TNA ADM 199 790

SECRET
Dynam A14/01 3 3
From Lieutenant Commander T.G.P. Crick, Royal Navy.
in H.M.S. Calcutta" for passage.
Date.. 29th May 1940.
To
..
The Vice-Admiral, Dover.
Submitted:-
As the Senior Officer of H.M.Ships"Abel Tasman",
"Alice" and "Kaapfalga" (Dutch barges), I have the honour to make the following report on operations at La Panne on
28th May.
2.
"Abel Tasman" was loaded with ammunition,
"Alice" and "Kaapfalga" with provisions. The destination of La Panne was received at Dover at 1900 on 27th May and ships sailed forthwith.
3.
On arrival at about 0500 ships were beached shortly after high water. A number of H.M. Ships were in the process of evacuating troops.
I proceeded ashore to make arrangements with the Military for unloading. It was extremely hard to get any information at all or to understand the situation.
After 2½ hours search I was able to locate G.H.Q. and reported to General Adam, who was in command of the Adam force. He stated that it was of paramount importance to evacuate as many troops on the beaches between La Panne and Dunkirk. I accordingly made those arrangements. There was great air activity all day and at about 1400 approximately
6 bombers commenced a wave of attacks with bombs and machine-gun on the three ships and the personnel in general on the beach.
The Military were about to commence embarking. I had left orders that in the event of attack the crew were to take cover on the beach, or elsewhere than on board, where there was still a quantity of ammunition. Immediately after, the second attack I went on board "Abel Tasman" to see that my orders had been carried out. The crew of 9 were extremely young and 6 of them had not been to sea before. I found one rating on board and got him ashore. There was only time to take cover under the ship closewto the keel. I was wounded in the foot by a machine-gun bullet during one of the attacks.
When the attacks were over my wound was dressed on the beach. I was in considerable pain and did not feel that I could adequately perform the duty of getting my ship back to Dover. I therefore turned over to the next Senior
C.O.. Later on I learned that my 1st Lieutenant had been very badly wounded. I therefore determined to return to
Dover. I was feeling much better after receiving proper medical attention. Ships were due to sail at 1700, and I
felt that I could carry out the navigation with one of the
1st Lieutenants in charge of the ship and that by stationing the ship with the sole Officer astern in the line that the three ships would return.to Dover with the troops.
Accordingly I was carried down to the beach at 1630 by the military, only to find that two of the ships had sailed. I could get no answer from the remaining ship by hailing. Apparently it had been decided to sail as were soon as possible after the bombing was over and as there

II.
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hoping bullet holes therby I gave when to flood orders the to engine flood all ballsst the is
I the tide rose.
recognition giving signal the tables and the route the secured the charts and burnt boarded KaapFalga where I took over command before order to abandon ship, order, then refloating Kaap Falga.
from Liett.Culmer R.N.V.R. who had succeeded in
It was now about 1630/29 and there was no sign of life on the beaches as everyone was still taking cover due to aidcraft overhead.
We proceeded due north from La Panne over the sandbanks into Nieuport Roads, as I
had been imformed by Major P.De Havilland that the Zudycote Channel was under fire.
The presence of enemy sircraft overhead prevented the destroyers sighted from stopping to receive our message. The destroyers were, however, steaming in the direction of Dunkirk,
Which I assumed to be in German Hands and I
assumed that they had somehow heard of the fall of
Dunkirk., and were on their way to Bombard.
I then decided not to return to Bray
Beaches that night, because:-
1. According to my imformation there would be no troops there to receive our stores.
2. If they wanted food at La Panne the
Alice was still aground with 250 tons aboard, which I was unable to destroy by fire due to the proximity of the Able Tasman with munitions aboard.
3. Major De Havilland's message was still underlivered.
.Kaap Falga had a deck cargo of over 20 tons and the crew of Alice and the other four soldiers took up nearly all the available space.
Kaap Falga reported arrival in Downs at
0300/29th through H.M.S. Holdfast on examination service.
NO orders were received and about 1200/31
I steamed Kaap Falga to Dover, where I reported to the Dynamo Operation Room.
which was completed by 0900/1st fell June.
It was decided to unload Kaap Falga,
During operation the unloading one Army Stevedore drowned.
off the in the dark and was made.)
( A separate jetty report has already been stand to At Dunkerk leaving there of evacuation. later
1600/1 KaapFalga was ordered not to than 0300/2 by go to this was the last night throttle as two hours funning at a to asphyxiating the engine room fumes and gaoke This coming pipe from was a red pipe
After had to be evacuated due leading off the silencer. close past the ready used use fuel hot tanks and and since pump it only led slow speed of fire. could be owing to Ship the serious anchored at danger anchor off Ramsgatea all effect night at repairs about as even if
2130/1 expert and aid remained could be obtained reach to Dunkirk by 0300/2.
it capable to engine, officers was block now which of the from The I maintaining impossible was maximum running for speed to was Dover and 5 imformed I next afternoon empty 50 the reckoned to silencer 70 ship. me degrees KaapFalga that were Engineer not the badly wishing centigrade coked up'.
Kaap above Falga normal, was not therefore employed that