TNA ADM 199 790

15
30th May may.
shortly after. Imbarkation proceeded thereafter at a good steady rate.
TV.A.Dover
Following signal was made at 0930:-
"Troops are concentrated in unlinited mubers just
East of Dunkirk Beach, on Bray Beaches and at
La Panne. Please do your best to distrbute. I am getting along splendidly here. Send two hospital ships now. If mist persists I will bring them in on arrival."
At 0943 the following Situation Report was made:-
"Conour are 1700 k/co. I have no M.Y.B. and can only communicate with U.K. by French wireless station,
02 when - destroyers are in sight. If conditions remain as at present a destroyer alongsido continuously for embarkation would be a magnificant holp. The moment hombing starts all met shove off".
At 0950 I made following signal:-
"If this weather persists I want = ship every half an hour".
The whole morning was atoty and 1donl for embaritation that Card ships arrived and BS great opportunity was again lost.
Hospital ships also did not arrive until attermoon and there were over one Shousand wounded waiting for transportation.
At 1600 two destroyers arrived.
At 1700 as COP us sent for 200 to go to G.H.Q. and
I traned over the daties of S.N.O. to Consunder Maund.
Valuey at 1836 following signal was made:-
*Am leaving for G.H.Q. for about two days and I have turned over the job of N.S.O. to Commander Hand who rully understands the estuation and has everything well in hand."
At 1846 following signal TRUE made:-
proceeding steadily despite internittent banbing attacks and bonbardments. Conditions appear favourable for good progress tonight. Request all available cruft may be made available both for Dunkirk and beaches. Number embarked to date only with destroyers 18,000."
At 2025 a situation Report this made as follows:-
thousand troops have been embarked during last hour.
"Despite intense bombardment and air attack four
Dunicirk will be untenable by Friday morning. Embarkation
Every possible effort will be made. I consider will be continued until last moment but depend upon large ships and destroyers at Pier tonight."
AS
********

13
178
Political pressure was now being brought to bear
Telday on the C.in C. that the evacuation must be on a fifty-fifty basis with the French. My only stipulation was that at all costs we should be allowed from use of the Eastern area while the French used the part, outer harbour and beaches.
I made a signal to Communder Harmd at Dunkirk to provide personnel for ships for General Laurencie's troops
(some 5,000 in mather) at C.in c's request. I also asked
Admiral Wake-Walker to keep Dunkirk going at 100%.
Little progress you could be unde off the beaches owing to the surf.
is have
G.H.C. informed = that a plan was being worked out for naval co-operation to bonbard advancing German tanks in that Truin troms the later stages. This, however, was never necessary, as
British ships my far as am aware at
1041, - have been continually heavily besbirded end they 020 greatually fining the renge of our londing
I wealt only enter necessary for the Clos of troups,
Continuose and heavy shelling all the number, but the evanuation prosected fairly meedily. At List shipe were in Inrge medere and strong in y protection Rept.
houghting sttack - The only thing necessary was tostep the making AS 1000 a signed tell received from the Air Landson occure as Tovor aching for position or energy bettery. This this Insuire with any certainty as the instity HAS probobity while, - is was to the details or Less Plage Secure Kork
Such, regity SOUR ede to this event. The becaus DIVE between end a great doct issued consente.
tory beirg astacks were delivered during the eventing bast wase consultrated enjoy upon derallet ships in the seartify live buchingt absorble care carried out on the ships Leading bus address insurest. The embarbation proceeded subsidity.

15
19
-8-
At 1800 approximately Lord Gort embarked at La Panne for the U.K.
At 1937 the following signal was mader-
"As it 10 vital to carry on the evacuation of troops throughout every available moment day and night it is intended to place two white lights at eastern and western pier head as a guide to ships in the hours of darkness. It is requested that all H.M.
ships and other vessels who are likely to enter port to-night be warned accordingly?
At 1945 a further signal was made:-
"Slow British progress in the port due to shelling, bombing, and wounded and French troops using quay.
Weather fine and clear, sea moderate, good prospects for night embarkation from beaches."
I returned Dunkirk with General Alexander and discovered that totally different instructions had been given to General
Alexander by Lord Cort and by Lord Gort in writing to Admiral
Abrial and General Fagalde.
Lord Cort had told the French authorities that General assist in
Alexander would hold-the the "PERISTER" for the French to embark and that he was to place himself md his three divisions under
General Fagalde's orders. General Alexander, however, was told by Lord Cort in my hearing that be was to do nothing to imperia his army and was ultimately responsible for their safety and evacuation.
I suggested to General Alexander that he should at once return to La Panne before the telephone was cut off to telephone to the Secretary of State for war, and to get the matter cleared up. This he did. The Secretary of State instructed General
Alexander to act on his own discretion and to proceed with the evacuation.
Admiral Abrial asked me to take charge of the British and
French embarkation, which I did. I also asked for French officers to assist, and they were provided.
The following signals were despatched:-
2028. "I have felt it necessary for the operation to

28
22
16.
At about 1200 Commander Ken and I motored into
Dunkirk to report progress as embarkation on our beach was then impossible. On our return our lorry was heavily machine gunned and hit. At this period a heavy bombing attack took place on the Fleet and beaches.
17.
On return to our headquarters (a lorry) we decided to make contact with General H.Q. but unfortunately our car broke down and we had to walk back 5 miles.
18.
During the night another naval embarkation party arrived on the beach to the eastward which reduced the limits of our beach.
19.
Early on Thursday morning 30th I proceeded to
Brigade H.Q. and offered the suggestion that piers be built by running lorries out to sea. This was quickly done and was successful.
20.
I then drove Colonel Whitten and Colonel Mackenzie into Dunkirk to see Captain Tennant and then drove them back to Brigade H.Q.
21.
During the afternoon and dogwatches the French poured into our beaches but no boats arrived within 11 miles of our H.Q.
22.
During the last dog the Germans directed mos to accurate artillery fire on our beach. This fire continued throughout the night and our lorry was hit. The beach was completely evacuated by allied soldiers.
23.
We had however taken up quarters in a water-boat that was ashore at low mter. No boats had now been in for
16 hours on our beach.
84.
During the night the weather became bad once more -
and a heavy surf was running.
At/

42
46
30th may shortly after. Embarkation proceeded thereafter at a good steady rate.
IsV.A.,Dorer
Following signal was made at 0930:-
"Troops are concentrated in unlimited numbers just
East of Dunkirk Beach, on Bray Beaches and at
La Panne. Please do your best to distribute. I am getting along splendidly here. Send two hospital ships now. If mist persists I will bring them in on arrival."
At 0943 the following Situation Report was made:-
Concur are 1700 k/cs. I have no M.T.B. and can only communicate with U.K. by French wireless station, or when destroyers are in sight. If conditions remain as at present a destroyer alongside continuously for embarkation would be a magnificent help. The moment bombing starts all must shove off".
At 0950 I made following signal:-
"If this weather persists I want a ship every half an hour".
The whole morning was misty and ideal for embarkation but few ships arrived and a great opportunity was again lost.
Hospital ships also did not arrive until afternoon and there were over one thousand wounded waiting for transportation.
At 1600 two destroyers arrived.
At 1700 a car was sent for me to go to G.H.Q. and
I turned over the duties of S.N.O. to Commander Maund.
Friday at 1836 following signal was made:-
"Am leaving for G.H.Q. for about two days and I have turned over the job of N.S.O. to Commander Maund who fully understands the situation and has everything well in hand."
At 1846 following signal was made:-
"Embarkation proceeding steadily despite intermittent bombing attacks and bombardments. Conditions appear favourable for good progress tonight. Request all available craft may be made available both for Dunkirk and beaches. Number embarked to date only with destroyers 13,000."
At 2025 a Situation Report was made as follows:-
"Despite intense bombardment and air attack four thousand troops have been embarked during last hour.
Dunkirk will be untenable by Friday morning. Embarkation
Every possible effort will be made. I consider will be continued until last moment but depend upon large ships and destroyers at Pier tonight."
As

44
Political pressure was now being brought to bear
Triday
The on the C.in C. that the evacuation must be on a fifty-fifty load basis with the French. My only stipulation was that at all costs we should be allowed free use of the Eastern arm while the French used the port, outer harbour and beaches.
0605.
I made a signal to Commander Maund at Dunkirk to for provide personnel ships for General Laurencie's troops
(some 5,000 in number) at C.in C's. request. I also asked
Admiral Wake-Walker to keep Dunkirk going at 100%..
0940, you
Little progress could be made off the beaches owing to the surf.
0945, "Sun 1s BOV coning through have
G.H.Q. informed 100 that a plan was being worked out for hours for naval co-operation to bombard advancing German tanks in
"Lord Goart the later stages. This, however, was never necessary, as far as / am aware. versels. dusk.
Request necessary ships my
1004. "Wo have been continually heavily boxibarded and they are gradually finding the range of our leading berth, would only enter ships 88
necessary for the flow or treops,
Continuous and beary shelling all the morning, but the evamition proceeded fairly speedily. At Last ships were arriving in Large numbers and strong a * protection kept bonging attack away. The only thing necessary use to scop the shelling. At 1800 a signed was received from the Air Lisison
Officer at Dover asking for position of energy battary, This was not known with any certainty as the lettery vas probably mobile, but it vos in the district of Loon Plage larguage Kark regly use and to this affect, The bechardsent, nevertheless, become more intense and a great deal more securate.
Very heavy attacks 1820 delivered during the ovening but were concentrated shiefly upon develist ships in the reads. Dive hombing attacks here carried out 00 the ships loading but without sussess. The embarkation processed easethly.

46
50
At 1800 approximately Lord Gort ambarked at La Panne for
U.K.
At 1937 the following signal was made:-
"As it is vital to carry on the evacuation of troops throughout every available moment day and night it is intended to place two white lights at eastern and western pier head as a guide to ships in the hours of darkness. It is requested that all H.M.
ships and other vessels who are likely to enter port to-night be warned accordingly"
At 1945 a further signal was made:-
"Slow British progress in the port due to shelling, bombing, and wounded and French troops using quay.
Weather fine and clear, sea moderate, good prospects for night embarkation from beaches."
I returned Dunkirk with General Alexander and discovered at totally different instructions had been given to General exander by Lord Gort and by Lord Gort in writing to Admiral rial and General Fagalde.
Lord Gort had told the French authorities that General assist exander would hold the "PERIMETER" for the French to embark id that he was to place himself and his divisions under eneral Fagalde's orders. General Alexander, however, was told
Lord Gort in my hearing that he was to do nothing to imperia is army and was ultimately responsible for their safety and vacuation.
I suggested to General Alexander that he should at once eturn to La Panne before the telephone was cut off to telephone o the Secretary of State for War, and to get the matter cleared p. This he did. The Secretary of State instructed General lexander to act on his own discretion and to proceed with the evacuation.
Admiral Abrial asked me to take charge of the British and
French embarkation, which I did. I also asked for French officers to assist, and they were provided.
The following signals were despatched:-
2028. "I have felt it necessary for the operation to

59
63
3/w May
AS about 0300 11 988 impossible to carry out
16.
At about 1200 Commander Ken and I motored into embarkation es the bonches.
Dunkirk to report progress as embarkation on our beach was
85.
vere showing signs of extreme exhaustion and then impossible. On our return our lorry was heavily machine
80 it 989 impossible to communicate with the Senior Navel Officer gunned and hit. At this period a heavy bombing attack took we decided to take over * shaler that the had salved and to go place on the Fleet and beaches.
to the bearest to report to the Senior Seval officer
17.
On return to our headquarters (a lorry) we decided
25.
We wasted vater and 0750 put to 00, to make contact with General H.Q. but unfortunately our car
There me very heavy surf running and se had only an uneven set broke down and we had to walk back 5 miles.
of sers, voge arutches and only an 062 to by.
18.
During the night another naval embarkation party
17.
We approached two destroyers but they both 201 underesy.
arrived on the beach to the eastward which reduced the
Tea other destroyers passed de at but paid no limits of our beach.
stiention to us.
19.
Early on Thursday morning 30th I proceeded to
28.
an hour if appeared the
Brigade H.Q. and offered the suggestion that piers be built
Margate the the Consumin to take 12 to the by running lorries out to sea. This was quickly done and was nearest destroyer at this time.
successful.
returning to 80 we case back with him
20.
I then drove Colonel Whitten and Colonel Mackenzie
19,
US28 and into Dunkirk to see Captain Tennant and then drove them back were salses within five minutes of being inboard the lifeboat.
to Brigade H.Q.
1 the or Staff
21.
During the afternoon and dogwatches the French poured Daven and into reported our beaches our return. but no boats arrived within 11 miles
1 usa ordered to return to Chather with by party, of our H.Q.
22.
During the last dog the Germans directed mon $
accurate artillery fire on our beach. This fire continued throughout the night and our lorry was hit. The beach was completely evacuated by allied soldiers.
23.
We had however taken up quarters in a water-boat that was ashore at low mter. No boats had now been in for
16 hours on our beach.
24.
During the night the weather became bad once more -
and a heavy surf was running.
At/

69
73
SECR &
PAge
8.
6.
second attempt TRU now David to tow the ship clear but little progress had been made before a third attack developped at about noon, carried out by 8 equairon of:
dive Dombers. By this time nearly all amunition TRIS expenied and the 4.7 guns were firing in the hope of keeping the enemy at a listance. The Germans however, cade 8 determined diving attack which was well prossed home to about 400 feet.
The ship WAS completely smotherou 00 hits and near misses some of which were of the "B" bomb type. The ship immidiately bogan to settle and I gave the order to abanlon ship. Thanks to the adequate preparations cade by if First ideutenant, Lieutonant-
Commander Moding there TIBUDS plenty of boats and carley floats ready for survivors. fter collecting all strey swimers the boats and floats pullod out to sea. LE JOLIE
picked up 8 officers an: 71 ratings and How.3. WHIT HALL" 20
officers and 52 ratings. One wholer and the notor boat had proceeded to far over the shocls which run parallel to the count for to piok them up.
7.
cank in about 4 fathers of wator in approximate youition with hor uppor Cook smash. Although the sodio and V.C.-V.F.
gear and all important documents had been destroyed I =
anxious to complete the destruction of the vessel. accordingly
I requested the Captain of to fire suns and torpeloss. This W&J done and the ship 180 left on fire forward.
It 10 not certain whether any of the torredoes hit and I
consider further destruction advisable. 1 intimated this in &
signal time.: 40 6/1 to the log Community:over despatched DO a secret Sand coosego.
8. the first attach I ordered the destruction of all Signal when the chip TXC rendered imobile after
Publications except the Fleet Signal Book bridge machine and current naval Syko card. This was done by Sub-
Lieutenant who burnt then in the two galleys.
All Confidential Books prefixed 10' more dumped overboard in a weighted sack except those out on loan to officers SS these could not be got at due to damage aft. The Asdic gear in the cabinet and on the bridge was diamentied where possible and thrown overboard and the remainder smashed The oscillator was removed and brought on the upper dock anidships 80 the finel attack developped. It is not known for certain whether the oscillator slid overboard when the ship sant. lenterns wore unshippod and thrown overboard.
9. on the bridge: C.B. _018 - and certain charge documents in the
The following books and documents were left
Captain's springback and the Meet Signal Book. The bridge was burning fiercely when last seon and it can be confidently stated that these documents and papers more lestroyed.
I would like to emphasise that the older
10. doctroyers with pan point using belted ammunition and 4.7° Guns with only 30 degrees elevation are no match for a determined air attack. Cur Lowis guno had also been recently surreniored.
when shipo of this type are operating within range of energy air attack losses must be expected unless adequate fighter protection is afforded. In all the enemy launched four big uir attacks at about hourly intervals during the forenoon of the 1st June. The first, secon: and fourth of these were unoppeced apparently unopposed by any British Aircraft

87
91
SECE
P6CO
6.
second attempt TRU now carlo to tow the ship clear but little progress had been made before & third attach developped at about noon,carrisi out by S squairon of MICHI
live bonbers. By this time nourly all scrumition TRIS expenied and the 4.7 gans were firing in the hope of Leopin; the enemy at B intunce. the German, honever, & determined diving attack which was well prosued home to about 400 feet.
The ship TRAG completely scotherol By hits and near nisses S000
of which were of the 3 boob type. The ship impediately bogan to settle and I gave the order to abanton ship. Thanks to the aloquato preparations code by if First Lieutonant, Licutenant-
Communier there 1800 plenty of boats and carley floats realy for survivors. fter collecting all strey swimers the boats and floats pullod out to sou. LES JONES
pickod up C officers an: 71 ratings and SHIP HALL" 2
officers and BC ratings. One shalor and the motor boat had processed to: for over the should which run parallel to the count for to piot: them up.
7.
not in about 4 fathers of mator in sperazizate with hor upsor look smosh. the Notto and V.C.-V.P.
coar and all important documento had been I =
anxious to complete the destruction of the vessel. accordingly
I the Captain of to fire guns and torpeloss. This wes done and the ship TOJ left on fire formari.
It is not certain whether any of the torredoeu hit and I
consider further destruction advisable. 1 intimated this in a airmal time 10 6, to the 110g Community: over doupatchol 30 a secret hert coorago.
8.
-hen the chip - 1-obile after the first attack 1 ordere_ the dectruction of all signal
Publications except the flect signal Dook bridge COST2-20
mohine and current naval iyko card. This was Lono by STID-
Lieutenant who burnt then in the two galloys.
All Confidential Books prefixod for more dumped overbourd in a weighted snok except those out on loan to officers SD these could not be COD at due to damage aft. The sale gour in the cabinet end on the bridge was dispential where possible and thrown overbour. and the remainder smoked. The oscillator T80
removed and brought on the uppor dook anidshipu as the final attack developped. It is not known for certain whether the oscillator alid overboard when the this san. lenterns were unshippod and thrown overboard.
D.
The following books and documento were left on the bridgo: C.D. 2010 WE and cortain charge locuments in the
Coptain's springback and the Most Signal Book. The bridge TRAD
burning fiercely when last seen and it can be confidently stated that these locumento and purara more lectroyed.
10.
I mould 11kc to englusise that the older
Soutroyers with DOC 2023 using belted amunition and 4.7° Dana with only 30 degrees elovation are no match for a determinel air attuck. our Lawis guna had also been recently surrenCored.
when shipo of this type are operating within range of enecy air attack logues must be expected unless alequate fighter protoction is afforiat. In all the enemy launched four big win attache at about hourly intervals during the forenoon of the 1st June. The first, secon: and fourth of these were unoppeced apparently unopposed by any British Aircraft

88
92
SECRET.
lace 3.
apparently unopposed by any British iroraft. On the third
000usion un intenso air buttle could be heard in progress above the clouds and no effective bombing took place. I would also like to state that from my observation the onery aircraft even when opposed word always more miserous than our own and in the cubsequent air buttles our fighters although outnumbered fought most courageously and effectively but concrully lost moro planes than the enomy. From our point of view the B.B.C.
Aillotins secoribing the air sotions off unkir: entirely microprosent the truo situation.
11.
The courage end Deheviour of I? officers and non The a great inspiration to 8 Curing the four hours while the ship drifted without help under the threat of destruction.
Their checrfulness and efficionay under these trying conditions
W&O cxtruordinary. That GO for were lost TREE alcost miraculous but IV DO put domn to SOZO extent to the trained courage of the ship's COMPANY who fought their gans mhore possible and took cover when they could not otherwise Do 02 uso. It is cost difficult shore all conductod themolves valiantly to choose those specially conspicuous for their behaviour, but these I
appond of lict of those specially worthy of contion.
12.
The Collowing promitions are attached:-
spronliz I:-
Verbutim statement by various officors and ratings appondix In:-
List of known survivoru and known killed.
pronlix 111.
Lict of officers and men specially mentioned.
prondix IV:- Copy of prolicinary report sent to the 145
Officer Communin -ovor.
1 have the honour to DO,
4r, your obsident servent,
(Nd.)
The Commander in Chief,
Commander, ostorn peronches.
Royal Savy.
Copios to:- The 20g Officer Commenting, over.
Co tuin 19th outrayer Notilla.
Captain (-), flymouth.
COMMA DER-18-CHERS
3- JUN 1940
WESTERN APPROACHES
VICE ADNIRAL
JUN 1940
.
DOVER

108
112
SECRET.
Inco 3.
apparently unopposed by any British iroraft. On the third occasion un intense air buttle could be heard in progress above the clouds and no effective bombing took place. I would also like to state that from my observation the onemy aircraft even when opposed wore always more numerous than our own and in the subsequent air buttles our fighters although outnumbered fought most courageously and effectively but generally lost more planes than the onomy. From our point of view the B.B.C.
Bulletins describing the air actions off Dunkirs entirely microprosentation truo libuation.
11.
The courage and wedffiders and non The C great inspiration to 20 during the four hours while the ship drifted without help under the threat of destruction.
Their checrfulness and efficioncy under these trying conditions was extruordinary. That GO for wore lost was almost miraculous but may be put down to some extent to the trained courage of the ship's company who fought their gane where possible and took cover when they could not otherwise be 02 uso. It is cost lifficult where all conducted themolves valiantly to choose those specially conspicuous for their behaviour, but these I
appoil a list of those specially worthy of contion.
12.
The following promitions are attached:-
Appendix I:- Verbutin statement by various officers and ratings appendix Ii:-
List of known survivoru and known killed.
appondix 111.
-ist of officers and mon specially mentioned.
prondix IV:-
Copy of proliminary report sent to the leg
Officer Communing over.
I have the honour to be, ir, your obsdient servant,
(Cite)
The Commander in Chief,
Commender, western pproaches.
Royal Navy.
Copies to:- The ACE Officer Commending, lover.
Ca tain (2), 19th -outroyer lotillo.
Captain Plymouth.
*
*
WESTERN AFPROACHES
P.T.O...

160
165
4
probably towards the where she might have bean salved by the enemy 11 she sank in shoul water, I asked the Commanding Officer 11 I should ink ser where she was.
He agreed and I cut my sweep wires and sunk er.
12. Five minutes after this the "SCOTIA" and RIGHTON
QUEEN" were sunk. I made a report and proceeded to rescue survivors. My whaler had been damaged and I only had a skiff left. One bunch of survivors were picked U. and
I then put the ship alongside bridge and must of the
"BRIGHTON QUEEN" and artially on er deck, and took off men clincin to her. These nen were mostly French
HTON
Colonial troops and must reluctant to let 80 of what
N.
support they had, it was sometimes necessary to make a line fast to them and pull then off. A carley float and skiff were used to assist in resoue work, no other boats were available. Thile "SALTASH" YRS alongable and on board "BRIGHTON QUEEN" she burped & little on the bilge, but it is not believed that my damage was done. German aircraft bombed and machine gunned men in the water.
my shift was machine gunned.
13.
The work of S.B. 1.Hutter at this time is worthy of mention. He, with the uld of untrained assistants, including Ldg. Sto. Crowley, dealt with 98 casualties,
CUE.
including 10 recussitation cases and only 3 died. He worked most successfully until 10 collepsed. Also worthy of mention is B. Gaughan, Sto. 1. who sma about I mile from the ship, when the ship might easily have had to leave him.
14.
I had picked up 350 to 400 survivors by now, many of them serious casualties, there were no more survivors in
SCUE.
the water SQ I returned to Margate. On the return journey
I closed three trawlers and took on board the Commanding
Officer and crew of M.T.B. 175, these included three serious casualties and one dead rating. I took the M.T.B
in tow and arrived at Margate at 1855.
15.
About 2000 I left the Pier and about 2200 sailed again for Duskerque with boats in tow, one motor boat and the small skiffs. I bad SOMO difficulty with the tow which
VD
MARGATE
light buoy I ran into thick smoke (from Dunkerque) my delayed no about half an hour. Before getting to the greeen
UNKERQUE
being very unreliable, I had to rely very much on compass hand lead (all the tubes for the machine slow had and been I used the in Knock Deep) which made y progress got
1 far Sast.
16.
Orders for this ni that all sweepers had to be lear at 0400. About 0200 I heard The buoy other and by 0500 and the destroyer evacuation the whistle would
UNKERQUE
commence was off the Breakwater at Dunkerque. I followed them at 0245 passed no on the may out, the 30 orders about being as I
did not 0300, even 11 I had an empty having seen sweepers feel Justified in breaking ship. Daring the clear by journey a small craft reported found an object a which mine, return back along ner course and investigation, proved
I turned for a mine, but on closer handles. These broken
I mistook kitchen utensil with broken small craft as horns.
to handles be a may have appeared to the end. June. 16. I anchored at Margate about 0800 and was toldito wait instructions.
I understood that this was the final

CONFIDENTIAL
Dynams 108
B14/0/
1173
167
H.M.S.SCIMITAR
8th June 1940
H.M.S.SCIMITAR...REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
Sir,
Ihave the honour to report on the proceedings of H.M. ship under my command between 26th May and 4th June as follows.
2. I received orders to sail for Dover at noon/28th and I arrived at Dover at about 2000 28th May. At about 2100 I
was ordered to leave under the orders of Captain (D) 16 in
"Malcolm". On arrival at Bray at about 0130 I was ordered to proceed a mile to the eastward and send in boats. My motor boat with whaler in tow proceeded inshore under Lieutenant J.R.G
Trechman and embarked troops. After about two hours my whaler was swamped inshore due to being rushed by troops. My motor boat continued to assist in towing and I embarked troops from various other boats. Later I secured another whaler and embarkation proceeded more rapidly.
3. At about 1230/29 I considered the ship was full
(about 350 troops) and I was ordered to return to Dover. I
sailed by route Y in company WIth "Shikari". I arrived at Dover at about 1630/29 and disembarked troops and then proceeded to oil.
4. I sailed for Dunkirk again at about 2000/29, starting via route Y, joining "Worcester" and then proceeding via route X to the beaches East of Bray. Good progress was made during the night embarking troops using our own motor boat and captured whaler and various other boats. In the morning I had
350 troops on board and proceeded via route X leaving my motor boat and whaler inshore under the command of Hidshipman Ball
R.N.R. Fog patches were encountered on the way back and I
arrived at Dover at about 1000/30.
5. After disembarking troops I sailed again at about
1130 and was ordered to go to Dunkirk harbour via route 8. I
arrived and went alongside at about 1330/30 and embarked about
500 troops very quickly. I returned via route $ being shelled and bombed off Calais. The shelling was of small calibre but fairly accurate; no damage was sustained. I arrived at Dover at about 1630/30 and disembarked troops.
6. I sailed again about 1830/30 for La Panne via route X. Near Dunkirk 1 sighted my motor boat and recalled it.
After waiting sometime at La Panne, where there were several other ships, I was ordered by "Worcester" to go to Bray. I collected a string of derelict boats and sent them in my motor boat under Sub Lieutenant Coldwell. Good progress was made in embarking troops and at about 0600/31 I had 500 on board and sailed after transferring my motor boat and string of other boats to the trawler "Olvina". I proceeded via route X to Dover in company with "Harvester".
7. I arrived at Dover at about 0930/31 and after disembarking troops sailed again about 1030. Whilst proceeding possible to the starboard hand buoys and just reached the through the Downs at 25 knots, I was navigating had as close as
N.W. Goodwin buoy when I was overtaken by Icarus, who out across close, and although I altered towards to starboard him. I as soon both and buoy went hard a starboard when he was with abreast me as the very would allow, I was drawn in about stopped but I sucked over and hit his stern line my stem. I found that was bows were crumpled in on the water collision with bulkhead. & definite
However of after the operation, I thought 10. I go on speed, rent allowing securing & collision mat, could at slow extreme my water pressure on to the in view of the urgenoy and proceeded at 8 knots, later at
The reasons

169
(2)
. 174
0830. Returned to beaches, contacted 350 troops of R.A.S.C.
and R.A.O.C. detachments, including Montenant Colonol and officers. with ascistance of 150 troops, large ship's lifebout was pulled down boach and successfully floated to accident embarlextion, but after removing good, dr take did not give sufficiont bucyancy to componsate for stove in gerboard stroke.
Scarlous lack of boats, reducing omborization rate to about 30 por hour with own bonts only. 227 troops orderhod remainder being cont off to Salamonder and dostroyers. Somo difficulty exporienced through persistent attempts of Large masses of French troops to intercept boats and domand passage Assisted by British troo a in heading off French submers by riflo fire from 50 yurds further along beach. Dunkirk burning with much molio. Miximm visibility, slight cloud. No. R.A.F. support aighted all day.
2600. Lovel bonbing attack on Sutton, Solvenndor, Grogliound and paddlors from 5000-10000 foot. Coo solvo pattom bombo without result. One salvo of H.S. straddling Station and paddlors, no lite.
One dive borbing attack on Suttom and Creyhound, noor nice started fire in Greyhound sundships. One line of 5 bombo aloco to G.H.).
on DOB front, on a line starting from centre of the town down beach and into don, final too bombo fulling such aldo of Service.
Comperitivoly mll bombo used, with incondinres, 000
of which got light to a drifter cable from Strtton which was sunk by paddlors gunfire. To R.A.P. support visible. for smll machine gun hits on Strtton. Greyhound budly damaged by bember and riddled with mahine on fire.
1706. Procoeded Dover, leaving La Panno during further air redd of Issu intensity, in company with Sulamander. No R.A.F. support visible on passage.
2300. Arrived off Dove, only, what. feld in progress, unchored
Chocrved plane at about 1500 foot drop three mignatic nines about
2 cables ahoad, coundo of nines strilling mor clearly andible.
Parashutos soon by several separate observers. signalied position of mines to V.A. Dovor.
mursday 30th. May. 0600. Proceeded into Dover, discharged troops.
1052. Proceeded Sheernues with one boilor. Drove fires in other boiler to make repairs to birlowork, damgod by bunb explosion.
1632. arrived Shoomoos, orderlood coal and ammittion.
riday State My. 0205. Left Shoorness in company with Lydd and Booo.
0400. Companyee maddenly produced a and 30 degrees of devintion,
Rose assumed load of dividion, Inter company dovintion improved and Subton responsed Lead.
0812. Arrived proceeded cust puballol to bonches passing
4 planes wrocked on he boach weat of two with Prench markings. 29. Passed Dunkisk harbour 1 cuble. Harbour fires. wall intect and little damage apparent from counard except Imgo
Continued DOID from bouch close work of
0835. high Hurricanes One 0.230 ship ounls alenguide cust plur of Dunicipt. 2
Sinfire, and Spitfires overhead, processing home of harbour, at
Fearch spood. and several cargo ships must court cast. continued groups Long column on the bonoh. Combinuous column about 1 wills dectroyers of troops surehing into Dunisive from long along bouch cast of
3 milon off is punno. wind Items force In frushering, troops with DOG
0906. slight Anchored but considerable mall.. Consenced loading
COMMANDING OFFICER
19 JUN 1940
H.M.S. "SUTTON"

(2)
0830. Returned to beaches, contacted 350 troops of R.A.S.C.
and R.A.O.C. detachments, including Lieutenant Colonel and officers. With assistance of 150 troops, large ship's lifeboat was pulled down beach and successfully floated to assist embarkation., but after removing gear, air tanks did not give sufficient buoyancy to compensate for store in garboard strake.
Serious lack of boats, reducing embarkation rate to about 30
per hour with own boats only. 227 troops embarked, remainder being sent off to Salamander and destroyers. Some difficulty experienced through persistent attempts of large masses of
French troops to intercept boats and demand passage. Assisted by British troops in heading off French Swimmers by rifle fire from 50 yards further along the beach. Dunk rk burning with much smoke. Maximum visibility, slight cloud, No R.A.F. support sighted all day.
1600. Level bombing attack on Sutton, Salamander, Greyhound and paddlers from 5000-10000 feet. One salvo pattern bombs without result. One salvo of H.E. straddling Sutton and paddlers, no hits.
One dive bombing attack on Sutton and Greyhound, near miss started fire in Greyhound amidships. One line of 5 bombs close to G.H.Q.
on sea front, on a line starting from centre of the town down beach and into sea., final two bombs falling each side of Sutton.
Comparitively small bombs used, with several incendiares, one of which set light to a drifter 1 cable from Sutton which was sunk by paddlers gunfire. No R.A.F. support visible. Few small machine gun hits on Sutton. Greyhound badly damaged by bombs and riddled with machine gun fire.
1706. Proceeded Dover, leaving La Panne during further air raid of less intensity, in company with Salamander. No R.A.F. support visible on passage.
2300. Arrived off Dover, calm, mist, Air raid in progress, anchored.
Observed plane at about 1500 feet drop three magnetic mines about
2 cables ahead, sounds of mines striking water clearly audible.
Parashutes seen by several observers. Signalled position hursday 30th. May. 0600. Proceeded into Dover, discharged troops.
of mines to V.A.Dover.
1052. Proceeded Sheerness with one boiler. Drew fires in other boiler to make repairs to brickwork, damaged by bomb explosion
1632. Arrived Sheerness, embarked coal and ammunition.
riday 31st May. 0205. Left Sheerness in company with Lydd and Ross.
0400. Compasses suddenly produced 20 and 30 degrees od deviation,
Ross assumed lead of division, later compass deviation improved and Sutton re-assumed lead.
0812. Arrived Dunkirk, proceeded east parallel to beaches passing
4 planes wrecked on the beach west od Dunkirk, two with Franch markings. 0829. Passed Dunkirk harbour distant 1 cable. Harbour wall intact and little damage apparent from seaward except huge fires.
Continual gunfire, some from beach close west of Dunkirk.
0835. Hurricanes and Spitfires overhead, proceeding homewards at high speed. One cargo ship sunk alongaide east pier of harbour, 2
French destroyers and several cargo ships sunk east of Dunkirk.
Long columns of troops marching into Dunkirk from east, scattered groups on the beach. Continuous column about 1 mile long along
0906. Anchored off La Panne. Wind N.W. force 3, freshening, sea beach 3 miles east of Dunkirk.
slight but considerable swell. Commenced loading troops with

187
191
(2)
0830. Returned to beaches, contacted 350 troops of R.A.S.C.
and R.A.O.C. detachments, including Licutenant Colonel and officers. With assistance of I50 troops, large ship's lifeboat was pulled down beach and successfully floated to assist embarkation, but after removing gear, air tanks did not give sufficient buoyancy to compensate for store in garboard strake.
Serious lack of boats, reducing embarkation rate to about 30
per hour with own boats only. 227 troops embarked, remainder being sent off to Salamander and destroyers. Some difficulty experienced through persistent attempts of large masses of
French troops to intercept boats and demand passage. Assisted by British troops in heading off French swimmers by rifle fire from 50 yards further along beach. Dunkirk burning with much smoke. Maximum visibility, slight cloud. No R.A.F. support sighted all day.
1600. Level bombing attack on Sutton, Salamander, Greyhound and paddlers from 5000-I0000 feet. One salvo pattern bombs without result. One salvo of H.E. straddling Sutton and paddlers, no hits.
One dive bombing attack on Sutton and Greyhound, near miss started fire in Greyhound amidships. one line of 5 bombs close to G.H.Q.
on sea front, on at line starting from centre of the town down beach and into sea, final two bombs falling each side of Sutton.
Comparitively small bombs used, with several incendiares, one of which set light to at drifter 1 cable from Sutton which was sunk by paddlers gunfire. No R.A.F. support visible. Few small machine gun hits on Sutton. Greyhound badly damaged by bombs and riddled with machine gun fire.
I706. Proceeded Dover, leaving La Panne during further air raid of less intensity, in company with Salamander. No R.A.F. support visible on passage.
2300. Arrived off Dover, calm, mist. Air raid in progress, anchored.
Observed plane at about 1500 feet drop three magnetic mines about
2 cables ahead, sounds of mines striking water clearly audible.
Parashutes seen by several separate observers. Signalled position of mines to V.A. Dover.
Thursday 30th May. 0600. Proceeded into Dover, discharged troops.
1052. Proceeded Sheerness with one boiler. Drew fires in other boiler to make repairs to brickwork, damaged by bomb explosion.
1632. Arrived Sheerness, embarked coal and ammunition.
Friday 31st May. 0205. Left Sheerness in company with Lydd and Ress.
0400. Compasses suddenly produced 20 and 30 degrees of deviation,
HOSS assumed lead of division, later compass deviation improved and Sutton re-assumed lead.
0812. Arrived Dunkirk, proceeded east parallel to beaches passing
4 planes wrecked on the beach west of Dunkirk, two with French markings. 0829. Passed Dunkirk harbour distant I cable. Harbour wall intact and little damage apparent from seaward except huge fires.
0835. Hurricanes gunfire, and Spitfires overhead, proceeding homewards at
Continual some from beach close west of Dunkirk.
high speed. One cargo ship sunk alongside east pier of harbour, 2
French destroyers and several cargo ships sunk east of Dunkirk.
Long columns of troops marching into Dunkirk from east, scattered groups on the beach. Continuous column about I mile long along beach 3 miles east of Dunkirk.
0906. Anchored off La Panne. Wind N.W. force 3. freshening, troops sea slight but considerable swell.. Commenced loading with

(2)
0830. Returned to beaches, contacted 350 troops of R.A.S.C.
and R.A.O.C. detachments, including Lieutenant Colonel and
202
officers. With assistance of 150 troops, large ship's lifeboat was pulled down beach and successfully floated to assist embarkation, but after removing gear, air tanks did not give.
sufficient buoyancy to compensate for stove in garboard strake.
Serious lack of boats, reducing embarkation rate to about 30 per hour with own boats only, 227 troops embarked remainder being sent off to Salamander and destroyers. Some difficulty experienced through persistent attempts of large masses of French troops to intercept boats and demand passage. Assisted by British troops in heading off French swimmers by rifle fire from 50 yards further along beach. Dunkirk burning with much smoke. Maximum visibility, slight cloud, No R.A.F. support sighted all day.
1600. Level bombing attack on Sutton, Salamander, Greyhound and paddlers from 5000-10000feet. One salvo pattern bombs without result. One salvo of H.E. straddling Sutton and paddlers, no hits.
One dive bombing attack on Sutton and Greyhound, near miss started fire in Greyhound smidships. One line of 5 bombs close to G.H.Q.
on sea front, on a line starting from centre of the town down beach and into sea, final two bombs falling each side of Sutton.
Comparatively small boats used, with several incendiaries, one of which set light to & drifter - cable from Sutton which was sunk by paddlers gunfire. No R.A.F. support visible. Few small machine gunshits on Sutton. Greyhound badly damaged by bombs and riddled with machine gun fire.
1706. Proceeded Dover, leaving La Panne during further air raid of less intensity, in company with Salamander. No R.A.F. support visible on passage.
2300. Arrived off Dover, calm, mist. Air raid in progress, anchored
Observed plane at about 1500 feet drop three magnetic mines about
2 cables ahead, sounds of mines striking water clearly audible.
Parachutes seen by several separate observers. Signalled position of mines to V.A. Dover.
Thursday 30th. May. 0600. Proceeded into Dover, discharged troops.
1052. Proceeded Sheerness with one boiler. Drew fires in other boiler to make repairs to brickwork, damaged by bomb explosion.
1632. Arrived Sheerness, embarked coal and ammunition.
Friday 31st. May. 0205. Left Sheerness in company with Lydd and Ross.
0400. Compasses suddenly produced 20 and 30 degrees of deviation,
Roas assumed lead of division, later compass deviation improved and Sutton re-assumed Lead.
0812. Arrived Dunkirk, proceeded east parallel to beaches passing
4 planes wrecked on the beach west of Dunkirk, two with French markings. 0829. Passed Dunkrik Harbour distant 1 cable. Harbour wall intast and little damage done apparent from seaward except huge fires.
Continual gunfire, some from beach close west of Dunkirk.
0835. Hurricanes and Spitfires overhead, proceeding homewards at the soattered harbour
Long columns of troops marching into Dunkirk from east, beach 3 miles east groups on the beach. Continious column about 1 mildalong of
Dunkirk. 0906. Anchored off La Panne, Wind N.W. force 3, freshening, with sea slight but considerable swell. Commenced loading troops
COMMANDING OFFICER
19 JUN 1940
H.M.S. "SUTTON"

209
224
On arrival at Dunkirk I use ordered to 80 to
West pier. I deemed this inadvisable and said 80.
Also it was suggested that I should pick up French soldiers from the beach inside the harbour. lithout boats this was impracticable.
Alongside East pier a full load was taken but not before I had cast off and returned oring to a misunderstanding. While alonguide a hulk two cables east from the pièr TAB heavily bombed by two waves of dive bombers. The second attack was in progress as I laft the pier and aircraft were engaged by the entire areasent.
Dive bonber attacks on leaving Dunkirk.
During the next half hour the ship was attacked by successive waves of dive bonbers consisting of three or four squadrons of about nine each.
The first attack took place in Dunkirk reads where avoiding action was not possible. The available speed was 19 knots. In this attack about half the bonbe dropped were time delay and the nearest appeared to be about 50 yards away. Although the ship was lifted in the water a number of times no structural damage was done.
Succeeding attacks took place in the channel leading northward from No.5 buoy. In these attacks the majority of the bomba burst on impact with the water and caused great damage to personnel. Some of these dropped as near as 10 yards.
In all it is estimated that over 100 bombe were dropped near the ship.
Attacks were pressed well home even down to
200 02 300 feet and it can be said that the bombing was
- 3 -

Pages
231
W (continued)
2010
possibly, already damaged by our fighters.
2105
Proceeded 10th 180 British troops.
Alongaide Eastern Pier embarking troops.
rday 1st. June.
0005
Anchored off Margate.
0133
0240
Alongside Margate Pier, disemberked troops.
0700
Ordered to anchor off Margate and unit orders.
Ordered to proceed to Dunkirk.
1000
troops. Alongaide Eastern Pier, Dunkirk Hartour, embarking
More or less continous High level Bombing in progress engaged enesy Bombers.
1130
Proceeded with 210 British troops, and 5 stretcher cases.
1235
In position 342° No.5 Bucy 1 Mile, steering 342° with two transports ahead. One being a large two funneller and the other a Paddle steamer (names not know), both carrying French treeps. To were all attacked w 16
Enery Dive Bonbers which were hotly engaged. Both transports were hit, and Kingfisher*near missed*. The smaller ship appeared to be sinking and the larger on fire, but still under way, and under control. A
number of small Drifters proceeding to Dunkirs, were close at hand and proceeded to pick up survivors. I
connenced to turn, 10th the same intention but sighted two destroyerstwo miles to the Northward, one British and one French, both without troops.I informed them by light and they closed at full speed. I then decided that the help Kingfisher, who was already full, could add, did not justify By risking the loss of By troops by remaining in the vicinity, 80 proceeded.
1442
Anchored off Margate Pier.
1555
Alongaide Margate Pier disembarking troops.
1635
Proceeded and anchored in Margate Roads, ordered to remain at 1 hour's notice in case required.
Not included in Saturday light's operations.
iday 2nd June.
No fresh orders received, took the opportunity to replenish armunition, 113 4ª H.S. Helley return empties,
During the dark hours several Parachute flares were seen and to oil seen to drop,off North Foreland.
May 3rd June.
1910
Weighed and in company, to rendezvous of Man and Auto
1955
Forned Carrier. escort on Auto Carrier, who informed no that
2130
Off"U" Buoy. Salamander firing at floating nine.
Lady of Man was still in Dover.
8149
Sighted two floating Mines about 12 feet apart with
Went a alongaide West Pier, Dunkirk Harbour and line between them. Ordered Guillemot to sink them.
1255
organised for embarkation, and appeared such fresher embarked 310 French troops, who were very wall than They also still possessed practically all their any of our own.
8319
Slipped equipment. and proceeded. There was considerable

SECRET
243
. 258
manocuvring and one rating near the wall fairly heavy shelling use in outside the harbour W88 slightly wounded by a splinter. On progress hemp wreck air the bearing - 30 88 soon 00 I 769 just clear or round I found the Dort peddle and mony fathoms arriving of hands the entrance to the Dorto I stopped and got B musber the of cleared on with knives to clear ito The bearin- ma the and 2 was able to proceed though Ny half practically In increasing light the ship WOB shelled from - a speedo coant I picked m a Service notor Jounch une also lifebox: and to the west of Dunkirko but was 20% hito Soon after gun 1e position ving the towad them back to the Worth Copúvino.
the Commanding Officer of Hollod, "Crested Engle" but from the
NAOLE" I have not yet doen the report from evidence of a survivor it appears that, after I had ordered her to Dunkirk on May 29th, the proceeded alongaido the sestem side of the East Mole at Dunkisk and embarited troups and consulties including many from II 3.3. "Grafton" and a transport which had both been sunk alongside by boabs. Heavy boaling and shell fire WUB experienced but "frested Regle" this unhit with the evening when she had just left the Vole to proceed have with her for 1 or troops and casualties and TROB his by a boob in the engl 0
TO no A fire was started and It appeared that 18 the engines were et: 11 working slowly the Companiting Officer decided to beich the shin. Before or after he ⑈ benched 11 is believed she was hit again by two borbs. It is thought that only a mail proportion of the hip's company were committies but that may 02 the streeth "
cases who were accomptated 1nth mardroom and after the ship were loot in the fire.
H.H.B. "OOLDEN OLN". I would like to & 'il the following return
HOWEIST and Lucas. Although technically Lic to Ludas 10 second in in Tespect or th report of proceedings formided by Reutenants
First Mentenant and there in no doubt that the initiative and
R.NoV.No Officer), Lieut. Neumen has curried our the Jusice of commend of the ship (se on R.N.R. Officer #: Lieud being an by the ship d 128 the absence of have Commiting
2 elmost entirely to Membership Research the took
Belf the commend and we toyally supported by the two
C. vewn. 1 1a 34 years of age and quite inexperienced an Naval once Lieutenant Nowman had decided white una to be concol Meuts Jo
Officers Lieutenants Lucan and/Denting who did excellent work matters - but I consider that the part he played in these operations have Paken any sotive part in the not been for his highest Seadership and Littletive 001000 agle would not is We they of the commentation and I on convinced Shirt had is
Lucan 340 & who handles the ship with great abill, and OR the
1 - V 11km S180 to mention the gooder york by Licut.
consider that which the ship that she 803 out enfetly JOB in a great
OCCBR on VOB in Dunidak Surbour it nights I
messure as due to the his fact personal efforts on the DD well his handling of the ship.
J, Shirley, Ust of men Telegraphist RaNaVaR whose
To the recomended I VOL the to add Fredito
BORION and excreme officer of the flotilla and elso that efficiency Actin Leading devotion to duty has been 05 the statest rely Kion Searen Scott 8.2. with any degree of competency €
02 At moo DU no BB Senior 10/31406, who USD the only man I duri could given, O.P.O. Sereen to and Uttam STATE RNR
the night visit tc take the Lunicipio wheel 1 thoroughts shill insteme the

Dynams 202.
BIGLO
- 337
H.M.S. Albury. H.M.S.
9th June 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to formed the account of proceedings of His Majesty's Ship Albury during the days May 28 th to June 6th 1940.
25
I left Harwich at noon on lay 38th in company with the Fifth Minesweeping Flotilla, arrived off
Zudecotte Beach at 3130 and, anchoring as close as possible, sent Doats inshore to embark troops. The rate of embarkation was then slow as the tide vis low and a small surf was troublesome 00 the beach. The troops were in good spirits though short of rations;
I landed a quantity of dry provisions in the skiff.
mile 3. to seamed of the ship, but no interference was
About 2330 a bomb was seen to drop about one caused to the work in hand.
4. ceeded without incident to Margate, where the troops
At 0830 on May 20th I got under my and prowere disembarked.
5. at 1930 on May 29th; a considerable amount of bombing
I then returned to Zudecotte, arriving there was in progress. On arrival the roads were fairly empty, as we had passed,on the my,a number of loaded ships returning.
had 6. grounded and,beirg being full of troops and survivors,
I made towards a burning Paddl -stommer, which appeared to be in 8 bad my. All boats and Carley up. Bombs were being dropped continually around the floats were sent any and many survivors were picked two Machino-gun attacks were carried out. I have ship and the Paddle-steamor during this operation, and but the utmost praise for all concerned, the majority nothing of whom are very young and had certainly never fire was kent as by the Twelve Pounder. I sent been in action before. Continual Anti-aircraft a signal for Fighter assistance, which arrived later in the evening.

rt of Proceedings of M.T.B. 107
-
Page
3
401
kships and transferred to H:M. 2020 proceeded in two tow
.M. "VIVACIOUS". 2230 Slipped tow and embarked Captain Dangerfield R.N.
H.M.S. "VIVACIOUS" and proceeded to Dunkirk imdependently. Navigation rendered difficult by spray obscuring vision and by unknown doviation on compass which had never been swung. 2330 (approx:) Arrived off Dunkirk entered harbour and cruised there. Considerable shelling in progress, icularly in vicinity of East Pier, alongside which M.T.B. 107 secured and Captain Dangerfield. On his return left harbour and searched for kships, two only being found, the third having been sunk in collision on way. During this period M.T.B. 107 was alongside, she was crushed by e French fishing craft which were engaged in evacuating troops and were er unable or unwilling to keep clear. After closing the block ships owed first into harbour and received crew from her boat and transferred to H.M.S. "VIVACIOUS" lying outside, thereafter going in again and ing up the remainder of the crew of the second blockship. Thereafter
Dunkirk at 0345 with H.M.S. "VIVACIOUS" and M.A/S.B 07 arriving Dover
3rd June. Considerable difficulty was experienced in manoeuvring
B., 107 in Dunkirkk harbour, of much heavy wreckage, her inability to go rnand her large turning circle.
ay, 2nd June
Left Dover 1735 and proceeded to embark Captains of blockships, sfering them to H.M. S"SHIKARI". 2030 Proceeded in the two tow of H.M.S.
KARI" to Dunkirk inz company of blockships. On arrival off Dunkirk bed tos and empboyed taking messages to blockships. On blockships hing at about 0245 attended leading blockshep S.S. Gourko to follow her nd take off crew. During watting period H.M.S. "SHIKARI" bombed without ct.
H avy shelling rifle and machine gun fire observed. As Hall.S.
rko" was proceeding to enter heavy explosion was observed on board from mine, torpedo or bomb. At once closed her to render assistance secured alongside. At about same time M.A/S.B. 10 did the same and rked part of her ship's company. XXXXXX S.S. "GOURKO" sank rapidly king one of M.T.B's 107's lines in so doing. As N.A/S.B. 10 had eeded into harbour to follow the remaining blockship N.T.B. 107
ined to rescue more of S.S. "GOURKO"S crew who had not succeeded in ing away. 8 were rescued, including the commanding officer, 3 being busly and 4 less seriously injured. Very considerable difficulty was rienced in doing this owing to much heavy wreckage, the presence of wreck of S.S. "KING ORRY" and the lack of manoeuvring power of M.T.B.
When satisfied that no-one remained in the water proceeded to search
H.M.S. "SHIKARI" to transfer survivors, as the small size of the boat and of accommodation made this highly desirable. Aa no sign of H.M.S.
KARI" any M.A/S.B. 10 could be found, and the blowing up of the remaining t, the time being between 0350 and 0400, I decided to make for Dover ship had or already been observed, and it was now practically broad daypendently to regretted error in navigation, M.T.B. 107 became involved no at utmost speed. On passage thick fog was encountered in and, the vins. I thereupon anchored until the weather cleared, having the sands faith
7 The fog rapidly cleared, and I proceeded across 4th June.
he compass. North Goodwin buoy, thence to Dover, arriving 0730, lay, 4th June.
At Dover.
esday, 5th June.
Proceeded from Dover to Portsmouth in company with D/C Boat and
B. 102.
eeded ined
B.
107
was ing a were engaged 11 and P
busly sep clear. After S"SHI
rieno received crew frooz compa vrem outside, thereafter takin We bloor of the second ttendeafter
A/S. IVACIOUS" and Averir Dover in oor
V wasriencedilty was experiesuvring awckag, hech heavy wrecksility to June.

52
OPERATION "DYNAMO"
H.M.D.B. "DESPATCH II"
51
1940
MAY
24th p.m. Commissioned at Poole. 1600 sailed from Poole for
Portsmouth. 2100 Berthed at Portsmouth Dockyard.
Ship "Wipped" during the night.
25th 0430 Left Dockyard for Spithead, Adjusted Compasses. Returned to Dockyard 1700 with defects.
26th 0400 Engines failed to start. 0420 Sailed from Portsmouth for
Newhaven. 1400 Berthed at Newhaven.
27th 1130 Engines failed to start. Air Compressor broken down;
Temporary repairs executed by Southern Rly by 21.45.
28th 0600 Engines failed to start. 0630 Sailed from Newhaven for Dover. 1740 Arrived off Dover. 2115 Anchored
29th 0410 Started to weigh Anchor; anchor foul of Sub. Cable;
0620 Weighed Anchor, proceeded to Downs for Route Orders.
0930 Left Downs for La Panne by Route "Y".
Ship was not attacked by any of the large number of enemy aircraft seen being engaged by Naval Patrol vessels hear
W.Hinder and Kwinte Bk Buoys, or by Aircraft seen engaged by Fighters off La Panne; none of the bad shots aimed?
by Nieuport Battery at 2 Destroyers North of Nieuport Bk Buoy fell neared than a cable to this vessel.
2000 Anchored 2 miles west of La Panne, and commenced embarking French troops.
30th 0400 Weighed and Proceeded 0405 Engines broke down, reanchore
Contact was made by Semaphore with a Destroyer close, who promissed a tow when he had filled-up with troops, but temporary repairs were eff/ected by 1030, and ship proceeded under own power. Course was set to return by Route "Y", but Paschol close ahead being heavily shelled by Nieuport
Battery, in company with Paschol, course was altered NW, across the banks, to Buoy "Y". About 6 miles S of "Y" Buoy a low flying aircraft attacked with 2 bombs which went well over. About 1 mile further on Lewis Gun fire was opened on another low flying enemy aircraft, who did not attack.
1915 Berthed at Ramsgate.
31st 0915091 Left Ramsgate; set course by Route "X" for Dunkirke.
1640 Dunkirke abeam; air raid in progress, nearest bombs, aimed at Destroyer,4 to for cable from this vessel.
1725 Anchored 31 East of Dunkirke off Battery de Dunes;
commenced embarking Middlesex Regiment. Constant High bombing Air Raids till dark; after dark low bombing and machine gun raids. 23.00 All available Middlesex Regiment embarked.
June 1st 0001 Weighed, and set course by Route "X" for Ramsgate.
0100 Dunkirke abeam.
0900 Berthed at Ramsgate;
Reported ship unable to proceed to sea without repairs.
June 4th p.m. Operation "Dynamo" cancelled. 22.00 Proceed from
Inner Basin to anchor in Roads.
5th 0400 Sailed from Ramsgate for Newhaven. 2000 Berhhed Newhaven.
6th 0705 Sailed from Newhaven for Poole. 1807 Amchored off Poole.
7th a.m. Proceeded into Poole Harbour.
p.m. Paid Off: Crew returned to R.N.B Portsmouth by train.
HWilmot-Sitwelk
Lieutenant Commander.

289.
-
83
NARRATIVE OF DUTCH BOAT "JAVA"
26th May - 4th June, 1940.
0645, 27th May, the crew of D.B.22 under the command of
Lieut-Commander Drake, RND left Chatham Barracks and travelled via
Portsmouth to Southampton, joining "Java" that evening. The vessel was then under repair, with orders on completion to load ammunition in the River.
On the afternoon of 29th May those orders were cancelled and we were instructed to fuel and proceed light to Dover.
Accordingly about 1700 with Main and Auxilliary machinery persuaded to function by Diesel experts from the shore "Java" left dock and proceeded down the Solent to Hamble.
At 0400 on 30th May our troubles started. Our final air pressure started the Main Engine and we left with the handicap of being able neither to stop or go astern as the belt driving our
Auxilliarys parted immediately. Eventually our Auxilliary
Diesel was started and ran all day for light and air with the result that shortly before arrival at Dover our E.R.A. collapsed owing to fumes. As our Windlass gear was already out of action the ship was allowed alongside and on the morning of 31st May
"Sandhurst" was notified of our defects. By this time our
Auxilliary engine also had ceased running.
The Main belt was renewed, but as regards the other and major defects, notably our Ballast Pump, it was pointed out that as they would take several hours to complete and we were under
1 hours' notice for sea, it was not worth starting on them.
On Saturday morning, 1st June Lieut-Commander Drake was taken ill and detained sick in "Sandhurst".
I received orders that afternoon to proceed to Dunkirk to arrive at 0200 on 2nd June and left at 1945, steaming 10 knots with neither Auxilliary nor Anchor gear working. My confidence in our new belt was apparently misplaced as being too slack it failed to drive the Compressor. This lack of air and consequent inability, if stopped, to restart, either ahead or astern, might have led to complications if, at midnight, 16 miles off Dunkirk,
No.3 Cylinder had not commenced to seize, shedding bolts from the Crankcase which my Engineroom staff eventually held in place with wedges. But our speed was down to 5 knots making an 0200
arrival impossible and I had no choice but to put about, but a for minuteslater however presumably with the Engine cooling, some higher revolutions were obtained, and I rmoceeded another 5 miles towards the shore. Again however the Engine failed and it was only at slow speed and with great care that it could be kept moving at all. Considering further progress unwise I cruised in the neighbourhood until daylight and then made the best of my way home, berthing in Dover about 1015, 2nd June. Here repairs were considered impossible and on Tuesday, 4th June I was towed by "Gorecht" to Sheerness and on the following day by "Bornrif"
to Tilbury, thence the following morning to Surrey Commercial Docks
ADNIRAL
Raviei
DOVER 14JUN 1940
ft. R.N.V.R.
R

"VREDE"
Page 3
151
145
wound' I5. As only in her enough air the for one start was available the was
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ berth, operation being carried out ship comments willing cooperation of our passengers, with whose the were most instructive.
I6. Outside the harbour entrance I closed a French pilot for instructions and was boarded by a French pilot who remained vessel
Dover. on board until he was discharged to the Customs Authorities at
I7. No other ships being available into which our troops could be embarked, and the first intensive bombing attack having started, I proceeded for Ramsgate, but made the entrance too late to catch the light or the tide, so proceeded to Dover.
I8. At Dover an air raid appeared to be in progress and I was unable to enter until daybreak on Thursday 30th.May when the party was disembarked at Admiralty pier.
I9. Fresh victualling stores were embarked and I was informed by Captain the Hon. George Fraser that I would be required to sail with a tow of motor boats for the beaches. Stores and provisions for the tow were embarked and the party sailed at IIOO.
20. About two miles off Dover the three forward main engine bearings statrted to run so I sent the tow back to report to
Captain Fraser and came to an anchor. I was later towed alongside Admiralty pier by the schoot "RIKA".
2I. I reported "Vrede" to be out of action, and myself and the company to be available for other duties, to the Vice-Admiral,
Dover and to the Captain, H.M.S. "Lynx". I and the Ist.Lieut:,
Lieut. Hamilton, were employed on various duties, during which time the ship remained in charge of the coxswain.
22. On Tuesday 4th. June I was instructed by Captain Hallifax R.N
to report with Lieut, Hamilton to Rex House for leave and return for to previous duty, leaving "Vrede" in charge of the coxswain disposal.
I have the honour to be,
Sir, your obedient servant ce-Admiral over.
Rampand Lieutenant Commander
0
mander in Chief
Royal Navy.
the Nore
VICE ADMIRAL
26 JUN 1940
*
DOVER

153
147
As considerable enemy air activity was in progress
I ordered troops accommodated on the upper deck to load their rifles and stand by to protect this vessel.
Course as requisite for Downs.
14:00 - Arrived off Downs.
14:30 - Pilot boarded with orders to take us to Margate.
17:00 - Arrived Margate. Discharged troops and two ladies, received two ladders, fresh water and stores.
20:00 - Proceeded in company with others for Braye. Crew employed cleaning hold and decks, rigging ladders and replacing life belts.
30th May 1940.
05:00 - Anchored in 21 FMS. off Braye beach. Troops commence boarding from ladders rigged on both sides of the ship.
The service rendered by shore boats and others was excellent. Between 05:00 and 09:00 vessel was shifted five times owing to falling tide.
07:00 - Enemy's shore guns commenced firing at ships loading troops along the beach.
09:00 - We have loaded approximately 420 troops. No more space on board is available. Weighed anchor and proceeded for
Downs. Course as requisite to avoid enemy's shells.
Troops on upper deck standing by to repel enemy air attack.
17:00 - Berthed alongside in Ramsgate Harbour. Discharged troops.
Received fresh water and stores. Crew of this ship entirely fatigued. Borrowed two Naval Ratings from
Naval authorities ashore. Proceeded outside harbour and anchored for the night. Crew clean hold and deck. All crew turn in for the night. Look out kept by borrowed
Naval Ratings.
31st May 1940.
Forenoon Crew employed overhauling Brenn Gun and rifles left on board with /troops. These were placed in positions to protect vessel against attack from the air.
16:00 - Ordered to proceed to Portsmouth. Proceeded accordingly.
1st June 1940
13:30 - opposite King's Stairs. Instructed concerned. operation
Secured "Dynamo" has concluded where this ship is
NOTE:/...

MOTOR CONVOY.
6/6/40.
Dynamo 188.
Motor Barge Sherfield
#
18
Ex-idghter Y.O. 63.
Ex-Lighter X.95.
Sub It. J.D.F. Kealy, R.N.
Motor Launch Nanette II.
On arriving at Sheerness Motor Boat Dook on Friday, Sist May, 1940, we received command of the above convoy with instructions to pick up British Troops from the shores round Dunkirk as soon as possible. This was at 2 p.m; by 2.15 9.
we were under way heading out to sea.
Good progress was made until later that night we lost contact with lighter X.9
although we spent some time in trying to locate her without success.
At 11 a.m. 1st June land was sighted, peniot Where were we? The one and decidedly irregular compass, the Deviation of which we never knew, which perhaps was Just as well. brought us to a buny round which was painted -"Ostend". This
Dyroms 188 - 181
REPORT.
SUB LIEUT. P. SNOW. R,N.
Motor Boat "REDA" - 12 ton - speed 8 knots.
Left Sheerness at approx. 1900 on Tuesday
28th. Made first crossing to Dunkirk on Wednesday 29th leaving Ramsgate at 1000. Arrived in company with five other small boats at 1700. Whilst proceeding up Dunkirk roads towards the beaches we were machine-gunned by low flying aircraft. Bullet stuck in deck-head having failed to penetrate. Embarked soldiers on destroyers and sloops for 3 hours under continual bombardment from the air.
Headed for Ramsgate at 2200 with a party of 21 English soldiers on board. Whilst leaving were deliberately bombed one salvo falling within 30 yards of the boat.
Loosened several planks but no material damage sustained.
Arrived Ramsgate approx. 0600 Thursday.
Left on second trip at 1100 on Friday 31st, arriving at Dunkirk at 1730. Took off about 50 Frenchmen to waiting ships and left for Ramsgate with 23 Frenchmen on board. Heavy bombers were bombing the beaches when we left at 2015.
Anchored off N. Goodwin for the night and proceeded into harbour at 0530.
Crew for 1st trip:-
R.W. Rawlings (P.O Motorman)
1 Civilian Volunteer
Crew for 2nd trip:-
R.W. Rawlings
1. Leading Seaman
1. A.B.
All times are approximate.
(Signed) P.Snow
Sub. Lieut, R,N.

MOTOR CONVOY.
6/6/40. Dynamo 188.
Notor Barge Sherfield
1
# 185
Ex-Lighter Y.O. 63.
Ex-Lighter X.95.
Sub Lt. J.D.F. Kealy, R.N.
Motor Launch Nanette II.
On arriving at Sheerness Motor Boat Dook on Friday, 31st May, 1940, we received command of the above convoy with instructions to pick up British Troops from the shores round Dunkirk as soon as possible. This was at 2 p.m; by 2.15 p.m.
we were under way heading out to sea.
Good progress was made until later that night we lost contact with lighter X.95
although we spent some time in trying to locate her without success.
At 11 a.m. 1st June land was sighted, paniol Where were we? The one and decidedly irregular compass, the Deviation of which we never knew, which perhaps was tust as well. brought us to a buoy round which was painted -"Ostend". This
*
182
19t.
REPORT OF "SKYLARK" - S/Lee MARES R.N.V.R.
Abandoned in Mid Channel and crew taken on board
1ty
"Strathelliott". S/L Mares was left behind at Dunkirk.
2
(Crew came back on Trawler).

MOTOR CONVOY.
6/6/40. Dynamo 188.
Motor Barge Sherfield
1 - 185
Ex-Lighter Y.O. 63.
Ex-Lighter X.95.
Motor Launch Nanette II.
Sub Lt. J.D.F. Kealy, R.N.
On arriving at Sheerness Motor Boat Dook on Friday, Sist May, 1940, we received command of the above convoy with instructions to pick up British Troops we were under way heading out to sea.
from the shores round Dunkirk as soon as possible. This was at 2 p.m; by 2.15 p.m.
Good progress was made until later that night we lost contact with lighter X.95
although we spent some time in trying to locate her without success.
At 11 a.m. 1st June land was sighted, peniol Where were we? The one and decidedly irregular compass, the Deviation of which we never know, which perhaps was just as well, brought us to a buny round which was painted - -"Ostend". This
Dynam 193 " 183 196
REPORT OF "MARY ROSE" - S/I H. Mc.Clelland R.N.V.B.
Ity
Engines failed on way over. Ship taken in cow, began
2
making water fast and became unmanageable and was abandoned in Mid Channel where she sank. Crew taken on board the Trawler "Strathelliott" where they helped to take off troops from the beach at Dunkirk.
Journey back made in trawler. No injuries to anyone.
8
on dng
18
#

MOTOR CONVOY.
6/6/40. Dynams 188.
Notor Barge Sherfield
1
#
Ex-Lighter Y.O. 63.
185
Ex-Lighter X.95.
Motor Launch Nanette II.
Sub Lt. J.D.F. Kealy, R.N.
On arriving at Sheerness Motor Boat Dook on Friday, Sist May, 1940, we received command of the above convoy with instructions to pick up British Troops we were under way heading out to sea.
from the shores round Dunkirk as soon as possible. This was at 2 p.m; by 2.15 p.m.
Good progress was made until later that night we lost contact with lighter X.95
although we spent some time in trying to locate her without success.
At 11 a.m. 1st June land was sighted, peniot Where were we? The one and decidedly irregular compass, the Deviation of which we never knew, which perhaps was just as well, brought us to a busy round which was painted - -"Ostend". This
Dynamotique
197
184
*
s
7
REPORT OF "SINGAPORE" R.N.V.R.
Ity
No personal injury to self or crew. Engine failed in North Sea and return had to take tow, Owing to heavy swell sudden strain WAB put on to tow and the winch was torn taking with it part of the fore deck, the anchor, cable and all ropes.
Managed to repair ngine temporarily and returned to
Ramagate.
too

OR CONVOY.
6/6/40. Dynamo 188.
or Barge Sherfield
#
185
Lighter Y.O. 63.
Lighter X.95.
Sub Dr. J.D.F. Kealy, R.N.
or Launch Nanette II.
On arriving at Sheerness Motor Boat Dook on Friday, 31st May, 1940, we ceived. command of the above convoy with instructions to pick up British Troops om the shores round Dunkirk as soon as possible. This was at 2 p.m; by 2.15 p.m.
were under way heading out to sea.
Good progress was made until later that night we lost contact with lighter X.95
though we spent some time in trying to locate her without success.
At 11 a.m. 1st June land was sighted, peniot Where were we? The one and cidedly irregular compass, the Deviation of which we never knew, which perhaps
B just as well, brought us to a buny round which was painted -"Ostend". This a a most salutary effect on us and putting the wheel to starboard we headed for e battle. The succession of sunken ships with the oil saturated water covered.
th junk and garbage of all sorts began to have a dampening effect on everybody.
wever, we fortified ourselves with large helpings of Mr. Machonicie's Irish Stew.
Continuing on passed Nieuport we found ourselves between two destroyers and shore battery in action;during this one of the destroyers was hit and the supertructure burst into flames. On closing in it was obvious that there was no one board and we drew away a magazine explosion. Shells then began to drop round us rom the remaining destroyer and to further our consternation at this moment at orpedo passed under the "Sherfield", disappearing up the beach; whether fired by submarine or the other destroyer is not known.
Next thing on the programs was the finding of a whole lot of chaps who had een in the oil-covered water for a considerable time and we experienced difficulty n getting them aboard as there were several wounded amongst them. These - were ostly off destroyers sunk during the day. During this interlule soldiers were een gathering on the foreshore, and owing to ebbing tide it was impossible to each the lighters and the motor boat. commenced to collect the soldiers and take chem to the lighters at twenty at a time. One young Army officer to whom great redit is due came along with a motor boat full of wounded, and after putting them aboard helped with the embarkation.
In the meantime one lighter continued to fish people out of the water and the ther went alongside the wrecked "Clan MacAlister" and took off 15 wounded survivors of the "Keith" and other ships.
All was going well when a number of enemy planes started to machine gun the beach and bombard the vicinity. It would be as well to mention that there were no other British ships or planes in sight, and being completely unarmed except for one Boer War rifle, we couldn't do much against them. As the last load was being gathered it appeared that the enemy were using Trench Mortars and machine guns from begind the Dunes.
During a lull the second lighter and motor boat made for the open sea; while the motor barge was receiving her last load of wounded enemy planes started paying further attention to her. She stopped all movement and drifted about for the next three quarters of an hour, hoping to be taken for a derelect, which thank God she wast At length the planes eased off and she made a dash (at 6 knots) for the open the familiar whine of a power bomber was heard, followed by a pattern of bombe sea, large quantities of tea being consumed. Peace reigned, but not for long;
exploding round the barge and a nice little machine gun attack followed.
The remainder of the trip was quite uneventful, entering Dover at 7 a.m. on
Sunday morning.
volunteers and the youngest being 17. A fine example was set by the fortitude
Too much praise cannot be given to the Civilian members of the crews, all being of the Troops waiting on the shore and in the water. All Naval members of the orews acted as expected.
missed On during the first night, had managed to get to Dunkirk and had had her full returning to Sheerness we found the third member of our convoy, whan - had share of excitement.

-3-
to 188
At this time a terrific aerial battle was on, shells from shore batteries were falling around and bombs dropping all over the place in close proximity. As I was towing this boat I saw a bomb hit the pleasure steamer "PRINCE OF WALES". I closed her and took aboard two badly wounded Officers and two ratings.
I offered to go aboard as she was sinking slowly, but was told only two dead remained on board.
Just before this, ordinary seaman Purbrick fell overboard from exhaustion and I picked him up somehow.
My Cox. was sleeping on his feet on and off and the two others lay down and stood up as strength permitted.
The C.O. of the "PRINCE OF WALES", although covered in blood, offered to try and steer the boat.
I then saw a man swimming naked in the water.
Stopped and got him.
Next a heavily loaded boat of soldiers turned right over close inshore, and left the men struggling in the water. I
got down to them and rescued the lot personally hauling them aboard with my crews feeble assistance.
While doing this, I got a rope round my Starboard screw and fouled the rudder. I now had a full load of soldiers on board (six wounded) a full boat load towing and soldiers clinging to the stern.
With what I thought was the last of my strength, I got my launch alongside a lifeboat and from there hauled her hand over hand, by means of a grass rope, up to the sloop "MOSQUITO". I then discovered the lifeboat's propeller was also fouled. Neither
I
nor my crew could clear the propeller, so I boarded "MOSQUITO" and asked the 1st Lieutenant to send someone to do so.
Meanwhile,
I
went below for a cup of tea.
I came on deck in fifteen minutes, but the rope could not be cleared I was told.
Air battle still in progress with bombs dropping all around.
I then with difficulty closed the yacht "GALETA" and asked her to take me in tow.
The C.O.'s ship was in a very bad position with regard to German shore batteries, nevertheless, he wanted another boat load of troops before leaving and asked me to try and close the beach and get one. I said I would, but asked him to watch out for me in case
I got ashore.
I proceeded towards the beach just then coincident with an explosion of some kind.
The launch seemed to rise from the water, fall back, rise again and fall back.
I could only move slowly now and I saw the yacht was drawing the fire from shore. One of the crew called out that the yacht was signalling me. I looked round and saw she was signalling me. With great difficulty I got alongside and made her fast for towing, then slumped on the yacht's deck, stupified with exhaustion, want of sleep and food, I suppose.
Unfortunately the tow rope parted a few minutes later.
The C.O. of yacht objected and rightly so to going back to the shealed area with his ships and troops on board.
So the "TRITON" was left afloat with a rope round her screw and a badly damaged stem and stern.
I regret exceedingly that I did not get her home again for various reasons.
It was about 1840 31st May, 1940, when my activities ceased.
I had been on my feet from 0700 29th May, to 1840 31st May, 1940, in a small craft, without sleep and the only food eaten from 2000 29th
May to that time was one tin of herrings, ont tin of bully beef and between five and two slices of bread each also four cups of tea without sugar.
We simply had not time to eat.
A few more remarks and I finish. I was the only
Commissioned Officer (excluding Commodore Skippers) who was constantly in the boats at La Panne.
I took off more troops than I can remember there - scores and scores of boat loads and I venture to say if my boat had not remained there to the last, hundreds would never have got away.

206
123
would be able to assist us if necessary and realised that we were the last English boat leaving harbour. Could not get engine of LADY CABLE to start but after a short while
W.D. boat came nearly alongside her engines were running and making considerable noise. Their action then appeared light. to me suspicious - she appeared to be undamaged in the half
By now dawn was nearly breaking. When W.D. boat came close to us I ordered one of my crew - Cadet Rating Price -
to board her. He managed to jump aboard but the two boats drifted apart. Price shouted that there was nobody aboard.
Yet her engines were going - in neutral of course. Displaying great initiative and resourcefulness, Price was able to make
HAIG go slow ahead and was able to steer her close enough to LADY CABLE for me to jump aboard. Our first efforts to get a line between the two boats were unsuccessful.
The operation was made difficult by the LADY CABLE being full of French soldiers who did not of course appreciate what was happening and were therefore unable to be of much assistance however willing they might be. After some time the two boats were secured but in order to pass a line it had been necessary for Price to swim from the HAIG to the
LADY CABLE with it. Price did this on his own initiative and displayed great courage and efficiency.
By the time the two boats were secure it was almost broad daylight and we were still very close to Dunkirk
Harbour and appeared to have drifted inshore to the S.W. and were very close to the pall of smoke which shrouded the coast to the West of Dunkirk.
On inspecting condition of HAIG found that she had a fair amount of water forward and was damaged extensively on the port bow. However, I got French poilus to work the pump in relays and towing LADY CABLE and going very slow ahead were able to make progress and prevent the water forward from rising.
For some time we did not discover that each engine had a separate control lever and had been going ahead on one engine only. For several hours we made slow progress.
Worsall was trying to get LADY CABLE's engine to start again and Smith was steering her. I left most of the French in
LADY CABLE.
I saw a submarine half surface about half a mile ahead on one occasion and also a number of German aircraft passed close ahead of us. Luckily we were either not seen or not deemed of sufficient importance to attack. A French destroyer came and had a look at us but I did not signal to her as we were making fair progress. A flight of 3
Hurricanes flew low over us and later we saw Spitfires and Defiants, but luckily no German planes approached us.
The starboard engine of HAIG packed up I think about
0730. I had not time to keep a detailed log of events.
By this time Stoker Worsall had got engine of LADY CABLE
to go again and I secured her alongside HAIG as towing her astern with only our port engine going was too difficult.
For a considerable time we made very slow progress using engines of both boats. LADY CABLE's engine kept stopping, which made our progress very slow and steering difficult. At last/ French
4-funnelled light cruiser or large destroyer X 440 (I think)
with bow wave painted on her, saw us and came up to help. I
had/

207
194
I had great difficulty in manoeuvring alongside and this difficulty was made worse by the attitude of a few of the
French soldiers who had become panicky and kept shouting
"Au Secours" and shouting at me to hurry up and get them alongside! Only a small section of the soldiers took this attitude which was formulated by a soldier (Heaven knows what rank or capacity) who looked at least sixty, having a pointed grey beard! I found it so difficult to get the boats alongside while we were secured together that I decided to cast off the HAIG and left Cadet Rating Price on board her with orders that I would come back to the HAIG as soon as the French soldiers were on board the cruiser.
We were very close to X440 and I was alongside her in about two minutes. The French troops scrambled aboard her and I spoke to a French Naval Officer and asked him to wireless Dover that I had the W.D. craft in tow, that we were in difficulties and needed assistance. He promised to do this and also told me the course we should follow from our present position. I noticed that while the French troops were boarding X440, the HAIG had drifted alongside
X440 further aft and I noticed Price talking to the French sailors but do not recall seeing him go aboard X440.
As soon as the troops were aboard I shoved off and
X440 went ahead. HAIG was now astern of X440 and I went alongside her at once. To my amazement there was no sign of Price, who must either have fallen overboard or else boarded the X440 and had not been able to get back aboard
HAIG before X440 went ahead. There was no sign of anyone in the water.
I was now left with Worsall and Smith to manage both the HAIG and LADY CABLE. There was no chance of the HAIG
towing the LADY CABLE owing to the fact that only HAIG's port engine was working and this would have made steering very difficult and also it would not have been possible to hands to pump. I decided then to try and tow HAIG alongside prevent the water from rising forward as there were no spare
LADY CABLE. First I stopped HAIG's engine - there was no object in leaving it running. It took us quite a while to discover how to stop the engine!
Efforts at towing alongside were unsuccessful - the lines kept parting and the bollard aft in LADY CABLE was not up to the strain. The only possible chance left of towing
HAIG was astern but this meant that the tow rope would have to be secured forward around the mast of LADY CABLE and led aft along the deck. We could not secure the tow rope aft owing to the bollards having been carried away by our previous efforts at towing HAIG alongside.
I realised that there was a considerable risk towing from forward that the tow rope might jump over the engine room cabin housing and I took every care to watch for this happening. We managed to make a little progress but several times the tow rope nearly jumped the cabin and unfortunately this finally happened when our engine had almost stopped and the HAIG yawed away to port. I went overboard like a shot from a gun and felt the screw of LADY CABLE touch my left foot. Luckily I caught hold of a fender alongside
HAIG. Worsall quickly got on board HAIG and he and Smith
(who was already aboad HAIG) were able to pull me out of the water. After this episode I decided reluctantly that any further efforts at towing HAIG were impossible, especially/

208
195
my left foot.
especially as I was partially incapacitated by a wound on
As we were a long way from the French coast I decided that there was very little chance of HAIG falling into enemy hands and that no doubt help would soon be forthcoming in reply to the wireless message I had asked X440 to send.
I hauled down HAIG's ensign and took it aboard LADY CABLE and we tried to make towards the English coast. Unfortunately the engine kept stopping and we made very slow progress and finally nothing would make our engine start again. We drifted helplessly for several hours and then sighted a Bell
Buoy which I believe may have been the N.W. Goodwin Bell
Buoy, but we did not get close enough to make sure. At last we sighted a warship and waved HAIG's White Ensign to try to attract stention. We were seen and the ship altered course towards us and came up close to LADY CABLE. She was the French transport ROUEN of Dieppe and was packed with troops from Dunkirk. An officer asked what I wanted and I
told him that we were broken down and asked to be taken aboard. To my surprise my appeal was met with a blunt
"No" - with no explanation, and the ROUEN steamed away.
My crew and I felt angry at this in view of the fact that we had rescued over 200 French soldiers during the night.
No doubt the ROUEN had good reasons for not taking us aboard but no explanation was given and I would like if possible to discover why she was unable to help us.
Luckily another ship some considerable distance away had noticed the ROUEN and observed that she had not picked us up. This ship was the CITY OF CHRISTCHURCH and she came up and took us in tow to the Downs where she was bound for in ballast. On arrival in the Downs where CITY OF
CHRISTCHURCH dropped anchor, we were able to start up the engine of LADY CABLE and I decided once again to try to make for Dover. However, we broke down after a run of about
15 minutes and were picked up by a tug (Operational I
don't know her name). She had orders to proceed to Ramagate with H.M. Drifter VIKING in tow and was about to do this when we broke down near her. She towed us to the VIKING
and I boarded the VIKING to have my injured foot attended to and get some rest. VIKING and LADY CABLE were towed round to Ramsgate where we arrived about 2100. I was landed and taken to "Merrie England" and then to Ramagate General
Hospital.
The Commanding Officer of VIKING at my request reported the return of LADY CABLE and that one member of my crew,
Cadet Rating Price was missing but might be aboard French warship X440. He also reported direct to C. in C., Dover, about HAIG. A little later, while I was still at "Merrie
England", the Commanding Officer of VIKING arrived to tell me that he had been informed from Dover that HAIG was safe.
Unfortunately he had no news for me of Cadet Rating Price.
The behaviour of my crew throughout the operation had been magnificent. The taking off of over 200 French troops and 6 British from the Mole was conducted quickly and calmly under difficult and hazardous conditions. Later,
Cadet Rating Price's work in helping to get the HAIG alongside LADY CABLE cannot be too highly praised. Without the great initiative and efficiency he displayed the operation would not have been successful and the HAIG would have drifted ashore to the S.W. of Dunkirk.
After/

221
209
OPERATION DYNAMO
ENCLOSURE NO. 7.
SHIP: EMPRESS, RIVER LAUNCH. LUCY LAVERS 4/B.
OFFICER REPORTING: SUB-LIEUTENANT T.W. BETTS, R.N.V.R.
Leaving H.M.S. KING ALFRED on Friday, May 31st, I
proceeded to Sheerness, to await the arrival of Motor Boats for the purpose of evacuating troops from Dunkirk. On Saturday, 1st
June, I was placed in command of the River Launch EMPRESS with a crew of 6. The clutch of the starboard engine had been giving trouble before I left, but I decided that, at any rate,
I could make Ramsgate. In this assumption I was wrong, as I
broke down when about half the distance was covered.
The trawler escorting the motor boats took me in tow to
Ramsgate, and thence to Dunkirk, where, having had my engineer repairing his engines on the journey over, I left the trawler and prepared to pick up troops. Nearing the beach West of
Dunkirk, and judging the water too shallow for further progress inshore, I rang down "Hard Astern" to the engine room, in order to take the way off my ship.
The starboard engine, then, not only refused to go astern, but refused to assume the neutral position, with the consequence that the ship was carried high and dry on to the beach. Upon examination I found that it would be quite impossible to salvage the ship until between 9 and 10 am. on the next day.
After having placed an anchor out well aatern, I and my crew swam out to deep water where we were soon picked up by a launch and put aboard a drifter.
The drifter proceeded to Dunkirk Harbour, and I and my crew assisted in the embarkation of troops, after which we returned with the drifter to Dover and reported to H.M.S. LYNX.
2nd June, 1940 at 1400 approximately, I was placed in charge of the R.N.L.I. Motor Lifeboat LUCY LAVER and proceeded to Dunkirk under tow with the Drifter GOLDEN SUNSHINE.
After/

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iday (continued)
.
possibly, already damaged by our fighters.
255
2010
2105
Proceeded with 180 British troops.
Alongside Eastern Pier embarking troops.
aturday 1st. 0005 June.
Anchored off Margate.
0133
Alongside Margate Pier, disemberked troops.
0240
Ordered to anchor off Margate and await orders.
0700
Ordered to proceed to Dunkirk.
1000
troops. Alongside Eastern Pier, Dunkirk Harbour, embarking
More or less continous High level Bombing in progress engaged enemy Bombers.
1130
Proceeded with 210 British troops, and 5 stretcher cases.
1235
In position 342° No.5 Buoy 1 Mile, steering 342° with
Scotes two transports ahead. One being a large two funneller
Queen and the other a Paddle steamer (names not known), both carrying French troops. We were all attacked by 16
Enemy Dive Bombers which were hotly engaged. Both transports were hit, and Kingfisher "near missed". The smaller ship appeared to be sinking and the larger on
Mare fire, but still under way, and under control. A
Three anys number of small Drifters proceeding to Dunkirk, were close at hand and proceeded to pick up survivors. I
Univerly commenced to turn, with the same intention but sighted two destroyerstwo miles to the Northward, one British and one French, both without troops. I informed them by light and they closed at full speed. I then decided that the help Kingfisher, who was already full, could add, did not justify my risking the loss of my troops by remaining in the vicinity, so proceeded.
1442
Anchored off Margate Pier.
1555
Alongside Margate Pier disembarking troops.
1635
Proceeded and anchored in Margate Roads, ordered to remain at 1 hour's notice in case required.
Not included in Saturday Night's operations.
unday 2nd June.
No fresh orders received, took the opportunity to replenish ammunition, 113 4" H.E. H.A., return empties,
During the dark hours several Parachute flares were seel and to oil.
seen to drop, off North Foreland.
onday 3rd June.
1910
Weighed and in company, to rendezvous of Man and Auto
1955
Formed Carrier. escort on Auto Carrier, who informed me that
Lady Buoy. Salamander firing at floating mine.
of Man was still in Dover.
2130
Off'W' floating Mines about 12 feet apart with
2149
2255
Went Sighted a line alongside between two French West them. Pier, troops, Ordered Dunkirk who Guillemot were Harbour very to and well sink fresher them.
organised embarked 210 for embarkation, and appeared much than They any also still possessed practically all their of our own.
2319
Slipped equipment. and proceeded. There was considerable

REPORT OF "NONETA" [SubeLdeuteled.PotterImin R.N.V.R.) ON
321
EVACUATION OF DUNKIRK
A
300
All times approximate.
12
May 31. 0400 and Upon arrival at Bray the beaches were thronged with men a number of floats and boats which had been brought off to the waiting ships and not taken inshore again. We collected as many of these as possible and took them close to the shore, letting them drift in on the tide.
The shallow water made approach to the shore difficult, and so we got under way and went to Destroyer
H.42. The Commander of this ship had by then got four of his ship's boats down and we found that our best method of getting the men off was to tow the boats in to the shore, all tied together, stand off until they were full and then take them in tow back to the destroyer.
We carried out this operation, repeatedly, from day-break until after mid-day when the destroyer was full and recalled her boats. I estimate that in this way we got
700 men off. From mid-day onwards we picked up boats or troops and took them to bigger ships.
At 1620 a large wave of enemy bombers attacked.
We were then just embarking troops from a float which was sinking---it was impossible to get under way until they were embarked and by that time a full scale air-raid was in progress. As we moved away from the shore one bomb fell very near to us on the starboard quarter. In consequence of this one man was killed and four wounded.
Damage and casualties summarised:-
One soldier killed.
Petty Officer Lock wounded in the thigh in two places.
Four soldiers wounded.
The damage to the ship was not extensive.
Upon consideration and in view of the fact that there was a heavy sea running I decided it was out of the question to move the wounded men. Owing to the fact that my Petty Officer was incapacitated, leaving me
Lieut. Dawson, in "Seriola", to request that Sub.Lieut.
single-handed, I signalled the C.O. of my Division,
Godman should join me, and that I had decided to leave for Ramsgate.

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310
During German the aircraft, embarkation an aerial battle was in progress between were being in the basin near the paddler's stern
British and dropped on Dunkirk anti-aircraft (one guns were in action, heavy bombs when she was and going burnt out), out wreck and a of large fire was seen to break out in the Docks.
The split well sunken a British destroyer was lying alongside the
East Pier as as A a sunken trawler with her White Engsign still flying just above the water. paddler and a troop ship with two large leaks in her side were lying off the entrance.
On the return passage soon after rounding No. 5 Buoy, three enemy planes were seen which dropped some bombs round the "MARE". These must have been of small size as they made very little splash.
After passing the Dyck Bank Buoy four or five heavy bombs were seen to fall round ships on the same course about two miles ahead, which included
"THREE KINGS" and "UNICITY". A salvo of seven bombs in line was dropped, and soon afterwards a pair of enemy planes appeared over the "MARE" and "TWEENWAYS"
which were chased off by a British fighter.
2100. The tow rope of the "TWEENWAYS" boat, which was being towed astern of a ship's lifeboat carried away, and as it was getting dark with fog setting in, thought it advisable not to waste time in recovering it and told the
Skipper to carry on.
June 2200. Went alongside at Ramsgate and discharged troops.
Lieutenant J.I. Cruickshank, R.N.V.R. of "SARAH HIDE" reports that he sailed at 1330, 31st May, in company with the "STRIVE" and other vessels for
Dunkirk.
"At 1920, when in the Dunkirk channel, a force of about 25 enemy bombers with screen of fighters was sean approaching from the East at a height of at least 1200 feet. When almost overhead they were attacked by a squadron of British fighters and during the fight that followed four planes crashed in the sea, of which three were identified as German.
would estimate that 80 bombs were dropped and the only casualty observed in I the large number of small craft about was that one drifter was "LORD
50 yards. had a Four bombs were seen to give off a yellowish green vapour gas and
HOOD" fractured steam pipe. The nearest bomb to "SARAH HIDE"
must have been of light weight as there was very little spray.
sent away to the Malo Les Bains Beach at of about 2135.
Salvos 10 of heavy shells 2300 the range was increased and shells West. the
The boats were were bursting on the beach at intervals fell amongat shipping minutes. waiting At off the beach. "SARAH HIDE" moved 300 yards in tow came alongside any one soldiers smack At and Four was 0015, on the taken fishing the civilian 1st beach. in June, smacks tow as in no a The put charge her motor other boats 5 rudder Officers boat stated tugs, were was with then that drifters, and smashed. two made he 95 lifeboats men had fast or been on A other thorough astern. board unable small at search 0145 to craft locate and was made could in be the found vicinity, it was but decided as to return to Ramagate.
of three bombs each were dropped astern channel. and close to
"SARAH HIDE's" Three port salvos quarter as we proceeded down Dunkirk 19 Jun
The troops were landed at Ramsgate at 0850.
Continued:

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I
376
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aircraft attacked which for the quickly rest of made off and we were not again directly
353
us by our extremely phosphorescent water. and I believe the aircraft detected the night. The sea surface was
At 2256 a M.T.B. proceeding very fast struck us glancing blow on the Starboard quarter. This craft did not a stop or answer any signals but appeared to carry a green light shining skywards. He was quickly lost in the darkness - marks and splinters left behind showed that he was painted a dark grey.
At Dunkirk itself the offing was lit by the burning oil tanks making ship very conspicuous and as the beaches were at this time obliterated by heavy smoke from these fires, I
anchored to the Westward at 0110 1st June and waited daybreak.
0350 weighed anchor and entered Dunkirk harbour. At CLUIO, in company with H.M.S. "Locust". 0500 berthed alongside and commenced embarking troops - severe air raids in progress all the time. Two raiders shot down by A.A. fire.
0620 let go and cleared harbour having embarked about
70 soldiers, mostly E. Yorks Regiment. 0750 attacked by enemy bomber, opened fire and hit him with bursts from Lewis gun. No received great assistance in this attack from the troops who mounted their Bren guns on deck. Observed one aircraft shot down by gunfire from H.M. Ships.
We were now compelled to go slow as our main engine circulating pumpawas damaged and engines getting extremely overheated.
1000 took in tow for Ramsgate a disabled motor launch.
1300 entered Ramsgate harbour and disembarked troops. 1315
left Ramsgate for Sheerness going dead slow owing to condition of engines. 1547 passed W/T signal to C. in C. for H.N.S.
"Ivanhoe" (in tow). 1916 entered Sheerness hargour and secured to buoy.
During the whole of the operation, I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the ship's company. Without exception they were calm and cool carrying out their duties with ourge and zeal under most trying conditions.
I wish to specially mention Sub Lieut J.G. Llewellyn
R.N.V.R. for his devotion to duty and coolness; Coxswain F.
Thompson R.N.P.S. for his leadership of the crew; Ordinary
Signalman J.L. Wells R.N.V.R. for quick and efficient and signalling;
R. Matthews R.N.P.S. Lewis Gunner for well controlled accurate fire with most economical use of amminition. Also,
Engineman Macallister, R.N.P.S. for keeping the engines running and controlling
D. Seaman R.N.P.S. (Helmsman) and H. Topte, leaks.
I have the 'honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) J.S. ROE
Lieutenant R.N.V.R.
4th June, 1940.

ort of Proceedings of M.T.B. 107
457
Page
2
429
ckships "VIVACIOUS". and transferred 2230 to "VIVACIOUS". 2020 proceeded in tru om H. M. S. difficult by proceeded to Dunkirk imdependently. Navigation
H. S. "VIVACIOUS" and Slipped tow and embarked Captain Dangerfield R.N. tow rendered which had spray obscuring vision and by unknown deviation on compass and never been swung. 2330 (approx:) Arrived off Dunkirk rticularly in vicinity of East Pier, alongside which M.T.B. 107 secured entered harbour cruised there. Considerable shelling in progress, land Captain Dangerfield. On his return left harbour and searched for ockships, two only being found, the third having been sunk in collision on way. During this period M.T.B. 107 was alongside, she was crushed by rge 0 French fishing craft which were engaged in evacuating troops and were ther unable or unwilling to keep clear. fter closing the block ships llowed first into harbour and received crew from her boat and transferred em to H.M.S. "VIVACIOUS" lying outside, thereafter going in again and cking up the remainder of the crew of the second blockship. Thereafter ft Dunkirk at 0345 with H.M.S. "VIVACIOUS" and M.A/S.B 07 arriving Dover
30 3rd June. Considerable difficulty was experienced in manoeuvring
T.B. 107 in Dunkirkk harbour of much heavy wreckage, her inability to go
Cornand her large turning circle.
nday, 2nd June
Left Dover 1735 and proceeded to embark Captains of blockships, ransfering them to H.M. S"SHIKARI". 2030 Proceeded in two two tow of H.M.S.
SHIKARI" to Dunkirk inz company of blockships. On arrival off Dunkirk lipped tos and empboyed taking messages to blockships. On blockships eighing at about 0245 attended leading blockship S.S. Gourko to follow her n and take off crew. During waiting period H.M.S. "SHIKARI" bombed without ffect. H avy shelling rifle and machine gun fire observed. As HmM.S.
Gourko" was proceeding to enter heavy explosion was observed on board er from mine, torpedo or bomb. At once closed her to render assistance nd secured alongside. At about same time M.A/S.B. 10 did the same and mbarked part of her ship's company. NXMXXX S.S. "GOURKO" sank rapidly roceeded into harbour to follow the remaining blockship M.T.B. 107
reaking one of M.T.B's 107's lines in so doing. As M.A/S.B. 10 had emained to rescue more of S.S. "GOURKO"s crew who had not succeeded in etting 8 were rescued, including the commanding officer, 3 being was eriously away. and 4 less seriously injured. Very considerable difficulty of xperienced in doing this owing to much heavy wreckage, the presence M.T.B.
or When satisfied to transfer survivors, as the small size of the boat H.M.S. and
07. wreck of S.S. that no-one remained in the water proceeded to search he "KING ORRY" and the lack of manoeuvring power of ack H.M.S. "SHIKARI" accommodation made this highly desirable. As no sign of remaining lockship or M.A/S.B. been observed, and it was now practically for Dover
SHIKARI" of any 10 could be found, and the blowing up of the broad dayight, had already between 0350 and 0400, I decided to encountered make and, ndependently wing at utmost error in navigation, M.T.B. 107 became having no faith the time being speed. On passage thick fog was involved in the oodwins. a my I thereupon rapidly cleared, and I proceeded across 4th June.
to regretted anchored until the weather cleared, the sands rthe compass. North Goodwin The fog buoy, thence to Dover, arriving 0730, uesday, 4th June.
At Dover.
ednesday, 5th June.
Proceeded from Dover to Portsmouth in company with D/C Boat and
.T.B. 102.