TNA ADM 199 790

262
217
CORVETTES
SHELDRAKE.
KINGFISHER.
GUILLEMOT. 1
rs

CONFIDENTIAL.
Dyram 95.
263
From.
The Commanding Officer. Sheldrake.
248
Date
2nd June. 1940.
Reference.
RDA/0/37.
To
The Flag Officer in Charge. Harwich.
Subject
Meritorious Service Awards.
1.
Operations in which Sheldrake has been involved during the evacuation from Dunkirk has enabled certain officers and men to distinguish themselves in H.M. Ship under my command. The circumstances are outlined below so that the necessary action may be taken by you should you concur.
2.
Sheldrake was ordered by C-in-C. Nore. to proceed to the KWINTE BUOY
and destroy the Asdic Apparatus of one of our destroyers wrecked in the vicinity
3.
On arrival 'Wakeful' was found to be lying completely capsized with her stern resting on the bottom and only the forefoot visible, which appeared from oil marks on the waterline to be semi buoyant. A Boat under the command of my First Lieutènant, Lieutenant HUGH WILLIAM MACKENZIE ROSE, R.N.
was sent over and placed a berthing wire running from the bull ring round the keel, to the bull ring the other side. It was intended to hang depth charges on this 'necklace' and countèrmine them with other depth charges, using Bickfords fuze.
4.
For the second trip with two depth charges, it was necessary to tow the whaler to the wreck on the end of a grass and to pump out oil fuel from Sheldrake to counteract the effects of ground swell and strong tide, which made operations difficult, particularly on the weather side.
Good seamanship and stout hearts succeeded in placing one charge on either bow in the required spot without damage to the boat. Throughout the operation all were acutely aware that we were only 10 miles from Dunkirk with aircraft of both sides passing the ship at intervals, and that at bomb in the vicinity of a boat would have countermined the depth charges that they were placing.
5.
On the whalers return to the ship for the demolition charges,
C-in-C. Nore's signal "Cancel my 1044 area now mined" was received. It confirmed our own fears that we had been working in a mined area. It seemed a pity to leave the job half done and it was decided to sink the wreck by gunfire using D.A. fuze asnear the required area as possible, and if the ship sunk before the charges placed had been exploded, to fire them with a countermining pattern of depth charges. She sank inside ten mintes, and using the escaping bubbles from the punctured stem as an aiming mark, a pattern was dropped, of which the centre charge produced a plune that told us that the desired effect had been achieved. The only damage to Sheldrake was a few light fittings on the Stokers Messdeck caused by the capstan engine
'whipping' on the light deck above.
6. Acting Petty Officer Albert Edward Jackson, Official No. 0/JX/125587
In addition to Lieutenant Rose I wish particularly to mention my Chief Boatswains Mate, whose energy din the whaler was largely responsible that the depth charges were placed.
7. for those concerned was the resoue of the survivors of H.M.Trawler
The second incident which I submit should receive. recognition
ST. ACHTLLEUS, which had been mined. After a night spent dodging M.T.B.
torpedoes with H.M.S. Widgeon, aircraft closed and informed me stress that survivors the in the waters bearing 340 degrees I wish particularly to the were efficiency of this flight of three aircraft in leadin me to continued scene. to
After passing the signal most expeditiously, two aircraft the ship circle over the area while one of their number flew past indicating

264
2
indicating the course aircraft to steer. This maneouvre.
continuously. As the broke showing to repeat the way arrived repeated another of the flight away the maneouvre. position,
8, and rescued by On arrival the whaler water. a number while A net Sheldrake of men made were in was found maneouvred clinging to to wireckage proved invaluable on one Fleetwood William Bond (no on single men in the occasion Able Seaman accordance with A.F.O's.'m number) Patrol Service, a bravery. fisherman, A enlisted for official net on which Bond was and hold him completely for exhaused. I 'sung only, displayed conspicuous standing, he was survivor was a few hostilitiesthe for someone to jump drifted in, down him. up Able the few minutes it would out!
before the ship since that he upon unable Seaman Bond complied and take move the man the few rescued necessary the foot of the netting. I to have discovered feet was to to swim. He was however able I
respiration, subsequently on to add that the man died although board. he revived for à time with artificial regret
9.
In connection with the rescue work, I also wish to mention
Officers Steward Morris Charles Donno. Official No. C/LX/122343. who repeatedly dived to assist in the recovery of other survivorsand subsequently worked continuously for some hours without a break rendering artificial respiration to one of other of the five men being so treated while Sheldrake was returning to harbour.
10.
I wish also to draw attention to the outstanding work of
Petty Officer Albert Vincent Sears. Official No. C/J/104779. my Coxswain, whose first aid work was particularly commented upon by the Medical Staff on arrival. Of the eleven survivors rescued only' two were able to walk ashore, four were cot cases and four men were found to be dead by the
Medical Officer on arrival in harbour. All those who died had shown signs of recovery, but it has been ascertained that they died, not from drowing, but from the effects of a depth charge placed to blow up the Anti-Submarine apparatus, which exploded after the crew were in the water. This produced internal infuries and shock.
Official No. C/JX/125676 and Able Seaman Drummond Jackson Ryder. Official to
In addition to Petty Officer Sears, Able Seaman John Anderson,
No. C/SSX/18252. Were outstanding in the unflagging energy in trying that no the apparently drowned to life. It was once more demonstrated has however men be up until rigor mortis and not man, set in. All apparently those who died dead, should given died as the result of shock water.
from drowning, though they were subsequently apparently lifeless when in the
11. inflatable lifebelts was also reported by to float when unconscious half or their
It the whaler's crew that men wearing dead, with the only, appeared life belts were lifebelf back with face the submerged. Those wearing feel cork that, while the rubber thisive when ideal, time permits in that it in wearing can be worn a cork whenever lifebelt sea, in addition, and is mouth free to breathe. I at there is a that should be promulgated.
(Signed)
IT. LIEUTENANT COMMANDER IN COMMAND.
Order

corvettes.
2.
An In interesting view account of attack by E. Boats, on of the as considered 3. an Anti Further E that Boat they escort as the should best proposed for be East fitted Coast employment with of placed to turn in bows such on a to position the enemy that the the ahead. is for D.O.D. (H)
8.6.40.
Noted with interest.
2. With reference to para. 11 of the report, ships have been informed that E. Boats operate in conjunction with aircraft. (C.-in-C., Nore's signal 1754/31/5
and R.A.D. Home Fleet's 1815/31/5). It should be obvious that the tactics of the E. Boat are largely governed by those of her quarry.
3. With reference to para. 12, an alternative explanation of the flares sighted by SHELDRAKE on
2nd June is that they were flares towed by aircraft on a course giving little change of bearing.
4. The provision of a 20 inch searchlight in the
KITTIWAKE class was recommended by D.T.S.D. in M.F.
7511/39. D.T.S.D. is trying to obtain this paper and will raise this question separately.
The use of a S/L may, however, assist the attack of other E boats and it is difficult to site it so that it will bear ahead without dazzling bridge personnel.
While
DIRECTOR OF TRAINING & STAFF DUTIES
DIVISION.
13.6.40. 13.
a paper all, outi bont Exprimu
Nolind with interest DAISW is to orring to dati.
2. Concern win Don (Hj: pma 3.5 some form of Saminique in is only Dur with
Mai shall may be name on our coin.
Chan anough.
13.6.40

CONFIDENTIAL.
252
From
The Commanding Officer. H.M.S. Sheldrake.
Date
3rd. June. 1940. Reference RDA/C/38.
TO
The Commander in Chief. The Nore.
Through The Commodore in Charge. Sheerness.
boby to Senior Officer. Conettes.
1.
The following renort of operations carried out in accordance with C-in-C. Nore's 1121/2 is submitted.
2.
Sheldrake sailed from Sheerness at 1615 with an additional demolition party of 12, with orders to destroy the asdic gear in
Basilisk ashore off La Panne. On passage zig zagging was employed where submarine attack could (be) reasonable expected.
3.
Routed via T Buoy (2005), Oostdyck (2053), Middlekerke (2128),
Nieuport Bk. (2024) Buoys I closed the shore in stages as the light failed, and was able to identify Basilisk by 2131 andthen waited till 2230 for darkness before closing in. She was awash up to her
FX deck in position Latitude 51degs. 08mins. 20secs. North. Longitude 2degs. 34mins. 50secs. East., 2 miles off shore.
4.
The demolition party was immediately placed abcard, while
Sheldrake lay off about a cable from the wreck. A Lew minutes after midnight the fuzes were lit, and the whaler hoisted at 0017. The officer in charge of demolitions has submitted a separate report as to the location of charges, which were lowered as far below water level as possible. The ship apperas to have already been pretty well gutted by fire forward, and her bridge wrecked. He was unable to make his way aft, but reports that her back had apparently been broke en by an explosion in the vicinity of the engine room. one empty
C.B. chest was found.
5. a few enemy aircraft were seen. Sever fighting was taking place
Throughout the operation I was apparently not located though up till midnight, the right 01 the enery be on the beach abreast the ship, with their gun batteries on the left and
Dunkirk illuminated by firexas usual) to my right. This fighting died down as the repeated bombing of gun positions by the R.A.F. took effect. I regret it was not possible to close the reported position have of Crested Eagle on the beach as Sheldrake would undoubtedly been illuminated by our own parachute flares. I had also hoped by placing been done depth to Wakeful, in addition to the internal demolitions, the charges to complete the destruction of the ship, as but had this possible: nor would a Mk. VII. charge fired from throwers was have not operated in the shallow water in which she was lying.
6.
Apart from tide, there were no navigational difficulties, as the buoys were lit.
continued overleaf

2.
continued
7. inshore between Nieuport intention of waiting Trapegeer GP.OCC. remained
Having re-embarked Bk. the GP.OCC. demolition and party at 0017 I
until 0230 with the or with a faint hope until that R
either left patrol, by appearing from on their return be journey able to engage. None were the half light to been established before met, and the dawn suffly of aircraft had not I was clear of the path
8. experience nith M.T.B. during few days, in the hope own
In submitting the above report the last I would like to add my methods of operating may be up.
from such scraps of unexplained built evidence a complete picture of that the
9.
During the night of Thursday 30th. May. I was stationed on bow of Vega and Blyskawica, with Widgeon on the other bow, patroll between S Buoy and the West Hinder. At 2330 I was examined closel a Seaplane (floats) fitted with a radial engine. NO attack was made at 0120 the French destroyer Siroco" was torpedoed by BS. with mile of us. Four pairs of red flares had been observed at 0119 and rocket at 0147.
10.
During the night of Friday 31st. May. I was patrolling under the orders of Widgeon, stationed on her quarter, between R and SB
At 2335 an M.T.B. was observed keeping station at 15 knots on the quarter of Sheldrake, distant about 3 cables. Before fire could be opened I heard the 'plop' of the torpedo at 2336, and realising too close to turn and ram and would expose my beam dangerously I
away to comb the track. The torpedo passed a ship's length under stern and up the starboard side. Widgeon had seen the attack, and ma was increased to 20 knots. Corvettes have no searchlight cannot be which point to attacks night and with of aircraft Widgeon the range, turned the glasses guns on turned 10" returned, at these to in before 2000ft. ram from the to small an investigate. the beam course doing innocent burning targets bridge. of her N.E. the navigation any small difficult, light, At I At followed. harm. 2340 0040 boat and I flares torpedoes At lights, орепей which as are At 0030 they only 0041 were I an course fire managed were visible aircraft seen a with heard torpedo west. astern to small throug illum passe to At not tra an passed down my port side, and two more alarm by siren, but I saw 03
At 0055 and 0100 Widgeon sounded an course S, at na ation following lights. the There continuous were no zig-zags further of widgeon till daylight.
one aircraft passed overhead, course attacks, but I spent
At 0135 one aircraft passed overhead, 130degs. 2000ft. a hecti
11.
Points that emerge from the above are:-
(a) made by lying in wait ahead 01
attacks of the target are not and always stopped. be used at the moment g
(b) (c) attack. small flares may sometimes been wate aircraft co-operate and phosephorosconce of llary assisted which gives by the ships marked away speeds.
continued

3.
SECRET
MO - 253
continued.
115)
12.
La Panne, 0115 to 0200/3. almost continuous flares
On and the from night of Sunday June 2nd. Sheldrake was 2 miles off out. The peculiarity of these flares was that they did not appear to about 3 (timed). Another was lit to replace it when it burnt estimated minutes range 5 to 7 miles, height 1000ft. Each flare burnt an for observed on a bearing of which varied from 350degs. to 005degs. were at certain. One only did fall, and it was immediately replaced by another be carried by aircraft, and they did not lose height: of this I am burning at the steady height.
MMANDER-I
CO 4- JUN 1940
*
THE NORE
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER IN COMMAND.
II.
No. R.E. 2/010.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
H. M. SHIPS & VESSELS,
THE NORE.
Submitted in accordance with your 1121/2.
2.
With reference to Paragraph 12. These flares may possibly have been flown from local patrol vessels with some form of kite suspension.
(Sgd.) H.R. Marrack.
COMMODORE-IN-CHARGE,
4th June, 1940.
SHEERNESS
III.
No. 3033/477. C/40.
SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.
7 JUN 1940
ITERY
(Copies to:- Flag Officer Commanding, Dover.
Commodore-in-Charge, Sheerness.)
HOW
Forwarded for the information of Their Lordshi with reference to Nore Message 1554/5th June.
The Nore.
6th June, 1940.
for A D M I R A L.

Din/o/
450
1162424
CONFIDENTAL.
423 44a illa,
FROM:
The Flag Officer in Charge, Harwich.
TO:
Vice Admiral, Dover.
(Copy to Commander-in-Chief, The Nore)
DATE:
7th June, 1940.
No. 207/40
Operation "DYNAMO"
In accordance with Nore General Order
No. 448, herewith are submitted such reports as I
have received so far from ships taking part in
Operation "Dynamo":-
th
Pack 95
(i)
M.T.B. No. 16's letter of 30th May.
ing
(ii)
H.M. Corvette "Sheldrake's" letter of 2nd June,
1160%
(iii)
Senior Officer, 8th M/S Flotilla (H.M.S.
ere ofgaulower
"GLENGOWER") letter of 3rd June.
Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "CAPE ARGONA"
edoe c/No
2.
Other reports are being collected and en
1/0/1124
will be forwarded as soon as possible. The writers of the enclosed reports have been directed to report twira was full Christian names of personnel recommended to lers assistry you at once.
1640.
8/6
3.
I refrain at this stage from offering further comment on these reports except that I would e
draw especial attention to the excellent report rendered reen by Acting Commander Michael Anthony Ormus Biddulph
1
of H.M.S."GLEN GOWER".
liled
The operation carried out by this Officer and his ships company appears to have been conducted throughout with exceptional skill, determination and bolt gallantry.
ficer
A
The
It yelanco e por
REAR ADMIRAL.
send
I
e to the Schuyt type. Having given them orders from the Senior Naval
Maund, I réturneu to DUNKITK, where 1 found two small vessels of
Officer, I returned M to Bray Dunes.
BRAY DUNES 1600/28
Several destroyers were now anchored off the beach
The two Schuyts were aground close inshore. The troops appeared the and whalers were embarking troops and taking them to the ships.
whalers, a and some were attempting to swim off to the Schuyts.
in demoralized state. They were hampering the work of
I proceeded close inshore, anchored in one under fathom, and succeeded in embarking many troops. This was lone considerable