Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, dating from 1940.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/790. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.
| Page | Image | OCR text | OCR tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| 219 |
|
Dynam. 111. |
Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 219.
Dynam. 111. 11/14/01. 199 Nil 1446 -215 214 Admiralty, S.V.1. 8th June, 1940. Rear Admiral, Dover Report of Proceedings, 29th May - 3rd June Sir, I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations off shore at Dunkirk between Wednesday, 29th May, and Tuesday, 4th June. 2. Much of this report has had to be completed from memory, and where incident is so crowded it is difficult not to give a confused pdoture. The picture was, however, confused, and so far as operations off the beaches were conserned organisation was not possible. The most that could be done was to exercise some control and direction. Narrative 29th May 3. I sailed at 2000 from Dover in ESK, who had on board 12 small beach parties. These were distributed at the beaches into any craft available and Commodore Hallett was put into a drifter to take charge off shore at Bray and Commodore Stephenson off La Panne. 30th May 4. At 0200, 30th May, I boarded HEBS off La Fanne and heard the general situation from Captain Bush. 5. At this time there were a few ships, drifters and other creft off the beaches and embarkation was proceeding slowly with the few boats available. 6. Daylight showed the beaches black with troors, a mumber of boats broached to. A very few boats, principally whalers, and scese notor-boats were bringing off troops. 7. It was misty, clouds were low and the sea was calm, but even so there was a slight surf inshore. 8. It became immediately obvious to 130 that any large enbarkation from the beaches depended on more inshore boats and arews. The areas were the essential as H.M. Ships could not spare men from A/A Guns and Amement and I signalled to this affect. 9. During the forenoon I went into Dunicisk in HERE to see the S.N.O. who I found was away with the 0. in 0. at La Panne, but none the less I was formed the opinion that embarkation from Dunkirk was the only prectical plan if able to got into the picture. Finding that the harbour could be used I large numbers were involved and all my subsequent afforts were directed to that end. I stressed this view in many signals. 10. the inshore At boats and the problem I had to deal with was to the same time the beaches had to be used to the control fullest capacity the of shipping available so as to balance these two requirements. half 11. Control of was the beach, and touch with Dunkirk their boats a being approach not easy; it was seldom possible involved to see more close than inshore, V/S. Ships often were these were the only boats available been invaluable. In the and the length of ten tied to their position by at that point. early days and off the beaches an M.A/S.B. would have 12. To put the situation that developed into a nutshell, /at the plans made