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TNA / ADM 199 790

TNA ADM 199 790

TNA ADM 199 790
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 790

Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, dating from 1940.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 790
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/790. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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Implicate
Dynam
Nil
///
114/0/1946
-
4902
Roar Admiral, Jamp Dover Report of Proceedings, 29th May - 3rd June
207
Minirality, S.W.1.
8th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations off shore at Dunkirk between Wednesday, 29th May, and Tuesday, 4th June.
2.
Much of this report has had to be completed from memory, and share incident is so crowded it is difficult not to give a confused picture. The picture was, however, confused, and so for as operations off the beaches were concerned organisation was not possible. The most that could be done was to exercise some control and direction.
Narrative
29th May
3.
I sailed at 2000 from Dover in ESK, who had on board 12 small beach parties. These were distributed at the beaches into any craft available and
Commodore Hallett was put into a drifter to take charge off above at Bray and
Commodore Stephenson off La Pame.
30th May
4.
At 0200, 30th May, I boarded HRBS off La Funne and heard the general situation from Captain Dush.
5.
At this time there were a for ships, drifters and other creft off the beaches and embarkation was proceeding alowly with the for boats available.
6.
Daylight showed the beaches block with troops, a mmber of boats broached to. A very for boats, principally whalers, and sloose noter-bonts were bringing off troops.
7.
It was nisty, clouds were low and the sea was calm, but even so there WELLS a stight surf inshare.
8.
It became imadiately obvious to 130 that any large unbarimition from the beaches depended on more inshore boats and crews. The crews were the essential 08 H.M. Ships could not spare non from VA Guns and Amendment and I
signalled to this affect.
who 9. I found was away with the O₂ in 0. at La Fanne, but none the less I was
During the forenoon I want into Dunicis in HERE to see the S.N.O.
formed the opinion that unbarkation from Dunkirk was the only practical plan if able to got into the picture. Finding that the harbour could be used I
large numbers were involved and all my subsequent afforts were directed to that onl. I stressed this view in many signals.
10. the inshore boats and the problem I had to deal with was to control the
At the same the the beaches had to be used to the fullest capacity of shipping available 80 as to balance these two requirements.
half 11, the length of the boach, and touch with Dunkir's involved a close approach
Control was not essy: it was selden possible to DOB more then and V/S. Ships were of tim tied to their position by their heats being early days off the beaches an H.A/S.B. would have inshore, and often these were the only boats available been at involuable. that point. In the
12.
To put the situation that developed into a mutabell, /at the plans made

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 212.

Implicate
Dynam
Nil
///
114/0/1946
-
4902
Roar Admiral, Jamp Dover Report of Proceedings, 29th May - 3rd June
207
Minirality, S.W.1.
8th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations
off shore at Dunkirk between Wednesday, 29th May, and Tuesday, 4th June.
2.
Much of this report has had to be completed from memory, and share
incident is so crowded it is difficult not to give a confused picture. The
picture was, however, confused, and so for as operations off the beaches were
concerned organisation was not possible. The most that could be done was
to exercise some control and direction.
Narrative
29th May
3.
I sailed at 2000 from Dover in ESK, who had on board 12 small beach
parties. These were distributed at the beaches into any craft available and
Commodore Hallett was put into a drifter to take charge off above at Bray and
Commodore Stephenson off La Pame.
30th May
4.
At 0200, 30th May, I boarded HRBS off La Funne and heard the general
situation from Captain Dush.
5.
At this time there were a for ships, drifters and other creft off the
beaches and embarkation was proceeding alowly with the for boats available.
6.
Daylight showed the beaches block with troops, a mmber of boats
broached to. A very for boats, principally whalers, and sloose noter-bonts
were bringing off troops.
7.
It was nisty, clouds were low and the sea was calm, but even so
there WELLS a stight surf inshare.
8.
It became imadiately obvious to 130 that any large unbarimition from
the beaches depended on more inshore boats and crews. The crews were the
essential 08 H.M. Ships could not spare non from VA Guns and Amendment and I
signalled to this affect.
who 9. I found was away with the O₂ in 0. at La Fanne, but none the less I was
During the forenoon I want into Dunicis in HERE to see the S.N.O.
formed the opinion that unbarkation from Dunkirk was the only practical plan if
able to got into the picture. Finding that the harbour could be used I
large numbers were involved and all my subsequent afforts were directed to
that onl. I stressed this view in many signals.
10. the inshore boats and the problem I had to deal with was to control the
At the same the the beaches had to be used to the fullest capacity of
shipping available 80 as to balance these two requirements.
half 11, the length of the boach, and touch with Dunkir's involved a close approach
Control was not essy: it was selden possible to DOB more then
and V/S. Ships were of tim tied to their position by their heats being
early days off the beaches an H.A/S.B. would have
inshore, and often these were the only boats available been at involuable. that point. In the
12.
To put the situation that developed into a mutabell, /at the plans made