could have Boaded quicker. in it but was, the sent every mmber ship of beaches it necessary Buf for this many of these ships I into which itself where be taken from the beaches into Duricist than I liked. large places could from possibly which boats were working locked up more abive moved 22. About noon At 1430 X proceeded in KKISH to La balloon. Permo try KNITH locate
HERE off LA Pume ome under fire from a shore to battery to and the battery further but West. 10 was beding directed by an observation was fired on and I withdrow.
/23.
À

209
3.
23.
A heavy gm was also sholling screemat blindly off Bray, the shots falling outside the ships in fairly well defined areas which could be avodded.
24.
An encounter between OUR own and many aircraft took place off
Bray in which three of our own adroraft ware shot down. later air attack developed on ships and 10 redds took place but no ships were damaged.
25.
In accordance with the plans toms of bonts should have arrived off
Duricizi about 1800. Two toms of dinghies currived at 1700 and were sent to La Parme where I also went in order to ensure the embarkation of the C.in c.
I left behind Ideutsnant Commission in on M.S.B. to direct the town when they arrived and to order a Large number of Hoppers and similar craft to beach themselves on the rising tite at the Western beaches. At La Fame
I found that BEE had embarked necombing to plan, and I embarked the rest of the H.C. from the beach 2 miles west in KEITH'S boats. During this time KEITH and THE were bonbed and the boats were marrowly missed.
26.
I then returned to Dunicirk share the rest of the town did not arrive till it was getting dark, making it very difficult to ensure their finding the further beaches. It. Communitor - laft behind in M.A.S.B.6. to direct then and I took KKITH up to La Panne to shepherd nome of the town in that direction. By this time the wind had dropped.
27.
About Midnight ILA/S.B.6 returned to KEITH, embarked the C.-in-C.
and took him to Dover.
28.
HEITH remained off La Purmo during the might, during which there were reports of Parachute Itines off Bray, M.T.B's were heard to the Enstrard, probably our own, and a for shells fall among ships off La Pame. The tom and beaches at La Panne were heavily shelled and the ambarkation moved
Westward in consequence. It was impossible to tall how the embaritation was going in the dark as KKITH could not get close inshore, but such reports as come in showed that it was slow and that beaches at la Panno were being heavily shelled.
1st June
29. ships were ordered to withdraw to the Westmund at dram. At daylight the
As the energy would be in occupation of La Fame in the norming situation WELLS an follows. The beaches at La Permo were enjity and - were
Westward. A Hinosweeper and a Paktler were eahore off Bray: a large musber moving along all beaches to the Westmurd. Ships But of Bruy were soving of boats were floating engiy and without cress.
boats and towed West. I also spent some the trying to a tag
30. loading Into Dunkirk and tried to get BOOD of the boats collected inluse by Notor to
During the naxt for hours I sent all abive that were not full or assist the Minesweeper ashoro. I begt BASTLISK with no and early of troops in Case any covering fire was needed.
were 31. made on nearly all ahive off the beaches by Dive
About 0730 large members of energy Boabers. appeared and attacks кктчи, 32. During and a tug with survivors of KNITH and large and were the others this period, one Destroyer off Dunicive SKINJACK was hit and BASILISK, sunk.
Bombs SKIPKACK, be dropped in threes and fives, one staff states that bombs small, and three planes action about 20 seconds. I at this time.
appeared to attacked together; one of have my loarnt subsequantly aone that all had small a delay creft and beaches wase machine gunned short of assumition and I had than intended return to to transfer Dover. to
BASILISK 33. so KNITH that KNITH was could load at Dualeis and
34.
At 0745 a new adas jumed the stearing / after gear in KNITH and shortly

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Hos the was lit in the after Bodler Rous and started to settle dom.
sptain Borthon then anchored her and N.T.B. 102, which had Just arrived, time alenguido. I embarked in her with my Staff, and after talling 2
ages to stand by KETTN I vent into Dunicisis to 800 General Alexander. Dive cribing and Moohing Gm attacks wire mile on the LEE on the my there.
General Member was my from the H.G., but I - a Staff Officer ml discussed the situation. At that time I gethered that the ylan was
D emounte during the meet right from the Teatem Dench only and be Rearguard were to within at does and nis their my to Dunkirit. AB
his mount continuing the orbarbation for BCDD hours of drytight I had save fears of have losses after that norning's experience.
6.
in there ms nothing more I could do at Dusidate and all ships were etaming I docided to return to Dover to min contact.
7.
I reached Dovor at 1130 in M.T.B. 102 and left again at 1730 in
LA/S.B. 10. At Dowar I TRIB oble to discuss the plans for the night sporations which was and thereafter I returned ench day the this empose.
of
The num for this right was mughly to about between 2100 and
0330 from the to niles of bench East of Dunidrity for which Large mobers of small cruft was to be towal out. In addition Personnel Ships were to enbask from
39. the S.N.O. ond the General, and give then details of the plan. I-5 then loant
3 salled early in M.M.S.B. 10 ml Invied at at 1900, visited to my growt relief that the Boarguard word being relieved by the French and withdrawing during the night.
40. between the bouches and Dunicisity continually senting abilys which were loading
4b 2100 ships started to unive and from then counts I noved very alouly off the beaches into Duniclare to fill up there. The plan ID
originally made would not have unde full use of Dunicis.
41. being off auxe of the Havel Ratings of the Shore Party, at the I Iny there until at 0200 2 went alongadde the root of the that ydur in Dunklark to
02A5 when I proceeded round all ships borthal in humbur. -
1t was shelling claim morning 3 decided to gob abive may by 0300 instead of the of considerable of the Hurbour at this the and a Truder VMI sus. As
0330, and a very seon this pub into affect: 201°c for Dovor: sow Internet hour.
small and't having homever, contributed thoir vesit off the benches to &
42. Naht Sunday and 3ml June
Dunicis schore and owner 30,000 for BOOD Prench 100ml and the bench unde any Husb-
At this abigo Presch, and the plan orranged from USI the beach close
10 - understood that there was to 5000 about Beltish from still murd. entirely 1 a strong udul and have shalling on embanisation there disponible.
45. Paddlers, A very Large and Schools - outside. provided and oursing organity in Personnel in allition Shipe, to Destroyers, Defiters
Flotilles $ boate working from thigs the French had collected a large meber the humber. of fishing
44. Vessels, Traviers, By this and the small also about which worked from days up
45.
I arrived at in K.A/S.B. 10. at /attade 2030, after a boahing

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5.
cortly assist after to the first Destroyer to leave. Two motor boats with him tack on the way. I then embarked General Alexander and transferred these on the pler and in the control and berthing of shipping had been parties over dly damaged to be of use. She was sent back to England.
sunk. The other arrived, but had one engine out of action and was too were attacked by aircraft on passage, and one with Commander Clouston sent by by 2200. There was a fresh Northerly breese and this, coupled with the
The evacuation was timed to start at 2100 and four Destroyers had got
Road tide, set ships off the pier and they had difficulty in berthing until the haft moving in and out of the harbours added to the difficulties.
de turned and the breeze dropped. Large numbers of French fishing and other
230 the B.E.F. were all away and at 2300 Captain Tennant and the rest of the
M.A/S.B. 10 assisted two destroyers to berth by pushing them. By lival party left in M.T.B. 102. The absence of the naval borthing parties, abarked with the last of the B.E.F., was much felt, and the French did nothing replace them.
There was then a very long pause before any French troops
Roaded. name down to the East pier. One ship was alongside * hours before she was
B°
There were large numbers of French troops at the West Quay and wo Personnel Ships were sent in there. The second of these, the ROUSE, went ground when clearing and I was reluctant to risk any more. Also this plar as supposed to be used by French ships and some French Destroyers did go there.
OUEN refoated at High tide next day and returned safely.
9.
The flow of troops was so slow that it was obvious that the ships vailable could not be filled in the time and I sent back three destroyers and several Fleet Sweepers empty and also at least two Personnel Ships.
50.
This was a disappointing night. For scose reason the French did not some down and did not appear in any numbers until about half an hoghe before dam.
The reason given was that a dounter-attack had to be made. At 0300 there were three Personnel Ships alongaide and I had to order then to leave at 0310. The
Slockships arrived at 0310 and I laft for Dover shortly aftermatis.
Light 3/4 June.
51.
For this night the time available for embarkation, 2230 to 0230, was reduced by an hour, and it was planned to use both Bast and West piers in addition from small boats. For upper the West pier schools, minesweepars, and two correttes to small craft at the quays of the harbour. Vessels also lay off for loading were detailed. East pier was to have 10 Transports, 6 Destroyers, and 4 Paddlers.
WEITSHED was to land berthing parties at 2200.
52.
I want over in M.T.B. 102 and arrived at 2200 to find the harbour swarming with French fishing boats on their way in and the piers full of troops.
very 53. was tide turned at 2330. WHITSHED and three Ships
There again a fresh Northerly wind and berthing conditions Personnel were and later difficult until the for over an hour to get alongaide, and finally I took in some of SABRE were trying off WEITSHED and landed them. No ship succeeding berthing the berthing party until 2330 so that only three hours was available for at the It East is pier remarkable that in spite of this only case paddler was unable the East pier.
54. continual Owing to fresh ships, the harbour entrance got very which the delay in borthing, the mmbers of small craft congested and and the the ships there were handled no collisions in these constricted waters. Time and again feared that arrival of is ude solely to the magnificent way in I
a ship would were go ashore in some impossible position.
/55 I

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6.
55.
I had to send some ships out and delay others going to the Test pier until the entrance was cleared.
56.
The flow of troops down the East pier was far better, but there were bad pauses. The West yder was always arouded, and as the ships dertailed for this were insufficient I led in a Personnel Ship to the West plar at 0145
and she was followed by ROYAL SOVEREIGN which did not leave till 0300.
57.
MALCOLM left at 0240 and EXPRESS at 0300 after embarking the berthing party. When the Inttor left there were about 200 non on the East pier and these were later embarked by SHIKART who was ascorting the blockships.
58.
At the West pier there were still a for hundred non, but I only had KELLET available and with her slow speed I did not feel justified in taking the risk of the late departure that loading her would have involved.
59.
During the night HIREVISION me holed by a French Truzler and transferred her troops, KHLINE went aground and got off, and one paddler was sent back unfilled.
60.
In the foregoing narrative I have mile no particular mention of
French Ships any more than I have of Deitish Ships. On all days, however,
French Destroyers were using the West any and I think they did all they could and played their part wall. Latterly also, large numbers of French fishing boats and small steamers took part and embarked may non from
Dunicire.
61.
There was intersittent shall fire on Dunicisio the whole time, but it was never effectively directed on the vital points such as the East Pier and had no effect on the ambariention, although one truelerine sunk in the
Harbour. That BO little interference occurred must, I think, have been due to the effective boaking of the batteries during the nights.
62.
During the last three nights at Dunicire the handling of ships in the harbour under the most difficult conditions was magnificent. Transports,
Destroyers, Minesweepers, Paddlers, and all descriptions of small craft were moving in and out in these confined waters, share there were several urecks in inconvenient places. Little time was lost, and that DO many - were brought off is due to the coolness and suprese semanship of the Captains of these ships.
63. boyond praise from the smallest credit to the largest, and what has
During these operations the work of all those engaged has been been all concerned. Few orders could be given but that did not accomplished in the result of the single-airled purpose and determination matter for of but of those who dune under my OWN observation I wish to bring your everyone did his ubsort. I had for opportunities to pdak out special to notice cases, the following Officers:-
Cantain & L.Berthon - H.M.S.
fire During attack, being finally aunit. Captain calls I put upon his and his shij the the I was in H.N.S. KNTTH she was Burthon subjected handled to shell his with great and boalding coolness and Judgement and not all the ship.
Liqutarant - H.M.S. KNITH.
the air attack which finally disabled KNITH and this took officer drastic handled the During ship with complete coolness in a materly way, avaiding

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7.
Finally when the helm jambed he continued to loong her under control.
avoiding action at high speed in very confined inters full of shipping.
Commodore
Did most valuable work off the beaches in a motor boat at
La Parme and Bray, organizing and controlling small craft and the embarkation of Lord Gart. When La Farme because unternable ording to shell fire he moved to Bray and only left the coast when driven off by the air attack of 1st June.
Ideutenant R.C.H.G.Evre - K.A/S.B. 10
Handled his boat with the greatest coolness and skill inside
Dunicize in crowled waters, darkness, and under shell fire. His good work greatly facilitated my task of control.
Lieutenant Commander
+
This officer assisted no throughout the operations and was invaluable. Unspering of himself be net any call on In with the greatest efficiency. On two occasions he carried out difficult tasks with complete success, controlling small cruft and directing Herchant ships to beach themselves so that they could be boarded at low tide.
Lieutement Viscount Kalburn
Acted as my Signal Officer and carried out Ida dirties with the greatest efficiency under most trying conditions.
I have the honour to be,
Story
Your obstitum servent,
W.R. WAKE-WALKER.
VIO ADMIRAL
9-JUN 1940
Bear Admiral.
DOVER
The Vice Admiral Commiting
Dover.

Dynam. 111.
11/14/01. 199 Nil
1446
-215
214
Admiralty, S.V.1.
8th June, 1940.
Rear Admiral, Dover Report of Proceedings, 29th May - 3rd June
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations off shore at Dunkirk between Wednesday, 29th May, and Tuesday, 4th June.
2.
Much of this report has had to be completed from memory, and where incident is so crowded it is difficult not to give a confused pdoture. The picture was, however, confused, and so far as operations off the beaches were conserned organisation was not possible. The most that could be done was to exercise some control and direction.
Narrative
29th May
3.
I sailed at 2000 from Dover in ESK, who had on board 12 small beach parties. These were distributed at the beaches into any craft available and
Commodore Hallett was put into a drifter to take charge off shore at Bray and
Commodore Stephenson off La Panne.
30th May
4.
At 0200, 30th May, I boarded HEBS off La Fanne and heard the general situation from Captain Bush.
5.
At this time there were a few ships, drifters and other creft off the beaches and embarkation was proceeding slowly with the few boats available.
6.
Daylight showed the beaches black with troors, a mumber of boats broached to. A very few boats, principally whalers, and scese notor-boats were bringing off troops.
7.
It was misty, clouds were low and the sea was calm, but even so there was a slight surf inshore.
8.
It became immediately obvious to 130 that any large enbarkation from the beaches depended on more inshore boats and arews. The areas were the essential as H.M. Ships could not spare men from A/A Guns and Amement and I
signalled to this affect.
9.
During the forenoon I went into Dunicisk in HERE to see the S.N.O.
who I found was away with the 0. in 0. at La Panne, but none the less I was formed the opinion that embarkation from Dunkirk was the only prectical plan if able to got into the picture. Finding that the harbour could be used I
large numbers were involved and all my subsequent afforts were directed to that end. I stressed this view in many signals.
10. the inshore At boats and the problem I had to deal with was to the same time the beaches had to be used to the control fullest capacity the of shipping available so as to balance these two requirements.
half 11. Control of was the beach, and touch with Dunkirk their boats a being approach not easy; it was seldom possible involved to see more close than inshore, V/S. Ships often were these were the only boats available been invaluable. In the and the length of ten tied to their position by at that point.
early days and off the beaches an M.A/S.B. would have
12.
To put the situation that developed into a nutshell, /at the plans made

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2.
over envisaged for more men being embarked from the beaches than was in tice possible when the moment arrived, and I had therefore to modify them the spot to make greater use of Dunkirk, and continually adjust the plan and means to a changing situation.
During the day of 30th May embarkation proceeded slowly - there were not gh ships off the beaches and at one moment HEBE was there alone. Men were ng off in pontoons but there was often no one to take these craft shore in, During the day lorries were driven into the sea to form piers.
There were many wounded on board HEBE, and at 4 Della I decided to a her home. Captain Bush went in her to stress the vital necessity for ts and crews if any mmbers were to come off from the beaches.
Accordingly I transferred to WINDSOR off Bray at 1600, and at 1630
ded at La Parme to visit the C.-in-0. It was necessary to wade the last few ds. Captain Tennant was with the C.-in-C. and the situation was discussed.
tressed my views as to the difficulties of embarkation by boat and the essity for moving towards Dunkiric, but I could not but be aware of a relustance the part of the Army to do so and a feeling that the Havy ought to be able to ark large numbers by boat from the beaches. Arrangements to take off the in-C. at 1600 on Friday were made, and he informed = of the affort of which had heard from the 1st Sea Lord by telephone, and which was to be made on day night. The details of this I received next day at 1000. when Captain sh returned in HEBE.
At my first attempt to return to WORCESTER in a pontoon peddled by ldiers the boat swamped in shallow water, but the second attempt with a aller crew was successful and I got on board at 2200.
31st May
At 0130 on Friday, 31st May, as WORCESTER was full up with troops I
ansferred to EXPRESS and in her proceeded to Dunkirk at daylight to direct ships where they were most needed.
On this day the breese freshened and being onshore made boat work very ffficult. Many boats were breached to and stranded at high water so that barkation from the beaches case almost to a standstill. I continued to urge ovement of troops to Dunkirk and considered the value of beaching shipe but dde. as very doubtful that it would be of any use except for a small period of the
9.
At 0645 I transferred to H.M.S. XETTH and kept her free from troops mbarkation or wounded men.
hereafter that my movements should not be haspered by consideration of
O.
At 1000 HEBE arrived with the plans for the evacuation for Friday night.
The essence the provision of larger numbers of small boats and crews to bring of off these the was rearguard at 0430 to minsswespers which were to be there about that time.
made 21. it During the day to get Destroyers, Paddlers, and other creft these the time of embarkation was advanced to 2030 and off this
Dunicisk at that time. could have Boaded quicker. As it was, I sent every mmber ship of beaches necessary for no Buf for this many of these ships would have been sent into which could itself where be they taken from the beaches into Dunkirk but I the liked. large places from which possibly boats were working looked up more ships than moved 22. About noon At 1430 I proceeded in KNITH to La Parme to try to locate
HOLD off La Panne came under fire from a shore battery and the battury on I withdrow.
further but West. it was being directed by an observation balloon. KEITH was
/23. A

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3.
23.
A heavy gun was also shelling somewhat blindly off Bray, the shots falling outside the ships in fairly well defined areas which could be avoided.
24.
An encounter between our own and enemy aircraft took place off
Bray in which three of our own adroraft were shot down. Later air attack developed on ships and 10 raids took place but no ships were damaged.
25.
In accordance with the plans tows of boats should have arrived off
Dunkirk about 1800. Two tows of dinghies arrived at 1700 and were sent to La Panne where I also went in order to ensure the embarkation of the C.in c.
I left behind Ideutenant Communder in an M.T.B. to direct the tows when they arrived and to order a large mmber of Hoppers and similar craft to beach themselves on the rising tide at the Western beaches. At La Parme
I found that HEBE had embarked Cy-in-C. according to plan, and I ambarked the rest of the H.Q. from the beach 2 miles west in KEITH's boats. During this time KEITH and HERE were bombed and the boats were narrowly missed.
26,
I then returned to Dunicirk where the rest of the town did not arrive till it was getting dark, making it very difficult to ensure their finding the further beaches. Lt. Commander Wynne-Bhrards was left behind in M.A.S.B.6. to direct then and I took KETTH up to La Fame to shepherd some of the town in that direction. By this time the wind had dropped.
27.
About Midnight M.A/S.B.6 returned to KETTH, embarked the 0.-in-C.
and took him to Dover.
28.
HEITH remained off La Parme during the night, during which there were reports of Parachute Mines off Bray, M.T.B's were heard to the Eastward, probably our own, and a few shells fell among ships off La Panne. The town and beaches at La Panne were heavily shelled and the embarkation moved
Westward in consequence. It was impossible to tell how the embarkation -
going in the dark as KETTH could not get close inshore, but such reports as came in showed that it was slow and that beaches at la Panne were being heavily shelled.
1st June
29.
As the enemy would be in occupation of La Panne in the worning ships were ordered to withdrew to the Westmard at dam. At daylight the situation was as follows. The beaches at La Panne were espity and - were moving along all beaches to the Westward. Ships Bast of Bray were moving
Westward. A Minesweeper and a Paddler were schore off Bray: a large mmber of boats were floating expty and without crews.
30. loading into Dunkirk and tried to get some of the boats collected by
During the next few hours I sent all ships that sere not full Hotor or boats and towed West. I also spent some time trying to induse a tug to assist the Minesweeper ashore. I kept BASILISK with 200 and eapty of troops in case any covering fire was needed.
were 31. made on nearly all ships off the beaches by Dive Bumbers.
About 0730 large numbers of energy Aircraft appeared and attacks
KEITH, 32. During and a tug with survivors of KNITH and were the others this period, one Destroyer off Dunkirk SKIPJACK was hit and BASILISK, sunk.
Bombs SKIPKACK, be dropped in threes and fives, one large and that bombs had and three delay planes action of about 20 seconds. I have learnt this time. subsequently
Small, appeared to attacked together; one of my staff states scie that all small a craft and beaches were machine gunned at
33. BASILISK so KNITH that was KRISH could load at Dunkirk and then return short of assunition and I had intended to to transfer Dover. to
#
At 0745 a near miss jammed the stearing goar in KNITH and shortly
/ after

202
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ter she was hit in the after Boiler Room and started to settle down.
aptain Berthon then anchored her and M.T.B. 102, which had just arrived, me alongside. I embarked in her with my Staff, and after telling 2
ags to stand by KEITH I went into Dunkirk to see General Alexander. Dive ombing and Maching Gun attacks were made on the N.T.B. on the way there.
5.
General Alexander was away from the H.Q., but I saw a Staff Officer nd discussed the situation. At that time I gathered that the plan was o evacuate during the next night from the Western Beach only and Dunicizione he Rearguard were to withdraw at dawn and make their way to Dunkirk. is his meant continuing the embarkation for some hours of daylight I had rave fears of heavy losses after that morning's experience.
6.
As there was nothing more I could do at Dunicirk and all ships were etuning I decided to return to Dover to make contact.
7.
I reached Dover at 1130 in M.T.B. 102 and left again at 1730 in
LA/S.B. 10. At Dover I was able to discuss the plans for the night operations which was invaluable, and thereafter I returned each day for this purpose.
38.
The plan for this night was, roughly, to embark between 2100 and
0330 from the 12 miles of beach East of Dunicirk, for which large numbers of small craft were to be towed out. In addition Personnel Ships were to enbark from Dunkirk.
39.
I sailed early in M.A/S.B.10 and landed at Dunicirk at 1900, visited the S.N.O. and the General, and gave them details of the plan. I then learnt to my great relief that the Rearguard were being relieved by the French and withdrawing during the night.
40.
At 2100 ships started to arrive and from then omards I noved between the beaches and Dunkirk, continually sending ships which were loading very slowly off the beaches into Dunkirk to fill up there. The plan as originally made would not have made full use of Dunkirk.
41. bring off some of the Naval Ratings of the Shore Party, and I lay there until
At 0200 I went alongside the root of the East pier in Dunkirk to
0245 when I proceeded round all ships barthed in harbour. there was it was clear morning I decided to get ships away by 0300 instead the considerable shelling of the Harbour at this time and a Trawler was sunk. of As
0330, and a very seen this put into effect I left for Dover; acue of small craft having however, continued their work off the beaches to a later hour.
42. Night - Sunday 2nd - Monday 3rd June.
it was understood that there were 5000 enbark British from still
Dunkirk and over 30,000 except for some French local craft from the beach made any Eastashore At this stage French, and the plan arranged was to beach close ward. entirely Actually a strong wind and heavy shelling on the embarkation there impossible.
43. Paddlers, Minesweepers A very large and Schools was provided in addition to and carrying capacity in Personnel Ships, Destroyers, Drifters
Flotillas of boats working from Tugs outside.
the French had collected a large mmber the harbour. of fishing
44. vessels, Trawlers, By this and time small also steamers which worked from quays up
45.
I arrived at Dunicis in M.A/S.B. 10. at 2030, after a boaking
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not on the way. I than embarked General Alexander and transferred him assist on the pier and in the control and borthing of shipping had been sent over rtly after to the first Destroyer to leave. Two motor boats with parties these were attacked by aircraft on passage, and one with Communder Clounton ly damaged to be of use. She ms sent back to England.
sunk. The other arrived, but had one engine out of notion and was too by 2200, There was a fresh Northerly breese and this, coupled with the
The evacuation was timed to start at 2100 and four Destroyers had got od tide, set ships off the pier and they had difficulty in borthing until the le turned and the brease dropped. Large mmbers of French flabing and other ft moving in and out of the harbours added to the difficulties.
M.A/S.B. 10 assisted two destroyers to borth by pushing them.in. By so the B.E.F. were all away and at 2300 Capisin Termant and the rest of the
7al party left in N.T.B. 102. The absence of the naval borthing parties, barked with the last of the B.E.F., was much folt, and the French did nothing replace them. There was then a very long pause before any French troops aded. no down to the East pier. One ship was alongside 28 hours before the -
There were large mmbers of French troops at the Yest Quay and
O Personnel Ships were sent in there. The second of these, the ROUN, went round when clearing and I was reluctent to risk any more. Also this plar
S supposed to be used by French ships and some French Destroyers did go there.
USN relibated at High tide next day and returned safely.
The flow of troops was so slow that it was obvious that the ships milable could not be filled in the time and I sent back three destroyers and veral Fleet Sweepers expty and also at least two Personnal Ships.
This was a disappointing night. For some reason the French did not one down and did not appear in any mmbers until about half an hour before dam.
be reason given was that a counter-attack had to be made. At 0300 there were free Personnel Ships alongside and I had to order then to leave at 0310. the lockships arrived at 0310 and I left for Dover shortly aftermatis.
1ght 3/4 June.
1.
For this night the time available for enharitation, 2230 to 0230, WAS
educed by an hour, and it was planned to use both Bast and West yders in addition rom small boats. upper the West pier schools, minosweepers, and two correttes o mall druft at the quays of the harbour. Vessels also lay off for loading are detailed. East For yder YEAR to have 10 Transports, 6 Destroyers, and 4 Paddlers.
HTTSHED was to land borthing parties at 2200.
ai swareding with want French over flating boats on their way in and the piers full of troops.
I in M.T.B. 102 and arrived at 2200 to fini the harbour some of SABRE were trying WHITSHRD and landed them. No ship succesding and later until the for over an hour to get alongside, and finally in very 53. difficult There was again tide a turned at 2330. SHIPPING and three I Ships took fresh Northerly wind and borthing conditions Pursonnel were borthing party until off 2330 so that only three hours was available was for the It East is pier remarkable that in spite of this only one paddler unable the East pdor.
3
Owing to the ships, the harbour antrance got very congested in which delay in borthing, the mmbers of small cruft and and the continual that arrival of fresh is ulo solely to the magnificant way the ships there were were handled no collisions in these constricted unters. Time and again I feared a ship would go ashore in some impossible position.
/55 I

204
219
6.
55.
pier until the entrance was cleared.
I had to send some ships out and delay others going to the Test
56.
The flow of troops down the East pier was far better, but there were bad pauses. The West pier was always crowded, and as the ships detailed for this were insufficient I led in a Personnel Ship to the Test pier at 0145
and she was followed by ROYAL SOVEREIGN which did not leave till 0300.
57.
MALCOLM left at 0240 and EXPRESS at 0300 after embarking the berthing party. When the latter left there were about 200 non on the East pier and these were later embarked by SHIRART who was escorting the blockships.
58.
At the West pier there were still a few hundred men, but I only had KELLET available and with her slow speed I did not feel justified in taking the risk of the late departure that loading her would have involved.
59.
During the night KINGFISHER was holed by a French Travler and transferred her troops, KELLET went aground and got off, and one paddler vas sent back unfilled.
60.
In the foreyoing narrative I have made no particular sention of
French Ships any more than I have of British Ships. On all days, however,
French Destroyers were using the Test Quay and I think they did all they could and played their part wall, Latterly also, large numbers of Prench fishing boats and small steamers took part and embarked may - from
Dunicirk.
61.
There was intermittent shall fire on Dunicisk the whole time, but it was never effectively directed on the vital points such as the East Pier and had no effect on the embarkation, although one sunic in the
Harbour. That so little interference occurred must, 1 think, have been due to the effective boaking of the batteries during the nights.
62.
During the last three nights at Dunkirk the harriling of aldye in the harbour under the most difficult conditions was magnificent. Transports,
Destroyers, Minesweepers, Paddlers, and all descriptions of small araft were moving in and out in these comfined waters, where there ware several wreaks brought off is due to the coolness and supresse seasanship of the Captains of in inconvenient places. Little time was lost, and that so many - were these ships.
63. beyond the smallest craft to the largest, and what
During these operations the work of all those engaged has has been been all orders could be given but that did not accomplished praise is from the result of the single-ainled purpose and matter determination for of but of those did who dame under my own observation I wish to bring your everyone concerned. his Few utrost. I had few opportunities to pdak out special to notice cases, the following Officers:-
Capitain B.L. Berthon - H.M.S. XXXTH
During the being finally sunk. Captain him and his ship the I was in H.M.S. KETTH she was Borthon subjected handled to shall his with fire great and bombing coolness attack, and judgement and not all the calls I put upon ship.
Ideutanant G.J.A.Iamaden - H.M.S. KNITH.
air attack which fimilly disabled KNITH and this took officer drastic handled the During ship with the complete coolness in a masterly way, /avodding ********

220
7.
Finally when the helm jambed he continued to keep her under centrol.
avoiding action at high speed in very confined waters full of shipping.
C
Commodore G. 0.Stephenson
Did most valuable work off the beaches in a noter boat at
La Panne and Bray, organising and controlling small craft and the embarkation of Lord Gort. When La Parme because untenable owing to shell fire he moved to Bray and only left the coast when driven off by the air attack of 1st June.
Ideutenant - IL.A/S.B. 10
Handled his boat with the greatest coolness and skill inside
Dunicirk in crowded waters, darkness, and under shell fire. His good work greatly facilitated my task of control.
Lieutenant Commander C.J.Vynna-Edwarts
This officer assisted no throughout the operations and vas invaluable. Unsparing of himself he not any call on him with the greatest efficiency. On two occasions he carried out difficult tasks with complete success, controlling small craft and directing Merchant ships to beach themselves so that they could be boarded at low tide.
Lieutenant Viscount Kelburn
Acted as my Signal Officer and carried out Ida duties with the greatest efficiency under most trying conditions.
I have the honour to be,
Stiry
Your obsident servent,
W.F. WAKE-WALKER.
VICE AD MIRAL
Bear Admiral.
*
DOVER
The Vice Admiral Commanding,
Dover.

Dynams 115.
20
222
REPORT OF OPERATIONS OFF DUNKIRK.
Having proceeded at maximum speed (26) knots)
with fuel available from a position about 120 miles north of Lands End, Worcester arrived off Dover at 0715 on the
COMPIDENTAL
Digrams 110k-
206
221
Subject
Recommendations for an anard or decoration in connection with the ovacuation of the B.B.F.
from the Dunicivit area.
From
:
The Commanding Officer, H.3.3. "Caloutta".
Date
6th June 1940.
No. 062/23
To
The Vice-Aduiral, Cover.
(Copted 502- The Consender in Chief, Horo.
The Plag Officer, 20th Squadron.) Cruiser
It is desired to recommend the following for consideration for a decoration or award in commetion with the evacuation of the B.S.F. from the Dunistisk areas-
20% Proderick James Merch, Cunner, Roefy1 Havy.
For his initiative and resource in charge of boald and for his withing exemple and energy
In working up to his usiab in heavy surf for hours on and.
Signalman Harry Guy O.I. U/JL 150713
his unhiring mores and devotion to hours duty on and and whillat being continuously drenched water in holding For the whaler's bown to a heavy surf for with up to the shoulders.
VICE TRAL)
you
10JUN 1940
(sgnd.) D. M. LEES
*
DOVER
CAPTAIN

Dynamo 115
207
999
REPORT OF OPERATIONS OFF DUNKIRK.
Having proceeded at maximum speed (26) knots)
with fuel available from a position about 120 miles north of Lands End, Worcester arrived off Dover at 0715 on the
28th May. Then on account of reduced fuel I was forced to make the passage to Dunkirk by "y" Channel at a speed of 18 knots.
A summary of Journeys made is shewn on the attached Appendix A.
On Journey I attempts were made to refuel from
"Anthony" but only 10 tons was taken on board. The return journey was made at 15 knots leaving less than 5 tons on board on arrival at Dover. Numerous enemy aircraft made towards the ship during the afternoon but all were driven off by gunfire. Destroyers astern were seen to be bombed. Athacked prinke S/M # West Hundred List hung. / pattern
4 depth drangers. Recult wreakings has - it.
Fuel was taken in before Journey 2 ( Route X
both ways) which took place without incident except for a heavy bombing attack on East Pier while embarking troops.
The continuation of this attack subsequently sunk the
Grenade 10 minutes after leaving the pier.
Journey 3. (Route X both ways) Troops were embarked from boats off Bray. All ships boats were left behind. Very few enemy aircraft approached the ship on this trip and any that looked dangerous were driven off by sunfire.
Journey 4. Sailed on route 8 but altered back to route X on receiving information of enemy shelling on
2. It was expected to embark troops from the beaches again but was ordered to carry R.A. Dover LAPANNE and Staff until dawn.
A full load was taken from boats at Bray after his departure.
- 1 -

208
223
On return X channel was taken at dead low water and owing to rounding No.5 Buoy Dunkirk roads too close, grounded on a shoal 337° 2.5 cables from that buoy. Then the ship was refloated it was discovered that 18 - 20 knots was the maximum safe speed.
Occasional firing was carried out on enemy aircraft in the vicinity during the evening of the
30th May.
Journey 5. As soon as ship had refuelled and had the propellers examined by divers a passage was made at 18 knots to the beaches which were reached at dusk on the 31st May.
East pier was full at this time and it was evident that difficulty was being experienced in getting men to the minesweepers already at the beaches. I visited all the beaches in turn finally anchoring at LAPANNE.
The minesweepers further inshore were getting small loads but none came the greater distance to WORCESTER. At dawn WORCESTER came under shell fire from shore batteries and I decided to slip the cable and proceed to East pier where a full load of troops was embarked.
Journey 6. June 1st. On approaching X xhannel about 1500 in the vicinity of No.5 buoy, two recent wrecks of transports were sighted; small craft and destroyers were picking up survivors. A few survivors were picked up.
At this time a signal was received from V.A.Dover to return to harbour forthwith. It seemed however not worth while to return so close from Dunkirk and so I continued my course through the roads where some French soldiers were picked up from an open boat and the crew of a small service motor launch which had broken down.
- 2 -

209
224
On arrival at Dunkirk I use ordered to 80 to
West pier. I deemed this inadvisable and said 80.
Also it was suggested that I should pick up French soldiers from the beach inside the harbour. lithout boats this was impracticable.
Alongside East pier a full load was taken but not before I had cast off and returned oring to a misunderstanding. While alonguide a hulk two cables east from the pièr TAB heavily bombed by two waves of dive bombers. The second attack was in progress as I laft the pier and aircraft were engaged by the entire areasent.
Dive bonber attacks on leaving Dunkirk.
During the next half hour the ship was attacked by successive waves of dive bonbers consisting of three or four squadrons of about nine each.
The first attack took place in Dunkirk reads where avoiding action was not possible. The available speed was 19 knots. In this attack about half the bonbe dropped were time delay and the nearest appeared to be about 50 yards away. Although the ship was lifted in the water a number of times no structural damage was done.
Succeeding attacks took place in the channel leading northward from No.5 buoy. In these attacks the majority of the bomba burst on impact with the water and caused great damage to personnel. Some of these dropped as near as 10 yards.
In all it is estimated that over 100 bombe were dropped near the ship.
Attacks were pressed well home even down to
200 02 300 feet and it can be said that the bombing was
- 3 -

210
225
accurate, only a miracle preventing the ship being struck. After releasing bomba the aircraft fired their front guns, but it seened without great accuracy.
Throughout these attacks the behaviour of the gun crows was magnificent. A heavy volume of fire was kept up all the time except at short intervals when death or wounds prevented a orew from functioning.
Two aircraft were certainly shot down and probably three.
Six Bren guns were found to be a useful addition to the armament.
By my order nen were told to lie down when over possible and on the bridge this was done whenever bonbe were seen to be released until after they had exploded.
The only man killed on the bridge was Sub.ldeut.
who was standing up firing a Bren gun.
A number of casualties occured when an H.E.
shell in the rack was detonated by a splinter outside the sickbay.
Aa a result of this action there ware 46 dead and 180 injured on board and numbers of splinter holes all over the ship. Those in oil fuel tanks subsequently stopped the ship about five niles from the North Coodrin light vessel. Others wrecked electrical circuits including the D.O. gear, and the gyro company. Only three holes were found below the water line.
Five miles from the North Goodsin water in the fuel tanks caused stoppage of nain engines and the Tug
St. Olaive was signalled to take us in tow. However after three quarters of an hour engines ware reported ready and course was shaped for Dover.
- 4 -

211
226
Entering the inner harbour about 2030
Worcester collided with S.S.Maid of Orleans on the way out.
I attribute this largely to the loss of manosuvering power both of screws and rudder from damaged sustained in recent operations.
John laumander RN
7.6.40
- 5 -

22%
APPENDIX A.
ATE.
JOURNEY
DOVER.
APPROX.
DUNKIRK.
NO.
No. OF
Arrive. Depart. Arrive. Depart.
TROOPS
EMBARKED.
8.5.40. 1.
0715.
0715.
1200.
1325.
450.
9.5.40. 2.
2040.
ter fuelling)
0700.
1040.
1320.
800.
1720.
31.5.40.) 50.5.40.) 3.
1925.
0130.
0740.
800.
1045.
31.5.40. 4.
1234.
1700.
0200.
750.
0725.
1. 6.40. 5.
(After fuelling.)
1608.
2100.
0430.
650.
0825.
1. 6.40. 6.
1300.
1600.
1630.
900.
2100.
TOTAL 4350.
Jolithin
76.40

213
228
H.M.S. WORCESTER.
Medical Organisation during the Evacuation of Dunkirk.
During the first six visits all casualties were those injured on shore except for a few minor shrapnel wounds.
After the second visit the R.A.M.C. provided a
Doctor and two orderlies to augment the medical staff of the ship. They brough some additional supplies.
Owing to the number of casualties it was impossible to keep details of the wounded or their wounds. We have records of about 10%.
The following were treated on board:
W.H.Phillips. 6087364.
P.S.Lyde. 2nd.Lieut.R.Velch.
R. Carmichael. 2077487.
R. Boxall.
1424735.
2074895.
C.Freeman.
371842.
G. Mortimer.
2003511.
B.Hazeltine.
1072589.
4105218.
A.Webber.
6139645.
N. Calvert.
J.Banfield. A.Jones. Odgers. Martin. Newton. Green. Salt.
J.Lynch.
5723342.
F. Coyle.
6977118.
H.
1918104.
G. Fulton.
4455342.
4979392.
W.Mc.Kergon.
1953338.
K.
1523249.
D.Ford.
124856.
J.
2058319.
L.Dorrington.
2072290.
D. Roberts.
4127489.
S. Archer.
2578464.
J. Melcourt.
1848902.
L.Ne.Greggor.
796184.
-
5049974.
J. Watt.
803512.
M. Kraschau.
22nd,Tirailleurs Algerians.
-
East Yorks.
- Perch. Royal Warwicks.
C. Coombs.
2061143.
- Mann.
2616074.
H. Drage.
76208.
- Sears.
2616014.
H. Beersford.
3240696.
- Jackson.
797213.
- Johnson.
4452964.
- Keather.
4748446.
- Neson.
3593644.
- Bentley.
859715.
- Curtis.
736 276.
- Morton.
5947916.
Ord.Seaman Clitharty.
We Oloman.
2032511.
All these casualties were handed over to the R.A.M.C.
at Dover and most of them were taken to hospital by hospital train.
JUNE 1st.
Sai led from Dover to Dunkirk. Near the French Coast picked wounded Frenchman from an open boat, Gerard Henri
Dehehonte up born 24.7.14. Compound fractured legs, one arm off, buttock shot off, given a grain of morphia, died in half an hour. His effects sent to the War Office, and he was buried at Dover.
At 1630 ship was bombed by 27 aircraft until Ship
Ship proceeded to Dunkirk where troops were 1715. embarked.
was also machine gunned by the aircraft.

229
Morphia had to be given from the Medical Officer's private supply, until all the needles broke, and then with a serum syringe. The shock sustained by the injured was made worse by their prolonged exposure on the decks and the lack of blankets and hot water bottles.
Johnson land RN
7.6.40

Dynam. 123.
215
230g
5th. June May 1940
Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Kingfisher".
No. 0/1/40.
Commander in Chief, Nore. Copies to 7.4. Dover, Captain A/S,Portland.
bject:-
Report of proceedings.
Submitted.
th K.R.and A.I. 1132.
The following report of proceedings is forwarded in accordance inesday 29th May P.M. Received orders to land Experimental gear and remove Experimental Dome, and be ready to sail for
Dover by 0600 Thursday 30th.
This operation took less time than was anticipated due to the good work of the Scientific Staff and my Ship's Company. Reported ready to proceed at
Midnight.
irsday 30th May
0001 Proceeded.
0900 Arrived at Dover and secured to No. 19 Bucy.
1317 Slipped and proceeded to Dunkirk by Route*X* with large Motor Boat *Sanbra* in tow. Speed 12 Knots.
Magnetic Mine exploded by Sweeper 1 mile ahead of
Kingfisher in swept channel 3 miles & of Dover.
1930 Arrived at Malo Beach, Dunkirk and embarked troops using Motor Boat and Whaler and *Sanbra*.
2300 Proceeded with 180 British troops on board.
lay 31st May
0510 Alongside Ramsgate Pier. Troops disembarked.
Had to wait for the tide before going alongside.
0533 Proceeded back to Dunkirk.
0800 Arrived Malo Beach and embarked troops with Motor boat and Whaler. No other boats were available.
1100 Had 80 troops on board One seriously wounded, and
It was nearing low water and a small ship which
20 French.
had been beached and which the boats had been using as a jetty was of no further use. There was sufficient surf on the beach to make embarkation extremely difficult and produce considerable off probably due to the fact that the Germans there were no more British troops ready to come risk of losing By only means of transport, also had started to shall the beach and the troops had tal
I decided to proceed with what I had and return taken cover.
as soon as possible by which time the state of
Alongside Margate Pier, disembarked troops.
the tide would be more favourable.
1440 Proceeded back to Dunkirk.
1835 1518 Arrived Malo Beach. Where there appeared and to small be very boats few waiting off. Decided to try the Harbour but troops and a large number of Tugs
1900 High bombing raid commenced, engaged enemy had to wait for & berth
Aircraft and considered Kingfisher shot one down

Pages
231
W (continued)
2010
possibly, already damaged by our fighters.
2105
Proceeded 10th 180 British troops.
Alongaide Eastern Pier embarking troops.
rday 1st. June.
0005
Anchored off Margate.
0133
0240
Alongside Margate Pier, disemberked troops.
0700
Ordered to anchor off Margate and unit orders.
Ordered to proceed to Dunkirk.
1000
troops. Alongaide Eastern Pier, Dunkirk Hartour, embarking
More or less continous High level Bombing in progress engaged enesy Bombers.
1130
Proceeded with 210 British troops, and 5 stretcher cases.
1235
In position 342° No.5 Bucy 1 Mile, steering 342° with two transports ahead. One being a large two funneller and the other a Paddle steamer (names not know), both carrying French treeps. To were all attacked w 16
Enery Dive Bonbers which were hotly engaged. Both transports were hit, and Kingfisher*near missed*. The smaller ship appeared to be sinking and the larger on fire, but still under way, and under control. A
number of small Drifters proceeding to Dunkirs, were close at hand and proceeded to pick up survivors. I
connenced to turn, 10th the same intention but sighted two destroyerstwo miles to the Northward, one British and one French, both without troops.I informed them by light and they closed at full speed. I then decided that the help Kingfisher, who was already full, could add, did not justify By risking the loss of By troops by remaining in the vicinity, 80 proceeded.
1442
Anchored off Margate Pier.
1555
Alongaide Margate Pier disembarking troops.
1635
Proceeded and anchored in Margate Roads, ordered to remain at 1 hour's notice in case required.
Not included in Saturday light's operations.
iday 2nd June.
No fresh orders received, took the opportunity to replenish armunition, 113 4ª H.S. Helley return empties,
During the dark hours several Parachute flares were seen and to oil seen to drop,off North Foreland.
May 3rd June.
1910
Weighed and in company, to rendezvous of Man and Auto
1955
Forned Carrier. escort on Auto Carrier, who informed no that
2130
Off"U" Buoy. Salamander firing at floating nine.
Lady of Man was still in Dover.
8149
Sighted two floating Mines about 12 feet apart with
Went a alongaide West Pier, Dunkirk Harbour and line between them. Ordered Guillemot to sink them.
1255
organised for embarkation, and appeared such fresher embarked 310 French troops, who were very wall than They also still possessed practically all their any of our own.
8319
Slipped equipment. and proceeded. There was considerable

- 232
Page 3.
aday (continued)
congestion in the harbour
2331
Just cleared Harbour entrance when Kingfisher was rammed by French Trawler 'Edmond Rene', and her Port
Bow, 20 feet from the stem opened up to the water-line
"M" and"F" Degaussing circuits were cut. The two ships swung alongside one another after the collision and troops transhipped to the trawler who was undamaged tesday 4th June.
0005
Received orders to return to Margate.
Kingfisher was making a little water in the Asdic
Compartment.
0010
Proceeded. Speed 7 Knots.
Ordered to proceed to Sheerness.
0505
In company with H.M. S.Lida who had been in collision and requested Kingfisher to stand Dy.
0540
Sighted French Destroyer with damaged bows,at anchor near N. Goodwin Lt. Vessel, who had been in collision
0545
French Destroyer got under way and proceeded to the
South.
0615
Observed heavy explosion in position 51° 23' II,
1° 31' E., and unknown ship sink. Several of H.M. Ships including H.M.S. Aulbury and H.M.S. Kellet near the position picked up survivors.
0714
H.M.S. Lida and Kingfisher arrived off Margate.
Decided to anchor attempt repairs to D.G. Circuits before proceeding,
0745
Thick FOE. Requisioned steamer King GeorgeV, hit
Kingfisher on the Starboard Bow when entering
Margate Road but caused practically no damage
1200
D.G. Circuits temporarily repaired. Received orders to proceed to Lowestoft at daylight on Wednesday.
During the evening M.A.S.B. No.1. came alongside and reported one engine out of action and requested a tow up the swept channel to abreast Harwich.
lednesday 5th June.
0400
North Knock Deep Buoy. Slipped M.A.S.B. No.1. who
Proceeded with M.A.S.B. No.1. in tow.
0926
Berthed in Lowestoft Harbour.
proceeded to Harwich.
1620

(copy)
Inprove 124 100.
220
- 235
H.M.S. "VERNON".
portsmouth.
6th June, 1940.
From: ACTING LTRIFT. Galls P.U.V.R.
Dynam. 12th 3234 1185
$15 VERRON.
PORTSHOUTH
8th June, 1940.
mit the following as "BEN & LUCY" and
Report of Movements of "DORIENTA" and
Tuesday, June 4th.
"BEN LUCY".
IS received from
Id from "VERION"
To: 136/49.
tay aboard "BST & LUCY",
DOVER, HE VICE ADMIRAL, its.
rul, the visibility very
(Copy to:- The Commander-in-Chief, we passed Dover
Portsmouth).
at 1645. I reported
I to stand by for orders, us day.
reference to
General Order 1700.
by,
I
received orders lag boats in tow,
L1 craft). We proceeded
1 to the remainder of the
Magerton
Low. At 2000 # were to Dunkirk channel when
1 us from the East flying our fighters and driven aff,
CAPTAIN.
had been dropped among the lerve that two vessels were
. vessel was towed back)
med was sunk. During this our two machine cune, the
VICE ADMIRAL
ed by one of our fighters.
we proceeded into the channel
1940
kirk harbour at 2100,
00 fathers. I ordered both
$ the boats in shore with ships if possible.
on the boats were inshore and the bay, I therefore
INSTA" to return independently as soon as she was loaded.
R.N. V.R. who requested a tow as his engines had been I disabled
I was then hailed by H.M.D. "FEASABLE", Lt. Turner by a shell, I replied that I would do so as soon as had filled with troops.
As my four boats were returning I observed that one was destroyed by a shell.
boat control officers who ordered my boats to boat return which
While embarking the troops I vas hailed by a power to name beach closes also with troops, to tow these "DORIENTA" boats to the containing to the harbour. I instructed a motor the position and I prosumed indicated. that she had proceeded as previously alongside me, At this stage contact with directed. was broken

(copy)
Dynam 124 100.
220
- 235
H.M.S. "VERNON".
PORTSMOUTH.
h
6th June, 1940.
ACTING LIEUT. Gollo nas, R.N.V.R.
CAPTAIN, H.M.S. "VERNON".
I have the honour to submit the following rt of the movements of Hello Drifters "BEN & LUCY" and
IDENTA" from Wednesday May 29th to Tuesday, June 4th.
In accordance with orders received from hander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, I sailed from "VERITON"
th Pier at 2400 on Wednesday, 29th May aboard "BRIT & LUCY",
INTA" in company, bound for Ramsgate.
The passage was uneventful, the visibility very
At 1405 on Thursday, 30th May, we passed Dover iving at anchor off Ramsgate Harbour at 1645. I reported
Naval Officer in Charge and was told to stand by for orders, ch were not given until the following day.
At 1350 on Friday 3kst May, I received orders proceed to Dunkirk taking four pulling boats in tow,
ORIENTA" in company also towing small craft). We proceeded route 15 We Our speed was adjusted to the remainder of the ege 'Armada' which was necessarily slow. At 2000 # were st to the North of the West entrance to Dunkirk channel when large force of enemy bombers attacked us from the Hast flying high altitude; they were engaged by our fighters and driven are, t not before a large mumber of bombs had been dropped among the a H.M.D. "FAIRBRESZ" which Iwas informed was sunk. During this ruck, namely, H.M.D. "LORD HOOD" (this vessel was towed back)
sembled shipping. I was able to observe that two vessels were tack I engaged one dive bomber with our two machine guns, the ither of two units was damaged and we proceeded into the channel struction of this machine was completed by one of our fighters.
preaching the shore to a depth of three fathoms. I ordered with both riving are my the bay to the East of Dunkirk harbour at 2100, structions to return to their parent ships if possible.
V vessels to slip their boats and sent the boats in shore ept enemy my ship moving and instructed "DORISITTA"
he commenced shelling the beach and the bay, to return I
It was now dark, and when the boats were therefore inshore ndependently as soon as she was loaded.
then hailed by HaM.D. "FEASABLE", disabled Lt. Turner
J N.V.R. a shell, who I requested replied that I would do so as soon as filled
I was a tow as his engines had been I had with troops.
As my four boats were returning I observed that one was destroyed by a shell.
While officers who ordered my boats a motor to boat which embarking the troops I vas hailed by return a power to boat the containing control the harbour. I instructed boats to the name alongaide me, At this stage contact directed. was broken beach closes to also with troops, to tow with these "DORISMTA"
position and I presumed indicated. that she had proceeded as previously

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My boats having departed I made contact with
H.M.D. "FEASABLE" taking her in tow and proceeded to Westward in search boat loads of troops and took then aboard, as there were no boat of further troops. When off the harbour entrance I contacted three crews I put them in tow astern of H.M.D. "FRASAHLE".
"BSN & LUCY" was now loaded to capacity and was preparing to proceed homewards when I was hailed by a naval rating alone in a waterlogged whaler. I took him aboard abandoning the whaler. I was then hailed by a fishing smack (9) "LETITIA" of
Southend who requested a tow as he was short of fuel, I told him
0100 June 1st.
to tail on, and continued my passage, the time being approximately
The channel was negotiated without event, two destroyers being passed bound in. At approximately 0200 we turned to the
North having rounded the Whistle bucy and, when about six miles to the North of the channel aircraft was heard overhead, while Asha gunfire and searchlights had been active for the last half hour.
At approximately 0330 a very heavy explosion occurred close to the port quarter of "FEASABLE", The skipper and I were thrown across the bridge with great violence. On looking art I saw a large column of smoke and water close astern of "FEASABLE". Owing to the abnormal phosphorescence of the water I judged this to be an aerial attack on what was thought to be a largevessel, and as
"FEASABLE" was still in tow and made no signal for assistance
I continued. (I was subsequently informed by "LETTTIA" that another smack named "ROWAN" which had attached herself to the tow unknown to me had been sunk by this explosion).
"BBH & LUCY" was now making water at about one foot per hour.
About 0700 I was overtaken and hailed by "VERNON"
Pinnace Va4 who requested a course for the North Goodwin
Light Vessel and then proceeded ahead or US.
At approximately 0745 we sighted North Goodwin to part and headed for Ramagate.
When approximately 3 miles to the N.E. of Ramagate
"LETITIA" slipped her tow and under her own power began to make off.
I hailed her and when he informed me about the loss of "ROWAN" I ordered him to report to Naval Officer in Charge,
Ramsgate. I repeated my previous instructions which I do not think he obeyed.
He replied that he was returning whene he came.
while my to do this the tow rope was picked up by a length
"FEASABLE" intention a to two her in Iashed alongside & LUCY".
When mile to the Northward of the harbour "BSN I signalled of attempting which apparently had been foul of our propeller fouled since we Portsmouth. to anchor. I signalled disabled. A had leaving sweep wire Our propeller became hopelessly Pierhead that I 80
100 were troops, both including obliged two wounded and that We remained I was at anchor until launch by Monday came into "RENASCENT" in contacting acetylene harbour off morning and At outter. and to took the having 1000 clear at skipper the low on While made the troops Monday, tide of screw. unsuccesful this succeeded "DORIENTA". ashore. June the operation explosion 3rd, attempts in He we clearing was were reported of on to a hand towed our obtain shell to screw I in but me succeeded a by that tow that drifter he broken his had managed engines the joints has to return been in damaged several at reduced blooked by steam speed pipes up the (the causing bilge boiler pumps flooding had with moved in ashes). the and to engine I room, which in turn R.N. who instructed "DORIENTA" no to return was
Portsmouth reported to and crew with me as "wrecked"

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238
"wrecked", but on the assurance of her skipper that he was confident he could bring her back to Portsmouth I returned to Captain Wharton and sought permission to bring "DORINITA" back, as, if it proved necessary, I could have taken her in tow. This permission WELES
granted and at 0600 on Tuesday, June 4th we weighed snohor and made passage to Portsmouth, arriving at 2100,
I wish to place on record, and draw attention to, the perfect discipline and devotion to duty of all members of both crews, with particular mention of Skipper Were Whatling, R.N.R.
Skipper W.F. Reynolds, R.N.R. and the engine room staff of
H.M.D. "DORIENTA" whose coolness in maintaining way on the ship in most arduous conditions undoubtedly prevented the abandonment of this ship.
Thave the honour to be, sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Sgd) Gello ILES.
Acting Lieutenant, R.N.V.R.
the
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223
SECRET
Subject.. H.M.S. BIDEFORD.J Report of Proceedings for the
. 238
period May 29th - May 30th. 1940.
From
The Commanding Officer. H.M.S. Bideford.
Date
June 6th. 1940. No.
6.0.1.
To
The Vice Admiral Commanding Dover.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward a narrative of the proceedings of H.M.S. Bideford, under my commabd, on May 29t
30th, and 31st. 1940.
B. H.M.S. Bideffrd was ordered to sail at noon on
May 29th, to proceed via The Downs and the South Rutyngen
Buoy to Dunkirk Roads, and to bring off from Bray Beaches as ma ny as possible of the soldiers there; and to report on the situation.
3. H.M.S. Bideford entered the Rade de Dunkeerke at
No.6W buoy at 1645 and zig-zagged up the channel at thirteen knots.
4. At about 1700 fire was opened on a squadron of ene enemy bombers who passed overhead at a height of about 6000
feet. One hit was observed and a bomber fell into the sea about two miles distant.
During the next three hours fire was opened at fre frequent intervals as enemy aircraft came over, but no furth hite were observed. The tendency of all fire appeared to be low and behind.
5. At about 1710 "Bideford" was attacked with bombs for the first time. The attack was carried out by one of a squadron of bombers flying at about 8000 feet. The pattern of four bombs fell in a line along the port side at a range of about fifty yards. The ship was sprayed with splinters and there was one casualty at No.2 Gun.
6. Immediately after this the ship was machine gunned by a single low flying ircraft, which passed down close one side and a few minutes later turned and repassed.
The order was given to "take cover" and there were no casualties. ( No.1 Gun's crew lay flat on deck only, which gives some indication of how low the aircraft was flying).
and hove to. The ship remained have to, except for manoeuver-
7. H.M.S. Bideford arrived off Bray at about 1730
ing as requisite on the approach of enemy aircraft, for the next three hours.
majority 8. whom were French, came alongside. Confuston and several was
At 1750 the first boat loads of troops, the swamped The off from shore. On arrivalalongside drift off evident. of boats were dangerously overcrowded the men on the way onboard and let their boats the boats on useless. tide. "Bideford's" Paddles motor boat was lowered whaler and was to the would all jump were lost overboard rendering ordered collect and tow inshore any empty boats. The was lowered.

22
SECRET9
Page 2.
was lowered and two officers and a signalman were sent in to endeavour to take charge on the beach. It was reported to me afterwards that this was next to impossible. The nen rushed the bee boats and capsized them in shallow water, and then left the boat without making any attempt to right it and use it again.
had one engine out of action; the other was blown up
There were only two motor landing craft in the vicinity; one subsequently when lying alongside the ship.
9. At about 1915 a dive bombing attack was made on the ship. The nearest of the pattern of four bombs fell about eighty yards on the port quarter, and the ship recieved no damage from this attack.
10. At about 2000 the ship was machine gunned again by alow flying aircraft. This attack caused several casualties both at No.2 Gun and on the signal bridge.
11. At 2007 (clock stopped!) the third bombing attack arrived. This was also a dive bombing a tack, and the pattern of four bombs landed on a line at an angle of about twenty degrees to the keel. The first bomb was observed by an officerto land about thirty yards from the ship. The fourth bomb hit the quarterdeck the starboard side forward, From this it is calculated that the third bombstruck either right on the stern, or was avery close miss. It is considered that one of the fifty depth charges was detonated; a portion of the internal wall (where primer is inserted) found afterwards supports this theory. (All primers and pistols had been removed previously).
12. The damage caused was very severe. About forty feet of the stern was blown away completely. A further forty feet was reduced to a tangled mass of metal; No.2 Gun was put out of action; the main mast fell in three pieces on the searchlight and 0.5" machine gun platforms, wrecking both; upper deck fittings on the boat deck were bent and battered by slinters; the bridge superstructure was severely shaken, a bulkhead dished and several frames cracked; the compass platform was loosened from the bridge screens; all woodwork such as doors and furniture throughout the ship was shattered, (including the sick bay door on the fore messdeck).
13. Thie attack was followed about ten minutes Jater by athird machine gun attack from an aeroplane with an half inch machine gun. (One bullet has been recovered from a hazel rod fender, and part of another is embeddedin a davit). There were no casualties from this attack.
14. At about 2020 it was reported that fire had broken out in the cabin flat. Orders were given toflood the after magazine and burn the signal books. Both orders were carried out, but the fire was quickly under control and the magazine was then pumped out. The ammunition was transferred to the forward magazine.
15. At about 2030 the fourth and final bombing attack was carried out. This was another dive bombing attack, but the bombs fell wide on the starboard quarter.
16. H.M.S. Bideford anchored and H.M.S. Kellett came alongside and took off about three hundred soldiers who had embarked.

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embarked.
ship in tow, but it was found that the vessel was held
17. At about 2130 H.M.Tug St.Clears endeavoured to tak endoned the attempt.
aground aft, and at about 2215 the tow parted, and the tu &
18. At about 2300 H.M.S. Havavt endeavoured to take us tow but without success.
19. During the night a further 350 French and 50
glish troops were embarked, and these were brought to England.
20. At 0300 on the 30th. H.M.S.Locust was ordered to ke Locust. us in tow, and by 9400 the ship was waterborne and in tow
21. Between 9400 and 0700 the tow parted three times, we had progressed only three miles. But after 0700 the tow satisfactory and H.M.S. Locust towed us across to the glish coast, arriving at the North Goodwin Light Vessel at
00. Speed made good since 0700 2.4 knots.
22. A single Junker bomber appeared for a moment above fog near the North Goodwin, but made off eastwards.
23. Shaped course to pass eastward of the Goodwins.
2245 a French soldier, fully equipped, was seen to jump over e sideby two of Bidefords shipscompany. The tow was stopped.
though a buoy was dropped and a boat lowered to search, it 1
regretted the nan was not recovered. The sea was calm and ae visibility at that time was good. The nan's name is not nown.
24. At 2315 we proceeded. The tow parted again at
330/31st, but after that no further trouble was experienced a nd we arrived at Dover at 1130 on th31st May.
25. The casualties to personnel were:-
(a) H.M.S.Bideford's ships company
(i) Killed. Three officers and nine men.
(11) Missing, believed killed. Four nen.
(111) Dangerously wounded. Two nen.
(1v) Seriously wounded. Ten men.
(v) Slightly wounded. One officer & six nen.
Total ship's company casualties. Four officers and thirty one men.
(b) Passengers.
(11) Nounded. Two officers (one dangerously).
(1) Killed. Two officers & ten other ranks.
Total passenger casualties. Four officers and ten men.
I have the honour to be,
Your obedient Sir, servant,
TOE
ADMIRA
10JUN 1940
Lieutenant Commander in Command.

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had embarked.
17. At about 2130 H.M.Tug St. Clears endeavoured to tak the ship in tow, but it was found that the vessel was held fast aground aft, and at about 2215 the tow parted, and the tu 5
abandoned the attempt.
18. At about 2300 H.M.S. Havavt endeavoured to take us in tow but without success.
19. During the night a further 350 French and 50
English troops were embarked, and these were brought to England.
20. At 0300 on the 30th. S.Locust was ordered to take us in tow, and by 9400 the ship was waterborne and in tow of Locust.
21. Between 9400 and 0700 the tow parted three times, and we had progressed only three miles. But after 0700 the tow was satisfactory and H.M.S. Locust towed as across to the
English coast, arriving at the North Goodwin Light Vessel at
2100. Speed made good since 0700 2.4 knots.
22. A single Junker bomber appeared for a moment above the fog near the North Goodwin, but made off eastwards.
23. Shaped course to pass eastward of the Goodwins.
At 2245 a French soldier, fully equipped, was seen to jump over the sideby two of Bidefords shipscompany. The tow was stopped.
Although a bucy was dropped and a boat lowered to search, it 1
is regretted the nan was not recovered. The sea was calm and the visibility at that time was good. The man's name is not known.
24. At 2315 we proceeded. The tow parted again at
0330/31st, but after that no further trouble was experienced a and we arrived at Dover at 1130 on th31st May.
25. The casualties to personnel were:-
(a) H.M.S.Bideford's ships company
(i) Killed. Three officers and nine nen.
(11) Missing, believed killed. Four nen.
(111) Dangerously wounded. Two men.
Total ship's company casualties. Four officers
(v) Slightly wounded. One officer & six men.
(1v) Seriously wounded. Ten men.
and thirty one men.
(b) Passengers. (1) Killed. Bwo officers & ten other ranks.
Total passenger casualties. Four officers and
(11) Wounded. Two officers (one dangerously).
ten men.
I have the honour to be,
Your obedient Sir, servant,
VICE ADMIRA
10JUN 1940
Lieutemant Commander in Command.