TNA ADM 199 790

14
i
18
Friday 31st May. The following signals were mades-
0320. "Request more shipsto load Dunkirk."
0445. "Every available ship will be required at Dunkirk during the next two hours to evacuate rest of army.
0605. "Imbarkation proceeding satisfactorily in spite of bonbardment. I would again stress the need for more ships and constant fighter protection
0638. "Am now receiving a number of Frenchmen. I have raised no objection to their embarking in British ships and an allowing then to do 80.
0940. "Request you will inform me whether troops are now being ordered to earch to Dunkirk from the beaches.
0945. "Sun is now coming through and I have a big target of ships in harbour. Request special air protection for next two hours.
0957. "Lord Gort has agreed that 5,000 Frehe troops should be embarked here this evening after dark in British vessels. Request necessary ships may be sent to arrive at dusk.
1044. "We have been continually heavily bonbarded and they are gradually finding the range of our loading berth. I would rather only enter ships as necessary for the flow of troops.
Continuous and heavy shelling all the morning, but the evacuation proceeded fairly speedily. At last ships were arriving in large numbers and strong a 2. protection kept bomeing attack away. The only thing necessary was tostop the shelling. At 1200 B signal was received from the Air Linison
Officer at Dover asking for position of energy battery. This was not known with any certainty as the battery was probably mobile, but it was in the district of Loon Plage Brouge Kerk
Soch. A reply was made to this effect. The bombardment, novertheless, become more intense and a great deal more accurate.
Very heavy attacks were delivered during the evening but were concentrated chiefly upon derelict ships in the roads. Dive bombing attacks were carried out on the ships loading but without success. The embarkation proceeded smoothly.

44
Political pressure was now being brought to bear
Triday
The on the C.in C. that the evacuation must be on a fifty-fifty load basis with the French. My only stipulation was that at all costs we should be allowed free use of the Eastern arm while the French used the port, outer harbour and beaches.
0605.
I made a signal to Commander Maund at Dunkirk to for provide personnel ships for General Laurencie's troops
(some 5,000 in number) at C.in C's. request. I also asked
Admiral Wake-Walker to keep Dunkirk going at 100%..
0940, you
Little progress could be made off the beaches owing to the surf.
0945, "Sun 1s BOV coning through have
G.H.Q. informed 100 that a plan was being worked out for hours for naval co-operation to bombard advancing German tanks in
"Lord Goart the later stages. This, however, was never necessary, as far as / am aware. versels. dusk.
Request necessary ships my
1004. "Wo have been continually heavily boxibarded and they are gradually finding the range of our leading berth, would only enter ships 88
necessary for the flow or treops,
Continuous and beary shelling all the morning, but the evamition proceeded fairly speedily. At Last ships were arriving in Large numbers and strong a * protection kept bonging attack away. The only thing necessary use to scop the shelling. At 1800 a signed was received from the Air Lisison
Officer at Dover asking for position of energy battary, This was not known with any certainty as the lettery vas probably mobile, but it vos in the district of Loon Plage larguage Kark regly use and to this affect, The bechardsent, nevertheless, become more intense and a great deal more securate.
Very heavy attacks 1820 delivered during the ovening but were concentrated shiefly upon develist ships in the reads. Dive hombing attacks here carried out 00 the ships loading but without sussess. The embarkation processed easethly.

45
49
Friday 31st May. The following signals were made:-
0320. "Request more shipsto load Dunkirk."
0445. "Every available ship will be required at Dunkirk during the next two hours to evacuate rest of army.
0605. "Embarkation proceeding satisfactorily in spite of bombardment. 1 would again stress the need for more ships and constant fighter protection
0638. "Am now receiving a number of Frenchmen. I have raised no objection to their embarking in British ships and am allowing them to do so.
0940. "Request you will inform me whether troops are now being ordered to march to Dunkirk from the beaches.
0945. "Sun is now coming through and I have a big target of ships in harbour. Request special air protection for next two hours.
0957. "Lord Gort has agreed that 5,000 Freinh troops should be ambarked here this evening after dark in British vessels. Request necessary ships may be sent to arrive at dusk.
1044. We have been continually heavily bombarded and they are gradually finding the range of our loading berth. I would rather only enter ships as necessary for the flow of troops.
Continuous and heavy shelling all the morning, but the evacuation proceeded fairly speedily. At last ships were arriving in large numbers and strong a r protection kept bomging attack away. The only thing necessary was tostop the shelling. At 1200 a signal was received from the Air Liaison
Officer at Dover asking for position of enemy battery. This was not known with any certainty as the battery was probably mobile, but it was in the district of Loon Plage Brouge Kerk
Soch. A reply was made to this effect. The bombardment, nevertheless, become more intense and a great deal more accurate.
Very heavy attacks were delivered during the evening but were concentrated chiefly upon derelict ships in the roads. Dive bombing attacks were carried out on the ships loading but without success. The embarkation proceeded smoothly.

manding Officer H.M.S. Saltash.
Dyram 91.
The 4th.1039.
Brulohing by
M.S.F. Vice adminar, Dover
"
71
Sir,
During the operations off Dunkerque the
329
ng Officer and men have shown perseverence and courage, the honour to submi t their names so that suitable action taken.
Join ieutenant Williams R.N.R., First Lieutenant of Saltash. H.M.S.
0011 the night of Friday, May 31st,he was loaned to H. Hebe was not required. On his way back in a motor boat he went other to pick up soldiers, not finding any he took two sailors lacking a whaler behind them,he made his way along the beach nick ame im Danna WAS hains hombarded the mmander in chief more
Dynamo go. 67
in on operations carried out By M.B. Honderung
C Dutch schoole).
n 26 may and 5 June 1940.
anchaed at sheerness waiting for orders
Sailed from Sheerness arrived and anchored on Deal.
ordered to Junkirk in company with 5 other Schools on Eastern entrance to I unkink roads.
ships harsing advised us that Dunkirk had fallen. Senior officers schoote developed engine
Grouble ordered Hondsrug to take him in low
Readed away drom unkink
Sliphed tow as S.O.S engine now working and schools ordered Crack to Deal german seaplane, machine gunned and
Comled us no damage, Put rather unpleasant as we had no gans to return fire.
anchored GM Dear.
ordered to Dunkink have uh and proceeded.
on Dunkink harbour made for beaches
Saw move teashing from beach and ran verset hand up on sand. Embarked troops

From: Commanding Officer H.M.S. Saltash.
Dyram 91. Blulol by
Date: June 4th.1039.
is
71
11149
To; Sement Space M.S.F. Vice adminar, Dover
Sir,
During the operations off Dunkerque the following Officer and men have shown perseverence and courage,
I have the honour to submit their names so that suitable action may be taken.
1. Lieutenant T,E. Williams R.N.R., First Lieutenant of Saltash. H.M.S.
On the night of Friday, May 31st, he was loaned to H.M.S.Hebe but he was not required. On his way back in a motor boat he went in shore to pick up soldiers, not finding any he took two sailors and, pullading a whaler behind them, he made his way along the beach nick Danna was haina hombarded the
To: Commander in chief more
Dynamo go. 67
Rehart on operations carried out By M.B. Honderung
(Dutch schoote).
Between 26 may and 5 June 1940.
26 anchaed at sheerness waiting for orders
24"
300 Sailed from Sheerness
000 arrived and anchored on Ifeal.
500 ordered to Junkirk in company with 5 other Schools
300 on Eastern entrance to unkink roads.
ships harsing advised us that Dunkink had fallen. Senior 6 Hiers schoote' developed engine trouble ordered Hondsrug to take him in low
Readed away drom Dunkink
28
345 Slithed tow as S.O.S engine now working and schools ordered Crack to Deal
430 german seaplane, machine gunned and
Comled us no damage, Put rather unpleasant as we had no gans to return fire.
000
anchored GH Dear.
815
ordered to Dunkink have wh and proceeded.
330 on Dunkink harbour made for beaches
29
200 Saw more thashing open beach and nan verset hand up on sand. Emparked troops

Form: Commanding Officer H. Saltash.
Dysams 91. Blulol by
Date:June 4th.1039.
is
71
114g
P; Seven M.S.F. Vice adminar, Dover
Sir,
During the operations off Dunkerque the ollowing Officer and men have shown perseverence and courage, have the honour to submi t their names so that suitable action ay be taken.
Lieutenant T,E.Williams R.N.R.,First Lieutenant of Saltash. H.M.S.
On the night of Friday, May 31st, he was loaned to H.M.S.Hebe
Out he was not required. On his way back in a motor boat he went shore to pick up soldiers, not finding any he took two sailors nd, pullading a whaler behind them,he made his way along the beach mink ame un Danne was haine hombarded the
2/
68
another Schoote on shore came in alongside
Found moheller had hicked wh nohe and engines would not turn ScRoole Bornrit towed us ON and back to Deal roads.
arrived and anchored disembarked troohs.
30"
00
after several attempts to clear screwohom heart asked SNQ Ramsgate it we might be towed in and beached This was approved.
1000 arrived Ramsgate hut vessel on Hand
231
200 Shih dry. cleared screw
730 Proceeded to Dunkink
500
arrived on beaches. heavy bombing.
300
no Goats available to bring men ON, sobeached shin but troops would not wade out so backed on and anchored
300
Embarked about 100 French troobscrom is mata boat.
000
Cruised along beaches. and then made for harbour entrance.
130
Secured alongride Preakwater. embarked hoops, heary Combing going on cleared harbour. we were able to machine gun low deying german heave troops assisting

79
Ing N. into the lots
Jilisk,
1. Lieut. E. Troweeks.
When we were bombed I was taking cover in after lobby, then proceeded to E.R. hatch but could not get below because of steam, was joined by C. Sto. Ricketts and C.E.R.A.,
Testlake, gave orders to shut off all boiler room emergency valves and then safety valves and shut main steam bulkhead valve on deck. As soon as possible E. Room and after boiler room were entered.
Attention first given to casualties but all bar one were dead.
First thought possible to get some part of machinory going but not possible. Concentrated on leaks. Bomb dropped port fore side wells bulkhend and stove in boiler room bulkhead.
Disabling port fan, engine, oil full pump, number three boiler, port circulator, main and reserve foed tanks and all pipes and leads adjacent were pierced and broken.
Leak at after end of 3.R. oil fule tank plugged.
Efforts made to run petrol dynamo for W/T but the magneto connection broke, Hands were told off to get hand steering in use. P.O. of fore boiler room reported no damage after first raid although C. Sto. reported oil suction line pierced and shut off.
2. Sub. Lieut. Jeaves.
During the first attack I was on the bridge as
Officer of the Watch and remained there for some time afterwards while the Captain went off to the engine and boiler rooms.
On the Captain's orders I went aft to the after steering compartment to see whether it was possible to steer by hand.
This was 30, and leaving a Leading Stoker and two or three hands I returned to the bridge as the ship was being taken in tow.
When the second attack took place I was in the fore and aft passage below the wheelhouse for some time and eventually went into the Petty Officers' Mess to try and assist the foremost supply party.
After the attack, on the First Lieutenant's orders,
I placed charts in the whaler and a small private motor boat and unshipped the steering compass from the wheelhouse, and put it in the whaler. I then went aft to continue connecting up to steer by hand. To do this it was necessary to clear a good deal of gear out of the compartment. This took about half an hour. By this time another attempt was being made to take the ship in tow, so I recovered the charts from the motor boat, and went up on the bridge.
When the ship was attacked for the third time I again went down to the fore and aft passage beneath the wheelhouse, where 1 stayed till the order abandon ship was given. Of the two charts containing confidential matter concerning minefields in the Dover area, one was destroyed and the other left in the whaler which has not yet returned.
The Fleet notices to Marines were thrown overboard in mid-channel. Fleet charts were left in their folios in the
Charthouse.

page 5.
83
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
ship 6. was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though it, ordering & torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off during attack. Complete Jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S fannel. Tas ordered by 1st. Lieut. to load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned, threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
bridge 7. on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F - load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60° and at no time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were passing 12 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. A wire was passed and made fast round a stout bean in the smack, which carried away some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongside the forecastle bowe pointing aft. At this point second bombing attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile, the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to taking up the slack too vaolently. This was due to the language difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the only other man on board the smack being an R.A.P. pilot. A
further bombing attack started, the final one, and I again stood off from the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship and I picked up all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and some men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men aboard, Whitehall appeared in the distance and we made out to intercept her, using the smack's airen and the French ensign half way up the foremast. We met her about 12 miles away and passed information to her and requested her to collect men from remaining boats. I then set out on a course for England and in mid-chainel we transferred everyone to H.M. Trawler Olvina.

93
Page.
97
1. Lieut. E. Treweeks.
When we were bombed I was taking cover in after lobby, then proceeded to E.R. hatch but could not get below because of steam, was joined by C. Sto. Ricketts and C.E.R.A.,
Westlake, gave orders to shut off all boiler room emergency valves and then safety valves and shat main steam bulkhead valve on deck. As soon as possible 3. Room and after boiler room were entered.
Attention first given to casualties but all bar one were dead.
First thought possible to get some part of machinery going but not possible. Concentrated on leaks. Bomb dropped port foro side G.R. bulkhead and stove in boiler room bulkhend.
Disabling port fan, engine, oil full pump, number three boilor, part circulator, main and reserve food tanks and all pipes and leads adjacent were pierced and broken.
Leak at after end of B.R. oil fulls tank plugged.
Efforts made to run petrol dynamo for W/I but the magneto connection broke. Hands were told off to get hand steering in use. P.O. of fore boiler room reported no damage after first raid although Ch. Sto. reported oil suction line pierced and shut off.
2. Sub. Lieut. Jeaves.
During the first attack I was on the bridge as
Officer of the Watch and remained there for some time afterwards while the Captain sent off to the engine and boiler rooms.
On the Captain's orders I went aft to the after steering compartment to see whether it was possible to steer by hand.
This was 30, and leaving a Leading Stoker and two or three hands I returned to the bridge as the ship was being taken in tow.
When the second attack took place I was in the foro and aft passage below the wheelhouse for some time and eventually went into the Petty Officers' Meas to try and assist the foremost supply party.
After the attack, on the First Lieutenant's orders,
I placed charts in the whaler and a small private motor boat and unshipped the steering compase from the wheelhouse, and put it in the whaler. I then went aft to continue connecting up to steer by hand. To do this it was necessary to clear a good deal of gear out of the compartment. This took about half an hour. By this time another attempt was being made to take the ship in tow, so I recovered the charts from the motor boat, and went up on the bridge.
When the ship was attacked for the third time I again went down to the fore and aft passage beneath the wheelhouse, where I stayed till the order Shandon ship was given. or the two charts containing confidential matter concerning minefields in the Dover area, one was destroyed and the other left in the whaler which has not yet returned.
The Fleat notices to Marines were thrown overboard in mid-channel. Fleet charts were left in their folios in the
Charthouse.

page 5.
97
101
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
6.
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though ship was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with it, ordering a torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off during attack. Complete jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S Pannel. Tas ordered by 1st. Lieut. to load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned, threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
7.
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the bridge on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F - load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60° and at no time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were passing 18 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. A wire was passed and made fast round a stout beam in the smack, which carried away some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongside the forecastle bows pointing aft. At this point second bombing attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile, the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to taking up the slack too vaolently. This was due to the language difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the only other man on board the smack being an R.A.F. pilot. A
further bombing attack started, the final one, and I again stood off from the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship and I picked up all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and some men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men aboard, Whitehall appeared in the distance and we made out half way the foremast. We met her about 12 miles away and to intercept her, using the smack's siren and the French ensign passed information up to her and requested her to collect men from mid-chai.nel we transferred everyone to H.M. Trawler Olvina.
remaining boats. I then set out on a course for England and in

117
Ing. EX into the loss G.:
Jilist
1. Lieut. E. Treweeks.
When we were bombed I was taking cover in after lobby, then proceeded to E.R. hatch but could not get below because of steam, was joined by C. Sto. Ricketts and C.E.R.A.,
Westlake, gave orders to shut off all boiler room emergency valves and then safety valves and shut main steam bulkhead valve on deck. As soon as possible 3. Room and after boiler room were entered.
Attention first given to casualties but all bar one were dead.
First thought possible to get some part of machinory going but not possible. Concentrated on leaks. Bomb dropped port fore side Z.R. bulkhead and stove in boiler room bulkhend.
Disabling port fan, engine, oil fule pump, number three boilor, port circulator, main and reserve feed tanks and all pipes and leads adjacent were pierced and broken.
Leak at after end of S.R. oil fule tank plugged.
Efforts made to run petrol dynamo for W/T but the magneto connection broke. Hands were told off to get hand steering in use, P.O. of fore boiler room reported no damage after first raid although C. Sto. reported oil suction line piereed and shut off.
2. Sub. Lieut. Jeaves.
During the first attack I was on the bridge as
Officer of the Watch and remained there for some time afterwards while the Captain went off to the engine and boiler rooms.
On the Captain's orders I went aft to the after steering compartment to are whether it was possible to steer by hand.
This was so, and leaving a Leading Stoker and two or three hands I returned to the bridge as the ship was being taken in tow.
When the second attack took place I was in the fore and aft passage below the wheelhouse for some time and eventually went into the Petty Officers' Meas to try and assist the foremost supply party.
After the attack, on the First Lieutenant's orders,
I placed charts in the whaler and a small private motor boat and unshipped the stearing compass from the wheelhouse, and put it in the whaler. I then went aft to continue connecting up deal of out of the compartment. This took about half an to steer by hand. To do this it was necessary to clear a good hour. By gear this time another attempt was being made to take the ship in tow, so I recovered the charts from the motor boat, and went up on the bridge.
went down the fore and aft passage beneath the wheelhouse,
When the ship was attacked for the third time I again where I to till the order Shandon ship was given. or the two charts stayed containing confidential matter concerning other left minefields in the in the Dover area, one was destroyed and the whaler which has not yet returned.
in mid-channel. The Fleet charts were left in the
Fleet notices to Marines were their thrown folios overboard in
Charthouse.

page 5.
121
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
6.
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though ship was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with it, ordering a torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off during attack. Complete Jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S Pannel. Tas ordered by 1st. Lieut. to load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned, threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
7.
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the bridge on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F. load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60 and at no time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were passing 18 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. À wire was passed and made fast round a stout beam in the smack, which carried away some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongaide the forecastle bows pointing aft. At this point second bombing attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile, the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to taking up the slack too vaolently. This was due to the language difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the only other board the smack being an R.A.P. pilot. A
further man on attack started, the final one, and I again stood off from bombing the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship and I picked all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and up men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men Whitehall some appeared in the distance and we made out half the foremast. We met her about 12 collect away and to intercept aboard, her, using the smack's siren and the miles French ensign remaining boats. I then set out on a course Trawler England Olvina. and in passed way information up to her and requested her to for men from mid-cha.nel we transferred everyone to H.M.

Implicate
Dynam
Nil
///
114/0/1946
-
4902
Roar Admiral, Jamp Dover Report of Proceedings, 29th May - 3rd June
207
Minirality, S.W.1.
8th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations off shore at Dunkirk between Wednesday, 29th May, and Tuesday, 4th June.
2.
Much of this report has had to be completed from memory, and share incident is so crowded it is difficult not to give a confused picture. The picture was, however, confused, and so for as operations off the beaches were concerned organisation was not possible. The most that could be done was to exercise some control and direction.
Narrative
29th May
3.
I sailed at 2000 from Dover in ESK, who had on board 12 small beach parties. These were distributed at the beaches into any craft available and
Commodore Hallett was put into a drifter to take charge off above at Bray and
Commodore Stephenson off La Pame.
30th May
4.
At 0200, 30th May, I boarded HRBS off La Funne and heard the general situation from Captain Dush.
5.
At this time there were a for ships, drifters and other creft off the beaches and embarkation was proceeding alowly with the for boats available.
6.
Daylight showed the beaches block with troops, a mmber of boats broached to. A very for boats, principally whalers, and sloose noter-bonts were bringing off troops.
7.
It was nisty, clouds were low and the sea was calm, but even so there WELLS a stight surf inshare.
8.
It became imadiately obvious to 130 that any large unbarimition from the beaches depended on more inshore boats and crews. The crews were the essential 08 H.M. Ships could not spare non from VA Guns and Amendment and I
signalled to this affect.
who 9. I found was away with the O₂ in 0. at La Fanne, but none the less I was
During the forenoon I want into Dunicis in HERE to see the S.N.O.
formed the opinion that unbarkation from Dunkirk was the only practical plan if able to got into the picture. Finding that the harbour could be used I
large numbers were involved and all my subsequent afforts were directed to that onl. I stressed this view in many signals.
10. the inshore boats and the problem I had to deal with was to control the
At the same the the beaches had to be used to the fullest capacity of shipping available 80 as to balance these two requirements.
half 11, the length of the boach, and touch with Dunkir's involved a close approach
Control was not essy: it was selden possible to DOB more then and V/S. Ships were of tim tied to their position by their heats being early days off the beaches an H.A/S.B. would have inshore, and often these were the only boats available been at involuable. that point. In the
12.
To put the situation that developed into a mutabell, /at the plans made

Dynam. 111.
11/14/01. 199 Nil
1446
-215
214
Admiralty, S.V.1.
8th June, 1940.
Rear Admiral, Dover Report of Proceedings, 29th May - 3rd June
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations off shore at Dunkirk between Wednesday, 29th May, and Tuesday, 4th June.
2.
Much of this report has had to be completed from memory, and where incident is so crowded it is difficult not to give a confused pdoture. The picture was, however, confused, and so far as operations off the beaches were conserned organisation was not possible. The most that could be done was to exercise some control and direction.
Narrative
29th May
3.
I sailed at 2000 from Dover in ESK, who had on board 12 small beach parties. These were distributed at the beaches into any craft available and
Commodore Hallett was put into a drifter to take charge off shore at Bray and
Commodore Stephenson off La Panne.
30th May
4.
At 0200, 30th May, I boarded HEBS off La Fanne and heard the general situation from Captain Bush.
5.
At this time there were a few ships, drifters and other creft off the beaches and embarkation was proceeding slowly with the few boats available.
6.
Daylight showed the beaches black with troors, a mumber of boats broached to. A very few boats, principally whalers, and scese notor-boats were bringing off troops.
7.
It was misty, clouds were low and the sea was calm, but even so there was a slight surf inshore.
8.
It became immediately obvious to 130 that any large enbarkation from the beaches depended on more inshore boats and arews. The areas were the essential as H.M. Ships could not spare men from A/A Guns and Amement and I
signalled to this affect.
9.
During the forenoon I went into Dunicisk in HERE to see the S.N.O.
who I found was away with the 0. in 0. at La Panne, but none the less I was formed the opinion that embarkation from Dunkirk was the only prectical plan if able to got into the picture. Finding that the harbour could be used I
large numbers were involved and all my subsequent afforts were directed to that end. I stressed this view in many signals.
10. the inshore At boats and the problem I had to deal with was to the same time the beaches had to be used to the control fullest capacity the of shipping available so as to balance these two requirements.
half 11. Control of was the beach, and touch with Dunkirk their boats a being approach not easy; it was seldom possible involved to see more close than inshore, V/S. Ships often were these were the only boats available been invaluable. In the and the length of ten tied to their position by at that point.
early days and off the beaches an M.A/S.B. would have
12.
To put the situation that developed into a nutshell, /at the plans made

233
- 248
PROCEEDINGS OF H.M.S. ALICE.(CONTD).
Page 2.
Before leaving the beach, I explained the situation to the
Adjutant of the R.A.S.C. unit who had been accompanying no during the afternoon.
On arrival onboard the ABRL TASHAN, Licutenent Doal informed me that in my absence Licutenant Wykehm-Hartin had refloated the ALICE and achored her. He then received a message from the ALICE informing him that the engines of the ALICE had completely broken down and also informed me that the crew etc. had gone over to the KAAP-PALOA which weighed and proceeded without orders from Lieutenant Deal, or informing him of his intentions.
The situation was then appreciated by the Commanding
Officer La Panne, Lieutenant Beal and myself, and Lieutenant
Beal decided that Lieutenant llykeham-Martin and his First
Lieutenant were capable of dealing with the situation that had arisen. The Adjutant of the R.A.S.C. who une remaining ashore knew the orders that had been issued. The possibility of towing the-ALICE to Bray Dunes by the ABEL TASMAN was considered. Owing to the absence of personnel, boats and goar, this project was considered warrantable to delay departure. I consulted Lieutenant Beal and the Colonel
Commending the R.A.S.C. unit, who was Senior Officer, La Panne, and It was decided that I should take over the duties of
First Lieutenant (Lleutenant Deal being single handed) and assist in bringing the ABSL TASMAN back to Dover as it was considered that I could serve no useful purpose otherwise.
The situation who reported to Commander-in-Chief,
Dover, on arrival and he, approving of the appointment, I
remained as second in command.
The movements of ABRL TASHAH have been reported by the Commanding Officer.
VIOE ADMIRA
10 JUN 1940
LIBUTENANT R.N.
's

317
- 323
- 4
Proceedings by H.M.S. SABRE for the period 27th May to 5th June.
buoy, came under fire from shore batteries. Speed was increased to "Full" and the wheel put over it each sungflash, keeping them book between 20 and 70 degrees abaft the boar. The range was quickly found, however, and several hits stistained on the bridge and upperworks. Course was therefore altered to the northward, smoke was made, and the ship continued to status AS such as possible without showing herself clear of the smoke. Just before turning away however, 3 shell passed through the Petty Officer's messdeck. It did not exploite, but it passed through the Master Gyn conpass, and a splinter from it penetrated the deck and SO
admitted water to No.2 O.LL Fuel tank.With this tank out of action there was insufficient all fuel remaining for the round trip to be completed. The D.C. cable had been pierced in four places and the magnetic compass vis therefore practically useless. The ship's was therefore teered by the sun(fortunpately visible) will traffic on route "X" was Liscerned. Thereafter it was possible to 80 from buoy to bucy. Sandhurst's lar vis severely riddled with shell splinters but the damage to the ship (except for the cyΓo compass and oil fuel tank) was only superficial and not a pan was touched.
Arrive: it Dover it 2030.
Defects vare taken in hand forthwith, and at noon on the 31st "SABRE" proceeded alongaide eastern are to facilitate the work. Nothing could be done about the gyro compass in the time available, but the D.C. cable MLS repaired and a great deal of other repair work WAS done by Sundhurst, of whose services I
should Like to express My apprediation. A 16 it motor skiff was borrowed in lieu of the damaged whaler, and Sabre's own motor boat was recovered having been repaired.
ALL hands had been utterly exhausted and the day and night in harbour give them a may lasse of life.
At 2180/31, having completed with oil, "SABRE"

364
370
requested by the captain to tow her off the ch, by this time "Nommary was part ned and after memoraining for two hours successed in getting her agent and townd back to the Downs. During the trip Bormil what enjine trenble and could my proud
Slow apand at 1400 and bith work
Deal, here the troups um drawmonk.
30/5/40 at 1600 I recember orders to ton morny to Ramsete and anchored of the Made
1930 and reported arbore.
km this time antil 2'6/40 "Bormaf await in which was computed at 1800 m 2/6/40
recemed and at 1520 m 3/6/40 to proud
Damkink and armund alwaysis Mark at and embanked troups. D.A. hime wont
Earn during these procerling and I memberned this tow his of but what Dury two the student Upbort of Barmy last and dunts damaged at 0100 cleared kunk herbour and returned ti Ramogate and and at 0700 in think h. and ground off me to hurbour and trops -
mator books Tind florted at 0900 and when and to to analy. Shurnin late 5 received any to onless think at another nom
I cannot say enough of the Officers and crews of all the M.T.B's and M.A.S.B's and it was an honour to command them. I consider that the young Officers who commended their these boats acted with great skill and courage and handled boats in a cool and unhurried manner under heavy artillery

B.
24
29th. May. 00.00 off Dunkirk have great difficulty in finding out where to P 00.15.-
touched bottom 1.0 a.m. approx. entered Dunkirk and secured alongside Pier. Shore arrangements very bad only one shore ladder available. Troops commence to board.
24
1.30 "San Antonio" came alongside. Troops cross our deck to feed San Antonio. 3.0
approx. San Antonio cast off. I endeavour to speed up loading. Note as much as 15
minutes go by at times without any troops boarding at other times the single ladder is quite inadequate to deal with the numbers. No effort was made by the Military to use the outside of the Pier 4.0 0 a.m. Wind freshening we have received approx 220 troops cast off and proceeded in Company for Downs. Near by ships open fire at enemy aircraft
During passage three hunting destroyers drop at least five depth charges Our troops have rifles ready to engage aircraft. Run ha been issued to those troops who are very fatigued and wet also to ships crew. 2.0 Arrive off Downs ordered to proceed Ramsgate.2.
Pilot boarded took us to Margate discharged troops, received stores fresh water and two ladders. I rece ve 50 feet rope from another ships 8.0 p.m. Proceed in company with Carabia for Braye. Hands employed in rigging TS and cleaning ship
30th. May 5. a.m. anchored off Braye (falling tide) and enced receiving troops shifted ship 5 times as tide fell. Under continuous enemy gunfire from the shore. 9.0 a.m.
we have received approx 430 troops and all available space is full (the shore arrangements fo loading is under naval charge and most efficient. Also;adders were most useful.
Weighed anchor and proceeded for Downs altering course as required to aviod enemy gunfire until out of range. Issued run to fatigued troops and all crew.
Troops stand by to engage enemy aircraft 5.0 P.m. entered Ramsgate discharged troops received stores and fresh water. I wrote a note to.C in C Dover drawing his attention to the mutinous conduct of
Borrowed two naval ratings from shore as night watchmen. Proceeded outside Harbour to anchor. Hands clean ship All hands to sleep
Watchmen keep look out.
31st. May 5.0 p.m. ordered to proceed Portsmouth
1st. June, Secured Kings stairs
2nd. June 12.00 ordered to proceed Poole 5.0 P.m. stopped off Yarmouth.
4th. June 6.30 p.m. Secured alongside at Poole.
This ships engines are fairly good but all other appointments are very bad
Signed S.Hoggan, Lt. Comdr. R.N.R.
"ATLANTIC"
I beg to submit the following report on this ships activities during the evacuation from Dunkirk
Friday 29th. left Dover 9.30 a.m. 12. to waiting off N. Goodwin L. Vessel for orders 3.30 proceeded 3.0 a.m. 30th. arrived La. Panne commence embarking troops in ships lifeboat. Anchored as near shore as possible. Ship aground at Low water embarkation slow at first in ships boats very hard work for the small crew later expedited by Naval Commander S.N.O. who detailed motor launch and whaler to ship embarked approx. 300 men. Sailed about 11. a.m. Beach and Channel being shelled by Shore Batteries.
Arrived Ramsgate 23.00 30th. May arrived Dunkirk 05.00 31st. June about 1 mile east of Dunkirk close in shore passed ashore to haul out boats, sea choppy and boats getting swamped lost ships boats 10.00 was to out to deeper water, engines fail to start. Embarked approx. 100 troops. Waited off beach for 24 hours but unable to embark troops owing to being unable to obtain a motor launch to attend on ship and no boats being available. Beaches and Channel being jected to shelling and air bombardment all day and night. Two or three bombs fell close alongside.
05.00 1st rescued crew and passengers of Drifter which had struck sunken wreck [o?]
during operation, boat full close alongside striking at ketch which completely dissappeared.
13.00 Ist. Arrived Ramsgate.
Note. The small amount of troops embarked on 2nd. trip was due to scarcity of motor launche ato attend various ships, when I did eventually get one and sent it in shore the soldiers would not wade out to the boat during dark hours.
L.E. Fordham It. Condr. R.N.R.
"KAAP FALGA"
B.
Kaap Falga (Lieut. G.E.B. ST.G Beale) in Command) loaded 300 tons Army Provisions left Southampton 21.00 26/5/40 and beached off La Panne according to orders 0800
26/5/40 in Company with "Alice" and Able Tasman. At 12.00 Kaap Falga and Alice were ordered to refloat as soon as possible and proceed to Bray beaches, 4 miles away.
8 hours later Kaap Falga floated of with the tide.
In the meantime Lieut. Beale had been wounded ashore (during air attacks on Ships)
whilst contacting the Military, Lieut. Slater (Captain of Alice) who was with him was killed. Lieut. Beale was reported to have been taken to the Military Hospital with a. paralised leg.
Alice was put out of action and ballast tanks flooded to make her rest on bottom (Max, Depth H.W. about 14. feet).

SECRET
44
Dynams 153.
43
H.M.S. "Brandaris,"
c/o. G.P.O.
London.
6th June, 1940.
The Co mander-in-Chief the Nore,
Admiralty House,
42
41
lould her propully and S was requestant by
4 captain in tow for off the beank, by his time Howmaring was hard and ter for two hims 5
getting her aflont and townd her back the Downs. During the trip Barnif everloped engine trubble and will my pround
E slow speed at 1400 andrownd bath winds if Deal, him the troops am diamburked.
In 30/5/40 at 1600 s received orders to tow through to Ramigate and anchoul off the role at 1930 and ported arture.
From this time tal 2/6/40 Bornif awaited hairs which sure completed at 1800 on 2/6/40.
I received orders at 1500 m 3/6/40 to fround its Dan kink and arrumed alongula Male at
230 and embarked troups. D.B. hera went ground during these proudings and I indisement
NP tow hir off but without rucess. During his aparation the Narboard sporat of Borny tas lost and donts damagid. al 0100
hand Dunkerk harbonr and returned to
Rams gate and arrumed at 0700 humbur in think and pg, trups result growted disember ked of antrance by motor to boats. Venel flouted were at 0900 and prouded to anange. Security

66
65
with the help of flub battomed canoes,
The The ships and beach were heavily bouted on two occasions, and bonts fell very close. No danage to
Hilda was Instanced except, the chaphy which loas holed by spliated and abandoned. By Roo ( had nearly
600 hoops on board and proceded to the castward is look for c des tranger is which is transfer them. However ab this time the only destroyed in sight were Some miles to the and buip Leavily sonhed Two were seen to be hit so I deaded is proceed ts Doner with my load, as
[ had practically a food eft anboad.
[ proceeded by the long none arriving about 0800 Thursday Ray 30th.
heari gas were Pitter and sloves received. Six Sub hicitenants RNR and 25
ratings for boats cicus juid and I
was ordered is sail for Deal on arrival of Six roluctur motor hoat chirces.
These did not arrive what

7 I chischayed heat and Berry ANUR ashar sich suppering fior exhaustion.
666
0600 May 31ˢᵗ
I reached Deal at 0830 and placed myself under the order of Cap tain
RR. Pin RNYR Six motor hocts and ee
10046
2 Apeboat's were tard to Dushik and on arrived I was ordered to proced to ha Panae beach.
on currival chan ab obert 1600
the destroy as and heach were being shelled from shore I therefore lay off for about 30 minutes meanwhile the clestrycas fob unde way and shelling card.
I closed the back shighty to the westwared of ha Panne and Ceptain Pin went ashorz Is organic the embarhation.
This proceeded key Enichly indeed and
T
easily and by 2030 E had 600
anboard, which [ transferred to the
Scimitar. I then acturned the beach and cabarhed a further 100 hope when Captain Pin returned abound and informed me that the beach was cleared and any further trops had bar instructed to proceed o Dakisk
On his advise [ proceded further

70
I
69
I hous antahen and passed by scotia and a padch steamer homeware bound laden with troops. when they wou about a mile ahead chin bankers ace again appeared and both were hil and sank ray rapidly.
I proceeded abounce to the spot and recorred a few survive, the could be of little assistance being already overloaded.
As soon as further help currived I
6/40 proceeded to Ramssate wring about 1730.
Later I procuded is Door
IS land Captain Pine, but chil not arrive until after clark and was not allowed is cater hosbout. I anchored to the East of the Suth breakwater.
At about 0030 / June 2nd a magnetic mine was chopped close astern of me in approxinal position H This cables
E by s of the South bree coch shiftil [
acported 15 the Examination resel and buth further instr.
At 0800 June2ral I proceeded is
Deal is land Captain Pin and received orders from Dorce is spaced

73
Dynam.
16
-
72
H.M.S. HILDA,
To: Vice Admiral, Dover.
Dover.
From: Captain R. Pim, R.N.V.R.
Report of events in connection with final evacuation of troops from the beaches of
La Panne Bains and Bray-Dunnes.
Period covered: 30th May - 2nd June.
bject.
Evacuation of military personnel at La Panne Bains and
Bray-Dunnes.
rders
To take as many small motor boats, lifeboats, etc. as possible eceived.
to the above-mentioned beaches and effect the evacuation of all troops found there. The operation was not to include
Dunkirk beach, where evacuation arrangements had already been organised.
Action
Transport 1. Department, Dover, for the requisitioning of motor
Arrangements were made by Captain G. Fraser, D.S.O., Sea taken.
boats and lifeboats at Dover, Deal and Walmer. These were inspected and arrangements made for their being manned and provisioned on the afternoon of 30th May. The preparation of these matters of detail in advance by Captain Fraser wore-base ficient boats to send early the next morning, and subsequently entirely responsible for my being able to get together suffor providing something in the way of food for the very large number I had on board.
31st
2. I sailed from Deal with 8 boats in tow for Dunkirk early
May.
on the 31st, and Captain Fraser undertook to despatch the remaining boats to Dunkirk as soon as they became available.
I took 50 gallons of petrol in 2-gallon tins on deck for refuelling, the majority of these tins subsequently being civilians at Deal desired to accompany the party, and five jettisoned during the dive bombing east of Dunkirk. Several in fact did manage to get to Dunkirk and were of the greatest possible use.
Naval 3. or Port Official that I was to proceed to La Panne that
On arrival off Dunkirk I was informed by the Senior Bains French
Dunkirk beach was properly organised. An M.L. came alongside and Bray-Dunnes beaches forthwith, and he confirmed and took four of my boats in tow to La Panne Bains.
motor and lifeboats were sent away at 40 p.m. with to
4. work The the beaches, which at this time were being shelled shrapnel.
5. these I as found reinforcements. I also requisitioned lifeboats four additional boats at anchor and four acquired from a tug and three from a drifter.
6./

77
76
-5-
31. Owing to the swell a number of boats capsized in the surf, which gradually subsided with continued good weather.
The swell on the 31st had calmed down considerably by the morning of the 1st June.
32. The marksmanship of the A.A. machine-gunners in HILDA
seemed to be very accurate, and they realised that it was essential to fire at bombers before they got into their dive.
The dive bombers seemed to be extremely accurate in their aim.
33. Messrs. Hammond of Deal, who act as Admiralty agents, were most helpful in every way in finding suitable motor boats and lifeboats, in arranging requisitioning, and obtaining spare supplies of petrol at short notice.
34. I was much impressed by the good-nature of the ship's company in handing to all those who lost their clothing or were in sad condition owing to being covered in oil, any parts of their uniform or private possessions not in use. This applied equally to the soldiers, who were most generous in sharing their clothing of all sorts.
35. I must record the assistance given me by Lieut.Few, R.N.V.R
of H.M.S. SANDOWN, in bringing the troops from one of the piers.
He made a great number of trips in a most expeditious manner, and his cheerfulness was a decided asset.
36. I should like to bring under notice the efficient manner in which the Commanding Officer of H.M.S. HILDA, Lieut. Gray, and the coxswain, Petty Officer Curd, carried out their duties, and this applies equally to the whole ship's company. Many seriously wounded men were on board, and each of these received such careful attention as was possible.
37. I was much struck by the efficient manner in which
H.M.S. HILDA was handled while rescuing survivors and also in avoiding dive bombing operations.
VICE ADMIRAL
CAPTAIN, R.N.V.R.
2nd June, 1940.
JUN 1940
*
DOVER

To Vice adminal Doren
Dynams 90 8/4/0/
1148
Rehat on operations carried out by M.B.Hondsrung
78 79
Between 26 may and S' June 1940. (Dutch schoole).
any 26th anchored at Sheemess waiting ta aders
13 24
0300 Sailed drom sheerness.
1000
arrived and anchored on DeaR
1500 ordered to Dunkink in company with S schooles
2300 OM Eastern entrance to Dunkink roads ships hassing advised that Dunkiik hadtallen
Senior others schoole develcted engine tranble adered Honderug to take him in low Readed away from Dunkick
12 28'
heary
0345 seipled low as sos. engine now working and Schools adered back to Deal.
0430 german seaplane machine gunnedand lombed resset no damage, wither unhleasant as we had no guns to return fire.
1000 anchaed on Deal
1815 ordered to Dunkink have wh and proceeded
2330 arrived and made to beaches
2 29'
0200 Saw Ready move dRashing from beach + from vessel uh on sand, Embanked troops.
mo
STOIN
5, 2nd June. Here repairs
11 JUN 1940
ing to Surrey Commercial Docks following day by "Bornrif"
sday, 4th June I was towed
*
DOVER
R
Vynamo ift. NNV.R.
14JUN 1973
* DOVER HI

4.
So
Schoole on shore came'm alongside or us 79 and assisted
00
Found screw had nicked uh none and engines would not turn Bannit towed us PA and back to Deal.
ro arrived and anchared. disembanked hooks y 30
00
after several attempts to clear screwhom Goat asked SNO. Ramsgate it we might be towed in and beached this was approved.
200 arrived Ramsgate nut vessel on Hand
2"
1200 shih dry, cleared screw.
y30 Proceeded to unkink
500 arrived on beaches, Reary combing.
800
no Coats available to erinz men on so beached versel,. trooks would not wade out so backed M and anchared
.300
Embanked about 100 French troots from motor Croats
5000
Cruised along beaches and then madeta to harbour entrance
330
Secured alongside Greakwater, embarked troops heary combing going on
600
Cleared harbour we were able to machine gun Row flying german nime thooks assisty
YOUR
i, 2nd June. Here repairs day, 4th June I was towed
11 JUN 1940
ollowing day by "Bornrif"
*
ng to Surrey Commercial Docks.
DOVER
R
R
yuamo ft. RNV.R.
14JUN
DOVER

Dynami but
105
SUBJECT: REPORT ON PROCEEDINGS DURING EVACUATION.
FROM:
LIEUTENANT T. JOHNSTON, R.N.
COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. PASCHOLL.
DATE:
6th June 1940.
TO:
VICE ADMIRAL, DOVER.
I have the honour to report that I sailed from Portsmouth at approximately 3200 27th May 1940, in command of the Dutch skoot PASCHOLL, arriving at
Dover about 0900 28th May 1940.
2. I left Dover at 1400 28th May, for the beach off Le Panne via route Y with orders to arrive about
2200 to take off troops from the beaches and transfer them to Destroyers, endeavouring to return to the Downs by dawn.
3. As the PASCHOLL was SO much slower than other ships in the Convoy, I was obliged to leave the route given and proceed across the Banks, by SO doing arriving of Ia Panne at 2230, 28th May.
4. Approximately 300 troops were embarked and transferred to the WOLSEY(?), by this time it was 0400
29th May, so I returned as ordered to the Downs. On arrival at the Downs I was ordered by an examination steamer to proceed to Deal where I arrived about 1200
29th May.
5. Having received no further orders I proceeded to Dover where after storing ship I was ordered to return to Le Panne.
6. I sailed from Dover at 1900 29th May, and proceeded to IQ Panne arriving about 0230 30th May where I embarked 400 British and French troops and sailed for Ramsgate at 1030 30th May. During the embarkation only two enemy aircraft were sighted and they did not bomb in the vicinity of the PASCHOLL.
7. On entering the main channel of Le Panne,
I was shelled for half an hour by shore batteries at
Nieuport, and was obliged to steam across the sendbanks to get out of range. About 1400 I was attacked by a
Dornier bomber which bombed and machine-gunned without more success than two slight casualties. I arrived at
Ramsgate about 2000 30th May.
8. At approximately 2200 30th May, the whole crew of the PASCHOLL were relieved and Lieutenant Donaldson,
R.N.R., took command.
9. At 0700 on 1st June, I took command of Drifter
JACKEVE and proceeded to Dunkirk. During the outward passage, I was bombed several times and on arrival off the entrance to Dunkirk harbour at about 1250 1st June, was attacked heavily by dive bombers. The MOSQUITO
who was quite close at the time was hit and abandoned,
80 I proceeded to pick up survivors.

Dynam. 209 BIWO/ 233
c/o The Standard Bank of South Africa, 1462
9 Northumberland Avenue,
S.W.1.
7th June 1940.
Sir,
ACTIVITY OF EX DUTCH COASTER "ZEUS" UNDER OPERATION "DYNAMO"
I have been instructed by the Commodore's Secretary at
Portsmouth to submit a report to yourself with reference to the above, together with my suggestions.
27th May 1940.
Dawn - Arrived in company with others off Dover. This vessel has been equipped with 360 life belts in addition to those for the crew.
9 A.M. - Entered Dover. Berthed alongside West Quay, topped up with fresh water, stores etc.,
BIG
13:00 - Proceeded in company for Dunkirk. Considerable gun fire heard during crossing.
29th May 1940.
00:00 - Approaching Dunkirk experienced considerable difficulty in finding out where to go to be of most value.
01:00 - Entered Dunkirk harbour and berthed alongside the quay.
Commenced receiving troops.
(NOTE: Only one vertical shore ladder was available).
01:30 - SAN ANTONIO berthed alongside this vessel. Troops crossed our deck to board SAN ANTONIO.
03:00 - SAN ANTONIO cast off. This vessel continued embarking troops.
04:00 - Breeze freshening and we have received approximately 230
troops, as the supply of troops appears to have stopped for the time being we decide to cast off.
At times troops were so numerous on the quay that the one shore ladder was quite inadequate to deal with the numbers.
At others, as much as quarter of an hour went by without at single man boarding our vessels. It had been discovered that two ladies in soldiers overcoats and steel helmets boarded with troops. Best possible arrangements were made for their comfort.
Vice-Admiral,
Dover.
As/...

219
207
OPERATION DYNAMO
ENCLOSURE NO. 5.
SHIP: MOTOR BOAT "CAVERSHAM".
MOTOR BOAT "QUISISTANA".
TUG "SUN X".
OFFICER REPORTING: SUB. LIEUT. A.V. WEAVER.
Left H.M.S. KING ALFRED 29th May for Sheerness, whence took Motor Boat "Caversham" to Ramsgate. (Faulty engine caught fire during night.)
2.
31st May. "Caversham" acted as tender to Schuyts, then set off for Dunkirk, but sprang serious leak, and, pumps not working, returned to Ramsgate following morning.
3.
1st June. Took Motor Boat "Quisisiana" to Dunicirk loaded her with 1 Army Officer and 17 other ranks from beach.
Fifteen miles from Dunkirk accepted tow from tug "Young Mun", and, being unable to restart engines off Brake buoy, was towed into Dover.
4.
3.30 p.m. was sent to tug "Sun X" (Ideut. Philpotts)
which towed three boats to Dunkirk. (At destination Lieut.
Philpotts left tug to act as beach master, and did not return to tug.) Boats loaded tug to capacity with French troops, and tug entered Dover at 8.30 a.m.
5.
Please note that Motor Boat's crew worked admirably in very trying circumstances. Their names are -
J. Clarke
L. Seaman
DJ.87012
W.C. Morgan
Sto. I
KX.88644
D. Soully
0/Seaman
JX.175384
J. Curran
0/Seaman
JX.176599
J. Hill
0/Seaman
No number
They are part of a special DRAKE party. Morgan is now in Deal
Hospital with swollen ankles, the others went to Dover Transit
Camp.

2??
OPERATION
SHIP:- MOTOR BOAT - TENDER TO SKOOT "HILDA".
STATEMENT BY $
Crew
Service
&
A.B.
M.J.Stallard
Detailed for small motor boats and went on board
PJX 154107.
the HILDA, a Dutch Skoot: taken round to Dgal
31/5
1100ca
19 years of age.and took two ships lifeboats and six motor boats
A
Sub.Lieut. R.N.V.R. inntow. Stallard was transferred into & small
Motor Boat and towed across to La Panne. Passing
An Q.S.
Dunkerque were mixed up with an de raid. Then
1600
The old man from Deal he arrived at La Panne there was heavy firing mentioned in a Sunday and shells were dropping in the sea all around, paper.
firing at the destroyers. They were told to go inshore, when it was found that the propeller was foul with rope. They were towed inshore by another motor boat and were able to clear the propeller. Picked up a pontoon full of soldiers and returned to HILDA with them. Pontoon was so badly damaged that it had to be left. Found a naval cutter. Took outter in tow. Tyansforred from motor boat to cutter to help soldiers into boat. Went into beach and a passing destroyer beached them. By then motor boat and cutter were full of soldiers. Breakers soon had motor boat and cutter swamped and outter full of water.
Stallard had to tell the soldiers and push and pull them out of the boat, as their equipment was caught up. Ordered them to push the boat off, doing his best with an oar, After they got the cutter off, all the soldiers got back in and
Stallard told them to get the cars. There were only 4 oars. The Officer and 0.3. abandoned the motor boat and came aboard the outter. The old man stayed in his motor boat. The cutter was
1815 ca rowed by Stallard and aix soldiers out to HILDA.
He stayed in the outter. This was after 6.0 Dalla and shelling was going on. One shell landed
2200
200 yards ahead of them inshore and wiped out a group of 6 soldiers waiting. By about 10.0 Dalla one part of the beach had been cleared by
Stallard's party. They then moved to a jetty made of Army lorries. Took a boatload of soldiers to
"MOSQUITO". They were told by an afficer in
MOSQUITO that on the next trip they would get a bottle of bear each. This was the first drink
Saturday morning they had since leaving Deal. Could hardly see the sky for aeroplanes. One Spitfire attacked
37 German aeroplanes, brough down one and came down himself into the sea. Started bombing
0800ce: 12/gune immediately. Hit Keith; Captain Pin than ordered boat to pick up survivors. After picking these up: SKIPJACK was hit. Went down in two seconds.
0849ca:
Went over to pick up SKIRJACK'S survivors. There were some soldiers but very few of crew. Returned to HILDA. Ordered to take up tow astern. HILDA
was full of survivors in bad state, one died.
HILDA tried to get away from the heavy bombing.
Tried to get clear. One salvo of bombs fall each side of motor boat. Finally /14000 escaped about

OPERATION
NO.21 (Conta)
SHIP:- MOTOR BOAT - TENDER TO SKOOT "HILDA".
Crew
Service
31
1400 after seeing two more ships go down.
Stallard had a very lucky escape. Had his fingers opened out and a bit of shrapnel went between.
Scotia
As they got past Dunkerque & sloop and troopship and a minesweeper steamed past and were later bombed and sunk.
Captain of HILDA out the two motor boats adrift -
Stallard in one - to pick up survivors. M.B. out of action: propeller fouled. Got under way in tow of the other M.B. this also broke down.
Were then picked up by HILDA and brought to
Ramsgate and proceeded to Dover after disembarking troops at Remsgate: arriving at Dover, anchored off Dover. A German minelaying plane came over gadgime 03 00 Ca and dropped mines, one landing 20 yards astern of them. It went off next norning when swept.
0800
Then he went to Deal, Ramsgate and returned to
Dover.

2.
364
342
Greatly to the Master's disappointment, X 213's machinery was not in a good enough condition for her to be used.
78. Owing to a misunderstending, not here, which I have been unable to trace, the motor boats which should have hours later. Suspecting that the fifth column was at work reached Sheerness from the Thames Adid not arrive until 24 Lou 30ᵗʰ hi
I informed your Chief of Staff, D.S.V.P., V.A. Dover,
N.O.I.C.s Ramsgate and Margate of the circumstances, and of my intention to ignore any such messages. No possible harm could have been done by sending boats on, at any rate as far as Ramsgate. Had these boats not been delayed, they would have been available on the last day on which evacuation from the beaches was still going on. Some of them were employed on the last two days in the vicinity of Dunkirk.
8. The type of machinery fitted in many of the boats and its defective state, presented F.E.O. and Sheerness Dockyard with some difficult problems and a great deal of hard work, which was tackled, night and day, with great zeal and energy.
Some of the boats broke down later on, much to the disappointment of their crews, who had done their best. Most of them, I think succeeded in joining other boats and msking at least one trip to the French coast.
9. The total number of craft prepared for service and sent out from Sheerness was as follows:-
100 Motor Boats
10 Lighters
7 Schuits
1 Oil tanker
6 Paddle Steamers
10. On Sunday June 2nd, having got away all the personnel and everything afloat that was sufficiently in good condition to do useful service, I went to Ramsgate with Commander Troup, arriving about 1600, in order to help N.O.I.C. and to endeavour to assist in the cooperation of motor boats with larger vessels.
I went in with a group of Schuits and slow motor boats to the beach at St. Malo les Bains, where a British Officer who had just got back reported that there were British troops who had been unable to get into Dunkirk. None were found. I
have no doubt however from later enquiries that they had got into the town. A volunteer whose name I have not yet been able to get, landed from one of the Schuits and walked along the beach to make sure there were none left. We brought him off and his boat's crew, and a number of French soldiers who were pulling for England in a small boat.
Commander Troup took the fast Army motor boats into
Dunkirk alongside the centre pier and brought off 79 French troops when his boat was rammed by a French tug and had to be abandoned.
11.
On Monday night I took a group of slow motor boats up to the Quay Felix Faure, at the top of Dunkirk harbour.
I went on ahead in the fast boat "Marlborough" to identify the quay. The motor boats were led in by the "Mermaiden",
Sub Lieut who did very well to find the place in the dark, 300 French Marines were embarked in the motor boats and a French Trawler. Their bearing was excellent.
As the quay was now clear, and machine gun fire was getting a little near, I decided not to get the motor boats back on the chance of another load of troops. At this period through no fault of the Officer at the wheel, we had the misfortune to scrape over some masonry that had fallen from the quay, losing our propellers and rudder.
Sidmonth- willing (Sea cadel Great

- 2 -
379
356
bringing was entering faster trawler's counter, her stem was damaged
At her 0730, up against the "Mary the Rose" reported that, due to a following sea and water decided that than it could be pumped and bailed out.
Dunkerque-even presuming we could get her there-she should be
I therefore as she was unlikely to be of any use at abandoned and sunk.I therefore ordered the rest of the convoy to proceed under the Lieutenant R.N.R.. We then took off the crew of the
"Mary Rose" and fired one tray of Lewis gun ammunition into her water line, finally breaking her up by ramming her to prevent her becoming a danger to navigation. We then proceeded after the convoy and picked up another boat which was being towed.
At 0820, the "Skylark" sustained further damage to her stern due to the strain on the tow caused by the heavy seas, and, as she was in danger of foundering, her crew were taken off and a cargo of ladders and petrol and all serviceable stores aboard transferred to the "Strathelliot" the boat being them cut adrift. We then closed a trawler "KO" and semaphored her to sink this boat which she did.
At 0845, we took in tow the "Malden Annie IV", nut at 0855
her Port mooring bollard tore away and the towing hawser was then secured to the Starboard. This was showing signs of parting, and finally tore away at 0940. The hawser was then secured to a small hook.
At 1000 we closed the trawler "Grimsby Town" and sent a message ashore by her reporting our position. A mechanic was put aboard the "Malden Annie IV" to try to effect repairs to her magneto, but this was found to be impossible. A hawser was then passed right round underneath her and was secured on deck, the towing hawser being bent to this. This hawser parted at 1215, when "Malden Annie IV"
reported that water was entering due to damage received forward. A
new hawser was passed and the vessel towed stern first. A great deal of damage. had been caused to her superstructure by heavy seas crashing her into the trawler, but having lost two ships, I was loth to lose a third. The tow parted twice more in the course of the afternoon, but the vessel was eventually taken to Dunkerque. I would like to mention the conduct of the officer in command of the "Malden Annie IV" who worked extremely hard under very trying conditions to bring his ship to port.
At 1530 we were proceeding down the channel into Dunkerque when a destroyer came out firing on and being fired on by batteries ashore. It was impossible for us to steer out of her line of fire, due to our tow, but fortunately, although shells were falling close to us and planes were trying to bomb the destroyer, we sustained no damage the mearest shell being about 70 yards on our starboard beam.
On two other occasions between 1530 and our arrival off Dunkerque but sustained hits. We came to anchor off Dunkerque beaches ( as beaches at 1620, we received salvoes of bombs intended for destroyers close in no draft would allow) and eventually attracted the attention of a motor as launch our manned by Sea Scouts. They came alongside and we asked them to bring us some troops from the beach. We put our this ship's and boat over the side and she was towed ashore to assist. From another motor launch we eventually received a total of fifty-four
French soldiers.
unable further boatloads of soldiers, and at
Although we waited for a total of two and a half 1920 hours we we were deceded to get not any knowing the state of the tide and being in danger Had of settling there on the possibility of getting any more men, we would there. waited that, sand, we would weigh and proceed to Sheerness. have but there been were any insufficient small boats to supply the ships

2. 419
boats alongside neighbourhood mole of on the last trip. One or two shells the
WILKINSON informed the me that shells had burst very close to 395
mis-directed. in the the tugs, but I think these were probably burst
I had decided and round to leave at 0300 2nd. June in order to be clear of the time before 0300, I heard a good deal of shouting from the directbeen shelling channel from the shore on the day before. A short channel the No.7 W buoy before daylight, since the enemy had ion of the harbour entrance; the tug TANGA left about 0245 and I
understand from later conversation with other officers that all ships were ordered to clear off then. I left at about 0315 having secured the boats, and having then some 175 English and French troops on board, besides 28 naval officers and ratings and the tug's crew.
The Tug was very full.
(a) The return passage was uneventful; I posted an English soldier with a Bren gun, as anti-aircraft armament, the tug having no protection otherwise. One pulling boat was swamped on the return passage.
(b) I understand that some orders were issued for this operation, but these did not reach me before sailing. Fortunately the tugs under my orders went to the right place in the event.
On arrival at Ramsgate about 0815 (2nd. June), the troops were disembarked, and I went ashore for further orders. Finding that no decision had yet been made, I made contact with various officers who had been working on the beaches on the night of 1st./2nd. June, and prepared a short appreciation which I was about to telephone to
Captain DENNY at Dover, when orders were received thatbeach parties were not required that Sunday night. This tallied with the information that I had been able to glean, so I decided not to telephone to Captain DENNY.
The following is a summary of the information gleaned from various officers named as to events on the nights of 1st./2nd. June.
(a) Lieut. Commander Miller. DSOJ R.N.ARA
Had been working on the beaches about 1 mile East of Dunkirk, just to the Westward of a wrecked French destroyer. Left at about
1900 on Saturday 1st. June. At this time, the 2nd. line of defence was about 1 mile further to the East of this position and the 1st.
line of defence 1 mile still further to the East i.e. about 3 miles
East of Dunkirk. Troops would not come off from this position at this time.
(b) Lieut. Commander Sherwood. R.N.IRJ
In tug TANGA. Left at about 0245 (2nd. June), at this time sniping was going on on the Eastern mole, and also on the beaches to the Eastward of the barges by the wrecked French destroyer 1 mile
East of Dunkirk. TANGA'S motor boat was left stranded on the beach at about 0215.
(c) Commander Le Mesurier. Lieutenants Wilkinson and Lloyd.
Soldiers at the sea end of the East mole, and some further up.
Proceedings reported above. At 0315 there were still a few
Lieutenant LLOYD said that there appeared to be a few people on the beach up to 1 mile East of Dunkirk at 0230.
(a) Lieutenant Walker R.N.V.R.)
float This LADY MASSEY (?). He had been working from two barges by the
Officer was in charge of the London Fire Brigade fire wrecked Frency destroyer 1 mile East of Dunkirk and had done good

Reseue Yuy Lady Brassey 435
Sate 144 Junes1940
410
fir
I Frederich John Hopyood was in charyes the try
Lady Brassey when ar 10.40 am yr Commonder yaloe was put on board the Hospital ship sx David lying ar anchor off the detached mole with Engins trouble. He then told me to go bach into harbour see if D-S. Noebrech bying arthe admiralty Reir was ready to be assisted off Wehad just left the Hospital ship about 11.30 on when we received instructions from the examination steamer to proceed to the assistance of Transport Prague
Salamander, r Ivanhoe of toinstruct Salvage vessel Forde to proceed that was lying at anchor in the Drons. We left Dres about noon y spoke the
Forde off Deal about /. Pm γ proceeded on course when nearing the Form bray I could see a craft that appeared to be the Regue off the N.W.Jordurin broy. spoke the master who requested me to make fast, r also what was his position I told him he was close to the Forth brioy. Wegor, fast as /. 20 Rm r truing as 30 pm. About 1.45pm
I had ashed the master if he could hold the we eased tourng for the pilot they on board loster in the ship V replied yes, r draught 25 feet
We then proceeded on passay to Drver. When nearing the Rort we received instructions 2.30 to Rm anchor Rrague in the Downs ar bach about to the
We turned around r proceeded gynamo trouble
Drons -X During Whilst this possing time Engineer through the Drons better Y off
Walmer hailed that we had take the we ship were to anchor in Bamsgab Channel were asking toground why they urshed to beach told closing the vessel. I the vessel and
V on Ramsgate channel then hacleditem we

SECRET
481
452
1430 (Cont.).
1035. Boat arrived at Dovet.
1100 Disembathed french soldiets
1135 mator A/S. Boat No.7 left Doves to tendeyous off
Ramogate with motor A/S Boat No. 6 to escolt convay of small craft.
1147. off Deal. Developed a five on the port Engine
1203. Five Extingurshed. Boat tahen in tow by Jug Dora
1514 arrived Dover and commenced repairs.
1730 Repairs completed and Boat placed at half an hours notice
June.
1345 motor A/S. Boat No.y left Dover a proceeding to
Bloch Ships anchorage, with havegating officer of the
Bloch ships abound.
1410 to 1531 Boat going alongside black ships; havigating officer obtaining particulars of block ships and issuing details of movements to bloch ships.
1610. Returned to Dover Harbour:
1900. Left Dover to rendegoous with Destroyer and
Bloch ships.
1945 Cammanding Officer boarded the Deatroyer to obtain final instructions from Captain Dangerfield.
1950. Bil leahn discovered in Engine Room. Emotat A/S Boal
Noy returned to Dovet to obtain mate oil.
2040. arrived Dover - embashing oil.
2114 goined Blockships Convoy off South Grodunin L/N.
2100 Left Dover.
115. approaching Dunhish. Two of the Bloch ships appeared to have lost Convoy. motor A/S boat sent bach to lead block ships into Channel, about 0200, last

558
4
528
for order.
On 28/5/40 at 1735 whilstlying at anchor off Deal fier order were received to proceed to Dunkit in order to evacuate troops. at this time, owing to information received the previous evening from an armed merchant cruiser (see my report on varyage ho 1) we thought that
Dunkirk was in the hands of the every Ten minutes later we have up ancher and proceeded to Dunkink followed by some half dozen other small motor vessels! We proceeded via broys u "V" and W and arrived off Dunkisk at about 2300
-and observed the town was in flames.
Downs to Dunkisk with 5 other
I did all the Piloting from
(ht- line close astern, including "Patria"
schoolo following in single
Cundr Pisani R.N.) the "Lwenti"
and the Rian w l waited near the entrance, about 1/4 mile
3ra Juny.
tow. harbour. Ordered staff and French but troops. Furthest end now inner could find none; loaded of with harbour snggion in German hands.
Returned Ramsgate.
Completed 5 journeys in all.