TNA ADM 199 790

Depears 109
814/04
4
1176
- 179
HolleS."Sutton"
6th June 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward herewith ay narrative of the events for the period May 26th to June 5th inclusive, covering the evacuation of heaches the British Expeditionar: Force from Dunkirk and the neighbouring
7772
nd
.
177
178
the
50
have
FACTORS ASSISTING THE EVACUATION.
is.
Discipline and coolness of troops under fire on beach and in underdler conditions in boats throughout ovacuation.
2.
Life saving note rised along ship's rideo.
Transly
3.
Assistance of Amy Bren Guns and gummers against 100->
flying dx attack,
4.
Calm weather and poor viribility.
5.
Presence of HA Light Cruiser "Galcuttia",
6.
Excellent physical condition of majority of troops.
7.
Namel state in which all piers ab Dunkirk more allowed to readn, which was invaluable in assisting embarkation of Troops into ships.
1
COMMANDING 19 JUN 1940
OFFICER
he
H.M.S. SUTTON
H.M.S

181
83
185
9L11/6
PACTURE OBSTRICTIONS THE EVACUATION, subarkation rate off Seaches at The less than 30 hear
17
by lack of control ashore for first for days) sait
FACTORS ASSISTING THE EVACUATION.
beach communication to expediate Londing, resulting
L.
Discipline and coolness of troops under fire on beach and in unfamiliar conditions in boats throughout evacuation.
Officers at beginning for attending menalties.
2.
Life saving nets rigged along ship' sides. time beating end particularly, dive boxinding and nachine guaraing, arought for last and 5. for short periods previously. This its
3.
Assistance of Army Bren Guns and gunners against lowin flying air attack.
pier, duilt from lorries end to only at fire,
4.
Calm weather and poor visibility.
beaches proventing alose approach, seasing thougs to and orces relatively deep water with full to
5.
Presence of HA Light Cruiser "dalcutta".
ing
6.
Excellent physical condition of majority of troops.
or to Low
P,
7.
Normal state in which all piers at Dunkirk were allowed ay.
to remain, which was invaluable in assisting embarkation of Troops into ships.
e
En allowing troops to embark equipment and rifles, (not hald, but on insecure pier, and difficulty in embarking bode boats at all times, and too fee estate bones beate
(Tompy portoons.
stope use by the to Low flying acks.
Bron
COMMANDING OFFICER
Greurille. M.
6 JUN 1940
Act. Cand Rozal Navy.
H.M.S. "SUTTON"
Lugo to the 01/101ency of this ratings department, communications, DOMO
of vital importance were continually maintained.
Potty Officer Harold Beasley, DaNa C/JX 93287.
his good rating was almost boats were lost 0.0 damaged, and his coolness and
This continually in char a of the hoat work. Due to courage under seamanship five were no of great encouragement to the troops and seamen under him.
Acting Fetty Albert George Dollery, 0.11. I/X 80017.
This officer of the motor boat during the whole period. Due to the rating was engineer which he ran the ongine, often under fire, the night have of troops been expected under the difficult wenther conditions.
number efficient manner evacuated in from the beaches were far in excess of what

191
195
FACTORS ASSISTING THE EVACUATION.
1.
Discipline and coolness of troops under fire on beach and in unfamiliar conditions in boats throughout evacuation.
2.
Life saving nets rigged along ship's sides.
3.
Assistance of Army Bren Guns and gunners against low-flying air attack.
4.
Calm weather and poor visibility.
5.
Presence of HA Light Cruiser "Calcutta".
6.
Excellent physical condition of majority of troops.
7.
Normal state in which all piers at Dunkirk were allowed to remain, which was invaluable in assisting embarkation of troops into ships.
COMMANDING OFFICER
*
6JUN 1940
*
Eminille. M. Tenth.
H.M.S. 4 SUTTON
Ad. Comes. Royal Navy.

Duplicate
Dynam ///
414/0/12
-1922
DarD
207
Miniralty, S.V.1.
with information
8th June, 1940.
Rear Admiral, Dover Report of Proceedings, 29th May - 3rd June
Sir, Dentas the
I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations
206
PACTORS INSTRUCTION N SECURITY
205
Low embarkation rate off basehes at the Issue this 30 per hour owned by lack of centrol ashore for first days: und of suitable boats FACTORS ASSISTING THE EVACUATION.
No whip to beach communication to augediate Issuing, resulting in casual 1. asseed by ships lying off banches for hours in deplight.
Discipline and coolness of troops under fire on beach
No That and in unfamiliar conditions in boats throughout evacuation.
Apparently no R.A.Z. protection statement agringt lovel Secting and
2. parLife saving nets rigged along ship' sides. exempt for last two days and This Lowered mozale considerably.
3.
Assistance of Army Bren Guns and gunners against low-
7
Only flying air attack. and to energy should (trs.
the
4. loan Calm weather and poor visibility. to hoodtate to 07083 to largue bosts.
MA 5. amount countating of 12 and Lowin - insidequate to
Presence of HA Light Cruiser "Calcutta".
produce become the, 02 to or Styleg streek.
No 6. billiamive shown by Army staff in local boats
Excellent physical condition of majority of troops.
on bacoh, look 7. of remain, which was invaluable in assisting embarkation of Proops
Normal state in which all piers at Dunkirk were allowed to packs, into ships. worn) emaing Late on Insections plar, and to enharking boats are beaches.
Insurrement bonie and boars shallow
No apparent Likes by stay la flying marking panting are beaches by
COMMANDING
Grenville M. Temple.
CORNAR
19JUN 1940
Ach. Cands. Moyal Navy.
H.M.S. "SUTTON"
the
Commandey office.
HMSSULTION
a

Dynams 115.
20
222
REPORT OF OPERATIONS OFF DUNKIRK.
Having proceeded at maximum speed (26) knots)
with fuel available from a position about 120 miles north of Lands End, Worcester arrived off Dover at 0715 on the
COMPIDENTAL
Digrams 110k-
206
221
Subject
Recommendations for an anard or decoration in connection with the ovacuation of the B.B.F.
from the Dunicivit area.
From
:
The Commanding Officer, H.3.3. "Caloutta".
Date
6th June 1940.
No. 062/23
To
The Vice-Aduiral, Cover.
(Copted 502- The Consender in Chief, Horo.
The Plag Officer, 20th Squadron.) Cruiser
It is desired to recommend the following for consideration for a decoration or award in commetion with the evacuation of the B.S.F. from the Dunistisk areas-
20% Proderick James Merch, Cunner, Roefy1 Havy.
For his initiative and resource in charge of boald and for his withing exemple and energy
In working up to his usiab in heavy surf for hours on and.
Signalman Harry Guy O.I. U/JL 150713
his unhiring mores and devotion to hours duty on and and whillat being continuously drenched water in holding For the whaler's bown to a heavy surf for with up to the shoulders.
VICE TRAL)
you
10JUN 1940
(sgnd.) D. M. LEES
*
DOVER
CAPTAIN

SECRET
Dynami 130.
220
Sea
1179
a
214
Subject ** Report on Operations in connection with the evacuation of the D.B.F. from the Dunitivis aroa.
From
** The Commanding Officer, "Caloutta".
Date
** 6th June 1940.
No. 001/20
To
** The Vice-Admiral, Dover.
(Copies to:- The Commander in Chief, Hore.
The Plag Officer, 20th Cruiser Squadred
The following report on the minor part played by H.M.S. "Calcutta" in the evacuation of the D.B.F. from the Dunkirk area 1a submitted.
2.
In view of the vast number of reports which you will receive, It has been made as brief as possible in the form of a chronological time table of events with covering remarks at the ond.
Monday 27th Hay
2320
Sailed from Trinity Day, The Downs for La Panno.
Tuesday 20th Hay
0110
Loud explosion about 8 cables on starboard boxes probably from torpedo fired by cheery submarine or N.T.D.
0225
Torpodo track crossing from part to starboard missed ship about 100 yards astern.
0235
N.T.B. heard and vaguely sighted bearing Croon 609
ship manoeuvred under Large holm. No subsequent torpedo tracits or explosions soon or hoard.
0248
Anchored in position 005° La Panno, air light, 310
Notor Cubtor and both wholore sent in to beach to commonce ovacuation into puddle stoamers mine sweepers "Sandown" and "Cracio Fields" who ware much closer inshore.
and "Inpulsive" also evacuating from this boach.
0500
Opened fire on one Hointol.
0525
Opened fire on one J U 00.
0615
Impulsive ordered to proceed to Duniciris and go alongaide East pior.
0621
0625
Evacuation of beach completed. "Crafton" and
Opened fire on S Hottols.
"sandown" and "Cracio Flolds" ordered alongaido
"Creyhound" proceeded. Paddle llinesweopers to discmbark their 700 troops into "Colcutta".
0041
0715
Weighed and proceeded to Sheerness.
Opened fire on 1 Heintal.
1015
Arrived Shoorness, disemberited 700 troops and slipped from buoy and proceeded to La Punno.
completed with oil fuel and provisions.
1710
Anchored in position 02430 La Penno had Air boon Mght used 2".0,
8157
Boats sent in to the BOIDO beach as conditions proviously. Heavy surf running and one Schoot to assist in embariation of about 70
for embarking troops extremely difficult. only wounded.
Wednesday 20th May....

28th May. (continued).
- 123
- 117
Several schoots were anchored in the Downs when we arrived and
I was ordered to anchor as convenient, as my anchor had to be weighed by hand and it was a lengthy process, I decided to proceed alongside
"Vrede", After consultation with the Commanding Officer "Vrede", we decided to weigh and to proceed to Dankirk in the hope of gleaning further information on the way, "Vrede" reducing speed to keep me company.
Off the North Goodwin Lt. Vess. we encountered a schoot returing full, who said that they were asking for us on the beaches East of Dunkirk. This was the first definate information that we were required to evacuate troops that we had received. "Vrede", and
"Reiger" then proceeded independently towards Dunkirk.
2300 Arrived off Zuyderoote buoy, sighted one Cruiser at anchor( afterwards identified as the "Calcutta") I closed the
"Calcutta", and asked where I could embark troops. "Calcutta"
ordered me to steer 140° to where her boats were operating. Contacted "Calcutta's" boats on the beach, and they brought off about
70 cot cases.
I cannot speak toohighly of the work done by "Calcutta's"
boats during this operation. There was a fresh breeze and choppy sea running with a considerable tide, but they continued throughout the night without let up. During this operation "Reiger's" starboard anchor chain parted and ship grounded without damage.
0300 Proceeded alongside "Calcutta". Transferred all cot cases from upper deck to "Calcutta" and proceeded with remainder.
29th May.
Arrived at Sheerness.
30th May.
0400 Sailed for Dunkirk, anchored off East Cant buoy owing to for, 0930 weighed and proceeded.
During the passage from North Goodwin to Dunkirk roads we were subjected to periodical machine gun fire from aircraft, none of which hit the ship, no plane coming below 4000 ft.
2000 Entered Dunkirk harbour, proceeded alongside quay emabrked 250 (approx) B.E.F.
While in Dunkirk the harbour was being subjected to fire from an enemy battery of about 6 in. calibore
2100 Sailed from Dunkirk.
( 31st May 1100 Arrived
Sheerness).

Dynams 61.
DOVER.
06
-
179
4th June, 1940
TO: COMMANDING OFFICER,
H.M.S."LYNX".
188
.
176
H.M.S. King Alfred
Hove
Sussex
Admiral Taylor
Dynamo 318. 8/4/0/1338
GRAMS:-
Office of the Commander-in-Chief,
Idmiral, Chatham.
The Nore,
EPHONE:-
Chatham No. 3221.
Admiralty House
Extensions 210 and 519).
Chatham,
No. 477.c.c./40.
15th June, 1940.
Wildfire at 1800 on Wednesday ng Alfred.
I was appointed
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING, DOVER.
:roft 36' twin screw motor cruiser
OPERATIONS OFF DUNKIRK.
g morning and put to sea in
Herewith is forwarded a report
Ramsgate by H.M.T. Strathelliot of the Commanding Officer, of ere we received our instructions at about 0930 Friday.
Dunkirk. M.Y. "Jong", on the operations off
0 a spot about 3 miles northeast d let her drift as close to the ated a life line ashore by ately an English soldier experienced dozen Belgians. I
men aboard as there was these of "Jong". However, we got to rn a Scoot. I then returned falls of one of the dinghy davits me for and when the men came out of to
FADMIRAL.
wer block on to the back ed them aboard quite easily.
ration during the day and also
VICE ADMIRA
steam hopper who wanted the
I off another ship.
17 JUN 1940 JUN
I took my boat alongside a
0
*
DOVER
ed ashore. There were off. a these men I took posite d and side of the lighter and
I went on to the aboard it.
Mano

Dyrams 61.
DOVER.
5
-
179
4th June, 1940
TO: COMMANDING OFFICER,
H.M.S."LYNX".
188
. 176
H.M.S. King Alfred
Hove
Sussex
Admiral Taylor
Room F. 7
Admiralty House
H.M.S. Wildfire
Sheerness
Kent
Dear Sir,
I arrived at H.M.S. Wildfire at 1800 on Wednesday the 29th May direct from H.M.S. King Alfred.
I was appointed to M.Y. "Jong" (a standard Thornycroft 36' twin screw motor cruiser central cockpit type) the following morning and put to sea in company at 1400.
We were escorted to Ramsgate by H.M.T. Strathelliot where we arrived at 2200.
There we received our instructions and proceeded to Dunkirk arriving at about 0930 Friday.
I immediately went to at spot about 3 miles northeast of the harbour anchored my boat and let her drift as close to the shore as possible.
I then floated a life line ashore by means of a life buoy.
Immediately an English soldier came out to me followed by about a dozen Belgians. I experienced considerable difficulty in getting these men aboard as there was about 3 ft of freeboard at the stern of "Jong". However, we got every man aboard and took them to a Scoot. I then returned to the beach and this time rigged the falls of one of the dinghy davits
Again I sent the life line ashore and when the men came out to me
I went overboard and hooked the lower block on to the back of their waist belts and my crew hauled them aboard quite easily.
I continued this operation during the day and also ran messages for the Captain of a steam hopper who wanted the services of an experienced engineer off another ship.
During the afternoon I took my boat alongside a supply lighter.that had been drifted ashore.
There were a number of British soldiers on board and these men I took off.
Others were still coming to the opposite side of the lighter and experienced difficulty in getting aboard it.
I went on to the

Dynoms 182.
186
From... Lieutenant R.H. Irving R.N.R. Motor Boat "TRITON".
Date... 3rd June, 1940.
To... Commodore Taylor, Sheerness.
Submitted, with reference to the short report handed in on my arrival at Sheerness, Saturday, 1st June, 1940, I shall now endeavour to fill in details left out at that time, due to inability to recollect everything and put it on record before being refreshed and rested, after so many hours of exertion.
On Wednesday, the 29th May, 1940, while supervising the cleaning and scrubbing of the Dutch Scoot "PRINCESS JULIANA"
of which vessel I was 1st Lieutenant, Lieutenant Commander
Gwinnir, R.N., who was C.O., instructed me, to report immediately to Commander Troupe for orders.
I reported as instructed, and was ordered to take command of thirteen launches and get them to Ramsgate.
I got clear of Sheerness with the launches about
1200 29/5/40, and arrived Ramsgate about 1930. I reported to
Commander Davies there, and explained to him what had been said tome by Commodore L. Taylor regarding the launch "SILVER QUEHON
and "BEVERLEY". "BEVERLEY", however, failed to turn up at
Ramsgate although I had sent back my fastest boat from Margate to look for her, and waited for one hour to allow him to catch up.
Commander Davies consulted the N.O.I.C. and it was decided that in the "TRITON" I should endeavour to get "SILVER QUESION and seven more launches to La Panne.
The other launches for various reasons could not proceed until the morning. Commander Davies said he believed
East of La Panne was devoid of Allied troops, and as far as he knew no troops on beaches West of Braye Duns.
This meant I had to make the Belgian coast within a three-mile limit, rather difficult without navigating instruments or current charts.
Nevertheless, I thought I could do it, so at 2200 on Wednesday I left the harbour with eight launches.
I waited outside and shouted to them to keep close up and follow me.
I steered for N. Goodwin Light Vessel, and stopped there to count my fleet, though it was very dark.
I
counted five and was informed the other three had put back to
Ramsgate with engine trouble.
I then order "SILVER QUEIN® to render every assistance in keeping boats together (Sub.Lt. in command) in order that the five of us might carry out a successful crossing.
Only the
Seaman Cox.J. Keith could steer on my boat; this meant I had to relieve him myself. Two of the crew were already seasick, but kept their feet and showed spirit.
From N. Goodwin I proceeded.
It was very dark, and on and off I passed ships heading N.W. or S.E. About 0300
30/5/40 visibility was very poor, with heavy rain, no ships in however, to get into a position 15 miles north of La Panne, and then sight, and I was a little doubtful of my position.
I decided, steer South (mag) to make the coast.
At 0400 turned south, strong wind and following sea, boat steering wildly. Still no ships in sight or land.
About 0420 saw a cruiser loaded with troops, recognised her as British, and closed her.
She had received heavy punishment aft from shellfire.
I made signs as to whether I should hold on my course, and she answered in the affirmative. At this time one of my boats very foolishly crossed my bow and received a blow which damaged her.
I instructed one of the others to watch her, and

206
123
would be able to assist us if necessary and realised that we were the last English boat leaving harbour. Could not get engine of LADY CABLE to start but after a short while
W.D. boat came nearly alongside her engines were running and making considerable noise. Their action then appeared light. to me suspicious - she appeared to be undamaged in the half
By now dawn was nearly breaking. When W.D. boat came close to us I ordered one of my crew - Cadet Rating Price -
to board her. He managed to jump aboard but the two boats drifted apart. Price shouted that there was nobody aboard.
Yet her engines were going - in neutral of course. Displaying great initiative and resourcefulness, Price was able to make
HAIG go slow ahead and was able to steer her close enough to LADY CABLE for me to jump aboard. Our first efforts to get a line between the two boats were unsuccessful.
The operation was made difficult by the LADY CABLE being full of French soldiers who did not of course appreciate what was happening and were therefore unable to be of much assistance however willing they might be. After some time the two boats were secured but in order to pass a line it had been necessary for Price to swim from the HAIG to the
LADY CABLE with it. Price did this on his own initiative and displayed great courage and efficiency.
By the time the two boats were secure it was almost broad daylight and we were still very close to Dunkirk
Harbour and appeared to have drifted inshore to the S.W. and were very close to the pall of smoke which shrouded the coast to the West of Dunkirk.
On inspecting condition of HAIG found that she had a fair amount of water forward and was damaged extensively on the port bow. However, I got French poilus to work the pump in relays and towing LADY CABLE and going very slow ahead were able to make progress and prevent the water forward from rising.
For some time we did not discover that each engine had a separate control lever and had been going ahead on one engine only. For several hours we made slow progress.
Worsall was trying to get LADY CABLE's engine to start again and Smith was steering her. I left most of the French in
LADY CABLE.
I saw a submarine half surface about half a mile ahead on one occasion and also a number of German aircraft passed close ahead of us. Luckily we were either not seen or not deemed of sufficient importance to attack. A French destroyer came and had a look at us but I did not signal to her as we were making fair progress. A flight of 3
Hurricanes flew low over us and later we saw Spitfires and Defiants, but luckily no German planes approached us.
The starboard engine of HAIG packed up I think about
0730. I had not time to keep a detailed log of events.
By this time Stoker Worsall had got engine of LADY CABLE
to go again and I secured her alongside HAIG as towing her astern with only our port engine going was too difficult.
For a considerable time we made very slow progress using engines of both boats. LADY CABLE's engine kept stopping, which made our progress very slow and steering difficult. At last/ French
4-funnelled light cruiser or large destroyer X 440 (I think)
with bow wave painted on her, saw us and came up to help. I
had/

207
194
I had great difficulty in manoeuvring alongside and this difficulty was made worse by the attitude of a few of the
French soldiers who had become panicky and kept shouting
"Au Secours" and shouting at me to hurry up and get them alongside! Only a small section of the soldiers took this attitude which was formulated by a soldier (Heaven knows what rank or capacity) who looked at least sixty, having a pointed grey beard! I found it so difficult to get the boats alongside while we were secured together that I decided to cast off the HAIG and left Cadet Rating Price on board her with orders that I would come back to the HAIG as soon as the French soldiers were on board the cruiser.
We were very close to X440 and I was alongside her in about two minutes. The French troops scrambled aboard her and I spoke to a French Naval Officer and asked him to wireless Dover that I had the W.D. craft in tow, that we were in difficulties and needed assistance. He promised to do this and also told me the course we should follow from our present position. I noticed that while the French troops were boarding X440, the HAIG had drifted alongside
X440 further aft and I noticed Price talking to the French sailors but do not recall seeing him go aboard X440.
As soon as the troops were aboard I shoved off and
X440 went ahead. HAIG was now astern of X440 and I went alongside her at once. To my amazement there was no sign of Price, who must either have fallen overboard or else boarded the X440 and had not been able to get back aboard
HAIG before X440 went ahead. There was no sign of anyone in the water.
I was now left with Worsall and Smith to manage both the HAIG and LADY CABLE. There was no chance of the HAIG
towing the LADY CABLE owing to the fact that only HAIG's port engine was working and this would have made steering very difficult and also it would not have been possible to hands to pump. I decided then to try and tow HAIG alongside prevent the water from rising forward as there were no spare
LADY CABLE. First I stopped HAIG's engine - there was no object in leaving it running. It took us quite a while to discover how to stop the engine!
Efforts at towing alongside were unsuccessful - the lines kept parting and the bollard aft in LADY CABLE was not up to the strain. The only possible chance left of towing
HAIG was astern but this meant that the tow rope would have to be secured forward around the mast of LADY CABLE and led aft along the deck. We could not secure the tow rope aft owing to the bollards having been carried away by our previous efforts at towing HAIG alongside.
I realised that there was a considerable risk towing from forward that the tow rope might jump over the engine room cabin housing and I took every care to watch for this happening. We managed to make a little progress but several times the tow rope nearly jumped the cabin and unfortunately this finally happened when our engine had almost stopped and the HAIG yawed away to port. I went overboard like a shot from a gun and felt the screw of LADY CABLE touch my left foot. Luckily I caught hold of a fender alongside
HAIG. Worsall quickly got on board HAIG and he and Smith
(who was already aboad HAIG) were able to pull me out of the water. After this episode I decided reluctantly that any further efforts at towing HAIG were impossible, especially/

2
556
526
proceeded on the route given to us at the time of sailing, namely by the west Hinder sycle and middelkisk bank brays. at about
2200 having reached a position about 8 on 9 miles from Dunkink we oberved two large Hospital ships escarted by an armed merchant cruiser coming from the direction of Dunkisk. these vessels had overtaken us earlier in the day a more signal was thereupon received from the armed merchant cruiser to the following effect -: "Dunkish has fallen and is in every's hands
Keep clear we had set out in company in with five other time motor vessels and at this ht Barwell one of those R.N. in and change Lt Hutchinem of the rest starboard beam and distant the
R.N.R. was about 1/2 mile on thereupon altered course towards We was further astern a la
3ra June tow.
inner harbour. Ordered staff but could find none; loaded with suguran and French troops. Furthest end of harbour now in German hands.
Returned Ramsgate.
Completed 5 journeys in all.

557
3
527
Lt. Barwell's vessel and repeated to him by moral the signal received we proceeded further towards
Dunkirk. after emsideration as to the proper action to take
A in the circumstances I-considered that as I was whally ignorant of what was required of me if I
could get to Dunkink it would he useless to attempt to proceed any further. I also observed that the armed morehant cruiser and hospital ships continued on their homeward couse. shortly afterwards when lose to the hisport bury, the ship was put about to return to the Downs for further order. On with the Brendaris in charged the passage back we same up had also of the information me him Commander Euman R.H. and informed received He stated he had received the same information intended returning to the Down óra June.
tow. DOE
inner but could find none; loaded of harbour English harbour. Orderea SM with staff and French troops. Furthest end now in German hands.
Returned Ramsgate.
Completed 5 journeys in all.

558
4
528
for order.
On 28/5/40 at 1735 whilstlying at anchor off Deal fier order were received to proceed to Dunkit in order to evacuate troops. at this time, owing to information received the previous evening from an armed merchant cruiser (see my report on varyage ho 1) we thought that
Dunkirk was in the hands of the every Ten minutes later we have up ancher and proceeded to Dunkink followed by some half dozen other small motor vessels! We proceeded via broys u "V" and W and arrived off Dunkisk at about 2300
-and observed the town was in flames.
Downs to Dunkisk with 5 other
I did all the Piloting from
(ht- line close astern, including "Patria"
schoolo following in single
Cundr Pisani R.N.) the "Lwenti"
and the Rian w l waited near the entrance, about 1/4 mile
3ra Juny.
tow. harbour. Ordered staff and French but troops. Furthest end now inner could find none; loaded of with harbour snggion in German hands.
Returned Ramsgate.
Completed 5 journeys in all.

595
Submitted Report of Dunkisk Operations
561
The Night of fune 3.4.
after being releved from H.T. School Tilly managed to faid a large casin cruiser as Mermanden, in which to you au last crosing. She had at the
Dynam. Office of 370 the Commander-in-Chief, B14/894 1435 pipe, due, due 6 a
TELEGRAMS:-
Admiral, Chatham.
The Nore, ey were boa meuded
TELEPHONE:-
Admiralty House,
Che am No. 3221.
Chatham.
(Extensions 210 and 519).
inder unfortunately a
560 x of machine. quing
22nd June, 1940.
1 rather chary of going
No:4770C/40.
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING, DOVER.
Issued 6 stay & hoard as claw U444 aft
REPORT OF DUNKIRK OPERATIONS.
sted of as stole am
This belated report is forwarded, since Sub. Lieut. Beale's an eldesly sicname is worth noting as a capable and energetic young officer.
anthy appointed 5 HMS
The Quai Felix Faure was by no means easy to find, even in dayuf during a greater light, and he did very well to get there in the dark also am board in inflam. in
2
'w' 3 bury a admiral for ADMIRAL,
Doat and as on boats by time were cast of
DOV R
will steam. Between w sating mines were enin sweepers for a considerable aux 9 exprome Draw with Lewis quifie-
Flear reached Dunkisk without mishap

she
Submitted Report of Dunkisk Operations.
561
The Night of fune 3.4.
after being relived from HM School Tilly'
managed to faid a large cabin cruiser, as Mermander, in which to you au last crosing. She had at the time a broken fuel and extaust pipe but, due 6 as efforts of leading Stoker younger, They were boa meuded in time to start with as remainder unfortunately as crew had received their full share of machine quaring in a previous tip and any were rather chary of going again, so, while an stoker voluntersed 6 stay on board the remaining four members of as clew wall left ashone. The crew eventually consisted of as stoke an air gummer on leave, Michael game, an elderly while -
haved gentleman M: MacPherson ecently appointed 5 HMS
Victory as a Lientement, and myself. During a greater part of as trip across we had also am board in adminal, Ramsqate - Commodore Taylor.
fuse after passing 'w' 3 bury a admiral traus fessed 19 a Was Department boat. and as an boats shick zill aen, had been Towed by tips, were cast of and told 6 follow under Casin our steam - Between w buoy and are channel. Chree floating mines were enline, Shile hey and 6 explode Deam with Lewis you fiecountried, which occupied as insesweepers for a ensidence
The Flest teached Dunkisk without mishap.

605
Once ashore, and 9 got in touch with a party
Engineers made arrangements for the of Ro stern to be raised in an attempt to clear boat whatever had become foul of them. while this away being done I took the crew and a party of we some way along the beach to where am abando sole cabin-cruiser lay. she appeared to be in good condition; after considerable effort and mus hampered by bompandment and machine attacks from berman aircraft she was ever refloated. I left her in charge of my consway the rest of the crew,.1 with orders to carry on previously. When I returned with the soldiers original place it was obvious that my A/A
boat was of no further use. The most import articles were removed to safety: Secret chai the Captain of the minesweeper PRINCESS ELIZA
and Aldis hamp to the Royal Curps of Signa had only a motorbicycles lamp.
With the aid of more soldiers we got a ships trip back took became over into badly another the sea motor-boat holed one. and so By made I had this abandoned several been time force my he and in in life-boat the as private almost the and engine redhot. appeared did They a pulling rejoined rather too Jerry me 70
for the remainder we of the time. There being five oars the work was exhausting and ob slow. with darkness, the submerged private cans, buses etc) and the suit the difficulty of operating from the sing con transports run out into the sea and