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TNA / ADM 199 790

TNA ADM 199 790

TNA ADM 199 790
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 790

Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, dating from 1940.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 790
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/790. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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Dynam. 111.
11/14/01. 199 Nil
1446
-215
214
Admiralty, S.V.1.
8th June, 1940.
Rear Admiral, Dover Report of Proceedings, 29th May - 3rd June
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations off shore at Dunkirk between Wednesday, 29th May, and Tuesday, 4th June.
2.
Much of this report has had to be completed from memory, and where incident is so crowded it is difficult not to give a confused pdoture. The picture was, however, confused, and so far as operations off the beaches were conserned organisation was not possible. The most that could be done was to exercise some control and direction.
Narrative
29th May
3.
I sailed at 2000 from Dover in ESK, who had on board 12 small beach parties. These were distributed at the beaches into any craft available and
Commodore Hallett was put into a drifter to take charge off shore at Bray and
Commodore Stephenson off La Panne.
30th May
4.
At 0200, 30th May, I boarded HEBS off La Fanne and heard the general situation from Captain Bush.
5.
At this time there were a few ships, drifters and other creft off the beaches and embarkation was proceeding slowly with the few boats available.
6.
Daylight showed the beaches black with troors, a mumber of boats broached to. A very few boats, principally whalers, and scese notor-boats were bringing off troops.
7.
It was misty, clouds were low and the sea was calm, but even so there was a slight surf inshore.
8.
It became immediately obvious to 130 that any large enbarkation from the beaches depended on more inshore boats and arews. The areas were the essential as H.M. Ships could not spare men from A/A Guns and Amement and I
signalled to this affect.
9.
During the forenoon I went into Dunicisk in HERE to see the S.N.O.
who I found was away with the 0. in 0. at La Panne, but none the less I was formed the opinion that embarkation from Dunkirk was the only prectical plan if able to got into the picture. Finding that the harbour could be used I
large numbers were involved and all my subsequent afforts were directed to that end. I stressed this view in many signals.
10. the inshore At boats and the problem I had to deal with was to the same time the beaches had to be used to the control fullest capacity the of shipping available so as to balance these two requirements.
half 11. Control of was the beach, and touch with Dunkirk their boats a being approach not easy; it was seldom possible involved to see more close than inshore, V/S. Ships often were these were the only boats available been invaluable. In the and the length of ten tied to their position by at that point.
early days and off the beaches an M.A/S.B. would have
12.
To put the situation that developed into a nutshell, /at the plans made

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 219.

Dynam. 111.
11/14/01. 199 Nil
1446
-215
214
Admiralty, S.V.1.
8th June, 1940.
Rear Admiral, Dover Report of Proceedings, 29th May - 3rd June
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations
off shore at Dunkirk between Wednesday, 29th May, and Tuesday, 4th June.
2.
Much of this report has had to be completed from memory, and where
incident is so crowded it is difficult not to give a confused pdoture. The
picture was, however, confused, and so far as operations off the beaches were
conserned organisation was not possible. The most that could be done was
to exercise some control and direction.
Narrative
29th May
3.
I sailed at 2000 from Dover in ESK, who had on board 12 small beach
parties. These were distributed at the beaches into any craft available and
Commodore Hallett was put into a drifter to take charge off shore at Bray and
Commodore Stephenson off La Panne.
30th May
4.
At 0200, 30th May, I boarded HEBS off La Fanne and heard the general
situation from Captain Bush.
5.
At this time there were a few ships, drifters and other creft off the
beaches and embarkation was proceeding slowly with the few boats available.
6.
Daylight showed the beaches black with troors, a mumber of boats
broached to. A very few boats, principally whalers, and scese notor-boats
were bringing off troops.
7.
It was misty, clouds were low and the sea was calm, but even so
there was a slight surf inshore.
8.
It became immediately obvious to 130 that any large enbarkation from
the beaches depended on more inshore boats and arews. The areas were the
essential as H.M. Ships could not spare men from A/A Guns and Amement and I
signalled to this affect.
9.
During the forenoon I went into Dunicisk in HERE to see the S.N.O.
who I found was away with the 0. in 0. at La Panne, but none the less I was
formed the opinion that embarkation from Dunkirk was the only prectical plan if
able to got into the picture. Finding that the harbour could be used I
large numbers were involved and all my subsequent afforts were directed to
that end. I stressed this view in many signals.
10. the inshore At boats and the problem I had to deal with was to
the same time the beaches had to be used to the control fullest capacity the of
shipping available so as to balance these two requirements.
half 11. Control of was the beach, and touch with Dunkirk their boats a being approach
not easy; it was seldom possible involved to see more close than
inshore, V/S. Ships often were these were the only boats available been invaluable. In the
and the length of ten tied to their position by at that point.
early days and off the beaches an M.A/S.B. would have
12.
To put the situation that developed into a nutshell, /at the plans made