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12 to Dunkirk East Pier destroyers will be sent there as well. All other craft except Hospital Carriers to embark from beach which is extended from one mile East of Dunkirk to one mile East of La Panne. Part 2 follows." Part 2 received as follows:- Whole length is divided into 3 equal ports referred to as La Panne, Bray, Malo, from East to West with a mile gap between each port. La Panne and Bray have troop concentration points each end and in middle; Malo at each end. These points should be tended by inshore craft. Pass this message by V/S to ships not equipped U/I, as opportunity offers. Destroyer at Dunkirk pass to S.N.O. Dunkirk." This was exactly what was required. In the evening a series of fierce air attacks were made on the Seatern Arm. These resulted in H.N.S. GREMADE being bombed while embarking troops. It looked for the moment as though she might sink and block the entrance to the harbour but a trawler and drifter were sent to assist her and managed to guide her into 8 pocket to the Westward of the main channel. She burned fiercely for some hours and eventually blew up with a loud explosion. A trawler was also bombed and sank in the channel in about 50 yards from the East Pier about two cables/from the Rastern Lighthouse. The transport FENELLA was sunk while loading at the outside extremity of the Kastern Arm. She was practically fully loaded but the troops were transferred to another ship with very little loss A troop transport CRESTED KAGLE was bombed and rendered unusable. She drifted down towards Bray where she ran aground. A "J" Class destroyer was bombed off the beaches but was taken in tow by another destroyer.
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17 & 21 "maximum number of French and British may be evacuated. Impossible from here to judge local situation. In close co-operation with Admiral Abrial you must act in this matter on your own judgment. At 2315 I made the following signal:- "Withdrawal now proceeding according to plan. Shall have certain reserves here to-morrow to assist French. Intend to complete evacuation to-morrow by midnight. A motor boat was sent to the mouth of the harbour at dusk and allocated berths to the ships as they entered, the requisite number of the personnel vessels being sent to the embarkation pier in the Western harbour to embark French troops. A good number of ships entered harbour and embarked troops, and the seamanship displayed by destroyers, sloops and transports was most praiseworthy under exceedingly difficult conditions. I gave orders to evacuate a large proportion of naval personnel during the night. the final All those that did remain until, withdrawal had performed their duties magnificently. Suriday 2nd June. 0800/2 - from S1N.0.Dunkirk. "Request again maximum number of transports for British and French. At 2130 June 2nd it is intended that all British shall be evacuated by midnight. Request M.A.S.B. at 2300. At 0405 - from S.N.O.Dumkirk. "Admiral du Nord requests that block ships will arrive at 6300 to-morrow night. He will signal if their placing is to be postponed. At 0730 - from S.N.O. Dunkirk:- "Wounded situation acute. Hospital ships should enter during day. Geneva Convention will be honourably observed. It is felt that the enemy will refrain from attack (This signal was made "en clear") At 0830 - from S.N O. Dunkirk:- "About 5000 British remain. Bofors ammunition short. Sporting chance of embarking to-night. Maximum number of fast motor boats at 2130 at inner end of Long Pier would assist. Early this morning the drifter Lord Cava our dépot ship, was sunk by shell fire.
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21 & 25 II XIGNINAV OFFICERS WHO PERFORMED VALUABLE SERVICES. Captain Howson. X Commission Hand # Levis (late P.S.T.O. who joined my party and and very good work). # kilwood # Honderson # Richardson X # surteen X # dotto x # Clountion Lieut. Communitor Junes Paym. Licutenant Broakett, R.N.R. Licutenant Balfour Commonder Commy Lieut. communder cubtoon. of the Drifter Land Cavan Commander Kerr X Names already given to V.A.Dover for special recognition in The first disputch but all the remainder are wathy of mention but particularly Khose / have underlaied.
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39 43 to Dunkirk East Pier destroyers will be sent there as well. All other craft EAT except Hospital Carriers to embark from beach which is extended from one mile East Inemyor Dunkirk to one mile Rest of La Panne. Part 8 follows." Scobing being It intended Part 8 received as follows - "Whole length is divided into 3 equal ports referred to as La Panne, Bray, Malo, from daly East to West with a mile gap between each port. La Panne and Bray have troop concentration points each end and in middle; Malo at each end. These points should be tended by inshore craft. Pass this nessage by V/S to ships not equipped I/C, as opportunity offers. or Destroyer at Dunkirk pass to S.N.O. Dunkirk." referred so the by a dive-bomber This was exactly what was required. In the evening a series of fierce air attacks ere made on the Enstern Arm. These resulted in H.R.S. GRENADE eing bombed while embarking troops. at It looked for the oment as though she night sink and block the entrance to the If arbour but 8 trawler and drifter were sent to assist her nd managed to guide her into a pocket to the Westward of information as to the blooking he main channel. She burned fiercely for some hours and by Commader If ventually blew up with a loud explosion. 1a reduced the A travler was also bombed and sank in the channel the simimum. in bout 50 yards from the East Pier about two cables/from the astern Lighthouse. The transport FENELLA was aunk while loading at he outside extremity of the Reatern Arm. She was practically ully loaded but the troops were transferred to another ship 1th very little loss A troop transport CRESTED EAGLE was bombed and endered unusable. She drifted down towards Bray where she an aground. A "J" Class destroyer was bombed off the eaches but was taken in tow by another destroyer.
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48 52 "maximum number of French and British may be evacuated. Impossible from here to judge local situation. In close co-operation with Admiral Abrial you must act in this matter on your own judgment. At 2315 I made the following signal:- "Withdrawal now proceeding according to plan. Shall have certain reserves here to-morrow to assist French. Intend to complete evacuation to-morrow by midnight. A motor boat was sent to the mouth of the harbour at dusk and allocated berths to the ships as they entered, the requisite number of the personnel vessels being sent to the embarkation pier in the Western harbour to embark French troops. A good number of ships entered harbour and embarked troops, and the seamanship displayed by destroyers, sloops and transports was most praiseworthy under exceedingly difficult conditions. I gave orders to evacuate a large proportion of naval personnel during the night. the final All those that did remain until, withdrawal had performed their duties magnificently. Suriday 2nd June. 0800/2 - from SIN.O.Dunkirk. "Request again maximum number of transports for British and French. At 2130 June 2nd it is intended that all British shall be evacuated by midnight. Request M.A.S.B. at 2300. At 0405 - from S.N.O.Dunkirk. "Admiral, an Nord requess that block ships will arrive at 6300 to-morrow night. He will signal if their placing is to be postponed. At 0730 - from S.N.O. Dunkirk:- "Wounded situation acute. Hospital ships should enter during day. Geneva Convention will be honourably observed. It is felt that the enemy will refrain from attack (This signal was made "en clear") At 0830 - from S.N O. Dunkirk:- "About 5000 British remain. Bofors ammunition short. Sporting chance of embarking to-night. Maximum number of fast motor boats at 2130 at inner end of Long Pier would assist. Early this morning the drifter Lord Cava our depot ship, was sunk by shell fire.
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17 Page 3. 81 Lieut, Cdr, W.G. Boaks. 4. With after guns until motor boat lowered and then went forward to make quite sure coxswain of boat (Hicks) understood his orders reference embarking troops and collection of drifting boats, Just as we got the beat clear I heard a bomb whistling down and dived under Pom-Pom platform. About six, possibly more, bombs dropped, one of which was presumably the one that went through the engine room - this very seriously wounded and burnt one rating and seriously burnt another but I escaped the full force of the back flash although thrown heavily against Pom-Fom deck overhead and almost knocked out. I then went to the bridge to see what the position was there, but there were no casualties there and 1 then went aft to the after guns to find en route that deck was buckled by mainmast. The after magazine and shell room were flooding and decided to close down. I then went down to my cabin and passed up about eight spare torches (placed there for use in disembarking troops previous day - night) as all lights were out and being daylight few were carrying torches on them. 1 found general chaos in Captain's Cabin flat and sent extra hands down to resecure deadlights as this compartment being next to the buckled part was rather important. I then went forward to supervise tow forward. In the midst of this another heavy attack was made and most hands took shelter, some in forecastle locker. I then found all but three of the cordite rounds from "A" gun had been jettisoned and in view of the nature of the attack ordered these three to be thrown overboard. After this attack we came out and then started to provide cordite again. I then went aft to see what damage bad been done during which the fishing drifter returned and I again went forward to rig дем tow lines and also ordered individual hands to turn out and lower boats and carley floats into water as by then it was known ship could not move and drifter could not have towed faster than say four knots. I also placed one hand with a lead line aft to keep check on amount of water ship was in from point of view of grounding and stationed hands ready to cast off boats' painters should ship sink without warning. Then to the forecastle to get up the after hemp and also 3/2" wire during course of which the third attack developed and I went aft to the after guns and with one round of cordite from forward fired the remaining round in Y gun myself at a passing bomber but not enough aim off in field of view to hit even with full deflection. After firing this round I went forward and noticed that X gun had a round left but was unable to fire as recoil cylinder had been emptied in preparation for firing and tearing gun out of mounting overboard. This cylinder was refilled but on going forward I discovered that the crack in deck appeared to have widened and gave orders that after guns were on no account to be fired in view of probable breaking off of after end. I then ordered every possible container of water to be filled from only remaining water left in hot water tank in galley and tore up soldiers ground capes to provide covers to prevent loss or contamination of this water. Boats' anchors were then placed in spare boats alongside and ears provided, sailing gear placed in whaler, after steering compase unshipped and placed in spare motor boat, torches distributed to boats, the after lifebuoy flare placed in whaler for possible use. After steering party detailed and party to clear the flat of weeckage. I then went forward for third time to take in tow during which the fourth attack developed - dive bombing - and upper deck was cleared.
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78 82 4. (contd.). On completion when ship had been struck and water was level with waist the question of scuttling ship came up but Captain decided this was unnecessary and order was given to abandon ship. I reached one of the spare Army boats two hundred yeard away and after collecting survivors to limit of boats capacity went to drifter. After collecting all but two floats we went off to head off & destroyer for the remainder. Particular merit:- A.B. Rawstron - courage, example & cheerfulness. A.Bis Glover and Ord. Sea Mullins - courage de cheerfulness. P.O. Robinson took charge well on forecastle. A.B. Davis. Torp. although badly burned took a lively interest in remaining action taken. Lieut. Sowry AC for tenacity of purpose with French drifter resulting in the recovery of seventy survivors and message passed to destroyer for remaining fifty. 5. Surg. Lieut. A.M. McHaffie. 1st. Attack. In Sick Bay 16 which was reduced to chaos from concussions. Casualties arrived after attack. Soldier complaining of burns of arms. Stocker complaining of burns of face. 2xStwaker Terpedoman complaining of extensive surface burns of face, scalp, neck and both eyes. Another rating complained of splinter wound of left arm. L.S.B.A. reported A.B. Riddle lying under Pon-Pom platform. When I arráved there I found him complaining of fracture of left feaur and very extensive burns of face and shoulders - Dressed him and then went down into engine room where I saw two BRA's dead. Griffeths& Grifftchs& Putt (stoker) was also dead. L.S.B.A. reported four dead in boiler room. 2nd. attack. Ordered to clear upper deck - and I went to port side alley way. Saw Mr. Francis of Pom-Pom platform and one rating. He called for rest of crew and I passed on call to ratings in fore meas deck. No hands came forward. Saw Captain climbing on to platform followed by rest of crew. Was called by Captain to attend to Mr. Francis and I went on to Pom-Pom platform and found Mr. Francis unconscious - splinter through lungs. Gave 1/6th. morphine. 3rd. attack. Was still on Pom-Pom platform until shortly after attack when Mr. Prancis died. During interval between 3rd. and 4th. attacks. Evacuated wounded into water boat lying in water amidships on starboard side. Was helped in this by L.S.B.A and Coxswain. Orders to do so were given by First Lieutenant. 4th. attack. Most of herew of motor, boat boarded ship including all Robertson stretcher a no on forecastle of motor boat - two ratings wounded except A.B. Riddle who was comatose and lying in remained in boat. Bomb hit water 10 yards off motor boat and wave upset and smashed boat against ship's side upsetting all within - Riddle disappeared before I could get to him and I lost sight of other members of boat's crew. Ship by this time WELLS being abandoned.
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95 3. 09 it, Cdr. V.G. Boaks. With after guns until motor boat lowered and then went ward to make quite sure coxswain of boat (Hicks) understood orders reference embarking troops and collection of drifting is, Just as we got the beat clear I heard & bomb whistling a and dived under Pom-Pom platform. About six, possibly more, DS dropped, one of which was presumably the one that went ough the engine room - this very seriously wounded and burnt rating and seriously burnt another but I escaped the full CO of the back flash although thrown heavily against Pom-Pom : overhead and almost knocked out. I than went to the bridge to see what the position was 0, but there were no casualties there and I than went aft to after guns to find en route that deck was buckled by mainmast. The after magazine and shell room were flooding and ided to close down. I then went down to my cabin and passed about eight spare torches (placed there for use in disembarktroops previous day - night) as all lights were out and go daylight few were carrying torches on them. I found eral chaos in Captain's Cabin flat and sent extra hands down resecure deadlights as this compartment being next to the cled part was rather important. I then went forward to supervise tow forward. In the st of this another heavy attack was made and most hands took Iter, some in forecastle locker. I then found all but three the cordite rounds from "A" gun had been jettisoned and in V of the nature of the attack ordered these three to be thrown rboard. After this attack we came out and then started to wide cordite again. I then went aft to see what damage had a done during which the fishing drifter returned and I again c forward to rig now tow lines and also ordered individual is to turn out and lower boats and carley floats into water by then it was known ship could not move and drifter could not a towed faster than say four knota. I also placed one hand a a lead line aft to keep check on amount of water ship was in a point of view of grounding and stationed hands ready to cast boats' painters should ship sink without warning. Then to the forecastle to get up the after hemp and D 35th wire during course of which the third attack developed I went aft to the after guns and with one round of cordite II forward fired the remaining round in Y gun myself at at sing homber but not enough aim off in field of view to hit a with full deflection. After firing this round I went forward noticed that X gun had a round left but was unable to fire as oil cylinder had been emptied in preparation for firing and ring gun out of mounting overboard. This cylinder was re- Led but on going forward I discovered that the crack in deck eared to have widened and gave orders that after guns were on account to be fired in view of probable breaking off of after I then ordered every possible container of water to be Led from only remaining water left in hot water tank in galley tore up soldiers ground capes to provide covers to prevent 3 or contamination of this water. Boats' anchors were then ced in spare boats alongaide and cars provided, sailing gear bed in whaler, after steering compase unshipped and placed in re motor boat, torches distributed to boats, the after lifeflare placed in whaler for possible use. After steering y detailed and party to clear the flat of weeckage. I then forward for third time to take in tow during which the fourth ok developed - dive bombing - and upper deck was cleared.
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95 Page 3. 09 Lieut, Cdr. N.G. Boaks. 4. With after guns until motor boat lowered and then went forward to make quite sure coxswain of boat (Hicks) understood his orders reference embarking troops and collection of drifting boats, Just as we got the beat clear I heard & bomb whistling down and dived under Pom-Pom platform. About six, possibly more, bombs dropped, one of which was presumably the one that went through the engine room - this very seriously wounded and burnt one rating and seriously burnt another but I escaped the full force of the back flash although thrown heavily against Pom-Pom deek overhead and almost knocked out. I then went to the bridge to see what the position was there, but there were no casualties there and 1 than went aft to the after guns to find on route that deck was buckled by mainmast. The after magazine and shell room were flooding and decided to close down. I then went down to my cabin and passed up about eight spare torches (placed there for use in disembarking troops previous day - night) as all lights were out and being daylight fow were carrying torches on them. I found general chaos in Captain's Cabin flat and sent extra hands down to resecure deadlights as this compartment being next to the buckled part was rather important. I then went forward to supervise tow forward. In the midst of this another heavy attack was made and most hands took shelter, some in forecastle locker. I than found all but three of the cordite rounds from "A" gun had been jettisoned and in view of the nature of the attack ordered these three to be thrown overboard. After this attack ao came out and then started to provide cordite again. I then went aft to see what damage had been done during which the fishing drifter returned and I again went forward to rig now tow Lines and also ordered individual hands to turn out and lower boats and carley floats into water as by then it was known ship could not move and drifter could not have towed faster than say four knots. 1 also placed one hand with a lead line aft to keep check on amount of water ship was in from point of view of grounding and stationed hands ready to cast off boats' painters should ship sink without warning. Then to the forecastle to get up the after hemp and also 3½ⁿ wire during course of which the third attack developed and I went aft to the after guns and with one round of cordite from forward fired the remaining round in Y gun myself at a passing bomber but not enough aim off in field of view to hit even with full deflection. After firing this round I went forward and noticed that X gun had a round left but was unable to fire as recoil cylinder had been emptied in preparation for firing and tearing gun out of mounting overboard. This cylinder was refilled but on going forward I discovered that the crack in deck appeared to have widened and gave orders that after guns were on no account to be fired in view of probable breaking off of after end. I then ordered every possible container of water to be filled from only remaining water left in hot water tank in galley and tore up soldiers ground capes to provide covers to prevent loss or contamination of this water. Boats' anchors were then placed in spare boats alongside and cars provided, sailing gear placed in whaler, after steering compasa unshipped and placed in spare motor boat, torches distributed to boats, the after lifebuoy flare placed in whaler for possible use. After steering varty detailed and party to clear the flat of weeckage. I then went forward for third time to take in tow during which the fourth attack developed - dive bombing - and upper deck was cleared.
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100 4. (contd.). On completion when ship had been struck and water was level with waist the question of scuttling ship came up but Captain decided this was unnecessary and order was given to abandon ship. I reached one of the spare Army boats two hundred yeard away and after collecting survivors to limit of boats capacity went to drifter. After collecting all but two floats we went off to head off a destroyer for the remainder. Particular merit:- A.B. Rawstron - courage, example & cheerfulness. A.B!s Glover and Ord. Sea Mullins - courage & cheerfulness. P.O. Robinson took charge well on forecastle. A.B. Davis. Torp. although badly burned took a lively interest in remaining action taken. Lieut. Sowry - for tenacity of purpose with French drifter resulting in the recovery of seventy survivors and message passed to destroyer for remaining fifty. 5, Surg. Lieut. A.M. McHaffie. 1st. Attack. In Sick Bay - which was reduced to chaos from concussions. Casualties arrived after attack. Soldier complaining of burns of ares, Stocker complaining of burns of face. 2x2xwaker Torpedoman complaining of extensive surface burns of face, scalp, neck and both eyes. Another rating complained of splinter wound of left arm. L.S.B.A. reported A.B. Riddle lying under Pom-Pom platform. When I arráved there I found him complaining of fracture of left femur and very extensive burns of face and shoulders - Dressed him and then went down into engine room where I saw two RRA's dead. Griffeths& Griffiths& Putt (atoker) was also dead. L.S.B.A. reported four dead in boiler room. 2nd. attack. Ordered to clear upper deck - and I went to port side alley way, Saw Mr. Francis of Pom-Pom platform and one rating. He called for rest of crew and I passed on call to ratings in fore meas deck. No hands came forward. Saw Captain Captain to attend to Mr. Francis and I went on to Pom-Pom platform climbing on to platform followed by rest of crew. Was called by and found Mr. Francis unconscious - splinter through lungs. Gave 1/6th. morphine. 3rd. attack. Was still on Pom-Pom platform until shortly after attack when Mr. Francis died. Evacuated wounded into Mater boat lying in water amidships on During interval between 3rd. and 4th. attacks. starboard side. Was helped in this by L.S.B.A and Coxawain. Orders to do 80 were given by First boat Lieutenant. wounded Riddle who was comatose and lying boat - in 4th. attack. Most of screw of motor, boarded ship including all Robertson except stretcher A.B. a ma on forecastle of motor two ratings remained in boat. and smashed Bomb against ship's side upsetting all within other - Riddle hit water 10 yards off motor boat and wave upset disappeared boat before I could get to him and I lost eight of menbers of boat's crew. Ship by this time was being abandoned.
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104 108 COPY. Slade Farm, Slade Cross, Bovey Tracey, Devon. 4/6/40. Sir, I have the honour to submit the following report as First Licutenant, H.M.S. "Basilisk". The general conduct of affairs during the combat between large numbers of enemy bonbars and H.M.S. "Basilisk" off Dunkirk on 1st of June has been dealt with by my Commanding Officer but the following can hardly be forwarded by the same channels. As the next senior officer ouboard I was most impressed with Commander H.Richmond's conduct throughout this harassing period and I feel that his efforts to keep up the morale of the ship's company should not pass without notice. Every effort was made to get the ship towed back to Dover by the French fishing drifter "Jolie Mascotte" but although taken in tow two or three times the attentions of the energy bombers made it necessary to slip tow twice and the last of many salvos striking the ship sunk it and attempt was abandoned. The foremont guns continued firing to the last although only using S.A.P.shell in order to keep up the morale of the ship, this by order of Commander Richmond. Firing at the after guns was stopped by my orders after one round due to the possibility of the shock breaking aff after end of ship near mainmaat where 11 was badly buokled and splitting more with movement of the ship. Abandon ship was ordered only after ship was sinking but period in between was devoted to the destruction as C.B.'s, A/S gear and F.C.C., etc. I have the honour to DO₂ Str, Your obedient Servant, (signed) W.G.BOAKS, Lieutemant Commender, Royal Navy. To:- Comman der-in-Chief, Western Approaches, Plymouth.
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109 COPY. Slade Farm, Slade Cross, Borry Traccy, Deven. 4/6/40. sir, I have the honour to submit the following report as First Lieutenant, H.I.S. "Basilisk", The general conduct of affairs during the combet between large numbers of onemy bonbers and H.M.S. "Basilish" off Dunkirk on 1st of June has been dealt with by by Commending Officer but the following can hardly be forwarded by the sexe channels. As the next senior officer amboard I 180 most impressed with Commander N.Hichmond's conduct throughout this havassing period and I feel that his afforts to keep to the morale of the ship's conceny should not pass without notice. Every offort vas made to get the ship lowed back to Dover by the French fishing drifter Volia liascotte" but although taken in for two OF three thes the attentions of the energy bombers made 11 necessary to slip tow twice and the last of many salvos striking the ship suite 10 and attempt the abandoned. The foremont gime continued firing to the last although only using S.A.P.shell in order to keep by the morals of the ship, this by order of Commender Richmond, Firing at the after gas was stopped by my orders after one round due to the possibility of the shoot breaking are after end of ship need mainment where 11 was baily buddled and aplitting more with movement of the ship. Abandon ship was ordered only after ship was sinking but period in between was devoted to the destruction of C.B. B₂ A/S gear and P.O.C., etc. I have the homour to be, Sir, Your obsdient Servent, (signed) W.O.BOAKS, Licutenant Commender, Royal Havy. To Im Commander-in-Ohier, Western Approaches, Plymouth.
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119 Page 3. Lieut. Cdr. W.G. Boaks. 4. With after guns until motor boat lowered and then went forward to make quite sure coxswain of boat (Hicks) understood his orders reference embarking troops and collection of drifting boats, Just as we got the beat clear I heard & bomb whistling bombs dropped, one of which was presumably the one that went down and dived under Pom-Pom platform. About six, possibly more, through the engine room - this very seriously wounded and burnt one rating and seriously burnt another but I escaped the full force of the back flash although thrown heavily against Pom-Pom deck overhead and almost knocked out. I then went to the bridge to see what the position was there, but there were no casualties there and I then went aft to the after guns to find en route that deck was buckled by mainmast. The after magazine and shell room were flooding and decided to close down. I then went down to my cabin and passed up about eight spare torches (placed there for use in disembarking troops previous day - night) as all lights were out and being daylight few were carrying torches on them. I found general chaos in Captain's Cabin flat and sent extra hands down to resecure deadlights as this compartment being next to the buckled part was rather important. I then went forward to supervise tow forward. In the midst of this another heavy attack was made and most hands took shelter, some in forecastle locker. I then found all but three of the cordite rounds from "A" gun had been jettisoned and in view of the nature of the attack ordered these three to be thrown overboard. After this attack we came out and then started to probide cordite again. I then went aft to see what damage had been done during which the fishing drifter returned and I again went forward to rig new tow lines and also ordered individual hands to turn out and lower boats and carley floats into water as by then it was known ship could not move and drifter could not have towed faster than say four knots. I also placed one hand with a lead line aft to keep check on amount of water ship was in from point of view of grounding and stationed hands ready to cast off boats' painters should ship sink without warning. Then to the forecastle to get up the after hemp and also 32 wire during course of which the third attack developed and I went aft to the after guns and with one round of cordite from forward fired the remaining round in Y gun myself at a passing bomber but not enough aim off in field of view to hit and noticed that X had a round left but was unable to fire as even with full deflection. After firing this round I went forward recoil cylinder had gun been emptied in preparation for firing and tearing out of mounting overboard. This cylinder was refilled but gun forward I discovered that the crack in deck no have in view of probable beeaking of after appeared to on going widened and gave orders that after guns off were on filled then remaining water left in hot water to galley end. account I to ordered be fired every possible container of water tank to in be and tore from only ground capes to provide anchors covers were prevent then placed or contamination alongside and cars provided, and gear loss up soldiers of this water. Boats' sailing spare in whaler, torches distributed to boats, After steering placed in spare boats after steering compass unshipped the after placed life- in buoy motor boat, whaler for possible use. of weeckage. I party flare placed in to clear the flat during which the then went detailed and party time to take in tow deck was cleared. fourth attack forward developed for - third dive bombing - and upper
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116 120 4. (contd.). On completion when ship had been struck and water was level with waist the question of scuttling ship came up but Captain decided this was unnecessary and order was given to abandon ship. I reached one of the spare Army boats two hundred yeard away and after collecting survivors to limit of boats capacity went to drifter. After collecting all but two floats we went off to head off a destroyer for the remainder. Particular merit:- A.B. Rawstron courage, example & cheerfulness. A.B!s Glover and Ord. Sea Mullins courage & cheerfulness. P.O. Robinson took charge well on forecastle, A.B. Davis. Torp, although badly burned took a lively interest in remaining action taken. Lieut. Sowry - for tenacity of purpose with Franch drifter resulting in the recovery of seventy survivors and message passed to destroyer for remaining fifty. 5. Surg. Lieut. A.W. McHaffie, 1st. Attack. In Sick Bay - which was reduced to chaos from concussions. Casualties arrived after attack. Soldier complaining of burns of arms. Stocker complaining of burns of face. Torpedoman complaining of extensive surface burns of face, scalp, neck and both eyes. Another rating complained of splinter wound of left arm. L.S.B.A. reported A.B. Riddle lying under Pom-Pom platform. When I arråved there I found him complaining of fracture of left feaur and very extensive burns of face and shoulders - Dressed him and then went down into engine room where I saw two BRA's dead. Griffiths& Griffeth& Putt (stoker) was also dead. L.S.B.A. reported four dead in boiler room. port side Saw Mr. Francis of Pom-Pom platform call and 2nd. attack. Ordered to clear upper deck - and I went to one alley He way. called for rest of crew and I passed on to Captain on to platform to Mr. Francis and I went on to platform Gave climbing in fore mess followed by rest of crew. Pom-Pom Was called by ratings rating. deck. No hands came forward. Saw Captain and found to Mr. attend Francis unconscious - splinter through lungs. 1/6th. morphine, 3rd. attack. Was still on Pom-Pom platform until shortly after attack Mr. Francis died. Evacuated During into water boat lying in and amidships Coxswain. on when interval between 3rd. and water 4th. attacks. Orders to do side. so were given by First bow starboard wounded Was helped in this Lieutenant. by L.S.B.A 4th. attack. Most of Norew of motor, boarded ship lying including in all Robertson wounded except stretcher A.B. a Riddle me on boat - two ratings remained in and Bomb hit water ship's side upsetting lost sight of other Riddle boat. 10 yards off motor boat all and within wave upset - disappeared smashed before boat against I could get to him and I menbers of boat's crew. Ship by this time was being abandoned.
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124 128 COPY. Slade Farm, Slade Cross, Bovey Tracey, Devon. 4/6/40. Sir, I have the honour to submit the following report as First Lieutenant, H.M.S. "Basilisk". The general conduct of affairs during the combat between large numbers of enemy bombers and H.M.S. "Bamilisk" off Dunkirk on 1st of June has been dealt with by my Commanding Officer but the following can hardly be forwarded by the same channels. As the next senior officer onboard I was most impressed with Commander.Richmond's conduct throughout this heraasing period and I feel that his afforts to keep mg the morale of the ship's company should not pass without notice. Every effort was made to get the ship towed back to Dover by the French fishing drifter "Jolie Mascotte" but although taken in tow two or three times the attentions of the enemy bombers made it necessary to slip tow twice and the last of many salvos striking the ship sunk it and attempt was abandoned. The foremost guns continued firing to the last although only using S.A.P.shell in order to keep up the morale of the ship, this by order 01° Commander Richmond. Firing at the after guns was stopped by my orders after one round due to the possibility of the shock breaking off after end of ship near mainmast where 11 was badly backled and splitting more with movement of the ship. Abandon ship was ordered only after ship was sinking but period in between was devoted to the destruction or C.B. S, A/S gear and F.C.C., etc. I have the honour to DO₂ Sir, Your obedient Servant, (signed) W.G.BOAKS, Lieutemant Commander, Royal Navy. To:- Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches, Plymouth®
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132 137 OPERATION 'DINAMO' NARRATIVE OF EVENTS, At noon on Tuesday the 28th May 1940, H.M.S.Lydd under my command left Harwish in company with the 5th M/S Flotilla arriving off Bray at about 2135. I was there ordered to proceed into Dunkirk harbour to enbark troops. I secured alongside the Eastern jetty and embarked about four hundred, leaving again at 2250. At 2318 about two miles to the eastward of the entrance a drifter was sighted ahead crossing from port to starboard about twenty yards away, fine on the port bow. The engines were put full speed astern, but it was too late so avoid a X sollision. The orew of the drifter were taken aboard another drifter, which was close by. IS 18 understood that the drifter in collision with Lydd was the 'Girl pamela' which subsequently sank. No damage was sustained by Lydd. At 0200 29th May when passing the Kwinke buay, flares were sighted and shouting heard close at hand. The light from an Aldis lamp revealed the bow and storn portions of H.M.S.WAkeful appearing above water with - alinging to them. I immediately lowered a whaler and two carley floats. Shortly after this H.M.S. Gossamer, which was close by, ordered no to put ay light out and drop a depth charge. I could not at once comply with the latter order as I was $00 close to the wreck and would have killed the non in the water; I therefore asked what the situation was, to which I received no reply; nor did I see Gossamer again. I kept the ship moving while the whaler and carley floats were picking up survivors and had just got twenty alongside when H.M.S. grafton appeared. I asked her is she would pick up the rest, and she asked me to circle
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134 139 ...herself. IT was then discovered that the Yessel ranned was the drifter 'Comfort' and not he M.T.B.. V.A.Dover was informed of the circumstances as far as I then knew than; I also informed Jason and Javelin not with shortly afterwards, of diafton's plight. On further questioning the two survivors of the Comfort, it was ascertained that she had been picking up survivors from the Wakeful, when and explosion threw all on board into the water and disabled the Yessel. Three men managed to scramble back again, of whom two got on board Lydd and the other who was apparently badly wounded, went down with the vessel when ahe was rammad. I landed the troops at Ramsgate and returned to Dunkirk by $ X route. When off Nieuport Bank buay as 1700 a large number of enemy aircraft started dive-bombing ships arriving and leaving, paying particular attention to the hospital ship St.Julien which had repeated attacks made on her. I arriver off Bray at 1730 and sent boats inshore to embark troops. I did not anchor but lay to off the beach. At about 1745 andurgent call for assistance was received from 3.8. clan Mee Allister which was on fire aft. I passed this to Pangbourne who was just arriving, as I had already started embarking troops. panghourne then went alongaide the burning ship. Embarkation was not such hampered as far as Lydd was conserued by the almos incessant boubing assacks; but 16 was
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169 (2) . 174 0830. Returned to beaches, contacted 350 troops of R.A.S.C. and R.A.O.C. detachments, including Montenant Colonol and officers. with ascistance of 150 troops, large ship's lifebout was pulled down boach and successfully floated to accident embarlextion, but after removing good, dr take did not give sufficiont bucyancy to componsate for stove in gerboard stroke. Scarlous lack of boats, reducing omborization rate to about 30 por hour with own bonts only. 227 troops orderhod remainder being cont off to Salamonder and dostroyers. Somo difficulty exporienced through persistent attempts of Large masses of French troops to intercept boats and domand passage Assisted by British troo a in heading off French submers by riflo fire from 50 yurds further along beach. Dunkirk burning with much molio. Miximm visibility, slight cloud. No. R.A.F. support aighted all day. 2600. Lovel bonbing attack on Sutton, Solvenndor, Grogliound and paddlors from 5000-10000 foot. Coo solvo pattom bombo without result. One salvo of H.S. straddling Station and paddlors, no lite. One dive borbing attack on Suttom and Creyhound, noor nice started fire in Greyhound sundships. One line of 5 bombo aloco to G.H.). on DOB front, on a line starting from centre of the town down beach and into don, final too bombo fulling such aldo of Service. Comperitivoly mll bombo used, with incondinres, 000 of which got light to a drifter cable from Strtton which was sunk by paddlors gunfire. To R.A.P. support visible. for smll machine gun hits on Strtton. Greyhound budly damaged by bember and riddled with mahine on fire. 1706. Procoeded Dover, leaving La Panno during further air redd of Issu intensity, in company with Sulamander. No R.A.F. support visible on passage. 2300. Arrived off Dove, only, what. feld in progress, unchored Chocrved plane at about 1500 foot drop three mignatic nines about 2 cables ahoad, coundo of nines strilling mor clearly andible. Parashutos soon by several separate observers. signalied position of mines to V.A. Dovor. mursday 30th. May. 0600. Proceeded into Dover, discharged troops. 1052. Proceeded Sheernues with one boilor. Drove fires in other boiler to make repairs to birlowork, damgod by bunb explosion. 1632. arrived Shoomoos, orderlood coal and ammittion. riday State My. 0205. Left Shoorness in company with Lydd and Booo. 0400. Companyee maddenly produced a and 30 degrees of devintion, Rose assumed load of dividion, Inter company dovintion improved and Subton responsed Lead. 0812. Arrived proceeded cust puballol to bonches passing 4 planes wrocked on he boach weat of two with Prench markings. 29. Passed Dunkisk harbour 1 cuble. Harbour fires. wall intect and little damage apparent from counard except Imgo Continued DOID from bouch close work of 0835. high Hurricanes One 0.230 ship ounls alenguide cust plur of Dunicipt. 2 Sinfire, and Spitfires overhead, processing home of harbour, at Fearch spood. and several cargo ships must court cast. continued groups Long column on the bonoh. Combinuous column about 1 wills dectroyers of troops surehing into Dunisive from long along bouch cast of 3 milon off is punno. wind Items force In frushering, troops with DOG 0906. slight Anchored but considerable mall.. Consenced loading COMMANDING OFFICER 19 JUN 1940 H.M.S. "SUTTON"
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(2) 0830. Returned to beaches, contacted 350 troops of R.A.S.C. and R.A.O.C. detachments, including Lieutenant Colonel and officers. With assistance of 150 troops, large ship's lifeboat was pulled down beach and successfully floated to assist embarkation., but after removing gear, air tanks did not give sufficient buoyancy to compensate for store in garboard strake. Serious lack of boats, reducing embarkation rate to about 30 per hour with own boats only. 227 troops embarked, remainder being sent off to Salamander and destroyers. Some difficulty experienced through persistent attempts of large masses of French troops to intercept boats and demand passage. Assisted by British troops in heading off French Swimmers by rifle fire from 50 yards further along the beach. Dunk rk burning with much smoke. Maximum visibility, slight cloud, No R.A.F. support sighted all day. 1600. Level bombing attack on Sutton, Salamander, Greyhound and paddlers from 5000-10000 feet. One salvo pattern bombs without result. One salvo of H.E. straddling Sutton and paddlers, no hits. One dive bombing attack on Sutton and Greyhound, near miss started fire in Greyhound amidships. One line of 5 bombs close to G.H.Q. on sea front, on a line starting from centre of the town down beach and into sea., final two bombs falling each side of Sutton. Comparitively small bombs used, with several incendiares, one of which set light to a drifter 1 cable from Sutton which was sunk by paddlers gunfire. No R.A.F. support visible. Few small machine gun hits on Sutton. Greyhound badly damaged by bombs and riddled with machine gun fire. 1706. Proceeded Dover, leaving La Panne during further air raid of less intensity, in company with Salamander. No R.A.F. support visible on passage. 2300. Arrived off Dover, calm, mist, Air raid in progress, anchored. Observed plane at about 1500 feet drop three magnetic mines about 2 cables ahead, sounds of mines striking water clearly audible. Parashutes seen by several observers. Signalled position hursday 30th. May. 0600. Proceeded into Dover, discharged troops. of mines to V.A.Dover. 1052. Proceeded Sheerness with one boiler. Drew fires in other boiler to make repairs to brickwork, damaged by bomb explosion 1632. Arrived Sheerness, embarked coal and ammunition. riday 31st May. 0205. Left Sheerness in company with Lydd and Ross. 0400. Compasses suddenly produced 20 and 30 degrees od deviation, Ross assumed lead of division, later compass deviation improved and Sutton re-assumed lead. 0812. Arrived Dunkirk, proceeded east parallel to beaches passing 4 planes wrecked on the beach west od Dunkirk, two with Franch markings. 0829. Passed Dunkirk harbour distant 1 cable. Harbour wall intact and little damage apparent from seaward except huge fires. Continual gunfire, some from beach close west of Dunkirk. 0835. Hurricanes and Spitfires overhead, proceeding homewards at high speed. One cargo ship sunk alongaide east pier of harbour, 2 French destroyers and several cargo ships sunk east of Dunkirk. Long columns of troops marching into Dunkirk from east, scattered groups on the beach. Continuous column about 1 mile long along 0906. Anchored off La Panne. Wind N.W. force 3, freshening, sea beach 3 miles east of Dunkirk. slight but considerable swell. Commenced loading troops with
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187 191 (2) 0830. Returned to beaches, contacted 350 troops of R.A.S.C. and R.A.O.C. detachments, including Licutenant Colonel and officers. With assistance of I50 troops, large ship's lifeboat was pulled down beach and successfully floated to assist embarkation, but after removing gear, air tanks did not give sufficient buoyancy to compensate for store in garboard strake. Serious lack of boats, reducing embarkation rate to about 30 per hour with own boats only. 227 troops embarked, remainder being sent off to Salamander and destroyers. Some difficulty experienced through persistent attempts of large masses of French troops to intercept boats and demand passage. Assisted by British troops in heading off French swimmers by rifle fire from 50 yards further along beach. Dunkirk burning with much smoke. Maximum visibility, slight cloud. No R.A.F. support sighted all day. 1600. Level bombing attack on Sutton, Salamander, Greyhound and paddlers from 5000-I0000 feet. One salvo pattern bombs without result. One salvo of H.E. straddling Sutton and paddlers, no hits. One dive bombing attack on Sutton and Greyhound, near miss started fire in Greyhound amidships. one line of 5 bombs close to G.H.Q. on sea front, on at line starting from centre of the town down beach and into sea, final two bombs falling each side of Sutton. Comparitively small bombs used, with several incendiares, one of which set light to at drifter 1 cable from Sutton which was sunk by paddlers gunfire. No R.A.F. support visible. Few small machine gun hits on Sutton. Greyhound badly damaged by bombs and riddled with machine gun fire. I706. Proceeded Dover, leaving La Panne during further air raid of less intensity, in company with Salamander. No R.A.F. support visible on passage. 2300. Arrived off Dover, calm, mist. Air raid in progress, anchored. Observed plane at about 1500 feet drop three magnetic mines about 2 cables ahead, sounds of mines striking water clearly audible. Parashutes seen by several separate observers. Signalled position of mines to V.A. Dover. Thursday 30th May. 0600. Proceeded into Dover, discharged troops. 1052. Proceeded Sheerness with one boiler. Drew fires in other boiler to make repairs to brickwork, damaged by bomb explosion. 1632. Arrived Sheerness, embarked coal and ammunition. Friday 31st May. 0205. Left Sheerness in company with Lydd and Ress. 0400. Compasses suddenly produced 20 and 30 degrees of deviation, HOSS assumed lead of division, later compass deviation improved and Sutton re-assumed lead. 0812. Arrived Dunkirk, proceeded east parallel to beaches passing 4 planes wrecked on the beach west of Dunkirk, two with French markings. 0829. Passed Dunkirk harbour distant I cable. Harbour wall intact and little damage apparent from seaward except huge fires. 0835. Hurricanes gunfire, and Spitfires overhead, proceeding homewards at Continual some from beach close west of Dunkirk. high speed. One cargo ship sunk alongside east pier of harbour, 2 French destroyers and several cargo ships sunk east of Dunkirk. Long columns of troops marching into Dunkirk from east, scattered groups on the beach. Continuous column about I mile long along beach 3 miles east of Dunkirk. 0906. Anchored off La Panne. Wind N.W. force 3. freshening, troops sea slight but considerable swell.. Commenced loading with
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(2) 0830. Returned to beaches, contacted 350 troops of R.A.S.C. and R.A.O.C. detachments, including Lieutenant Colonel and 202 officers. With assistance of 150 troops, large ship's lifeboat was pulled down beach and successfully floated to assist embarkation, but after removing gear, air tanks did not give. sufficient buoyancy to compensate for stove in garboard strake. Serious lack of boats, reducing embarkation rate to about 30 per hour with own boats only, 227 troops embarked remainder being sent off to Salamander and destroyers. Some difficulty experienced through persistent attempts of large masses of French troops to intercept boats and demand passage. Assisted by British troops in heading off French swimmers by rifle fire from 50 yards further along beach. Dunkirk burning with much smoke. Maximum visibility, slight cloud, No R.A.F. support sighted all day. 1600. Level bombing attack on Sutton, Salamander, Greyhound and paddlers from 5000-10000feet. One salvo pattern bombs without result. One salvo of H.E. straddling Sutton and paddlers, no hits. One dive bombing attack on Sutton and Greyhound, near miss started fire in Greyhound smidships. One line of 5 bombs close to G.H.Q. on sea front, on a line starting from centre of the town down beach and into sea, final two bombs falling each side of Sutton. Comparatively small boats used, with several incendiaries, one of which set light to & drifter - cable from Sutton which was sunk by paddlers gunfire. No R.A.F. support visible. Few small machine gunshits on Sutton. Greyhound badly damaged by bombs and riddled with machine gun fire. 1706. Proceeded Dover, leaving La Panne during further air raid of less intensity, in company with Salamander. No R.A.F. support visible on passage. 2300. Arrived off Dover, calm, mist. Air raid in progress, anchored Observed plane at about 1500 feet drop three magnetic mines about 2 cables ahead, sounds of mines striking water clearly audible. Parachutes seen by several separate observers. Signalled position of mines to V.A. Dover. Thursday 30th. May. 0600. Proceeded into Dover, discharged troops. 1052. Proceeded Sheerness with one boiler. Drew fires in other boiler to make repairs to brickwork, damaged by bomb explosion. 1632. Arrived Sheerness, embarked coal and ammunition. Friday 31st. May. 0205. Left Sheerness in company with Lydd and Ross. 0400. Compasses suddenly produced 20 and 30 degrees of deviation, Roas assumed lead of division, later compass deviation improved and Sutton re-assumed Lead. 0812. Arrived Dunkirk, proceeded east parallel to beaches passing 4 planes wrecked on the beach west of Dunkirk, two with French markings. 0829. Passed Dunkrik Harbour distant 1 cable. Harbour wall intast and little damage done apparent from seaward except huge fires. Continual gunfire, some from beach close west of Dunkirk. 0835. Hurricanes and Spitfires overhead, proceeding homewards at the soattered harbour Long columns of troops marching into Dunkirk from east, beach 3 miles east groups on the beach. Continious column about 1 mildalong of Dunkirk. 0906. Anchored off La Panne, Wind N.W. force 3, freshening, with sea slight but considerable swell. Commenced loading troops COMMANDING OFFICER 19 JUN 1940 H.M.S. "SUTTON"
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Implicate Dynam Nil /// 114/0/1946 - 4902 Roar Admiral, Jamp Dover Report of Proceedings, 29th May - 3rd June 207 Minirality, S.W.1. 8th June, 1940. Sir, I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations off shore at Dunkirk between Wednesday, 29th May, and Tuesday, 4th June. 2. Much of this report has had to be completed from memory, and share incident is so crowded it is difficult not to give a confused picture. The picture was, however, confused, and so for as operations off the beaches were concerned organisation was not possible. The most that could be done was to exercise some control and direction. Narrative 29th May 3. I sailed at 2000 from Dover in ESK, who had on board 12 small beach parties. These were distributed at the beaches into any craft available and Commodore Hallett was put into a drifter to take charge off above at Bray and Commodore Stephenson off La Pame. 30th May 4. At 0200, 30th May, I boarded HRBS off La Funne and heard the general situation from Captain Dush. 5. At this time there were a for ships, drifters and other creft off the beaches and embarkation was proceeding alowly with the for boats available. 6. Daylight showed the beaches block with troops, a mmber of boats broached to. A very for boats, principally whalers, and sloose noter-bonts were bringing off troops. 7. It was nisty, clouds were low and the sea was calm, but even so there WELLS a stight surf inshare. 8. It became imadiately obvious to 130 that any large unbarimition from the beaches depended on more inshore boats and crews. The crews were the essential 08 H.M. Ships could not spare non from VA Guns and Amendment and I signalled to this affect. who 9. I found was away with the O₂ in 0. at La Fanne, but none the less I was During the forenoon I want into Dunicis in HERE to see the S.N.O. formed the opinion that unbarkation from Dunkirk was the only practical plan if able to got into the picture. Finding that the harbour could be used I large numbers were involved and all my subsequent afforts were directed to that onl. I stressed this view in many signals. 10. the inshore boats and the problem I had to deal with was to control the At the same the the beaches had to be used to the fullest capacity of shipping available 80 as to balance these two requirements. half 11, the length of the boach, and touch with Dunkir's involved a close approach Control was not essy: it was selden possible to DOB more then and V/S. Ships were of tim tied to their position by their heats being early days off the beaches an H.A/S.B. would have inshore, and often these were the only boats available been at involuable. that point. In the 12. To put the situation that developed into a mutabell, /at the plans made
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Dynam. 111. 11/14/01. 199 Nil 1446 -215 214 Admiralty, S.V.1. 8th June, 1940. Rear Admiral, Dover Report of Proceedings, 29th May - 3rd June Sir, I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations off shore at Dunkirk between Wednesday, 29th May, and Tuesday, 4th June. 2. Much of this report has had to be completed from memory, and where incident is so crowded it is difficult not to give a confused pdoture. The picture was, however, confused, and so far as operations off the beaches were conserned organisation was not possible. The most that could be done was to exercise some control and direction. Narrative 29th May 3. I sailed at 2000 from Dover in ESK, who had on board 12 small beach parties. These were distributed at the beaches into any craft available and Commodore Hallett was put into a drifter to take charge off shore at Bray and Commodore Stephenson off La Panne. 30th May 4. At 0200, 30th May, I boarded HEBS off La Fanne and heard the general situation from Captain Bush. 5. At this time there were a few ships, drifters and other creft off the beaches and embarkation was proceeding slowly with the few boats available. 6. Daylight showed the beaches black with troors, a mumber of boats broached to. A very few boats, principally whalers, and scese notor-boats were bringing off troops. 7. It was misty, clouds were low and the sea was calm, but even so there was a slight surf inshore. 8. It became immediately obvious to 130 that any large enbarkation from the beaches depended on more inshore boats and arews. The areas were the essential as H.M. Ships could not spare men from A/A Guns and Amement and I signalled to this affect. 9. During the forenoon I went into Dunicisk in HERE to see the S.N.O. who I found was away with the 0. in 0. at La Panne, but none the less I was formed the opinion that embarkation from Dunkirk was the only prectical plan if able to got into the picture. Finding that the harbour could be used I large numbers were involved and all my subsequent afforts were directed to that end. I stressed this view in many signals. 10. the inshore At boats and the problem I had to deal with was to the same time the beaches had to be used to the control fullest capacity the of shipping available so as to balance these two requirements. half 11. Control of was the beach, and touch with Dunkirk their boats a being approach not easy; it was seldom possible involved to see more close than inshore, V/S. Ships often were these were the only boats available been invaluable. In the and the length of ten tied to their position by at that point. early days and off the beaches an M.A/S.B. would have 12. To put the situation that developed into a nutshell, /at the plans made
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Page 2. 236 My boats having departed I made contact with H.M.D. "FEASABLE" taking her in tow and proceeded to Westward in search boat loads of troops and took then aboard, as there were no boat of further troops. When off the harbour entrance I contacted three crews I put them in tow astern of H.M.D. "FRASAHLE". "BSN & LUCY" was now loaded to capacity and was preparing to proceed homewards when I was hailed by a naval rating alone in a waterlogged whaler. I took him aboard abandoning the whaler. I was then hailed by a fishing smack (9) "LETITIA" of Southend who requested a tow as he was short of fuel, I told him 0100 June 1st. to tail on, and continued my passage, the time being approximately The channel was negotiated without event, two destroyers being passed bound in. At approximately 0200 we turned to the North having rounded the Whistle bucy and, when about six miles to the North of the channel aircraft was heard overhead, while Asha gunfire and searchlights had been active for the last half hour. At approximately 0330 a very heavy explosion occurred close to the port quarter of "FEASABLE", The skipper and I were thrown across the bridge with great violence. On looking art I saw a large column of smoke and water close astern of "FEASABLE". Owing to the abnormal phosphorescence of the water I judged this to be an aerial attack on what was thought to be a largevessel, and as "FEASABLE" was still in tow and made no signal for assistance I continued. (I was subsequently informed by "LETTTIA" that another smack named "ROWAN" which had attached herself to the tow unknown to me had been sunk by this explosion). "BBH & LUCY" was now making water at about one foot per hour. About 0700 I was overtaken and hailed by "VERNON" Pinnace Va4 who requested a course for the North Goodwin Light Vessel and then proceeded ahead or US. At approximately 0745 we sighted North Goodwin to part and headed for Ramagate. When approximately 3 miles to the N.E. of Ramagate "LETITIA" slipped her tow and under her own power began to make off. I hailed her and when he informed me about the loss of "ROWAN" I ordered him to report to Naval Officer in Charge, Ramsgate. I repeated my previous instructions which I do not think he obeyed. He replied that he was returning whene he came. while my to do this the tow rope was picked up by a length "FEASABLE" intention a to two her in Iashed alongside & LUCY". When mile to the Northward of the harbour "BSN I signalled of attempting which apparently had been foul of our propeller fouled since we Portsmouth. to anchor. I signalled disabled. A had leaving sweep wire Our propeller became hopelessly Pierhead that I 80 100 were troops, both including obliged two wounded and that We remained I was at anchor until launch by Monday came into "RENASCENT" in contacting acetylene harbour off morning and At outter. and to took the having 1000 clear at skipper the low on While made the troops Monday, tide of screw. unsuccesful this succeeded "DORIENTA". ashore. June the operation explosion 3rd, attempts in He we clearing was were reported of on to a hand towed our obtain shell to screw I in but me succeeded a by that tow that drifter he broken his had managed engines the joints has to return been in damaged several at reduced blooked by steam speed pipes up the (the causing bilge boiler pumps flooding had with moved in ashes). the and to engine I room, which in turn R.N. who instructed "DORIENTA" no to return was Portsmouth reported to and crew with me as "wrecked"
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II. 26y (NARRATIVE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER H.M.S. FRISO DURING 283 OPERATION DYNAMO) Friday 31st May (contd) During the mornang one of the Beachmasters came off to me and endeavoured to persuade ae to beach the ship (HEBE & SURSOM CORDA) were doing so very successfully. As it was so as to lead quicker, pointing out that two other smaller skoots now a falling tide with an onshore wind I refused. For this I was later very glad as both other skoots shor tly afterwards became stuck on the beach and were unable to get off. (HKBE came off at the next high water. During the forenoon I hailed a large motor driven pleasure boat, got him alongside no and transferred 256 men to him. By about 1230 I had onboard 648 men and space was extremely cramped. I had delayed my departure hoping that a destryer or other fast craft would appear and take my load from me so that I could fill up again. However as another skoot appeared I slipped my anchor (the capstan being again defective) and sailed. Just as I was about to leave Dunkirk Roads I was hailed by a Fleet Minesweeper and ordered to tow a Drifter full of troops to Dover. By 1330 the Drifter was in tow and we were proceeding at about 5 knots. At approximately 1400 a Heinkel appeared out of the low cloud and at a height of 350 feet released a large bomb, probably 500 lbs, and as he passed over he opened fire with machine guns. The bomb fell on my Port quarter batween ate and the Drifter. Luckily the Bomb exploded below the surface and beyond violently shaking both ships no ajur major damage was done. The force of the explosion caused my compans to jump out of its gimbals. Certain damage was done to Auxiliary Machinery in the Engine Room. After we had been proceeding for about half an hour we were shelled by the Nieuport Battery. As the third salvo straddled us I decided to risck the navigational dangers and cut across the snadbanks 80 as to present the minimum target and to open the range as fast as possible. Luckily the Enemy never found the range again. Thick fog was encountered at about 1830. On making the North Goodwin Light Vessel I discovered that the Shaking up had caused a 30 dgree error in the compass. During the cassage through the Downs the tow parted on several occasions due to the wash of fast moving vessels. At about 0100 on Saturday lat June I was about 1 cable from the entrance to Dover Harbour when I was bombed again. This time it was only a very small bomb, which although a very near miss only wetted the troops on the port aide aft. There were no casualties from machine gun fire. At 0130 I secured alongside Admiralty Pier Dover. At 0230 we shifted billet and secured for the night for which I was very grateful an we had been running continuously for over three days and I had had no sleep for 90 hours. On Saturday temporary repairs were At effected 1700 to the and provisions and water ware embarked. where as I could not anchor I secured in the Inner I proceeded Engine to Ramsgate with HEBE in company arriving Harbour. at 2000, Sunday and Monday 2nd & 3rd June respectively permanent On were effected to the Engine in and Capatan. they were When all repairs brought to immediate notice case required skoots were it was decided that FRISO Harbour. was not sufficiently reliable again and so was left in the Inner I and on Friday were in the Boats at the time cannot speak too highly of ay crew for 7/4 who hours worked continuously, The 0 nly men being onboard and myself. were without my First & Lieutenant break. one seamen and the B.R.A. I have the honour to be, Sir, VICE ADMIRAL Your obedient servant, JUN1940 DOVER Lieutenant. Royal Navy.
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318 - 324 - Proceedings by H.M.S. SABRE for the period 27th May to 5th June. "SABRE" again sailed for Dunkirk, and at 0115/1 both boats were & again sent in to the - eastern beach. No troops were found there, 86 proceeded to search further east. Hearing "S.O.S" being sounded C a syren, steamed towards 16 and Count a drifter stranded on a submerged wrack. Went alongside and took off the crew and troops. Jus before dawn some more instroyers were Count off Bray, and Sabre's Doats were sent in to bring off troops which could now be seen in large numbers. On "Shikari" CLILING up a cutter was taken over from her. The towage of this, full of trocps, proved too much for the motor boat and the troops had to pull off to the ship. INO trips were made in this way. Hourwhile on orders from R.A.Dover (in Heith) "SABRE" went alongside a tus, took off her troops and sent him to tow "Speedwell" off. During this time a single aircraft (apparently ch a Messersmidt 100) approached and made some rather half hearted machine gun attacks. Intense 1.4 thre provented these from boing X pressed home. There vas also VI unsuccassful dive bonbing attack by a Junkers 87. Numerous British fighters ware seen, and our freedom from serious interference was prosumably due to them. At 0700 having about 500 troops aboard, *SABRE* returned to Dover, arriving at 1000. At 2030/1 procested to Dunkirk in company with "Codrington" at 28 knots. It 8315 secured so the east pier and C111- ad up with troops. Shoved off at midnicht and returned, fortunbately coming no with "Icarus" who YAS followed as or as the DONILS (Sabre compass still Daine unreliabe). Arrived at 0400/3 and landed troops. 18 1845/8 proceeded to Dunkirk in company with 7 "Shikari" who was sent about at the North Goodsin be T. until arrival in Dunkirk Channel, then passing new Ruytingen bank bucy H.M.H.S. "parts" was seen to be sinking and to have boats away. A crossichannel steamer which had just been overtaken was sent to has assistance
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Depramen 203. 342 From: Acting Lieutenant F.G.H. ILBS, R.N.V.R. Unit Officer. Date: 8th June, 1940. To: VICE ADMIRAL, DOVER. Jastimets Jades a nt (Copy to:- The Communder-in-Chief, Portsmouth. aread Just 902 (Through Captain, H.N.S. "VERNON"). Sir, of Indred overl I In accordance with paragraph 2 of C.P.G.O. 1691, I have the honour to submit the names of the following officers and men who I consider greatly distinguished themselves during the evacuation of the B.B.F. from Dunkirk. H.m. Drifter Skipper Wello Watling, R.N.R. His cool bearing and demeanour throughout the operation and especially during the time H.ll. Drifter "FRASABLE" was taken in tow under heavy fire contributed most materially to the saving of both ships. A. Prampton, A.B. H.O. Official Number not known. T.W.Turner A.B. H.O. IS/JX/167136 B.C. Winney A.B. H.O. LT/JX/167132 L.R. Ayers. A.B. H.O. III/JX/167128. The above four seamen, aanned the two Lewis guns continually ina most steadfast Hanner and without any protection whatsoever for five hours under heavy bombardments both from the air and land. RESILLS 10% FOIT H.M. Drifter "DORINNTA". Juvoi Skipper U.P Reynolds, -103 mo) This officer showed great coolness throughout the whole operation and great initiative when ordered to proceed in independently. the channel are Deakisk withouts chart He navigated his ship with extreme and skill his engines narrow partially disabled, thus, undoubtedly, saving this, ship and as the troops on board. Due X/369, and W. Kennedy Engineman R.N.R. Enginemen H.O. IR/XX/101797 J, Smith J.J. Shone Stoker H.O. Official Number not known. Stoker R.N.R. X/104158. J. Pirie. When the the boiler was 30 rooked and by the feed explosion ship vas damaged bya aball bursting the close to the stern, joints were blown water to fly that sundry steam pipe to dause steem and not the purps choked in all pump damaged 80 bilges as became flooded and energy shown by directions, the initiative, skill and ship to reach these with ashes. especially The 1. Kennedy, enabled eventually the to proceed to Ramsgate Portamouth, ratings, under although her own Captain steam Wharton, and Royal Navy, considered her a wreck in the Engine Room. F. Russell. X/18714 Seaman R.N.R. Seaman R.N.R. be Hurfield. official Number not known H.O. Ord. Searan. official their not known H.O. Seaman. X/7963 R. Reekie F.C. West. The above four seamen manned the two Lewis guns continually /in
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CONFIDENTIAL 320c. (For use with S. 1320b). NAVAL MESSAGE. (Revised 356 October, 1935.) ite SS 10 ECRE 1 55 An Dynam 349 Alel Tasman. 60 355 65 3 TER OF PROCEEDINGS EVACUATION. RN a 70 A 23c 344 a I I st. 0030. Crossed to Hebe to collect Lord Gort. On arrival 1 ound (approx) he had just gone over to Keith. Returned to Keith. 0304 Sailed for Dover with Lord Gort and General Leese. 0547 Arrived Dover. Fueled and carried out rep-airs to starboard bow. 3nd. 1201 Sailed from Dover to search for drifter "Girl Gladys" reported broken down 7 mines east of Dunkirk and soldiers in open boat 3 miles off Dunkirk reported by aircraft. 1330 Collected occupants of two open boats off Dunkirk. (approx) Left 1st Lieut. to sail Thames barge with approximately 240 soldiers to Dover. 1530 Picked up 18 soldiers in open boat. Carried out (approx) unsuccessful search for drifter "Girl Gladys". 1700 Abandoned search. Set course to intercept Thames barge. 1720 Dive-bombing attack by six or eight planes. 1730 Set course for Dover as now had wounded on board. 1922 Arrived Dover. rd. Refueled. Carried out repairs to bullet holes and engines. Fuel tanks and hull seems leaking. th. 1255 Sailed for Portland. 2057 Arrived Portland for dooking.
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CONFIDENTIAL 320c. (For use with S. 1320b). NAVAL MESSAGE. (Revised Dynams 805. 356 October, 1935.) te $$ 100 ECRE SS 1 An 60 Dynam 355 65 TER OF PROCEEDINGS - EVACUATION. DN a 70 Decreases 20H. 010 3160 -3- with engines stopped when boats and planes could be detected by sound at a far greater range than visibility permitted. It is submitted that this course might profitably be employed during patrols. May 31st 1940. 1140 to June 1st 1940. 0547. Instructions were received to proceed to Ramsgate, rendezvous and escort small boat convoy to Dunkirk. The Convoy sailed at 1453 approximately 3 hours after scheduled time. Opportunity was taken at Ramsgate to off-load all depth charges as it was considered inadvisable to continue carrying these. The convoy consisted of 5 tugs and 5 drifters each towing between three and fifteen small boats. The convoy straggled somewhat on the way over and when the Reutigen bouy was reached the leaders were eased down to enable the convoy to arrive together. At this time & large force of German bombers and fighters were seen approaching. There were inumerable ships of all shapes and sizes in the vicinity and & general bombing raid was commenced. British fighters arrived at this time and the attack became disorganised, - the bombers eventually disappearing inland. The convoy arrived off Dunkirk from Keith who directed the convoy to the various beaches as at approximately 2110, S.0.6. embarked Lieut. Comdr. Wynne-Edwards required. approximately 2315 when returning to the Keith a collision At occurred with what appeared to be as medium-sized yacht. S.0.6. astern but the yacht's stern swinging round was put into to port stove in S.0.6. on the starboard bow as she altered course ribs and making & large out in the planking the aid above fracturing several the damage was being inspected by On shaded torch fire General Leese was embarked and instructions of a waterline. While was opened on 9.0.6. from at German aeroplane. were arrival given at Keith Lord Gort from Hebe, and to return to England Keith. at Hebe it as Keith and approximately three-quarters embarked dropping arrival General Leese discovered that Lord Gort crossed to to collect in Dunkirk if Lord Gort approved. had of an 9.0.6. returned Gort to also arrived there. He to Dover. was forthwith and the and that it was the first time be any desired. the crew had hour later Lord General Leese taken direct of fire fact their behaviour left nothing to June 2nd 1940. 1201 to 1982 Gladys" Instructions were received down 7 miles east about 3 miles off to carry out a of search Dunkirk for drifter and for "Girl approximately reported 30 broken soldiers in an was open set boat from Dover direct to Dunkirk towards reported tho by aircraft. Course than intended to proceed to slowly put out to clear of land and make allow for the set promised and the coast to search for another the approach to the of coast the tide fro BI the outer Reutigen. It was open boat, subsequently approximately sea 10 miles east of Dunkirk to escort had been time caution the had report to be was exercised received. as Air no ships were operating off Dunkirk
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CONFIDENTIAL 320c. (For use with S. 1320b). NAVAL MESSAGE. (Revised Dynamso ds. 356 October, 1935.) te ECRE $5 10 55 1 An Dynam 349 lasman 60 355 65 TER OF PROCEEDINGS - EVACUATION. DNI n 70 7010 3347 4 during daylight. About half-way across a French trawler with an open boat in tow was hailed. He reported having picked the boat up with soldiers off Dunkirk and it was thought this might be the boat for which we were searching. To make sure we proceeded to Dunkirk where two open boats and a Thames barge with sail set were found approximately three miles from the coast. The first open boat yielded five Spaniards, the second one about 6 soldiers, Belgian, French and English. We then went alongside the Thames barge at approximately 1330. This was found to contain about 320 soldiers including two Colonels and a Major of Artillery, and various wounded. They were endeavouring to sail to England but had made approximately three miles in 10 hours, see note below. Motor-mechanic Whittaker fitted a new piston to the air compressor motor while the 1st Lieut. and myself trimmed the sails. They had no charts on board. The air compressor motor was made to run but all efforts to start the diesel failed. I then left 1st Lieut., Leiut. Dehammel with instructions opened the distance to search for the "Girl Gladys". to sail the my barge to Dover; and proceeded along the coast having About two up miles to the east I found an open boat containing 18 soldiers who were embarked, after which we approached to within of La Panne. Visibility was good and no sign of the drifter approximately three miles of the coast slightly to the eastward could be seen, the search was therefore abandoned and course was set to intercept the Thames barge. by approximately eight dive-bombers, 20 to 30 were the dropped At 1720 when out of sight of land bombs we were attacked The fell at to attack in pairs out dive of the sun and eight six distances or varying from 10 to 50 yards of and ship. having bombers appeared their bombs continued their endeavour firing to machine- miss guns. the Course was appeared to explode after entering water, released altered frequently in an the some bombs. Some the surface and & certain number appeared ahead and not the to explode at all. the splash. A certain amount who were exposed was on striking One exploded under the bow right of discomfort ship passed through myself and members of the crew hours or 80. to experienced the by eyes for the next twelve manning Able-Seaman Power of the soldiers in the fore to peak. return to Dover now had splash in the was wounded in the leg when As I the port wounded on board ask for assistance for barge sailing turret also one I considered it advisable the barge. A tug was forthwith and approximately to 2100 and found the Deut. Dehammel well sent out at from Dover. I consider Sub. bombing to performed a very subjected had caused leaks for that night's the about 10 miles creditable operation. The to the hull which and petrol the ship tank had and been the ship was not used again operation.
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CONFIDENTIAL 1320c. (For use with S. 1320b). NAVAL MESSAGE. (Revised Dynamo 203. 356 October, 1935.) rite ECRE oss 100 55 1 " Dynam 355 349 lasman 60 65 ETTER OF PROCEEDINGS - EVACUATION. DN a 70 - 2 - 350 : 0030 Crossed to Hebe to collect Lord Gort. On arrival found (approx) he had just gone over to Keith. Returned to Keith. 0304 Sailed for Dover with Lord Gort and General Leese. 0547 Arrived Dover. Fueled and carried out repairs to starboard bow. d. 1201 Sailed from Dover to search for drifter "Girl Gladys" reported broken down 7 mines east of Dunkirk and soldiers in open boat 3 miles off Dunkirk reported by aircraft. 1330 Collected occupants of two open boats off Dunkirk. (approx) Left 1st.Lieut. to sail Thanes barge with approximately 240 soldiers to Dover. 1530 Picked up 18 soliders in open boat. Carried out (approx) unsuccessful search for drifter "Girl Gladys". 1700 Abandoned search. Set Sealth COULESE to intercept Thanes barge. 1720 Dive-bombing attack by six or eight planes. 1730 Set course for Dover as now had wounded on board. 1922 Arrived Dover. rd. Refueled. Carried out repairs to bullet holes dndengines Fuel tanks and mll seams leaking. th. 1255 Sailed for Portland. 2057 Arrived Portland for docking.
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CONFIDENTIAL 320c. (For use with S. 1320b). NAVAL MESSAGE. (Revised Dyrams. & S. 356 October, 1935.) te ECRE $5 100 55 1 An Dynam 355 349 Ahel Tasman. 60 65 TTER OF PROCEEDINGS - EVACUATION. a 70 353 during daylight. About half-way across a French trawler with an open boat in tow was hailed. He reported having picked the boat up with soldiers off Dunkirk and it was thought this might be the boat for 14 ich we were searching. To make sure we proceeded to Dunkirk where - two open boats and & Thames barge with sail set were found approximately three miles from the coast. The first open boat yielded five Spanieards, the second one about 6 soldiers, Belgian, French and English. No then went alongside the Thanes barge at approximately 1330. This was found to contain about 220 soldiers including two Colonels and a Major of Artillery, and various wounded. They were endeavouring to sail to England but had made approximately three miles in 10 hours, ⑉ note below. Motor-mechanic Whittaker fitted a new platon to the air compressor motor while the let.Lieut. and myself trimed the sails. They had no charge on board. The air compressor motor was made to run but all efforts to start the diesel failed. I then left my 1st,Lieut., SublLient. Delhamel with instructions to sail the barge to Dover, and proceeded along the coast having opened up the distance to search for the "Girl Gladys". About two miles to the east I found an open boat containing 18 soldiers who were embarked, after which we approached to withing approximately three miles of the coast alightly to the eastward of La Panne. Visibility was good and no sign of the drifter could be seen, the search was therefore abandoned and course was set to intercept the Thanes barge. by eight six or eight dive-bombers, 20 to 30 bomba were dropped At approximately 1720 when out of sight of land we were attached The bombers at appeared to attack in pairs out of the sun and and fell distances varying from 10 to 50 yards of the ship. having released their bombs continued their dive firing machine- to guns. Course was altered frequently in an endeavour miss the bombs. Some appeared to explode after entering the water, at on striking exploded under the box right discomfort a ome the surface and a certain,appeared ahead and not the to ship explode passed all. One the splash* A certain amount who of were exposed was the experienced by the x eyes for the next twelve manning the through myself and members of the crew hours or 80. to splash in wounded in the leg when part Able-Seaman Power of was the soldiers in the fore to peak. return As to Dover I now had wounded on board ask for assistance for the the barge. barge sailing well was turrets also one I considered it advisable A tug sent forthwith out and to 8100 and I consider found Sub.Lieut, Delfammel about performed 10 a very creditable subjected had operation. caused leaks The for to bombing the that bull night's to which and the the petrol ship tank had and been the ship was not used again operation.
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dynamo 216. 380 CONFIDENTIAL H.M.S. SUTSHALL 7th June, 1940. Sir, In accordance with your memorandum 3.14/0/1101/40 paragraph 2, I have the honour to subnit the names of the following Officers and Ratings of H.M.S. WHITSHALL under my command as being recomended for decoration or mention in dispatches. (1) Temporary Surgeon Lieutenant James Corrie BROKN. R.N.V.R. This officer ma conspicuous throughout these operations for his coolness and for his skill in attending the sounded. He was lent to H.M.Drifter JACKETS on passage from Dunicorque to Ranagate, and assisted by George Frederick SINS, BD/J111898 also of HelleS. WHITEHALL, attended severely wounded survivors of Halles. HOSQUITO, performing two amputations under very difficult conditions. Later on the size day he again did good work amongst the wounded onboard H.M.S. WORCESTER. (2) Lieutenant Allan Donald Peter CAMPBELL, R.H. Cerried out his duties as Executive Officer with marked ability. His organisation for embarking the military and caring for them on passage was most satisfactory. In addition he controlled the after group of 4.7" guns very skilfully and was responsible for bringing down at least one enemy bomber. (3) Mr. Samuel George Seagrove sourell, Commissioned ingineer,R.N The result of the efficient manner in which this officer has always run the Engine Room Department of Halles. WHITSHALL ma Mr. Morrell was also of great assistance to both the wounded and apparent in the smooth working of the Department during this period. unwounded Naval and Military personel who were evacuated in the ship. (4) Cecil Kenneth SOUSTER, Petty Officer, Carried out the duties of Gunners liate with great ability. His supervising the fighting of the sain gun areasment was admirable. work in keeping the 2-pdr pom pome in action as well as in (5) Harold Nethven SEABROCK, Chief Petty Officer, O.N.D/JA3574. during these assistance to the Commending Officer. and 3500 troops he As operations, and by his coolness and skilful In addition steering Torpedo Comswain he was continuously at the whool was of great "anack" meals for each of between 3000 in HeMalls WITHHALL. provided and survivors of H.M.Ships who took passage (6) Milliam Smith, Officers Stoward 1st Class, Online D/1824. which for military he set to his quarters - namely - the after tas officers conspicuous during passage and for supply the party to for his devotion to duty fine In providing example guns. Eas awarded Croix do Quarro in 1914-18 Har. (7) Villian Alfred Proderick LIKE, Chief Engine Room Artificer, D.N. D/13/04. The Cool conduct
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Dyn zib 381 CONFIDENTIAL H.M.S. WHITSHALL 7th June, 1940. Sir, In accordance with your memorandum 3.14/0/1101/40 paragraph 2, I have the honour to submit the names of the following Officers and Ratings of H.M.S. SHITSHALL under ay command as being recommended for decoration or mention in dispatches. (1) Temporary Surgeon Lieutenant James Corrie BROWN. R.N.V.R. This officer was conspicuous throughout these operations for his coolness and for his skill in attending the wounded. He was lent to Drifter JACKEVE on passage from Dunkerque to Ramagate, and assisted by George Frederick SINS, BD/J111898 also of H.M.S. WHITEHALL, attended severely wounded survivors of H.M.S. MOSQUITO, performing two amputations under very difficult conditions. Later on the same day he again did good work amongst the wounded onboard H.M.S. WORCESTER. (2) Lieutenant Allan Donald Peter CAMPBELL, R.N. Carried out his duties as Executive Officer with marked ability. His organisation for embarking the military and caring for them on passage was most satisfactory. In addition he controlled the after group of 4.7" guns very aldifilly and was responsible for bringing down at least one enemy bomber. (3) Mr. Samuel George Seagrove CHRELL, Commissioned The result of the efficient manner in which this officer has always run the Engine Room Department of H.H.S. WHITEHALL was Mr. Morrell was also of great assistance to both the wounded and apparent in the smooth working of the Department during this period. unwounded Naval and Military personal who were evacuated in the ship. (4) Cecil Kenneth SOUSTER, Petty Officer, O.N.D/J102937. Carried out the duties of Cunners liate with great ability. work in keeping the 2-pdr pom pome in action as well as in His supervising the fighting of the main gun armament was admirable. (5) Harold Methven SEABROCK, Chief Petty Officer, O.N.D/JA3574. during assistance to the Commanding Officer. and 3500 troops he these As operations, and by his coolness and skilful In addition steering Torpedo Coxswain he was continuously at the wheel was of great "snack" meals for each of between 3000 in H.M.S. SHITEHALL. provided and survivors of H.M.Ships who took passage (6) William Smith, Officers Steward 1st Class. O.N. D/L824 which for military he set to his quarters - namely - the supply after Was officers conspiquous during passage and for the fine party to for his devotion to duty. in providing example guns. Was awarded Croix de Guerre in 1914-18 Tar. (7) William Alfred Frederick LUKE, Chief Engine Room Artificer, O.N. D/M3704. The Cool conduct.......
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B. 24 29th. May. 00.00 off Dunkirk have great difficulty in finding out where to P 00.15.- touched bottom 1.0 a.m. approx. entered Dunkirk and secured alongside Pier. Shore arrangements very bad only one shore ladder available. Troops commence to board. 24 1.30 "San Antonio" came alongside. Troops cross our deck to feed San Antonio. 3.0 approx. San Antonio cast off. I endeavour to speed up loading. Note as much as 15 minutes go by at times without any troops boarding at other times the single ladder is quite inadequate to deal with the numbers. No effort was made by the Military to use the outside of the Pier 4.0 0 a.m. Wind freshening we have received approx 220 troops cast off and proceeded in Company for Downs. Near by ships open fire at enemy aircraft During passage three hunting destroyers drop at least five depth charges Our troops have rifles ready to engage aircraft. Run ha been issued to those troops who are very fatigued and wet also to ships crew. 2.0 Arrive off Downs ordered to proceed Ramsgate.2. Pilot boarded took us to Margate discharged troops, received stores fresh water and two ladders. I rece ve 50 feet rope from another ships 8.0 p.m. Proceed in company with Carabia for Braye. Hands employed in rigging TS and cleaning ship 30th. May 5. a.m. anchored off Braye (falling tide) and enced receiving troops shifted ship 5 times as tide fell. Under continuous enemy gunfire from the shore. 9.0 a.m. we have received approx 430 troops and all available space is full (the shore arrangements fo loading is under naval charge and most efficient. Also;adders were most useful. Weighed anchor and proceeded for Downs altering course as required to aviod enemy gunfire until out of range. Issued run to fatigued troops and all crew. Troops stand by to engage enemy aircraft 5.0 P.m. entered Ramsgate discharged troops received stores and fresh water. I wrote a note to.C in C Dover drawing his attention to the mutinous conduct of Borrowed two naval ratings from shore as night watchmen. Proceeded outside Harbour to anchor. Hands clean ship All hands to sleep Watchmen keep look out. 31st. May 5.0 p.m. ordered to proceed Portsmouth 1st. June, Secured Kings stairs 2nd. June 12.00 ordered to proceed Poole 5.0 P.m. stopped off Yarmouth. 4th. June 6.30 p.m. Secured alongside at Poole. This ships engines are fairly good but all other appointments are very bad Signed S.Hoggan, Lt. Comdr. R.N.R. "ATLANTIC" I beg to submit the following report on this ships activities during the evacuation from Dunkirk Friday 29th. left Dover 9.30 a.m. 12. to waiting off N. Goodwin L. Vessel for orders 3.30 proceeded 3.0 a.m. 30th. arrived La. Panne commence embarking troops in ships lifeboat. Anchored as near shore as possible. Ship aground at Low water embarkation slow at first in ships boats very hard work for the small crew later expedited by Naval Commander S.N.O. who detailed motor launch and whaler to ship embarked approx. 300 men. Sailed about 11. a.m. Beach and Channel being shelled by Shore Batteries. Arrived Ramsgate 23.00 30th. May arrived Dunkirk 05.00 31st. June about 1 mile east of Dunkirk close in shore passed ashore to haul out boats, sea choppy and boats getting swamped lost ships boats 10.00 was to out to deeper water, engines fail to start. Embarked approx. 100 troops. Waited off beach for 24 hours but unable to embark troops owing to being unable to obtain a motor launch to attend on ship and no boats being available. Beaches and Channel being jected to shelling and air bombardment all day and night. Two or three bombs fell close alongside. 05.00 1st rescued crew and passengers of Drifter which had struck sunken wreck [o?] during operation, boat full close alongside striking at ketch which completely dissappeared. 13.00 Ist. Arrived Ramsgate. Note. The small amount of troops embarked on 2nd. trip was due to scarcity of motor launche ato attend various ships, when I did eventually get one and sent it in shore the soldiers would not wade out to the boat during dark hours. L.E. Fordham It. Condr. R.N.R. "KAAP FALGA" B. Kaap Falga (Lieut. G.E.B. ST.G Beale) in Command) loaded 300 tons Army Provisions left Southampton 21.00 26/5/40 and beached off La Panne according to orders 0800 26/5/40 in Company with "Alice" and Able Tasman. At 12.00 Kaap Falga and Alice were ordered to refloat as soon as possible and proceed to Bray beaches, 4 miles away. 8 hours later Kaap Falga floated of with the tide. In the meantime Lieut. Beale had been wounded ashore (during air attacks on Ships) whilst contacting the Military, Lieut. Slater (Captain of Alice) who was with him was killed. Lieut. Beale was reported to have been taken to the Military Hospital with a. paralised leg. Alice was put out of action and ballast tanks flooded to make her rest on bottom (Max, Depth H.W. about 14. feet).
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3. (astailed account). 29 5/40 Sailed Amazone, Poole to Portsmouth D.Y. 5/40 a.m. 'wiped' ship in Block; stored with 14 days provisions and various instruments and navigational books. p.m. Swung ship for compass adjustment and anchored near outer Spit Buby. Sailed at dark in company to Newhaven. 5/40 0005 sighted submarine, surfaced, 1'm E of Owers Lt.V.. Reported to Examination Vessel on arrival with instructions to pass on message. Anchored outside harbour on orders received, having no opportunity to provide sand-bags, Lewis gun, etc. Salled at dark for Dover in company, led by Foxglove. 5/40 Arrived at Dover a.m. Sailed p.m., for Operation Dynamo, in company, and proceeded by long route. Amazone led the skyts, but the compass was found to be reading about 70 low, due to Gerricks' being topped ready for the exercise, and her position was lost by the time this was rectified. I beached the ship about m/a mile west of Bray, bows in, and with a kedge astern. Lieut. Audley, R.N.V.R. landed in our two small boats and led down troops from the sand-dunes. By 0300 the boats' crews were exhausted and the boats were being capsized by the sea which had increased with the westerly wind. It was obvious that no more could be taken off in our own boats from the beach. I approached a sloop which was not anxious to take our troops. A large steamer at anchor outside informed me that she was on her way in, and there was too much sea for putting Amazone alongside her. I decided not to go in to the eastern jetty at such a late hour with troops on board and returned, without incident, by the long route to Dover. Disembarked about 100 officers and men (British) at Admiralty Pier. Lieut. Audley's leg had been injured when hoisting in our boats4 and he was placed on the sick list.. Sub. Lieut. Clarabut, R.N. was detailed from Montrose as First Lieutenant. I embarked essential stores and large quantities of water, also a Lewis gun and as few sand-bags. Nei ther the Naval Shore Signal Station nor the Pier Master was urs. able to inform Mr. Clarabut of the ship's whereabouts and it was 0th. not possible to leave until 0230 after I had found him myself. This wasted five hours. 0230 Sailed in company with Pacific but lost touch soon afterwards. Made landfall to Eastwards of Dunkirk about 0930. Having been informed that there was no danger from mines I had taken a short out in shallow water. This, and the fact that the compass was still 'low', caused us to mistake Gravilines for Dunkirk! I steamed up and down the coast and examined the harbour from about 1 mile out and found no sign of life. Having no W/T, and having had no orders since 2100 the day before, I steamed W.N.W to seek information. Picked up drifter and Anchored about 300ˣ from shore in 10 ft. water and embarked about proceeded to Bray Beach. 400 officers and other ranks, sending in water drums by empty boats. 340691 L.A. C. Harker returned inshore several times, until exhausted, with a large collapsible boat, taking water drums each time. He took charge of the troops in his boat most efficiently and set a very fine example. Later, while the ship was being dive-bombed, he took charge of the troops on deck and directed rifle-fire very cooly during each attack in spite of fairly accurate machine-gun fire. .915 Proceeded. Fredanja informed me he was taking route Y so, presuming there were special orders, sailed/company. in 2010 Attacked by German bomber off Middlekirke. Three bombs dropped close to Fredanja - avoided delay-action effect. 013 3 more bombs dropped close to Fredanja. Lef.
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CONFIDENTIAL. Дурашь 197 Biwlo/zn Subject: Narrative of Events of H.M.S. Caribia. * 456 From...... Lieut. JUNE D.H. Swift, R.N., The Gables, Halifax. Date 8th May 1940. To The Vice Admiral, Dover. (Copy to:- The Commander in Chief, The Nore.) Sir, I have the honour to submit the following narrative of events of H.M.S. Caribia in accordance with N.G.O. 448. The draft left Chatham at 0800 on the 26th May and took over the ship from the Dutch crew at Tilbury at 1500. In the afternoon victualling stores were embarked and the ship was then "wiped". This was satisfactorily completed at 0315/27. The ship was then ordered to proceed to Southend for compass adjustment and to Sheerness for storing and fuelling. Southend was reached at 0630 and during the forenoon the ship was swung for compass adjustment. On arrival at Sheerness at 1300 the ship moored and fuel and water were taken in and later naval stores and special stores embarked. The ship was then ordered to proceed to Southend for orders. At 0800/28 orders were received to proceed to Marte les Bains. On approaching Dunkirk at 2230 a drifter with 120 troops on board was closed. These troops were embarked and the drifter returned to the harbour for more. As these had not arrived after one hour the ship entered the harbour and secured alongside the eastern pier. The ship was then filled with a total of about 320 troops and at 0400 slipped and proceeded. At 1300/29 the North Goodwin examination vessel was hailed and orders were received to proceed to Margate. The troops were disembarked at Margate Pier at 1600 and provisions and stores were embarked. Orders were then received to proceed to the beaches east of Dunkirk, with "Zeus" in company as the latter's compass was unreliable. The ships slipped and proceeded at 1930/29.
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II. 62 (NARRATIVE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER H.M.S. FRISO DURING 61 OPERATION DYNAMO) Friday 31st May (contd) During the moráing one of the Beachmasters came off to me and endeavoured to persuade me to beach the ship so as to lead quicker, pointing out that two other smaller skoots (HEBE & SURSOM CORDA) were doing so very successfully. As it was now a falling tide with an onshore wind I refused. For this I was later very glad as both other skoots shor tly afterwards became stuck on the beach and were unable to get off. (HEBE came off at the next high water. During the forenoon I hailed a large motor driven pleasure boat, got him alongside me and transferred 250 men to him. By about 1230 I had onboard 648 men and space was extremely cramped. I had delayed my departure hoping that a destryyer or other fast craft would appear and take my load from me so that I could fill up again. However as another skoot appeared I slipped my anchor (the capstan being again defective) and sailed. Just as I was about to leave Dunkirk Roads I was hailed by a Fleet Minesweeper and ordered to tow a Drifter full of troops to Dover. By 1330 the Drifter was in tow and we were proceeding at about 5 knots. At approximately 1400 a Heinkel appeared out of the low cloud and at a height of 350 feet released a large bomb, probably 500 lbs, and as he passed over he opened fire with machine guns. The bomb fell on my Port quarter between me and the Drifser. Luckily the Bomb exploded below the surface and beyond violently shaking both ships no xjer major damage was done. The force of the explosion caused my compass to jump out of its gimbals. Certain damage was dome to Auxiliary Machinery in the Engine Room. After we had been proceeding for about half an hour we were shelled by the Nieuport Battery. As the third salvo straddled us I decided to risck the navigational dangers and cut across the snadbanks so as to present the minimum target and to open the range as fast as possible. Luckily the Enemy never found the range again. Thick fog was encountered at about 1830. On making the North Goodwin Light Vessel I discovered that the Shaking up had caused a 30 dgree error in the compass. During the oassage through the Downs the tow parted on several occasions due to the wash of fast moving vessels. At about 0100 on Saturday 1st June I was about 1 cable from the entrance to Dover Harbour when I was bombed again. This time it was only a very small bomb, which although a very near miss only wetted the troops on the port side aft. There were no casualties from machine gun fire. At 0130 I secured alongside Admiralty Pier Dover. At 0230 we shifted billet and secured for the night for which I was very grateful as we had been running continuously for over three days and I had had no to the Engine and provisions and water were embarked. At 1700 sleep for 90 hours. On Saturday temporary repairs were effected where as I could not anchor I secured in the Inner Harbour. I proceeded to Ramsgate with HEBE in company arriving at 2000, On Sunday and Monday 2nd & 3rd June respectively permanent repairs were effected to the Engine and Capatan. were When all skoots were brought to immediate notice in case they required again it was decided that FRISO was not sufficiently reliable and so was left in the Inner Harbour. I cannot speak too highly of my crew who worked without a break. The o nly men being onboard at the were continuously, and on Friday were in the Boats for 7½ time hours my First Lieutenant one seamen and the E.R.A. and myself. I have the honour to be, VICE ADMIRAL Sir, Your obedient servant, * * DOVER Gene Lymmus. Lieutenant. To the Vice Adminal Royal Navy. Dorn.
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73 Dynam. 16 - 72 H.M.S. HILDA, To: Vice Admiral, Dover. Dover. From: Captain R. Pim, R.N.V.R. Report of events in connection with final evacuation of troops from the beaches of La Panne Bains and Bray-Dunnes. Period covered: 30th May - 2nd June. bject. Evacuation of military personnel at La Panne Bains and Bray-Dunnes. rders To take as many small motor boats, lifeboats, etc. as possible eceived. to the above-mentioned beaches and effect the evacuation of all troops found there. The operation was not to include Dunkirk beach, where evacuation arrangements had already been organised. Action Transport 1. Department, Dover, for the requisitioning of motor Arrangements were made by Captain G. Fraser, D.S.O., Sea taken. boats and lifeboats at Dover, Deal and Walmer. These were inspected and arrangements made for their being manned and provisioned on the afternoon of 30th May. The preparation of these matters of detail in advance by Captain Fraser wore-base ficient boats to send early the next morning, and subsequently entirely responsible for my being able to get together suffor providing something in the way of food for the very large number I had on board. 31st 2. I sailed from Deal with 8 boats in tow for Dunkirk early May. on the 31st, and Captain Fraser undertook to despatch the remaining boats to Dunkirk as soon as they became available. I took 50 gallons of petrol in 2-gallon tins on deck for refuelling, the majority of these tins subsequently being civilians at Deal desired to accompany the party, and five jettisoned during the dive bombing east of Dunkirk. Several in fact did manage to get to Dunkirk and were of the greatest possible use. Naval 3. or Port Official that I was to proceed to La Panne that On arrival off Dunkirk I was informed by the Senior Bains French Dunkirk beach was properly organised. An M.L. came alongside and Bray-Dunnes beaches forthwith, and he confirmed and took four of my boats in tow to La Panne Bains. motor and lifeboats were sent away at 40 p.m. with to 4. work The the beaches, which at this time were being shelled shrapnel. 5. these I as found reinforcements. I also requisitioned lifeboats four additional boats at anchor and four acquired from a tug and three from a drifter. 6./
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Dynami but 105 SUBJECT: REPORT ON PROCEEDINGS DURING EVACUATION. FROM: LIEUTENANT T. JOHNSTON, R.N. COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. PASCHOLL. DATE: 6th June 1940. TO: VICE ADMIRAL, DOVER. I have the honour to report that I sailed from Portsmouth at approximately 3200 27th May 1940, in command of the Dutch skoot PASCHOLL, arriving at Dover about 0900 28th May 1940. 2. I left Dover at 1400 28th May, for the beach off Le Panne via route Y with orders to arrive about 2200 to take off troops from the beaches and transfer them to Destroyers, endeavouring to return to the Downs by dawn. 3. As the PASCHOLL was SO much slower than other ships in the Convoy, I was obliged to leave the route given and proceed across the Banks, by SO doing arriving of Ia Panne at 2230, 28th May. 4. Approximately 300 troops were embarked and transferred to the WOLSEY(?), by this time it was 0400 29th May, so I returned as ordered to the Downs. On arrival at the Downs I was ordered by an examination steamer to proceed to Deal where I arrived about 1200 29th May. 5. Having received no further orders I proceeded to Dover where after storing ship I was ordered to return to Le Panne. 6. I sailed from Dover at 1900 29th May, and proceeded to IQ Panne arriving about 0230 30th May where I embarked 400 British and French troops and sailed for Ramsgate at 1030 30th May. During the embarkation only two enemy aircraft were sighted and they did not bomb in the vicinity of the PASCHOLL. 7. On entering the main channel of Le Panne, I was shelled for half an hour by shore batteries at Nieuport, and was obliged to steam across the sendbanks to get out of range. About 1400 I was attacked by a Dornier bomber which bombed and machine-gunned without more success than two slight casualties. I arrived at Ramsgate about 2000 30th May. 8. At approximately 2200 30th May, the whole crew of the PASCHOLL were relieved and Lieutenant Donaldson, R.N.R., took command. 9. At 0700 on 1st June, I took command of Drifter JACKEVE and proceeded to Dunkirk. During the outward passage, I was bombed several times and on arrival off the entrance to Dunkirk harbour at about 1250 1st June, was attacked heavily by dive bombers. The MOSQUITO who was quite close at the time was hit and abandoned, 80 I proceeded to pick up survivors.
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Dyrams 61. DOVER. à 179 5 4th June, 1940 TO: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S."LYNX". 189 . -2- 177 lighter to see if I could help them and found a young Tommy (K. Alfred) in the water vigorously assisting the others to get aboard. Just as I arrived he said he was exhausted and so we got him on to the lighter and I went overboard to take his place. We continued to get men on to my boat until no more were coming down the beach. During this operation three bombs fell quite close to the lighter but no one was hurt. I took this boat load of about thirty five out to the hopper. I spent some time during the afternoon trying to pull other motor boats which had gone ashore without dropping an anchor off the beach which was a lee shore. I also towed various whalers and ships boats out to the transports. Towards evening the big ships started sending their own boats ashore on long lines and as this occurred about every 50 yds the manoeuvring of motor boats became difficult. I was hailed by a tug which had a supply lighter in tow outside the line of big ships. Saying that he could come no nearer the beach he asked me to take this lighter as close in as I could. The lighter was almost unmanageable. While towing it the water circulation of one engine gave out but I had to continue using the engine which got very overheated until I could safely drop the lighter after taking it through the line of big ships to the shore. This caused the engine to seise up. Shortly afterwards the other engine began to give trouble and could only be used at slow speeds. I later discovered that this was due to a choked jet in the carburettor. Just as dark came I passed a rope to a drifter and asked permission to hang on until morning when I could see to try to repair my engines. This drifter had not got its complement of men on board and during the night he moved about slowly from one spot to another trying to get a load. During this period a bomb fell very close to us. The fourth time he moved he headed to a point south of the harbour and then very slowly made his way down channel. About a mile from the harbour I realised he was heading for home and being then too far from the seat of operations Ramsgate. and being practically engineless I let him tow me right back to We entered the harbour at noon (Saturday). I reported for duty again at 0800 on Sunday morning and though I was given command of another boat and got her all ready I was not again ordered to sea. I brought both my boats back to H.M.S. Wildfire on Thursday p.m. the 6th June. yours obediently Ian F. Smith SubL RNVR
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Dynoms 190. 204 191 REPORT ON WORK DONE ON DUNKIRK BEACH BY "CONSTANT NYMPH" 30/31 MAY, 1940. CHARGE HAND. - B.A. Smith., Little Ship Club (Owner of motor boat). CREW. - STOKERS ALLEN AND MIXIKUE from Sheerness. We left Ramsgate about 3.30 Pollo on 30th May, 1940, in tow of H.M.S. "Jutland" (A Dutch boat taken over by Navy) after lying outside the Harbour from 9.30 a.m., during which time we had done a little ferrying work between ships. We were towed with a whaler and cutter on same tow. Arrived at our station some miles east of Dunkirk Harbour about 9.30 p.m. and towed whaler and cutter to beach as soon as "JUTLAND" had 30/5 anchored slight mist. At first we could only find Frenchmen on the beach and took off several boat loads, then a British officer waded and swam to "CONSTANT NYMPH" while running slowly up and down the beach line in about 3 feet 5 inches waiting for the boats to be filled and keeping a look out for British troops, In spite of darkness and slight mist, the fires on shore and fine night made bodies of men show up against the sand. On hearing from British officer that thousands of our men. were a little nearer Dunkirk, we worked further up and got mainly British for some time; not many wounded. One nice fire which was a leading mark was blown out by another bomb later on in the night, but we were fairly well at home by then and it caused no delay. Having filled "JUTLAND", the motor-boat with whaler and outter turned over to "LAUDANIA",a similar ship, and filled that. "JUTLAND" left 31/5 about 3 a.m. I am informed by Captain of "LAUDANIA" that these ships hold about 450 men each, making a total of 900 men taken off. About 8 a.m. "LAUDANIA" was full and the cutter was aground under a stranded lighter and her crew could not get her off, Captain of "LAUDANIA" told me to get the crew if I could not get the outter, and this was done. Certain odd boats were found on the beach by troops of both nations, any found trying to row to ships in our area were collected and towed to ship, mk and efforts made to use them again if serviceable. These efforts were usually hampered by Frenchmen not tying up to the ship when boarding and letting the boat drift. Bombing in the district seemed fairly continuous, some explosions shook the boat a good bit, but nothing seemed very near. Anti-aircraft fire seemed to come from the beach in many cases, tracer bullets from that line were often to be seen. There was some heavy shelling, apparently directed by planes dropping Very lights over the ships, one crump was either very near or very big as the boat trembled as if she had grounded. Being deaf and having a lot to de prevented my noticing the bombing much but my crew seemed to think it was increasing with daylights About 8 a.m. on Friday, 31st May, 1940, having used all fuel and got rope in the propeller, I was ordered to turn over the motor boat and whaler to a Drifter believed to have fuel and mechanics, and go aboard "LAUDANIA" which left at once with all orews and arrived Margate about 5 p.m. Both Allen and Medkle, the two young Stoker ratings who were my crew, worked steadily and efficiently throughout the ten hours or so of working on the beach and were always on the look-out for swimmers or odd craft to be picked up. These lads had hover been to sea and were only enlisted in January 1940, they informed me. (sa) B.A. Smith. 6th June, 1940,
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208 195 my left foot. especially as I was partially incapacitated by a wound on As we were a long way from the French coast I decided that there was very little chance of HAIG falling into enemy hands and that no doubt help would soon be forthcoming in reply to the wireless message I had asked X440 to send. I hauled down HAIG's ensign and took it aboard LADY CABLE and we tried to make towards the English coast. Unfortunately the engine kept stopping and we made very slow progress and finally nothing would make our engine start again. We drifted helplessly for several hours and then sighted a Bell Buoy which I believe may have been the N.W. Goodwin Bell Buoy, but we did not get close enough to make sure. At last we sighted a warship and waved HAIG's White Ensign to try to attract stention. We were seen and the ship altered course towards us and came up close to LADY CABLE. She was the French transport ROUEN of Dieppe and was packed with troops from Dunkirk. An officer asked what I wanted and I told him that we were broken down and asked to be taken aboard. To my surprise my appeal was met with a blunt "No" - with no explanation, and the ROUEN steamed away. My crew and I felt angry at this in view of the fact that we had rescued over 200 French soldiers during the night. No doubt the ROUEN had good reasons for not taking us aboard but no explanation was given and I would like if possible to discover why she was unable to help us. Luckily another ship some considerable distance away had noticed the ROUEN and observed that she had not picked us up. This ship was the CITY OF CHRISTCHURCH and she came up and took us in tow to the Downs where she was bound for in ballast. On arrival in the Downs where CITY OF CHRISTCHURCH dropped anchor, we were able to start up the engine of LADY CABLE and I decided once again to try to make for Dover. However, we broke down after a run of about 15 minutes and were picked up by a tug (Operational I don't know her name). She had orders to proceed to Ramagate with H.M. Drifter VIKING in tow and was about to do this when we broke down near her. She towed us to the VIKING and I boarded the VIKING to have my injured foot attended to and get some rest. VIKING and LADY CABLE were towed round to Ramsgate where we arrived about 2100. I was landed and taken to "Merrie England" and then to Ramagate General Hospital. The Commanding Officer of VIKING at my request reported the return of LADY CABLE and that one member of my crew, Cadet Rating Price was missing but might be aboard French warship X440. He also reported direct to C. in C., Dover, about HAIG. A little later, while I was still at "Merrie England", the Commanding Officer of VIKING arrived to tell me that he had been informed from Dover that HAIG was safe. Unfortunately he had no news for me of Cadet Rating Price. The behaviour of my crew throughout the operation had been magnificent. The taking off of over 200 French troops and 6 British from the Mole was conducted quickly and calmly under difficult and hazardous conditions. Later, Cadet Rating Price's work in helping to get the HAIG alongside LADY CABLE cannot be too highly praised. Without the great initiative and efficiency he displayed the operation would not have been successful and the HAIG would have drifted ashore to the S.W. of Dunkirk. After/
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217 205 OPERATION DYNAMO ENCLOSURE NO. 3 B SHIP:- M.D. AURA OFFICER:- SUB. LIEUT. M.A. CHODZKO, R.N.V.R. REPORT I. Sr On Saturday, June 3rd, I received instructions to take charge of the Motor Launch AURA and proceed to a beach East of Dunkirk Harbour. Left Dover Harbour towed by drifter GIRL GLADYS at 15.30. Before leaving it had been reported to me that the AURA'S engine was not operating successfully, in as much that she would not come astern. As the weather appeared to be favourable there seemed no reason why the operation could not be carried out. X We shipped from GIRL GLADYS in the proximity of 5W Buoy and proceeded Eastwards. I was able to tow cutters from one of the Paddle Steamers to the beach on this first trip inwards. The time was 0100 - About 100 British troops were transferred from the shore to various vessels. The engine was giving considerable trouble so that shortly after 0215, June 4th, it failed completely. The launch was then manoeuvred towards some Thames Sailing Barges, and we endeavoured to repair the engine. On examination we found that a defective dynamo was causing the trouble, and as operations were ordered to cease at 0300, I decided to abandon AURA at 0245. I transferred the crew to a dinghy which we found, and then managed to get aboard a "paddle steamer" which was getting under way. All members of my crew behaved excellently throughout the twelve hours. REPORT II. 2nd On Sunday, June 4th, I repaired aboard the drifter YORKSHIRE LASS in the capacity of Skipper. I received orders to proceed to Dunkirk Harbour. Leaving Dover at about 1515, we arrived off Dunkirk at 0000. Off the S. Foreland Ljeutenant Commander Prior, Royal Navy, was transferred from the drifter.UTPROSIM aboard the YORKSHIRE LASS. There was little delay in arriving alongside and we started embarking French troops before 0030. Another drifter arrived alongside our vessel so we transferred our troops and carried on loading. By 00115 we seemed to be practically full. There appeared to be no more troops on our portion of the jetty and I dispatched a soldier to see if we could collect another 50 men. Other ships were arriving alongside, so by 0130 we were steaming out of the Harbour. During the whole operation, and during the passage, the troops behaved in an orderly manner. During the homeward passage the vessel developed a hot bearing, and as it was just daybreak, I signalled SUN XI of to take us in tow until repairs were effected. Within three quarters an hour we proceeded under our own power and arrived in Harbour at 0830 Monday, June 5th. The whole ships company were highly efficient in their duty, and on investigation 100 French troops and 3 British Tommies had been transported. The British Tommies reported as having lost their division, and had only arrived in Dunkirk on Saturday. Report ends.
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220 208 OPERATION DYNAMO ENCLOSURE NO. 6 SHIP: MOTOR BOAT "LADY CABLE". OFFICER REPORTING: LIEUTENANT B.S. FIDLER, R.N.V.R. June 1st/2nd 1940. Left Dover 1705 towed by drifter "Golden Sunbeam". Arrived Dunkirk and cast off from "Golden Sunbeam" 0005 (about) arrived beach 0030 (about). Took two full loads to transports, left Dunkirk 0305 with troops for Ramsgate arriving 0815, disembarked troops and returned to Dover at 1130.
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221 209 OPERATION DYNAMO ENCLOSURE NO. 7. SHIP: EMPRESS, RIVER LAUNCH. LUCY LAVERS 4/B. OFFICER REPORTING: SUB-LIEUTENANT T.W. BETTS, R.N.V.R. Leaving H.M.S. KING ALFRED on Friday, May 31st, I proceeded to Sheerness, to await the arrival of Motor Boats for the purpose of evacuating troops from Dunkirk. On Saturday, 1st June, I was placed in command of the River Launch EMPRESS with a crew of 6. The clutch of the starboard engine had been giving trouble before I left, but I decided that, at any rate, I could make Ramsgate. In this assumption I was wrong, as I broke down when about half the distance was covered. The trawler escorting the motor boats took me in tow to Ramsgate, and thence to Dunkirk, where, having had my engineer repairing his engines on the journey over, I left the trawler and prepared to pick up troops. Nearing the beach West of Dunkirk, and judging the water too shallow for further progress inshore, I rang down "Hard Astern" to the engine room, in order to take the way off my ship. The starboard engine, then, not only refused to go astern, but refused to assume the neutral position, with the consequence that the ship was carried high and dry on to the beach. Upon examination I found that it would be quite impossible to salvage the ship until between 9 and 10 am. on the next day. After having placed an anchor out well aatern, I and my crew swam out to deep water where we were soon picked up by a launch and put aboard a drifter. The drifter proceeded to Dunkirk Harbour, and I and my crew assisted in the embarkation of troops, after which we returned with the drifter to Dover and reported to H.M.S. LYNX. 2nd June, 1940 at 1400 approximately, I was placed in charge of the R.N.L.I. Motor Lifeboat LUCY LAVER and proceeded to Dunkirk under tow with the Drifter GOLDEN SUNSHINE. After/
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222 * 210 - 2 - After having searched the beach West of Dunkirk for troops and not seeing any, we proceeded into the Harbour again and took on a load of French soldiers. The Drifter GOLDEN SUNSHINE then towed my ship back to Dover. (Signed) T.W. Betts Sub-Lieutenant R.N.V.R. 4th June, 1940.
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OPERATION DYNAMO ENCLOSURE NO. 14 2100 Ship: R.N.L.B. "WALTON AND FRINTON" E.M.E.D. Written up by Petty Officer Tel.Cooley Officer Reporting: Commanding Officer Lt.R.H. Mead, R.N.V.R. Sat. June 1st. 0400 Manned Walton Life Boat RNLB - EMID. 0500 To sea. 0536 Made to signal Station "where are drifters that are going to tow lifeboats". From signal station "go alongside". 0550 Lay off drifters. Proceeding to make enquiries as regards intentions. 0600 Small boats informed what we are doing. 0614 Secure alongside P.O. steps; Captain ashore for enquiries. 0630 Left P.O. steps. 0645 Lay off drifters. 0715 Taken in tow by drifter "Thrifty". Ships in our tow Southend-on-Sea Lifeboat "Abdybeauclark" lifeboat Walton E.N.E.D. Lifeboat P.E.42 "Summer" Maid" Motor Boat "White Bear". 0725 Left Dover. 0729 Tow slipped second from end. 0733 Tow O.K. Under way - sighted South Goodwin Light Vessel at 0730. 0900 To passing sloop "are there many more to take off". 0901 Reply "Yes". 0910 Destroyers wash parted tow. 0928 Tow O.K. Under way. 1027 Passed E. Goodwins. 1256 Captain H-M passed. 1404 Destroyer H-15 passing broke tow on last boat in line. 1407 Tow O.K. Under way. 1502 Tow broken on last boat in line. 1516 Tow O.K. Under way. 1517 3 planes attacked around. Sloop bombed. 1522 Mine sighted floating. Mine fired at. Result uncertain. 1537 Ybonne et Moabe of Gravelin French Flag with one English soldier with Brenn Gun onboard heading England. Turned on communicating with us and headed towards Dunkirk. (Boat just mentioned was sunk about 1615 by bombs direct hit.) 1550 Searching around among very large wreckage. 1605 Turned back for few miles while drifter reports and await results of message by W/T regarding ship in distress further up main 1615 Bombed channel. by (about 30) many planes - 1 trawler sunk (not in our company). Bomb dropped by our trawler and broke tow throwing men in water. Men picked up. Our planes arrived. 1624 Proceeding to investigate Trawler. 1635 Air attack still on. 1652 Bombs heard dropping Drifters heading home 1640 Departed planes. without leaving orders. Tried to communicate with drifters to ask their intentions with Aldis but could get no reply. Tried to collect small boats and motioned life-boat to stop (scored out in log "Comd. Gunner onboard") Lifeboat went on but stopped by Aldis. 1710/
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1710 Only one boat in company (Abdy Beau Clark Aldeburgh lifeboat). 1718 Life-boat "Rosa Wood" Shoreham joined company. One drifter ahead. 1726 To drifter "what are your intentions". 1730 To drifter "Stop". "Rosa Wood" and "Phyllis Lunn" informs us he intends returning Dover. 1736 Three British planes over. 1740 Closed drifter. Hang on in position until last, most other boats and one drifter out of sight. Speed boat informs us soldiers still ashore but refuses to come aboard. 1821 Planes attacking with bombs. 1837 To trawler "Have you had any reply". From trawler "No". 1838 Planes still bombing. 1 ship damaged not our fleet. Captain decided to try on his own to reach Dunkirk. The two life-boats in company turned back. Bombs still dropping. Being machine-gunned 1849. last and stays hit. 1854 Captain carrying on to Dunkirk single-handed. 1859 24 fighters overhead. 1908 I have been deserted please stand by no. To Motor Boat with Liteut.Commander on board. Put us on our course. 1926 Covered white conspicuous parts of ship with oilskins. From Cairmoorn I.B. "Steer S.558 for Dunkirk". S.S. "Sun 4" Duniciric 2012. 2023 One friendly plane overhead. 2044 Proceeding to Dunkirk beach. Arrived Duniciple with "Sun 4". Message from M.B. "Inadvisable to go in". Captain boarded "Sun 4" 2100. 2108 Proceeding to Dunkirk. Arrived Dunicive harbour 2135. No one on piers. Picked up "Sun 4" one rowing boat to go to beach. Lieut. Mead billed. Boats in beach taking ratings from shore all night (run aground). 0423 2nd June Sunday left Dunkirk. (Scored out in log 'believed to be last boat in Life-boat in tow of "Sun 4% 0450 "Sun 4" ran aground. 0456 Under way. Rope round starboard propellor of life-boat. 0923 Passed S. Goodwins. 1010 Arrived Ramagate - "Sun 4ª anchored, Lifeboat secured astern. 1030 (approx.) Soldiers landed. 1310 Left anchorage for Ramagate Harbour S.B. and secured alongside "Princess London" at 1325. 1412 1424 Arrived and secured to "Sun 4" off Ramagate. Left P.L. Steamboat. 2023 Left anchorage Ramsgate Harbour and secured Collected all spare ammunition laying. alongside H.M.S. DWARF 2035. Monday 3rd June 0930 Reported to N.O.I.C. Ramsgate for permission Told sail to Dover. Permission granted. to Commander by Cook, Piermaster prior to sailing. inform to Naval Officer-in-Charge to report Dover. Sailed from Ramsgate 1026 an Informed Condr. Cook and asked him to route 1112 Dover. Passed Occ. fog bell. 1157 1354 To examination steamer off Dover. "Walton Passed South break. 1355 Told to proceed. Arrived Dover and secured Life-boat. May I enter". alongside.
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CONFIDENTIAL Binlohage 232 Subject. REPORT ON DEATH OF LIEUT. R.H.MEAD, R.N.V.R. 220 25 From The CAPTAIN, H.M.S. EXCELLENT. Portsmouth. Date **** 20th June 1940. No. 554/07026. To .... THE VICE ADMIRAL, DOVER. (COPY TO:- COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, PORTSMOUTH). Unit, on behaviour of Lieutenant R.H.Mead, R.N.V.R., Meikle, R.N. the the Commanding Officer of the D/C Motor Boat The attached report by Lieutenant E.F. Hamiltonduring Operation Dynamo, is forwarded in accordance with Confidential Portsmouth General SyPBrind Order, 1700. L.B. VICE ADMIRA CAPTAIN. an 24 JUN 1940 * ope DOVER tian led - ced ope it. ant pa, Lynami ide Note:- During the above operations the "Cordelia # was working with Sport engine only - which, owing to being overworked, seized up. Estimated that 300 troops were carried by "Cordelia" and whaler from the beach. 1100 Taken in tow by the G.R.1740 (drifter) and proceeded towards Dover. 1130) Shelled by shore 2030 Entered Dover Harbour and tied up at Prince of 1145) batteries. Wales Pier (Inner Harbour). 2100 Reported to LYNX office. Friday/
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