TNA ADM 199 790

11
Embarkation proceeded at rate of 3 to 4,000 an hour.
Troops were now consisting mainly of the Fighting Corps, all the non-combatant troops in the area having been evacuated. The display of this Corps Troops was noticeably superior - - previous detachments had reached the embarkation point in a straggling manner with scarcely any semblance of order. The Corps Troops marched in formation along the beaches, quickly scattering during an air raid, and reforming and continuing afterwards.
It was this order which enabled such a high rate of embarkation to be maintained.
At 1800 I proceeded with Brigadier Perminter by
Motor Boat to La Panne to G.H.Q. to report on the difficult situation vis-a-vis the French over the evacuation. When on board EXPRESS I made a signal to the Admiralty and to
V.A. Dover giving an appreciation of the situation as follows:-
"Bombing of beaches and Dunkirk pier hasnow commenced without opposition from fighters. If they hit
Dunkirk pier embarkation will become very jammed.
Beach at La Panne covered with troops congregating in large numbers. Very slow embarkation taking place from Restern Beach.
The French Staff at Dunkirk feel strongly that they are defending Dunkirk for us to evacuate, which is largely true. To continue evacuation my appreciation is as follows -
The perimeter must be strongly held, food and stores immediately provided, and bombing of Dunkirk pier must be prevented.
There is no other Alternative evacuation to take off mone than a tithe of men now on beach before they are bombed continuously."
In Dunkirk itself we were left in comparative peace by enemy aircraft until the evening. V.A. Dover's 1906/29
received, reading:-
"Evacuation of British troops to continue at maximum speed during the night. If adequate supply or personnel vessels cannot be maintained

17
&
21
"maximum number of French and British may be evacuated.
Impossible from here to judge local situation. In close co-operation with Admiral Abrial you must act in this matter on your own judgment.
At 2315 I made the following signal:-
"Withdrawal now proceeding according to plan. Shall have certain reserves here to-morrow to assist French.
Intend to complete evacuation to-morrow by midnight.
A motor boat was sent to the mouth of the harbour at dusk and allocated berths to the ships as they entered, the requisite number of the personnel vessels being sent to the embarkation pier in the Western harbour to embark French troops.
A good number of ships entered harbour and embarked troops, and the seamanship displayed by destroyers, sloops and transports was most praiseworthy under exceedingly difficult conditions.
I gave orders to evacuate a large proportion of naval personnel during the night.
the final
All those that did remain until, withdrawal had performed their duties magnificently.
Suriday 2nd June.
0800/2 - from S1N.0.Dunkirk.
"Request again maximum number of transports for British and French. At 2130 June 2nd it is intended that all
British shall be evacuated by midnight. Request
M.A.S.B. at 2300.
At 0405 - from S.N.O.Dumkirk.
"Admiral du Nord requests that block ships will arrive at
6300 to-morrow night. He will signal if their placing is to be postponed.
At 0730 - from S.N.O. Dunkirk:-
"Wounded situation acute. Hospital ships should enter during day. Geneva Convention will be honourably observed. It is felt that the enemy will refrain from attack (This signal was made "en clear")
At 0830 - from S.N O. Dunkirk:-
"About 5000 British remain. Bofors ammunition short.
Sporting chance of embarking to-night. Maximum number of fast motor boats at 2130 at inner end of Long Pier would assist. Early this morning the drifter Lord Cava our dépot ship, was sunk by shell fire.

28
22
16.
At about 1200 Commander Ken and I motored into
Dunkirk to report progress as embarkation on our beach was then impossible. On our return our lorry was heavily machine gunned and hit. At this period a heavy bombing attack took place on the Fleet and beaches.
17.
On return to our headquarters (a lorry) we decided to make contact with General H.Q. but unfortunately our car broke down and we had to walk back 5 miles.
18.
During the night another naval embarkation party arrived on the beach to the eastward which reduced the limits of our beach.
19.
Early on Thursday morning 30th I proceeded to
Brigade H.Q. and offered the suggestion that piers be built by running lorries out to sea. This was quickly done and was successful.
20.
I then drove Colonel Whitten and Colonel Mackenzie into Dunkirk to see Captain Tennant and then drove them back to Brigade H.Q.
21.
During the afternoon and dogwatches the French poured into our beaches but no boats arrived within 11 miles of our H.Q.
22.
During the last dog the Germans directed mos to accurate artillery fire on our beach. This fire continued throughout the night and our lorry was hit. The beach was completely evacuated by allied soldiers.
23.
We had however taken up quarters in a water-boat that was ashore at low mter. No boats had now been in for
16 hours on our beach.
84.
During the night the weather became bad once more -
and a heavy surf was running.
At/

is
35
soon as the fighters left, they seemed to know the exact moment in which to approach.
(3)
Lack of satisfactory communication arrangements was most noticeable. There were no portable wireless sets ashore with the beach parties nor were any field telephones supplied by the naval parties. The only method of communicating messages to ships embarking from the beaches was by & written message sent off in a boat.

4238
43
Embarkation proceeded at rate of 3 to 4,000 an hour.
Troops were now consisting mainly of the Fighting Corps, all the non-combatant troops in the area having been svacuated. The display of this Corps Troops was noticeably superior - previous detachments had reached the in embarkation point in a straggling manner with scarcely any semblance of order. The Corps Troops marched in formation along the beaches, quickly scattering during an air raid, and reforming and continuing afterwards,
It was this order which snabled such 8 high rate of embarkation to be maintained.
At 1200 I proceeded with Brigadier Parminter by
Motor Boat to La Panne to G.H.Q. to report on the difficult situation vis-a-vis the French over the evacuation. When on board EXPRESS I made a signal to the Admiralty and to
V.A. Dover giving an appreciation of the situation as follows:-
the
"Bombing of beaches and Dunkirk pier hasnow commenced the without opposition from fighters. If they hit
Dunkirk pier embarkation will become very jammed.
Beach at La Panne covered with troops congregating in large numbers. Very slow embarkation taking place from
Restern
Beach.
The French Staff at Dunkirk feel strongly that they are defending Dunkirk for us to evacuate, which is largely true. To continue evacuation my appreciation is as follows -
The perimeter must be strongly held, food and stores immediately provided, and bombing of Dunkirk pier must be prevented.
the
There is no other alternative evacuation to take off mone than a tithe of men now on beach before they are bombed continuously."
very loss
In Dunkirk itself we were left in comparative peace by enemy aircraft until the evening. V.A. Dover's 1906/29
received, reading these bombed the
Evacuation of British troops to continue at maximum speed during the night. If adequate supply of personnel vessels cannot be maintained

48
52
"maximum number of French and British may be evacuated.
Impossible from here to judge local situation. In close co-operation with Admiral Abrial you must act in this matter on your own judgment.
At 2315 I made the following signal:-
"Withdrawal now proceeding according to plan. Shall have certain reserves here to-morrow to assist French.
Intend to complete evacuation to-morrow by midnight.
A motor boat was sent to the mouth of the harbour at dusk and allocated berths to the ships as they entered, the requisite number of the personnel vessels being sent to the embarkation pier in the Western harbour to embark French troops.
A good number of ships entered harbour and embarked troops, and the seamanship displayed by destroyers, sloops and transports was most praiseworthy under exceedingly difficult conditions.
I gave orders to evacuate a large proportion of naval personnel during the night.
the final
All those that did remain until, withdrawal had performed their duties magnificently.
Suriday 2nd June.
0800/2 - from SIN.O.Dunkirk.
"Request again maximum number of transports for British and French. At 2130 June 2nd it is intended that all
British shall be evacuated by midnight. Request
M.A.S.B. at 2300.
At 0405 - from S.N.O.Dunkirk.
"Admiral, an Nord requess that block ships will arrive at
6300 to-morrow night. He will signal if their placing is to be postponed.
At 0730 - from S.N.O. Dunkirk:-
"Wounded situation acute. Hospital ships should enter during day. Geneva Convention will be honourably observed. It is felt that the enemy will refrain from attack (This signal was made "en clear")
At 0830 - from S.N O. Dunkirk:-
"About 5000 British remain. Bofors ammunition short.
Sporting chance of embarking to-night. Maximum number of fast motor boats at 2130 at inner end of Long Pier would assist. Early this morning the drifter Lord Cava our depot ship, was sunk by shell fire.

59
63
3/w May
AS about 0300 11 988 impossible to carry out
16.
At about 1200 Commander Ken and I motored into embarkation es the bonches.
Dunkirk to report progress as embarkation on our beach was
85.
vere showing signs of extreme exhaustion and then impossible. On our return our lorry was heavily machine
80 it 989 impossible to communicate with the Senior Navel Officer gunned and hit. At this period a heavy bombing attack took we decided to take over * shaler that the had salved and to go place on the Fleet and beaches.
to the bearest to report to the Senior Seval officer
17.
On return to our headquarters (a lorry) we decided
25.
We wasted vater and 0750 put to 00, to make contact with General H.Q. but unfortunately our car
There me very heavy surf running and se had only an uneven set broke down and we had to walk back 5 miles.
of sers, voge arutches and only an 062 to by.
18.
During the night another naval embarkation party
17.
We approached two destroyers but they both 201 underesy.
arrived on the beach to the eastward which reduced the
Tea other destroyers passed de at but paid no limits of our beach.
stiention to us.
19.
Early on Thursday morning 30th I proceeded to
28.
an hour if appeared the
Brigade H.Q. and offered the suggestion that piers be built
Margate the the Consumin to take 12 to the by running lorries out to sea. This was quickly done and was nearest destroyer at this time.
successful.
returning to 80 we case back with him
20.
I then drove Colonel Whitten and Colonel Mackenzie
19,
US28 and into Dunkirk to see Captain Tennant and then drove them back were salses within five minutes of being inboard the lifeboat.
to Brigade H.Q.
1 the or Staff
21.
During the afternoon and dogwatches the French poured Daven and into reported our beaches our return. but no boats arrived within 11 miles
1 usa ordered to return to Chather with by party, of our H.Q.
22.
During the last dog the Germans directed mon $
accurate artillery fire on our beach. This fire continued throughout the night and our lorry was hit. The beach was completely evacuated by allied soldiers.
23.
We had however taken up quarters in a water-boat that was ashore at low mter. No boats had now been in for
16 hours on our beach.
24.
During the night the weather became bad once more -
and a heavy surf was running.
At/

manding Officer H.M.S. Saltash.
Dyram 91.
The 4th.1039.
Brulohing by
M.S.F. Vice adminar, Dover
"
71
Sir,
During the operations off Dunkerque the
329
ng Officer and men have shown perseverence and courage, the honour to submi t their names so that suitable action taken.
Join ieutenant Williams R.N.R., First Lieutenant of Saltash. H.M.S.
0011 the night of Friday, May 31st,he was loaned to H. Hebe was not required. On his way back in a motor boat he went other to pick up soldiers, not finding any he took two sailors lacking a whaler behind them,he made his way along the beach nick ame im Danna WAS hains hombarded the mmander in chief more
Dynamo go. 67
in on operations carried out By M.B. Honderung
C Dutch schoole).
n 26 may and 5 June 1940.
anchaed at sheerness waiting for orders
Sailed from Sheerness arrived and anchored on Deal.
ordered to Junkirk in company with 5 other Schools on Eastern entrance to I unkink roads.
ships harsing advised us that Dunkirk had fallen. Senior officers schoote developed engine
Grouble ordered Hondsrug to take him in low
Readed away drom unkink
Sliphed tow as S.O.S engine now working and schools ordered Crack to Deal german seaplane, machine gunned and
Comled us no damage, Put rather unpleasant as we had no gans to return fire.
anchored GM Dear.
ordered to Dunkink have uh and proceeded.
on Dunkink harbour made for beaches
Saw move teashing from beach and ran verset hand up on sand. Embarked troops

From: Commanding Officer H.M.S. Saltash.
Dyram 91. Blulol by
Date: June 4th.1039.
is
71
11149
To; Sement Space M.S.F. Vice adminar, Dover
Sir,
During the operations off Dunkerque the following Officer and men have shown perseverence and courage,
I have the honour to submit their names so that suitable action may be taken.
1. Lieutenant T,E. Williams R.N.R., First Lieutenant of Saltash. H.M.S.
On the night of Friday, May 31st, he was loaned to H.M.S.Hebe but he was not required. On his way back in a motor boat he went in shore to pick up soldiers, not finding any he took two sailors and, pullading a whaler behind them, he made his way along the beach nick Danna was haina hombarded the
To: Commander in chief more
Dynamo go. 67
Rehart on operations carried out By M.B. Honderung
(Dutch schoote).
Between 26 may and 5 June 1940.
26 anchaed at sheerness waiting for orders
24"
300 Sailed from Sheerness
000 arrived and anchored on Ifeal.
500 ordered to Junkirk in company with 5 other Schools
300 on Eastern entrance to unkink roads.
ships harsing advised us that Dunkink had fallen. Senior 6 Hiers schoote' developed engine trouble ordered Hondsrug to take him in low
Readed away drom Dunkink
28
345 Slithed tow as S.O.S engine now working and schools ordered Crack to Deal
430 german seaplane, machine gunned and
Comled us no damage, Put rather unpleasant as we had no gans to return fire.
000
anchored GH Dear.
815
ordered to Dunkink have wh and proceeded.
330 on Dunkink harbour made for beaches
29
200 Saw more thashing open beach and nan verset hand up on sand. Emparked troops

Form: Commanding Officer H. Saltash.
Dysams 91. Blulol by
Date:June 4th.1039.
is
71
114g
P; Seven M.S.F. Vice adminar, Dover
Sir,
During the operations off Dunkerque the ollowing Officer and men have shown perseverence and courage, have the honour to submi t their names so that suitable action ay be taken.
Lieutenant T,E.Williams R.N.R.,First Lieutenant of Saltash. H.M.S.
On the night of Friday, May 31st, he was loaned to H.M.S.Hebe
Out he was not required. On his way back in a motor boat he went shore to pick up soldiers, not finding any he took two sailors nd, pullading a whaler behind them,he made his way along the beach mink ame un Danne was haine hombarded the
2/
68
another Schoote on shore came in alongside
Found moheller had hicked wh nohe and engines would not turn ScRoole Bornrit towed us ON and back to Deal roads.
arrived and anchored disembarked troohs.
30"
00
after several attempts to clear screwohom heart asked SNQ Ramsgate it we might be towed in and beached This was approved.
1000 arrived Ramsgate hut vessel on Hand
231
200 Shih dry. cleared screw
730 Proceeded to Dunkink
500
arrived on beaches. heavy bombing.
300
no Goats available to bring men ON, sobeached shin but troops would not wade out so backed on and anchored
300
Embarked about 100 French troobscrom is mata boat.
000
Cruised along beaches. and then made for harbour entrance.
130
Secured alongride Preakwater. embarked hoops, heary Combing going on cleared harbour. we were able to machine gun low deying german heave troops assisting

Prom: Commanding Officer H. Saltash.
Depairs 91. Bruloling by
Date:June 4th.1039.
o; Sement space M.S.F. Vice adminar, Dover
"
71
Sir,
During the operations off Dunkerque the ollowing Officer and men have shown perseverence and courage,
If have the honour to submit their names so that suitable action ay be taken.
Lieutenant T,E.Williams R.N.R., First Lieutenant of Saltash. H.M.S.
On the night of Friday, May 31st,1 he was loaned to H.M.S.Hebe but he was not required. On his way back in a motor boat he went shore to pick up soldiers, not finding any he took two sailors nd, pullading a whaler behind them, he made his way along the beach nick ame Danna was haine hombarded the
3/.
-
69
with Bren guns arrived Ramsgate and disembarked troops
Proceeded Dunkink Combed on several occasions no damage.
Entered harbour embarked French trooks harbour being shelled and bombed
, cleared harbour
2"
10
arrived Ramsgate disembarked hooks and anchored ON waiting for aders.
3"
10
Hore wh and proceeded Dunkink in company with three other schootes
45
arrived alongside Jetty at Past and embarked French troops
'+
000 serv Dunkink and proceeded.
530 arrived Ramsgate after thick too tor east three hours a hassage, diseimbarked troops.
1630 anchaed ON and rested crew
615 ordered to Fillury home, rh and proceeded
200 arrived Sanding stage es
00 Pilor exanded and vessel proceeded to surrey commercial Dock

Tom: Commanding Officer H. Saltash.
Dysams 91. Brulohing by ate:June 4th.1039.
0; Semon spece M.S.F. Vice adminar, Dover
"
71
Sir,
During the operations off Dunkerque the following Officer and men have shown perseverence and courage,
⑉ have the honour to submit their names so that suitable action ay be taken.
Lieutenant T,E.Williams R.N.R.,First Lieutenant of Saltash. H.M.S.
On the night of Friday, May 31st,he was loaned to H.M.S.Hebe but he was not required. On his way back in & motor boat he went texin shore to pick up soldiers, not finding any he took two sailors and, pullading a whaler behind them,he made his way along the beach
CAR he could nick amv un La Panpe was being bombarded the
41.
-
66
70
10
Secured to Quelee Dock - haid off shin returning all stores and crew to chatham.
P.O.(T). amb Potts /J.92816 showed great coolness getting men under cover when shih was gunned and Combed on 28' may.
and was a tower astrength during the whole operation.
THenny
7.- JUN 1940
.
*
THE NORE
Sient. R.N.R.
6 may 1940.
Times given in this report are approximate.
Total number or men landed about 1500
in town expective hassages drom Dunkink

Dysam
91.
From: Commanding Officer H.M.S. Saltash.
Bhulo
Date:June 4th.1039.
To; Seven Spece M.S.F. Vice adminar, Dover
"
71
1149
Sir,
During the operations off Dunkerque the following Officer and men have shown perseverence and courage,
I have the honour to submit their names so that suitable action may be taken.
1.
Lieutenant T,E.Williams R.N.R.,First Lieutenant of H.M.S.
Saltash.
On the night of Friday, May 31st, he was loaned to H.M.S.Hebe but he was not required. On his way back in a motor boat he went in shore to pick up soldiers, not finding any he took two sailors and, pullading a whaler behind them,he made his way along the beach to see if he could pick any up.La Panne was being bombarded the whole time he was ashore. He knew that I thought he was aboard 'Hebè and that the C.O.of 'Hebe' thought he was aboard me so that he could not expect any ship to wait for him;both pontcons were destroed while he was ashore. Eveentually he turned to 'Hebe' and when he came, back to me on Sunday night was perfectly ready and fit for more.
He franch only dead men & must have been ashise two hours
While Saltash was rescuing survivors from S.S.
Brighton Queen,and was in a precarious position alongside her bridge and on her deck and might have had to move any time (there was also summarke of small air attack) intermitted sumbing - gunning
2. Brian Sto.1.,C/KX79268.,stripped and swam with a line to two men a mile away, finding the line a hindrance he discarded it, and, unaided, rescued these two men.After a short rest he continued to swim out lines to men closer to the ship. Bombing and machine gunning
Was going on in close proximity to Maughan.
3. Frederick HUTTER, X7183. with the aid of two or three untrained assisstants, succoured ninety (98), repeat(98), casualties, ten of whom required artificial respiration, several of the others were serious casualties. There was no medical Officer on board and only two men of the 98 died. Hutter worked till he collapsed.
4. Receive, Thomas CRANSTONE a.B.,B22751(R.F. swam out with a line and orders to sh ps skiff which WAS in difficulies rescued this party and a party on a Neither party could have reached the ship unaidad for some time. Distance swum about 200 yards.
Y.R.Jah.
Liautenant-Commander in Command.
VICE ADMIRAL
8-JUN 1940
+
DOVER

Dynamo 93
72
SECTION
NOD
and Juno 1940.
sir,
I regret to have to report the loss of thereise
BRITHER by enemy action at 1013 let June 1940 off the Bolgian coast. The circumstances are as follows.
at about 0315 while embarking British troors off
DEPARTMENT I TRUE attacked by a squadron of nine German JUNKSHS
dive bombers. They approached from astern and on eighting 1 went full speed shoul 13 boilors connected, and as the Dombo were released turned hard to port. as far as I could judge such aircraft released a pattern of five bombs one being & large "B" type and four smaller bombs with slight delay action. one of the latter exploded at the after end 02 HOW boilor room on the port side and siereed blew anay the bulkhoad vioroing both main and auxiliary stoam linou and main oil fuol supply. «11 engine room and boilor room personnel were killoi. About six of the "B" type bonds than exploded underneath the ship flooding the after cagazine and shell room and probably the gland conpartments and storo rooms just forward of this position. The uppor dock and sideo of the ship crecked right across in the vioinity of the suimast. This 18
& general line of mouthous in dostroyers.
In order to precerve stability the torpedoes and death charges were jottluoned and the ship floated confortably with little increase in drought. I invected ongine room and No.3
doilor room and found that a Joall acount of nuter was making its very through shrapnol holos. Those were plugged and colligion not placed over the norst louks. It WILL found imposible to got steam to the enginos unl the ship thereafter remined imobile.
1.
fforts were now made to sond out measages for assistance. is tug who had been attending on Hamada "KEITH" passed no a 013nal telling DD to sink to which I replied that I
was out of action und required imediate assistance. I also requested him to inform The Ylag officer Commending, Dover to this effect. Due then dies peared. Signals for assistance were also made by using type & II with battory nover. It is
Coubtful whether any of these measuges more received owing to very heavy traffic at the time and comparative woukness of by signals.
5.
a Bolgiun fiching smock under French colours was soon in the distunco and the notor boat TRIO dearatched to susson her to our assistance. She WELL is JULIA AMOUNT of Card and after
JONE offorts a tow was pussed and corse set to open from the coast.
This ha hardly been accomplished before & second attack devollopped at about 0945. This consisted of lovel bumbing from about 0000t.
such bomber acting independently. about hulf a squalron of 18
carried out the attack. Considering the ship WAS & stationary targot and there was little wind these attacks were Dourly carried C
out and no bumbo hit. This may have been due to pon pon fire is which Hunner 12 new in charge. Unfortunately this gallant officer WAS killed at his post by machine run bullets which were fired continuously us the bombers pussed overhead.

69
73
SECR &
PAge
8.
6.
second attempt TRU now David to tow the ship clear but little progress had been made before a third attack developped at about noon, carried out by 8 equairon of:
dive Dombers. By this time nearly all amunition TRIS expenied and the 4.7 guns were firing in the hope of keeping the enemy at a listance. The Germans however, cade 8 determined diving attack which was well prossed home to about 400 feet.
The ship WAS completely smotherou 00 hits and near misses some of which were of the "B" bomb type. The ship immidiately bogan to settle and I gave the order to abanlon ship. Thanks to the adequate preparations cade by if First ideutenant, Lieutonant-
Commander Moding there TIBUDS plenty of boats and carley floats ready for survivors. fter collecting all strey swimers the boats and floats pullod out to sea. LE JOLIE
picked up 8 officers an: 71 ratings and How.3. WHIT HALL" 20
officers and 52 ratings. One wholer and the notor boat had proceeded to far over the shocls which run parallel to the count for to piok them up.
7.
cank in about 4 fathers of wator in approximate youition with hor uppor Cook smash. Although the sodio and V.C.-V.F.
gear and all important documents had been destroyed I =
anxious to complete the destruction of the vessel. accordingly
I requested the Captain of to fire suns and torpeloss. This W&J done and the ship 180 left on fire forward.
It 10 not certain whether any of the torredoes hit and I
consider further destruction advisable. 1 intimated this in &
signal time.: 40 6/1 to the log Community:over despatched DO a secret Sand coosego.
8. the first attach I ordered the destruction of all Signal when the chip TXC rendered imobile after
Publications except the Fleet Signal Book bridge machine and current naval Syko card. This was done by Sub-
Lieutenant who burnt then in the two galleys.
All Confidential Books prefixed 10' more dumped overboard in a weighted sack except those out on loan to officers SS these could not be got at due to damage aft. The Asdic gear in the cabinet and on the bridge was diamentied where possible and thrown overboard and the remainder smashed The oscillator was removed and brought on the upper dock anidships 80 the finel attack developped. It is not known for certain whether the oscillator slid overboard when the ship sant. lenterns wore unshippod and thrown overboard.
9. on the bridge: C.B. _018 - and certain charge documents in the
The following books and documents were left
Captain's springback and the Meet Signal Book. The bridge was burning fiercely when last seon and it can be confidently stated that these documents and papers more lestroyed.
I would like to emphasise that the older
10. doctroyers with pan point using belted ammunition and 4.7° Guns with only 30 degrees elevation are no match for a determined air attack. Cur Lowis guno had also been recently surreniored.
when shipo of this type are operating within range of energy air attack losses must be expected unless adequate fighter protection is afforded. In all the enemy launched four big uir attacks at about hourly intervals during the forenoon of the 1st June. The first, secon: and fourth of these were unoppeced apparently unopposed by any British Aircraft

79
Ing N. into the lots
Jilisk,
1. Lieut. E. Troweeks.
When we were bombed I was taking cover in after lobby, then proceeded to E.R. hatch but could not get below because of steam, was joined by C. Sto. Ricketts and C.E.R.A.,
Testlake, gave orders to shut off all boiler room emergency valves and then safety valves and shut main steam bulkhead valve on deck. As soon as possible E. Room and after boiler room were entered.
Attention first given to casualties but all bar one were dead.
First thought possible to get some part of machinory going but not possible. Concentrated on leaks. Bomb dropped port fore side wells bulkhend and stove in boiler room bulkhead.
Disabling port fan, engine, oil full pump, number three boiler, port circulator, main and reserve foed tanks and all pipes and leads adjacent were pierced and broken.
Leak at after end of 3.R. oil fule tank plugged.
Efforts made to run petrol dynamo for W/T but the magneto connection broke, Hands were told off to get hand steering in use. P.O. of fore boiler room reported no damage after first raid although C. Sto. reported oil suction line pierced and shut off.
2. Sub. Lieut. Jeaves.
During the first attack I was on the bridge as
Officer of the Watch and remained there for some time afterwards while the Captain went off to the engine and boiler rooms.
On the Captain's orders I went aft to the after steering compartment to see whether it was possible to steer by hand.
This was 30, and leaving a Leading Stoker and two or three hands I returned to the bridge as the ship was being taken in tow.
When the second attack took place I was in the fore and aft passage below the wheelhouse for some time and eventually went into the Petty Officers' Mess to try and assist the foremost supply party.
After the attack, on the First Lieutenant's orders,
I placed charts in the whaler and a small private motor boat and unshipped the steering compass from the wheelhouse, and put it in the whaler. I then went aft to continue connecting up to steer by hand. To do this it was necessary to clear a good deal of gear out of the compartment. This took about half an hour. By this time another attempt was being made to take the ship in tow, so I recovered the charts from the motor boat, and went up on the bridge.
When the ship was attacked for the third time I again went down to the fore and aft passage beneath the wheelhouse, where 1 stayed till the order abandon ship was given. Of the two charts containing confidential matter concerning minefields in the Dover area, one was destroyed and the other left in the whaler which has not yet returned.
The Fleet notices to Marines were thrown overboard in mid-channel. Fleet charts were left in their folios in the
Charthouse.

17
Page 3.
81
Lieut, Cdr, W.G. Boaks.
4.
With after guns until motor boat lowered and then went forward to make quite sure coxswain of boat (Hicks) understood his orders reference embarking troops and collection of drifting boats, Just as we got the beat clear I heard a bomb whistling down and dived under Pom-Pom platform. About six, possibly more, bombs dropped, one of which was presumably the one that went through the engine room - this very seriously wounded and burnt one rating and seriously burnt another but I escaped the full force of the back flash although thrown heavily against Pom-Fom deck overhead and almost knocked out.
I then went to the bridge to see what the position was there, but there were no casualties there and 1 then went aft to the after guns to find en route that deck was buckled by mainmast.
The after magazine and shell room were flooding and decided to close down. I then went down to my cabin and passed up about eight spare torches (placed there for use in disembarking troops previous day - night) as all lights were out and being daylight few were carrying torches on them. 1 found general chaos in Captain's Cabin flat and sent extra hands down to resecure deadlights as this compartment being next to the buckled part was rather important.
I then went forward to supervise tow forward. In the midst of this another heavy attack was made and most hands took shelter, some in forecastle locker. I then found all but three of the cordite rounds from "A" gun had been jettisoned and in view of the nature of the attack ordered these three to be thrown overboard. After this attack we came out and then started to provide cordite again. I then went aft to see what damage bad been done during which the fishing drifter returned and I again went forward to rig дем tow lines and also ordered individual hands to turn out and lower boats and carley floats into water as by then it was known ship could not move and drifter could not have towed faster than say four knots. I also placed one hand with a lead line aft to keep check on amount of water ship was in from point of view of grounding and stationed hands ready to cast off boats' painters should ship sink without warning.
Then to the forecastle to get up the after hemp and also 3/2" wire during course of which the third attack developed and I went aft to the after guns and with one round of cordite from forward fired the remaining round in Y gun myself at a passing bomber but not enough aim off in field of view to hit even with full deflection. After firing this round I went forward and noticed that X gun had a round left but was unable to fire as recoil cylinder had been emptied in preparation for firing and tearing gun out of mounting overboard. This cylinder was refilled but on going forward I discovered that the crack in deck appeared to have widened and gave orders that after guns were on no account to be fired in view of probable breaking off of after end. I then ordered every possible container of water to be filled from only remaining water left in hot water tank in galley and tore up soldiers ground capes to provide covers to prevent loss or contamination of this water. Boats' anchors were then placed in spare boats alongside and ears provided, sailing gear placed in whaler, after steering compase unshipped and placed in spare motor boat, torches distributed to boats, the after lifebuoy flare placed in whaler for possible use. After steering party detailed and party to clear the flat of weeckage. I then went forward for third time to take in tow during which the fourth attack developed - dive bombing - and upper deck was cleared.

78
82
4. (contd.).
On completion when ship had been struck and water was level with waist the question of scuttling ship came up but
Captain decided this was unnecessary and order was given to abandon ship. I reached one of the spare Army boats two hundred yeard away and after collecting survivors to limit of boats capacity went to drifter. After collecting all but two floats we went off to head off & destroyer for the remainder.
Particular merit:-
A.B. Rawstron - courage, example & cheerfulness.
A.Bis Glover and Ord. Sea Mullins - courage de cheerfulness.
P.O. Robinson took charge well on forecastle.
A.B. Davis. Torp. although badly burned took a lively interest in remaining action taken.
Lieut. Sowry AC for tenacity of purpose with French drifter resulting in the recovery of seventy survivors and message passed to destroyer for remaining fifty.
5.
Surg. Lieut. A.M. McHaffie.
1st. Attack. In Sick Bay 16 which was reduced to chaos from concussions. Casualties arrived after attack.
Soldier complaining of burns of arms.
Stocker complaining of burns of face.
2xStwaker Terpedoman complaining of extensive surface burns of face, scalp, neck and both eyes.
Another rating complained of splinter wound of left arm.
L.S.B.A. reported A.B. Riddle lying under Pon-Pom platform. When
I arráved there I found him complaining of fracture of left feaur and very extensive burns of face and shoulders - Dressed him and then went down into engine room where I saw two BRA's dead.
Griffeths& Grifftchs& Putt (stoker) was also dead.
L.S.B.A. reported four dead in boiler room.
2nd. attack. Ordered to clear upper deck - and I went to port side alley way. Saw Mr. Francis of Pom-Pom platform and one rating. He called for rest of crew and I passed on call to ratings in fore meas deck. No hands came forward. Saw Captain climbing on to platform followed by rest of crew. Was called by
Captain to attend to Mr. Francis and I went on to Pom-Pom platform and found Mr. Francis unconscious - splinter through lungs. Gave
1/6th. morphine.
3rd. attack. Was still on Pom-Pom platform until shortly after attack when Mr. Prancis died.
During interval between 3rd. and 4th. attacks.
Evacuated wounded into water boat lying in water amidships on starboard side. Was helped in this by L.S.B.A and Coxswain.
Orders to do so were given by First Lieutenant.
4th. attack. Most of herew of motor, boat boarded ship including all
Robertson stretcher a no on forecastle of motor boat - two ratings wounded except A.B. Riddle who was comatose and lying in remained in boat.
Bomb hit water 10 yards off motor boat and wave upset and smashed boat against ship's side upsetting all within - Riddle disappeared before I could get to him and I lost sight of other members of boat's crew.
Ship by this time WELLS being abandoned.

page 5.
83
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
ship 6. was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though it, ordering & torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off during attack. Complete Jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S fannel. Tas ordered by 1st. Lieut. to load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned, threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
bridge 7. on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F - load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60° and at no time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were passing 12 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. A wire was passed and made fast round a stout bean in the smack, which carried away some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongside the forecastle bowe pointing aft. At this point second bombing attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile, the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to taking up the slack too vaolently. This was due to the language difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the only other man on board the smack being an R.A.P. pilot. A
further bombing attack started, the final one, and I again stood off from the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship and I picked up all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and some men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men aboard, Whitehall appeared in the distance and we made out to intercept her, using the smack's airen and the French ensign half way up the foremast. We met her about 12 miles away and passed information to her and requested her to collect men from remaining boats. I then set out on a course for England and in mid-chainel we transferred everyone to H.M. Trawler Olvina.

so
84
Page 6.
Leading Seaman Wohdhouse.
Motor hoat.
Whilst pushing the towing vessel into position, the bombing formation came over. I let go and sheered off, the first salvo lifting the boat almost out of the water.
Messerschmidt fighters attacked us with machine gun and cannon (Bombs were also dropped) for just a few minutes short of an hour. L.S. Hicks watched their flight and gave me helm and engine orders, the boat not being hit though a couple of cartridge cases dropped into us. We found ourselves out of sight of the ship, had a little council of war, and decided, knowing the ship was out of wireless communication to make Dunkirk for help. We headed west, and not far outside the harbour two troopships were bombed and sunk. We picked up what we considered a safe complement, tried to get in touch with a vessel to assist Basilisk.
In t.is were not successful and were told to make England.
We drew a rough chart and set our course, arraving
Ramsgate roughly eight hours later. I then turned over the boat to the Naval authorities. We reported that Basilisk was badly hit and were assured that help had been sent.

86
Dynam 93.
90
SECTION
,VCD
and Juno 1940.
Sir,
BASILISK
I regret to have to report the loss of by enemy action at 1033 Lst June 1940 off the Bolgion coast. The circumstances are as follows.
at about 0315 while enbarking British troors off
I TRUE attacked by B squadron of nine German JUNKINS
dive bombers. They approached from estern and on sighting 1 vent full speed ahout 13 boilors connected, and as the bombu were roleased turned hard to port. as far as I could judge each aircraft released a pattern of five bombs one being & large "B" type and four smaller bombs with elight dolay action. one of the latter oxyloded at the ufter ond of 10.00 boilor room on the port side and storess blow away the bulkhoad pioroing both nain and auxiliary steam linos and main oil fuol supply. all engine room and boilor room personnel were killet. about six of the B type bonds then exploded underneath the ship flooding the after magazine and shell room and probably the Fland compartments and storo rooms just forward of this position. who upper lock and sideo of the ship cracked right coross in the vioinity of the minnest. This is is general line of contract in dostroyers.
In order to precerve stability the torpedoes and le charges jottluonod und the ohi floated confortably with little incroase in draught. I invested ongine room and No.3
boilor room and found that a mall amount of nuter was making its way through shraphol holos. These were plussed and colligion net placed over the morst looks. It WAS found incosible to got stean to the engines und the unin thoroafter remined imobile.
1.
fforts were now made to send out medicares for undistance. A tug who had been attending on Hamada "K"ITH" passed no a signal tolling DD to sink to which I roplied that I
was out of action and required imediate assistance. I also requested him to inform The YIng -fficer Commanding, Pover to this effoct. Suc then dion geared. Signals for assistance were also nido by using type 6 4 with battory power. it 18
Coubtful whether any of these sessuges nore received owing to very heavy truffic at the time and comparative noukness of by cignals.
8.
Solcion flohing smok under French colours was seen in the distance and the notor boat TRAD desrutched to suston hor to our addistance. she WALL is JUNIA of CAN and after
JOLIO offorto a tow WHO pussed and corse set to open from the coast.
This he hardly been accomplished before & second attack devolloyped ut about 0945. This consisted if lovel bumbing from about 6, 10000.
sach bomber acting independently. about hulf a squalron of 18
curried out the uttuck. Considering the ship was 8 stationary turget and there was little wind these attacks were poorly curried C
out and no bumbu hit. This say have been due to pon pom firo if which vunner in Best in charge. Unfortunately this
Callant officer WBS killed at his post by machino cun bullets which
LOTO fired continuously 40 the bombers passed overhead.

87
91
SECE
P6CO
6.
second attempt TRU now carlo to tow the ship clear but little progress had been made before & third attach developped at about noon,carrisi out by S squairon of MICHI
live bonbers. By this time nourly all scrumition TRIS expenied and the 4.7 gans were firing in the hope of Leopin; the enemy at B intunce. the German, honever, & determined diving attack which was well prosued home to about 400 feet.
The ship TRAG completely scotherol By hits and near nisses S000
of which were of the 3 boob type. The ship impediately bogan to settle and I gave the order to abanton ship. Thanks to the aloquato preparations code by if First Lieutonant, Licutenant-
Communier there 1800 plenty of boats and carley floats realy for survivors. fter collecting all strey swimers the boats and floats pullod out to sou. LES JONES
pickod up C officers an: 71 ratings and SHIP HALL" 2
officers and BC ratings. One shalor and the motor boat had processed to: for over the should which run parallel to the count for to piot: them up.
7.
not in about 4 fathers of mator in sperazizate with hor upsor look smosh. the Notto and V.C.-V.P.
coar and all important documento had been I =
anxious to complete the destruction of the vessel. accordingly
I the Captain of to fire guns and torpeloss. This wes done and the ship TOJ left on fire formari.
It is not certain whether any of the torredoeu hit and I
consider further destruction advisable. 1 intimated this in a airmal time 10 6, to the 110g Community: over doupatchol 30 a secret hert coorago.
8.
-hen the chip - 1-obile after the first attack 1 ordere_ the dectruction of all signal
Publications except the flect signal Dook bridge COST2-20
mohine and current naval iyko card. This was Lono by STID-
Lieutenant who burnt then in the two galloys.
All Confidential Books prefixod for more dumped overbourd in a weighted snok except those out on loan to officers SD these could not be COD at due to damage aft. The sale gour in the cabinet end on the bridge was dispential where possible and thrown overbour. and the remainder smoked. The oscillator T80
removed and brought on the uppor dook anidshipu as the final attack developped. It is not known for certain whether the oscillator alid overboard when the this san. lenterns were unshippod and thrown overboard.
D.
The following books and documento were left on the bridgo: C.D. 2010 WE and cortain charge locuments in the
Coptain's springback and the Most Signal Book. The bridge TRAD
burning fiercely when last seen and it can be confidently stated that these locumento and purara more lectroyed.
10.
I mould 11kc to englusise that the older
Soutroyers with DOC 2023 using belted amunition and 4.7° Dana with only 30 degrees elovation are no match for a determinel air attuck. our Lawis guna had also been recently surrenCored.
when shipo of this type are operating within range of enecy air attack logues must be expected unless alequate fighter protoction is afforiat. In all the enemy launched four big win attache at about hourly intervals during the forenoon of the 1st June. The first, secon: and fourth of these were unoppeced apparently unopposed by any British Aircraft

93
Page.
97
1. Lieut. E. Treweeks.
When we were bombed I was taking cover in after lobby, then proceeded to E.R. hatch but could not get below because of steam, was joined by C. Sto. Ricketts and C.E.R.A.,
Westlake, gave orders to shut off all boiler room emergency valves and then safety valves and shat main steam bulkhead valve on deck. As soon as possible 3. Room and after boiler room were entered.
Attention first given to casualties but all bar one were dead.
First thought possible to get some part of machinery going but not possible. Concentrated on leaks. Bomb dropped port foro side G.R. bulkhead and stove in boiler room bulkhend.
Disabling port fan, engine, oil full pump, number three boilor, part circulator, main and reserve food tanks and all pipes and leads adjacent were pierced and broken.
Leak at after end of B.R. oil fulls tank plugged.
Efforts made to run petrol dynamo for W/I but the magneto connection broke. Hands were told off to get hand steering in use. P.O. of fore boiler room reported no damage after first raid although Ch. Sto. reported oil suction line pierced and shut off.
2. Sub. Lieut. Jeaves.
During the first attack I was on the bridge as
Officer of the Watch and remained there for some time afterwards while the Captain sent off to the engine and boiler rooms.
On the Captain's orders I went aft to the after steering compartment to see whether it was possible to steer by hand.
This was 30, and leaving a Leading Stoker and two or three hands I returned to the bridge as the ship was being taken in tow.
When the second attack took place I was in the foro and aft passage below the wheelhouse for some time and eventually went into the Petty Officers' Meas to try and assist the foremost supply party.
After the attack, on the First Lieutenant's orders,
I placed charts in the whaler and a small private motor boat and unshipped the steering compase from the wheelhouse, and put it in the whaler. I then went aft to continue connecting up to steer by hand. To do this it was necessary to clear a good deal of gear out of the compartment. This took about half an hour. By this time another attempt was being made to take the ship in tow, so I recovered the charts from the motor boat, and went up on the bridge.
When the ship was attacked for the third time I again went down to the fore and aft passage beneath the wheelhouse, where I stayed till the order Shandon ship was given. or the two charts containing confidential matter concerning minefields in the Dover area, one was destroyed and the other left in the whaler which has not yet returned.
The Fleat notices to Marines were thrown overboard in mid-channel. Fleet charts were left in their folios in the
Charthouse.

95
3.
09
it, Cdr. V.G. Boaks.
With after guns until motor boat lowered and then went ward to make quite sure coxswain of boat (Hicks) understood orders reference embarking troops and collection of drifting is, Just as we got the beat clear I heard & bomb whistling a and dived under Pom-Pom platform. About six, possibly more,
DS dropped, one of which was presumably the one that went ough the engine room - this very seriously wounded and burnt rating and seriously burnt another but I escaped the full
CO of the back flash although thrown heavily against Pom-Pom
: overhead and almost knocked out.
I than went to the bridge to see what the position was
0, but there were no casualties there and I than went aft to after guns to find en route that deck was buckled by mainmast.
The after magazine and shell room were flooding and ided to close down. I then went down to my cabin and passed about eight spare torches (placed there for use in disembarktroops previous day - night) as all lights were out and go daylight few were carrying torches on them. I found eral chaos in Captain's Cabin flat and sent extra hands down resecure deadlights as this compartment being next to the cled part was rather important.
I then went forward to supervise tow forward. In the st of this another heavy attack was made and most hands took
Iter, some in forecastle locker. I then found all but three the cordite rounds from "A" gun had been jettisoned and in
V of the nature of the attack ordered these three to be thrown rboard. After this attack we came out and then started to wide cordite again. I then went aft to see what damage had a done during which the fishing drifter returned and I again c forward to rig now tow lines and also ordered individual is to turn out and lower boats and carley floats into water by then it was known ship could not move and drifter could not a towed faster than say four knota. I also placed one hand a a lead line aft to keep check on amount of water ship was in a point of view of grounding and stationed hands ready to cast boats' painters should ship sink without warning.
Then to the forecastle to get up the after hemp and
D 35th wire during course of which the third attack developed
I went aft to the after guns and with one round of cordite
II forward fired the remaining round in Y gun myself at at sing homber but not enough aim off in field of view to hit a with full deflection. After firing this round I went forward noticed that X gun had a round left but was unable to fire as oil cylinder had been emptied in preparation for firing and ring gun out of mounting overboard. This cylinder was re-
Led but on going forward I discovered that the crack in deck eared to have widened and gave orders that after guns were on account to be fired in view of probable breaking off of after
I then ordered every possible container of water to be
Led from only remaining water left in hot water tank in galley tore up soldiers ground capes to provide covers to prevent
3 or contamination of this water. Boats' anchors were then ced in spare boats alongaide and cars provided, sailing gear bed in whaler, after steering compase unshipped and placed in re motor boat, torches distributed to boats, the after lifeflare placed in whaler for possible use. After steering y detailed and party to clear the flat of weeckage. I then forward for third time to take in tow during which the fourth ok developed - dive bombing - and upper deck was cleared.

95
Page 3.
09
Lieut, Cdr. N.G. Boaks.
4.
With after guns until motor boat lowered and then went forward to make quite sure coxswain of boat (Hicks) understood his orders reference embarking troops and collection of drifting boats, Just as we got the beat clear I heard & bomb whistling down and dived under Pom-Pom platform. About six, possibly more, bombs dropped, one of which was presumably the one that went through the engine room - this very seriously wounded and burnt one rating and seriously burnt another but I escaped the full force of the back flash although thrown heavily against Pom-Pom deek overhead and almost knocked out.
I then went to the bridge to see what the position was there, but there were no casualties there and 1 than went aft to the after guns to find on route that deck was buckled by mainmast.
The after magazine and shell room were flooding and decided to close down. I then went down to my cabin and passed up about eight spare torches (placed there for use in disembarking troops previous day - night) as all lights were out and being daylight fow were carrying torches on them. I found general chaos in Captain's Cabin flat and sent extra hands down to resecure deadlights as this compartment being next to the buckled part was rather important.
I then went forward to supervise tow forward. In the midst of this another heavy attack was made and most hands took shelter, some in forecastle locker. I than found all but three of the cordite rounds from "A" gun had been jettisoned and in view of the nature of the attack ordered these three to be thrown overboard. After this attack ao came out and then started to provide cordite again. I then went aft to see what damage had been done during which the fishing drifter returned and I again went forward to rig now tow Lines and also ordered individual hands to turn out and lower boats and carley floats into water as by then it was known ship could not move and drifter could not have towed faster than say four knots. 1 also placed one hand with a lead line aft to keep check on amount of water ship was in from point of view of grounding and stationed hands ready to cast off boats' painters should ship sink without warning.
Then to the forecastle to get up the after hemp and also 3½ⁿ wire during course of which the third attack developed and I went aft to the after guns and with one round of cordite from forward fired the remaining round in Y gun myself at a passing bomber but not enough aim off in field of view to hit even with full deflection. After firing this round I went forward and noticed that X gun had a round left but was unable to fire as recoil cylinder had been emptied in preparation for firing and tearing gun out of mounting overboard. This cylinder was refilled but on going forward I discovered that the crack in deck appeared to have widened and gave orders that after guns were on no account to be fired in view of probable breaking off of after end. I then ordered every possible container of water to be filled from only remaining water left in hot water tank in galley and tore up soldiers ground capes to provide covers to prevent loss or contamination of this water. Boats' anchors were then placed in spare boats alongside and cars provided, sailing gear placed in whaler, after steering compasa unshipped and placed in spare motor boat, torches distributed to boats, the after lifebuoy flare placed in whaler for possible use. After steering varty detailed and party to clear the flat of weeckage. I then went forward for third time to take in tow during which the fourth attack developed - dive bombing - and upper deck was cleared.

100
4. (contd.).
On completion when ship had been struck and water was level with waist the question of scuttling ship came up but
Captain decided this was unnecessary and order was given to abandon ship. I reached one of the spare Army boats two hundred yeard away and after collecting survivors to limit of boats capacity went to drifter. After collecting all but two floats we went off to head off a destroyer for the remainder.
Particular merit:-
A.B. Rawstron - courage, example & cheerfulness.
A.B!s Glover and Ord. Sea Mullins - courage & cheerfulness.
P.O. Robinson took charge well on forecastle.
A.B. Davis. Torp. although badly burned took a lively interest in remaining action taken.
Lieut. Sowry - for tenacity of purpose with French drifter resulting in the recovery of seventy survivors and message passed to destroyer for remaining fifty.
5, Surg. Lieut. A.M. McHaffie.
1st. Attack. In Sick Bay - which was reduced to chaos from concussions. Casualties arrived after attack.
Soldier complaining of burns of ares,
Stocker complaining of burns of face.
2x2xwaker Torpedoman complaining of extensive surface burns of face, scalp, neck and both eyes.
Another rating complained of splinter wound of left arm.
L.S.B.A. reported A.B. Riddle lying under Pom-Pom platform. When
I arráved there I found him complaining of fracture of left femur and very extensive burns of face and shoulders - Dressed him and then went down into engine room where I saw two RRA's dead.
Griffeths& Griffiths& Putt (atoker) was also dead.
L.S.B.A. reported four dead in boiler room.
2nd. attack. Ordered to clear upper deck - and I went to port side alley way, Saw Mr. Francis of Pom-Pom platform and one rating. He called for rest of crew and I passed on call to ratings in fore meas deck. No hands came forward. Saw Captain
Captain to attend to Mr. Francis and I went on to Pom-Pom platform climbing on to platform followed by rest of crew. Was called by and found Mr. Francis unconscious - splinter through lungs. Gave
1/6th. morphine.
3rd. attack. Was still on Pom-Pom platform until shortly after attack when Mr. Francis died.
Evacuated wounded into Mater boat lying in water amidships on
During interval between 3rd. and 4th. attacks.
starboard side. Was helped in this by L.S.B.A and Coxawain.
Orders to do 80 were given by First boat Lieutenant.
wounded Riddle who was comatose and lying boat - in
4th. attack. Most of screw of motor, boarded ship including all
Robertson except stretcher A.B. a ma on forecastle of motor two ratings remained in boat.
and smashed Bomb against ship's side upsetting all within other - Riddle hit water 10 yards off motor boat and wave upset disappeared boat before I could get to him and I lost eight of menbers of boat's crew.
Ship by this time was being abandoned.

page 5.
97
101
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
6.
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though ship was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with it, ordering a torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off during attack. Complete jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S Pannel. Tas ordered by 1st. Lieut. to load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned, threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
7.
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the bridge on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F - load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60° and at no time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were passing 18 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. A wire was passed and made fast round a stout beam in the smack, which carried away some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongside the forecastle bows pointing aft. At this point second bombing attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile, the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to taking up the slack too vaolently. This was due to the language difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the only other man on board the smack being an R.A.F. pilot. A
further bombing attack started, the final one, and I again stood off from the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship and I picked up all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and some men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men aboard, Whitehall appeared in the distance and we made out half way the foremast. We met her about 12 miles away and to intercept her, using the smack's siren and the French ensign passed information up to her and requested her to collect men from mid-chai.nel we transferred everyone to H.M. Trawler Olvina.
remaining boats. I then set out on a course for England and in

98
Page 6.
102
Leading Seaman Wordhouse.
Mator boat.
Whilst pushing the towing vessel into position, the bombing formation came over. I let go and sheered off, the first salvo lifting the boat almost out of the water.
Messerschmidt fighters attacked us with machine gun and cannon (Bombs were also dropped) for just a few minutes short of an hour. L.S. Hicks watched their flight and gave me helm and engine orders, the boat not being hit though a couple of cartridge cases dropped into us. We found ourselves out of sight of the ship, had & little council of war, and decided, knowing the ship was out of wireless communication to make Dunkirk for help. We headed west, and not far outside the harbour two troopships were bombed and sunk. We picked up what we considered a safe complement, tried to get in touch with a vessel to assist Basilisk.
In this were not successful and were told to make England.
We drew a rough chart and set our course, arraving
Ramsgate roughly eight hours later. I then turned over the boat to the Naval authorities. We reported that Basilisk was badly hit and were assured that help had been sent.

Dyusum 93
106
110
SECTION
DEVONUES, and Juno 1940.
Sir,
I regret to have to report the loss of Hellows by enemy action at 103 lat June 1940 off the Belgian coast, The circumstances are 68 follows.
at about 0815 while embarking British troors off
EASURES I TRIC attacked by a squadron of nine German JUNKARS
dive bombers. They approached from astern and on sighting I went full speed shoul 13 boilors connected and as the bombu were released turned hard to port. 43 far as I could judge such aircraft released & pattern of five Dombs one boing a large "B" type and four smaller bombs with alight delay action. une of the latter exploded at the ufter end of 40.3 boilor room on the port side and storeed blew away the bulkhoad pieroing both main and suxiliery steam linou and main oil fuel supply. +11 engine room and boilor room personnel were killed. About six of the "B" type bomba then exploded underneath the ship flooding the after magazine and shell room and probably the gland compartments and store rooms
Just forward of this position. The uppor deck and older of the ship cracked right across in the vicinity of the minnest. This is a gonoral line of neukness in dostroyers.
In order to precerve stability the torpedoes and depth charges were jottluoned and the ohio floated confortably with little increase in drought. 1 increated ongine room and Ro.3
boiler room and found that a small amount of nuter was making its way through shrapnel holos. These were plugged and collision eat placed over the norst lonks. It WELL found impossible to got steam to the enginee and the ship thereafter remined imobile.
4.
fforts were now made to send out messages for assistance. a tug who had boon attending on Hahada "K-ITH" passed me a signal triling DO to sink to which I replied that I
was out of action and required immediate addistance. 1 aluo requested him to inform The Ylag officer Commanding, Nover to this effect. Tue then dion peared. Jignals for assistance were also mudo by using type 4 4 with battory power. It is doubtful whether any of these seauages were received owing to very heavy traffic at the time and comparative meukness of by cignals.
5.
a Belgiun fishing smook under French colours was seen in the distunce and the notor boat TRIO desputched to her to our assistance. she WAS 43 JULI- of Could and after
DOBB efforts a tow WELD passed and corse not to open from the coast.
This ha: hardly been accomplished before & second attack devellopped ut about 0945. This consisted of lovel bumbing from about S, 10000.
each bomber acting independently. about hulf 5 squairon of 18
curried out the attack. Considering the ship was a stationary target and there was little wind these attacks were pourly curried C
out and no bumba hit. This may have been due to pon pom fire if which Hunner (2) 183 in charge. Unfortunately this gallant officer WBG killed at his post by machino [un bulleta which wore fired continuously as the bonbers pussed overhead.

117
Ing. EX into the loss G.:
Jilist
1. Lieut. E. Treweeks.
When we were bombed I was taking cover in after lobby, then proceeded to E.R. hatch but could not get below because of steam, was joined by C. Sto. Ricketts and C.E.R.A.,
Westlake, gave orders to shut off all boiler room emergency valves and then safety valves and shut main steam bulkhead valve on deck. As soon as possible 3. Room and after boiler room were entered.
Attention first given to casualties but all bar one were dead.
First thought possible to get some part of machinory going but not possible. Concentrated on leaks. Bomb dropped port fore side Z.R. bulkhead and stove in boiler room bulkhend.
Disabling port fan, engine, oil fule pump, number three boilor, port circulator, main and reserve feed tanks and all pipes and leads adjacent were pierced and broken.
Leak at after end of S.R. oil fule tank plugged.
Efforts made to run petrol dynamo for W/T but the magneto connection broke. Hands were told off to get hand steering in use, P.O. of fore boiler room reported no damage after first raid although C. Sto. reported oil suction line piereed and shut off.
2. Sub. Lieut. Jeaves.
During the first attack I was on the bridge as
Officer of the Watch and remained there for some time afterwards while the Captain went off to the engine and boiler rooms.
On the Captain's orders I went aft to the after steering compartment to are whether it was possible to steer by hand.
This was so, and leaving a Leading Stoker and two or three hands I returned to the bridge as the ship was being taken in tow.
When the second attack took place I was in the fore and aft passage below the wheelhouse for some time and eventually went into the Petty Officers' Meas to try and assist the foremost supply party.
After the attack, on the First Lieutenant's orders,
I placed charts in the whaler and a small private motor boat and unshipped the stearing compass from the wheelhouse, and put it in the whaler. I then went aft to continue connecting up deal of out of the compartment. This took about half an to steer by hand. To do this it was necessary to clear a good hour. By gear this time another attempt was being made to take the ship in tow, so I recovered the charts from the motor boat, and went up on the bridge.
went down the fore and aft passage beneath the wheelhouse,
When the ship was attacked for the third time I again where I to till the order Shandon ship was given. or the two charts stayed containing confidential matter concerning other left minefields in the in the Dover area, one was destroyed and the whaler which has not yet returned.
in mid-channel. The Fleet charts were left in the
Fleet notices to Marines were their thrown folios overboard in
Charthouse.

119
Page 3.
Lieut. Cdr. W.G. Boaks.
4.
With after guns until motor boat lowered and then went forward to make quite sure coxswain of boat (Hicks) understood his orders reference embarking troops and collection of drifting boats, Just as we got the beat clear I heard & bomb whistling bombs dropped, one of which was presumably the one that went down and dived under Pom-Pom platform. About six, possibly more, through the engine room - this very seriously wounded and burnt one rating and seriously burnt another but I escaped the full force of the back flash although thrown heavily against Pom-Pom deck overhead and almost knocked out.
I then went to the bridge to see what the position was there, but there were no casualties there and I then went aft to the after guns to find en route that deck was buckled by mainmast.
The after magazine and shell room were flooding and decided to close down. I then went down to my cabin and passed up about eight spare torches (placed there for use in disembarking troops previous day - night) as all lights were out and being daylight few were carrying torches on them. I found general chaos in Captain's Cabin flat and sent extra hands down to resecure deadlights as this compartment being next to the buckled part was rather important.
I then went forward to supervise tow forward. In the midst of this another heavy attack was made and most hands took shelter, some in forecastle locker. I then found all but three of the cordite rounds from "A" gun had been jettisoned and in view of the nature of the attack ordered these three to be thrown overboard. After this attack we came out and then started to probide cordite again. I then went aft to see what damage had been done during which the fishing drifter returned and I again went forward to rig new tow lines and also ordered individual hands to turn out and lower boats and carley floats into water as by then it was known ship could not move and drifter could not have towed faster than say four knots. I also placed one hand with a lead line aft to keep check on amount of water ship was in from point of view of grounding and stationed hands ready to cast off boats' painters should ship sink without warning.
Then to the forecastle to get up the after hemp and also 32 wire during course of which the third attack developed and I went aft to the after guns and with one round of cordite from forward fired the remaining round in Y gun myself at a passing bomber but not enough aim off in field of view to hit and noticed that X had a round left but was unable to fire as even with full deflection. After firing this round I went forward recoil cylinder had gun been emptied in preparation for firing and tearing out of mounting overboard. This cylinder was refilled but gun forward I discovered that the crack in deck no have in view of probable beeaking of after appeared to on going widened and gave orders that after guns off were on filled then remaining water left in hot water to galley end. account I to ordered be fired every possible container of water tank to in be and tore from only ground capes to provide anchors covers were prevent then placed or contamination alongside and cars provided, and gear loss up soldiers of this water. Boats' sailing spare in whaler, torches distributed to boats, After steering placed in spare boats after steering compass unshipped the after placed life- in buoy motor boat, whaler for possible use. of weeckage. I
party flare placed in to clear the flat during which the then went detailed and party time to take in tow deck was cleared. fourth attack forward developed for - third dive bombing - and upper

116
120
4. (contd.).
On completion when ship had been struck and water was level with waist the question of scuttling ship came up but
Captain decided this was unnecessary and order was given to abandon ship. I reached one of the spare Army boats two hundred yeard away and after collecting survivors to limit of boats capacity went to drifter. After collecting all but two floats we went off to head off a destroyer for the remainder.
Particular merit:-
A.B. Rawstron courage, example & cheerfulness.
A.B!s Glover and Ord. Sea Mullins courage & cheerfulness.
P.O. Robinson took charge well on forecastle,
A.B. Davis. Torp, although badly burned took a lively interest in remaining action taken.
Lieut. Sowry - for tenacity of purpose with Franch drifter resulting in the recovery of seventy survivors and message passed to destroyer for remaining fifty.
5. Surg. Lieut. A.W. McHaffie,
1st. Attack. In Sick Bay - which was reduced to chaos from concussions. Casualties arrived after attack.
Soldier complaining of burns of arms.
Stocker complaining of burns of face.
Torpedoman complaining of extensive surface burns of face, scalp, neck and both eyes.
Another rating complained of splinter wound of left arm.
L.S.B.A. reported A.B. Riddle lying under Pom-Pom platform. When
I arråved there I found him complaining of fracture of left feaur and very extensive burns of face and shoulders - Dressed him and then went down into engine room where I saw two BRA's dead.
Griffiths& Griffeth& Putt (stoker) was also dead.
L.S.B.A. reported four dead in boiler room.
port side Saw Mr. Francis of Pom-Pom platform call and
2nd. attack. Ordered to clear upper deck - and I went to one alley He way. called for rest of crew and I passed on to
Captain on to platform to Mr. Francis and I went on to platform Gave climbing in fore mess followed by rest of crew. Pom-Pom Was called by ratings rating. deck. No hands came forward. Saw Captain and found to Mr. attend Francis unconscious - splinter through lungs.
1/6th. morphine,
3rd. attack. Was still on Pom-Pom platform until shortly after attack Mr. Francis died.
Evacuated During into water boat lying in and amidships Coxswain. on when interval between 3rd. and water 4th. attacks.
Orders to do side. so were given by First bow starboard wounded Was helped in this Lieutenant. by L.S.B.A
4th. attack. Most of Norew of motor, boarded ship lying including in all
Robertson wounded except stretcher A.B. a Riddle me on boat - two ratings remained in and Bomb hit water ship's side upsetting lost sight of other Riddle boat. 10 yards off motor boat all and within wave upset -
disappeared smashed before boat against I could get to him and I
menbers of boat's crew.
Ship by this time was being abandoned.

page 5.
121
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
6.
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though ship was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with it, ordering a torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off during attack. Complete Jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S Pannel. Tas ordered by 1st. Lieut. to load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned, threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
7.
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the bridge on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F. load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60 and at no time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were passing 18 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. À wire was passed and made fast round a stout beam in the smack, which carried away some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongaide the forecastle bows pointing aft. At this point second bombing attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile, the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to taking up the slack too vaolently. This was due to the language difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the only other board the smack being an R.A.P. pilot. A
further man on attack started, the final one, and I again stood off from bombing the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship and I picked all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and up men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men Whitehall some appeared in the distance and we made out half the foremast. We met her about 12 collect away and to intercept aboard, her, using the smack's siren and the miles French ensign remaining boats. I then set out on a course Trawler England Olvina. and in passed way information up to her and requested her to for men from mid-cha.nel we transferred everyone to H.M.

118
Page 6.
122
Leading Seaman Wordhouse.
Mator boat.
Whilst pushing the towing vessel into position, the bombing formation came over. I let go and sheered off, the first salvo lifting the boat almost out of the water.
Messerschmidt fighters attacked us with machine gun and cannon (Bombs were also dropped) for just a few minutes short of an hour. L.S. Hicks watched their flight and gave me helm and engine orders, the boat not being hit though a couple of cartridge cases dropped into us. We found ourselves out of sight of the ship, had a little council of war, and decided, knowing the ship was out of wireless communication to make Dunkirk for help. To headed west, and not far outside the harbour two troopships were bombed and sunk. We picked up what we considered a safe complement, tried to get in touch with a vessel to assist Basilisk.
In this were not successful and were told to make England.
We drew a rough chart and set our course, arraving
Ramsgate roughly eight hours later. I then turned over the boat to the Naval authorities. We reported that Basilisk was badly hit and were assured that help had been sent.

126
CONFIDENTIAL.
130
To: The Admiralty.
via: V.A. Dover.
H.M.S. "SALANDER".
Copies to: F.O., London.
5th June, 1940.
M.S.4.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following narrative of events which took place on Friday, 31st May, and Saturday, 1st June, 1940.
At 1800/31/5 I left Dover in company with HALCYON and SKIPJACK
to rendezvous with the remainder of the minesweepers at YY buay by 2200 in accordance with V.A. Dover's 0357/31/5.
Here I took FITZROY under my command and followed astern of the other two groups through Dunkirk Roads, past Dunicirie, to a position off Bray,
I was then ordered by NIGER to anchor one mile to his Eastward, to avoid magnetic mines laid near No.8 Buoy. This was accomplished by 0015/1/6.
The beach at Bray was under shrapnel fire from inland energy batteries, and as no boats closed no I lowered a shaler with a Volunteer crew to land for soldiers (See appendix No.1).
The boat returned in about half an hour with one hand and a message from General Nontgomery to inform all ships that he intended moving Weatward to Dunkirk at once as the beach was becoming untenable.
This message I passed to all ships in V/S to ch.
The pontoon pier had been hit by shell fire and no troops seemed to be embarking at all, so I weighed and kept under way closing the beach as much as I could.
When a little light appeared, however, boats began to above off from the beach and dame to no. RA Dover now ordered all ships to embark men in boats and move Westwards to Dunkirk at dawn. A continual stream of boats came off with military personnel, and by 0600/1/6 I had embarked about 450 men, including 29 wounded of whom 11 were stretcher cases, Attacks by aircraft took place on all ships and salvoes of bombs were dropped, no ships being hit. We were then attacked by front machine gun fire from Messerschmitt 109's, and one casualty was sustained.
L.S.A. Gullett was hit in the hand by a bullet. I then noved Westeard astern of KNITH and SKIPJACK.
At 0820/1/6 an air attack took place on all three ships, and
SKIPJACK was sunk, and KSITH hit and set on fire. KSITH abandoned ship, and I closed her and sent away both whalers as lifeboats. (See appendix
No.2). Whilst resouing survivors I was again attacked by Junkers 87
dive bombers, and a salvo of four bombs fall about 50 feet ahead of the ship. They exploded under water when two bomba were approximately abreast the bridge. The ship lifted bodily and heeled to starboard, and then settled down with a list to part. She then sank about a foot, suddenly.
I feared she was in danger of sinking, so I ordered the S.P's on board to be jettisoned. This was done in a weighted bag. (See appendix No.3)
I stopped engines and waited reports from the Singineer Officer and Recutive
Officer.
The Engineer Officer and First Lieutenant ascertained that the forward, was and had flooded compartments amidahips In comprising about the cold and ship still seaworthy, although she had gained about 1 foot of draught hour rooms, steam WILLS gunners got on main engines again. (See Engineer Officer's
0001 stores and canteen store. attached a quarter of an report).

136
141
ammunition sailing again in company with Sutton and Ross at 0230, may 31st arriving off Bray by I route at 0915.
As there were no enemy aircraft in the visinity, I anchored.
Troops were embarked and at 1130 Sutton and Ross transfered their troops to ae and all proceeded to Margate where I dis-
-embarked five hundred.
At 1915 I proceeded towards the rendesvous off 1 buoy, being ordered at 2145 to assist Tug St.ABBS, one of whose tow of three
Thanes barges had broken adrift. I picked up this barge and towed her to Dunkirk, arriving at 0330, tat June. At about this time a vessel which was unidentified was seen to blow up, presumeably on a magnetic mine, in the neighbourhooh of the whistle buoy off Bray.
About two hundred and fifty troops had been embarked when at message was brought off from the Brigadier to say that he had stopped embarkation from the beaches, which were being shelled, and was retiring on Dunkirk. I passed this message so Kwith.
During the embarkation low flying aircraft sachinegunned boats and ships. Several hits were registered on one machine, which was afterwards seen to creat on the sand dunes, by &
Bren sug in Lydd fired by one of the troops embarked. Another machine was also thought to have been his by the starboard pair or Lowis guns fired by ord.Sea. N.F.R. Duxbury, O.N.O/JX 173054.
At 0625 I proceeded by route X to Dover= arriving at 11299.
On the way enemy bombors appeared but after a few SALYOB were driven off by our fighters who were seen to bring down two.
a
At 1920 I again proceeded by route X to Dukirk, anchoring in the roads about half a mile east of the harbour entrance at
2350. The beach and roads wro being should, and there and ns appear to be much boat traffic. I sent the motor boat inshore

139
144
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE. (continued).
(3) Sto.1. Joseph FoodSwiss ROADLEY, O.N. C/SX 94432.
For ably assisting Lieut.Hear in his case of the wounded in addition to his boiler room watchkeeping duties; continuing to Nort until overcome by sheer exhaustion and nervous strein.
(4) P.O. Prodrick Harold KING, O.H. G/J 100181., for keeping the anti-sireraft spearms in an efficient state do that no delays or jamba occured.
(5) Ldg.Sto. Raymond Persival John JRMETT, O.N. 0/3% 85935.
for keeping the twenty year old angine of Aydd's motor boat in efficient running order, Bo that no breakforms of any sors occured as any time daring ambarkation.
MAIN
IN CONSTAND.
E.H.S. LYDD.
7ah June 1940.

Dynam 103 814/0/1152 B14/0
1156
...Vice Admiral Dover.
148
From. Commanding Officer H.M.S.Shikari.
Date.7th June 1940.
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS;
The following is submitted in accordence with Signal
2001/4/40.
Tuesday 28th May.
Returned from night Convoy to Cherbourg at 1400.
Landed S.P's and fuelled. 1430 Sailed independently for
Dover at 28 knots. 1930 Arrived off Dover. Instructed to join Malcolm. 2000 Sailed under Captain D.16's Ordersto carry out evacuation.
Wednesday 29th May.
0100 Arrived off Beach at La Panne. Commenced work, using Motorboat and Whaler. Heavy Surf running.
Whaler capsized owing to military rushing boat in the
Surf. With daylight evacuation speeded up and this Y88
greatly assisted by Naval Landing Graft. As in subsequent work, drifting boats were being towed in by the Motorboat with Boatkeepers from Shikari. Kedge anchors were used when Surf was heavy and boats veered to the shore.
During all operations, hands not required at the Guns were in boats or assisting to embark the military. Supply
Parties only closing up when the Guns fired. 1215. Ship full. Returned to Dover. Disembarked troops, fuelled.
1745. Left Dover for La Panne. Many bombing attacks on
Ships in vicinity, when near Dost Dyok buoy. Closed
Paddle Steamed "Gracie Fields* who had been hit, but as sufficient craft were available to take off her troops, proceeded. Zig-Zagging at high Speeda was employed whenever bombing attacks took place or were threatened.
Thursday 30th May.
Ran aground on approaching the Coast but got off on the rising tide, three hours later, at Dawn. Contin
-ued embarking troops. 0800 Full. Returned to Dover. On passing Nieuport Bucy came under fire from a battery behind Nieuport for seven minuted. It is thought that the fire was controlled by an observation Baloon over
Nieuport. This fact was reported by signal but the
Baloon was up for the next few days. No hita were registered. Smoke screen and Zig-Zagging was commenced after the first Salvo. 1300. Arrived Dover. Disembarked.
Many of these troops from the Beaches had only Half
Kits and were wet through. The Ship's Company did all they cuold for the Soldiers and now in consequence have deplated Kits, The Coxswain, his Staff and the
Cooks and Stewards did Great work in supplying the
Soldiers with food and drink, under most trying circumkeep the Galley fire going when steaming at high speeds.
stances; especially as in Shikari it is impossible to
A burst steam pipe to one of the oil fuel pumps necessitated proceeding to & buoy while Sandhurst made repairs. This was rapidly done. 1930. Ready for sea again. Sailed for La Panne. Gyro Compass failed when approaching Dunkirk by "X" Route for the first time.
2230 Darkness slowed down evacuation considerably, close and our boats took Soldiers to light draught Ships This inshore when uncertain of Shikari's position.
added considerably to the time spent off the Beaches.

H.M.S. "Pangbourne"
158
At Sea.
5th.June 1940
Sir,
I have the honour to forward the following narrative in accordance with your signal 2049/4/6.
At approximately midnight on Sunday 26th. May, H.M.S.
with the remainder of the 5th.m.8.
150
4
155
at 1600. Dive bombers everywhere and shells falling on beach. Although attack after attack TSS made by bombers on various ships relatively ****** few hits appeared to be secured. Motor Launch having lost dinghy on previous day I went alongside an abandoned wreck. One of the wreck's boats was swung out, lowered, and taken in too by Launch. French troops were ferried to the Launch in this boat by Launch crew. Conditions (other than state of sea which was good) were shocking as German planes were flying low, dropping bombs and using machine-guns.
Operation delayed 89 great difficulty was experienced in rersuading some of the Frenchmen to ambark. So far as I could understand, their units were incomplete and they were unwilling that part of a unit should embark without thefrest. At one point on the beach there were at least 2,000 men, none of whom would embark. The rowing boat bad to be pulled back to the Launch and towed further Rest where 8 fresh start me made. Eventually
& full load was obtained and we sailed for Hamagate by the same route. Throughout the first part of the return journey repeated bombing and machine gun attacks were made. On one occasion a salvo of 6 bombs was released so low that they were plainly visible as they left the racks. They all fell close together near the Launch but all failed to explode. Several machine gun bullets

154
Sheet 2. 159
At 0030 on Wednesday 29th. May I slipped and proceeded down harbour. After rounding No.6E whistle and bell buoy I found myself in among two or three
French destroyers, stopped in the channel, and as a result missed No.13 bouy and went aground on sandbank north of Zuydcoote Pass Engines were put to full astern and the ship slid off into about ten fathoms. In order to ascertain my exact position and wait until unlit bouys could be seen I anchored and very shortly picked up the
Nieuport buoy While waiting the ship was roughly fixed and found to be in position51 degrees 7 minutes 30 seconds
North, 2 degrees 28 minutes 48 seconds East, and clear of the channel. I proceeded without further incident to
Margate. Just before dawn gunfire was observed shead and shortly afterwards several destroyers passed ae proceeding towards the French coast. Later passing the Kwiente buoy one sunken destroyer and another badly down by the stern were passed.
At I000 ship secured alongside Margate pier and disembarked troops. Although no exact counting of troops was possible, about 450 in all were landed, including approximately 50 stretcher cases and 100 walking cases.
The arrangements for disembarkation of troops at Margate were most efficient.
At 1107 Wednesday 29th. may slipped and proceeded back to Dunkirk, being joined by Lydd at North Goodwin light vessel. At 1315 Lydd reported & submarine to starboard, although not observed by Pangbourne a warning was broadcast at 1321 Between 1645 and 1715 just off Nieuport bank several air attacks were directed against Pangbourne and all ships in the vicinity. Immediately after this two
British soldiers were picked up in an exhausted condition, apparently having been blown from the deck of some small ship. At approximately 1730 several enemy bombers appeared to be about to attack Pangbourne but passed overhead, and were distinctly observed to attack & hospital ship about a mile on the Starboard beam for & considerable period without registering any direct hits. Just before passing the Nieuport Bank buoy a large lifeboat containing some thirty Belgian soldiers was picked up and the boat taken in tow for use on the beach. On closing the beach 1 was ordered to proceed Alanasise the Clan MacAlister lying at anchor and embark the crew. This ship was on fire aft, and the ammunition round the after gun was continually exploding.
The Master reported to ae that there was no chance of saving the shipas all hoses were out and the steering gear out of action. The crew, including some 30 Lascars, and several
Naval ratings, - crews of motor boats - were all embarked.
I then proceeded and anchored about half a mile off the beach opposite the Sanatorium. All available boats were lowered and sent inshore in charge of Lieut. Tadman
R.N.R. and Rabbitts, Boatswain R.N.. Between
1860 and 1900 the ship was subjected to numerous low diving bombing attacks, although no direct hits were made there were several near misses. The hull was holed on both sidesabove and below the water line and the D.U. coil cut in several places. It was during this period that all casualties occurred, resultang in the death of of seven the ratings and six Belgian soldiers, and wounding seven

2
163
into tugs there (I did not know that ships were going to embark troops and return to Margate, discharge them alongside the Pier - according to the chart there is not
ERQUE
enough water) and return to position W. by 2200. I
turned West again, but there seemed there would be a waste
S.
of time so, I decided to turn East again and eport myself
Panne) and assist in embarking troops aboard other ships.
to "HEBE" (who had informe me me was Senior Office, La
Circumstances made it necessary to embark 100 troops aboard myself, no opportunity arising to put them aboard any ot er ships.
6.
Later I was ordered to proceed in execution of previous orders (I left one boat with "HEBE"). Just Test of Bray
I passed the Admiral and reported to him that I had 100
KERQUE
troops on board. He told me to join him and I followed
DS.
him back to La Panne. While lying off there a further raid commenced and he ordered ne to 80 West at full speed.
It was during this raid that one aeroplane ms brought down by the 12 pdr. gun at maximum range. The raid was nearly over and the Admiral out of sight by the time I was
West of Dunkerque, SQ I returned to look for him and was told to return to La Panne, and embark troops after dark.
7.
At La Panne an B.N.V.R.Signalman reported to no that
"HEBE" wanted an officer badly, the wording of the signal sounded as if the Commanding Officer wanted someone capable of relieving him for a period. This appears to have been wrong, and may have originated in at verbal
KERQUE
message from the C.O. or the Commodore of the motor boat alongside. At any rate, I sent over my 1st. Lieutenant,
ADS.
he found he was not required in "HEBE", SO took the motor boat ashore to look for more troops. Finding none, he, with the aid of to sailors, walked along the beach pulling the whaler with them to see if they could find any. The whole time the place was being bombarded. ("HEBE" was signalling at times with a bright light) He eventually returned to "HEBE". I consider his actions worthy of reward, as he could eatly have rned to no at once.
8.
In the meantime I had taken a further 300 or SO troops on board and was nearly full and, as the difficers amongst
IKERQUE
them told me there were no further troops on 8 org, I
ADS.
reported this to "HEBE" and was told to return to Marcate;
not knowing my 1st. Lieutenant was assore, but thinking him in "HEBE", I did SO.
9.
I had now been between Dunkerque and La Panne for about steamer when she was being shelled and during frequent air
13 hours, several times passing the burning Clan Line raids. Ships company had been continuously at action they had been courously employed almost continuously stations, or takins on troops, without proper food; also since leaving the Tyne 60 hours before but, as yet, showed only officers were myself, Lieutenant R.N.V.R., Sobey R.N.R., and no signs of strain. I was short of two H. seamen and the
Temporary is surficiently experienced to be left as 0.0.7,,
Lieutenant A.R.Patton, who, as yet, except not under the most favourable conditions, and the

160
165
4
probably towards the where she might have bean salved by the enemy 11 she sank in shoul water, I asked the Commanding Officer 11 I should ink ser where she was.
He agreed and I cut my sweep wires and sunk er.
12. Five minutes after this the "SCOTIA" and RIGHTON
QUEEN" were sunk. I made a report and proceeded to rescue survivors. My whaler had been damaged and I only had a skiff left. One bunch of survivors were picked U. and
I then put the ship alongside bridge and must of the
"BRIGHTON QUEEN" and artially on er deck, and took off men clincin to her. These nen were mostly French
HTON
Colonial troops and must reluctant to let 80 of what
N.
support they had, it was sometimes necessary to make a line fast to them and pull then off. A carley float and skiff were used to assist in resoue work, no other boats were available. Thile "SALTASH" YRS alongable and on board "BRIGHTON QUEEN" she burped & little on the bilge, but it is not believed that my damage was done. German aircraft bombed and machine gunned men in the water.
my shift was machine gunned.
13.
The work of S.B. 1.Hutter at this time is worthy of mention. He, with the uld of untrained assistants, including Ldg. Sto. Crowley, dealt with 98 casualties,
CUE.
including 10 recussitation cases and only 3 died. He worked most successfully until 10 collepsed. Also worthy of mention is B. Gaughan, Sto. 1. who sma about I mile from the ship, when the ship might easily have had to leave him.
14.
I had picked up 350 to 400 survivors by now, many of them serious casualties, there were no more survivors in
SCUE.
the water SQ I returned to Margate. On the return journey
I closed three trawlers and took on board the Commanding
Officer and crew of M.T.B. 175, these included three serious casualties and one dead rating. I took the M.T.B
in tow and arrived at Margate at 1855.
15.
About 2000 I left the Pier and about 2200 sailed again for Duskerque with boats in tow, one motor boat and the small skiffs. I bad SOMO difficulty with the tow which
VD
MARGATE
light buoy I ran into thick smoke (from Dunkerque) my delayed no about half an hour. Before getting to the greeen
UNKERQUE
being very unreliable, I had to rely very much on compass hand lead (all the tubes for the machine slow had and been I used the in Knock Deep) which made y progress got
1 far Sast.
16.
Orders for this ni that all sweepers had to be lear at 0400. About 0200 I heard The buoy other and by 0500 and the destroyer evacuation the whistle would
UNKERQUE
commence was off the Breakwater at Dunkerque. I followed them at 0245 passed no on the may out, the 30 orders about being as I
did not 0300, even 11 I had an empty having seen sweepers feel Justified in breaking ship. Daring the clear by journey a small craft reported found an object a which mine, return back along ner course and investigation, proved
I turned for a mine, but on closer handles. These broken
I mistook kitchen utensil with broken small craft as horns.
to handles be a may have appeared to the end. June. 16. I anchored at Margate about 0800 and was toldito wait instructions.
I understood that this was the final

CONFIDENTIAL
Dynams 108
B14/0/
1173
167
H.M.S.SCIMITAR
8th June 1940
H.M.S.SCIMITAR...REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
Sir,
Ihave the honour to report on the proceedings of H.M. ship under my command between 26th May and 4th June as follows.
2. I received orders to sail for Dover at noon/28th and I arrived at Dover at about 2000 28th May. At about 2100 I
was ordered to leave under the orders of Captain (D) 16 in
"Malcolm". On arrival at Bray at about 0130 I was ordered to proceed a mile to the eastward and send in boats. My motor boat with whaler in tow proceeded inshore under Lieutenant J.R.G
Trechman and embarked troops. After about two hours my whaler was swamped inshore due to being rushed by troops. My motor boat continued to assist in towing and I embarked troops from various other boats. Later I secured another whaler and embarkation proceeded more rapidly.
3. At about 1230/29 I considered the ship was full
(about 350 troops) and I was ordered to return to Dover. I
sailed by route Y in company WIth "Shikari". I arrived at Dover at about 1630/29 and disembarked troops and then proceeded to oil.
4. I sailed for Dunkirk again at about 2000/29, starting via route Y, joining "Worcester" and then proceeding via route X to the beaches East of Bray. Good progress was made during the night embarking troops using our own motor boat and captured whaler and various other boats. In the morning I had
350 troops on board and proceeded via route X leaving my motor boat and whaler inshore under the command of Hidshipman Ball
R.N.R. Fog patches were encountered on the way back and I
arrived at Dover at about 1000/30.
5. After disembarking troops I sailed again at about
1130 and was ordered to go to Dunkirk harbour via route 8. I
arrived and went alongside at about 1330/30 and embarked about
500 troops very quickly. I returned via route $ being shelled and bombed off Calais. The shelling was of small calibre but fairly accurate; no damage was sustained. I arrived at Dover at about 1630/30 and disembarked troops.
6. I sailed again about 1830/30 for La Panne via route X. Near Dunkirk 1 sighted my motor boat and recalled it.
After waiting sometime at La Panne, where there were several other ships, I was ordered by "Worcester" to go to Bray. I collected a string of derelict boats and sent them in my motor boat under Sub Lieutenant Coldwell. Good progress was made in embarking troops and at about 0600/31 I had 500 on board and sailed after transferring my motor boat and string of other boats to the trawler "Olvina". I proceeded via route X to Dover in company with "Harvester".
7. I arrived at Dover at about 0930/31 and after disembarking troops sailed again about 1030. Whilst proceeding possible to the starboard hand buoys and just reached the through the Downs at 25 knots, I was navigating had as close as
N.W. Goodwin buoy when I was overtaken by Icarus, who out across close, and although I altered towards to starboard him. I as soon both and buoy went hard a starboard when he was with abreast me as the very would allow, I was drawn in about stopped but I sucked over and hit his stern line my stem. I found that was bows were crumpled in on the water collision with bulkhead. & definite
However of after the operation, I thought 10. I go on speed, rent allowing securing & collision mat, could at slow extreme my water pressure on to the in view of the urgenoy and proceeded at 8 knots, later at
The reasons

163
SCIMITAR REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
168
PAGE 2
*
The reasons for this collision and as report on the damage sustained have been more fully reported to Capatin (D) 16.
8. I arrived at Dunkirk at about 1300/31 and was ordered to go to Bray beaches. I spent this afternoon and evening in company with "Vivacious" and "Shikari" off Bray under intermittent bombardment and bombing during which no damage was sustained. During one bombing attack at sbout 1700(?) an aircraft was shot down; it is thought that this was from "Scimitar's" A
gun. I myself was watching A gun bursts, which appeared close to the target and at the moment the aircraft caught fire a burst from A gun appeared nearly in line. The aircraft fell in the sea and was obviously a total loss. During this period no troops were embarked as I had no boats and no other boats come near.
There seemed to be trouble in embarking due to choppy water.
9. At nightfall/31 the weather improved and troops were very quickly embarked, principally from the "skoot" "Hilda"
which was doing excellent work. I sailed at about 2300 with
500 troops, proceeding at 8 knots. During the passage numerous aircraft were heard but no attacks were made. A slight collision occurred with an unknown trawler, in which my port propellor guard was damaged. I arrived at Dover at about 0600/1 and after disembarking troops proceeded to oil. A further examination of the damage was made.
100 At 1000/1 I was ready and was orderedato proceer to Dunkirk again, but when near the North Goodwin L.V. I was ordered to return. At this time I had just sighted Prague in difficulties 80 I went to his assistance. Re asked me to take some of his troops 80 I went alongside while under way and embarked 500. I then stood by while he proceede through the Downs and at about 1530/1 I arrived at Dover and disembarked troops subsequently proceeding to a buoy.
11. At 0600/2 I proceeded to Sheerneas to disembark ammunition, thence to London for repairs by Messrs
Harland and Wolff. Repairs are expected to take 14 days.
12. "Soimitar" being short handed compared to other destroyers, all ratings had to work very hard and it was noteworthy that Engine room ratings not only steamed the ship with full also assisted on deak in embarkation etc. Nearly all seamen took efficiency and took their place at ammunition supply parties, but part as boat's crews at one time or another, using skill and determintion inxtrying conditions. The following are considered
Midshipman M.J.BALL R.N.R.,.for taking adminate charge with of the boats particularly worthy of mention or award.
in bombing etc. for & day ship absent.
A.B.
P/J
96339.
for taking charge of his gun's crew
G.PASMORE
well, and skill in shooting down an enemy
P/K 61614 aircraft For long and untiring it work as driver
Stoker in TYLER the motor and keeping running nearly continuously for 3 days.
I have the honour to be
Sir
The Vice Admiral your obedient servent
DOVER
Two copies to
Strants
The Captain (D)
16th D.F.
Lieutenant in Command
ADMIRAL
9-JUN 1940
DOVER

Dynams 109.
-tbs
66.
*
170 71
164
cer H.M.S. Sutton.
FOR INFORMATION
169
1.
No. 5/19.
AND
18 Admiralty.
ANY ACTION NECESSARY.
or of Minesweeping.
M.S.
ets on
.D.M.S.
/s 1
Magnetic Material
/s S 2
and
Moored Material
/s 3
Operational Magnetic dng
/s 4
Operational Moored n is forwarded herewith
/s 5
Personnel
40.
P.
10y.
S 6
Intelligence
Department. A copy of
10
S 7
Charts and Searched Channels ecretary Bab th.
ffice
(Tomphy
P.miembe. I.ve iew be.
acks.
ler in Command.
ALL Talbert C.S. Gower, O.N. C/JX 139945, as this ratings department, communications, some sental on equipe continually maintained.
ra*ley. Dalla C/JR 93287.
20 12 last für Antinually in char a of the boat work. Due to
THIS avoids. none alosasm cuare lost or damaged, and his coolness and and LORIES encouragement to the troopa and season ubsed S is enjur sends at have boat during the whole period. Due
0.050 USE De MEAA 002, 0.8. FAX 80017.
INSTITUTE ed the engine, often under fire, the thes is does goat Beaches were far in excess of what
IN filed different ODNE difficult weather conditions.

Libb!
Dynams 109.
-tbs
170 71
From:-
Commanding Officer H.M.S. Sutton.
Date:-
June 19th. 1940.
No. 5/19.
To
:-
Secretary to the Admiralty.
Copy to Director of minesweeping.
ints
Ion
M
sand raing
The Narrative of Dunkirk Operation is forwarded herewith rip, in accordance with C.A.F.O. 1045/40.
eney.
the
This may be of interest to D.M.S. Department. A copy of in the narrative is forwarded herewith.
COMMANDING OFFICER
re/ampy
19 JUN 1940
10
*
H.M.S. "SUTTON"
I.ve iew be.
stacks.
the
Commander in Command.
V.A. Dare
18
15"
in the efficiency of this ratings department, comunications, come relegraphist Albert Cash Gower, O.N. C/JX 139945, unt vital importance were continually maintained.
Actty This Officer Harold Beasley, continually Dalla C/JA in char 93287. 0 of the boat work. Due to his good rating was almost boats were lost or damaged, and his coolness and courage under seamanship Tige were no of great encouragement to the troops and season under him.
This Petty Officer Albert of the motor boat during often under period. fire, Due
Acting Fet George Dollery, Valla FAX the 80017. whole to the rating was engineer which he ran the engine, of shat the number efficient manner evacuated in from the beaches were far conditions. in excess might have of troops been expected under the difficult weather

166
171
H.W.S. "Sutton"
6th June 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward herewith my narrative of the events for the period May 26th to June 5th inclusive, covering the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk and the neighbouring beaches.
I have pleasure in informing you that Hallo hip under by command sustained superficial damages only, and no casualties.
I would especially like to bring before your notice the following officers and men.
(mail)
Lieut (3) Richard llegarty, Royal NAVYA As engineer officer of the ship, he maintained his department in an exceedingly high state of efficiency.
On several occasions when high speed was required, he produced revolutions in excess of the full speed revolutions on trials, when the ship was built, twenty four years ago, The noral of, his department could not have been higher, and the whole ingine Room department, when not below, were continually assisting in embarking and diambarking troops. This officer is over So years of age.
Sub Lieutenant William Cooffrey Hewett, Royal Kaval Volunteer Reserve(Tim)
This officer was almost pntimally in charge of the boat work on the beaches, frequently under machine gun and shell firs, and bombing attachs.
No showed great coolness and courage in encouraging and organising the troops, and it was entirely due to his fine seasonship, no boats were lost. In addition to any recognition you may are at to seard him, 1
would strongly recommend him to be promoted to Temporary L'eutenant for which rank I understand he 1a eligible.
Sub-Lieutenant John Valcoln Hay, Royal Navy.
This officer an Navigator was of the greatest nacistance to be on the bridge, and coolness in carrying out Daily his duties under fire, Due showing to him courage the difficulties of navi_ation, in - lighted and charted, shoul waters,were overcome. for one period he 188 36 hours on the bridge without a break.
Leading Albert C.S. Cower, O.N. C/JX 139945,
Due to the Telegraphist efficiency of this ratinga department, communications, come of vital importance were continually maintained.
Petty This Officer Harold Beasley, continually Date C/JH in charge 93287 of the boat work. Due to his good rating was almost boats were lost 0.7 damaged, and his coolness and seamen and courage under seamanship Time were no of great encouragement to the troopa under him.
This to rating Petty was Officer engineer Albert of which George the motor he Dollery, ran boat the during Walls ongine, FAX the often 80017. whole under pariod. of fire, what Due the might have of troops been expected under the difficult weather number the efficient manner evacuated in from the heaches sere far in conditions. excess

(1).
168
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS 26th. MAY TO 5th. JUNE 1940, EVACUATION
173
OF BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FROM DUNKIRK AND BEACHES TO
THE EASTWARD BY H.M.S.SUTTON. FOURTH MINESWEEPING FLOTILLA.
Sunday 26th. May. Raised steam and unlocked from Royal Dook,
Grimsby. Sailed at 1900, Salemander and Fitaroy in
Company+ sea. Sutton as Senior Officer. Fresh S.W.Wind, slight
Oh passage several Aircraft seen and heard, mostly friendly. Passed by Galates and destroyers.
Monday 27th. May Light breeze, calm sea, naximm visibility.
Anchored in Downs by orders of V.A.Dover at 1600.
Skipjack and Halcyon anchored near by. Destroyers full of Troops continually passing at high speed.
Tuesday 28th. May. Calm, some rain, visibility one mile.
1545, Weighed and proceeded to Dunkirk, Fourth M.S.F. in company with Salam Skipjack, later joined by Haloyon.
1730, steering jemmed, reduced speed and proceeded under hand steering+
1750, 5th. M.S.F. coming up eatern, steering repaired, proceeded at 15 knots.
1825, Kwinte Bank Buoy aboam. Ship sinking in visinity, rejoined 4th. M.S.F. Hurricanes passing overhead.
2030, more Hurricanes, sighted Dunkirk fires 10 miles, weather clearing, Fiteroy detached to investigate boat.
2050, turned towards beaches and proceeded East, parallel.
Observed large numbers of troops at intervals along beach near Dunkirk, with more scattered and decreasing groups towards la Panne+ Desultory gânfire. No aircraft in sight.
2125, anohored off beach about four miles East of Dunkirk, in four fathoms. No troops visible, owing to moke and approaching darkness. Motor boat and whaler sent schore to contact troops. Troops appeared from send dunes in disorganised parties, mostly ReA.S.C. and R.B's who had lately been engaged on demolition of bridges, ammunition dumps and railheads. Troops were rather shaken by constant air attacks, with machine guns. They had been waiting on the beaches for 30 hours before contacting ships. Tery oritical of lack of Allied air support during whole of retreat, but were cheerful and disciplined. Rather exhausted after forced marches of 20 to 30 miles. 0.0. reported no embarkation organisation or control ashore. The clean shaven and comparatively fresh appearance of the troops and the condition of their aquipment, contrasted increasingly as the evacuation progressed, with the evidences of strain shown by Ships companies of H.M.Ships.
10stroops embarked batween 2130 and 0200, in batches of 25, mostly with rifles and equipment. Beach good for embarimtion, shelving sand and oalm weather.
Wednesday 29th. May* 0300, Moved to another position further East and after dragging anchor into shallow water where line by now commenced bringing off troops but motor boat broke down, a considerable surf was running, managed to Embarked get a into a Dutch scoot, of Leicestershire and was towad back Regiment. to ship. COMMANDING OFFICER
miles 0730, off shore, and disembarked all troops, detachment proceeded alongaide Calcutta, who was anchored Salamander
19 JUN 1940
following.
H.M.S. "SUTTON"