TNA ADM 199 792

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were An impracticable not feature of this plan was that craft inshore asking too much to think that when our crying need It was for to be used except for the rear guard. small boats, any such could be held idle while was men were on beaches with ships waiting to take them so many off.
Actual development of this plan was very different.
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HEBE sent up to La Panne, to be there at 1800 to receive
Gort whom Stevenson was to bring off.
Beaches shelled during the day, but in most cases shells landed on dunes which had a fairly steep scarp and protected the beach. Shelling was principally to westward of
Braye; at one time a French battery 2 or 3 miles out of
Dunkerque on top of dunes, but close to sea, received a lot of attention.
1330
As I was returning to eastward HEBE signalled she had been shelled off La Panne at 1200 and had had to move westward a couple of miles.
1430
Went up in KEITH off La Panne to see if battery could be shelled, but had to withdraw - not essential to be so far to the eastward and battery was not visible. Its fore was directed by an observation balloon over Nieuport;
aircraft came out to shoot it down, but without result;
it was re-hoisted as soon as they left. Shell bursts appeared to be 6 or 8-inch, in salvoes of four.
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Owing to the shelling of anchorage at La Panne urged Gort to embark as soon as possible, but he would not leave before the time arranged.
Soon after, I moved down to Dunkerque so as to be on spot when boats arrived. En route a terrific air battle overhead - 3 Spitfires shot down, 2 in the sea; onepilot killed, the other not found.
While waiting off Dunkerque signal from VA, Dover, to say
Army wanted to start embarkation at 2000 instead of 0100.
Replied: Boats had not arrived and sloops would not be there then, but would do my best. (This had an unfortunate effect: as sloops could not be there in time I had to keep destroyers, etc., off the beaches which would otherwise have been sent to Dunkerque during the night.
Result = though many were embarked from beaches, very few ships went into Dunkerque where men were waiting, and full use of it was not made.)
Always impossible for me to do more than deal with the situation of the moment. Did not know what ships were coming or when - except for the pre-arranged plan of the sloops; nor could Dover give me much information.
The stream of ships was constant, but irregular; not possible to see any way ahead. My policy was to keep only enough ships off the beaches and send all others into
Dunkerque, but situation changed continually. I wanted
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to be in several places at once.
The first of the boat tows did not arrive until 1700 - a tug with what looked like 6 dinghies in tow: she was
Could not wait off Dunkerque as I wanted to get up to La preceded by some motor yachts which came in company.
Panne for Gort, so left Wynne-Edwards in a motor yacht to direct the tows as they arrived, and to order a large number of hoppers and other craft that were lying off the westwen beaches to beach themselves on the rising tide so that men could embark.
Gort's embarkation produced some odd incidents.
Dover had sent over 4 MTBs and MA/SBs to get him: the reached me. During the afternoon 2 MTBs came to me and signal informing me of this, like many others, never said they were to embark a party from a point 2 miles west of La Panne. Could not understand this; thought they must have been sent to fetch off some of Naval landing the H.
party, but realise now the party concerned was
Staff. While approaching La Panne, shortly before 1800, HEBE
1800
signalled to me "General on beach abreast you, and saw a group at water's edge with 2 cars and some KEITH'S gnalmen.

8
300
KEITH'S I learnt boats he sent in, but Gort was not in 207 and
No one his staff: heavy air attack trips necessary time.
to bring off was in HEBE already. Three first boat
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ships and was hit, though narrow escapes. Many during this on increase beaches; HEBE shot down a Heinkel. attacks
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of shell fire off Braye, where CLAN Great was and a valuable decoy: she was hit and bombed MACALLISTER several times blindly into this area, as shells fell near CLAN MACALLIS-
started burning again. Enemy guns seemed to be firing
TER but not among ships loading which were some inshore of her. Later, these ships did come under fire, way and
VIVACIOUS was hit twice and had 11 casualties - 2-300
troops on board. Ordered her to go into Dunkerque and fill up there.
Lees was Senior Staff Officer of H. Q. Staff, and I thought it would be a good education for him to see something of what the naval problem was, so I kept him on the bridge with me. As Gort was in HEBE I felt he was safe, and as
HEBE was doing good work embarking troops I did not send her back to Dover with him at once. Therein, perhaps, I
was wrong, as I had not realized the anxiety of Government to have him safe and sound at home, but felt he would
1st sooner the ship helped to bring off more men than he should land a few hours earlier in England.
During the day made signal to all ships with instructions for supporting fire against enemy tanks and lorries on the beach. Critical place likely to be at La Panne after the line was evacuated; intended to be there myself in KEITH
at daybreak next morning. Also kept BASILISK free of
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1700
Weather improved gradually. Signal = "Weather off beaches now good: many more boats should come into use again as tide rises. General movement of troops westward towards
Dunkerque. No petrol supply yet and many boats getting short off La Panne and Braye. Movement from Dunkerque continues. Great air activity. "
1815
Drifters with petrol arrived.
After embarking H. Q. Staff I returned to Dunkerque and found Wynne-Edwards had been doing good work. Saw for the first time that strange procession of craft of all kinds that has become famous - small motor yachts, motor launches drifters, Dutch schuyts, Thames barges, fishing boats, pleasure steamers, tugs towing dinghies, lifeboats and all manner of pulling boats.
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As tows of boats appeared they were told to which beach be they should go; particularly anxious there should sufficient at La Panne which was farthest off. Directed 10
miles up the coast; and as light was beginning the remaining to fail, several tows to go on to La Panne, telling them it was
Motor I left and Wynne-Edwards went on up to in La a MA/SB Panne myself. to direct Off Panne Braye were I saw tows I had feared - that tows ordered to La stopping what at Braye: got there just in farther time to on. warn
CODRINGTON (off Braye) to send them out to Lees how easy it was to talk about ten-mile distribu-
Pointed boats and craft at certain places along different a ting of coast, but that it was a very craft which thing stretch it done in practice, in the dark, by to help to get not been there before and with no lights the first place them. they had inevitable tendency was to stop assembled. at
The where other craft were
In the (on a his return to me at about off was La Panne.
came to end pretty fair distribution was 2230) made, and able Wynne- to
Edwards report that it was there this were evening a number that of I boats saw 2 would transports be bombed. go into
Dunkerque and out was just as it was getting from dark, that direction.
I think very nervous that they and shortly
They moved heard very heavy bombing aircraft attacking off
Actually, afterwards bombing was from our NOW own dark and I remained batteries La Panne in down company the coast. with HEBE and several other Stayed ships.

10
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About from seaward this time saw a Belgian fishing boat 200
tigate. down the Zuidcoote Pass. BASILISK appear on inves- scene
Was first of a dozen such boats which to tion. appeared; on their way to Dunkerque to assist in shortly evacua-
As mists and clouds dispersed many aircraft appeared scene, and fighters constantly came low over us. Often on they were Spitfires, but our ships were not taking any chances and opened fire indiscriminately on them.
Hoisted signal "Cease Fire" and blew syren to attract attention, but our own machine gun aft in KEITH continued firing - once firing started they could not hear the
"cease fire" gong.
KEITH now had only about 30 rounds of H.A. ammunition left,
SO decided would shortly transfer flag to BASILISK and send
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KEITH into Dunkerque to fill up and return to Dover.
Before I could do this a very heavy bombing attack developed, first of all in and around Dunkerque itself. IVANHOE
was hit and entirely enveloped in smoke just off entrance;
2 hours later saw her being towed back to Dover. HAVANT
was sunk near the entrance.
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Not long afterwards a compact formation of 30-40 JU 87's appeared from the S.W. Everyone opened fire on them and enemy spread out. Fire seemed effective and thought it was driving them away, so left bridge for a moment.
KEITH attacked by 3 D/Bs: one bomb burst 10 yards astern and helm jammed when hard over; two others near misses.
Ship soon under control in hand steering: 1 man hurt.
1900
Attacked by 3 more D/Bs: one bomb down after funnel and
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exploded below; several casualties.
Owing to danger of fire, foremost torpedo tubes were fired As to get rid of torpedoes. Holes in side from bomb.
ship could not steam let go anchor, and shortly after
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MTB 102 came alongside. Could do no good in KEITH, so transferred to the MTB with my staff and 1 wounded man.
Sent two nearby tugs to assist KEITH and then made for
Dunkerque. KEITH again attakked and hit under bridge:
heavy list to port, but H.A. gun still firing. She was twice more and her men were taken off by a tug, which the hit picked up men from BASILISK and SKIPJACK: both sunk:
latter also sunk at this time. Tug also was bombed down and and about 30 of KEITH'S men lost, and planes came machined gunned men in water.
MTB to see General Alexander (now in command Tennant.
bombed most of the way in, but managed to dodge after them.
0915
Landed Gort's departure), but he was away and so was
Learnt that plan was to continue evacuation during the next
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night withdraw from their new positions at dawn and for several from western beaches and Dunkerque; rear guard retire were to
Dunkerque. to This meant continuing embarkation hours spaces round local H.Q. full of ambulances and ounded of daylight: feared heavy losses.
Open doctors doing what they could.
with ships still afloat had left Dunkerque, MTB so returned and, in to make spite of more bombing and machine gunning, Dover
All contact with VA, Dover. Left in the reached
1130
in safety at 1130.
Embarkation Plan to take place between 2100 and of 0330 Dunkerque. and was to for the night:-
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be from this a large number of ships and small also being were being sent the 1½ miles of beach to the east craft
For and sent over. Personnel ships RAF to assembled Dunkerque itself to go alongside pier. were the into their efforts between 1900 and and 0700 from over period concentrate when ships would be on passage to
Dunkerque. cross-channel type used for normal ferrying
Personnel across ships to = France. Manned by and their loading alongside crews troops been going into the harbour so were very and had could carry 3,000 men, used
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valuable; the pier. but Some they were large targets and were reluctance with

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reluctance when bombing was probable, especially several would only go into Dunkerque in daylight. as This now considered too dangerous, and Naval Officers were put on board to act as advisers to the masters and crews were stiffened with seamen. They went in every night and did
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magnificent work. Other craft, also, including French destroyers, were to go in and load alongside: British at
East Pier, French at West Quay.
Gap in pier had been bridged, but I feared that Germans would now shell pier heavily and make it impossible for ships to be kept alongside. Asked RAF to reconnoitre:
report gave accurate account of gap, but no word as to whether pier was being shelled.
1700
Arranged to leave Dover at 1700. Picked up Wynne-Edwards and Norfolk and embarked in MA/SB 10, in which a portable loud-speaker was fitted (similar sets found very useful in
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HEBE and EXPRESS). A flag had been made for me out of a piece of cleaning cloth - the red stripe made one half of the cross, and the other half and the balls had been added in red paint. Harbour was full of destroyers, sloops, etc., many showing signs of minor damage. Some were out of action all together, and all were enjoying a short, well-earned rest. I had an hour's sleep on way over; up till then had had about 7 hours in short snatches, but felt quite fresh and fit.
When some miles away from Dunkerque sighted 2 MTBs approach ing on port bow. They did not make contact and were
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probably French.
1900
Arrived at Dunkerque and made fast alongside shore end of pier. Went to the "Bastion" (H.Q. of Army and the local
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French Naval and Military Command) - 10 minutes' walk.
Many buildings and sheds damaged. A French field gun was firing back over the town. Road fairly clear, but litter-
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ed with vehicles the whole way. Men straggling along the road, but very few troops seen as they were kept away on beach behind shelter of wall except when ships came along-
Found side. Tennant and Alexander at the "Bastion. Heard that
French were holding a line in rear of ours and that rear would continue to hold. Joined by my proper Flag-Lieut. with guard were to withdraw through this line which the French
(Balfour): he had come over the day after I left, a
Returned to the pier. A Lysander Army Co-op plane, which
W/T set.
had been flying over pier all day, was fired at by several
Bofors guns - not hit. Explained it was probably the reconnaissance plane I had asked for.
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While having some food in the MA/SB, the Navigating Officer He of KEITH appeared, saying he was the only survivor.
had swum ashore and reached a battery on the dunes some distance outside Dunkerque, and had then walkked in.
(Actually, only 3 Officers and 33 mon were lost, and 16
wounded.) Close by my boat was Tennant's drifter; he also had 2 old steamboats. Next day the drifter was sunk by a shell.
Naval Party ashore = about 6 Officers and a number of men messengers, signalmen, etc. Arranged to collect some of them at 0200/2, but Tennant would not leave then.
"Tomorrow we'll either be back in London, in a German prison or done for.
went outside harbour to meet the first ships arriving.
2100
Beginning to get dark. First ship was a sloop, followed off
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by beaches to the east of the pier and boats ferried men minesweepers, destroyers and tugs. They anchored the off. Noticed 3 or 4 Thames barges anchored off them beach; and they seemed to be deserted, but men got off to full of away. soldiers who were trying to sail her home: a Officer
One barge was met later in mid-Channel Naval was put on board and she got back safely.
During

12
beaches During the than night found there were more ships 301
304'
the could be loaded: there was lying off the diverting ships from beaches as necessary. Beaches and were pier, so I Kept on the move between harbout plenty of room outside at very Pier heavilCy shelled, but still a lot of men got off.
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where was outlined against glow of fires still burning someto the westward of Dunkerque: steady stream of men passing along it. Numerous small craft passing up to the inner basins. French TBs loading at West Quay.
Shelling seemed to be concentrated on beach and to eastward of pier; shells falling inside harbour, and about midni a side. trawler was sunk. Also casualties in a destroyer along-
2nd June. Went up to shore end of pier to embark the base party:
0200
violent outburst of shelling. No signs of party, so
Wynne-Edwards went to look for them. A number of French troops had cut into the flow of British troops by a converging route: result was that about 5,000 British were held up and did not get off that night. Instead, a lot of
French troops got away from the East Pier in addition to
0245
those from the West Quay. Base party came down at 0245
and embarked.
Dawn
As morning was clear I decided to get ships away at 0300
instead of at 0330 as originally planned. Men were still coming down to pier, but it was no use risking ships being sunk alongside and blocking the pier and harbour.
(Word picture of scene - darkness out to seaward, glare of
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fires inshore, etc. Not very much noise.)
Returned to Dover to discuss next night's operation.
Still 5,000 of B.E.F. to come and an unknown number of
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French (30-40,000?). Plan was to use Dunkerque only, except for some French local craft which would embark from
Dawn beach immediately east of Dunkerque. Embarkation was to start at 2100 and go on till 0300, when blockships were to enter the harbour. Programme was worked out for ships to come in at half-hourly intervals to different berths, so that 3 or 4 ships should be alongside East Pier continuously. Denny thought this was impossible and liable to result in confusion, but a scheme was got out which provided carrying capacity of 37,000 men besides those that would go off in small craft. I also got 2 fast boats told off to act as runners for me (? from VERNON)
Besides the large ships, there were tugs, schuyts, drifters and all manner of small craft going over as well - some to lie off and be loaded by smaller boats, and others to go
Large number of wounded in Dunkerque: orders had been right up harbour past the large ship berths.
embarking given wounded would have taken up too much that fit men were to be got away in preference, valuable as time. Decided to try to get some of the wounded the Germans away in time in Hospital ships, in the hope that bombed day would respect them: 2 were sent over, but one she was had to sunk, the other was so badly damaged that had to be return. and Wounded, except for walking cases, left over again in MA/SB 10, with Somerville and and Goodenough 3
behind.
On Belgian soldiers who were about half-way across a pull-
Went the way over had a mild bombing attack picked in up ing boat. outside the harbour met one of the two the fast other motor
Just Both had been machine-gunned and had to boat be boats. and left (not seen again): this one disabled as she had only one engine left in working his order. staff.
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returned at Dunkerque. Picked up Alexander General and
2030
Transferred Arrived them to a destroyer, and in her bullet was later killed by a machine gun last from of his a
Mansergh when close to Dover. Tennant and the the British plane party left in a MTB as soon as the last of troops had gone.
The

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MAY29
The Vice Admiral, Dover, stressed that those Navol Ratings must be got away and must not run the risk of getting caught schore at the ond. I met the signal officer, Viscount Kelburn, who had been lont to me, and arranged that he should collect a party of Signal Ratings to accompany me.
I was also much surprised to meet Commodores Stevenson and Hallett, who arrived at Dover by train after I did; I thought they were already at Dunkirk.
I finally sailed in the "ESK" at 2000 with these two Officers, the disciplinary beach parties and my signalmen and staff. There was no news of the 200 men of the beach parties and I do not know to this day what became of them.
On the way over I arranged that Commodore Stevenson would take charge off La Panne, and Commodore Hallett off Braye, and at that time
I intended to be off St. Malo and Dunkirk myself or to put Captain Bush in charge there. I also spoke to the officers in charge of the disciplinary parties and warned them not to get caught but said that it would probably be impossible to give them any order as to when to come off,
It was thought that the embarkation could hardly go on for 1201'C than a day or two and each day we expected to be the last.
At this time I must confess that I had very little idea of what it was going to be possible to do or how to set about it. I knew that large numbers of craft of all sorts, Destroyers Sloops and Minesweepers were fetching troops back, but I had no idea at all of local conditions -
where they could borth, the possibilities of using the harbour - boat facilities for off shore transport - or what communications oxisted.
My general plan was to put an officer in some amall ship in charge off shore at each of the main beaches and to try and organise the flow of ships to the beaches myself from some central position.
In the "ESK" we were kindly given some sandwiches, and after a short talk we made ourselves as comfortable as we could in the Captain's cabin and tried to sleep. I...

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the conditions inshore were getting worse and I did not want to get stranded I decided to go into Dunkirk and drive to La Panne from there.
All this time the large number of mon and wounded in "НЯ" had been on my mind. Feeling that I could not keep her any longer I decided to send her back to Dover with Captain Bush to explain the boat situation and point out the vital necessity of sending out boats and crews.
Accordingly at 3.30 I transferred my staff to "WINDSOR" and went into Dunkirk in M.T.B. 102 which had come at my request. I had folt badly in need of means of getting about quickly, and a fast boat of
X
light draft would have been invaluable. The trouble was that when I did get one its endurance was so low that it had to return almost immediately
X
to Dover.
On arrival at Dunkirk I found that Tennant was with Lord Gort and that to drive there would be likely to take a longer time than I cared to be away so I decided that I must land from a boat after all.
The M.T.B. had not onough fuel to reach La Panne and roturn to
Dover, so I boarded the "GOSSAMER" and took her up to La Panne where
I transferred to "WORCESTER" at about 5.30 p.m. There I again found
Commodore Stevenson and lent him my spare pair of trousers and underclothea as he got soaked through whenever he landed.
La Panne was in telephonic communication with England and sometimes
I received messages by W/T from Dover about the situation there - 80 for
31
instance one timed 1749 saying that ships were urgently wanted off In
Panne actually at 1900 there were four destroyers and one minesweeper
X
at LO. Panne and the situation was constantly changing. G.H.Q. wear in touch with Admiralty and Vice Admiral, Dover, and gave their views and criticisms of what was happening. This probably accounts for a signal from the First Sea Lord on this day asking if boats were distributed along the beaches to the best advantago. Actually of course practically the only boats that could get inshore except the pontoons and D. few local craft were whalers and their distribution was dependont on the position of the ships they belonged to.

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to be there rysolf also.
About 10 p.m. I started back to the ship. It was getting dark and as I left the house with Lord Gort on enemy plano came over and a Bofors gun opened fire on 1t. I said goodbye to Lord Gort and went down the boach with Termant, General Lees and my Flag Lieutenant. Tennant asked if I had got 2 boat and I Laughod and vold him that I. hot got to make my otm way off -
boats were too precious to be kept hanging about. The tide was further out and there were a number of boats and portoon craft stranded. A number of mon of the 12th Lancers were trying to get pontoons afloat, and 10 YES
good to see them taking action to help themselves. Lying unused was a pontoon boat about 8 foot by 4. - flat-bottomed with sides about 18 inches high. I called over some soldiers and we got round it and carried it to the waters cdge. I then placed four 02 them each side and told than to wade out with 1t and get in when I told them. As we waded out thesea was calm, but a small swell was coming in and as the water got deoper I got them into the boat two by two until only Flags and I were still wading at the stern with the water well over our knees. Finally we got in togother and t started the soldiers paddling by numbers, rather like E racing boat's CLOW. They soon picked it up but I noticed there was already a good doal of water in the boat 4. the freeboard W&G about 3 inches and the wavelets were washing up to my stern as I sat on the gunwhale. I decided we should not get for before we swamped, and finding by means of my paddle that we were still in fairly shallow water I told my crow to jump'out. Out we all got and returned with our boat to the beach and emptied it. Tennant and Ceneral Leos had been
2
standing all this time watching and as we came ashore I could not asist the temptation of saying to the latter "Another example 0:3 Novel ineptitude."
Reluctantly I had to reduce my crew by two and off we set again. This time things went All right and the soldiers settling down to paddling in fine style with the aid of occasional "one-two-threes" soon brought us off to the
"WORCESTER" ogain.
Having already lent all my spare olothing to Commodore Dovemson I had to fall back on Commender Allison for a change and I emerged From his cabin wearing an anotent pair of (Tey flamnol trousers, dirty white Gym shoos and

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Owing to the shelling of the anchorage at La Panno and the difficulty it might cause later in the day I urged Lord Cort to ombark as soon SD
(ca)
possible, but he would not leave before the time that he had arranged.
1330
Soon after, I moved down to Dunkirk so as to be on the spot when the boats arrived. On the way a terrific air battle took place overhead and 1415-30
1t seemed to go against us. I saw three Spitfires shot down, one went inland over the dunes, still under control, one came down towards the sea at a fairly gentle angle and when only one hundred feot or so up the pilot seemed to be pulled out by his parachute and came down in the sea with his parachute open - the plane went on for quite a way and than flow into the water. The third pilot baled out a good way up and came down a couple of miles away.
An M.T.B. and a. motor boat in sight went off to try and pick them up and the
Captain of the M.T.B. told me later that the pilot they got to W&S shot to pieces and they salved his parachute for identification purposes. I am afraid the other was not found.
I waited anxiously off Dunkirk for the arrival of the boat town and 31/5
while I waited, came a signal from V.A. Dover to say that the Army wanted to start embarkation at 2000 instead of 0100. I replied saying that the boats had not arrived and the sloops would not be there then but that I
would do my best. To anticipate - this had an unfortunate effect, because, as the sloops intended for the beaches could not be there in time I had to keep destroyers, minesweepors and other craft off the beaches which would otherwise have been sent in to Dunkirk during the night. As a result though many were embarked from the beaches very fow ships worrt into Dunkirk where men were already waiting and full use of it was not made.
It was always impossible for me to do more than doal with the situation of the moment. I did not know what ships were coming 02' whon - execut for the pre-arranged plan of the sloops. Nor was 1t possible for Dover to give me much information. Ships got back there, unloaded, and were OST again, the stream W&B constant but irregular and it was not possible to see any way shead. My policy was always to keep only sufficient ships off the beaches and send all the others into Dunkirk, but the situation changed continually. When I was off La Panne I could not watch the other and of the

326
323
" 1.6
line - I wanted to be in several places at once.
31/5
The first of the boat tows was due at 1500 but did not appear till a couple of hours later. I can well remember the first, a tuz with what looked like helf a dozen dinghies in tow. She was proceded by some useful motor yachts which came in company.
I could not wait off Dunkirk as I VAB anxious to get eway up to In
Panno for Lord Gort, so I left Wynne-Edwards in 2. motor yacht to direct the tows as they arrived, and to order a large number 0: hoppers and other craft that were lying off the Western beaches to beach themselves on the rising ride so that men could embark,
The embarkation of Lord Gort produced some odd incidents, As already related I had orranged with Stevenson to bring him off at six o' clock, If the weather was too bed he was to go into Dunkirk and emhark from there.
I had ordered "HEBE" to be off La Panne at that time and was going up there myself in "KNITH." In the meantime Dover had been busy and had sent over four M.T.B.'s and M.A.S.B's to get him. The signal informing me of this, like many others, never reached me. During the afternoon two N.T.B.'s came to me and said that they were to enbark a party from a point two miles west of La Panne. This quite baffled me and I thought that they must have been sent to fetch off some of the Naval lending party, but I realise now that the party concerned was the H.Q. Staff.
31/5
Anyway, shortly before 1800 I was approaching La Panne when "HEBS"
signalled to me "General on beach abreast you," and there I saw a group etc the water's odge with a couple of cara and some signalmen. "XEXST"S"
boats were at once sent in, but to my surprise Lord Gort Y.O.D not in the first boat and I learnt that he was in "HERE" already. Three taxipo were necessary to bring off his staff and a heavy air attack book place while this was going on. One plane tried to bomb the boats and they had a mireculous escape. I saw one bomb burst between than 08 they 1701'0 loading up and the motor boat returned covered in grey mul.
Many air attacks were made at this time on the ships and baschos, and
"HEBE" shot down a Heinkel. There WRB also a great increase in sholl The off Brayo, where the "OLAN MACATI.TSWER" was a valuable docoy. She you 1:20

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and bombed several times and started burning again. I got the impression that these guns were firing blindly into this area, as sholls foll near the
Olan Macallistor" and over her but not among the ships loading which were some way inshore of her. Later, however, these chips did COMO under fire, and "VIVACIOUS" reported she had been hit twice and had eleven casualties, and two or three hundrod troops on board, I ordered her to 80 into Dunkirk and fill up there.
General Lees 172.S the Senior Officer of the H.Q. Staff and I thought it
2
would be a good education for him to see something of what the naval problem was, so I kept him on the bridge with ICC. As Lord Gort was in the "EdEE"
I felt that he WGB safe, and as the "HEBE" was doing good work caberking troops I did not send her back to Dover with him at once. Thorein perhaps
I was wrong, as I had not realized the anxiety of the Government to have him safe and sound at home but had felt he would soonor the ship helped to bring off more men rather than that he should land a few hours carlier in
England.
During the day I made a signal to all ships with instructions for supporting fire against enemy tanks and lorries on the boach. The critical place was likely to be at La Panne after the line was evacuated, and I intended to be there myself in "KETTH" at deybreak the noxt morning. I also kopt
"BASTLISK" free of troops for the same purpose.
The weather improved gradually and at 1700 I was able to signal:-
" Weather off beaches now good. Many more boats should come into use again
Q.B tido rises. General movement of troops westward towards Dunkirk. No petrol supply yet and many basts are getting short off La Panno and Braye,
Movement from Dunkirk continuos. Great air activity."
Actually drifters with petrol arrived not long after at 1815.
31/5
After embarking the Headquarters Staff I returned to Dunkirk to DOG
how the boat situation was getting on. There I found Wynne-Invardo who had been doing good work, and I saw for the first time that strange procession of craft of all kinds that has become Pamous - tuge towing dinghise, lifeboats and all manner of pulling boats - small motor yachts, motor Isunchos, drifters, Dutch scoots, Thames barges, fishing boats, pleasure ateamoro,

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325
- 21 -
31/5
thousands of men were waiting but no boats, messages from ships that thoir beats found no one on the beach. The truth of 1t was, I think, that the
Germans had the range of the lorry breakwator and the beaches nost 1t and they shelled them heavily. Boats went in there and found no one on the troops had moved further west clear of the shell firo. I do not know to this day what really took place there. Off shore one felt helpless, the ships and the boats were there and the troops ashoro and one could do no more.
Aircraft passed close overhead flying down the anchorages and fairway, and "MALCOLM" off Braye reported that a number of parachuto mines had been dropped to westward of there and suggested that ships ought to loavo by the uidcoote
Zudcote
Ruy pass in the morning, as the pasuage to the West WEB no heavily mined.
The noise of M.T.B. engines could often be hobrd to deaward and castward and added to my anxiety, though I thought they might possibly be our own patrol. About 2300 I received an urgent signal from Admiralty asking where
Lord Gort was and why I had detailed the M.T.B.'s sent for him to other work.
As the M.A.S.B. had just returned with Wynne-Edwards, I sent it off at once to "HEBE" to collect Lord Gort. To my horror it came back almost at otice to say that Lord Gort had just left "HEBE" in a motor launch. It was very dork and "НЫВЕ" could not; be seen though we knew where she was and I wellted anxiously for the boat to arrive. Presently out of the dark a boat appeared and como alongside, still not the right one and I had a bad moment thinking of the possibilities of the boat getting lost. However, to my relief, after what appeared about half an hour, the right boat, in charge OF Stevenson once moro, found US at last. Apologizing to Lord Gort for keoping him walting 30 long,
I transferred him to the M.A.S.B. and sent him off to Dovor with Ceneral Iecs.
My experience of the bombing the day before led 100 to request fighter
June, protection at dawn though I had no doubt that this was alroady hoing arrenged.
At 0215 I heard that troops were moving Westward and case to the conclusion that embarkation at La Panne was no longer possible. "MARCOLN" and "HARVISING"
which were off Lo Panne were ordered into Dunkirk in consoquence.
I also made D. signal telling ships to keep close to the buoyo as I hoped that they would thus avoid any minos which had boon Groy od in the channel. At 0235 I made the following signal to V.A. Dover and

331
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- 23 -
1/6
At 0400 it was misty with low clouds and I hailed these conditions with reliof, but unluckily they did not last, Most of the ships were full, Those that were not I sent into Dunkirk for though thore were still many mon on the beaches, and some of the small boats were still there, the majority of small craft had disappeared back to England. Here again I did not realize that they had beon sent over for the night and were making their way back as intended.
At 0625 I reported "Situation report at 0600 1st June. Troops DIC
evacuating gradually to Dunkirk as Eastern beaches are untonable. I an directing all boats and small craft to vicinity and Ideding all ships at Dunkirk.
More ships required. Heavy bombing on Dunkirk and fighter sittacks on ships."
About this time I suddenly saw a Bolgian fishing boat appear on the scone
Zudcote from seaward down the Ruytigon pass. I WOD suspicious 01 hor and ordered
"BASILISK" to investigate, She turned out to be the first of a dozen such beats which shortly after appeared. They were on their way into Dunkirk to assist in the evacuation.
As the mists and clouds dispersed many aircraft appeared on the scone and
X
fighters constantly came low over us. Mot'c often than not they were Spitfires, but owr ships were not taking chances and nearly always opened fire indiscriminately on them. As this kept happening I hoisted 6 Flag "Coase firo,"
and blow the syren to draw attention and try and stop the firing. In spito of this I can remember our own machine gun aft in "KEITH" firting away regardless of the "cease fire" gong; once started firing they could hear nothing.
"KETTH" by this time was running very short of П.А. amminition and had only about 30 rounds left for her H.A. gun. The 4.7's could be used for barrage fire only and had n. limited elevation. I decided in conseguence that
I would shortly transfer my flag to "BASILISK" and and "KEX" into Dunktik to fill L13) and return to Dover. Before I had time to do SO a very heavy bombing attack developed, first of all in and around Dunkink itsolf. I remember someone saying "B destroyer has blown up off Dunkirk" and I looked and DAY D. ship entirely enveloped in smoke just off the entrance. This was the "IVANEROS"
but she did not below use and = couple of hours later I BOW her boing howell back to Dover- In this attack the "HAVAN was also sunk near the entrence.

340
227
as 32 -
outlined against the glow of fires that were still burning somewhere to the
1/6
Westward in Dunkirk, and the steady streem of men passing along it and the shapes of ships alongside vore silhouetted against the glare. Invide the harbour there were numerous small craft passing up to the inner basins and navigation was always exciting. French M.T.B's came in and loaded alongside the West quay where from the boat, the MASSCS of French troops in orderly ranks with their characteristic holmets showed up against the fires beyond. There was the noise of continuous shelling which securd to be concentrated on the beach and to Eastward of the pier, but inside the harbour the crack of bursting sholls sounded very close and I often looked round in the expectation of splashes nearby but saw none. Shells were however falling inside the harbour and about midnight I saw two masts sticking out of the water with the masthood light still burning on ONC. It was a trawler which had just been sunh. There were casualties also in a destroyer alongsido.
2/6
At 0200 as arranged we went up to the shore and of the pior to embark the base party. As we got alongside there was a violont outburst of shelling, which seemed to be very close to us, but the pier gave one = feoling of protection, There were no signs of the party so Wynne-Edwards wont along to the dug-out and headquarters 200 yards away. I vaited on the parapet for his return and watched the solid line of men making their way along the roadway to the pier. By this time they were Frenchmen who load out into the flow of
British troops by a converging route. As a result 5,000 British were held up or did not get off that night " instead a lot of French troops got away from the East pier in addition to those from the West quay.
Wynne-Edwards camo back soon to say the party were on thoir vey and et about 0245 we loft thoo acida dothe party on board.
By this time ins.get 11ght, and as the morning VOD very clear I decided and 100.00 nses 33 6000 0300 instead of 0330 80 had uniginelly been inking 01400 Todo pior, but it was no uso munistres so the rights LITE eau dol ПОРВ goods vecê the pier and herbour, aven
TOYETS OQTIVE 1100 allo one 124 stature SSW99 PAI 1200. $0000 at one of classing
GOODLI ear US 50) domnt PARODAD
AND the state 01 200
Cloustion and his

342
337
- 34
The plan was to use Dunkirk only, except for some French local craft
2/6
which would embark from the beach immodiatoly East of Dunkirk. The omborkation was to start at 2100 and go on till 0300 at which time blockships were to onter the harbour.
I had felt the previous night that more ships could have used the pink had they been available and I had sent additional ships there from off the berches into the harbour. To make full use of the pier this night 2 programme was worked out of personnel ships, destroyers, minemwcepors and sloops coming in at half-hourly intervals to different berths so that three or four ships should be alongside the East Pier continuously. Denny thought this impossible and liable to result in confusion but a scheme was got out which provided a carrying capacity of 37,000 men in addition to those that would get off in the small craft. I also asked for a couple of fast boats to act as runners for me, and two *** I bolieve from the "VERNON" mis were told off.
Besides the large ships there were tugs, scoots, drifters and all noner of small craft going over as well - some of them to lay off and be loaded by smaller boats and others to go right up the harbour past the large ship borths.
There was a large number of wounded in Dunkirk and orders had had to be given that fit men were to be got away in preference, as apart from anything else, embarking wounded would have taken up too much valuable time. In consequence it was decided to try and get some of the wounded away in daytime in
Hospital ships in the hope that the Germans would respect then. Two were accordingly sent over but one was bombed and sunk and the other WAS 80 bedly damaged that she had to return. The wounded, except those who could walk and get down to the pier, had to be left behind.
I went over again in M.A.S.B. 10, accompanied by Senerville and Goodenough and on the way we had A mild bombing attack and also picked up three Bolgian soldiers who had got about half way across in a pulling boat. They 1010 not too pleased at being taken back to Dunkirk but were later docented into 8 deptroyer.
Just outside the harbour we met one of the two fast motor boats in charge of D. Sub-Lieutenant. He told us that he had started over with the other boat but they had both been machine-sunned and the other boat disabled. Commender
Clouston who was in it had told him to go on and leave him. Clouston and his

343
340
- 35 -
2/6
boat wore not soon egain und X had to nend the survivor book on 10 hed only one engine and was too badly damaged to be of use.
We got over about 2030 and went in and picked up Gonoral Aloxander and his staff. I transferred them to a destroyer shortly after, and in her
General Mansergh was later killed by a machino-sun bullet from 0. pl: no then close to Dover. Tennant and the last of his party loft in on M.T.B. as soon as the last of the British troops had gono.
The outer part of the East Fier was not built solid but was of concrete piles through which the Westgoing tide set. This, coupled with a fresh
Eastorly wind, made it very difficult for ships to got alongside until the tido turned about 2300. We used the M.A.S.B. to push one destroyer in and tried to get other small craft to do likewise. By this time the French had come to life and a large number of their small craft of overy sort, size and description filled the narrow harbour. To make matters môre complicated the M.A.S.B.'s clutch went wrong and she could not go astern. Turning in that harbour became most dangerous in consequence as hoats of all sorts boro down on us from both directions.
By 2200, however, in spite of the tide and wind, 1/- destroyers hed got any and the last of the B.E.F. was clear soon after.
Then there was a long pause. The French should have followed OU2* men on the East Pier but they did not appear. I could see crowds of beholmetted figures at the West quay and there seemed a scareity of French ships, 30 I sent two personnel ships in there, One was the "ROYAL SOVERSION" who vas handled magnificently, turning and going alongaide bown out. Another was the "ROUEN,"
Q. French cross-channel steamer. I don't know what happened to her but in gotting away she got broadside on to the wind and grounded just to the Westward of the quay; there she lay showing up clearly against on oil fuel five bohind hor.
The tide was falling and I had visions of her still there in daylight - Sull of men and a sitting target for bombers. I went outside the herbour and cont in a tug to try and help her but the tug drew too much water and could not got near. I also sent a lifeboat to her to try and get the mon away. The men, I
think, were got away, but she remained there until she florted off with the next tide in daylight and then returned in safety.

345
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- 37 -
3/6
had been thought to be the last and thon each day the chigo had been enked for one EOYO offort, By this time many of the Commanding Officers and in were at the limit of their endurance and the Vice Admiral did not Sool to could order ships to go over. Accordingly D. signal was made solding that ships would be ready and able to go, and finally 10 transports, G destroyers,
8 mineswoopers, 4 paddle sweepers, 2 corvottes, 2 yachts, ]. gunboat, 10
drifters, 5 scoots and 1 this were collected. Bosides these there was a large number of small craft and hoats 0.5 before.
For this night the time was cut down by an hour to between 2230 and
0230. The small craft were to go right up to the quays and docks of the innor harbour, the transports, destroyers and 4. paddle sycopers MCIC to use the East Pier and the remainder the West Quay. irvangoments were also made to bring off the Fronch Admiral in MASB.No. 7 as his own M.T.B.S vote soid to bo out of action.
Naval pier and borthing partion for the East Piar under Commender
Buchanan were to go over early in H.M.S. "WHITSHED." I went over in M.S.B.
102, the same that had brought ne away from the "KEITH." This boat had a cruising ongine which was very usoful when we were noving about incide in the confined waters of the harbour, which were crowded with smill creft. On the way we passed other ships who had started carlier, and in the distance they seemed to be having a hot time from an air attack,
I got over tvt 2200 to find the harhour with French fishing craft and vessels of all sorts. They were yelling and crowding alongside the East Pier which was alroady thick with French troops. At one time 11
100ked as if they would get in the way of the Transports and destroyers which were on their way, but I managed to get them to [0 on w the innor herbour and out of the way in time.
"WHITSHED" arrived at 2220, but owing to a fresh Easterly wind and the
Westgoing tide she could not get alongside the pier where there VOD no one who could be persuaded to assist by taking a lina. She was soon followed
"SABRE" and "KINGFISHER." The "KINGPISHER" was sont into the Wont to may got by the others were backing and filling in the narrow harbour buying easter but alongaide and being continually net off. The situation was not made

CASE 3711
31-1
35
28
28a
91Gon
91-7
H.M. SHIPS LOST DURING EVACUATION OF TROOPS FROM
11-2
DUNKIRK (Operation "DYNAMO")
Index(31)
WHS
& as below
28
Vice Admiral A. Bedford appointed to conduct informal enquiries
28a into losses, to learn lessons for general application and to ascertain the behaviour of material etc.
Reports.
List of ships and officers concerned.
X
Special remarks re:-
91Gen
Design Generally
91-7
Watertight Doors.
9147
Steering Gear. Wire Hauser connection of "Crested Eagle"
continued to function after heavy explosions, whereas usual chain and rod connection would probably have been fractured.
Protection of Steering Gear. Stores in after storing C
compartment should be as stowed as not to interfere with steering gear if displaced by explosion etc.
(Also see D.710/41)
31-5
Scuttles for Escape of Personnel. More and larger scuttles necessary. Aluminium scuttle frames too weak to withstand heavy shocks.
Deck Protection. Experiments with Bitumastic and other materials. Excellent resistance of decks of "Westward Ho"
to machine gún bullets.
X
11-2
Older Destroyers
"Whip" af ship excessive, following blow from explosion or near miss. Reference to investigations into possible modification of structures to avoid buckling etc.
11,11-2
Armament of Smaller War Vessels, including Minesweepers.
597a 59-42
2,31-5
Firefighting Equipment in H.M. Ships
X
5-3,19-2
Destruction of C.B's in Emergency. Particular reference to smaller vessels operating in shallow waters.
Various incendiary etc. proposals.
Skipper MacLean of H.M. S. Nautilus praised by Vice Admiral
Bedford for special action taken to destroy confidential publications.
11-2
Destroyers lost at Dunkirk.
11
Minor War Vessels lost at Dunkirk.
59 7.00
Behaviour of material. Special reports by Vice Admiral Bedford,
91Gen x
with remarks by Controller's Departments etc.
9
Motor Boat, property of Lt. Tattersall, lost with H.M. Waverley,
Reference to claim for compensation
1940

N.L.
9553
55
D-51.
(Revised-June, 1933
1940
CONFIDENTI,
FROM WHOM
DATE
RNO Weymouth
6/5 AB/40
16. 8- 40
MARKINGS TO BOARD.
SUBJECT.
Confidential
53
9552
|940ffice of the Resident
Naval Officer,
WEYMOUTH.
No.7/6.AB/40.
16th August, 1940.
Report of Enquiry into the loss of
H.M. Paddlesweeper "Waverley" in
SAUG 1940
operation "Dynamo".
MILITARY MILIT ARY BRANCH
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty Letter NL. 6245/40 dated
1st August, 1940, be pleased to submit to their Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry held by me into the circumstances attending the loss of H.M. Paddle
Minesweeper "Waverley" on 29th May, 1940.
2. Temp. Lieutenant F.P. Tattersall R.N.V.R., the 1st
Lieutenant of "Waverley" was examined on 16th August, 1940, and I elicited facts as follows:-
3. Whilst underway at about 1400 with some 750 troops on board the ship was bombed and a near miss - about 30 feet from the ship - - put W/T and lights out of action and also rendered one boat useless.
4. Two further bombs which fell on and through the
Sweeping deck aft flooded the steering compartment and put steering gear out of action. The after bulkhead of the
Saloon compartment held for some 20 minutes. The pressure of water then proved too great and this bulkhead gave and the consequent flooding of the Saloon compartment caused the ship to sink by the stern almost at once.
5. The damage sustained was such that a vessel of this type could not be expected to remain afloat. The behavior of material was normal and there is nothing in these circumstances to be learnt from the loss of this ship.
6. I would like to place on record that as "Waverley" was the ship of the Senior Officer of the group and carried the medical officer, Lieutenant Tattersall had his private 18 ft.
motor boat on board. This boat, in addition to its general

N.L.
9553
55
D-51.
(Revised-June, 1933
1940
CONFIDENTI
FROM WHOM
DATE
RNO Weymouth
6/5 AB/40
16. 8. 40
MARKINGS TO BOARD.
SUBJECT.
54
N.L.
9552
H.M. Paddlesweeper
-2-
1940
"Waverley"
Report of Enguiry (Continued)
usefulness in conveying the M. 150 other vessels, proved of considerable value in saving many lives after the ship sank.
I understand that Lieut. Tattersall has preferred a claim for compensation for the boat which was not picked up by the drifter which rescued the men who were in it.
7. S.P.s and C.B.s, except those in one "holed" chest which was thrown overboard, went down with the ship in about 15
fathoms. No trace of the ship remained.
8. In view of my remarks in Para.2 above, I do not consider that anything is to be gained by examining Temp.Lieut. S.F.
Harmer-Elliott, R.N.V.R. who was in command of "Waverley".
9. I was assisted in my enquiry by Commander S.M. Walker R.N.
(H.M.S. Boscawen) and Engineer Lieutenant A. Henderson R.N.R.
(H.M.S. Mercury).
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant, aBeatorg
Vice-Admiral.
The Secretary of the Admiralty,
The Admiralty, S.W.1.

Reference
No mention is made in the Admiralty Dover's Report concerning the part played by the "ST. SEIRIOL" a small passenger steamer belonging to the Liverpool and North
Wales Steamship Co. Ltd.
The Minister of Shipping, in his broadcast about the
Dunkirk evacuation, specially mentioned the Chief Officer of this vessel who made two trips in the "ST. SEIRIOL" to
Dunkirk and spent the whole of one night in a Lifeboat picking up survivors from another ship which had been sunk. He and his boat's crew rescued 150 men. In consequence of his efforts he became partially paralyzed in the legs and could take no further action in the evacuation.
His action was outstanding and calls for some recognitior
It is suggested he should be decorated.
The Officers full name and address is:-
Joseph McNamee,
155, Islington,
Liverpool.
Almin
23rd July, 1940.
1s.
Wt14698/963
If JK filmy Troy- 100 no action
5/39 JC&SLtd.
Seems To have been Taken
644/230
IMITE)
BMD.

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
Page 4.
(a) Shore Artillery. At the commencement of the operation, the southern Route Z was found to be under gunfire from batteries near Calais, and consequently could only be used by night. The northern Route Y was usable only by night when later the batteries near Nieuport brought fire to bear on the Zuydecoote Pass, which was too narrow to permit a reasonable chance of ships running the gauntlet of fire. By this time, however,
Route X was available, and was free of gunfire until
German batteries near Gravelines brought its exit into the Dunkirk Roads under gunfire. This occurred in the afternoon on Saturday, 1st June, and in conjunction with the result of enemy air attack, led to the suspension of daylight traffic altogether.
(e) Submarines. U-boats do not appear to have caused any casualties. It is unlikely that the one thought to be present penetrated further than the northern Route Y.
It may well be that this U-boat laid moored mines, which are thought to have caused the loss of two A/S trawlers.
8.
AIR CO-OPERATION.
The system of co-operation between the Naval and
R.A.F. Commands does not permit of direct contact with the
R.A.F. operational units allocated for duty with the Naval
Command. For this reason much time appears to be lost and the needs of the ever-changing situation may not be provided for. Delays and lag occur, resulting often in the R.A.F. effort being brought to bear either in the wrong place or at the wrong time, or with inadequate force to meet the current situation. The requirement is for the Naval Commander in charge of an operation to be able to convey his requirements direct to the R.A.F. Commander of the R.A.F. Operational Units, and for this latter officer to communicate direct to the Naval Commander the steps that he is taking to meet the stated requirement.
It is unnecessary to stress the vital necessity for effective air co-operation in an operation of this nature. Not only did unopposed German air effort interrupt and reduce seaborne traffic, but it also prevented embarkation by suspending troop movement. To both Naval and Military observers on the coast, the situation at times was extremely disheartening. Rightly or wrongly, full air protection was expected, but instead, for hours on end the ships offshore were subjected to a murderous hail of bombs and machine gun bullets.
Required by their duty to remain offshore waiting for the troops, who themselves were unable to move down to the water for the same reason, it required the greatest determination and sense of duty, amounting in fact to heroism, on the part of the ships' and boats' crews, to enable them to complete their mission.
In their reports, the Commanding Officers of many ships, while giving credit to the R.A.F. personnel for gallantry in such combats as were observed from the ships, at the same time express their sense of disappointment and surprise at the seemingly puny efforts made to provide air protection during the height of this operation.
In this connection, as one Commanding Officer remarks, the formations of our own fighters when operating over the area were so outnumbered by enemy aircraft that it was no surprise to the observer to note that more British machines were shot down than were enemy, and feelings of disgust were engendered on listening in to the B.B.C. of/ report

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on Operati on "DYNAMO".
Page 6.
fighting formations were encountered. French troops handled were either demoralised and had to be controlled by force or by the use of fire-arms, or were so rigidly bound by discipline and tradition that they would not embark except by complete formation under their own unit officers. In either case, the rate of embarkation was much slower than with British troops.
12. INITIATIVE SHOWN BY COMMANDING OFFICERS AND
SUBORDINATE PERSONNEL.
A most satisfactory feature of the operation was the high degree of initiative shown by Commanding and
Subordinate Officers of units operating off the coast, ranging from H.M. Destroyers to comandeered motor boats. The majority of officers and ratings in command were in situations requiring independent action in extrenely difficult conditions. Often the easiest course was to be satisfied with work already achieved and to return to the United
Kingdom with a final load of troops. The reverse action was invariably executed, namely, continued operation off the coast as long as there were both troops ashore to be evacuated and vessels off shore to receive them. If the craft in use was damaged or sunk the crew invariably seized some other boat to continue their efforts.
Unaware of the military situation ashore and often forced to move westward by bombardment from German artillery or even by rifle fire from advancing German forces, the majority of these boats, commanded often by stokers or hostility only seamen, had only one object in view, to lift from the beach any, and all troops, British or Allied, within sight of the water's edge.
On their return to the United Kingdom when asked to report their proceedings it was only in answer to direct enquiry that it would transpire that these young men had been subjected, in many cases, to an unparalleled bombardment from the air. They appeared to consider that this was part of the day's work requiring no comment.
13. LOSSES OF TROOPS AFTER EMBARKATION.
It is a distressing fact that many ships were sunk or damaged on the return voyage when laden with troops. It is fortunate that in most of such cases the majority of such troops were saved owing to the large volume of traffic that was coming and going between Dunkirk and the United Kingdom.
Exceptions to this were due to the rapidity with which certain ships sank after having been bombed or torpedoed. Such cases are as follows:-
WAKEFUL torpedoed. Ship broke in half and only those on the upper deck were saved. About 600 troops were below.
CRESTED EAGLE. Was bombed and then beached in a burning condition. Only about 300 saved out of 600 on board.
SKIPJACK. 250 - 300 troops on board, most of whom, unfortunately, went down with the ship when she sank.
WAVERLEY/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 2.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Monday, 27th May, 1940. (continued)
embarkation from beaches in the La Panne-Dunkirk area, as such matters as crews, fuel and general organisation were taken in hand. Five Personnel Vessels routed to start in daylight completed the round trip during the 27th and lifted a total of 3952. In addition 17 drifters of the Dover Command sailed from Dover for the Malc beach, and during the night lifted 2000 troops from the beach by ships' dinghies. During the day destroyer patrols had been established to the Northward to cover the passage of merchant ships between Dunkirk and the Downs, and the Admiralty asked Western Approaches to reinforce the Dover destroyers.
6.
Commander-in-Chief, Nore, sailed 6 small skoots for the South Downs to CO operate in Dunkirk, and sailed 4 skoots loaded with Army stores direct to Dunkirk, In the evening
Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate, was asked to take over the fuelling and despatching of all small power boats with the attendant pulling boats forming the inshore flotilla. Some unnecessary delays occurred at this stage as the majority of the Naval Authorities and the Admiralty were directing the small craft for Dunkirk to be routed to Dover, although the
Vice Admiral, Dover, had asked for the Downs to be their destination. Once despatched by the Authorities no communication with these vessels was possible until they arrived at their destination, and so the requirements of assembling these craft at the Downs or Ramsgate was in many cases delayed by as much as 24 hours or more since during the night misfortune befell many tows that came adrift due to moderate weather or collisions and the business of rounding them up could not be effected until daylight,
7. The Vice Admiral had intended to maintain a destroyer at Dunkirk as a W/T link, but the S.N.O., on arrival, decided that conditions at Dunkirk made this impossible.
8. At 2025 the Vice Admiral, Dover, received a Most
Immediate message from the S.N.O., Dunkirk, who had just reached his station, as follows: "Port consistently bombed all day, and on fire. Embarkation possible only from beaches
East of harbour A.B.C.D. Send all ships and passenger ships there to anchor. Am ordering WOLFHOUND to load there and sail.
T.O.O. 2005/27". Me while Vice Admiral, Dover, had asked the Commender-in Chier, Nore, to send every available shallow draught power boat, capable of ferrying from beaches to ships lying off the beaches Eastward of Dunkirk, stocked with fuel and provisions for two days; this move being made with a view to saving time by cutting out the passage to, and subsequent reorganisation, at Ramsgate, prior to proceeding to the French Coast. It should be noted at this time
(2000/27) there were no pulling boats, cutters or whalers immediately available for attendance on Power Boats. A
further signal: "Please send every available craft to beaches
East of Dunkirk immediately. Evacuation tomorrow night is problematical. 1958/27" was received from S.N.O., Dunkirk.
Later that evening a roport was received from
2/:

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 6.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Tuesday, 28th May. (continued)
beach with the object of embarking that force as soon as possible.
19. As regards enemy activity, this day the Germans contented themselves with bombing the town and port of Dunkirk, but on a small scale compared with that to be experienced later, the fact that a heavy pall of smoke from the burning town probably because of incroasing R.A.F. air cover and also due to covered the operation most of the day.
20. Losses to H.M. Ships - 28th May.
A/S Trawler THURINGIA sunk by mine in position 51° 20' N,
2° 03' E. Four survivors.
Flare-burning Drifters PAXTON and BOY ROY damaged by enemy aircraft and beached. No casualties.
Destroyer WINDSOR. Bombed about 1100. Damage to hull and aerials. Various casualties.
Minesweeper BRIGHTON BELLE. Sunk in collision.
LL Trawler THOMAS BARTLETT sunk by mine in shallow water whilst trying to avoid gunfire in position 51 2 12 N, 54 E.
Personnel Vessel QUEEN OF THE CHANNEL sunk by bombing attack.
Wednesday, 29th May.
21. The Northern Route Y having been swept, it was arranged to sail personnel ships to Dunkirk at daylight and to continue to sail throughout the day; this route would take ships clear of the artillery fire on shore. Personnel ships accordingly started at 0230.
22. Much consideration had been given to the practicability of building piers on the beaches using lines of berges. Reports from ships that worked off the beaches showed, however, that owing to the very gradual shoaling of the water at all states of the tide such a barge pier, to be effective, would have to be of very great length, beyond the resources available.
23. Information was received that the Personnel Vessels with their Mercantile Marine crews were having difficulty in making the entrance to Dunkirk harbour in the face of the navigational difficulties caused by a heavy smoke pall over the entrance and in face of bombing and shelling encountered en route and whilst alongside. In certain vessels the crews were unwilling to sail when ordered, consequently application was made to the Commander-in-Chief, Nore, for Naval Officers and ratings for duty in the Personnel Ships. Nevertheless, it subsequently transpired that at Dunkirk there had been a good number of ships throughout the night, at times exceeding the influx of troops.
24. S.N.O., Dunkirk, and other Senior Officers on the
Coast reported during the early hours that surf on the beaches was retarding boat work. S.N.O., Dunkirk, at 0709, asked for all ships to go to Dunkirk. The Vice Admiral could not accept this as it was essential to maintain lifts off the beaches as well/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 9.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Wednesday, 29th May (continued).
route provided the passage between Calais Bell Buoy and
Dunkirk be made in darkness.
Route X passed some 26 miles to the South-westward of the extreme N.E. point of the Northern Route Y, the locality in which enemy M.T.B. attack threatened, and was shielded by the
French minefields in the Ruytingen and Dyck channels. It appears that the enemy M.T.B. command failed to appreciate the withdrawal of traffic to the S.W. and did not follow up.
In the evening it was reported that there was no congestion anywhere on the coast, except at La Panne. The force at La
Panne was accordingly reinforced as ships became available.
30. An additional beach party of 7 officers and a number of ratings under Captain J. Howson was sailed in SABRE at
1600 for Dunkirk, and Captain E. Bush, who had already visited
Dunkirk and was aware of the general conditions, was sent to
HEBE as S.N.O. afloat off the beaches. An M.T.B. was placed at the disposal of the S.N.O. on the coast.
31. At about 1600 a heavy air attack commenced on the
East Mole Pier, Dunkirk harbour, mainly by dive bombing, which lasted continuously for more than 2 hours. At the same time, other air attacks took place on ships lying off Bray,
Attacks were renewed from time to time up till after 2000, nt only on Dunkirk, but on ships off Bray, in the Zuydecoote
Pass and those in the Southern end or X Route. These attacks vere to have a disastrous result on the evacuation arrangements at Dunkirk. There were present alongside the inner side of the Eastern Arm 2 destroyers GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 Trawlers head of the GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 more trawlers ahead of them vith the CANTERBURY in the next berth, and a French destroyer head of the CANTERBURY. Outside the harbour on the outside of
;he Eastern Arm the Transport FENELLA was berthed opposite the
RENADE and JAGUAR and the CRESTED EAGLE opposite the 6 trawlers.
in addition, the MALCOLM and VERITY were also in the harbour ut further inside. This presented a very good target and the hips were soon hit and embarkation of troops ceased for the ime being. CANTERBURY, accompanied by JAGUAR, succeeded in eaving harbour, but both were hit by bombs and damaged. Both succeeded in reaching Dover, though JAGUAR had to be towed art of the way and was subjected to many attacks on passage.
ANTERBURY reached harbour at 2115 and disembarked 1950 troops ut was sufficiently damaged to prevent her being used again n these operations. To return to Dunkirk - FENELLA was lying longside on the outside of the pier, and was hit and sunk.
RENADE and one of the trawlers on the East side were hit and he trawler sank in the fairway. GRENADE sinking and on fire ad to be abandoned and appeared to be about to sink in the airway. A trawler was detailed to tow her clear. VERITY, no witnessed this occurrence was continuously straddled by ombs for 35 minutes. Passage all along the pier having eased, she cast off, and skirting the burning GRENADE and rawler, proceeded out of harbour, grounding slightly on a ink drifter in the entrance. At about 1800 KING ORRY arrived o find the harbour occupied only by burning and sinking ships, th no sign of any one on the pier nor any boat moving in the harbour/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 13.
Operation "DYNAMO"
Narrative of Events.
Thursday, 30th May.
40. As an example of the difficulty of any one man appreciating the situation at Dunkirk and the beaches during the night, at 0030/30 the S.N.O. on the French Coast reported that he had no destroyers. In fact, at that time, all available destroyers, namely 10, in the Dover Command, were either on, or on passage to or from, the coast, and the remaining 5 were at Dover discharging troops, embarking ammunitition, fuelling, etc. and were to sail within the next
+ hours.
Simultaneously the V.C.I.G.S. reported that the beaches were well organised, the troops in good heart, and there had been no bombing since dark, but that there was still a great shortage of small craft - urgently required. This last fact was well known to the Vice Admiral, Dover.
41. Commander-in-Chief, Nore, was requested to send as nuch grass hawser as possible to Ramsgate, as quickly as ossible, for supplying the skoots, to haul boats off the beaches, thus speeding up the boat work to compensate for the hortage of boats, which would continue for at least another
14 hours.
42. At 0500 the 7 modern destroyers remaining with Vice dmiral, Dover - ICARUS, IMPULSIVE, INTREPID, IVANHOE, HAR-
ESTER, HAVANT and JAVELIN - sailed to Sheerness in accordance ith Admiralty instructions. The MONTROSE and MACKAY sailed
'or repairs.
43. Meantime the Vice Admiral, Dover, had been much xercised regarding the possibility of the continued use of unkirk harbour for personnel vessels and was anxiously waiting the report from VANQUISHER, who had been sent to nvestigate the reported obstruction. VANQUISHER'S report as received at 0610 stating entrance was practicable but that bstruction exists towards outer inside end of the EASTERN ARM.
ending amplifying reports, the sailing of personnel vessels o Dunkirk was resumed, although at this time there were still personnel vessels presumed to be in the vicinity of Dunkirk arbour, whose movements and whereabouts throughout the night till remained obscure.
The Vice Admiral asked R.A. Dover, who was in HEBE, hether personnel ships could, in fact, still use Dunkirk. In he meantime a series of signals from Rear Admiral Dover, and estroyers off the coast, were received, stating that the eaches were filling up rapidly and more ships and boats were rgently required there. Although it was known that the estroyers could use Dunkirk, it appeared at this time that the est division of transport was to send the great majority of estroyers to the beaches, where urgent demands could not be gnored, and the personnel vessels to Dunkirk Harbour, only an ccasional destroyer being sent to Dunkirk from the reduced umber now available for the operation.
44/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 14.
peration "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
'hursday, 30th May. (Continued).
44. At Dunkirk there were no air attacks in the early orning and all was quict. Later, when ships began to arrive n quantity, in view of the massive target presented by a umber of ships alongside the East pier at C. time, the S.N.O.,
Dunkirk ordered destroyers alongside only one at a time. At bout 0800 a store ship arrived at Dunkirk with provisions but
10 water. This caused so much congestion on the pier that inloading was abandoned when half complete, and the store ship filled with troops. A certain amount of water was obtained from destroyers.
45. During the forenoon the Military constructed a long pier of lorries with deck planking, into the sea off Bray. This vas an excellent piece of work, but was insufficiently stable for use by such craft as paddle steamers, nor even smaller power craft in a lop. It was invaluable later for embarking troops into small boats. As regards general embarkation off the beaches, it was later learnt that it was c common occurrence for processions of small boats loaded with troops to be cast adrift when empty and allowed to float away to seaward, owing to the lack of sufficient naval ratings as boat-keepers. For the same reason many of the smaller pulling boats were swamped and sunk due to overloading by uncontrolled "rush" of soldiers.
Both these faults were remedied later.
46. Matters proceeded smoothly throughout the day owing to the mist and there being a big smoke cloud over Dunkirk which prevented the enemy bombers attacking the ships in large numbers.
In order to increase the rate of embarkation through the bottle-neck of the East Pier gangway, the troops were urged to quicken their pace and eventually thousands of troops, tired and without food and water for days, broke into the double and kept it up the whole length of the pier for more than two hours.
47. The attempt to maintain an adequate rate of lift using only the older destroyers was by now shown to be impracticable. The destroyers were lifting about 17,000, personnel vessels about 9500 in the 24 hours. Remaining vessels were estimated to be worth about 15,000 per day. This gave a total lift of about 43,000 per day. The situation called for & lift of at least 55,000 per day. Verbal representations being made to C.N.S., authority was received for the return to the Dover Command of the modern destroyers released the ight before.
Accordingly Commander-in-Chief, Nore, at 1531 gave orders to HARVESTER, HAVANT, IVANHOE, IMPULSIVE, ICARUS and
INTREPID to proceed at once to Dunkirk. Subsequently some of these destroyers were diverted to the beaches.
48/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 18.
Operation "DYNAMO". Narrative of Events.
Friday, 31st May (Continued).
Goodwins and commenced to hunt.
55. The arrivals at the home ports indicated that in spite of the frequent requests for more ships and more boats received from the various authorities on the French coast, the rate of evacuation was steadily increasing and would permit, all being well, of implementing the final evacuation plan during the night 31/5 - 1/6. Accordingly, instructions were issued for the special tows to leave Ramsgate at 1300/31 for
Dunkirk via Route X, and Commander-in-Chief, Nore, and Flag
Officer-in-Charge, Harwich, were requested to provide all available M.T.B.'s to escort this convoy for as much of the outward passage as possible, which was timed to commence from
Ramsgate at 1300/31. Speed of advance - 5 knots. A party of Naval officers had been assembled at Dover to embark in these tows and had been given detailed instructions on the plan. Two M.A./S boats and 2 M.T.B.'s in the Dover Command were ordered to accompany the boat convoy and subsequently embark the Commander-in-Chief, B.E.F. and Staff off the beaches.
56. Shortly after sunrise an on-shore wind arose and boat work became difficult, many whalers capsizing, and the prospects of completing the evacuation to plan began to be less favourable. The following extract from the report of
Captain Howson, S.N.O., on the beaches illustrates conditions at Bray at this time:
"At 0400 there was a very considerable number of destroyers, paddlers, trawlers, skoots, etc, off Bray, and embarkation was proceeding satisfactorily, but a lop had already started. There were about 10 motor yachts which had arrived from England. These craft drew 6-7
feet and were unable to get close in to any of the beaches. During the forenoon, considerable towing of empty craft towards the beach was carried out, and only about 2 boats were allowed to get adrift and ultimately ground. With the falling tide, however, a number of boats were seen to ground and remain ashore until the tide rose in the afternoon. These included an A.L.C., motor boat and a lifeboat. Other power boats broke down. Nevertheless, the embarkation, much hindered by the lop, proceeded satisfactorily. As further destroyers and sloops arrived, they were directed to lower their motor boats and whalers as this had not already been done, began to subside and with the rising tide conditions for these boats were quite invaluable. About noon, the lop embarkation very greatly improved, more boats were sent in and more boats floated off and matters were proceeding very well, when the gun at La Panne started to shell the beaches and fore hore with great accuracy. A certain number of light craft were sunk. The A.L.C. broke down and was towed away by a steamer. MOSQUITO, destroyers and sloops proceeded westward clear of the firing.
57/

Page 20.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Friday, 31st May (continued).
effective quantities direct from the beaches, and to use the special tows, ships lifeboats, power lifeboats and ear-marked tugs, which were on passage from Ramsgate, and which had been for lifting the final covering force.
In the afternoon, however, it was learned that the
Military plan had been changed, and that it was no longer possible for the original covering position, as planned, to be held by 4,000 troops who were then to withdraw to the beaches for embarkation by boat. Instead, it was learned that the
Eastern-most Division was to be withdrawn Westward from the
La Panne area, and that the special flight of boats was to be used to lift this force from the beaches. At the same time, the troops in the Bray and Malo sectors were boing thinned out by movements Westward towards Dunkirk itself. This change of plan involved concentrating the special tows and the minesweepers - to which they were to transfer the troops - into the stretch opposite the beach between Bray and one mile East of La Panne, and also advancing the commencement of the operation by one hour. The risk of this change of plan was obvious as the boat tows were not in communication with the
Vice Admiral, and reliance had to be placed on the Minesweepers to inform and see that the escorting M.A.S.B.'s would shepherd the tows to the new positions. The minesweepers had anchored so as to serve as guiding marks, as had been explained to the
Naval Officers in each tow.
Apart from the special tow, a very large number of small power boats despatched, in most cases direct, from the
South East Ports, Newhaven to Sheerness, were arriving off the beaches, and compensated in a large measure for the heavy losses that had occurred amongst the original towing boats, whalers, outters, lifeboats and ships' boats, which had occurred on the beaches during the preceding 3 days.
On the La Panne beaches after 1600 very good progress was made. The piers of pontoons built by the Military the previous day were extremely useful, and were largely responsible for the rapid evacuation of troops. All the troops that could be found were embarked by midnight and ferried off to the ships. The local Beach-master (Captain R. Pim, R.N.V.R.)
searched the adjacent beaches for stragglers at midnight, and was informed by a Starf Officer that no more troops would embark from the La Panne beaches, but would march to Dunkirk, as it was anticipated that these beaches would be shelled and probably be in German hands the following day. This, as it turned out, was a correct forecast. The Beach-master estimates that 5,000 men were lifted from the La Panne beaches during the evening and up to midnight.
62. At 1920 all ships in the fleets were informed by the Vice Admiral that the final evacuation of the B.E.F. was expedted on the night lst/2nd June, and that the evacuation of the French from Dunkirk and Malo beach would continue from
1st June by both British and French ships.
63/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 25
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Saturday, 1st June (continued).
proportion 50 per cent. British and 50 per cent. French. The plan was set in motion without incident until 2200, when it was reported that a number of towing craft and small boats were returning empty from the coast. All ships were warned to look out for these, and to force them back to their duty on the coast.
Subsequent investigation gives reason to believe that this defection was due to false information being passed between ships on the coast and believed to originate from a non-identified skoot.
77. Commander Maund proceeded to the mouth of the harbour in a motor boat commanded by a Dutch Naval Officer with a
Dutch naval crew and led all ships into harbour to their berths.
The Rear Admiral, Dover, was also afloat in a M.T.B. supervising traffic control.
By 2300 the night was very dark, sometimes as many as
6 or 7 vessels were entering the port of Dunkirk at once whilst yet others were leaving. All were without lights and displayed the highest degree of seamanship in these difficult and fateful circumstanoes.
78. At 2315 the S.N.O., Dunkirk, signalled: "Withdrawal now proceeding according to plan. Shall have certain reserves here tomorrow to assist French. Intend to complete evacuation tomorrow by midnight."
Remarks.
78A. The outstanding feature of the day was the series of events leading to the abandonment of daylight evacuation.
Increasing enemy air attack, which the R.A.F. were unable to K
smother with the means at their disposal, caused serious loss of ships, and continual interruption of embarkation on the beaches and in Dunkirk. Further, the sole remaining cross channel route was now under fairly heavy and accurate shore artillery fire.
In these circumstances it was apparent that continuation of the operation by day must cause losses of ships and personnel out of all proportion to the number of troops evacuated, and if persisted in, the momentum of evacuation would automatically and rapidly decrease.
79. Casualties to H.M. Ships on 1st June.
Trawler ARGYLLSHIRE sunk by torpedo from M.T.B. near
S. Buoy. Survivors taken off by MALABAR.
Trawler STELLA DORADO sunk by torpedo from M.T.B.
Survivors picked up by KINGSTON GALENA.
Minesweeper SALAMANDER attacked by enemy aircraft and hit at about 0850. Ship disabled but was able to return to
Dover under her own steam.
Personnel/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 28
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Sunday, 2nd June (continued).
daylight hours enabled all transport resources to accumulate during the day and to be held available for a massed descent upon Dunkirk Harbour during the night. By making provision for increased pier and berthing parties and traffic controlled by motor boat in the harbour channels, it was hoped to berth all craft that were available between the hours of 2100/
2 and 0300/3.
The times of sailing of all vessels were adjusted so as to space them out over the evacuation period at Dunkirk, and allowance was made for a proportion failing to make the passage.
The French agreed to make their own arrangements for embarkation from the Dunkirk East Beach and the West Pier on the new outer harbour.
At 1530 two R.A.F. Motor Boats, 243 and 270, left in company for Dunkirk carrying Commander J.C. Clouston and an augmented pier party. When off Gravelines attacks were made on the boats by eight Junkers 87 with machine guns and small bombs. No. 243 had a near miss which damaged her. For ten minutes No.270 rried on trying to avoid attacks. She then returned to No.243 but Commander Clouston who was in the water instructed 270 to proceed. Destroyers were instructed to look for survivors. Two were picked up only. One stated that he saw Commander Clouston dead in the water.
84. At 1030 an urgent request transmitted "en clair"
was received from Dunkirk for Hospital Ships as follows:-
"Wounded situation acute and Hospital Ships should enter during day. Geneva Convention will be honourably observed it is felt and that the enemy will refrain from attacking."
As this appeared to be the only way of evacuating the wounded, observing that the whole facilities of the port during the night evacuation hours would be required for fighting troops, it was decided to send two Hospital Ships. The WORTHING
sailed at 1300 and the PARIS at 1700. At 1440, the A/S Patrol was overheard on R/T reporting that the WORTHING was being bombed at a point about two-thirds of the way across the
Channel. She returned to United Kingdom reporting that she had been attacked by 12 Junkers. The attack caused no casualties, but plates were started and there was some superficial damage. She had to return to harbour to refuel before commencing another trip to Dunkirk.
At 1915 PARIS reported that she was bombed and badly damaged with engines useless, at the point where the WORTHING
had been attacked, and at 1947 she sent out an S.O.S. Tugs were sent to her assistance.
Thus the last attempt to evacuate the wounded by
Hospital Carrier from Dunkirk was brought to nought.
The PARIS subsequently sank shortly after midnight at W. buoy 10 miles off the French coast.
85./

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 32.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 31
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Monday, 3rd June (continued).
93. In the evening the Vice Admiral was informed by the
B.N.L.O. Marceau that it was estimated 30,000 French remained and that the French Admiralty agree that evacuation should be terminated that night if possible. Force used was to consist of 9 Personnel Vessels with one in reserve, 9 Destroyers is
(maximum number available), 4 Paddle Minesweepers, 7 Fleet
Minesweepers, 9 Drifters, LOCUST, 2 Corvettes, 4 French
Destroyers and a number of organised motor boat flotillas including lifeboats from Ramsgate and Dover, together with a large number of French and Belgian fishing vessels. The lifting capacity of this force, if used to the full, was more than 30,000, but it was certain that the facilities within
Dunkirk could not permit more than about 25,000 to be embarked in the time available, and this number only if the French troops moved with the greatest rapidity at all points of embarkation. This point was impressed upon the French Liaison
Officers and a number of French officers and ratings added to the augmented pier parties which were despatched to Dunkirk at 2200 in advance of the evacuation force.
94. The movements commenced according to plan. The weather conditions at Dunkirk, although favourable as regards tide were adverse with a north easterly wind tending to blow
S,
Personnel Vessels and Destroyers off the vital East Pier making berthing difficult. The MANXMAN, the seventh Personnel Ship due to sail refused to sail, and her place was taken by the
ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
Tuesday, 4th June.
95. At midnight when the earlier vessels had commenced the return voyage fog was reported in mid-channel and off the r
Thanet coast and a number of ships had to anchor before entering harbour. The EXPRESS and SHIKARI were the last ships to leave Dunkirk at 0318 and 0340 and carried approximately
1,000 troops and the British pier parties. Except for an air attack on SHIKARI this final passage was made without interruption by the enemy and though the fog made navigation extremely difficult it undoubtedly served to shield the Armadas from enemy aircraft.
I
96. When the count was taken later in the day it was ascertained that 27,000 troops had been evacuated as a result of the night's operation and Admiral Nord agreed that the operation should be considered as completed, observing that all anmunition at Dunkirk had been expended and that the numbers left behind were small consisting principally of noncombatant troops. This decision was agreed to by the French
Admiralty at 1100, and the operation Dynamo terminated by
Admiralty Message 1423/4.
97. It was realised that in all probability there might be a number of open boats, barges, etc. drifting about in the channel with troops on board. It was accordingly decided to have val

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 340
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued), boats which never left the estuary and only one of their crews had been further afield than Ramsgate before. In spite of this fact perfect formation was maintained throughout the day and night under the control of a Sub-Lieutenant, R.N.V.R.
in command of the Unit and all orders were carried out with great diligence even under actual shell fire and aircraft attack.
103. The difficulties of passage from the United
Kingdom to the Flanders coast were great. With compasses of doubtful accuracy and no navigational instruments other than a lead pencil, once a boat lost contact with a main convoy the chances of making a correct landfall in the strong currents of the straits were slight. Many of the small craft had not even a compass, yet all who left the Flanders coast in safety managed to reach the English coast to refuel and the majority set off again to repeat the adventure.
Cases occurred, however, of boats attempting to enter Calais instead of Dunkirk, where they received a rousing reception from the Boche, and yet another case where the landfall was made between Gravelines and Calais and the Sub-Lieutenant in command landed, findi it necessary to shoot 2 German soldiers before leaving for his proper destination of Dunkirk.
Open boats of all kinds, from the naval cutters and whalers to seaside dinghies, were towed over from
England by the motor boats themselves or in special tows by tugs. Some of these pulling boats were manned by odd naval ratings as boat keepers, and others by soldiers off the beach.
One of the principal difficulties was to avoid fouling the motor boats' screws with painters and lines attached to all these pulling boats. Carley floats and inflated motor inner tubes also played their part in carrying men from the beach to the motor boats,
104. Having reached the coast the business of ferrying from the water line to the offshore craft was by no means easy. Apart from the surf, which was usually experienced for some hours every day, derelict lorries, which had been abandoned below the high tide mark, proved a serious danger to boats. Another source of much trouble close inshore was the large amount of floating grass rope which various craft had used and lost in their rescue work, and numerous articles of military equipment such as great coads jettisoned during the evacuation. A great number of small power boats were put temporarily out of action by such ropes and garments fouling the screws, usually resulting in broaching to and being swamped while they were thus unmanageable.
The number of soldiers taken off the beaches by motor boats cannot be estimated, One 35 ft. motor launch, however, ferried off 600 men to transports and carried 420
direct to England.
105. of the pulling boats used, the main difficulty was insufficient provision made for Naval boat keepers to take charge of the outgoing boats and bring them back to the disembarkation points. As a result, the soldiers detailed to act as boat keepers for an outward trip, failed to return the boat on the inward trip and it was necessary for the
Naval boat keepers to swim or to wade out to the drifting boats/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 35,
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
Inshore Flotillasand Naval Shore Parties (continued)
boats which had been cast away by the soldiers on disembarkation.
106. By the night of the 30th/31st a considerable number of collapsible boats and pontoons had been received from the Royal Engineers of the B.E.F. These were of great assistance and paddled off about 10 men in each trip, but again, in spite of all efforts, in the vast majority of cases, the soldiers left these craft when they arrived at the offshore ship.
107. Much of the most meritorious work of lifting off the beaches was done by the offshore warships' own boats, who were tireless in their efforts. All small pulling boats and small power boats were lowered and were lent from ship to ship when their own parent ship left the coast to unload at a United Kingdom port. In addition, H.M. ships seized drifting and abandoned boats as opportunity offered and manned them up with boat keepers. Owing to the physical exhaustion of these boats' crews after hours of work, relief crews of stokers were frequently provided from amongst the many volunteers that came forth.
108. A typical example of dogged work by a ship's boat was afforded by the action of JAVELIN's and JAGUAR's boats off Bray beach in the afternoon of 28/5. When their two motor cutters and two whalers first grounded offshore they were rushed and swamped by soldiers. Order being restored the boats had to be baled out and the wet engines restarted, following which 700 troops were embarked by these few boats in a short time during continuous bombing attacks.
109. Of the power boats available by far the most useful and suitable were the A.L.Cs., M.L.Cs. and the small type of R.N.L.I. life-boat. The high speed service motor boats such as DOLPHIN's and EXCELLENT's boats and the R.A.F.
Seaplane tenders proved unsuitable for work in shallow waters on a lee shore owing to the vulnerability of their propellers and rudders and their poor manoeuvring powers at low speeds.
110. Of the civilian manned craft one of the best performances was that of the London Fire Brigade fire float
MASSEY SHAW. All the volunteer crew were members of the
London Fire Brigade or Auxiliary Fire Service and succeeded in doing 4 round trips to the beaches in their well-found craft. In contrast to this performance and that also of the R.N.L.I. crews of the Ramsgate and Margate life-boats, who took their boats over to Dunkirk, no volunteers, except for the coxswain and engineer of the Dover life-boat, were forthcoming from the R.N.L.I. crews of the other life-boats, which were accordingly manned by R.N. crews. Also it must be noted that civilian craft of such flotillas as the Rye fishing fleet did not relish the idea of carrying out ferrying work off the Flanders coast. Fishing boats and pleasure boats from as far along the south coast as Brixham and
Dartmouth arrived at various times up to p.m. 30/5, but again the civilian crews were not prepared to proceed to Dunkirk.
Accordingly, the most suitable of such boats as could be manned by the Naval personnel available were taken up, but the remainder took no part in the operations.
111./

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 39.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
A.L.C. 5 Report. East end of Bray beach 29th May.
"A slight surf, thrown up by the onshore wind, made beaching awkward, and the use of an anchor was essential.
Owing to bad seamanship, A.L.C. 5 lost her anchor and warp at the first attempt at beaching, with the result that the craft rode on much farther than was intended or desirable.
She was inmediately rushed on all sides by a wild, undisciplined mob of French soldiers, so many of whom got aboard that the boat was grounded; and it was only by the use of considerable amount of force that a sufficient number could be got overboard, so that the craft could be got off the beach.
Two very good anchors, one complete with a good long warp, were found in a derelict motor boat and these were used to replace the lost anchors before making a further trip.
The second attempt to embark French troops shewed that their undisciplined behaviour was likely to imperil the safety of the craft, and it was decided to proceed farther found. up the coast to La Panne where British troops were
These troops were ferried from the beach to one or other of the craft anchored offshore, at the rate of approximately 3 trips per hour."
A.L.C. 16. Report. 29th May.
and proceeded straight inshore to the beach near Old Dunkirk
"A.L.C. 16 was the first boat to be hoisted out, where she evacuated British troops. After making some seven soldiers, who overwhelmed the boat to such an extent that trips successfully, she was boarded by a mob of French flooded and both engines failed.
she became partially swamped, the starboard battery was
A.L.C. 16 to be floated off, and the port engine started."
Eventually sufficient French were evicted to enable
A.L.C. 17. Report. 29th May.
and followed A.L.C. 5 up the coast towards Bray. On
"A.L.C. 17 was the fourth boat to be hoisted out, of approaching the beach she was promptly boarded by crowd grounded. On the falling tide she was soon left
French soldiers, who so overloaded the boat that a she dry, the and remained In the meantime stranded the for Coxswain some three of A.L.C.17 hours. high procured and bayonets, to drove off the French when these again attempted assistance of some British troops, who with fixed rush the boat as the tide rose."
Wednesday, 29th May.
attempts of Large masses of French troops to intercept boats
"Soat difficulty experienced through persistent holding off French by means of rifle fire 50 yards further and demand passage. Assisted by British troops succeeded in along the beach."
June 1st/

3
ried us four hours to do scale normally bombardment 20 minutes. This ide to fly another work which takes (made in Germany)
which was entirely kite deserted from a except large floating for Bank's crane party. We
THE decided There so cases similar to key this that our uninterrupted and large to wind which continued
Owing to return a contrary to H.Q. We found our the efforts proved of
IM
car presumably the result of about 2 miles and our were of fifth many column activity. We made way times on the way, especially on the We reported leading that H.Q. it it was back to H.Q. on foot, a distance road to were bombed several H.Q. the position seemed extremely from grave. the South Quay. Cdr. was
Henderson hardly informed us that G.H.Q. intended taking to be over evacuation bastion
At practicable to embark troops the and the extreme shortage of supplies. We were and to sail as soon as that all superfluous personnel would have therefore ordered owing by to Dove to go aboard the "Gervaise Rentual" most of the bombardment permitted. The air force personnel, onboard. We demolition the party were, we were informed, already and QZS.60. were On arrival also at the ship we found we had no charts and to the our given a new route order via Zuydcoote Passage therefore made way bastion. At the bastion we found that a number of soldiers, the obviously a back as quickly as we could through the bombardment unnerved by the relentless attack, were approaching H.Q. in went out in the midst of the bombardment, without steel helmets, destroy- or fire threatening manner with their rifles. Cdr.Dove and Cdr. Henderson arms which had just entered harbour, arrived. The situation control and and parleyed with them until a naval landing party from which a might
"
have er developed seriously was immediately brought under take we informed that the evacuation of the town of Dunkirk was to were forthwith. We were therefore given new orders by Cdr.Dove. found We place able to collect a chart and return to the ship where we were Cdr. Bankes. He told us to collect as many small craft as possible and take them and the drifter round to the beaches on the north side of the town to pick up soldiers. We tried to commandeer two Belgian tugs and manage to secure two launches byt on investigation both were too badly a picket boat but the French naval commander objected strongly. We did damaged to be serviceable. One had its steering gear rendered useless one by bombs, and the other, a diesel engine, had no fuel, and no knew how to work it. We now had onboard four air force officers, 10
re moment four drifters arrived in the entrance, two of which were in a soldiers, the majority of the demolition party and Cdr. Bankes. At this sinking condition owing to bombing and machine-gunning, These two the
"Bola Roy" and the "Paxton" were sunk by gun-fire from the "Gervaise
Bentual", clear of the fairway, after all personnel had been taken onboard, the drifters "Playmates" and "Gervaise Rentual." The remaining
2 drifters were ordered by Cdr. Bankes to tie off the beaches and they proceeded thereforthwith.
We were now helded from the South Quay and on crossing there found Cdr. Dove who was the last person to leave the South Quay. We took him aboard and landed him and Cdr. Bankes on the North Jetty, where they met Captain Tenant, Cdr. Dove insisted on returning to the bastion to the end of the pier, within hail for an hour. Captain Tenant then told find out if there were anyone left there and instructed us, to be off us to extend those orders until midnight. It was now about dark and air activity was intense. Huge fires light up the town and later numerbelieved we heard artillery. After standing off for about 1 hour, ous parachute flares were dropped by the enemy. For the first time we gun us, we received enemy a morse message from the beach, to come alongside in which time the enemy dropped magnetic mines and attempting to machine the North Jetty, There we found Naval Commander whose name was not ascertained, other Captain drifter and tell any personnel ships to come alongfrom Tenant's party, who ordered us to make conside the North We spoke to the Queen of the Channel (?)
to this effect Jetty. drifters who were Lying some way to the north and were difficult and to the locate. Another morse message asked us to use and found all possible a despatch. to After this we?) returned ship alongside to the North and fully Jetty loaded. were
We took personnel (Queen of Channel and children and some soldiers, and hound aboard which written) was was destroyer, continuing "Unless and complete W/T dubies. fighter The protection gist of this can be message provided (which only to proceed a home to Dover also an urgent despatch to H.M.S. "Wolfordered aboard about 30 women after delivering women and children before dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

DMS
OPERATION "DYNAMO".
bas
H.M.S. # GOSS AMER ",
5th June, 1940.
L
1
D
The Commander in Chief,
H.M.Ships and Vessels at the Nore.
ir,
I have the honour to submit the following despatch on the operations J
£ H.M.Ship # GOSSAMER # under my command during the evacuation of unkirk, for the information of Their Lordships.
1
We made six trips in all, and transported, as accurately as can be scertained, 3214 British and French troops to this country. A list E
18 recomendations for awards is appended. At the same time the entire hips company did as much to deserve a medal as tose few I was able to ingle out.
When this operation is compared with the glordous feat at Zecbrugge in 1918, I am inclined to believe that it imposed greater strain on the ficers and men. This was particularly 80 due to the constant repetition in the belief that each one was the last. Again there were the long hours off the beaches in momentary expectation of the arrival x enemy aircraft(en expectation which was seldom disappointed ). Then the six hour passage home with constant reports of the presence of enemy
L.T.B.'s on the route, and in the knowledge that we had six or sevenhu undred souls on board and no boats whatever.
"GOSSAMER" sailed from Harwich at 1230 on 28th May, 1940, in company with H.M.Ships "KELLETT", "ALBURY", "ROSS", "LYDD", "PAINGBOURNE", sand "LEDA". H.M.S. "SALTASH" was left in the Tyne boiler cleaning.
flotilla arrived at EUIDCOTE addititis Pass at 2030 and stapped off
BRAY at 2115. There cared to be a large wood close to the shore but on neurer approach this was seen to be a mass of troops on the and.
Two ships were left there and the remainder proceeded to the East Pier at Dunkirk which at that time was intact.
As it was low water it took half on hour to embark troops down 1mprovised ladders, but "GOSSAMER" sailed at 2215 with 430 on board.
from now on it was impossible to exercise control over the fiotilla as a unit, and this narrative is concerned with "GOSSAMER" alone.
Just outside the 2UIDCOTE PASS we come upon the "MANNIAN" aground, and S.S. "PRAGUE" stopped, without charts. "MANXMAN" was given directdons, and a boat was sent to "PRAGUE" with a chart of Dunkirk. As will be seen this delay seved our lives.
Proceeding towards KWINT DOUY we soon came into a patch of water filled with mom crying BHelp", and heads could be seen all round in the
Ben.
I stopped and lowered boats ( three whalers and a skiff ).
I
WED then halled by Commonder R.L. Fisher of H.M.S. "WAKEFUL" who said he had been torpedoed and that the Submerine vas still near by.
In actual fact I believe he was attacked by on M.T.B. Dut my boats and almost all my officers were now lost in the night, and it took some time to recover them with such few men as they had been able to pick up.
The skiff was loft alongside a drifter. No doubt we were wrong to stop, but at the time I thought otherwise. We then steered so as to evoid KWINT BUOY, and proceeded without further incident to Dover, arriving there at 0655 an Wednesday 29th May.

Ship sailed from Dover at 0850 on 29th May, did a days minesweeping and arrived off Dunkirk, lit by the red flames of the burning oil tanks at 0040 on 30th May. On this occasion troops were embarked off BRAY
DUNE in our own boats and canvas punts. There were no incidents of note, and we sailed at 0515, arriving at Dover at 1015 on Thursday morning. All boats were left on the beach by order from Rear Admiral
Dover.
Third trip. Sailing from Dover at 1330 with a party of signalmen for LA PANNE, we arrived off BRAY at 1830. Admiral Wake Walker came on board for passage to LA PANNE, where we transferred him to H.M.S.
"WORCESTER" and enchored at 1930. I can recall no. features of this trip, which was eclipsed by the incidents of the following one.
we proceeded at 0118 and arrived at Dover at 0600.
Fourth trip. In order to comply with Vice Admiral Dover's
0446/30 12 hours were spent at Dover.
A
smallamotor-boat, the
"Handy
Billy! was requisitioned. We left at 1800 and anchored as ordered, one mile west of LA PANNE and 4 cables from the shore, at 1207.
Sub-Lieutenant M.Phipps proceeded to search the shore in "Handy Bill and reported no answer to his hails. Inside an hour, however, the situation had changed, and thousands were massing abreast the ship.
UI called for more boats by searchlight up and down the immic coast, and eventually was much assisted by H.M.S. "IVANHOE" who lent me a motor-boat. The vital need now was for more boats. About this time
Lieutenant-Commander McLelland swam off from shore with a message for
Dover which he was just able to gasp out before collapsing. The troops had been forcedout of LA PANNE and were marching West.
We also embarked a Major, 2nd in Command 2nd Coldstream Guards, and on his advice ordered the bulk of the troups to move West on Dunkirk in small groups.
I decided to remain where I was and to embark the wounded and such troops as refused to move on. "IVANHOE" remained with me.
At this time a paddle minesweeper most gallently grounded herself close inshore to save as many as possible. I do not know har name.
At 0500 as I had expected a flight of Messerschmidt 109's appeared from Eastward, flew low over the beaches and sprayed ships and men with machine-gun fire. The silvery tracer bullets were clearly visible in the morning light. Our fire did something to disperse these machines and casualties did not appear to be heavy.
At 0600 Captain D in H.M.S. "CODRINGTON" asked me my intentions
End as I had 675 troops on board I replied I was proceedingt He ordered me to Dunicirk to "Fill up".
On our way there we went alongside H.M.S. "SKIPJACK" who required
8oz.
chloroform. We then berthed on East Arm just beyond the break, and very quickly embarked some 170 French troops. The enemy was now bombing the town and massing off the harbour entrence. As I went astern "IVANHOE" was hit as she steamed full speed past the pierhead.
We set course west, and were about to turn North at 5W Buoy when we were attacked by some five Junkers 87 dive bombers. These were followed by nine or ten otheres the a few minutes later. It was at this time that H.M.S. "HAVANT" was hit. During these attacks
I
attribute our escape to the coolness and precision with which Lieutenant.Menisty and Yeoman of Signals J.Young ( C/J X 131436
observed each aircraft as it turned to the attack, and assisted me in handling the ship. The salvoes sonbanneck of four small bombs and one large one fell very close; on two occasions it was only our swing during the flight of the bombs that saved us. The 0.5" machine-gun fired until all the feree springs fell off. The 4" guns were hampered by the swing of the ship.
This was a most trying time for the troops between decks who could not tell whether or not we were hit. A great deal was done to calm them by P.O. Std. A.Hockney ( L 14824 ) who actually sat on the ladder to the messdeck and sang to the soldiers.

Page 12,
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel - List 'B'
MISCELLANEOUS
CALCUTTA (A.A. Vessel).
Commanding Officer.
Captain Dennis Marescaux Lees, R.N.
LORMONT.
Commanding Officer.
Lieutenant Commander Walter Stuart Smithies, R.N.
Officers.
Sub.Lieutenant Alexander Frederick Sidney Davidson, R.N.R.
Ratings.
Marine A. Hobberjam.
Marine, H. Ambrose.
H.M.S. EXCELLENT's A.A. Motor Boat
Commanding Officer.
Sub.Lieutenant Alastair William Maxwell Matthew, R.N.
Thames L.D.F. GOLDEN EAGLE.
Officer.
Lieutenant James Colin Newman, M.B.E., R.N.V.R.
Rating.
Chief Petty Officer James S. Seaman, C/J.3192.
Thames L.D.F. ROYAL EAGLE.
Officers.
Lieutenant Arnold Herbert Dunkerley, R.N.R.
Lieutenant (E) Rodney L. Helyer, R.N.R.
A.A. Kite Party.
Commanding Officer.
Commander John Scott Dove, R.N.
Officers.
Sub.Lieutenant John Lawrence Field, R.N.V.R.
Sub.Lieutenant Richard Graham Addis, R.N.V.R.
Motor/

Page 13,
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel - List 'B'
MISCELLANEOUS.
(Continued).
Motor Vessel LAROC.
Ratings.
Mate, Jack Lynn.
Engineer, Raymond Crane.
Deck Hand, Leonard Lynn.
Steward, H. A. E. Frost.
Motor Barge SHEFFIELDs
Commanding Officer.
Sub.Lieutenant John David Farquharson Kealy, R.N.
Hopper Barge LADY SOUTHBOROUGH.
Commanding Officer.
A. M. Poole - Master.
LIGHTER X209.
Commanding Officer.
Acting Master R. G. Banks.
Fleet Fuelling Craft C.9.
Ratings.
Petty Officer Stanley A. Steward, P/J. 111270.
Petty Officer Arthur W. Duck, P/J.105768.
Eel Boat JOHANNA.
1
W.D. Launch MARLBOROUGH)
Commanding Officer.
Acting Sub.Lieutenant Adrian Carew Hunt, R.N.
Tug ST. CLEARS.
Commanding Officer.
Mr. William Josiah Penny, Master.
Rating.
Able Beaman Arthur Chawner, O.N. N.K.
SMALL BOATS.
Officers.
Sub.Lieutenant E. S. Foreman, R.N.V.R.
Sub/

Lieutenant Derek Peel Willan, Royal Navy,
Lieutenant H.M.S. Icarus. Frederick Worcester. Greville Woods, Royal
Captain John Henry Wh
Transport Tynwald.
Lieutenant Navy, H.M.S. Alfred Thomas Cook, R.N.R.,
Mr. Terence O' Hanlon,:
Dorrien Rose.
H.M.S. Medway Queen.
Lieutenant Lieutenant Kenneth Arthur Gadd, R.N.R.,
Joseph Cox, R.N.R.
Mr. Hubert Donald F1
H.M. Hospital Carrier
Mr. Arthur Patrick Jo
Lieutenant Tom Preston Graham, R.N.R.
H.M.S. Ross.
Officer, H.M. Transpo
Lieutenant Robert Hunter Irving, R.N.R.,
Mr. Frank Edward M
Lieutenant Frederick Thomas Renny, R.N.R.,
Motor Boat Triton.
H.M. Hospital Carrier
Mr. Allan Watterson,
H.M. Skoot Hondsrug.
Transport Tynwald.
Lieutenant Robert Archibald Vallings, R.N.R.,
Mr. Joseph Wilfred Coul
Lieutenant Cecil John Carp, R.N.V.R., H.M.S.
H.M.S. Speedwell.
H.M. Transport Royal
Mr. William McGregor,
Princess Elizabeth.
Lieutenant Robert Peverell Hichens,
Transport King Georg
Mr. Bernard Murphy,
R.N.V.R., H.M.S. Niger.
Lieutenant Alexander Harper Turner,
Transport Dorrien Ro
R.N.V.R., H.M.S. Watchful.
Mr. Walter Ernest Oxer
Sea Cadet Lieutenant Harry Sidmouth-Willing,
H.M. Transport Prag
H.M. Skoot Hilda.
Mr. David Douglas R
Surgeon Lieutenant Joseph Wishart Shield,
H.M. Hospital Carrie
M.B., B.Ch., R.N.V.R., H.M.S. Grafton.
Mr. Andrew Sinclair,
Sub-Lieutenant Edmund Charles Croswell,
Transport Royal Sove
Royal Navy, H.M.S. Harvester.
Mr. George Frederick To
Sub-Lieutenant George Arthur Gabbett-
H.M. Transport Maid
Mulhallen, Royal Navy.
Mr. James Lang Croc
Sub-Lieutenant William Ronald Williams,
Transport Biarritz.
Royal Navy, Motor Boat Swallow.
Mr. Charles Powell Maso
Sub-Lieutenant Eric Sidney Flint, R.N.R.,
Transport Tvnwald.
H.M.S. Mosquito.
Sub-Lieutenant John David Greaves, R.N.R.,
H.M.S. Medway Queen.
Sub-Lieutenant John Cambridge Clarke,
R.N.V.R., Motor Boat Rapide.
+
Sub-Lieutenant Thomas Ellison Godman,
R.N.V.R., H.M.Y. Seriola.
Sub-Lieutenant R.N.V.R., H.M.S. William Sutton. Geoffrey Hewitt,
Sub-Lieatenant R.N.V.R., H.M. John Grive. Kenneth Barton Miles,
Herbert Bernhard
H
TOTAL
H.M.S.
John Ball, R.N.R.,
Bryce, R.N.R.,
Jones, Royal Engineer Navy, Engineer H.M.S. Reginald Sabre. Thomas
Gunner Reynolds, Royal Navy, H.M.S.Salamandr.
Gunner H.M.S. Frederick Wolsey. William Benoy, Royal
Skipper Navy, (T) H.M.S. Reginald Grenade. William Clare, Navy,
Skipper Drifter Andrew The Boys. Buchan, R.N.R., Royal
Skipper Reed. George Hattan, R.N.R., H.M. H.M.
Drifter Midas. Herbert Holden, R.N.R., Drifter
Skipper Captain H.M. Reynolds, R.N.R., H.M.
Captain Captain Card CANADA Captain Captain H.M. most Scotia. H.M. 87. Transport James Transport Robert Fryer, McCallum Prague. Rowland Master, Hughes, Baxter, H.M. Master, Tug Master, Master, Master, Fore- H.M. S.S.
Pitman, Master, H.M.
Master, Master, H.M.

19.
"
which
Mr. Engineer, Launch Haig.
Mr. Norman Regisald >mith, Walter, Chief First Engineer, Hospital Carrier Dinard.
Mr. Donald Brewer, Yacht Engineer, H.M.Y.Lahloo.
Mr. Thomas McDermott Weir, Yacht Engineer, H.M.Y. Eila II.
Mr. C
Coggins, Engineer, M.Y. Masayru.
Mr. Raymond Crane, Engineer, M.V. Laroc.
/Mr. / William Leonard Evans, Second Engineer, Royal Daffodil
Mr. James Steward, Second Engineer, S.S. Dorrien Rose.
'Mr. Frank Cherry, Third Engineer, (Able Seaman), Launch Swallow.
VMr. James Henry Edward Spain, Third Engineer, Launch Kestrel.
Mr. W StamLister, Lister, Purser, 58 Tynwald.
Mr. Paddy McFadden, Beatswain, S.S. Dorrien Rose.
Mr. Douglas Kirkaldie, Coxswain, Motor Boat Fervent.
Able Seaman T
Bassett, S.S. Dorrien Rose.
Able Seaman John Fowles, Hospital Carrier Isle of Guernsey.
Able Seaman Henry Charles Herring Hay, Launch Swallow.
Able Seaman John Upperton, S.S. Dorrien Rose.
Ordinary Seaman Clifford Barrett, S.S. Dorrien Rose.
Fireman Ali Khan, S.S. Dorrien Rose.
Fireman Abdul Mohand, S.S Dorrien Rose.
Fireman Rbet Phillips, S.S. Biarritz.
wre
Carpenter J
Gaste, S.STynwald.
S.S.
Donkeyman A
Allen,,Tynwald.
Deckhand Leonard Lynn, M.V. Daroc.
Steward H
A
E
Frost, M.V. Laroc.
Mrs. A. Goodrich, Stewardess, Hospital Carrier Dinard.
Mr. William Ferguson, Acting Naval Store Officer.
/1 Mr. Robert William Whidby Corbutt, Acting Deputy Naval Store Officer.
Mr. Donald John Woods, Deputy Armament Supply Officer.
Mr. Archibald Armytage Bakewell, Deputy Victualling Store Officer.
Lance Corporal Chapman, 6208138, 1/8th Middlesex Regiment.
21
William Cecil Ernest Smith, R.A.M.C., 7520070.
Fireman EAMMMAXGX Henry Albert William Ray, Auxiliary Fire Service,
London Fire Brigade Fire Fleat Massey Shaw
Fireman Edmund Gordon Wright, Auxiliary Fire Service, London Fire
Brigade Wire Fle

18.
Han
Ordinary Seaman Bert Marston, P/JX.175182, H.M.S. Worcester.
Ordinary Seaman John Philip Charles Mead, LT/JX.193106, H.M.Y.Christock
Ordinary Seaman Hugh Watson Miller, C/JX.170010, H.M.S. Royal Eagle.
Ordinary Seaman Frank Arthur Victor Patrick, C/JX.171302, H.M.S.Crest
Eagle.
Ordinary Seaman Thomas Edgar Whyte, R.N.V.R., CD/X.133, Newhaven
Life Boat Rosa Wood and Phyll
Lund.
Seaman Arthur George Farrow, LT/JX.179655, H.M.S. Glenavon.
Seaman George Fred Mathews, R.N.P.S., LT/JX.185264, H.M.D.The Boys.
Seaman Raymond Allenby Stone, R.M.R., X.19746A, H.M.S. Jaguar.
Ordinary Signalman Victor Albert Leslie Shallis, LD/X.4505, H.M.
Danlayer Gulzar.
Stoker Second Class Ralph Kearvell, P/KX,87052,H.M.S. Worcester
Stoker John Pirie, R.N.R., X.10415,S., H.M.D. Dorienta.
Second Hand John Malcolm Fenwick, LT/JX.185753, H.M.Y. Alouette 1.
Engineman James Smith, H.M. H Drifter Douenta.
Fireman John Develand Connell, T.124, H.M.S. Medway Queen.
Cook George Henry Cliefe, T.124, H.M.Danlayer Gulzar.
Deckhand Charles
E
Baldry, T.124, H.M.Danlayer Gulzar.
Captain William Hay Baker, Master, S.S. Biarritz.
Captain Herbert Cecil Bond, Master, S.S. St. Andrew.
Captain II
F
Boyce, Master, Hopper Barge 24,
Captain George Beaumont Butler, Master, M.V.Laroc.
Captain John Willimm Dickinson, Master, Ngorama.
Captain Henry Clarke, Master, Princess Maud.
Captain RederickJohn Hopwood, Master, Tug Lady Brassey.
Captain Eyril Glad west Hughes, O.B.E., S.S. Master, S.S. Nephrite.
Captain R chard Hughes, Master, Killarney.
Captain Welfred # yvon Larbalestier, Master, S.S Roebuck.
Captain Ewen Mackinnon, Master, Loch Garry.
Captain William Josiah Penny, Master,
Lord Rodney.
Captain
A
M
Pooke, Master,
Lady Southborough.
Captain Thomas C
Woods, Master,
Lady of Mann.
Captain R
G
Banks, Acting Master, Lighter X.209.
Mr. John William Ailwyn Jones, Chief Officer, Hospital Carrier Vinard
Mr. Reginald Frederick Pembry, Chief Officer, Hospital Carrier Isle
Mn Arthur Patrick Joseph Paterson, First Officer, M.
Mr. Jack Lynn, Mate, M.V.Laroc.
Mr. Victor Smith, Mate, Java.
Service,
Mr. John Bingham Woodhouse, Second Officer, S.S. Prague it Massey Shaw
London Fire
Brigade Wire Flo

eutenant Alexander Harper Turner, R.N.V.R.
ipper George Hattan, W.S.3022, H.M.
skipper illiam John Francis REED
Sub-Lieutenant DORI
Lieutenant Sub-Lieutenant Sub-Licutenant Robert Robert George Hunter Walter Arthur Irving, Timbrell, R.M.R., R.C.N., Motor LLANTH GRI
Lieutenant Charles Waterland
Sub-Lieutenant William Ronald Mo
Sub-Lieutenant John Cambridge Clarke, SWALLOW, R.N.V.R., Et
Boat RAPIDE.
Master W. Thompson, S.S. DORIEN ROSE.
Chief Engineer B. Murphy, D.D. DORIEN ROSE.
Mate, T.O. Hanlon, S.S. DORIEN ROBE.
Sub-Lieutenant Michael Herbert Bernard Soloman
Thames Cockle Boat
Master, J. Freyer, Tug FOREMOST 87.
Lieutenant Commander Stratford Hercules Dennis
Co manding M.T.B. Bas
Lieutenant Christopher William Stuart Dreyer,
M.T.B. 1
Lieutenant Donald Terry McBarnet, R.N., Dutch
H.M.S. DOGGERSBAN
Sea Cadet Lieutenant Harry Sidmouth-Willing, D
R.M.S. HILDA.
Lieutenant Frederick Thomas Renny, R.N.S., Dut
H.M.S. HONDBRUG.
Engineer Mr. J. Crockett, - BIARRITZ.
Master, Charles Archibald Hancock, - CANTERBUR
Master, Ernest Leonard Hill, Hospi tal GUERNSEY Carrier
Master, Robert Mellum licLean, Personnel Ship LI
William Oswald Young, H. Transport
Master, chard Pittman, - St. Helie HEL
Master, Second Officer Reginald Frank Edward Martin, - ET.
Second Chief Engineer Officer The Allan Joseph Conspicuous Watterson, Wilfrid Gallantry Coulthard, - TYINTALD 0/3x.2 Medal. R
Acting Able Beuman Leading (Cook) Seaman J.H. Ronald Elton, H.M.Y.
Account

C.W.19295
(Revised-June, 1983.)
D-51.
1940
FROM WHOM
DATE
Merchant Service Vessels employed in Operation "Dynamo".
/
(Extracted from Case 5458).
Personnel Ships
Case 5458 Vol. III. 7.)
29.
QUEEN OF THE CHANNEL
"
III. 6.
sunk
1.
"
DORRIEN ROSE
"
1.
NEW PRINCE OF WALES
"
III. 6.)
sunk
1.
SCOTTISH CORPORATION
"
III. 6.)
1.
MASSEY SHAW
"
III. 6 & 8)
1.
LIGHTER X 209
"
III. 6.)
1.
C.E.in C. TUG PRIMA
)
"
III. 6.)
1.
"
HOPPER BARGE W.24)
1.
"
"
"
W.26)
1.
"
"
"
W.95)
1.
THYRA
1.
PUDGE
London and Rochester ( "
II.5.)
1.
CABBY
Trading Company,
1.
SEINE
)
Limited.
1.
BEFENDER
1.
RELIANCE
1.
LETITIA
Bawley Boats
III 8
1.
ENDEAVOUR
"
Civilian crews.
1.
RESOLUTE
1.
RENOWN (Sunk)
1.
QUEENSLAND,
Tilbury Dredging Company.
(Case 5458.Vol.III.8.)
1.
JOHANNA
"
(Dutch eel boat)
III.8. 1.
River M/L "MADAME SANS GENE" (sunk)
"
III.8.) 1.
M/V "SEA ROAMER"
"
III.8.) 1.
"FAAR BREEZE" Drifter
1.
Votor Boat "KIT CAT"
(
"
III.8.) 1.
Southend Lifeboat "GREATER LONDON"
1.
Launch belonging to Skylark Shipbuilding
(
"
III.8.) 1.
Co. Poole.
opper " Barge "Lady Southborough"
1.
"
1.
QUEEN'S CHANNEL
"
"
GALLIONS RANCH
Tilbury l.
"
(
"
"
FOREMOST 101.
Contracting
III.8.) 1.
"
"
FOREMOST 102.
& Dredging
1.
"
"
1.
JAMES 67.
Company.
Dutch eel boat "CHANTECLER"
(
"
III.8.) 1.
Motor Life Boat unnamed,
#
(S.Lt.Amos, R.N.V.R.)
III.8.) 1.
Motor Yacht "RYGATE II"
"
III.8. 1.
M/B "QUICKSILVER"
"
III.8. 1.
Motor Cruiser "BOBELI"
"
III.8.) 1.
M/B "RAPIDE"
"
III.8.) 1.
"NAID ERRANT"
"
III.8.) 1.
M/B "THARK"
#
III.8.) 1.
Total. 71.
Mainly civilian crew, but R.N. or R.N.R.Officer in command.