TNA ADM 199 790

14
i
18
Friday 31st May. The following signals were mades-
0320. "Request more shipsto load Dunkirk."
0445. "Every available ship will be required at Dunkirk during the next two hours to evacuate rest of army.
0605. "Imbarkation proceeding satisfactorily in spite of bonbardment. I would again stress the need for more ships and constant fighter protection
0638. "Am now receiving a number of Frenchmen. I have raised no objection to their embarking in British ships and an allowing then to do 80.
0940. "Request you will inform me whether troops are now being ordered to earch to Dunkirk from the beaches.
0945. "Sun is now coming through and I have a big target of ships in harbour. Request special air protection for next two hours.
0957. "Lord Gort has agreed that 5,000 Frehe troops should be embarked here this evening after dark in British vessels. Request necessary ships may be sent to arrive at dusk.
1044. "We have been continually heavily bonbarded and they are gradually finding the range of our loading berth. I would rather only enter ships as necessary for the flow of troops.
Continuous and heavy shelling all the morning, but the evacuation proceeded fairly speedily. At last ships were arriving in large numbers and strong a 2. protection kept bomeing attack away. The only thing necessary was tostop the shelling. At 1200 B signal was received from the Air Linison
Officer at Dover asking for position of energy battery. This was not known with any certainty as the battery was probably mobile, but it was in the district of Loon Plage Brouge Kerk
Soch. A reply was made to this effect. The bombardment, novertheless, become more intense and a great deal more accurate.
Very heavy attacks were delivered during the evening but were concentrated chiefly upon derelict ships in the roads. Dive bombing attacks were carried out on the ships loading but without success. The embarkation proceeded smoothly.

45
49
Friday 31st May. The following signals were made:-
0320. "Request more shipsto load Dunkirk."
0445. "Every available ship will be required at Dunkirk during the next two hours to evacuate rest of army.
0605. "Embarkation proceeding satisfactorily in spite of bombardment. 1 would again stress the need for more ships and constant fighter protection
0638. "Am now receiving a number of Frenchmen. I have raised no objection to their embarking in British ships and am allowing them to do so.
0940. "Request you will inform me whether troops are now being ordered to march to Dunkirk from the beaches.
0945. "Sun is now coming through and I have a big target of ships in harbour. Request special air protection for next two hours.
0957. "Lord Gort has agreed that 5,000 Freinh troops should be ambarked here this evening after dark in British vessels. Request necessary ships may be sent to arrive at dusk.
1044. We have been continually heavily bombarded and they are gradually finding the range of our loading berth. I would rather only enter ships as necessary for the flow of troops.
Continuous and heavy shelling all the morning, but the evacuation proceeded fairly speedily. At last ships were arriving in large numbers and strong a r protection kept bomging attack away. The only thing necessary was tostop the shelling. At 1200 a signal was received from the Air Liaison
Officer at Dover asking for position of enemy battery. This was not known with any certainty as the battery was probably mobile, but it was in the district of Loon Plage Brouge Kerk
Soch. A reply was made to this effect. The bombardment, nevertheless, become more intense and a great deal more accurate.
Very heavy attacks were delivered during the evening but were concentrated chiefly upon derelict ships in the roads. Dive bombing attacks were carried out on the ships loading but without success. The embarkation proceeded smoothly.

198
213
7.
Finally when the helm jambed he continued to loong her under control.
avoiding action at high speed in very confined inters full of shipping.
Commodore
Did most valuable work off the beaches in a motor boat at
La Parme and Bray, organizing and controlling small craft and the embarkation of Lord Gart. When La Farme because unternable ording to shell fire he moved to Bray and only left the coast when driven off by the air attack of 1st June.
Ideutenant R.C.H.G.Evre - K.A/S.B. 10
Handled his boat with the greatest coolness and skill inside
Dunicize in crowled waters, darkness, and under shell fire. His good work greatly facilitated my task of control.
Lieutenant Commander
+
This officer assisted no throughout the operations and was invaluable. Unspering of himself be net any call on In with the greatest efficiency. On two occasions he carried out difficult tasks with complete success, controlling small cruft and directing Herchant ships to beach themselves so that they could be boarded at low tide.
Lieutement Viscount Kalburn
Acted as my Signal Officer and carried out Ida dirties with the greatest efficiency under most trying conditions.
I have the honour to be,
Story
Your obstitum servent,
W.R. WAKE-WALKER.
VIO ADMIRAL
9-JUN 1940
Bear Admiral.
DOVER
The Vice Admiral Commiting
Dover.

220
7.
Finally when the helm jambed he continued to keep her under centrol.
avoiding action at high speed in very confined waters full of shipping.
C
Commodore G. 0.Stephenson
Did most valuable work off the beaches in a noter boat at
La Panne and Bray, organising and controlling small craft and the embarkation of Lord Gort. When La Parme because untenable owing to shell fire he moved to Bray and only left the coast when driven off by the air attack of 1st June.
Ideutenant - IL.A/S.B. 10
Handled his boat with the greatest coolness and skill inside
Dunicirk in crowded waters, darkness, and under shell fire. His good work greatly facilitated my task of control.
Lieutenant Commander C.J.Vynna-Edwarts
This officer assisted no throughout the operations and vas invaluable. Unsparing of himself he not any call on him with the greatest efficiency. On two occasions he carried out difficult tasks with complete success, controlling small craft and directing Merchant ships to beach themselves so that they could be boarded at low tide.
Lieutenant Viscount Kelburn
Acted as my Signal Officer and carried out Ida duties with the greatest efficiency under most trying conditions.
I have the honour to be,
Stiry
Your obsident servent,
W.F. WAKE-WALKER.
VICE AD MIRAL
Bear Admiral.
*
DOVER
The Vice Admiral Commanding,
Dover.

225
240
SECRET
Page 3.
embarked.
ship in tow, but it was found that the vessel was held
17. At about 2130 H.M.Tug St.Clears endeavoured to tak endoned the attempt.
aground aft, and at about 2215 the tow parted, and the tu &
18. At about 2300 H.M.S. Havavt endeavoured to take us tow but without success.
19. During the night a further 350 French and 50
glish troops were embarked, and these were brought to England.
20. At 0300 on the 30th. H.M.S.Locust was ordered to ke Locust. us in tow, and by 9400 the ship was waterborne and in tow
21. Between 9400 and 0700 the tow parted three times, we had progressed only three miles. But after 0700 the tow satisfactory and H.M.S. Locust towed us across to the glish coast, arriving at the North Goodwin Light Vessel at
00. Speed made good since 0700 2.4 knots.
22. A single Junker bomber appeared for a moment above fog near the North Goodwin, but made off eastwards.
23. Shaped course to pass eastward of the Goodwins.
2245 a French soldier, fully equipped, was seen to jump over e sideby two of Bidefords shipscompany. The tow was stopped.
though a buoy was dropped and a boat lowered to search, it 1
regretted the nan was not recovered. The sea was calm and ae visibility at that time was good. The nan's name is not nown.
24. At 2315 we proceeded. The tow parted again at
330/31st, but after that no further trouble was experienced a nd we arrived at Dover at 1130 on th31st May.
25. The casualties to personnel were:-
(a) H.M.S.Bideford's ships company
(i) Killed. Three officers and nine men.
(11) Missing, believed killed. Four nen.
(111) Dangerously wounded. Two nen.
(1v) Seriously wounded. Ten men.
(v) Slightly wounded. One officer & six nen.
Total ship's company casualties. Four officers and thirty one men.
(b) Passengers.
(11) Nounded. Two officers (one dangerously).
(1) Killed. Two officers & ten other ranks.
Total passenger casualties. Four officers and ten men.
I have the honour to be,
Your obedient Sir, servant,
TOE
ADMIRA
10JUN 1940
Lieutenant Commander in Command.

225
240
SECRET
Page 3.
had embarked.
17. At about 2130 H.M.Tug St. Clears endeavoured to tak the ship in tow, but it was found that the vessel was held fast aground aft, and at about 2215 the tow parted, and the tu 5
abandoned the attempt.
18. At about 2300 H.M.S. Havavt endeavoured to take us in tow but without success.
19. During the night a further 350 French and 50
English troops were embarked, and these were brought to England.
20. At 0300 on the 30th. S.Locust was ordered to take us in tow, and by 9400 the ship was waterborne and in tow of Locust.
21. Between 9400 and 0700 the tow parted three times, and we had progressed only three miles. But after 0700 the tow was satisfactory and H.M.S. Locust towed as across to the
English coast, arriving at the North Goodwin Light Vessel at
2100. Speed made good since 0700 2.4 knots.
22. A single Junker bomber appeared for a moment above the fog near the North Goodwin, but made off eastwards.
23. Shaped course to pass eastward of the Goodwins.
At 2245 a French soldier, fully equipped, was seen to jump over the sideby two of Bidefords shipscompany. The tow was stopped.
Although a bucy was dropped and a boat lowered to search, it 1
is regretted the nan was not recovered. The sea was calm and the visibility at that time was good. The man's name is not known.
24. At 2315 we proceeded. The tow parted again at
0330/31st, but after that no further trouble was experienced a and we arrived at Dover at 1130 on th31st May.
25. The casualties to personnel were:-
(a) H.M.S.Bideford's ships company
(i) Killed. Three officers and nine nen.
(11) Missing, believed killed. Four nen.
(111) Dangerously wounded. Two men.
Total ship's company casualties. Four officers
(v) Slightly wounded. One officer & six men.
(1v) Seriously wounded. Ten men.
and thirty one men.
(b) Passengers. (1) Killed. Bwo officers & ten other ranks.
Total passenger casualties. Four officers and
(11) Wounded. Two officers (one dangerously).
ten men.
I have the honour to be,
Your obedient Sir, servant,
VICE ADMIRA
10JUN 1940
Lieutemant Commander in Command.

-359
365
PAGE III
ARKS.
Traffic on the route at night was somewhat exciting,and the constant meeting of all sorts and conditions of raft similarly engaged, and to the number of wrecks that were encountered, It was fortunate that the wind remained from the
North East towards the end, thereby shielding the approach from the fire from Gravelines Batteries.
During the bombing attack on Dunkirk p.m. Wednesday 29th May, the ships A.A. fire was most effective.
An H.E. from "X" Gun and a burst from the starboard 0.5"
Machine Gun were seen to envelop enemy aircraft and it is considered that these two were either destroyed or hit. This was confirmed by the soldiers who were subsequently embarked and who stated that they were much impressed by the whole performance. I have reason to believe therefore that
"Express's" fire met with the above measure of success.
The performance of all Officers and Men under my command was of the highest order, and to my complete satisfaction during the whole of this operation. Under severe strain all hands remained alert,boats crews while very weary made incessant boat trips, and the constant manning of the armament and its effective employment on all suitable occasions was extremely creditable.
The large numbers of troops onboard constantly expressed their appreciation of what was done for in providing such comforts as food drink,and clothing as them by the sailors, who I know did their utmost for them was possible.
The Hospital party rendered particularly, constant and valuable assistance to the wounded on board.
I have much oride in submitting the attached list of personnel whom I consider worthy of special mention.
I have the Honour to be,
Sir,
Your Obedient Servant,
VICE ADMIRAL
CAPTAIN.
Royal Navy.
11 JUN 1940

54
53
As far as I could see the beach I had left (opposite the
Sanatorium) was the only one which was properly organised and where the troops could consequently beembarked much quicker than elsewhere, so I boarded H.M.S. Codrington and explained the situation asking if a Destroyer could be sent down with me. The Codrington came down herself and ordered another
Destroyer to join her. After this the Sanatorium beach was well attended by larger craft.
7.
Whilst I was reporting to Codrington I sent my boats inshore to bring off some of the Frenchmen who were assembled there. They immediately mobbed and capsized the boats, threatening my sailors with revolvers when they tried to evict some. I sent in another boat with an armed party and rescued three of my four seamen the other being taken off by a lixe:
Destroyer's motor boat. Later in the day I saw the French soldiers still crowded in my boat which was then high and dry.
8
I transferred another load of soldiers to Destroyers during the day and was much assisted by Codrington leaving à her boats behind with me. During the night at IS hours before low water I ran the ship aground as by this time my crew who had all worked continuously since our arrival wer almost on the point of collapse and could no longer work the boats. The soldiers were able to walk out to the ship for about 1/21 an hour either side of low water and during this time I collected a full load of between 300 & 350 men.
About 2 hours after low water I managed to float offf and as by this time there were plenty of pulling boats and motor boats to tow them I decided to take my load to Margate where they were disembarked at about noon on Thursday 30th.
On arrival all gear left behind by the evacuees was cleared out of the ship and quantities of stores placed onboard. I
was very much impressed by the efficient organisation of the
Pier staff.
9.
After refuelling and filling my fresh water tank
I sailed for Dunkirk where I arrived that night and embarke another load with which I sailed next morning. On arrival at
31°
Margate P.M. on Friday I was told to remain there till further orders. At about noon on Sunday the second Iwas told
2th to tow & four motor boats to Dunkirk. On the way across we were waved back by some ship whose name I could not see but decided to go on in fulfillment of my orders. I found a number of Frenchmen on the beach but very few would embark as they said we would be bombed, this was probably due to the fact that we were the only ship working on the beach and thereforethe only target for aircraft who came our way, most of them however dropped their bombs on a French gunboat which had been grounded opposite the harbour. I tried two or three places along the beach but without much success, I did however manage to collect some British soldiers from boats which they had salvaged. I then proceeded towards
Dunkirk but when I saw there was a paddle steamer secured 3
alongside and only a few men coming down to her at considerble intervals I decided to return with what men I had. There was were no other ships moving in the channel on the way back so we received the undivided attention of I8 german aircraft who carried out high level bombing attacks on us in groups of 3 for fourty minutes without getting any salvos very close.
They were driven off by 7 British fighters. I can only surmise that the Germans were amusing themselves at our expense as they were dive-bombers and did not once carry ouT
a dive-bombing attack despite the absence of A.A. fire.

Dynami but
105
SUBJECT: REPORT ON PROCEEDINGS DURING EVACUATION.
FROM:
LIEUTENANT T. JOHNSTON, R.N.
COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. PASCHOLL.
DATE:
6th June 1940.
TO:
VICE ADMIRAL, DOVER.
I have the honour to report that I sailed from Portsmouth at approximately 3200 27th May 1940, in command of the Dutch skoot PASCHOLL, arriving at
Dover about 0900 28th May 1940.
2. I left Dover at 1400 28th May, for the beach off Le Panne via route Y with orders to arrive about
2200 to take off troops from the beaches and transfer them to Destroyers, endeavouring to return to the Downs by dawn.
3. As the PASCHOLL was SO much slower than other ships in the Convoy, I was obliged to leave the route given and proceed across the Banks, by SO doing arriving of Ia Panne at 2230, 28th May.
4. Approximately 300 troops were embarked and transferred to the WOLSEY(?), by this time it was 0400
29th May, so I returned as ordered to the Downs. On arrival at the Downs I was ordered by an examination steamer to proceed to Deal where I arrived about 1200
29th May.
5. Having received no further orders I proceeded to Dover where after storing ship I was ordered to return to Le Panne.
6. I sailed from Dover at 1900 29th May, and proceeded to IQ Panne arriving about 0230 30th May where I embarked 400 British and French troops and sailed for Ramsgate at 1030 30th May. During the embarkation only two enemy aircraft were sighted and they did not bomb in the vicinity of the PASCHOLL.
7. On entering the main channel of Le Panne,
I was shelled for half an hour by shore batteries at
Nieuport, and was obliged to steam across the sendbanks to get out of range. About 1400 I was attacked by a
Dornier bomber which bombed and machine-gunned without more success than two slight casualties. I arrived at
Ramsgate about 2000 30th May.
8. At approximately 2200 30th May, the whole crew of the PASCHOLL were relieved and Lieutenant Donaldson,
R.N.R., took command.
9. At 0700 on 1st June, I took command of Drifter
JACKEVE and proceeded to Dunkirk. During the outward passage, I was bombed several times and on arrival off the entrance to Dunkirk harbour at about 1250 1st June, was attacked heavily by dive bombers. The MOSQUITO
who was quite close at the time was hit and abandoned,
80 I proceeded to pick up survivors.

124
1st May.
1300 Arrived Sheerness.
*
118
st. June.
1100 Sailed from Sheerness to Dunkirk
During the passage from V buoy to W buoy, we were attacked by three ememy bombers who dropped two patterns of three bombs from a height of about 6000 ft, the nearest of these fell about 100 yards from the starboard quarter but did no damage, they also fired machine guns without success.
2130 Arrived Dunkirk, On entering harbour I saw two Channel
Steamers alongside the jetty, one half full the other empty, and no other troops in sight. I turned with the intention of proceeding to the beaches, when I sighted a large party of French soldiers near the small jetty in Nouveau Avant Port. I proceeded alongside and loaded about 330 French artillery.
2215 Sailed from Dunkirk.
Whilst in Dunkirk similar conditions to the previous visit were experienced. The German Battery appeared to be situated want to the southern of No 12 bucy.
On passage through the Roads we encountered a W/D launch which had broked down and took her in tow. Off No 12 bucy I was hailed by an M.T.B. who was overloaded and appeared to have engine trouble, I took on board nine of HS him passengers and took her in tow
2nd June.
0600 Off North Goodwin Lt. Ves. cast off M.T.B. and W/D launch,
M.T.B. towing W/D launch to Ramagate. Proceeded to Sheerness,
0930 Arrived Sheerness.
1600 Sailed for Ramsgate.
2300 Anchored off Ramsgate breakwater.
3rd June.
1560 Weighed and proceeded to North Goodwin
1530 Grounded in Que prn Bank
1830 Refloated, unable to start engines owing to defect in clutch.
2000 Dredged clear of Queern Bank. Anchored.
On receiving orders from"Pascall" to proceed to North Goodwin
I set a course from Que Jrn buoy with F'buoy on the starboard bow. The buoy I actually put on the starboard bow was E buoy, both these buoys are black and white checkered.
This grounding and consequent engine movements probably caused the clutch to seize active thus preventing "Reiger" from taking part in the
(final effort)

127
-2-
This method was found successful and two trips were carried out in same manner. For the third endeavour,
"VANQUISHER" and"FITZROY" having left for England, and no other larger craft being in the vicinity, my intentions were to close again, fill to capacity and proceed towards La Panne, to transfer troops if requested, or return to England.
It is regretted that this effort failed in that
"SURSUM"CORDA" was beached too securely and no efforts ot my part were successful in re-floating.
Thiswwas due to an error in judgement on my part in allowing too many men on board at the time and my incorrect appreciation of the time of the tide turning, no tide tables being carried.
H.M.S. "HEBE" came to my assistance, but unfortunately though a tow was passed, her lack of power and manoeuvreability were strong handicaps, and she herself grounded two cables to
Eastward.
At 0800/30 it was realised there was no chance of the ship moving until the following High Water.
During the period of waiting until High Water that evening, I assisted where possible on the Beach in the vicinity of the Ship, and during periods where there were no small craft operating, took aboard soldiers for shelter and distributed what food remained aboard "SURSUM-CORDA".
All members of my crew worked magnificently under somewhat strained conditions, and with no consideration for themselves.
Further endeavours to re-float were made between 1800
and 2030 using kedge anchor with soldiers onboard assisting.
At 1840 a shell from an enemy shore battery burst & few yards ahead of the ship and four soldiers were hit by splinters. I ordered these and one officer hit whilst on the beach to be placed below and with the assistance of a stretcher bearer my First
Lieutenant, Lieutenant Brooks rendered first aid and made them as comfortable as conditions allowed.
I then cleared the ship of soldiers and continued my efforts to re-float, but with no success, delay being caused by an influx of soldiers somewhat naturally seeking shelter after the shell fire, whom L'ordered to stand by to board "HEBE" who
I could see appeared to shew hopeful signs of clearing the beach. The majority of them carried out these orders and
"HEBE" was re-floated at approximately 1945. On receiving report of my engines being temporarily out of action and on point of "seizing-up") decided further efforts were fruitless, and retaining only wounded and completely exhausted men onboard for shelter, until small craft or ambulances could be commandeered to take them off, decided to land and assist on beach where possible.
(continued ty d, that too
Cing.

MOTOR CONVOY.
6/6/40.
Dynamo 188.
Motor Barge Sherfield
#
18
Ex-idghter Y.O. 63.
Ex-Lighter X.95.
Sub It. J.D.F. Kealy, R.N.
Motor Launch Nanette II.
On arriving at Sheerness Motor Boat Dook on Friday, Sist May, 1940, we received command of the above convoy with instructions to pick up British Troops from the shores round Dunkirk as soon as possible. This was at 2 p.m; by 2.15 9.
we were under way heading out to sea.
Good progress was made until later that night we lost contact with lighter X.9
although we spent some time in trying to locate her without success.
At 11 a.m. 1st June land was sighted, peniot Where were we? The one and decidedly irregular compass, the Deviation of which we never knew, which perhaps was Just as well. brought us to a buny round which was painted -"Ostend". This
Dyroms 188 - 181
REPORT.
SUB LIEUT. P. SNOW. R,N.
Motor Boat "REDA" - 12 ton - speed 8 knots.
Left Sheerness at approx. 1900 on Tuesday
28th. Made first crossing to Dunkirk on Wednesday 29th leaving Ramsgate at 1000. Arrived in company with five other small boats at 1700. Whilst proceeding up Dunkirk roads towards the beaches we were machine-gunned by low flying aircraft. Bullet stuck in deck-head having failed to penetrate. Embarked soldiers on destroyers and sloops for 3 hours under continual bombardment from the air.
Headed for Ramsgate at 2200 with a party of 21 English soldiers on board. Whilst leaving were deliberately bombed one salvo falling within 30 yards of the boat.
Loosened several planks but no material damage sustained.
Arrived Ramsgate approx. 0600 Thursday.
Left on second trip at 1100 on Friday 31st, arriving at Dunkirk at 1730. Took off about 50 Frenchmen to waiting ships and left for Ramsgate with 23 Frenchmen on board. Heavy bombers were bombing the beaches when we left at 2015.
Anchored off N. Goodwin for the night and proceeded into harbour at 0530.
Crew for 1st trip:-
R.W. Rawlings (P.O Motorman)
1 Civilian Volunteer
Crew for 2nd trip:-
R.W. Rawlings
1. Leading Seaman
1. A.B.
All times are approximate.
(Signed) P.Snow
Sub. Lieut, R,N.

MOTOR CONVOY.
6/6/40. Dynamo 188.
Notor Barge Sherfield
1
# 185
Ex-Lighter Y.O. 63.
Ex-Lighter X.95.
Sub Lt. J.D.F. Kealy, R.N.
Motor Launch Nanette II.
On arriving at Sheerness Motor Boat Dook on Friday, 31st May, 1940, we received command of the above convoy with instructions to pick up British Troops from the shores round Dunkirk as soon as possible. This was at 2 p.m; by 2.15 p.m.
we were under way heading out to sea.
Good progress was made until later that night we lost contact with lighter X.95
although we spent some time in trying to locate her without success.
At 11 a.m. 1st June land was sighted, paniol Where were we? The one and decidedly irregular compass, the Deviation of which we never knew, which perhaps was tust as well. brought us to a buoy round which was painted -"Ostend". This
*
182
19t.
REPORT OF "SKYLARK" - S/Lee MARES R.N.V.R.
Abandoned in Mid Channel and crew taken on board
1ty
"Strathelliott". S/L Mares was left behind at Dunkirk.
2
(Crew came back on Trawler).

MOTOR CONVOY.
6/6/40. Dynamo 188.
Motor Barge Sherfield
1 - 185
Ex-Lighter Y.O. 63.
Ex-Lighter X.95.
Motor Launch Nanette II.
Sub Lt. J.D.F. Kealy, R.N.
On arriving at Sheerness Motor Boat Dook on Friday, Sist May, 1940, we received command of the above convoy with instructions to pick up British Troops we were under way heading out to sea.
from the shores round Dunkirk as soon as possible. This was at 2 p.m; by 2.15 p.m.
Good progress was made until later that night we lost contact with lighter X.95
although we spent some time in trying to locate her without success.
At 11 a.m. 1st June land was sighted, peniol Where were we? The one and decidedly irregular compass, the Deviation of which we never know, which perhaps was just as well, brought us to a buny round which was painted - -"Ostend". This
Dynam 193 " 183 196
REPORT OF "MARY ROSE" - S/I H. Mc.Clelland R.N.V.B.
Ity
Engines failed on way over. Ship taken in cow, began
2
making water fast and became unmanageable and was abandoned in Mid Channel where she sank. Crew taken on board the Trawler "Strathelliott" where they helped to take off troops from the beach at Dunkirk.
Journey back made in trawler. No injuries to anyone.
8
on dng
18
#

MOTOR CONVOY.
6/6/40. Dynams 188.
Notor Barge Sherfield
1
#
Ex-Lighter Y.O. 63.
185
Ex-Lighter X.95.
Motor Launch Nanette II.
Sub Lt. J.D.F. Kealy, R.N.
On arriving at Sheerness Motor Boat Dook on Friday, Sist May, 1940, we received command of the above convoy with instructions to pick up British Troops we were under way heading out to sea.
from the shores round Dunkirk as soon as possible. This was at 2 p.m; by 2.15 p.m.
Good progress was made until later that night we lost contact with lighter X.95
although we spent some time in trying to locate her without success.
At 11 a.m. 1st June land was sighted, peniot Where were we? The one and decidedly irregular compass, the Deviation of which we never knew, which perhaps was just as well, brought us to a busy round which was painted - -"Ostend". This
Dynamotique
197
184
*
s
7
REPORT OF "SINGAPORE" R.N.V.R.
Ity
No personal injury to self or crew. Engine failed in North Sea and return had to take tow, Owing to heavy swell sudden strain WAB put on to tow and the winch was torn taking with it part of the fore deck, the anchor, cable and all ropes.
Managed to repair ngine temporarily and returned to
Ramagate.
too

OR CONVOY.
6/6/40. Dynamo 188.
or Barge Sherfield
#
185
Lighter Y.O. 63.
Lighter X.95.
Sub Dr. J.D.F. Kealy, R.N.
or Launch Nanette II.
On arriving at Sheerness Motor Boat Dook on Friday, 31st May, 1940, we ceived. command of the above convoy with instructions to pick up British Troops om the shores round Dunkirk as soon as possible. This was at 2 p.m; by 2.15 p.m.
were under way heading out to sea.
Good progress was made until later that night we lost contact with lighter X.95
though we spent some time in trying to locate her without success.
At 11 a.m. 1st June land was sighted, peniot Where were we? The one and cidedly irregular compass, the Deviation of which we never knew, which perhaps
B just as well, brought us to a buny round which was painted -"Ostend". This a a most salutary effect on us and putting the wheel to starboard we headed for e battle. The succession of sunken ships with the oil saturated water covered.
th junk and garbage of all sorts began to have a dampening effect on everybody.
wever, we fortified ourselves with large helpings of Mr. Machonicie's Irish Stew.
Continuing on passed Nieuport we found ourselves between two destroyers and shore battery in action;during this one of the destroyers was hit and the supertructure burst into flames. On closing in it was obvious that there was no one board and we drew away a magazine explosion. Shells then began to drop round us rom the remaining destroyer and to further our consternation at this moment at orpedo passed under the "Sherfield", disappearing up the beach; whether fired by submarine or the other destroyer is not known.
Next thing on the programs was the finding of a whole lot of chaps who had een in the oil-covered water for a considerable time and we experienced difficulty n getting them aboard as there were several wounded amongst them. These - were ostly off destroyers sunk during the day. During this interlule soldiers were een gathering on the foreshore, and owing to ebbing tide it was impossible to each the lighters and the motor boat. commenced to collect the soldiers and take chem to the lighters at twenty at a time. One young Army officer to whom great redit is due came along with a motor boat full of wounded, and after putting them aboard helped with the embarkation.
In the meantime one lighter continued to fish people out of the water and the ther went alongside the wrecked "Clan MacAlister" and took off 15 wounded survivors of the "Keith" and other ships.
All was going well when a number of enemy planes started to machine gun the beach and bombard the vicinity. It would be as well to mention that there were no other British ships or planes in sight, and being completely unarmed except for one Boer War rifle, we couldn't do much against them. As the last load was being gathered it appeared that the enemy were using Trench Mortars and machine guns from begind the Dunes.
During a lull the second lighter and motor boat made for the open sea; while the motor barge was receiving her last load of wounded enemy planes started paying further attention to her. She stopped all movement and drifted about for the next three quarters of an hour, hoping to be taken for a derelect, which thank God she wast At length the planes eased off and she made a dash (at 6 knots) for the open the familiar whine of a power bomber was heard, followed by a pattern of bombe sea, large quantities of tea being consumed. Peace reigned, but not for long;
exploding round the barge and a nice little machine gun attack followed.
The remainder of the trip was quite uneventful, entering Dover at 7 a.m. on
Sunday morning.
volunteers and the youngest being 17. A fine example was set by the fortitude
Too much praise cannot be given to the Civilian members of the crews, all being of the Troops waiting on the shore and in the water. All Naval members of the orews acted as expected.
missed On during the first night, had managed to get to Dunkirk and had had her full returning to Sheerness we found the third member of our convoy, whan - had share of excitement.

REPORT
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522
ON THE OPPERATIONS OF THE MOTOR LAUNCHES "YSER" AND
"MALBOROUGH DURING THE EVAQUATION OF THE BRITISH &
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7
FRENCH FORCES.
Yug Vincia
The Hopper no.95, which I had been ordered to take h
round to Ramsgate, anchored early last Wednesday evening, and Commander Duffet gave me the Belgian ferry boat "Yser".
We started in 8 convoy of eighteen other small motor craft at about 0100 on Thursday. Shortly after daylight
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the escorting drifter had to turn back with two of the small
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boats, and with our much greater speed we soon left the remainder of the launches well astern.
VI940
Owing to the fact that the "Yser" was not fitted with a compass we deviated from our course, making a landfall
8 few miles to the westward of the town. We arrived off the beaches at about 0900, and ran aground in our attempts to approach close enough to the sands for the men to wade out to us. There was no anchor in the boat, but we salvaged two of the plowshare type from other abandoned boats, and laid them out at low tide in order to kedge her off.
During the afternoon and dog-watches we were able to be of some use by acting as a liason link between the boats and the officers of the embarking troops. The Frenchmen were very reluctant to wade in deeper than their waists, and
Petty Officer Clarke (Chatham Division) spent approximately five hours, with water up to his neck, helping the soldiers ief into the small boats.
agret
I should like to take this oppotunity to recommend
Petty Officer Clarke for his cheerfulness, vigour, and valuable advice offered on this occasion and later in the WD boat
"Malborough". I understand that Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten mentioned Petty Officer Clarke in his despatches following the torpedoing and bombing of HMS "Kelly".
Our efforts to refloat the "yser" were without success, and having waited for high tide we took passage home
G. Gabbett- Mulhallen.
Sub.Lieutenant Royal Navy.
The Captain's Secretary.
H.M.S. FERVENT.
RAMSGATE.