TNA ADM 199 792

up ADM
199
792

CASE 7711
Volume VII
1
WAR HISTORY.
X
52 Holland
52 France
X
52 Belgium
52 Germany
6
6-1 x
Index (1)
W.H.S.
EVACUATION OF REFUGEES AND ALLIED TROOPS FROM
FRANCE, HOLLAND AND BELGIUM.
Arrangements for dealing with ----- in event of German Invasion.
Reception ports for
-----.
Report by V.A. Dover on Operation "DYNAMO"
Rear Admiral Wake-Walker.
Report on evacuation from Dunkirk 29.5.40 - 4.6.40
1940 - 1941
NOT TO BE DESTROYED
PERMANENT RECORD
our
This file is quoted as an that original reference in the Official all
The WAR History. At SEA
voz. 1

52H
523
6
96+
W Refugees from Holland of Belgium in Event of German Invasion of those Countries.
arrangements for dealing with
)
north of south Indand scoreand,
Isee of one
Bhannel Islands,
Bristol, Poole, de. considered as possible reception areas.
Memorandum accrespondence ne
Gransport required.
Posts of Landing.
shore accommodation.
Home Office instructions.
96.1 Possible landing of Enemy agents posing
85 as refrgees. Suggestion shall Eoachguards be given powers of arress 5 Details swarement by D.
of refugees was smaller than expected, d that
Duted Constert arriving as Poole were all dispersed into service.
1940

N.L.
D201
928
0.
SECRET
1940
D-51.
(Revised-June,
:
w3712/100
FROM WHOM
DATE
Home Office
18.1.40.4
MARKINGS TO BOARD.
SUBJECT.
arrangements for dealing with Belgian and Duteh refugees in the event of their countries being attacked.
(Ho's letter of 17/1/40 do D.O.).
FORMER.
Possible accommodation in five
Referred
Referred
NOTATION ONLY.
Date to
Date to
Referred to
Date
34
N L.
C. E. 7881/1922.
91509 Wt. 12/11/0514 450,000 3/39-MeO & Co Ltd-T. 3255
Sta. 47/88.

MO
COPY
17th January, 1940.
928
SECRET AND IMMEDIATE
1940
Sir,
I am directed by Secretary Sir John Anderson to say, for the information of Mr. Secretary Eden, that the question has been under consideration, in consultation with the Departments concerned, of what plans can be made beforehand for dealing with an influx of refugees from
Holland and Belgium in the event of an invasion of those countries by the enemy. I am in this connection to invite attention to paragraphs
13 and 14 of the Report of the Sub-Committee on the Control of Aliens in War (C.I.D. Paper No. 1543-B) and to the Minutes of the third and fourth meetings of that Sub-Committee.
Enquiries as to what accommodation could be made available in this country are being made by the Ministry of Health, and the Home Office is also enquiring as to the position in Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man.
The question also arises whether some of the refugees might be accommodated in Eire, and I am to ask whether Mr. Eden thinks a confidential enquiry on the subject might properly be addressed to the Eire Government by means of a memorandum on the lines of the memorandum enclosed herewith.
Copies of this letter and the enclosure are being sent to the Foreign
Office, Admiralty, War Office, Treasury, Ministry of Health, Scottish Health
Department, Ministry of Labour, Unemployment Assistance Board, Customs,
Ministry of Shipping, Ministry of Transport, and Ministry of Food.
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Sgd.) A. MAXWELL
The Under Secretary of State,
DOMINIONS OFFICE.

VERY SECRET
928
WAR REFUGEES
6
While nothing in this memorandum should be taken as indicating that
H.M. Government has any special reason to suppose that the possibilities with which it deals are imminent, considerations of humanity and prudence have led the Departments concerned to consider what steps would have to be taken to deal with an influx of refugees from Belgium or Holland in the event of a German invasion of those countries.
During the last war nearly 250,000 Belgian refugees were accommodated here without insuperable difficulty, but it is estimated that at least
500,000 might be expected to escape on this occasion.,In addition to this great increase in numbers, the problem of accommodation has been very greatly complicated by the danger of large scale air raids and the necessities of existing evacuation schemes.
The French Government has indicated that although it would be prepared to do all in its power to assist in the evacuation of refugees from Belgium, it could not undertake to retain any substantial number owing to the grave problems arising from the evacuation of the population of Northern France and the presence in that country of the British Expeditionary Force as well as the French Army.
For obvious reasons, any appeal to the public is impossible at present but energetic steps are being taken to prepare emergency schemes for accommodation in public buildings etc., in neutral areas. The resources of reception areas are already fully taxed and it would be undesirable to send large numbers of refugees - especially women and children - to evacuation areas, where they might be expected to be subjected to severe air raids.
It is doubted, however, whether this course can be avoided if the total should prove to be as large as is now feared.
H.M. Government is therefore anxious to explore all the possibilities of accommodation outside Great Britain and semi-official approaches have already been made to the Channel Islands, Isle of Man, and Northern Ireland.
The advantages to the unfortunate people concerned of being placed in an area free from enemy attack will at once be apparent.
The purpose of this note is to bring the problem to the notice of
/the

- 2 -
the Government of Eire in the hope that they will feel it not inconsistent wi th their position in the war to take their part in caring for innocent sufferers from it.
It has not been considered necessary at this stage to enter into questions of detail but it may perhaps be added that, for naval reasons, refugee ships would, if possible, be diverted to West Coast Ports and that it would presumably present no difficulty to send an agreed proportion of them direct to Eire ports without the necessity for any announcement or public undertaking beforehand.
HOME OFFICE.
17th January, 1940.

N.L.
929
D-51.
(Revised-June, 1983.)
1940
CONFIDENTIAL behin
FROM WHOM
DATE
%
Home office
20. 1.40.
7
MARKINGS TO BOARD.
SUBJECT.
Bopy of lever which Sir Alexander Maxwell.
has sent Sir Alexander landogen. about which and Belgian Reprgees.
FORMER.
Ports of landing, accommodation xe,
NOTATION ONLY.
Referred
Referred
Date
Date to to
Referred to
Date
D. T.D.
NL
M.
M.
C.E. 7881/1922.
21500 Wt. 42/41/6514 450,000 3/39-McC & Co Ltd-T. 3255
Sta. 47/88.

69 Mo no(seart) asend to DTD and N.L.
A.K
8
&
20/1/40
S
dam
Dear I'm. Phillips he
I Enclose a day the letter which Sir Alexander has
SEnd to Si Alexander Cadogan about Dutch, Delian repayees.
A lute the meeting will follow.
-y
Ins Sincerely
JEmter hilmiams hints Secrety.
Philips Gy being nad for their salety and nealth during a 0 to 4 days winter voyage.
This estimate is offered with the greatest reserve, and should be subject to improvement in the light of fuller information.
4./

COPY.
HOME OFFICE,
9
WHITEHALL.
URGENT AND CONFIDENTIAL.
20th January, 1940.
S
929
dam he
1940
Dear Cadogen,
I had a conference this morning with representatives of the Admiralty, the Ministry of
Health and the Ministry of Food on the question of what provisional arrangements can be made for a to situation which would arise If large numbers of en
Dutch and Belgian refugees came to this country
3
owing to the invasion of Holland and Belgium. The view of the Admiralty is that their representatives in Antwerp, Amsterdam and Rotterdam ought to have instructions which would enable them to tell the captains of Dutch and Belgian ships where they must go if they are bringing refugees to the United Kingdom.
Moreover, It appears from the discussion with the
Admiralty that there are insupurable difficulties about bringing these ships into London or ports on the South and Best coast. We urged upon the Admiralty being nad for their safety and health during a 3 to 4 days winter voyage.
This estimate is offered with the greatest reserve, and should be subject to improvement in the light of fuller information.
4./

of
10
or representatives that in such an emergency 10 would be most desirable to bring the refugees to the nearest port, and that from our point of view there would be
S
many advantages in bringing a large proportion of them dam to London; but the dmiralty pointed out the objections he to this course, and after prolonged discussion we all felt bound to accept the Admiralty view, which is this:
that about 100 small ships should be sent to Poole but that all the larger shipe ought to be sent round the
West
Best cosst to Belfast Looh and to the Clyde.
The to journey to Belfast Looh or the Clyde will take about en three days. It is therefore essential that the ships carrying m
which are to make such a journey crowded with refugees
(a) shall be properly equipped with food and water, and (b) shall know that they have to make this journey y
and shall limit the number of passengers accordingly.
Captains who might take 8. large number of passengers on board if they were only about to make a short journey would have to limit the numbers very severely in many cases if they knew they had to make a two or three days journey.
The problem then is:is there any means of telling being naa for their safety and health during a 3 to 4 days winter voyage.
This estimate is offered with the greatest reserve, and should be subject to improvement in the light of fuller information.
4./

3.
/
the Dutoh and Belgian authorities that arrangements
11
a for sending the larger ships - the long journey will be essential. If the Datch and Belgian authorities
S
know this beforehand, they will have B chance to make dam arrengements for provisioning the ships and warning he the captains not to allow on board more passengers than can be conveyed on so lengthy a journey.
If no such warning is given beforehend the gravest difficulties may arise. In an emergency large numbers of persons may crowd on to an ill-provided boat
75
and the captain, who has been contemplating a short en journey, will then be told by the Admiralty representative
3
that he has to make a three days' journey.
I imagine the difficulties of consultation with the authorities of these countries are serious.
on n the
Ly other hand, if no such consultation takes place the gravest troubles may arise and the British Government may be accused of lack of humanity in foreing an 111-
including children aga mifim persons provided ship crowded with distressed people to take 80
long a journey.
us
The Admiralty representative told se that their officers in the Dutch and Belgian ports are at present being nad for their sarety and health during a 3 to 4 days winter voyage.
This estimate is offered with the greatest reserve, and should be subject to improvement in the light of fuller information.
4./

12
4.
0
10
forbidden to enter into any discussions on this subject
1
1th the Dutch or Belgian authorities.
The Home Office only comes into the matter because is we have been saked to take the initiative In consulting dam with the other Departments concerned with preparing plans he for the reception of refugees in the United Kingdom, but it seems to me that I ought to bring this matter of consultation with the Dutch and Belgian authorities to your notice, and to ask that the Foreign Office, in consultation with the Admiralty will settle what is to
7
be done about warning the Dutch and Belgian authorities.
en
If there 1a to be any consultation with the Dutch and
S
Belgian authorities, it would also be very desirable to give some indication of the numbers of refugees whom we could receive. For example, the Scottish Office say ly that they could not contemplate the landing of more than
100,000 refugees in the Clyde district even on the assumption that it is only necessary to put them up for two or three days until they can be dispersed to other places.
It would be a great help to us to know as soon as possible whether any consultation is to take place with in being had for their safety and health during a 3 to 4 days winter voyage.
This estimate is offered with the greatest reserve, and should be subject to improvement in the light of fuller information.
4./

5.
13
b
0
1/1
-
the Dutch and Belgian authorities, but meanwhile the
Home Office, Ministry of Health, Scottish ffice and
4
Their
Ministry of Food will go shead with our plans on the
S
assumption that the bulk of the refugees will have to dam be brought, in the first instance, to Belfest Loch and consider
The to the Clyde, and that we must decide how they are to be distributed and disposed of after their arrival at these points.
Yours sincerely, to
(Sd.) A, MAXWELL
en
S
ly
The Hon.
Sir Alexander Cadogen,
0.0.%.0., 0.8.
g being had for their safety and health during a 3 to 4 days winter voyage.
This estimate is offered with the greatest reserve, and should be subject to improvement in the light of fuller information.
4./

Note: Ships can carry 80000
HO expect 500, 000.
11061/40 40
laps application
MEMORANDUM.
DTD)
Evacuation of Shipping from Dutch and Belgian Ports.
14
In an emergency it is lik;; y that a large number of ships will wish to clear from the three chief ports, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Antwerp, and that they will carry a great many refugees. The ships may not be confined to those wearing the Dutch and Belgian flags.
It is known that on 16th January 50 ships were in
Amsterdam and 75 in Rotterdam, their sizes ranging from the smallest to 16,000 tons. The number in Antwerp, including Ghent
(for which figures have not yet been secured) was possibly between
50 and 75. In addition there are known to be 200 small coasters laid up in Dutch ports.
2.
No estimate can be formed of the number of refugees likely to demand passage, but it may well be great, and the probability is that no provision will be made for victualling those who embark and who may be forced to remain in the ships for a fortnight or more.
3.
A very rough high limit of the number which should properly be allowed to embark is suggested to be 80,000. This is based on the assumptions that the greater part of the shipping referred to in paragraph 1 sails for United Kingdom anchorages, and that the numbers embarked will be subject to control, regard being had for their safety and health during a 3 to 4 days winter voyage.
This estimate is offered with the greatest reserve, and should be subject to improvement in the light of fuller information.
4./

15
4.
The arrangements made for clearing refugee ships are as follows: -
(a) Six anchorages have been selected.
Mounts Bay and Bristol Channel (South shore abreast
Public of Watchet) for the reception of ships which do not there not carry refugees.
(Yawy)
Mounts Bay is the more unattractive
7
of the two, and it is not proposed to order ships constin to this anchorage during the winter months.
others
Belfast Lough and Firth of Clyde. For the
Lifes with reception of ships carrying refugees.
Insle
Poole Harbour. A large number of small craft are expected to be included in the evacuation. The
Home Office state that as many as possible of this class which embark refugees shall be directed to
Poole, in the neighbourhood of which is a promising coasters with upingles reception area. Investigation has revealed that were refusion the harbour is thought to be capable of accommodating,
3rd in emergency, 100 small craft of the coastal type.
This
Milford Haven, in Angle Bay. It is considered wastes with refuse practicable to provide berths for 60 or 70 small craft of the coastal type in Angle Bay on the South
1500 upses
Shore of Milford Haven. It can be assumed that no insuperable difficulty will arise in dealing with such refugees as a fleet of this size is capable of carrying.
(b) Consular Shipping Advisers at the three ports already hold blank route instructions, corrected for the latest information, which will carry ships through the Downs to Belfast, the Clyde, and Bristol Channel.
Failin special
When required, in default of precise instructions from Admiralty they will issue these route instructions to conform with the allocation plan described/

Ammalls.
15
4.
The arrangements made for clearing refugee ships are as follows: -
(a) Six anchorages have been selected.
Mounts Bay and Bristol Channel (South shore abreast
Purals of Watchet) for the reception of ships which do not there not carry refugees.
(yany)
Mounts Bay is the more unattractive
?
any of the two, and it is not proposed to order ships
30 coastin to this anchorage during the winter months.
my others
Belfast Lough and Firth of Clyde. For the hips with reception of ships carrying refugees.
Emple
Poole Harbour. A large number of small craft are expected to be included in the evacuation. The
Home Office state that as many as possible of this class which embark refugees shall be directed to
Poole, in the neighbourhood of which is a promising coasiters with upses reception area. Investigation has revealed that
2000 refusin the harbour is thought to be capable of accommodating,
3rd in emergency, 100 small craft of the coastal type.
This
Milford Haven, in Angle Bay. It is considered coastes with upsee practicable to provide berths for 60 or 70 small craft of the coastal type in Angle Bay on the South
1500 refuses
Shore of Milford Haven. It can be assumed that no insuperable difficulty will arise in dealing with such refugees as a fleet of this size is capable of carrying.
(b)
Consular Shipping Advisers at the three ports already hold blank route instructions, corrected for the latest information, which will carry ships through the Downs to Belfast, the Clyde, and Bristol Channel.
Failing special
When required, in default of precise instructions from Admiralty they will issue these route instructions to conform with the allocation plan described,

3 16
3.
14
described at (a). Consular Shipping Advisers will now be told that small ships to the total number of 100 (carrying refugees) are to be routed to Pools, and to the total number of 70 (carrying refugees) are to be routed to Milford Haven. this (20) tollsBa of
Buth thermase. 200 to Beefast a chyone / to the
(c) It has been suggested that a sufficient supply of be charts is obtainable from Chart Agents at the three firm ed ports. This is being checked, and if the supply proves to be short of probable requirements it is proposed to make an issue to Consular Shipping
Advisers from Admiralty at once.
(a) Ships which are routed to United Kingdom will be instructed to fly the signal ZNW to ensure against being held in the Downs, and to fly the same signal when making their United Kingdom anchorage.
5.
British ships will sail on their own initiative or on instructions should the need arise, and may be expected to and unte know their destinations. i Foreign ships, in default of any previous agreement between Governments will sail in their own good time, and can be assisted only if they apply for routes.
6.
The formulation of a detailed scheme for dealing with refugees after disembarkation is understood to be in the hands of the
Alien Advisory Committee of the Home Office.
This Committee is known to be exploring the possibility of accepting refugees in the neighbourhood of the
Clyde, Bristol, Poole, and in the Isle of Man. They propose further to enquire whether the Government of Eire will help.
Why Brislot?
that I N. relaw
112/ma Haven area

4
17
4 -
7.
Clearly & considerable time may elapse between the arrival at an anchorage of ships carrying refugees and their complete disembarkation. The reception areas chosen may not be in the vicinity of the anchorage in which the ships are waiting, or the refugees may have to be dispersed to several areas. The Admiralty proposal for directing refugee ships to a
Belfast, the Clyde, and in moderate numbers to Poole has been accepted by the Aliens Advisory Committee as being the best arrangement possible at short notice in the absence of any clear indication where in the event the refugees will be received.
8.
The first stage of Admiralty responsibility finishes with the action described in paragraph 4. The first stage of
Home Office responsibility begins on disembarkation of the refugees. A serious hiatus is left, which will have to be bridged somewhat as described in paragraph 9.
9.
Admiralty. Provision of a staff, or increase of
ATD
and landing from existing staff, to control berthing of the ships at each anchorage. Provision of such anti-submarine protection at each (DLD
anchorage as may be possible or necessary Routeing and possibly furn preliming auchorase as in 4 above convoy of ships to ports of disembarkat tion in a number of cases. local
Brook 111, final laways Show place he by paras 4 a 5 Supra)
have
Government of Northern Ireland, Home Office. Provision of autor sufficient force to maintain discipline in refugee ships, and to assist Customs and Health Officers in conducting their examinations. The assistance of the War Office may have to be asked for.
Ministry of Food. Supply of water and provisions during the time refugee ships are held in the anchorages.
Customs, Ministry of Health, Scottish Health Office. Necessary examination of refugees before or on landing. Which
Ministry of Health./
the examin alsows at X a shore or on board.

16 518
hrve authorits (My Health) humeral accommodale and care of
5 -
uposes
Ministry And of Health. Selection restination of reception areas, plans for transpor housing and care of refugees.
final I upiques
Ministry of Shipping. Provision of suitable, ships (cross-channel as prohming anchorage type) for transfer of refugees from ships to selected landing
^
places.
Ministry of Shipping, Ministry of Transport. Allocation to suitable ports, after disembarkation of refugees of, such ships as may be requisitioned.
10.
It is quite impossible to indicate the size of the problem. Obviously it may be big. It is foreseen that great delay will be imposed on the refugee ships in the anchorages to which they first proceed, and on the various Authorities which will be concerned in their supervision. The extent of this delay will be governed wholly by the development of Home Office plans for dealing with the refugees. These plans are, it seems clear, still in the embryo stage. It is difficult to see how they can be carried to the stage of detail until consultation with the Dutch and Belgian Governments has taken place. The
Home Office is taking up with the Foreign Office the necessity for conversations which should be designed to secure, inter alia, that
(a) it is understood that ships will not be allowed to sail to the nearest convenient North Sea Port, but will be directed to an anchorage distant 3 or 4 days steaming.
(b) the number of refugees permitted to embark in each ship is based on consideration of (a);
(c) at least 7 days victuals for all onboard is embarked in each ship before sailing;
(a) control is established at the docks to enforce the provisions referred to at (b) and (c).
11./

#
19
- 6 -
11.
It is understood that the Home Office is indicating to the Departments referred to in paragraph 9
what action will be required of each on arrival of refugee ships in the selected anchorages, and will co-ordinate the plans of each in a comprehensive scheme.
12.
Meanwhile this memo is circulated to the Naval
Authorities who will be concerned, for information and any action which may be necessary.
Sta. 47/88.
3255

Sta. 47/88.
C. E. 7831/1922.
ADMINI ITS. ALS
MEMORANDUM.
Evacuation of Shipping from Dutch and Belgian Ports.
21509 Wt. 12441/0514 450,000 3/30-McO & Co Ltd-T. 3255

MEMORANDUM.
Evacuation of Shipping from Dutch and Belgian Ports.
Note: The Home Office
In an emergency it is likely that a large number of ships expoctation? 500, 000 upples will wish to clear from the three chief ports, Amsterdam, Rotterdam mush he modified to 80, 000
atailable in in thiffing in the fish the hims I accomordation and Antwerp, and that they will carry a great many refugees. The ships may not be confined to those wearing the Dutch and Belgian flags.
instruck.
Others may come befare have, or
It is known that on 16th January 50 ships were in later.
Amsterdam and 75 in Rotterdam, their sizes ranging from the smallest to 16,000 tons. The number in Antwerp, including Ghent
(for which figures have not yet been secured) was possibly between fuhere ent
50 and 75. In addition there are known to be 200 small coasters
You had laid up in Dutch ports.
confiss Turneral water This a)
2.
No estimate can be formed of the number of refugees likely to demand passage, but it may well be great, and the probability is uples that no provision will be made for victualling those who embark and who may be forced to remain in the ships for a fortnight or more,
5-4898 unless the shur phen end) up with Through
=) Belgin
3.
A very rough high limit of the number which should n3 200 ships with properly be allowed to embark is suggested to be 80,000. This
400 passelles each is based on the assumptions that the greater part of the shipping
80, oro referred to in paragraph 1 sails for United Kingdom anchorages, and that the numbers embarked will be subject to control, regard
200 coasters with being had for their safety and health during a 3 to 4 days winter go stenges each voyage.
= 4000
This estimate is offered with the greatest reserve, and should be subject to improvement in the light of fuller information.

Adminity
4.
arrangements made for clearing refugee ships are as follows:
(a) Six anchorages have been selected.
(i) Mounts Bay and Bristol Channel (South shore abreast of Watchet) for the reception of ships which do not
(Say up to 30 cas tir)
carry refugees. 1 Mounts Bay is the more unattractive
A
of the two, and it is not proposed to order ships to this anchorage during the winter months.
(1) Belfast Lough and Firth of Clyde. For the
1 200 ships, with 80, oro reception of ships carrying refugees refugers
(iii) Poole Harbour. A large number of small craft are expected to be included in the evacuation. The small craft
Home Office state that as many as possible of this of the constal type with will class which embark refugees shall be directed to
Poole, in the neighbourhood of which is a promising reception area. Investigation has revealed that the harbour is thought to be capable of accommodating, in emergency, 100 small craft of the coastal type
A with say 2500 ufugess
(iv) Milford Haven, in Angle Bay. It is considered practicable to provide berths for 60 or 70 small craft of the coastal type in Angle Bay on the South
Shore of Milford Haven.
It can be assumed that no
Confirm?
insuperable difficulty will arise in dealing with
Mytealth Bruy Thips m Vletter to twansea such refugees as a fleet of this size is capable of
A say 1500 u/ugees carrying.
1
amsterdam, Roller tam 00 Antrap
(b) Consular Shipping Advisers at the three ports already hold blank route instructions, corrected for the latest information, which will carry ships through the Downs to Belfast, the Clyde, and Bristol Channel.
knless special
When required, in default of precise instructions are por
+
from Admiralty they will issue these route instructions to conform with the allocation plan

described at (a).
Consular Shipping Advisers will now be told that small ships to the total number better of 100 (carrying refugees) are to be routed to Pools, and to the total number of 70 (carrying refugees) are to be routed to Milford Haven.
(c) It has been suggested that a sufficient supply of charts is obtainable from Chart Agents at the three
There is wr a sufficient myth 7 charts araitable ports. This is being checked, and if the supply proves to be short of probable requirements it is laster
1s berry ware proposed to make N issue to Consular Shipping
Advisers from Admiralty at once.
(a) Ships which are routed to United Kingdom will be instructed to fly the signal ZNW to ensure against being held in the Downs, and to fly the same signal when making their United Kingdom anchorage.
B.
(e)
British ships will sail on their own initiative
Cancel 5 as unimber or on instructions should the need arise, and may failuy be expected to
4
know their destinations. Foreign ships, in defaul of any previous agreement between Governments will sail in their own good time, and can be assisted only if they apply for routes.
6.
The formulation of a detailed scheme for dealing with refugees after disembarkation is understood to be in the hands of the Alien Advisory Committee of the Home Office.
This Committee is known to be exploring the possibility of accepting refugees in the neighbourhood of the
Whr Bistre
Clyde, Bristol, Poole, and in the Isle of Man. They propose
What, N. hela further to enquire whether the Government of Eire will help.
nilfow Haven

Sta. 47/88.
C. E. 7881/1922.
- 4 -
7.
Clearly a considerable time may elapse between the
A Estimated go up to y 10
arrival at an anchorage of ships carrying refugees and their days complete disembarkation. The reception areas chosen may not be in the vicinity of the anchorage in which the ships are waiting, or the refugees may have to be dispersed to several areas.
)L
The Admiralty proposal for directing refugee ships to
In some cases the ancharges
Belfast, the Clyde, and in moderate numbers to Poole, has been elected in para 4 will and he prelim may muchages.
accepted by the Aliens Advisory Committee as being the best arrangement possible at short notice in the absence of any clear indication where in the event the refugees will be received.
8.
The first stage of Admiralty responsibility finishes
21509 Wt. 13411/6514 450,000 3/30-McO & Co Ltd-T. 3255
with the action described in paragraph 4. The first stage of
Home Office responsibility begins on disembarkation of the
My Health refugees. A serious hiatus is left, which will have to be bridged somewhat as described in paragraph 9.
9. 191 Admiralty. i Provision of & staff, or increase of existing start, to control berthing of the ships at each
Provision of such anti-submarine protection at each convey anchorage or 48 may be possible or necessary Routeing and
A (Loal Defence ships to ports of disemburketion in a number of possibly cases,
A from as in prelim 4 above in as to anchange final th) sufficient Government of Northern Ireland, Home Office.
to assist force Immigration to maintain a discipline in refugee Provision of and l landing local place name authorits).
Customs n and Health Officers in conducting ships, their examinations. The assistance of the War Office may have to be asked for if examine atim is m
(c) Ministry of Food. Supply of water and provisions during the t home ship time refugee ships are held in the anchorages.
Customs, Ministry of Health, Scottish Health Office. Necessary
Which?
examination of refugees before or on landing.

lumedian Care
2
accommontation ACCRU motalion,
- 5 -
(e) Ministry of Health. Selection of reception areas, plans for transport distination as final
A
housing and care- of refugees.
(t) Ministry of Shipping. Provision of suitable ships (cross-channel type) for transfer of refugees from ships to selected landing prelom injury places.
anchange
(g Ministry of Shipping, Ministry of Transport. Allocation to suitable ports, after disembarkation of refugees of such ships as may be requisitioned.
10.
It is. quite impossible to indicate the size of the problem. Obviously it may be big. It is foreseen that great delay will be imposed on the refugee ships in the anchorages to which they first proceed, and on the various Authorities which will be concerned in their supervision. The extent of this
My Health delay will be governed wholly by the development of Home Office plans for dealing with the refugees. These plans are, it seems clear, still in the embryo stage. It is difficult to see how they can be carried to the stage of detail until consultation
Remember
11.
Costin with the Dutch and Belgian Governments has taken place. / The
Home Office is taking up with the Foreign Office the necessity that for conversations which should be designed to secure, inter alia,
(a) it is understood that ships will not be allowed to sail to the nearest convenient North Sea Port, but will be directed to an anchorage distant 3 or 4 days steaming.
(b) the number of refugees permitted to embark in each ship is based on consideration of (a);
(c) at least 7 days victuals for all onboard is embarked in each ship before sailing;
(a) control is established at the docks to enforce the provisions referred to at (b) and (c)

AR Fletcher
3
S
22
ADM 199/792
14466726
Return by (05/08/2025 07:00:03)
doris sp\9949722 (Gary Fletcher)
Closure status: Open
S
24/06/2025 07:00:03

MOST SECRET
AT
99
PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN FRENCH AND BRITISH
NAVAL AUTHORITIES FOR THE EVACUATION OF THE FRENCH
AND BRITISH ARMIES FROM DUNKERQUE AND VICINITY.
The timing and order in which British and French troops will be evacuated must be decided by mutual agreement between Lord Gort and General Blanchard.
MOST SECRET
MO (36)
Rs rge
98
c.
FROM
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING, DOVER
DATE
27th MAY, 1940 A14/0/821
Ben
TO
THE SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY
Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships nt the attached copy of a Note of the proposed arrangements agreed at a Conference at Dover today, 27th
28 MAY MAY 1940 RY
May, between Admiral Odenhal from the British
Admiralty, a representative from the French Admiralty, a representative from Admiral du Nord and myself, for the evacuation of the French and British Armies from Dunkerque and vicinity.
VICE ADMIRAL

MOST SECRET
99
PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN FRENCH AND BRITISH
NAVAL AUTHORITIES FOR THE EVACUATION OF THE FRENCH
AND BRITISH ARMIES FROM DUNKERQUE AND VICINITY.
The timing and order in which British and French troops will be evacuated must be decided by mutual agreement between Lord Gort and General Blanchard.
20-
Vice Admiral, Dover, will be responsible for regulating the sailing of French and British vessels to
Dunkerque for loading.
30-
Admiral Abrial ( with Rear Admiral Platon, Governor of Dunkerque, under his orders) is the only authority in charge of all arrangements for berthing and loading ships at
Dunkerque and on the coast. Captain Tennant is under
Admiral Abrial orders for arranging for berthing, loading etc.
of British vessels.
400
A French Naval Staff will be placed at Dover, for handling this side of evacuation, under the orders of
Vice Admiral Ramsay.
5.-
All naval means for evacuation shall be shared between
Dover and Dunkerque.
+
60-
The French Navy will send big transports to
Scuthampton or where necessary to evacuate to France as fast as possible, all troops arriving by smaller ships at
Dover and other places in the vicinity. Troops will be sent by train, when disembarked, to the next port of embarkation.
70-
British and French Admiralty agree that evacuation will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, without
(a) Adequate air protection.
(b) Re-occupation of the coast from Dunkerque to
Griz Nez, gained by a counter attack OD land forces combined with a naval operation.
Dover,
27th. May 1940.

104
the
M.011883/40
-
100
Commander-in-Chief to C.I.G.S.
I have received verbal message from Brigadier
Swayne that General Georges wishes embarkation to be done by myself and First French Army with mutual co-operation and everything. I am quite prepared to co-operate but support by which is implied resources is all on our side. Strongly urge that French should take their share in providing naval facilities.
Small parties of French have already been embarked but every Frenchman embarked is in place of 1 Englishman.
My instructions are that safety of B.E.F. is primary consideration. Removal of First French Army on arrival will deserve embarkation, by no means all those now in this area. May I be informed early what the policy regarding the embarking of French should be.

104
The
M.O 11883/40
101
DRAFT REPLY.
C.I.G.S. to Commander-in-Chief.
In reply to your 0 (B) 14/68 of the 29th of the 5th. While it is eminently desirable that nothing should be done which might suggest lack of co-operation with French, your instructions that safety of B.E.F. is primary consideration stand.
We have every reason to believe that French Admiralty are taking steps to provide shipping for evacuation of French troops.
When they have done so, facilities should therefore be shared equally between British and French personnel.
Until French ships materialise, however, you are authorised to use British ships for British personnel.
Arrangements to be made at Dunkirk must be concerted with Captain Tennant, S.N.O., and Admiral
Abrial.

102
101
M.011883/40
hdeart
CNS.
Ttte Service offer
102
Diva that 100
drawed W.W. received following for CNS
We canst refuse to Evacute Harchmin That table then off with on own troop. Ae s however to repeatedly upst thet Fail and of providing transport failities Jo the Lada Les stick to beat the Franch.
N.S Telephond to MARCEAU at 1600 telly them the they mot Shed way available weft 70
Cracting are.
S
Spoke tome on telephne of 1610 + 2111
him the Three qwiws what for CNS +
to MARCEAN was has dealt with spoke of CIGS Mather in same sense spoke to V.A Doa - for him the what as for tow.w.

104
101
31-1
M.011883/40
got
Evacuation of allied Troops from N.W. France. 26.5-4.6.40
10 peration "Dynamo")
Report submitted by V.A.Dover including:-
Narrative of Events.
HM ships taking part.
31-1 H.M. ships lost.
sembarkations in U.K. ports.
-
103
numbers disembarked in England.
the French Troops
1
2 destroyed by ships fire.
too freatrate operation.
Noted.
Carb
:
28/5
ate etc etc e thing officers.
tobe co-operation requested in ing recommendations.
28/5
40.
O.D. (H)
VCNS tells me this has been dealt with
&
servens
30/5.
NAVY BILL
ISSUED

104
f
52
drance
101
31-1
M.011883/40
90.1
Evacuation of allied Troops from N.W. France. 26.5-4.6.40
10 peration "Dynamo")
Report submitted by V.A.Dover V. including:-
Narrative of Events.
HM ships taking part.
31.1 H.M. ships lost.
Daily list of disembarkations in u.k. ports.
Daily record of numbers disembarked in England.
Co - operation of the French Troops
Enemy aircraft destroyed by ships fire.
Enemy efforts too frustrate operation.
40-19-0 air Co. operation.
control of Troops.
atc etc etc
Report to be forwarded to all thing officers.
90-1 air Ministry & Was Office co-operation tobe requested in analysing report and froming recommendatious.
1940.
NAVY BILL
ISSUED

Copies this uport have been distributed
Vo:
1st Lord
1st Six Land
V.CN.S.
ACNS (H)
D.P.D.
IS.P.S. (Lyhard)
CW (Mshadour)
Pupiar- to send SF. upus towar othir and
An ministry.
Phosone the MM.
19/6/40
Read with the greatest interest.
2. Loss of troops after embarkation.
The loss of 2,000 troops after embarkation is remarked on as a tragedy by Vice Admiral, Dover but in point of fact it is a minute percentage of the whole that were rescued.
3. Air Co-poeration.
Remarks by V.A. Dover are fully concurred in. It vital, particularly in view of the invasion threat that to seems closer co-operation should be attained. It is difficult imagine such a picture as is painted by Admiral Ramsay being accepted for one moment by General Goering!
4.
It is noted that page 6 of the original report is apparently missing.
(Copy harten insulted)
Charcoma
M D.O.D. (H)
28.6.40.
Concur with D.O.D. (H).
important lesson Vice-Admiral's learnt - namely para. that the officer in his charge
2. The 8 contains the really requirements direct to the R.A.F. authority Operational Units working again, of an operation should have to communicate with him. will arise distriand although Undoubtedly copies of this this requirement have been widely the buted, it seems unlikely that report action will be taken by
Air Ministry to amend the present method unless the
Admiralty presses for it. It seems to be discussion with Air Marshal Joubert in the first instance.
suitability of A.L.Cs and M.L.Cs for combined operations
3. Para. 109 of the report confirms the special letter, with a few omissions, would be suitable for publi-
4. It is considered that the Vice-Admiral's covering cation as a despatch.

(1952) Wt. 20906/9711 40M 8/39 S.E.R. Ltd. Gp. 671
107
Register No.
Minute Sheet No. 105
Page 6 is included in the ww.ord copies distributed.
Submitted, in the- first instance, whether any action should be. taken with the Air Ministry as pupaned m D.T.S.D.
Capits of the upot have not been 25ml trAin Ministry or was office.
Prosine,
HW 7th
15-7-40
Had a combined staff been told to investigate the problem of evacuating 300,000 men from a harbour and beaches under the shadow of hostile shore based aircraft and in close contact with the enemy's troops, it is probable that their appreciation would have been very pessimistic. It is even possible that by all known rules the operation could have been summed up as impossible.
2. DYNAMO was carried out by impromptu measures, executed with the greatest courage.
3. The lessons to be learned and it is hoped, applied to future combined operations, can only be extracted by the most carful analysis.
4. The portions of the Report which in any way reflect on
R.A.F. co-operation or on the conduct of troops have been marginally lined in blue. There are some stronger criticisms of the conduct of troops - particularly of the Pioneer Corps -
in V.A. Dover's letter of 6th July, B.14/0/1028/40, advance copies of which have been circulated under M. Branch minute
M. 013316/40 of 14th July, but which has not yet come before the Board.
5. Propose that the document complete be analysed by a
Committee of 3 Officers of the rank or equivalent rank of
Captain, R.N. One officer from
& Savie
A.C.N.S. (H).
22.7.40.

despatch
:- With regard to publishing this covering letter as a
Dunkirk actually Para.4 came - off second the half. beaches These and how figures many from enemy. are illuminating, and should I think be the Died the para.7 to be
Paras.7 would have to 11 complete, omitted. except for the first 7 lines of either It is Para.13. not ashore as if or This they afloat. would died in merely action be distressing thery relatives. sense the operation Press, followed the first 6 paras. which has already the in
This in only leaves a general description of individuals. by general praise and mention of appeared some
Their have given Lordships publicity after to the these. event, and the honours and awards
The general tributes paid by the Prime Minister and
The mangled above, I do not think it would arouse much interest. as
2. While I see no harm in publishing the despatch, from Press cannot afford the space to print large extracts it the Gazette these days, while to the historical student would be nearly valueless.
Narrative the of Events, and I think perhaps some - "corrective" to within the Service - say to all Flag Officers including only the
3. Suggest, therefore, the report be circulated criticisms of the R.A.F. may be desirable.
7th August, 1940.
DTSO efened for consideration of (5) KNS(H)
and
(3)
vensa.
Gae for Heads
9(ht liu
(H)

(1709) Wt. 22622/4313 50M 9/38 S.E.R. Ltd. Gp. 671.
108
Register No.
M.011883/40
Minute Sheet No. 2.
105
Submitted:
(1) For approval to forward this report to all Flag
Officers with the "corrective" referred to in V.C.N.S.'
para.3 contained in the attached draft covering letter (I).
(2) For approval to write to Air Ministry and War
Office informing them of the existence of this report and requesting, as in the attached draft (II) their co-operation in analysing the report and framing recommendations therefrom as in A.C.N.S.(H)'s para. 5.
2.
It is suggested that if action as at (2) above is approved, the analysis should be carried out at the I.D.C.
DIRECTOR OF TRAINING & STAFF DUTIES
DIVISION.
24.8.40.
(2) of
DTIS: 24.8.40.
Comm his pace.
(H)
3L 8. 4
Conan
P.SOP
319

1. D.N.A.D. suggests that for the record purposes in War
Diary it is desirable to note that following Naval aircraf squadrons took part in these operations:
801
"Skuas"
806
815
Swordfish"
825
826 "Albacore"
2. These squadrons operated under the orders of
Coastal Command and carried out attacks on tanks, transport, batteries, gun emplacements and enemy positions in the
Calais and Dunkirk areas and also attacks on E-boats. In spite of their relative inadequacy for the purpose the
"Skuas" were also detailed for fighter escort of ships.
3. It should also be noted that the above aircraft were the only available British DIVE bombers, the Royal Air
Force possessing none.
(lanet Mooty
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL AIR DIVISION.
17.10.40.
A
28 OCT RECEIVED 1949
Abpd - Acrs (H).
x 4/xii

111 12
109
CONFIDENTIAL 0
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
MILITARY BRANC
19
*
(Dover Despatch A. 14/0/876/40 of 18th June, 1940). DMIRALI
X435
been
Paez 6 mining walcole 107
SECRET.
24/6 109
HONESOUT
FROM
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER.
DATE
18th June, 1940.
No.A14/0/942/40.
TO
SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.
OPERATION "DYNAMO" - INDIVIDUAL SHIP REPORTS.
No. 11883/40
With reference to Dover Despatch No. A14/0/876/40 of
18th June, 1940, containing my report on Operation "Dynamo", be pleased to inform Their Lordships that it is intended to forward at a later date, for record purposes, the individual reports addressed to me from ships and officers who took part. There are about 330 of these reports, but all essential information has been extracted into the report, narrative, appendices, or recommendations of personnel.
2.-
At the present date the lists of recommendations of personnel are not complete and it is for this reason that the reports referred to are not being sent simultaneously with the
Despatch quoted in paragraph 1.
* MILITARY
J.
ADMIRALO 20 JUN
Sammy
VICE ADMIRAL.

111 12
109
CONFIDENTIAL T.
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
MILITARY BRANC
19 JUN 1940
*
(Dover Despatch A. 14/0/876/40 of 18th June, 1940). DMIRAL
1
110
1940
105
Head of Military Branch
1st Lord (already sent)
1st S.L.
V.C.N.S.
A.C.N.S. (H)
C.W. (Mr.Gleadowe)
21st June
0
S.F.Bath (Mr.Walsh)
D.P.D.
lost d
M.011883/40
:h
CONFIDENTIAL.
e e
A copy of Vice Admiral, Dover's Report on operation "Dynamo" is forwarded herewith.
(Sgd.). J. MacDongall.
for Head of Military Branch.
S
ve e
in a
as ch

111 12
109
CONFIDENTIAL to
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
MILITARY BRANC
19 JUN1940
*
(Dover Despatch A. 14/0/876/40 of 18th June, 1940). A DMIRALI
STATEMENT OF CONTENTS.
1
Pages.
Report dated 18th June, 1940
...
1 - 8
Introduction
...
...
1 - 2
Narrative of Events
...
...
1 - 40
Appendix I
:.
H. M. Ships, etc. taking part.
1 - 2
Appendix II
:.
H. M. Ships, etc. lost during
1 - 2
Operation "DYNAMO".
d
Appendix III
:
Daily list of disembarkations
1 - 10
in U. K. ports.
"
:h
Appendix IV
:
Daily record of numbers
1
disembarked in England.
Appendix V: Co-operation of the French le e
1
troops.
Appendix VI: Enemy aircraft destroyed by
1
ships' fire.
istribution made by over. lag Officer Commanding,
No. of Copies.
dmiralty
...
... 12, together with
...
original stencils
Ornander-in-Chief, Nore.
1
...
Portsmouth.
1
ve
1
...
1
er
Sheerness
1
an aval Officer-in-charge, Ramsgate. Dover.
1
he
1
0/
: was rench

112
CONFIDENTIAL
110
Office of
The Flag DOVER. Officer Commanding,
No. A.14/0/876/40.
18th June, 1940.
Sir,
Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report on Operation "DYNAMO", namely the evacuation of the Allied Armies from Dunkirk and neighbouring beaches between 26th May and 4th June, 1940. The report takes the form of this covering letter, together with detailed narrative and appendices.
2. THE POLICY AND THE PROGRESS OF THE EVACUATION.
During the course of the operation 316,663 troops reached safety in England after being evacuated from Dunkirk, and from the beach stretching 10 miles eastward from the entrance to Dunkirk Harbour. To those on the French coast, when in the early stages anything up to 50,000 troops were waiting to embark on a 10 mile sea front, the presence of perhaps 20 small warships offshore, and 200 small boats spread along the length of coast at any given moment, must have appeared as a feeble effort to tackle this great task.
Furthermore, it was impossible to adjust the arrival of ships, either at Dunkirk or opposite the beaches, to synchronise with the ebb and flow of the troop concentrations.
Broadly speaking, for the first 5 days of the movement, had more beaching craft been available to ferry from the beach to offshore vessels, it would have been possible to have evacuated a greater number. For the last 3 to 4 days, however, when the main bulk of the B.E.F. had already been evacuated, the rate of lifting was governed by the availability of the troops during the limited hours evacuation was possible.
3.
Throughout the operation one of the greatest difficulties was the ever changing situation presented.
Within 24 hours of the start, the operation took the shape of a forlorn hope to rescue the maximum number, say up to
45,000 before the whole force was to be overwhelmed by the enemy.
Next, the military situation became more stable, and it appeared that some three to four days would be available to complete evacuation of the B.E.F., estimated at some
175,000. During this stage evacuation by British resources of French troops was introduced, some 25,000 being mentioned.
decision to lift the rearguard of the B.E.F. off the beaches
During the course of the fifth day (30/5) a tentative at a definite time, viz. 0130/1, was reached. 24 hours later this plan was altered by military considerations, involving an
Naval definitely committed to provide for the extension of the period of evacuation. At the same time, the
50,000. evacuation or French forces, then mentioned as about 40,000/
Later, the French number rose and 150,000 or more was quoted. Finally no agreement could be reached with the French
Secretary as/
London,,Salty, 1.