TNA ADM 199 790

41
30th May 30 Th
45
Passenger transport KING ORRY which had been damaged by a near miss p.m. 29th May, still alongside the
Pier at midnight. I saw the Captain and told him he must go and gave him the alternative of beaching himself on the
Eastern beach if his ship was not seaworthy, or of proceeding wathout Crooks well to England = the escort of a trawler. At 0230 he was
^
observed endeavouring to clear the harbour. It was subsequently found out that he sunk about 4 cables outside the entrance.
At 0039/30 made the following signal to Dover:-
"There is a shortage of ships and boats. I have no destroyers".
There were no air attacks in the early morning
Later when ships began to arrive, and all was quiet. 1 In view of the heavy target presented by a number of ships being alongside the Mole at one time, destroyers were ordered alongside the Pier one at a time.
Arrival of the first destroyer was a signal for an attack by one bomber. Subsequently, however, the bright sunshine of yesterday gave way to mist and it was possible to speed up embarkation without undue risk.
0755 following signal was made:-
"Great opportunity missed during night when only three drifters arrived. No water or food yet provided on
Dunkirk beach for large number of troops. Sporadic bombing".
Attbout 0800 store ship arrived with provisions but no water. This caused so much congestion on the Pier that in view of the urgent need to send off every possible man, about half the foodhad been unloaded.
unloading was, after abandoned and the store ship filled with troops. A certain amount of water was obtained from destroyers.
One personnel ship arrived about 0920, the first one since the previous day. Other ships (three drifters) filled shortly

page 5.
83
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
ship 6. was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though it, ordering & torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off during attack. Complete Jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S fannel. Tas ordered by 1st. Lieut. to load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned, threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
bridge 7. on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F - load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60° and at no time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were passing 12 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. A wire was passed and made fast round a stout bean in the smack, which carried away some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongside the forecastle bowe pointing aft. At this point second bombing attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile, the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to taking up the slack too vaolently. This was due to the language difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the only other man on board the smack being an R.A.P. pilot. A
further bombing attack started, the final one, and I again stood off from the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship and I picked up all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and some men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men aboard, Whitehall appeared in the distance and we made out to intercept her, using the smack's airen and the French ensign half way up the foremast. We met her about 12 miles away and passed information to her and requested her to collect men from remaining boats. I then set out on a course for England and in mid-chainel we transferred everyone to H.M. Trawler Olvina.

so
84
Page 6.
Leading Seaman Wohdhouse.
Motor hoat.
Whilst pushing the towing vessel into position, the bombing formation came over. I let go and sheered off, the first salvo lifting the boat almost out of the water.
Messerschmidt fighters attacked us with machine gun and cannon (Bombs were also dropped) for just a few minutes short of an hour. L.S. Hicks watched their flight and gave me helm and engine orders, the boat not being hit though a couple of cartridge cases dropped into us. We found ourselves out of sight of the ship, had a little council of war, and decided, knowing the ship was out of wireless communication to make Dunkirk for help. We headed west, and not far outside the harbour two troopships were bombed and sunk. We picked up what we considered a safe complement, tried to get in touch with a vessel to assist Basilisk.
In t.is were not successful and were told to make England.
We drew a rough chart and set our course, arraving
Ramsgate roughly eight hours later. I then turned over the boat to the Naval authorities. We reported that Basilisk was badly hit and were assured that help had been sent.

page 5.
97
101
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
6.
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though ship was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with it, ordering a torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off during attack. Complete jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S Pannel. Tas ordered by 1st. Lieut. to load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned, threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
7.
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the bridge on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F - load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60° and at no time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were passing 18 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. A wire was passed and made fast round a stout beam in the smack, which carried away some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongside the forecastle bows pointing aft. At this point second bombing attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile, the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to taking up the slack too vaolently. This was due to the language difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the only other man on board the smack being an R.A.F. pilot. A
further bombing attack started, the final one, and I again stood off from the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship and I picked up all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and some men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men aboard, Whitehall appeared in the distance and we made out half way the foremast. We met her about 12 miles away and to intercept her, using the smack's siren and the French ensign passed information up to her and requested her to collect men from mid-chai.nel we transferred everyone to H.M. Trawler Olvina.
remaining boats. I then set out on a course for England and in

98
Page 6.
102
Leading Seaman Wordhouse.
Mator boat.
Whilst pushing the towing vessel into position, the bombing formation came over. I let go and sheered off, the first salvo lifting the boat almost out of the water.
Messerschmidt fighters attacked us with machine gun and cannon (Bombs were also dropped) for just a few minutes short of an hour. L.S. Hicks watched their flight and gave me helm and engine orders, the boat not being hit though a couple of cartridge cases dropped into us. We found ourselves out of sight of the ship, had & little council of war, and decided, knowing the ship was out of wireless communication to make Dunkirk for help. We headed west, and not far outside the harbour two troopships were bombed and sunk. We picked up what we considered a safe complement, tried to get in touch with a vessel to assist Basilisk.
In this were not successful and were told to make England.
We drew a rough chart and set our course, arraving
Ramsgate roughly eight hours later. I then turned over the boat to the Naval authorities. We reported that Basilisk was badly hit and were assured that help had been sent.

page 5.
121
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
6.
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though ship was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with it, ordering a torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off during attack. Complete Jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S Pannel. Tas ordered by 1st. Lieut. to load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned, threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
7.
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the bridge on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F. load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60 and at no time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were passing 18 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. À wire was passed and made fast round a stout beam in the smack, which carried away some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongaide the forecastle bows pointing aft. At this point second bombing attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile, the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to taking up the slack too vaolently. This was due to the language difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the only other board the smack being an R.A.P. pilot. A
further man on attack started, the final one, and I again stood off from bombing the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship and I picked all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and up men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men Whitehall some appeared in the distance and we made out half the foremast. We met her about 12 collect away and to intercept aboard, her, using the smack's siren and the miles French ensign remaining boats. I then set out on a course Trawler England Olvina. and in passed way information up to her and requested her to for men from mid-cha.nel we transferred everyone to H.M.

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122
Leading Seaman Wordhouse.
Mator boat.
Whilst pushing the towing vessel into position, the bombing formation came over. I let go and sheered off, the first salvo lifting the boat almost out of the water.
Messerschmidt fighters attacked us with machine gun and cannon (Bombs were also dropped) for just a few minutes short of an hour. L.S. Hicks watched their flight and gave me helm and engine orders, the boat not being hit though a couple of cartridge cases dropped into us. We found ourselves out of sight of the ship, had a little council of war, and decided, knowing the ship was out of wireless communication to make Dunkirk for help. To headed west, and not far outside the harbour two troopships were bombed and sunk. We picked up what we considered a safe complement, tried to get in touch with a vessel to assist Basilisk.
In this were not successful and were told to make England.
We drew a rough chart and set our course, arraving
Ramsgate roughly eight hours later. I then turned over the boat to the Naval authorities. We reported that Basilisk was badly hit and were assured that help had been sent.

Dynam 106
153
H.M.S. *Pangbourne*
158
At Sea.
5th.June 1940.
Sir,
1 have the honour to forward the following narrative in accordance with your signal 2049/4/6.
At approximately midnight on Sunday 26th. May, H.M.S.
remainder of the
5th.4.S.
147
SLYDLE'S-CLOSE,
152
HIGHTOWN,
RINGWOOD.
From Lieut.-Commander H.G.Boys-Smith, R.N.R.
To
Vice-Admiral, Dover.
Date June 7th, 1940.
Subjet:- Summarized report of part taken by ships and craft under my commend during the evacuation of
Dunkirk.
th a.m.
Joined Dutch Scoot "Trente" at filbury in command.
Sailed p.m. for Shoerness where vessel 403 prepared for operations.
th p.m.
Sailed from Sheerness direct for Dunkirk beaches via Rest Bindar Buoy in company with other "scoots".
3th 6330
When approaching Beaches was turned back by
Naval M.L. with orders to return to Ramagate. Half an hour later was attacked by one salvo of bomba and machine gun fire by a German comber which appeared to be returning from the direction of England. Arrived
Ramsgate 8.m. same day.
18th p.m.
Sailed for Dunkirk via Buoys U, V, 1, and 6 West.
Dunkirk harbour entrance was reached just before midnight.
A full load of British troops was ferried off in drifters
(380). Ship sailed immediately by same route. Fierce fires were blazing all over Dunkirk, lighting up the sea. Continuous distant firing was heard. Local

156
161
Sheet 4. & final embarkation.
At 0200 a lifeboat with 43 French troops and 4 Officers came alongside and embarked. They stated that they were from a French vessel which had run aground on & sandbank.
Whilst getting this party inboard I was ordered by R.A.D to *
return to England. As Albury was leaving harbour at this time I followed her out clear of the channel and then proceeded to Folkestone and disembarked troops, then proceeded to Dover and coaled as I had only 15 tons of coal remaining. Owing to being unable to leave Granville
Dock until 2130 Pangbourne did not take part in any further operations.
1 have the honour to be Sir,
Your Obsdient Servant
VICE ADMIRAL
Commander R.N.
9- JUN 1940
*
*
DOVER

196
211
5.
cortly assist after to the first Destroyer to leave. Two motor boats with him tack on the way. I then embarked General Alexander and transferred these on the pler and in the control and berthing of shipping had been parties over dly damaged to be of use. She was sent back to England.
sunk. The other arrived, but had one engine out of action and was too were attacked by aircraft on passage, and one with Commander Clouston sent by by 2200. There was a fresh Northerly breese and this, coupled with the
The evacuation was timed to start at 2100 and four Destroyers had got
Road tide, set ships off the pier and they had difficulty in berthing until the haft moving in and out of the harbours added to the difficulties.
de turned and the breeze dropped. Large numbers of French fishing and other
230 the B.E.F. were all away and at 2300 Captain Tennant and the rest of the
M.A/S.B. 10 assisted two destroyers to berth by pushing them. By lival party left in M.T.B. 102. The absence of the naval borthing parties, abarked with the last of the B.E.F., was much felt, and the French did nothing replace them.
There was then a very long pause before any French troops
Roaded. name down to the East pier. One ship was alongside * hours before she was
B°
There were large numbers of French troops at the West Quay and wo Personnel Ships were sent in there. The second of these, the ROUSE, went ground when clearing and I was reluctant to risk any more. Also this plar as supposed to be used by French ships and some French Destroyers did go there.
OUEN refoated at High tide next day and returned safely.
9.
The flow of troops was so slow that it was obvious that the ships vailable could not be filled in the time and I sent back three destroyers and several Fleet Sweepers empty and also at least two Personnel Ships.
50.
This was a disappointing night. For scose reason the French did not some down and did not appear in any numbers until about half an hoghe before dam.
The reason given was that a dounter-attack had to be made. At 0300 there were three Personnel Ships alongaide and I had to order then to leave at 0310. The
Slockships arrived at 0310 and I laft for Dover shortly aftermatis.
Light 3/4 June.
51.
For this night the time available for embarkation, 2230 to 0230, was reduced by an hour, and it was planned to use both Bast and West piers in addition from small boats. For upper the West pier schools, minesweepars, and two correttes to small craft at the quays of the harbour. Vessels also lay off for loading were detailed. East pier was to have 10 Transports, 6 Destroyers, and 4 Paddlers.
WEITSHED was to land berthing parties at 2200.
52.
I want over in M.T.B. 102 and arrived at 2200 to find the harbour swarming with French fishing boats on their way in and the piers full of troops.
very 53. was tide turned at 2330. WHITSHED and three Ships
There again a fresh Northerly wind and berthing conditions Personnel were and later difficult until the for over an hour to get alongaide, and finally I took in some of SABRE were trying off WEITSHED and landed them. No ship succeeding berthing the berthing party until 2330 so that only three hours was available for at the It East is pier remarkable that in spite of this only case paddler was unable the East pier.
54. continual Owing to fresh ships, the harbour entrance got very which the delay in borthing, the mmbers of small craft congested and and the the ships there were handled no collisions in these constricted waters. Time and again feared that arrival of is ude solely to the magnificent way in I
a ship would were go ashore in some impossible position.
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203
218
5.
not on the way. I than embarked General Alexander and transferred him assist on the pier and in the control and borthing of shipping had been sent over rtly after to the first Destroyer to leave. Two motor boats with parties these were attacked by aircraft on passage, and one with Communder Clounton ly damaged to be of use. She ms sent back to England.
sunk. The other arrived, but had one engine out of notion and was too by 2200, There was a fresh Northerly breese and this, coupled with the
The evacuation was timed to start at 2100 and four Destroyers had got od tide, set ships off the pier and they had difficulty in borthing until the le turned and the brease dropped. Large mmbers of French flabing and other ft moving in and out of the harbours added to the difficulties.
M.A/S.B. 10 assisted two destroyers to borth by pushing them.in. By so the B.E.F. were all away and at 2300 Capisin Termant and the rest of the
7al party left in N.T.B. 102. The absence of the naval borthing parties, barked with the last of the B.E.F., was much folt, and the French did nothing replace them. There was then a very long pause before any French troops aded. no down to the East pier. One ship was alongside 28 hours before the -
There were large mmbers of French troops at the Yest Quay and
O Personnel Ships were sent in there. The second of these, the ROUN, went round when clearing and I was reluctent to risk any more. Also this plar
S supposed to be used by French ships and some French Destroyers did go there.
USN relibated at High tide next day and returned safely.
The flow of troops was so slow that it was obvious that the ships milable could not be filled in the time and I sent back three destroyers and veral Fleet Sweepers expty and also at least two Personnal Ships.
This was a disappointing night. For some reason the French did not one down and did not appear in any mmbers until about half an hour before dam.
be reason given was that a counter-attack had to be made. At 0300 there were free Personnel Ships alongside and I had to order then to leave at 0310. the lockships arrived at 0310 and I left for Dover shortly aftermatis.
1ght 3/4 June.
1.
For this night the time available for enharitation, 2230 to 0230, WAS
educed by an hour, and it was planned to use both Bast and West yders in addition rom small boats. upper the West pier schools, minosweepers, and two correttes o mall druft at the quays of the harbour. Vessels also lay off for loading are detailed. East For yder YEAR to have 10 Transports, 6 Destroyers, and 4 Paddlers.
HTTSHED was to land borthing parties at 2200.
ai swareding with want French over flating boats on their way in and the piers full of troops.
I in M.T.B. 102 and arrived at 2200 to fini the harbour some of SABRE were trying WHITSHRD and landed them. No ship succesding and later until the for over an hour to get alongside, and finally in very 53. difficult There was again tide a turned at 2330. SHIPPING and three I Ships took fresh Northerly wind and borthing conditions Pursonnel were borthing party until off 2330 so that only three hours was available was for the It East is pier remarkable that in spite of this only one paddler unable the East pdor.
3
Owing to the ships, the harbour antrance got very congested in which delay in borthing, the mmbers of small cruft and and the continual that arrival of fresh is ulo solely to the magnificant way the ships there were were handled no collisions in these constricted unters. Time and again I feared a ship would go ashore in some impossible position.
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SECRET
Page 3.
embarked.
ship in tow, but it was found that the vessel was held
17. At about 2130 H.M.Tug St.Clears endeavoured to tak endoned the attempt.
aground aft, and at about 2215 the tow parted, and the tu &
18. At about 2300 H.M.S. Havavt endeavoured to take us tow but without success.
19. During the night a further 350 French and 50
glish troops were embarked, and these were brought to England.
20. At 0300 on the 30th. H.M.S.Locust was ordered to ke Locust. us in tow, and by 9400 the ship was waterborne and in tow
21. Between 9400 and 0700 the tow parted three times, we had progressed only three miles. But after 0700 the tow satisfactory and H.M.S. Locust towed us across to the glish coast, arriving at the North Goodwin Light Vessel at
00. Speed made good since 0700 2.4 knots.
22. A single Junker bomber appeared for a moment above fog near the North Goodwin, but made off eastwards.
23. Shaped course to pass eastward of the Goodwins.
2245 a French soldier, fully equipped, was seen to jump over e sideby two of Bidefords shipscompany. The tow was stopped.
though a buoy was dropped and a boat lowered to search, it 1
regretted the nan was not recovered. The sea was calm and ae visibility at that time was good. The nan's name is not nown.
24. At 2315 we proceeded. The tow parted again at
330/31st, but after that no further trouble was experienced a nd we arrived at Dover at 1130 on th31st May.
25. The casualties to personnel were:-
(a) H.M.S.Bideford's ships company
(i) Killed. Three officers and nine men.
(11) Missing, believed killed. Four nen.
(111) Dangerously wounded. Two nen.
(1v) Seriously wounded. Ten men.
(v) Slightly wounded. One officer & six nen.
Total ship's company casualties. Four officers and thirty one men.
(b) Passengers.
(11) Nounded. Two officers (one dangerously).
(1) Killed. Two officers & ten other ranks.
Total passenger casualties. Four officers and ten men.
I have the honour to be,
Your obedient Sir, servant,
TOE
ADMIRA
10JUN 1940
Lieutenant Commander in Command.

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Page 3.
had embarked.
17. At about 2130 H.M.Tug St. Clears endeavoured to tak the ship in tow, but it was found that the vessel was held fast aground aft, and at about 2215 the tow parted, and the tu 5
abandoned the attempt.
18. At about 2300 H.M.S. Havavt endeavoured to take us in tow but without success.
19. During the night a further 350 French and 50
English troops were embarked, and these were brought to England.
20. At 0300 on the 30th. S.Locust was ordered to take us in tow, and by 9400 the ship was waterborne and in tow of Locust.
21. Between 9400 and 0700 the tow parted three times, and we had progressed only three miles. But after 0700 the tow was satisfactory and H.M.S. Locust towed as across to the
English coast, arriving at the North Goodwin Light Vessel at
2100. Speed made good since 0700 2.4 knots.
22. A single Junker bomber appeared for a moment above the fog near the North Goodwin, but made off eastwards.
23. Shaped course to pass eastward of the Goodwins.
At 2245 a French soldier, fully equipped, was seen to jump over the sideby two of Bidefords shipscompany. The tow was stopped.
Although a bucy was dropped and a boat lowered to search, it 1
is regretted the nan was not recovered. The sea was calm and the visibility at that time was good. The man's name is not known.
24. At 2315 we proceeded. The tow parted again at
0330/31st, but after that no further trouble was experienced a and we arrived at Dover at 1130 on th31st May.
25. The casualties to personnel were:-
(a) H.M.S.Bideford's ships company
(i) Killed. Three officers and nine nen.
(11) Missing, believed killed. Four nen.
(111) Dangerously wounded. Two men.
Total ship's company casualties. Four officers
(v) Slightly wounded. One officer & six men.
(1v) Seriously wounded. Ten men.
and thirty one men.
(b) Passengers. (1) Killed. Bwo officers & ten other ranks.
Total passenger casualties. Four officers and
(11) Wounded. Two officers (one dangerously).
ten men.
I have the honour to be,
Your obedient Sir, servant,
VICE ADMIRA
10JUN 1940
Lieutemant Commander in Command.

226
SECRET²⁴¹
Subject.. Personnel. Recommendations for Services in Action.
From.....
Date
The Commanding Officer. H.M.S.BIDEFORD.
June 6th. 1940. NO.....
To
The Vice Admiral Commending. Lover.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward the following report on the conduct of By officers and ships company during the period May 29th - May 31st. 1940.
2. The general behaviour of the personnel was excellent. There was a feeling of great satisfaction throughout the ship when the orders to proceed to Dunkirk were recieved,
3. The behaviour of the nen under fire was exemplary.
There were no signs of panic or fear; orders were passed and recleved clearly, and were executed rapidly and correctly. All did their duty caluly and efficiently.
4. Great credit for the general organisation of the ship to meet emergencies is due to the late Lieutenant PAUL
ALISTAIR STEWART R.N., the Executive officer and Gunnery officer of the ship.
5. No acts of exceptional gallantry were observed, but I wish to bring to your special notice the two following cases of very great devotion to duty:-
I. Surgeon Lieutenant JOHN JORDAN. MB. B.Ch. R.N.
This officer by his conduct, zeal and unswerving devotion to duty throughout the period May 29th - May 31st.
was an outstanding example to us all. His Sick Borth Attendant seriously wounded; with limited resources, he competed with some fifty casualties, many horribly autilated or dangerously wounded. He performed sever 1 major operations; he organised his limited resources to their utmostn; throughout the period h he attended his patients continuously, and at all times displayed great Dility, patience and understanding. No effort was too much for him, no call was left unanswered; he was completely selfless. He upheld the traditions of the Royal Navy and of his profession in a most worthy nanner. It is considered that he TO
would be the very worthy recipient of a decoration in recogniti of his services.
GEORGE CROWDER
II. No.7354480. Private WILLIAM CROWDER.
6th. Field Ambulance " Company.
England. After the ship was struck by bonbs he volunteered
This man wasembarked from Bray Beach for passage to an hour later S.M.S.Kellett came alongside to take off all troops immediately to assist the Surgeon in tending the wounded, About promptly said he would remain in H.W.S.Hideford and continue embarked, because this was considered most advisable. Crowder
Bideford the very severly damaged and aground; at that time tending wounded. He did yhis knowing full well that thatH.M.S.
it was considered was highly improbable the ship would England. reach

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242
Page 2.
would reach England;
yet in he was prepared to give up his chance of getting away of the greatest possible help to our Surgeon. Crowder
H.M.S. Bideford after H.M.S.Kellett had proceeded, and was order to tend his wounded comrades. He remained in hours continuously, in a most efficient manner. I consider carried out his voluntary duties for all but forty eight this man showed a great sense of duty and displayed great personal courage in his decision to remain onboard. I wish to decoration. recommend him as being worthy of consideration for a
.The following men of this ship are recommended for their services. They are placed in order of merit.
I.S.P.O. Charles William Donnelly. D/K.59925.
A/Ck. Albert Victor HOCKING. D/MX.58549.
When the ship was bombed everyone aft was killed or badly wounded, except these two nen. S.P.O.
Donnelly's duty was "in charge of the after fire and repair party". Hocking formed one of the "First Aid Party".
The fire main aft wasblown away, and fire brue out in the cabin flat immediately above the after magazine.
These two men working entirely on their own, ran hoses aft from the first sound connection, and succeeded in getting the fire under sontrol, and hoses down the after magazine hatch to flood the magazine, (the magazine flooding arrangements were destroyed) and partly flooded it before assistance came, I consider their very prompt and efficient action probably saved the ship, and I consider them both worthy of consideration for the Distinguished Service Medal.
II. Iconsider the following three nen worthy of being
"mentioned in despatches" for the services set forth against their names.
(a) Signalman Charles Raymond CRAIG.D/JX.141848.
He was landed with Lieutenant Davey, when that officer lande to organise the embarkation on the beach. Craig joined one of the embarkation posts, took charge of the signalling apparatus and got into communication with several sh ships. When the station was destroyed by bombing, Craig improvised a signal lamp out of the head light of a lorry, and used this till the battery ran down. He remained ashore all night and was eventually sent off by the embarkation officer.
On arrival at Dover he volunteered immediately to go over to
Dunkirk Pier, where signalmen were required, and spent another night there.
(b) P.O.Tel. Frederick PERRY. D/JX. 127240.
After the main mast was destroyed and all aerials were destroyed this man succeeded in rigging a jury aerial and getting through an importatnt signal to the Vice Admiral, Dover.
(o) AB. Leslie Kenneth FOSTER. D/J.108109.
This man was quartermaster throughout the time the ship Dunkeerke Rade. He performed his duties in a most efficient was in manner. Afterethe stern was blown off and there was

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230
245
city port on operations in connection with the evacuation of the B.B.F. from the Duniciple aroa. (Continued).
Wednesday 20th May.
500
All wounded that could be moved evacuated into
Schoot or ships boats all of which returned to
"Calcutta".
Schoot, with a certain number of wounded, sent back to England as she was nearly unmanagoable with her stooring goar in a precarious state.
345
Doats sent in again to collect HOTO troops as they arrived and 18 possible to connect with Lord Corb in view of your message 0127/20th May.
Officer in charge of "Calcutta's" bonts, If P.J. Harch
Cunner, made personal contact with Lord Corb about
0 miles inland, and placed "Caloutta" at his disposal for his or his staff's evacuation. Lord
Cart courteously refused to be evacuated at this stage.
430
One of "Calcutta's a shalers lost.
580
Opened fire on one Dornier.
7710
"Calcutta's" boats returned with more troops and sent in again to La Panno with relief crows.
735
"Sutton" alongside to disembark her troops into
"Caloutta" and return close inshore opposite La
0010
Panno. "Salemander alongside and as for "Subton" above.
1810
Party of tuge and drifters towing own boats aighted, proceeding homewards full of troops. All ordered alongside "Calcutta"to disembarkttheir troops and return to La Panno for mr.
1227
"Java" towing launch alongside.
1328
"Colden Sunbean" towing launch alongaide.
1230
"Lord Rodney" alongside.
1237
"Lord Keith" towing Launch alongaide.
1247
"Lord St Vincent" alongsido.
1250
"Lord Collingwood" alongaide.
1335
Panne at this time, informed that bugs and drifters
Captain (D) 1st D/Y, who WAD senior officer at La were being sent in to load up again.
1350
"Calcutta's" boats returned to ship.
1357
1000
Weighed. Arrived Shoorness. Diserbarked 1000 troops and completed with oil fuel and amition.
Priday 31st Hay.
1040
Anchored off East Margato buoy with "Mallard" and
Slipped from buoy at Shoorness.
3130
"shoorwater" in company.
Saturday 1st June.
0315
Weighed and proceeded with "Mallard" between and W "sheerwater". and X
0500
Commonded patrolling on X route buoyse to return to Sheerness.
0038
ordered fire on one Heinkel who shot had down. attached and
1015
1018
damaged Opened fire on two more Heinkels diving from
Opened "Mosquito". Heinkel
Detached "she reator" to stand by "Mosquito".
broken clouds.
1024
1312 ********

332
338
7.
mostly suffering from severe burns; the Commanding
Fifty seven cot-cases alone were brought off,
Officer and other survivors from His Majesty's Destcleared the steamer out as far as was known, I proroyer Grenade were amongst those embarked, After having ceeded down the coast towards Bray, and picked up troops from several boats, which they had found on the beach. A
Captain Churchill, from the Headquarters Staff, off and told me that he had to get over to England to see his uncle, the Prime Minister,by 0600.
8.
I proceeded to Margate, arriving at 0550 on May
30th, disembarked troops,survivors and Cartain Churchill, then sailed for Sheerness for coal and Ammunition.
9.
I left Sheerness at 0300 on the 31st and arrived without incident off the beach just to the Bast of
Dunkirk, at 0930. The rate of embarkation was slow ording to considerable surf on the beach, but valuable assistance was given by a large power boat, It was necessary for me to leave at 1230 in order to unload and be at By render-vous by 8300 on May 31st for the evening operations.
10.
I sailed from liargate to comply with previous instructions and proceeded, under the orders of the
Senior Officer 11 the Fifth Minesweeping Flotila, to By appointed station off the beach; navigation at this period was difficult,a the absence of wind allowed the smoke from Dunkirk to settle over the channel, that visibility The poor. On enchoriz at 2345 a shell from 8
shore battery landed about a cable to securd; this ma repeated spasmodically. Reports were then received of magnetic nines being dropped in the channel.
on 11, embarkation, using ships' boats, Short y after a
About 0832 the Flotil a ms ordered to carry bombing attack took place,and from then on these attacks were practically continuous. Several Heinkel III
type aircraft were observed, but the majority of the attackers were identified as Junkers 87 Dive-bombers.
Embarkation was carried out, though the rate ha slow, this operation the ship case under machine-gun fire aground; 12. a vire was passed and I towed her off. During
His Majesty's Ship Speedwell ma seal to be tenant for the speed and coolness with which be carried from the air, end great credit is due to ay First Lieuout the ution.
afloat 15. to proceed alongaide in Dunkirk harbour, and to
I then received orders from the 7108 Officer comp. ete with troops there. As troops vere being and a machine-gun embarked, attack me delivered, but no casualties were bombs were dropped in the harbour incurred.
14. board, His Majesty's Dostroyer Ivanhoe to was her hit
Just before I al ipped, with a full load of by troops a bomb on outside the herbour. Two ships went assistance, 80 I proceeded at full speed,

CONFIDENTIAL
320c. (For use with S. 1320b).
NAVAL MESSAGE.
(Revised Dynams 805. 356
October, 1935.)
te
$$
100
ECRE
SS
1
An
60
Dynam
355
65
TER OF PROCEEDINGS - EVACUATION.
DN
a
70
Decreases 20H. 010
3160
-3-
with engines stopped when boats and planes could be detected by sound at a far greater range than visibility permitted. It is submitted that this course might profitably be employed during patrols.
May 31st 1940. 1140 to June 1st 1940. 0547.
Instructions were received to proceed to Ramsgate, rendezvous and escort small boat convoy to Dunkirk. The Convoy sailed at 1453
approximately 3 hours after scheduled time. Opportunity was taken at Ramsgate to off-load all depth charges as it was considered inadvisable to continue carrying these. The convoy consisted of
5 tugs and 5 drifters each towing between three and fifteen small boats. The convoy straggled somewhat on the way over and when the Reutigen bouy was reached the leaders were eased down to enable the convoy to arrive together. At this time & large force of
German bombers and fighters were seen approaching. There were inumerable ships of all shapes and sizes in the vicinity and &
general bombing raid was commenced. British fighters arrived at this time and the attack became disorganised, - the bombers eventually disappearing inland. The convoy arrived off Dunkirk from Keith who directed the convoy to the various beaches as at approximately 2110, S.0.6. embarked Lieut. Comdr. Wynne-Edwards required. approximately 2315 when returning to the Keith a collision At occurred with what appeared to be as medium-sized yacht.
S.0.6. astern but the yacht's stern swinging round was put into to port stove in S.0.6. on the starboard bow as she altered course ribs and making & large out in the planking the aid above fracturing several the damage was being inspected by
On shaded torch fire General Leese was embarked and instructions of a waterline. While was opened on 9.0.6. from at German aeroplane.
were arrival given at Keith Lord Gort from Hebe, and to return to England
Keith. at Hebe it as Keith and approximately three-quarters embarked dropping arrival General Leese discovered that Lord Gort crossed to to collect in Dunkirk if Lord Gort approved. had of an 9.0.6. returned Gort to also arrived there. He to Dover. was forthwith and the and that it was the first time be any desired. the crew had hour later Lord General Leese taken direct of fire fact their behaviour left nothing to
June 2nd 1940. 1201 to 1982
Gladys" Instructions were received down 7 miles east about 3 miles off to carry out a of search Dunkirk for drifter and for "Girl approximately reported 30 broken soldiers in an was open set boat from Dover direct to Dunkirk towards reported tho by aircraft. Course than intended to proceed to slowly put out to clear of land and make allow for the set promised and the coast to search for another the approach to the of coast the tide fro BI the outer Reutigen. It was open boat, subsequently approximately sea
10 miles east of Dunkirk to escort had been time caution the had report to be was exercised received. as Air no ships were operating off Dunkirk

CONFIDENTIAL
320c. (For use with S. 1320b).
NAVAL MESSAGE.
(Revised Dynamso ds. 356
October, 1935.)
te
ECRE
$5
10
55
1
An
Dynam
349
lasman
60
355
65
TER OF PROCEEDINGS - EVACUATION.
DNI
n
70
7010
3347
4
during daylight. About half-way across a French trawler with an open boat in tow was hailed. He reported having picked the boat up with soldiers off Dunkirk and it was thought this might be the boat for which we were searching. To make sure we proceeded to Dunkirk where two open boats and a Thames barge with sail set were found approximately three miles from the coast. The first open boat yielded five Spaniards, the second one about 6 soldiers, Belgian, French and
English. We then went alongside the Thames barge at approximately 1330. This was found to contain about 320
soldiers including two Colonels and a Major of Artillery, and various wounded. They were endeavouring to sail to England but had made approximately three miles in 10 hours, see note below.
Motor-mechanic Whittaker fitted a new piston to the air compressor motor while the 1st Lieut. and myself trimmed the sails.
They had no charts on board. The air compressor motor was made to run but all efforts to start the diesel failed.
I then left 1st Lieut., Leiut. Dehammel with instructions opened the distance to search for the "Girl Gladys".
to sail the my barge to Dover; and proceeded along the coast having
About two up miles to the east I found an open boat containing 18
soldiers who were embarked, after which we approached to within of La Panne. Visibility was good and no sign of the drifter approximately three miles of the coast slightly to the eastward could be seen, the search was therefore abandoned and course was set to intercept the Thames barge.
by approximately eight dive-bombers, 20 to 30 were the dropped
At 1720 when out of sight of land bombs we were attacked
The fell at to attack in pairs out dive of the sun and eight six distances or varying from 10 to 50 yards of and ship.
having bombers appeared their bombs continued their endeavour firing to machine- miss guns. the Course was appeared to explode after entering water, released altered frequently in an the some bombs. Some the surface and & certain number appeared ahead and not the to explode at all. the splash. A certain amount who were exposed was on striking One exploded under the bow right of discomfort ship passed through myself and members of the crew hours or 80. to experienced the by eyes for the next twelve manning
Able-Seaman Power of the soldiers in the fore to peak. return to Dover now had splash in the was wounded in the leg when As I the port wounded on board ask for assistance for barge sailing turret also one I considered it advisable the barge. A tug was forthwith and approximately to 2100 and found the Deut. Dehammel well sent out at from Dover. I consider Sub. bombing to performed a very subjected had caused leaks for that night's the about 10 miles creditable operation. The to the hull which and petrol the ship tank had and been the ship was not used again operation.

CONFIDENTIAL
320c. (For use with S. 1320b).
NAVAL MESSAGE.
(Revised 356
October, 1935.)
te
ECRE
ss
10
55
1
PA
Alel Tasman.
60
Dynam 355
65
THER OF PROCEEDINGS - EVACUATION.
a
70
352
346
with engines stopped when boats and planes could be detected by sound at a far greater range than visibility permitted. It is submitted that this course might profitably be employed during patrols.
May Slst. 1940. 1140 to June 1st. 1940. 0547.
Instructions were received to proceed to Ramsgate, rendenvous and escort small boat convoy to Dunkirk. The Convoy sailed at 1453
approximately 3 hours after scheduled time. Opportunity was taken at Ramsgate to off-load all depth charges as It was considered inadvisable to continue carrying these. The convoy consisted of
5 tugs and 5 drifters each towing between three and fifteen small boats.
The convoy straggled somewhat on the way over and when the Reutigen bouy was reached the leaders were eased dom to enable the convoy to arrive together. At this the a large force of
German bombers and fighters were seen approaching. There were
Anumorable ships of all shapes and sizes in the vicinity and a general bombing raid was commenced. British Mighters arrived at this time and the attack because disorganised, The bombers eventually disappearang inland.
The convoy arrived off Dunkirk at approximately 2110, S.0.6. embarked Lieut.Comdr.@ynne-Edwardes from Keith who directed the canvoy to the various beaches as required. At approximately 2315 when returning to the Keith a collision occurred with what appeared to be at medium-sized yacht.
S.0.6. was put into astern but the yacht's stern subcking swinging round as she altered course to part stove in S.O.6. on the starboard bow fracturing several ribs and making a large out in the planking above waterline. While the damage was being inspected by the aid of a shaded torch fire was opened on S.0.6. from a German aeroplane.
were given at to collect Lord Corb from Hebe, and to return to England
On arrival Keith General Leese was eurbarked and instructions dropping General Leese in Dunkirk if Lord Gort approved.
Keith. arrival at Hebe returned to Keith and approximatly three-quarters
On it was discovered that Lord Cort had crossed to of Inc. S.0.6. Lord Gort also arrived there. He was embarked forthwith an hour later and General Leese taken direct to Dover.
Considering fire the their behaviour laft nothing to desired.
and he fact that it was the first time be any of the crew had
June 2nd. 1940. 1801 to 1922.
Gladys" were broken down 7 miles east of Dunkirk 3 miles and off for
Instructions received to carry out a search for drift."Girl approximately reported 30 soldiers in Course an open was boat set about from Dover direct Dunkirk to reported the by aircraft. It was then intended subsequently to proceed to slowly put out towardds to the outer Reutigen. for the open boat, approximately sea clear coast to search make another approach to the coast the tide from the
10 of land and Dunkirk to allow for the set of been promised and time miles east of received. Air escort had off Dunkrik causion the had report to be was exercised as no ships were operating

CONFIDENTIAL
320c. (For use with S. 1320b).
NAVAL MESSAGE.
(Revised Dyrams. & S. 356
October, 1935.)
te
ECRE
$5
100
55
1
An
Dynam
355
349
Ahel Tasman. 60
65
TTER OF PROCEEDINGS - EVACUATION.
a
70
353
during daylight. About half-way across a French trawler with an open boat in tow was hailed. He reported having picked the boat up with soldiers off Dunkirk and it was thought this might be the boat for 14 ich we were searching. To make sure we proceeded to Dunkirk where - two open boats and & Thames barge with sail set were found approximately three miles from the coast. The first open boat yielded five Spanieards, the second one about 6 soldiers, Belgian, French and English. No then went alongside the Thanes barge at approximately 1330.
This was found to contain about 220
soldiers including two Colonels and a Major of Artillery, and various wounded. They were endeavouring to sail to England but had made approximately three miles in 10 hours, ⑉ note below.
Motor-mechanic Whittaker fitted a new platon to the air compressor motor while the let.Lieut. and myself trimed the sails.
They had no charge on board. The air compressor motor was made to run but all efforts to start the diesel failed.
I then left my 1st,Lieut., SublLient. Delhamel with instructions to sail the barge to Dover, and proceeded along the coast having opened up the distance to search for the "Girl Gladys".
About two miles to the east I found an open boat containing 18
soldiers who were embarked, after which we approached to withing approximately three miles of the coast alightly to the eastward of La Panne. Visibility was good and no sign of the drifter could be seen, the search was therefore abandoned and course was set to intercept the Thanes barge.
by eight six or eight dive-bombers, 20 to 30 bomba were dropped
At approximately 1720 when out of sight of land we were attached
The bombers at appeared to attack in pairs out of the sun and and fell distances varying from 10 to 50 yards of the ship.
having released their bombs continued their dive firing machine- to guns. Course was altered frequently in an endeavour miss the bombs.
Some appeared to explode after entering the water, at on striking exploded under the box right discomfort a ome the surface and a certain,appeared ahead and not the to ship explode passed all. One the splash* A certain amount who of were exposed was the experienced by the x eyes for the next twelve manning the through myself and members of the crew hours or 80. to splash in wounded in the leg when part
Able-Seaman Power of was the soldiers in the fore to peak. return As to Dover I now had wounded on board ask for assistance for the the barge. barge sailing well was turrets also one I considered it advisable A tug sent forthwith out and to 8100 and I consider found Sub.Lieut, Delfammel about performed 10 a very creditable subjected had operation. caused leaks The for to bombing the that bull night's to which and the the petrol ship tank had and been the ship was not used again operation.

366
ENCLOSURE TO REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - DUNKIRK OPERATIONS.
H.M.S.EXPRESS, eutenant Commander
As Navigating Officer was of
Deane R.N.
the greatest assistance in keeping the ships reckoning under most difficult conditions, in charting the routes and ever increasing number of wrecks. Has most ably carried out his duties in this and all minelaying operations in which "Express"
has been employed.
eutenant D.H. Maitland-
An exceptionally able Officer kgill-Crichton R.N.
whose attention in promoting the efficiency of the ships company,in the performance of their Seamanlike and at action duties was fully proved by the highly satisfactory manner in which the ship embarked approx:
3500 troops, and was fought when attacked by aircraft and shore batteries. This
Officer has maintained an excellent spirit and state of efficiency in all the various services on which the ship has been employed throughout the var.
Reficient and 0001 as G.C.O.
b Lieutenant ships fire as directed
L. Aldridge R.N.
R.F.
Ably dealt with the large rgeon Lieutenant of casualties embarked in the
C. Shelford R.N.V.R.
number ship for the passage to England.
As Officer of the (marters of fire
R.J.A.Baker nner street aft displayed valuable and on which the has the var ship in airing been employed.

SECRET
4
2.
......and as there were only 4 Officers for the three ships only two of the ships sailed. I consider that this was a proper decision having regard to the circumstances. The inexperience of the crew and the strangeness of the ships and also the locality made a passage an extremely arduous affair.
The close proximity of the German army made it imperative to return to England as soon as possible.
Accordingly I was put on board H.M.S. "Calcutta" early to-day en route for Chatham Hospital.
4.
During the time ashore at La Panne I was beseiged with requests for a passage to England or France from French and Belgian Officers. These Officers all stated that their desire was to reform and fight again.
I informed them all sympathetically that I
could not give them a passage without the approval of
General Adam. As this was not forthcoming in the majority of cases, about 20 of them got & Diesel engined boat from the beach and requested that they might come across to
England in company with me. I readily acceded to this request and was prepared to tow them if necessary.
5.
I understand that the Admiralty were informed by the Military that my 1st Lieutenant and myself had become casualties.
6.
I regret that I am unable to inform you of the present whereabouts of the three ships.
from 7. Dover I considered it proper that this report should
As routeing and instructions were received be submitted to you. If this is not correct it is requested that this report may be forwarded to the proper authority.
VIOE ADMI
ADMIR
7.5.8.a.
A
Lieutenant-Commander, R.N.
DOV

68
I
-
67
to the westward and anchried opposite the
French battery until daylisht. During the might I shifted borth further to the westward to avoid "oras" from the
Perman batteries shelling the French fort.
June 1ˢᵗ
1/6
At darr [ closed the beach ajain where some troops were seen marching lowards Dushisk. They should no particular clesse Is come off and only about 100 straggles were embarled, the main body antioning along the beach.
At about 0800 therefore [ closed the "Kith flying the flag of hear Admiral wake-walhor. Captain Pin reported the situation and was andered IS close the beaches close castward of Danhih, and if there were no troops there to proceed
Is England.
Shortly often this stung formating of enemy chise bonkers appeared and Kith was aepeatedly attached until put out of action and chandmed ship. During this period E remained under way
3ig zagging as apart from Keith and Skipjack there appeared the

69
68
little else for the arrift 5 cittach.
I about proceedure to the aid of "Huths survivors and with the heep of mater bouts recovered a large mumber, including two British Brigadies and a
French seneral. while this was taking place enemy chise bonhare appeared your and Sanh "Skipsack about half mile from n2. As soon as possible i proceded K their and and piched up all the Survivors except ⑆ but 12 of were recovered by a they. They were in a rong pitcous state being conced in oil fact, and in some uses service wounded. By the time this was completed E had Are then a full load, emadering their condition, and maraded for England. Dive bombus appeared your and finished off the "Kith but by some oversight child not attack Hilda althnish she appeared to the only craft left eflout in the roads.
I passed Dunkish breakwah chat
1130.
Shortly after passing No bbuy

74
73
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6. I approached a number of trawlers and other small vessels which seemed to be getting under way for Great Britain and asked them to remain until I could fill them up with troops. It seemed to me that the orders which they said they had received to return to Great Britain were not bona fide.
7. I proceeded ashore and interviewed various military officers at as many of the beaches as possible. At the request of a senior military officer I agreed to assume the duties of Beach Master and arranged to continue the organisation until all the troops on the beaches were on board. I told them that if anything went wrong during the night we would return at dawn. I learned that some of the men had been in the dunes for two or three days awaiting embarkation, and they were obviously much cheered up to learn that they would get out that night. The flat-bottomed boats which the military had been using themselves were extremely dangerous in the surf which, although not very great, was sufficient to capsize these boats.
8. I found from experience that it was much quicker to run a load of troops in a single motor boat rather than to fill up one or more lifeboats and tow the greater number. The dangers of controlling boats in tow when they were crowded both near the shore and alongside H.M. ships were considerable. During the night I acquired in one way or another five additional lifeboats, and in many cases the military themselves acted as crews.
9. The pontoon bridges which had been built by the military the previous day were extremely useful, and were largely responsible for the rapid evacuation of troops. It is interesting to note that a few moments after the last men had been taken off one of these bridges it was hit by enemy artillery.
10. All the troops that I could find were embarked by midnight and placed in ships which sailed for England. Just before midnight I went along certain of the beaches to look for stragglers. A Staff Officer informed me that no more troops would embark from these beaches but that they would march to
Dunkirk, as it was anticipated these beaches would be shelled and would probably be in German hands the following day. This, as it turned out, was a correct forecast.
11. I estimate that from pontoon bridges and beaches approximately 5,000 troops were probably embarked.
12. The soldiers, though obviously extremely tired, made no complaints of the delay or of the wettings which they got in wading out in the surf to get into the motor boats, and were more than thankful for the kindnesses which were shown them in the various ships. One could not but be impressed by the amount of friendly cheering which occurred when H.M. ships passed the troop ships at sea. The great majority of the troops were carrying their rifles and side-arms, and I insisted that in no case must they be thrown away. I was impressed to notice that the military padres were always amongst the last to leave the beach in their respective parties.
13./

74
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13. Several of the motor boats had now broken down and between midnight and 3 a.m. complete repairs were done to these boats, which was most creditable to the R.N.R. and
R.N.V.R. officers and ratings sent from EXCELLENT and KING
ALFRED to man them.
14. I found it necessary to shift my anchorage to the west during the night, as shells meant for the beaches were ricocheting over H.M.S. HILDA.
15. In accordance with my undertaking to the troops, I sent off all boats again at 3.15 a.m. to search the beaches, starting from the western end of Bray-Dunnes. During the next three hours approximately only 250 men were taken off the beaches, and these in small parties; they were apparently stragglers.
A large rearguard party marching along the beach decided to continue to Dunkirk.
June.
16. At 7.30 a.m. approximately I closed H.M.S. KEITH and reported the position to Admiral Wake-Walker. He told me to continue my search of the beaches and if possible transfer my troops to another ship, subsequently returning to England.
17. Unfortunately, with the exception of KEITH, SKIPJACK, one destroyer a considerable distance away and an Admiralty tug, there were no vessels to whom I could transfer these troops, besides which, with the dive bombing and shelling, it would, as it turned out, have been impossible.
18. dive bomber and was abandoned shortly afterwards.
At approximately 8 a.m. H.M.S. KEITH received at direct hit closed from KEITH a and picked up some 50 survivors out of the water, including this stage I jettisoned all my spare petrol. The off Admiralty the
I the Q.M.G. of the B.E.F. and other Staff Officers.
At went alongside KEITH before she sank and took the east majority make a final inspection of the beaches and to see motortug of the survivors. I then proceeded to that no to boats had been left behind.
19. dive bomber Half an and sank immediately. I closed SKIPJACK picked hour later SKIPJACK received a direct hit and from a up some 60 or 70 survivors.
20. Dive bombing had been more while or less HILDA continuous proceeded since towards early morning Dunkirk Germans or narrowly 21. three At on and seemed missed 10.30 occasions, passage the to attacks be home. but in in complete during went the British on the control fighters greater for of bomba, of England, two part sink. the were of and air. of H.M. seen being after the transports on day an two the hour's I saw the steaming, latter while struckby dive bombers and
22./

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22. As I now had some 530 troops on board my small vessel, many of whom were in an extremely critical condition or badly wounded, and as there were some 15 ships standing by to pick up the survivors from these transports I thought it better to continue my course to England, but succeeded in picking up a number of French survivors. I was impressed by the splendid action of one British army officer, who several times went overboard to tie lines round those in the water. I did not ascertain his name.
23. I passed a signal to V.A. Dover through a destroyer giving E.T.A. for Ramsgate and asking for ambulances.
24. I arrived at Ramsgate at 5.30 p.m. and landed all my
British and French troops together with survivors from H.M. ships.
One man had died and two others were in an extremely critical condition.
25. I telephoned a full report of the operations and of the final evacuation of the beaches to an officer on the Staff of
V.A. Dover, and at 7.30 sailed for Dover. While on passage home I passed a number of motor boats being towed to Dunkirk, and after consultation with the Q.M.G. advised them to continue their journey and ask for instructions on arrival, as they might be of use to the Officer-in-Charge of the evacuation at
Dunkirk beach. The only boats brought home by me were two which were completely out of order. The other lifeboats, whalers etc. were left at Dunkirk for further use.
26. HILDA arrived at Dover at 10 o'clock but was not permitted to enter. While at anchor outside at approximately 11 o'clock a magnetic mine was dropped 50 yards south-east of the ship, and this was duly reported to the Examination Officer and sweeping operations carried out next morning.
June.
27. Reported at the office of V.A. Dover the results of the operation which I had been ordered to carry out, and was told to submit a full report in writing.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.
28. The evacuation was carried out without injury to any of the troops, but a number were killed on the beaches by shrapnel while standing by or moving along.
29. I found that the crews of the motor boats, all young officers and ratings, were very steady both under shell fire and while close to dive bombing.
30. The great majority of the troops were carrying their rifles and equipment, and I was particularly struck by the fact that I heard no complaint at any time from these tired men, even when up to their shoulders in water in the surf. They appreciated to the full the efforts we were making.
31./

75
-4-
22. As I now had some 530 troops on board my small vessel, many of whom were in an extremely critical condition or badly wounded, and as there were some 15 ships standing by to pick up the survivors from these transports I thought it better to continue my course to England, but succeeded in picking up a number of French survivors. I was impressed by the splendid action of one British army officer, who several times went overboard to tie lines round those in the water. I did not ascertain his name.
25. I passed a signal to V.A. Dover through B destroyer giving E.T.A. for Ramsgate and asking for ambulances.
24. I arrived at Ramogate at 5.30 p.m. and landed all my
British and French troops together with survivors from H.M. ships.
One man had died and two others were in an extremely critical condition.
25. I telephoned a full report of the operations and of the final evacuation of the beaches to an officer on the Staff of
V.A. Dover, and at 7.30 sailed for Dover. While on passage home I passed a number of motor boats being towed to Dunkirk, and after consultation with the Q.M.O. advised them to continue their Journey and ask for instructions on arrival, as they might be of use to the Officer-in-Charge of the evacuation at
Dunkirk beach. The only boats brought home by me were two which were completely out of order. The other lifeboats, whalers etc. were left at Dunkirk for further use.
26. HILDA arrived at Dover at 10 o'clock but was not permitted to enter. While at anchor outside at approximately 11 o'clock a magnetic mine was dropped 50 yards south-east of the ship, and this was duly reported to the Examination Officer and sweeping operations carried out next morning.
June. 27. Reported at the office of V.A. Dover the results of the operation which I had been ordered to carry out, and was told to submit a full report in writing.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.
28. The evacuation was carried out without injury to any of the troops, but a number were killed on the beaches by shrapnel while standing by or moving along.
29. I found that the crews of the motor boats, all young officers and ratings, were very steady both under shell fire and while close to dive bombing.
30. The great majority of the troops were carrying their rifles and equipment, and I was perticularly struck by the fact that I heard no complaint at any time from these tired men, even when up to their shoulders in water in the surf. They appreciated to the full the efforts we were making.
S1./

CONFIDENTIAL
97
96
ORANJE's dated 10th June 1940 (cont)
communicate.
At this time a Blenheim bomber -1th British markings, flew overhead. towards the beach where st dropped all number of small bombs and was fired at with mechine runs and rifles. It was then presumed that the beach was held by German troops, but it was later ascertained that the Germans had obtained and were using a number of aircraft with British markings.
Alongside the Barrage vessel we were informed by el number of soldiers wearin British and French uniforms that the B.E.F.
was being evacuated, and that they had been told to find their own way back to England as best they could, all their officers having already left them. They also stated that they had nothing to eat and asked us to provide them with bread.
I informedthem that I was proceeding to Dunkirk, but would consider pickin them on the return journey. ORANJE then proceeded on her way.
7. On approaching Dunkirk ORANJE met snother scoot coming away who informed us that we were too small to be of use alongside, nor could we land stores there, and should return home. ORANJE turned about, recovered 5 soldiers from the barrage vessel after insuring that they were genuine, supplied the remaining Frenchmen with bread, and sailed for in hom_e. A number of rafts, boats and lifebuoys were observed on the way home, all of which were investigated, but no survivors were found nor were any names found on any of the
ORANJE wreckage. arrived off the North Goodwin Light Vessel at 1500 and was ordered to Ramsgate, proceeding alongside about 1630. The majority of the bomb dam_age was made good, and ORANJE sailed at 1930. with orders to disembark provisions at Le Panne, about 10 miles east of Dunkirk.
8. Wednesday 29th May. ORANJE arrived off Le Panne at 0430 and picked up one man off a raft in an exhausted sond condition. An attempt was then made to beach the ship after streaming a kedge anchor, but the kedge would not hold, and so the bower anchor was let go and the ship allowed to swing round with the tide. In view of the fact that the ship was drawing eight feet of water and that the beach shelves very gradually it was not possible to get closer in than è of 8
mile.
I then proceeded ashore personmally to interview the military 9. authorities and returned on board at 0730 to move the ship to a more convenient place. An arrangement had been made for one working party to come on board to unload the holds, ano ther to muster on the beach to unload the boats, and as many large boats as pos ible would be commandeered.
It was now.
- slum Skut who We arbbiny lud ashin, of pan Pacific beauty Kasi then hor and of: belowed, about he the Pause.
steat Vein was this party 5 anim at the White of at Here spend have in ausurs & trey our
Proceded the beach Ildius were directed C/C for Guild was But &
hail In nituition we is line is Cuch or.
Here Me Guamanding offer a Inimo

Dynamic 376
8/4/0/139
126
J.6633, c/o Messrs. J.S. White & Co.
Cowes, Isle of White,
20th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report of proceedings during operation "DYNAMO" in accordance with P. G. 0.
1700/6/6/40.
In accordance with orders from Commander-in-Chief,
Portsmouth, I assumed command of His Majesty's Ship "SURSUM_
CORDA", (Ex Dutch Skoot) at Poole, P.M. Friday 24th May, 1940, sailing for Portsmouth at 1600, arriving at 2130.
"SURSUM-CORDA" remained in company with other Skoots under the ordera of Lieutenant Commander Stuart in H.M.S
"FREDANJA" until P.M. 28th May, 1940, when ship was sailed for
Dunkirk from Dover at 1400 by order of Vice Admiral Dover, for islbe the evacuation of troops via North Goodwin and Middle Kirke.
On arrival off beaches at Dunkirk at approximately
2230, decided to enter harbour straight away having sighted large number of soldiers on mole, but apparently no other ships in the harbour, though a transport and other skoots were lying off, and two ships just leaving. The western side of the harbour was ablaze.
Having evacuated British troops, approximate number three hundred and seventy, ship sailed for Dover at 0330; &
hospital ship and six or seven other skoots having entered and secured to the mole were also embarking troops by this time.
Ship arrived off Dover 1130/29, no incidents of
30/5?
importance occurring on passage.
"SURSUM-CORDA" remained at Dover, storing and provisioning until orders were received to sail again for Dunkirk at 2100.
Short routevia Calais was taken; ship proceeding independently as visibility was decreasing and all skoots were not ready.
On arrival off Western beaches of Dunkirk, a wreck was sighted approximately half a mile to West of Harbour
31/5
entrance in the approach channel, and cries of & man in the water were heard, a boat was lowered, but the rescue work was
Priso)
left finally to a Sloop's whaler the Sloop itself being on her return passage to England. "SURSUM-CORDA" proceeded and arrived off beaches Eastern side of Dunkirk at 0430/30.
Many men were sighted waiting on the beach approximately two or three miles east of the mole, and on closing H.M.S. "FITZROY"
lying approximately three quarters of a mile off the beach, was asked to assist in ferrying troops from small craft to ITZROY"
and "VANQUISHER", three to four cables to Westward.
For approximately half an hour my Ship remained stopped three cables from the beach embarking as many troops as possible.
This process I considered far tooslow as the number of small boats employed in that area amounted only to four or five and these appeared to be in danger of being swamped by excessive loads, so decided to close the beach while the tide was flooding and endeavour to embark troops over my bows.

127
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This method was found successful and two trips were carried out in same manner. For the third endeavour,
"VANQUISHER" and"FITZROY" having left for England, and no other larger craft being in the vicinity, my intentions were to close again, fill to capacity and proceed towards La Panne, to transfer troops if requested, or return to England.
It is regretted that this effort failed in that
"SURSUM"CORDA" was beached too securely and no efforts ot my part were successful in re-floating.
Thiswwas due to an error in judgement on my part in allowing too many men on board at the time and my incorrect appreciation of the time of the tide turning, no tide tables being carried.
H.M.S. "HEBE" came to my assistance, but unfortunately though a tow was passed, her lack of power and manoeuvreability were strong handicaps, and she herself grounded two cables to
Eastward.
At 0800/30 it was realised there was no chance of the ship moving until the following High Water.
During the period of waiting until High Water that evening, I assisted where possible on the Beach in the vicinity of the Ship, and during periods where there were no small craft operating, took aboard soldiers for shelter and distributed what food remained aboard "SURSUM-CORDA".
All members of my crew worked magnificently under somewhat strained conditions, and with no consideration for themselves.
Further endeavours to re-float were made between 1800
and 2030 using kedge anchor with soldiers onboard assisting.
At 1840 a shell from an enemy shore battery burst & few yards ahead of the ship and four soldiers were hit by splinters. I ordered these and one officer hit whilst on the beach to be placed below and with the assistance of a stretcher bearer my First
Lieutenant, Lieutenant Brooks rendered first aid and made them as comfortable as conditions allowed.
I then cleared the ship of soldiers and continued my efforts to re-float, but with no success, delay being caused by an influx of soldiers somewhat naturally seeking shelter after the shell fire, whom L'ordered to stand by to board "HEBE" who
I could see appeared to shew hopeful signs of clearing the beach. The majority of them carried out these orders and
"HEBE" was re-floated at approximately 1945. On receiving report of my engines being temporarily out of action and on point of "seizing-up") decided further efforts were fruitless, and retaining only wounded and completely exhausted men onboard for shelter, until small craft or ambulances could be commandeered to take them off, decided to land and assist on beach where possible.
(continued ty d, that too
Cing.

-3-
The situation was unchanged during the night;a guard being placed on board and making repeated attempts to signal larger craft passing close to send assistance for bne wounded, who were not in a fit state to be moved to the beach.
Lieutenant Brooks was despatched with two seamen on a raft to commandeer small boats seen drifting down channel approximately half a mile to seaward, but was caught by the tide and eventually picked up by & destroyer and retained onboard as a watchkeeper. This officer had been of the greatest assistance during the operations.
At 0430 an ambulance was procured and three of the wounded transfered to a field station, and at 0520, & motorboat was at last successfully hailed and the remaining wounded were embarked,
Shortly afterwards & whaler and motorboat from H.M.S.
"KINGFISHER" which was endeavouring to work from the beach close to the ship came alongside and took off parties of twenty to thirty. Use was made of "SURSUM-CORDA" in such & manner during the remainder of the forenoon, parties of men embarking onboard and being transferred to Whalers or Motorboats from the stern.
I had reported the situation to the Commanding Officer
H.M.S. "KINGFISHER" and asked him if he would take my men onboard, as I had no further use for them.
At approximately 1230 I was informed that the mole was to be used again and ships were alongside waiting and that all British troops were to proceed there, but I continued taking off stragglers where necessary. Orders were then received from "KINGFISHER" that myself and crew were to repair onboard.
In reporting to the Commanding Officer, I was informed he was returning straight to Ramsgate.
My crew were discharged to Ramsgate and ordered to report to Naval Officer-in-Charge.
I returned myself in "KINGFISHER"to assist where necessary.
Two members of my crew, Leading Seaman Whalley and Sto.
Hobbs, volunteered to return with me, but considered that they should remain for some rest and if necessary would be required for other craft later.
These two ratings were of very great assistance to me during the operation and had no consideration for themselves whatever.
"KINGFISHER" secured alongside the mole at approximately
1930, and I reported to the S.N.O. at Dunkirk informing him of the grounding of "SURSUM-CORDA" and offering to assist where required.
I was ordered to return to England again in the
"VANQUISHER" arriving in Dover approximately 0200 Saturday,
1st June.

138
147
132
11
From Lieut.-Commander H.G.Boys-Smith, R.N.R.
To
Vice-Admiral, Dover.
Date June 7th, 1940.
plain
Subjet:- Summarized report of part taken by ships and craft under my command during the evacuation of
Dunkirk.
th a.m.
Joined Dutch Scoot "Ewente" at Tilbury in command.
Sailed p.m. for Sheerness where vessel was prepared for ded operations.
th p.m.
Sailed from Sheerness direct for Dunkirk beaches
300.
via West Hinder Buoy in company with other "scoots".
3th 6330
When approaching Beaches was turned back by ans
Naval M.L. with orders to return to Ramsgate. Half an hour later was attacked by one salvo of bombs and machine gun fire by a German bomber which appeared to
1.
be returning from the direction of England. Arrived
Erik
Ramsgate a.m. same day.
00
8th p.m.
Sailed for Dunkirk via Buoys U, V, If, and 6 West.
situal
Dunkirk harbour entrance was reached just before midnight.
A full load of British troops was ferried off in drifters & k.
(380). Ship sailed immediately by same route. Fierce
Leh fires were blazing all over Dunkirk, lighting up the sea. Continuous distant firing was heard. Local
I
4R
ICE ADMIRAL
Ell day light an air
JUN 1940
the durlsping at
*
DOVER
- disausanted toops, promium stares.

Dyram 162
158
153
The Commanding Officer,
HMS "Vernon".
From Commanding Office,
HMS "Bystander."
Isv. June 1940.
Report upon the action of seaman cook J.H.H. Elton (RM.
Patrol Service) in reseuring survivors from Hims King
Orry on 30st cllay 1940.
"
Sir,
I beg to submit the following report upon the action of man cook J.H.H. Elton. a member of the of this ship, when this ship was engaged in reseuring survivors
HMS "King Orly: when she foundared off Dunkirk at about
+5 30 th ellay, 1940.
This ship. an echo-sounding vessel was in the process refitting at Ramsgate when she was given route orders for unkink to assist in transporting troops to England.
During this operation. I arrived at Dumkink at
30 of 29th ellay 1940 I was instructed to proceed to HMS
ing Pry" and take off her arew as she was in danger of bundering as a result of a bombing raid earlier in the day.
the Commanding officer of King Drry: however, decided to attempt

159
154
beach thank her outside the harbow and I therefore left and proceeded to take on board my ship 72 soldiers
Dunkirk for transporting to england
I left Dumkirk hasbour at 0130, 30sh ellay 1940 and ountered "King Qry smiking in the fairway. The ship turned
S and pundered in about fifteen minutes, but I was le to approach her and launch the 8 ft boat with a w of two - seaman cook Elton and seaman R. Scott.
These men found that the crew of King Only were impting to swim to my ship but that they were in a ak state owing to the effects of the bombing vaids they had enienced and toof the very cold water. Elton thereupon ed into the water and supported as many of the survivors he could find while Scott rowed boatboads of men back
"Bystander: In my estimation Elton remained in the water a half-hour at first supporting swimmers and then swimming and endeavouring to recover chose who could be heard roning. On the last trip back to "Bystander, eight 02 ten were recoured as Elton was able to put survivors on
-rafts and tow them across.
I regret there was not more time at my disposal to over more men and I was aware of at least two presons

&
I
187
made for the coast.
All five of us had so far crossed safely.
At 0500 arrived at beach near La Panne, and recognised it as Cupola, hundreds upon hundreds of troops waiting to be taken off. I proceeded, stopped just out off the surf and commenced towing boatloads of soldiers to Destroyers and Trawlers.
I continued without stopping for any reason until about
1200 30/5/40, when alongside a Destroyer, a voice hailed me, saying,
"Well done, motor boat, wait for me".
An Officer wearing a lambskin coat came on board. He was wet through, however, he said he wanted me to carry on as I was doing and that then he would have one or two other jobs for me.
So I carried on taking off troops to ships. In the late afternoon the Officer above mentioned, whose name I then leanred was Commodore Stephens or Stevens, asked me to run him down to a certain position on the beach, and he instructed me not to do anything until he returned as he was going ashore to look for Lord
Gort, and, if he got him, I was to take him straight to England.
Enemy shore batteries were now on and off dropping heavy shells quite close. Commodore Stephens waded ashore through the surf, up to the neck in water. In an hour's time he returned, waded out again, but did not mention Lord Gort's name, and I did not ask him why he had not come.
I made a good guess.
The Commodore then ordered me to close a destroyer, and I had the honour of receiving my Admiral on board with C.O.S. ( I can't remember his name). I closed the surf to land him by his whaler which I was towing. However, he ddd not land and I returned him aboard his ship. shells stillfalling around.
Commodore Stephens and I then carried on taking troops to ships.
Long before this I had spoken to "SILVER QUEEN" and made sure she had distributed her petrol supplies.
She disappeared about this time and I did most of the rescue work myself,
(with one or two boats from destroyers) from now on until the following afternoon. At 0100, rescued 7 soldiers from drowning.
Continued rescue work until 0200 (approx.) 31/5/40
when, being in very close inshore, I went aground; I knew the tide was rising so didn't worry, but put out my anchor astern and tried to heave her off.
Succeeded in floating her at 0400 and carried on as before.
Now I was feeling the strain somewhat, but worse lay ahead. At about 0800 strong North wind and very heavy swell, boat rolling and pitching at every turn and going alongside ships was very difficult.
Commodore Stephens now asked me to take him out to an
M.T.B. which had come in, and he asked me to continue the good work alone.
He said I had done good work, but could not allow me to rest, too much remained to be done.
I might say that the
Commodore said I was "A good fellow", and on other occasions said
I was "a bloody fool". It is not my place to pass remarks about
Senior Officers, but this Officer, without cap, soaked through, without food, was a great example to me.
He helped me to steer, to pass lines, to haul drowning soldiers aboard, and very often would say, "Come on the Army".
"Where have I seen you before, you are so good looking, I'm sure I know you".
Other times he cursed the lot as stupid.
I carried on after he left me and so I come to 1330 on
31/5/40. sight, and heavy shelling was taking place, suddenly the shelling
I was heading close inshore at this time, no boats in became terrific, and my Cox. called out "For God's sake get off,
Sir, look, all the destroyers have left".
It was as he said, but a small Merchant ship remained.
I closed her and saw she too was heaving up. so I proceeded after the destroyers towards
Dunkerque. the last Naval Boat. The troops had all disappeared from the
I was the last Naval Officer to leave La Panne, and beach. to the most Easterly position from Dunkerque in which our ships
I proceeded along the beach close inshore, until I came lay.
I got a very heavy boat load of troops in tow.

Dynam 232
205
192
LOG of H.M. Motor Boat LADY CABLE of Torquay during operations carried out June 2md and 3rd, 1940.
In command: Acting Sub-Lieutenant G.A. Cadell, R.N.
Cadet Rating G.R. Price
Stoke Worsall
Able Seaman or Ordinary Seaman Smith from Newfoundland,
Sunday, June 2nd, 1940.
Took over boat during forenoon from Mr. Gooding who operates boat for owner at Torquay. She had done one trip to the beaches near Dunkirk. Took on provisions, water, petrol, etc. Mr. Gooding showed Stoker Worsall the working of the engines Cylinder Atlantic - running on petrol.
At about 1500 went over to Prince of Wales Pier and was then taken in tow by SUN VI, together with two life-boats and one other craft. Started for Dunkirk at approximately
1530, having been handed previously copy of Sailing
Instructions to Drifters, together with rough sketch map of course to follow. After uneventful trip arrived off
Dunkirk harbour at about 2230 and received orders to proceed in harbour and go a long way up the Mole to embark soldiers - fill up and return to tug, then go in for further loads. At times had difficulty in persuading
French troops to embark in LADY CABLE, the reason apparently being reluctance to break their units or to act without definite orders from their officer who was probably still in the town of Dunkirk. However, we took four boat loads off - each load containing between 40 and 50 soldiers.
Three loads I took to tugs and one to H.M.S. WISHART when tug was not in usual position. Spoke to tug after fourth trip and was informed that it would soon be light and that she could'nt wait much longer. In reply to a question if any British officers were still left on the Mole, I replied that on earlier trips I had seen one who had asked me not to leave him behind. This officer was engaged in helping the embarkation of the troops. I had not seen him on my last trip but told tug I would make another trip to see if he was there. Informed tug would be as quick as possible and if tug could not wait, would return to England under own power. Tug said she could only wait a short while.
On going in for fifth time engines began to go badly and stopped altogether before reaching point of embarkation.
Engines got going again and we went alongside and collected about 24 more French soldiers. There was no sign of British officer and Price reported to me that French on the Mole told him he had gone. I sent Price up on to the Mole to make enquiries. Owing to the improbability of tug waiting for us, I only took 24 soldiers as a greater number would have made trip back to England under own power too hazardous. Just after passing lighthouse at end of harbour, engines stopped again. Noticed we were close to W.D. craft (later found to be HAIG) who I imagined from her position was watching us and would/

208
195
my left foot.
especially as I was partially incapacitated by a wound on
As we were a long way from the French coast I decided that there was very little chance of HAIG falling into enemy hands and that no doubt help would soon be forthcoming in reply to the wireless message I had asked X440 to send.
I hauled down HAIG's ensign and took it aboard LADY CABLE and we tried to make towards the English coast. Unfortunately the engine kept stopping and we made very slow progress and finally nothing would make our engine start again. We drifted helplessly for several hours and then sighted a Bell
Buoy which I believe may have been the N.W. Goodwin Bell
Buoy, but we did not get close enough to make sure. At last we sighted a warship and waved HAIG's White Ensign to try to attract stention. We were seen and the ship altered course towards us and came up close to LADY CABLE. She was the French transport ROUEN of Dieppe and was packed with troops from Dunkirk. An officer asked what I wanted and I
told him that we were broken down and asked to be taken aboard. To my surprise my appeal was met with a blunt
"No" - with no explanation, and the ROUEN steamed away.
My crew and I felt angry at this in view of the fact that we had rescued over 200 French soldiers during the night.
No doubt the ROUEN had good reasons for not taking us aboard but no explanation was given and I would like if possible to discover why she was unable to help us.
Luckily another ship some considerable distance away had noticed the ROUEN and observed that she had not picked us up. This ship was the CITY OF CHRISTCHURCH and she came up and took us in tow to the Downs where she was bound for in ballast. On arrival in the Downs where CITY OF
CHRISTCHURCH dropped anchor, we were able to start up the engine of LADY CABLE and I decided once again to try to make for Dover. However, we broke down after a run of about
15 minutes and were picked up by a tug (Operational I
don't know her name). She had orders to proceed to Ramagate with H.M. Drifter VIKING in tow and was about to do this when we broke down near her. She towed us to the VIKING
and I boarded the VIKING to have my injured foot attended to and get some rest. VIKING and LADY CABLE were towed round to Ramsgate where we arrived about 2100. I was landed and taken to "Merrie England" and then to Ramagate General
Hospital.
The Commanding Officer of VIKING at my request reported the return of LADY CABLE and that one member of my crew,
Cadet Rating Price was missing but might be aboard French warship X440. He also reported direct to C. in C., Dover, about HAIG. A little later, while I was still at "Merrie
England", the Commanding Officer of VIKING arrived to tell me that he had been informed from Dover that HAIG was safe.
Unfortunately he had no news for me of Cadet Rating Price.
The behaviour of my crew throughout the operation had been magnificent. The taking off of over 200 French troops and 6 British from the Mole was conducted quickly and calmly under difficult and hazardous conditions. Later,
Cadet Rating Price's work in helping to get the HAIG alongside LADY CABLE cannot be too highly praised. Without the great initiative and efficiency he displayed the operation would not have been successful and the HAIG would have drifted ashore to the S.W. of Dunkirk.
After/

OPERATION DYNAMO
ENCLOSURE NO. 14 2100
Ship: R.N.L.B. "WALTON AND FRINTON" E.M.E.D.
Written up by Petty Officer Tel.Cooley
Officer Reporting: Commanding Officer Lt.R.H. Mead, R.N.V.R.
Sat. June 1st. 0400 Manned Walton Life Boat RNLB - EMID.
0500 To sea.
0536 Made to signal Station "where are drifters that are going to tow lifeboats". From signal station "go alongside".
0550 Lay off drifters. Proceeding to make enquiries as regards intentions.
0600 Small boats informed what we are doing.
0614 Secure alongside P.O. steps; Captain ashore for enquiries.
0630 Left P.O. steps.
0645 Lay off drifters.
0715 Taken in tow by drifter "Thrifty". Ships in our tow Southend-on-Sea Lifeboat
"Abdybeauclark" lifeboat Walton E.N.E.D.
Lifeboat P.E.42 "Summer" Maid" Motor Boat
"White Bear".
0725 Left Dover.
0729 Tow slipped second from end.
0733 Tow O.K. Under way - sighted South Goodwin
Light Vessel at 0730.
0900 To passing sloop "are there many more to take off".
0901 Reply "Yes".
0910
Destroyers wash parted tow.
0928
Tow O.K. Under way.
1027
Passed E. Goodwins.
1256
Captain H-M passed.
1404 Destroyer H-15 passing broke tow on last boat in line.
1407 Tow O.K. Under way.
1502 Tow broken on last boat in line.
1516 Tow O.K. Under way.
1517 3 planes attacked around. Sloop bombed.
1522 Mine sighted floating. Mine fired at.
Result uncertain.
1537 Ybonne et Moabe of Gravelin French Flag with one English soldier with Brenn Gun onboard heading England. Turned on communicating with us and headed towards Dunkirk.
(Boat just mentioned was sunk about 1615 by bombs direct hit.)
1550 Searching around among very large wreckage.
1605 Turned back for few miles while drifter reports and await results of message by W/T
regarding ship in distress further up main
1615 Bombed channel. by (about 30) many planes - 1 trawler sunk (not in our company). Bomb dropped by our trawler and broke tow throwing men in water. Men picked up. Our planes arrived.
1624 Proceeding to investigate Trawler.
1635 Air attack still on.
1652 Bombs heard dropping Drifters heading home
1640 Departed planes.
without leaving orders. Tried to communicate with drifters to ask their intentions with
Aldis but could get no reply. Tried to collect small boats and motioned life-boat to stop (scored out in log "Comd. Gunner onboard") Lifeboat went on but stopped by
Aldis.
1710/

293
Copy.
274
R.N. Chatham. Barracks,
The Commanding Officer,
H.M.S. "Crested Eagle".
Sir,
I have the honour to report that during the intense beaching, and burning of the vessel, all men under my conaerial bombardment of the pier, and the subsequent bombing, trol remained steady at their posts and carried out their duties with great coolness. I should like especially to report on the following men:
Tilbury A.B.
1e
Frend. A.B.
Plack, A.B.
Patrick.
for their work in keeping the vessel alongside the quay and for assisting the wounded men to board the vessel. I have to report that an unknown A.B. or O.S. a survivor from the
"Grenade" suffering from severe facial injuries, requested that he should assist to men the A.A. guns. Being shorthanded I posted him as gunlayer and Captain of the Gun at
No.2 Pom pom. This Gun he kept in action for 20 minutes after the bombing of the vessel.
Four German Prisoners on board were of great al assistance in rescuing wounded from the damaged compartments, these men were handed over to a French N.C.O. on reaching shore.
side
Engineer Lieut. Turnbull, R.N.R. was placed in hospital in a large hotel about 2 miles East of Dunkirk.
He was badly burnt about the hands and face and suffering slightly from shock. Owing to the congested state of the beaches it was impossible to collect all survivors. All men seen were instructed to return to England by the earliest availableboat.
in.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
R.M. Roberts,
Sub.Lieut. R.N.R.
1035. Observed large number of troops waiting by
Zuidcoote Sanatarium'and no boats or ships in immediate vicinity.
1040 Anchored in 2½ fathoms in position
Dunkirk High lighthouse bearing 237 deg. 3.25 miles.
Established communication ashore by using ship's ropes secured ashore and by using two ship's boats and two small boats salved from beach, ferried troops from beach to ship.
Owing to falling tide, shallow water and inshore swell operations were difficult and troops had to wade into 3 feet of water to keep boats afloat but by changing the boats creews for every trip - about 60 troops per hour were embarked.
During this time bombing, shelling and aerial and machine gunning took place, and gun's crews were continually on the alert and in action and embarking operations continued without a break.
Embarked about 340 troops.

2.
364
342
Greatly to the Master's disappointment, X 213's machinery was not in a good enough condition for her to be used.
78. Owing to a misunderstending, not here, which I have been unable to trace, the motor boats which should have hours later. Suspecting that the fifth column was at work reached Sheerness from the Thames Adid not arrive until 24 Lou 30ᵗʰ hi
I informed your Chief of Staff, D.S.V.P., V.A. Dover,
N.O.I.C.s Ramsgate and Margate of the circumstances, and of my intention to ignore any such messages. No possible harm could have been done by sending boats on, at any rate as far as Ramsgate. Had these boats not been delayed, they would have been available on the last day on which evacuation from the beaches was still going on. Some of them were employed on the last two days in the vicinity of Dunkirk.
8. The type of machinery fitted in many of the boats and its defective state, presented F.E.O. and Sheerness Dockyard with some difficult problems and a great deal of hard work, which was tackled, night and day, with great zeal and energy.
Some of the boats broke down later on, much to the disappointment of their crews, who had done their best. Most of them, I think succeeded in joining other boats and msking at least one trip to the French coast.
9. The total number of craft prepared for service and sent out from Sheerness was as follows:-
100 Motor Boats
10 Lighters
7 Schuits
1 Oil tanker
6 Paddle Steamers
10. On Sunday June 2nd, having got away all the personnel and everything afloat that was sufficiently in good condition to do useful service, I went to Ramsgate with Commander Troup, arriving about 1600, in order to help N.O.I.C. and to endeavour to assist in the cooperation of motor boats with larger vessels.
I went in with a group of Schuits and slow motor boats to the beach at St. Malo les Bains, where a British Officer who had just got back reported that there were British troops who had been unable to get into Dunkirk. None were found. I
have no doubt however from later enquiries that they had got into the town. A volunteer whose name I have not yet been able to get, landed from one of the Schuits and walked along the beach to make sure there were none left. We brought him off and his boat's crew, and a number of French soldiers who were pulling for England in a small boat.
Commander Troup took the fast Army motor boats into
Dunkirk alongside the centre pier and brought off 79 French troops when his boat was rammed by a French tug and had to be abandoned.
11.
On Monday night I took a group of slow motor boats up to the Quay Felix Faure, at the top of Dunkirk harbour.
I went on ahead in the fast boat "Marlborough" to identify the quay. The motor boats were led in by the "Mermaiden",
Sub Lieut who did very well to find the place in the dark, 300 French Marines were embarked in the motor boats and a French Trawler. Their bearing was excellent.
As the quay was now clear, and machine gun fire was getting a little near, I decided not to get the motor boats back on the chance of another load of troops. At this period through no fault of the Officer at the wheel, we had the misfortune to scrape over some masonry that had fallen from the quay, losing our propellers and rudder.
Sidmonth- willing (Sea cadel Great

Dynams 121.
367
I
St. Malo Les Bains. June 2nd - 3rd.
- 345
on the 2nd. from operations were to be for fast craft only,
I reached The Ramsgate with Commander Troup about 4 p.m.
but hearing a Colonel, who had just come ashore, that
2/6
he thought there were some British troops and others near
St. Malo who had not been able to get into Dunkirk, I got permission from V.A. Dover to go there with a group of
Schuits, motor boats and life boats. Commander Troup was to take the fast boats into the Avant Port and Commendant
Anduse - Faru arranged for the French motor fishing boats to go *mto St. Malo and ferry troops to a French ship and a paddle steamer. The larger ships, however did not sail, and the fishing boats went to Avant Port instead of St.
Malo. 3 Schuits and 12 motor boats were available. They sailed between 1800 and 1900. I was expecting a M.A.S.B
from Harwich and waited as long as I could for her, as I
thought her armament might be useful during our withdrawal.
As she did not come I went in the 12 know motor boat "White
Wings", Sub Lieut. Mullins. We left about 2045 and owing
2/6
to a head sea and some trauble with the starboard engine, did not overtake the slow convoy.
2.
I found the three Schuits in the appointed place between E.12 buoy and the shore and went in to close the motor boats. They had already been in and found the beach deserted. After giving one boat which had broken down to a Schuit to tow, I ordered them all to return to Ramsgate and went back to the beach to make sure no one was left behind.
6
3.
The battery of four/inch guns near Nieuport, which had been shelling a point somewhere near La Panne, where I supposed some Allied troops to be holding out, and had been dropping an occasional shell in our neighbourhood, now started to register on the Eastern Mole.
They got the range with about four rounds, and then landed a salvo on the mole itself, these direct hits wore just short of me! Though evidently fired at entreme range, the salvo fell well together. Another round struck and sank a transport which was entering. It was now time to leave, but as it got lighter we made out S ship's lifeboat pulling off with very tired men in her. This was a party from the Schuit "Hilda", in charge of a volunteer from one of the yachting associations. I Ashou hope it will be possible to get his name. He had been and along the beach to make sure therewas no one there.
4.
There were hundreds of troops lined up on the
Mole, but it was clearly impossible for us to do anything but report. We also discovered a motor boat ashore (The
"Singapore") at the foot of the mole. The lifeboat went ashore and our volunteer waded along the beach to help her off. The boats's crew decided to wait till the tide lifted them, keeping under cover so that aircraft should think the boat deserted. As my boat drew too much to get anywhere near her, I decided to withdraw. The "Singapore" got away and returned to Ramagate in company with the motor boat "Kitcat", which had been into Dunkirk.
who 4. were pulling for England in a small fishing boat. I
Off Dunkirk we picked up 6 French soldiers saw in the distance another of my boats towing a life boat full of troops, but I do not know her name. 8 German bombers flew out of the smoke cloud, but turned off to the westward, ignoring us. Many British aircraft were seen on the return voyage.

Dynam 195. 369
Car. HR Troup's report
347
I left Ramsgate on the night 2nd - 3rd June in
War Ministry fast motor boat "Haig" with three other fast
W.M.M.B's. I took with me the French Naval Attache Captain de Revoir who came over to see how the embarkation was going on on the pier. I gave instructions to the Offi ers in charge of boats to act independently and ferry troops to ships taking a final boat load back to Ramsgate.
I entered Dunkirk harbour and proceeded alongside the centre pier and with great fifficulty persuaded 40
French soldiers to come aboard. These I took to a big ship outside and returned for more. After loading 39
I again proceeded out and just in the entrance was rammed by a French tu on the prto beam; as the hole was a good foot above the water line I went on. I had not gone more than 200 yards when another French tug altered course and rammed me in the forecastle, cutting halfway through the upper deck and right up to the keel.
I managed to get clear quickly and took the boat alongside the "Westward ho" and got the soldiers out, one of whom got his shoulder smashed in the collision. A destroyer coming across the bow of the "Westward ho" caused her to go astern and the wash from her paddle filled the boat up with water and washed her away from the ship. Asx soon as the ship stopped I again got alongside and as it was now three oclock and the Captain had been ordered to clear out everyone else having gone, I decided to abandon the boat and get on board the ship with my crew and return to
Margate. On the way over Captain de Revoir told me there was some difficulty on the pier and suggested he should go there the following night and help. I therefore arranged to take him.
On night on 3rd- 4th I left gsate in the
W.M.M.B. "Swallow" at 2000, but I left without Captain de Revoir who missed the boat, arriving at Dunkirk at
2230 going straight alongside the centre pier where I
landed and sent the boat off ferrying, with orders to come back at 0330 for me.
I found I could be useful as was suggested by
Captain de Revoir in making ships fast, finding out the number of men they could take and then getting the French
Officers to help me embark the troops quickly, So I
decided to make myself Piermaster and everything else combined. The French soldiers were very loath to be separated from each other, their companies or their
Officers but by promising them they would only be separated for two hours and would meet again in England
The French Officer Captain le Comte leChartier de Sedouy they moved quicker. I embarked at least 10,000 troops.
on the staff of General Lucas of the 32nd Division was and a staff off with me not later than 0330, I had some very helpful and I arranged with him to take the general somewhat I instructed the Officer in the boat if order qualms about the boat returning for me as her engines were he was in groggy doubt to close one of the other boats and him to any in by 0300 at the latest. It so happened that he come broke down altogether and told no one and it was into harbour about 0305 just at the time I was beginning
Just by luck that the motor boat which took me off came to wonder.
I would like to put on record the wonderful discipline of the French troops when the last ship left about 0300.

1594/07
FROM: Unit Officer, 40th A.S. Group, H.M.S. "Olvina".
DATE: 17th June, 1940.
TO: Flag Officer 1/c Portland.
Dupram 353
-397
371
narrative. 6th June, 1940, the honour to submit the following of
In I have accordance with your Memo No. 2912
proceeded she became to Dover in company with "Topaze". During the
On Wednesday, 29th May, at 1700, "Olvina"
night detached and reached Dover independently at 1045/30 May. The Examination Vessel was hailed for instructions, and at 1230 orders were received to proceed to the Downs, where the Examination Vessel would have our a steamer off the Goodwins, directed us to the Examination sailing orders. This ship, which was engaged in towing
Tug at the North Goodwin Light Vessel, where we anchored at 1545 to await instructions from the shore, since the
Tug had no orders for us. At 1810 orders were received pick up troops.
to proceed to Bray beaches, 6 miles east of Dunkirk, to
At 2210 the anchor was dropped 1 mile to east of Dunkirk, when visibility was very low owing to smoke clouds. Orders were then received from a destroyer to investigate a reported enemy M.T.B. 2 miles to eastward.
Anchor was weighed at 2221, and we steamed to Bray beaches without encountering the M.T.B. Pilotage was somewhat hazardous in the intense darkness, owing to wrecks obstructing the channel, and at 2345 the anchor was dropped as close inshore as possible.
The ship's boat was taken away soon after midnight, and brought off two loads of troops totalling
32, including one stretcher case, which was put aboard a destroyer. Owing to deterioration of conditions, no more troops were embarked until daylight, when the boat was pulled ashore on two more occasions.
At about 0500/31 May, "Sabre" was full of troops and ready to proceed to England, so it was arranged that "Olvina" should provide a crew for "Sabre"s" motorboat and use it for embarking troops. Accordingly, after refilling with petrol from "Icarus", the motorboat was manned and proceeded to tow off ships' boats and Royal Engineer's pontoon floats from the pier to vessels anchored off. The pier consisted of motor lorries driven into the sea at low water, having planks lashed to the roofs. Owing to a northwesterly breeze, which freshened to force 3/4 at 1100, only the eastern side of the pier could be used, and some difficulty was experienced in handling the boats. Probably about 300 to 350 troops were removed in this manner, of which 240 were put aboard "Olvina".
No interference by enemy action was experienced during the embarkation, although enemy aircraft were sand being dunes. fired at, and shrapnel was observed to burst on the

- 3 -
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471
with engines greater stopped range when than boats and planes could be detected 443 by sound at a that far this course might profitably visibility be employed permitted. during patrols. It is submitted
May 31st. 1940. 1140 to June 1st. 1940. 0547.
Instructions were received to proceed to Ramsgate, rendezvous and escort small boat convoy to Dunkirk. The Convoy sailed at 1453
approximately 3 hours after scheduled time. Opportunity was taken off-load all depth charges as it was considered inadvisable to continue carrying these. The convoy consisted of
5 tugs and 5 drifters each towing between three and fifteen small boats.
The convoy straggled somewhat on the way over and when the Reutigen bouy was reached the leaders were eased down to enable the convoy to arrive together. At this time a large force of
German bombers and fighters were seen approaching. There were inumerable ships of all shapes and sizes in the vicinity and a general bombing raid was commenced. British fighters arrived at this time and the attack became disorganised, - The bombers eventually disappearing inland.
The convoy arrived off Dunkirk at approximately 2110, S.0.6. embarked Lieut Nyme-Edwardes from Keith who directed the convoy to the various beaches as required. At approximately 2315 when returning to the Keith a collision occurred with what appeared to be a medium-sized yacht.
S.0.6. was put into astern but the yacht's stern swinging round as she altered course to port stove in S.O.6. on the starboard bow fracturing several ribs and making a large out in the planking above waterline. While the damage was being inspected by the aid of a shaded torch fire was opened on S.0.6. from a German aeroplane.
On arrival at Keith General Leese was emvbarked and instructions were given to collect Lord Gort from Hebe, and to return to England dropping General Leese in Dunkirk if Lord Gort approved.
On arrival at Hebe it was discovered that Lord Gort had crossed to
Keith. S.0.6. returned to Keith and approximatly three-quarters of NX an hour later Lord Gort also arrived there. He was embarked forthwith and he and General Leese taken direct to Dover.
Considering the fact that it was the first time any of the crew had been under fire their behaviour left nothing to be desired.
June 2nd. 1940. 1201 to 1922.
Instructions were received to carry out a search for drift "Girl approximately 30 soldiers in an open boat about 3 miles off Dunkirk to
Gladys" reported broken down 7 miles east of Dunkirk and for reported by aircraft. Course was set from Dover direct the coast Reutigen. to search for the open boat, subsequently to put out the outer It was then intended to proceed slowly towardds to sea clear of land and make another approach to the coast approximately the
10 miles Dunkirk to allow for the set of the tide from and time the east of was received. Air escort had been promised causion had report to be exercised as no ships were operating off Dunkrik on passage to Dunkirk.
0115 Arrived Dunkirk and embarked C.O's of block-ships and Captain Dangerfield.
Carried out reconnaissance of the harbour.
0200 returned to block-ships.

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472
an open with soldiers off hailed. He reported having picked with the during daylight. boat in tow was About half-way across a French trawler boat up boat for in ich Dunkirk and it was thought this might be the we were searching. To make sure we barge with sail set were found approximately three miles from proceeded to Dunkirk where хихаря two open boats and a Thames the coast. The first open boat yielded five Spanieards, the second one about 6 soldiers, Belgian, French and English. We then went alongside the Thames barge at approximately 1330. This was found to contain about 220
soldiers including two Colonels and a Major of Artillery, and various wounded. They were endeavouring to sail to England but had made approximately three miles in 10 hours, see note below.
Motor-mechanic Whittaker fitted a new piston to the air compressor motor while the 1st Lieut. and myself trimmed the sails.
They had no charys on board.
The air compressor motor was made to run but all efforts to start the diesel failed.
I then left my lst.Lieut., SublLieut. Dehammel with instructions to sail the barge to Dover,and proceeded along the coast having opened up the distance to search for the "Girl Gladys".
About two miles to the east I found an open boat containing 18
soldiers who were embarked, after which we approached to withing approximately three miles of the coast slightly to the eastward of La Panne. Visibility was good and no sign of the drifter could be seen, the search was therefore abandoned and course was set to intercept the Thames barge.
At approximately 1720 when out of sight of land we were attacked by eight six or eight dive-bombers, 20 to 30 bombs were dropped and fell at distances varying from 10 to 50 yards of the ship.
The bombers appeared to attack in pairs out of the sun and having released their bombs continued their dive firing machineguns. Course was altered frequently in an endeavour to miss the bombs.
Some appeared to explode after entering the water, some on striking the surface and a certain appeared not to explode at all. One exploded under the bow right ahead and the ship passed through the splash. A certain amount of discomfort was experienced by myself and members of the crew who were exposed. to the splash in the M eyes for the next twelve hours or 30.
Able-Seaman Power was wounded in the leg when manning the port turrett also one of the soldiers in the fore peak. As I now had wounded on board I considered it advisable to return to Dover forthwith and to ask for assistance for the barge. A tug was sent out at approximately 2100 and found the barge sailing well about 10 miles from Dover.
I consider Sub,Lieut, Dehammel performed a very creditable operation. The bombing to which the ship had been subjected had caused leaks to the hull and the petrol tank and the ship was not used again for that night's operation.
on passage to Dunkirk.
0115 Arrived Dunkirk and embarked C.O's of block-ships and Captain Dangerfield.
Carried out reconnaissance of the harbour.

left Ramagah in taw of three skelfs for Duskinh at
2.45pm.
as 4pm her were off the Sandethe Bany, other
550
good Yes o
-
520
From:- Act. Sub. Lieut. MacIntyre.
Date:- 5th June, 1940.
To:-
Naval Officer in Charge, Ramsgate.
28th May.
2000
Reported to S.N.O. Ramsgate.
2200
Left in Silver Moon for beaches three miles to eastward of Dunkirk.
29th May.
0800
Arrived at beaches - bombed.
Ferried soldiers to ships at anchor.
1400
No ships left. Departed for England. No charts or compass.
1800
Off Calais; shelled for twenty minutes.
2230
Arrived Ramsgate.
30th May.
?312r
0900
Took over Balaquain.
0930
Proceeded for beaches.
1300
Arrived off beaches; ferried soldiers during continued shelling.
1700
Rope round port screw.
1710
Given tow by drifter.
1730
Arrived Dunkirk; loaded up with soldiers.
1740
Left for Ramsgate.
2230
Arrived Ramsgate.
31st May.
0900
Reported to Lt. Cdr. Wilson.
1600
Left in "Encore" with him for Dunkirk.
2000
Picked up soldiers in lifeboat.
2200
Arrived Dunkirk. Filled up with soldiers.
2215
Proceeded for Ramsgate.
1st June.
0545 Arrived Ramsgate.
2nd June.
1900
Took out "Santosy"; broke down; returned 2000.
3rd June.
0945
Took over "Letitia".
1630
2300
Arrived Left off Dunkirk; proceeded inside harbour and 9 took in tow with tugs.
off troops under the orders of Commodore ---
2400
Arrived alongside gunboat and embarked demolition party.
(presumably Rear-Admiral Taylor).

618
I, E.W. Filley am Master of the auxiliary barge "THYRA"
582
6
We were requisitioned on the 29th May at Millwall 11.30 p.m., towed to Tilbury where three days rations were put aboard.
Proceeded in tow of Tug "SUN 12" with other barges, to Southend, thence ordered to Remsgate and thenoe to Dover Harbour, arriving
2.30 p.m. on the 30th May and lying at Prince of Wales Pier.
May 31st. Volunteers were called for to go to Dunkirk and all the barges crews offered their services.
We proceeded outside breakwater with barge "H.A.C." in tow.
We were both taken in tow by tug "ST. ABBS" and proceeded to
Dunkirk, arriving there at 5.0 a.m. on Saturday June 1st.
We were shot off by the tug at Dunkirk Pier Head and told to beach barges. Towed "H.A.C. with me into beach and with their assistance we got eleven French Soldiers off the beach on to our barge. Other groups of Soldiers refused to come as they wanted to di go to France and not to England.
ed
At that time bombing was very bad and we had no protection of any kind, not even helmets and we went into the beach as close as possible and picked up the crews of the barge "GLENWAY" and the barge "LARK", also eight British Soldiers that were aboard them as they had been left on the beach with 8 tor in for the Frenchmer to get when the tide went out, and the crews had been told to get out of it. Including "H.A.C." crew, we had 28 men aboard.
As the tugs had disappeared, the only thing I could do was to proceed with what I had got and come away to England. I sailed half way across and was picked up by the tug "EMPIRE HENCHMAN"
arriving at Dover 11.45 p.m. on June lst.