TNA ADM 199 792

N.L.
9553
55
D-51.
(Revised-June, 1933
1940
CONFIDENTI,
FROM WHOM
DATE
RNO Weymouth
6/5 AB/40
16. 8- 40
MARKINGS TO BOARD.
SUBJECT.
Confidential
53
9552
|940ffice of the Resident
Naval Officer,
WEYMOUTH.
No.7/6.AB/40.
16th August, 1940.
Report of Enquiry into the loss of
H.M. Paddlesweeper "Waverley" in
SAUG 1940
operation "Dynamo".
MILITARY MILIT ARY BRANCH
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty Letter NL. 6245/40 dated
1st August, 1940, be pleased to submit to their Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry held by me into the circumstances attending the loss of H.M. Paddle
Minesweeper "Waverley" on 29th May, 1940.
2. Temp. Lieutenant F.P. Tattersall R.N.V.R., the 1st
Lieutenant of "Waverley" was examined on 16th August, 1940, and I elicited facts as follows:-
3. Whilst underway at about 1400 with some 750 troops on board the ship was bombed and a near miss - about 30 feet from the ship - - put W/T and lights out of action and also rendered one boat useless.
4. Two further bombs which fell on and through the
Sweeping deck aft flooded the steering compartment and put steering gear out of action. The after bulkhead of the
Saloon compartment held for some 20 minutes. The pressure of water then proved too great and this bulkhead gave and the consequent flooding of the Saloon compartment caused the ship to sink by the stern almost at once.
5. The damage sustained was such that a vessel of this type could not be expected to remain afloat. The behavior of material was normal and there is nothing in these circumstances to be learnt from the loss of this ship.
6. I would like to place on record that as "Waverley" was the ship of the Senior Officer of the group and carried the medical officer, Lieutenant Tattersall had his private 18 ft.
motor boat on board. This boat, in addition to its general

Noted few ANAD 27.8.40
5/9/40.

N.L.
9553
55
D-51.
(Revised-June, 1933
1940
CONFIDENTI
FROM WHOM
DATE
RNO Weymouth
6/5 AB/40
16. 8. 40
MARKINGS TO BOARD.
SUBJECT.
54
N.L.
9552
H.M. Paddlesweeper
-2-
1940
"Waverley"
Report of Enguiry (Continued)
usefulness in conveying the M. 150 other vessels, proved of considerable value in saving many lives after the ship sank.
I understand that Lieut. Tattersall has preferred a claim for compensation for the boat which was not picked up by the drifter which rescued the men who were in it.
7. S.P.s and C.B.s, except those in one "holed" chest which was thrown overboard, went down with the ship in about 15
fathoms. No trace of the ship remained.
8. In view of my remarks in Para.2 above, I do not consider that anything is to be gained by examining Temp.Lieut. S.F.
Harmer-Elliott, R.N.V.R. who was in command of "Waverley".
9. I was assisted in my enquiry by Commander S.M. Walker R.N.
(H.M.S. Boscawen) and Engineer Lieutenant A. Henderson R.N.R.
(H.M.S. Mercury).
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant, aBeatorg
Vice-Admiral.
The Secretary of the Admiralty,
The Admiralty, S.W.1.

Noted шурный few ANAD 27.8.40
hold.
JDNC.
5/9/40.
10

Noted, concurring with para. 11 of the report.
Para. 12 regarding side scuttle frames has been noted.
Loseanoficen
PASSA
Noted.
Lawah for 16.9.40. P.T.M.
hoted. DOD (H) 17/9.

1940
The Office of the Resident
Naval Officer,
WEYMOUTH.
No. 6/5 AB/40.
16th August, 1940.
18 AUG 1940
Report of Enquiry into the loss of
BRANCH MILITARY
6
H.M.S. "Grafton" in operation "Dynamo".
Sir,
With reference to AL. NL 6245/40 dated 1st August, 1940, be pleased to submit to their Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry held into the circumstances attending the loss of H.M.S. "Grafton" on 29th May, 1940.
2.
I examined Lieutenant Commander H.C.J. McRea R.N., the
Senior surviving officer, and Lieutenant (E) J.A.L. Hoskin R.N.
the Engineer Officer of "Grafton".
3.
At about 0250 when in vicinity of KWINTE WHISTLE BUOY
"Grafton" was hit by a torpedo on the port quarter just ahead of port propeller. The stern of the ship abaft the fore part of the wardroom was completely severed and sank.
(ii)
The upperdeck watertight hatch to wardroom lobby was, shortly afterwards, closed.
4.
The explosion of the torpedo caused the upper deck to be considerably indented right across between the after torpedo tubes and the after superstructure.
5.
Before the after bulkhead of the after magazine and shell room the ship was making no water but shortly afterwards "Lydd"
was in collision with "Grafton" and hit her at about the position of the indentation mentioned above. Water then commenced to leak into No. 7 oil fuel tank. As water was getting through to the after boilers with the fuel from No. 7 and 8 tanks, these were shut off.
6.
Although "Lydd" struck "Grafton" on the starboard side in the vicinity of No. 7 oil fuel tank, the blow was a glancing one and, while not in itself fracturing the ship's side, caused some indentation and probably started rivets and aggravated any damage to the tank that may have been caused by the explosion.
A little later S.S. "Malines" came alongside and all surviving troops were transferred to her.
7.
The Engineer Officer states that after the explosion it was found that the starboard propeller shaft could be moved but not the port shaft which was bent at the engine room bulkhead.
Otherwise all machinery and boiler rooms were in working order and all lights were burning.
8.
Almost immediately after the torpedo struck the ship an explosion in the vicinity wrecked the whole of the fore part of the bridge killing the Captain and Navigating Officer. The side plating on both sides were left intact. It has not been possible of the Admiralty.
Vice Admiral.
C. E. 7831/1922.
Wt. 48364/D6526 6/40 S.P.&Co

CONFIDENTIAL.
- 2 -
57
H.M.S. "Grafton".
Report of Enquiry (Continuation)
9553
1940
possible to elicit the cause of this damage.
9.
At 0400 approximately the ship was floating at about normal draught, except for a small list about 5° - to starboard and slightly down by the stern. Steam was maintained in No. 1 boiler.
10. Preparations were being made for "Grafton" to be taken in tow. "Ivanhoe" came alongside. As, however, she was on her way to Dunkirk to evacuate troops it was decided to abandon
"Grafton". "Ivanhoe" then took on board Officers and men remaining in "Grafton". "Ivanhoe" stood off and fired about
8 rounds of 4.7" shell at "Grafton" and then proceeded to
Dunkirk. On "Ivanhoe's" return passage from Dunkirk at about
1600 she passed close to the spot where she had left "Grafton"
and there was no sign of the latter though "Wakeful's" bow was seen still standing up (see Para. 3 of my report No.2/2 AB/40
of 10th August, 1940).
11. From the information elicited it is clear that from the material point of view "Grafton" stood up very well to damage received and the sea being slight, it seems that had there been any vessel available to take her in tow, there was a reasonable possibility of the ship reaching a British port.
12. A small point in connection with material which may be worth noting was that the explosion caused by the torpedo tore out four aluminium alloy scuttle frames two on the port side in the after cabin flat and two on the starboard side in the fore cabin flat. Scuttle frames of this material appear to be too weak to withstand heavy shocks.
13. No arrangements had been made to destroy the Asdic dome:. C.B.s in the chest in the Captain's cabin sank in the ship. S.P.'s, Secret Mine Chart and Charts were thrown overboard in a weighted bag.
14.
I was assisted in my enquiry by Commander John Domvile
Auchmity Musters R.N. and Commander (E) William Evelyn Cavendish
Davy R.N.
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant, aBedford
The Secretary of the Admiralty.
Vice Admiral.
C. E. 7831/1922.

Noted.
pumps in destroyers is separate consideration."
Reference paragraph under 7(iv), the provision ex usually awnings, lumber gear - stowed in the
Reference para. 7(v), etc. a large is quantity of stor steering gear flat. Enclosing the steering gear is readily accessible. The course practicable considered desirable, as best this gear should be at all not times be to secure the stores more stoutly and compartment SO that if displaced they will not of Commanding Officers to this by A.F.O.
the steering gear, and it is proposed to call the attenti
Reference paragraph 7(vi), when a destroyer rec a heavy blow either near the ends or amidships (e.g. from mine, torpedo, bomb or near miss), the "whip" of the shi about two nodal points situated near the bridge and at the after end of the machinery spaces is very large. In some the older destroyers, this has resulted in buckling as sta in paragraph 3(ii) of attached report, but in later destroyers (viz. KELLY, JERSEY) the ships have withstood this shock much better. Investigations are in hand to determine whether any modification of structure is practicable to strengthen the older destroyers in this locality.
s.v hoodal
24/9/40
D.N.O.
24 2 SEP 1940
Reference Noted, para 7(1), improvements in the present arrangment involved precludes the probibility of extensive alterations, of anxiliary steam pipes are under consideration but the work observing that owing to limitations of weight destrayer's hipe amangment are bound to be very vulnerable.
Reference para 7(v). it is considered that the fresent policy of guarding the stering gear by means of wire gratings should be extended to all cases where these are not already fitted.
7
for E.m.C
16/11/40
hoted for WNAD
Funa freedues
25.11.40
t
Director of Electrical Engineering
21.11.40

(1025) (Wt. 10009/5046 100M 5/40 S.E.R. Ltd. Gp. 671.
- 59
Register No. N.L. 9723/40.
Minute Sheet No. 1.
Reference paragraph 2 of E. in C's remarks, the drawings show portable wood covers and wire screens surrounding the steering gear in all destroyers. It is evident from the remarks in paragraph (v) of attached report that this is not sufficient, and, for the reasons stated in paragraph 2 of
D.N.C's remarks, dated 24.9.40, it is not desirable to fit more permanent screens.
x1
It is proposed therefore to take action as in the last part of para. 2 of D.N.C's remarks.
apc. apcona
DEC1940
Noted. - action should be taken as at kg DNC's 31/12.
for NE 2/1/40
-2 JAN 1941
Submitted for approval,
Fanson
Head FNR
3.1.41,
Atthmed thomas
Marlin
6.1.41 AFO

60
CONFIDENTIAL
Office of Commander-in-Chief,
Western Approaches,
9723
Mount Wise,
Devonport.
1340
19th August, 1940.
No. 8/7.AB/40.
HOME
REPORT OF ENQUIRY INTO THE LOSS OF H.M.S. "BASILISK"
IN OPERATION "DYNAMO".
21 AU 1940
BRANCH MILITARY
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty letter N.L. 6245/40
dated 1st August, 1940, be pleased to submit to Their
Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry into the circumstances attending the loss of H.M.S. "Basilisk"
on 1st June, 1940.
2. Commander M. Richmond, R.N., the senior surviving officer of "Basilisk" and who was in command of that ship, was examined on the 19th August, 1940.
3. At about 0815 on 1st June in the first air attack, a bomb with slight delay action exploded in the port side of the after end of No. 3 boiler room, cutting main and auxiliary steam lines and thus putting all machinery out of action. It also burst the bulkhead between the boiler room and engine room. This explosion made shrapnel holes in the port side in engine room and No. 3 boiler room. The smaller holes were plugged from within or without with wooden plugs and the larger ones covered by a collision mat.
about
(ii) In this attack/6 large bombs, which appeared to be of the delay action type, exploded in the water underneath the ship and these explosions caused the upper deck to buckle right across at a position between the after end of the after torpedo tubes and the after superstructure. The ship's sides were similarly buckled at this station.
4. Torpedo and depth charges were jettisoned and at about 0845 the ship was floating on an even keel with little increase in draught.
5. At about 0945, whilst efforts were being made by a Belgian tug - "La Jolie Mascotte" - to tow the ship a second air attack was made, during which, however, no hits or damage were sustained. The tug slipped the tow and proceeded to a distance.
6. At about 1200 in a third attack this time bombers diving to about 400 feet - the ship was smothered by hits and near misses, the bombs appearing to be of a "delay action" type.
Explosions underwater seemed to cause the main damage. The ship shuddered and heeled to starboard, righted herself and sank in about three minutes, settling on the bottom on an even keel in about 4 fathoms. She was then abandoned.
The destruction of "Basilisk" was completed by "Whitehall"
firing guns and torpedoes at her.
7

9723
61
- 2 -
1940
7. The following remarks are put forward as the result of experience gained from damage:-
(1) Engines and Boilers.
Arrangement of Main Steam system is such that if pipes on starboard side were undamaged and cross connection valve shut, the starboard turbines could still be provided with steam. No improvement is therefore suggested in the existing system.
Arrangements of both auxiliary superheated and auxiliary saturated systems, on the other hand, are such that they are very vulnerable. The whole system, in each case, being put out of action if any part of the system in the boiler rooms is damaged.
In the case of "Basilisk" it is presumed. that the bomb damaged both these systems, so that all steam auxiliaries were consequently put out of action so that it was impossible to maintain steam.
It is therefore considered that the provision of additional isolating valves and alternative leads in both the auxiliary superheated and saturated steam system is highly desirable.
(ii) Lighting.
It was not found possible to start the petrol driven dynamo on account of magneto trouble. The
Oldham lamps of which an additional number had recently been supplied all worked and were most useful. It is considered that a number of torches should be placed in handy positions in each compartment.
(iii) W/T.
An arrangement had been made in "Basilisk" to carry power direct to the W/T installation from the petrol driven dynamo, and had the engine been able to be started this secondary means of operating W/T would have been very valuable.
(iv) Pumps.
Although the necessity did not here arise it was brought out in my enquiry that it would be an advantage to have two portable electric pumps available for pumping out flooded compartments and for use in case of fire.
(v) Steering Gear.
Concussions caused stores etc. stowed in the after steering compartment to fall in and cover the steering gear. It is considered desirable to have the steering gear endlosed to prevent this.
(vi) Construction.
In the case of "Basilisk" hull weakness was again demonstrated. In two other cases ships have broken their

- 3 -
9723
62
13401
their backs at the same position. In one case as the result of an explosion forward and in the others of one aft.
This weakness may be due to the comparitive absence of weight in this part of the ship.
Before it there is the engine room with torpedo tubes above, and abaft it there are the after guns, magazines and shell rooms.
This section contains on the main deck only the cabin flats and below two oil fuel tanks which cannot always be full.
Also, in this connection, the ship's bottom from abaft this station is flat and rises towards the stern. Here all plating, including decks, is of lighter than further forward.
The actual breaking of the ship's back appears to be caused by the "whipping" of the stern on the explosion taking place.
8. I was assisted in my enquiry by Commander
C.H. Brookes, R.A.N. and Commander (E) F.A. Lister, R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
VICE ADMIRAL.
The Secretary of the Admiralty.

Confidential
63
tome Kitz and Shippeds
January,
1
DOCKYARD
Stowage of Stores in Steering
Gear Compartment.
Destroyers.
D.710/41
1
During a bombing attack on one of H.M. Destroyers the concussions caused the stores in the after steering compartment to fall in and cover the steering gear.
2.
The attention of Commanding Officers is, therefore, invited to the necessity for making arrangements to secure the stores more stoutly, and dispose them in the compartment so that if displaced they will not interfere with the steering gear. Enclosing the steering gear is not desirable as this gear should be at all times readily accessible.
JDR.

fonfidential
63
helfed town of thems Kith and shippeds restization
January,
1
DOCKYARD
Stowage of Stores in Steering
Gear Compartment.
Destroyers.
D.710/41
1
During a bombing attack on one of H.M. Destroyers the concussions caused the stores in the after steering compartment to fall in and cover the steering gear.
2.
The attention of Commanding Officers is, therefore, invited to the necessity for making arrangements to secure the stores more stoutly, and dispose them in the compartment so that if displaced they will not interfere with the steering gear. Enclosing the steering gear is not desirable as this gear should be at all times readily accessible.
JDR.

Noted.
2. The 3" A.A. gun in KEITH was not primarily intended for close defence. For this purpose the ship had two converted Mk. II* pom pom equipm rang
3. Shields are being provided for all close range weapons.
not:
4. The multiple pom poms are/available for SKIPJACK class except at t)
expense of other services.
5. D.T.S.D. referred re 0.5 inch Mk. IV twin equipments.
CW
WSG
BJ
3.9.40.
for DIRECTOR OF NAVAL ORDNANCE.
4
September, 1940.
&
1.
Concur with D.N.O. (There appears to be a typing error in his paragraph 4.)
2.
0.5" Mark IV equipments cannot be made available for
SKIPJACK class as all are allocated to Auxiliary war vessels
None the less HALCYON class minesweepers are certainly underarmed. Subject to D.N.O's and D.N.C's remarks it is proposed to submit for approval in principle to alter their A.A.
armaments as follows, positions being prepared for the additional guns as opportunity offers and the guns to be allocated as and when available.
(A) GOSSAMER, LEDA, SEAGULL, HAZARD, HEBE, SHARPSHOOTER,
BRAMBLE, BRITOMART and SPEEDY:-
Add 1 - 0.5" Mark III and re-arange this and existing 0.5" Mark III in sided positions.
(B) GLEANER and JASON (A/S Patrol vessels of H ALCYON Class)
Add 1 - 0.5" Mark III as for GOSSAMER etc.
(C) NIGER and SALAMANDER
Remove forward 4" V in C.P. II and substitute
4" V on H.A. III or IV mounting.
Add 1 - 0.5" Mk. III as for GOSSAMER etc.
(D) HALCYON, HARRIER, HUSSAR and SPEEDWELL.
Remove 2 pdr. II and substitute 2 - 2 pdr on single mountings, sided. Priority for allocation
+1
to be after Corvettes.
requirement 3. for 11 additional 0.5" Mk. III equipments for Ships
Should it be clearly impossible to meet the shown in para. 2 (A) and (B), single 2 pdrs. (2 per ship)
should be allocated in lieu and the existing 0.5"s diverted to other services.
and w
DIRECTOR OF TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES
DIVISION.
14-9.40.

)5) Wt. 39034/0256 100M 1/40 S.E.R. Ltd. Gp.671.
- 65
Register No. NL 9957/40.
Minute Sheet No.
DiSD'n 14/9/40 has has extracted to at x
12491/10
on on papers.
2. DM 1 DMAD
iqlalum 160.
noted, carewring with ANO at 4
Noted they jo DNAP
26.11.40
DONC
15OCT1940

CONFIDENTIAL.
NC
MILITARY BRANCI
66
24 AUG 1940
Room 90 Archway Block (s).
No.9/8.AB/40.
24th August, 1940.
9957
ENQUIRY INTO THE LOSS OF H.M.S. "KEITH"
IN OPERATION "DYNAMO".
1940
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty Letter, No. N.L. 6245/40 dated 1st August,
1940,
I have the honour to submit to Their Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry into the circumstances attending the loss of
H.M.S. "Keith" on 1st June, 1940.
2. Captain E.L. Berthon, D.S.C., R.N., the senior surviving officer of
"Keith" and who was in command of that ship, was examined on the 23rd August, 1940.
3. At about 0740 in the first dive bombing attack made on "Keith", delay action bombs exploding just astern of the ship caused the wheel on the bridge to jam but tiller flat steering wheel was connected up and the ship was conned by telephone from the bridge.
4. At about 0750 a near miss or hit on the starboard side made a large hole in the side at the forward end of the Starboard Engine Room below the water line, and this or another bomb burst the bulkhead between the Engine Room and
After Boiler Room on the starboard side. Both these compartments were flooded.
A fire which had started in the boiler room thus being extinguished.
At about the same time another hit or near miss on the port side caused ship to take a heavy list to Port.
5. Engines were now completely out of action, and ship stopped.
6. Ship lay with one anchor down and was water tight except for the flooded Engine and After boiler rooms.
Shortly afterwards orders were given to abandon ship and only those necessary for preparing ship to be towed, remained on board. At this time the ship righted herself and remained for about ten minutes on an even Keel but very low in the water. A further bombing attack now caused the stern to rise sharply and the ship capsized to port and disappeared below the water in about
5 fathoms.
7. The severe bombing to which "Keith" was subjected, caused damage which makes no reflection on the material, and no defects which contributed to her loss were revealed.
8. As regards stability it is of interest to note that, prior to the attacks, "Keith", with 1400 troops on the upper deck and mess decks, when steaming at 28 knots was forced to put her helm hard over, and that though she heeled very heavily and remained over for an appreciable time, she came back on an even keel.
9. Lessons learnt from the experience in the case of "Keith" are as follows:-
(i) Armament.
The 3" Anti Aircraft gun is not the best weapon for repelling close Air attack. It is considered that a larger number of, and better positioned, small calibre guns with a high rate of fire and big spread, are the most effective.
It is also considered very necessary that the gunners of small Anti
Aircraft weapons should have some form of shield.
(ii) Carley Floats.
These should not be stowed in a vertical position as they are, thus, more difficult to launch and much more exposed to damage from gun fire, bomb splinters, etc.
10

67
- 2 -
10. I was assisted in my enquiry by Commander T.A. Powell, R.N., and
Commander (E) P.C. Taylor, R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant, aBeatorg
The Secretary
VICE ADMIRAL.
of the Admiralty.
9957
1940
It is considered that in this class of ship it would be prererable to mount a multiple pom pom in place of the After 4" gun, also that in place of the
4 barrel.5 gun amidships, one twin.5 on each side of the ship, giving the maximum possible are of fire, would be more valuable.
7. The twin Lewis (Double barrel) gun on the fore bridge proved useful and, it is thought, accounted for one enemy bomber which, after its attack, crashed in the sea astern.
8. I was assisted in my enquiry by Commander T.A.Powell, R.N., and
Commander (E) P.C. Taylor, R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant, aBestord
The Secretary of the Admiralty
VICE ADMIRAL.

-NC
-
70
CONFIDENTIAL.
c/o OFFICE OF
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER.
27th August, 1940.
No. 11/10.AB/40
10141
Sir,
1940
Enquiry into loss of H.M. Drifter
"Paxton" in Operation "Dynamo".
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L. 6245/40
dated 1st August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their
Lordships the following report resulting from an Enquiry into the circumstances attending the loss of H.M. Drifter
"Paxton" on 28th May, 1940.
2.-
Temporary Skipper A. M. Lovis, R.N.R. the surviving officer who was in command of "Paxton" was examined on
27th August, 1940.
3.-
At about 1630 a near miss from a bomber diving low blew a hole in the ship's port side.
She made water instantly but as engines were still working she proceeded, sinking steadily, to a position in the harbour clear of the fairway where in about 20 minutes she settled down and was abandoned with gunwale awash in shallow water.
4.-
All S.P's and charts had previously been thrown overboard in a weighted bag and in deep water.
5.-
In the circumstances in which this vessel was lost no useful information as to the behaviour of material was obtained.
6.-
I was assisted in my enquiry by Commander F. J.
Walker, R.N., and Lieutenant Commander (E) Weston Smith,
R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
ADM 30AUG 30 AUG BRANCH 1940
aBedford
VICE ADMIRAL.
The Secretary of the Admiralty,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

NC
10142
-
72
1940
CONFIDENTIAL.
HINDS
c/o OFFICE OF
30 AUG 1940
No. 12/11.AB/40
ADMIRALTY
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER.
27th August, 1940.
Sir,
Enquiry into the loss of H.M. Drifter "Girl
Pamela" in Operation "Dynamo".
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L. 6245/40
dated 1st August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their
Lordships the following report resulting from an Enquiry into the circumstances attending the loss of H.M. Drifter
"Girl Pamela" on 29th May, 1940.
2.- Temporary Skipper C. Sanson, R.N.R. the senior surviving officer who was in command of "Girl Pamela"
was examined on 27th August, 1940.
3.- At about midnight on 29th/30th May, "Girl Pamela"
in company with three other drifters was lying, with engines stopped, outside the entrance to Dunkirk harbour in a heavy smoke pall when she was rammed by an escort vessel coming out of the harbour. She was struck on the starboard bow and sank within four minutes on an even keel in about 3
fathoms.
4.- All C.B's and confidential matter, which were placed ready for destruction, were immediately burnt in the stokehold.
5.- The circumstances in which this vessel sank were such that, from the material point of view, there is nothing to be learnt.
6.-
I was assisted in my enquiry by Lieutenant Commander
(E) Weston Smith, R.N.
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient servant, a Bedford
VICE ADMIRAL.
The Secretary of the Admiralty,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

CENTRA
AUG 194
74
CONFIDENTIAL.
c/o OFFICE OF
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING
DOVER.
N.L.
10167
28th August, 1940.
No. 13/12.AB/40
1940
Sir,
Enquiry into Loss of H.M. Danlayer "Nautilus"
in Operation "Dynamo".
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L. 6245/40 dated
1st August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an Enquiry into the loss of H.M. Danlayer "Nautilus" on 29th May, 1940.
2.- Acting Skipper R. MacLean, R.N.R. the senior surviving officer who was in command of the vessel was examined on
28th August, 1940.
3.- Whilst going alongside "Greyhound" during heavy bombing attack to transfer soldiers an explosion from a near miss about 6 feet off caused "Nautilus" to lift out of the water. Engine was put out of action, steering gear jambed and ship started making water rapidly.
4.- Soldiers and crew were transferred to "Greyhound"
and by the time this operation was completed she was about
6 feet down in the water and sinking.
Later "Sandown"
fired a few rounds to ensure her sinking as soon as possible and to clear the fairway.
5.- S.P's and confidential matter on board were destroyed by fire. In this connection I would like to draw attention to the very commendable action taken by Skipper MacLean.
After transfer of all personnel to "Greyhound" and when water had risen nearly to the level of his bunk he remained on board, and in order to prevent the books sinking in shallow water he made a pile on his bunk, soaked it in petrol and set fire to it thus ensuring their destruction.
6.- The loss of this vessel reveals, in the circumstances, no information of value as to material.
7.- I was assisted in my Enquiry by Lieutenant Commander
(E) Weston Smith, R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant, aBedford
VICE ADMIRAL.
The Secretary of the Admiralty,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

will Bebby
10932
x Confidential
D-51.
(Revised-June, 1933.)
1940
78
FROM WHOM
DATE
Adminal Bedford.
various dates
MARKINGS TO BOARD.
SUBJECT.
Loss of various H.L. thips
/
"Dinamo"
CONFIDENTIAL.
No. 14/13 A.B./40.
CENT AUGTRY
Admiralty, S.W. 1.
-
75
30th August, 1940.
Enquiry into loss of H.M.
Armed Yacht GRIVE in
Operation Dynamo.
10168
Sir,
119401
With reference to Admiralty Letter M.L 6245/40
dated 1st August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their
Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry into the loss of H.M. Armed Yacht GRIVE on the 1st June
1940.
2.
Temporary Sub Lieutenant J.K.B. Miles, R.N.V.R, the senior surviving officer of GRIVE was examined on
29th August, 1940.
3.
At about 2230, when GRIVE had just turned on an easterly course and was about 1½ miles from the coast a big explosion right underneath literally blew the ship to pieces and she disappeared in about 8 to 10 fathoms.
4.
Although it cannot be definitely stated what was the cause of the explosion it seems most probable that it was due to a magnetic mine.
5.
The ship had not been degaussed but work was
1947
in hand when she was withdrawn for Operation Dynamo.
6.
In the circumstances nothing was learnt from the loss of this vessel.
ARY
7. H. de P. Richardson, R.N., and Commander (E) C. Gatey,
I was assisted in my enquiry by Commander
1940
R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant, aBidford Vice Admiral.
he Secretary of the Admiralty.
178.

H.M.S. "HAVANT".
report
With reference to paragraph. 10. of enclos
Generator was fitted in No.1. Boiler Room.
the Diesel pump, provision which for can be used steering provided gear of these ships by han
2. working In the event of electrical failure there jammed. the rudder head is not for Sel But
Engineer in Chief.
8th October. 1940.

-
80
CONFIDENTIAL.
N.L.
10932
No.16/15.AB/40
Harwich.
1940
3rd September, 1940.
Sir,
Enquiry into the loss of H.M.Paddle Minesweeper
"BRIGHTON BELLE" in operation "Dynamo".
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L. 6245/40 dated bet
August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an Enouiry into the
NL
CONFIDENTIAL
w10932/40
9530
No.4/4.AB/40.
8530
13th August 1940.
REPORT INTO THE LOSS OF H.M. TUG ST. FAGAN
IN OPERATION "DYNAMO".
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty letter N.L. 6245/40
dated 1st August 1940, be pleased to submit to Their Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry held by me into the circumstances attending the loss of H.M. Tug
ST. FAGAN on 1st June 1940.
2. Lieutenant-Commander G.H. Warren, R.N., who was in command of ST. FAGAN was examined on 13th August 1940
and the following is an account of the loss of this vessel.
3. At about 0300 approximately three miles east of
Dunkirk, ST. FAGAN slipped the lighters she was towing and they proceeded to establish communication with the beach for the purpose of embarking troops. ST. FAGAN was standing by under way but stopped. At about 0400 the ship was struck amidships by a bomb and sank immediately in about six fathoms. She settled on the sea bed on an even keel with masts standing vertically.
4. ST. FAGAN had not been degaussed but as her
Coxswain, who was not far off in the skiff, stated that he saw a bomb drop on the ship - he thought down the funnel -
there does not appear to be much doubt that this was the cause of her loss. The Commanding Officer stated that he heard aircraft overhead though he did not see any.
5. There were no survivors from the personnel in the boiler and engine rooms from whom it would have been possible to elicit particulars as to the actual damage.
6. In the circumstances no useful information is obtainable as to behaviour of material nor do any suggestions for improvements arise.
7.
MILITARY BRANCH
The Secretary of the Admiralty.
ADMIRAL 16AUG1940

H.M.S. "HAVANT"
report
With reference to paragraph.10. of enclos
Generator was fitted in No.1. Boiler Room.
the Diesel
2. In the event of electrical failure pump, provision which for can working be used steering gear of these ships by there han jammed. provided the rudder head is not
0.18

- 80
CONFIDENTIAL.
N.L.
10932
No.16/15.AB/40
Harwich.
1940
3rd September, 1940.
Sir,
Enquiry into the loss of H.M.Paddle Minesweeper
"BRIGHTON HELLE" in operation "Dynamo".
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L. 6245/40 dated bst
August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an Enquiry into the loss of
-
78
REPORT INTO THE LOSS OF H.M. TUG ST. FAGAN IN
OPERATION "DYNAMO" - Page 2.
7. There was no time to salve the small number of
S.P's onboard and these went down in the ship.
8. I was assisted in this Enquiry by Commander John
Domvile Auchmuty Musters, D.S.C., R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant, aBeatord
Vice Admiral.
9530

H.M.S. "HAVANT"
With reference to paragraph.10. of report
Generator was fitted in No.1. Boiler Room.
the Diesel enclos for 2. In the event of electrical failure provision which can working be used steering gear of these ships by there han pump, jammed. provided the rudder head is not
0.11

I
80
CONFIDENTIAL.
N.L.
10932
No.16/15.AB/40
Harwich.
1940
3rd September, 1940.
Sir,
Enquiry into the loss of H.M. Paddle Minesweeper
"BRIGHTON HELLE" in operation "Dynamo".
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L. 6245/40 dated bet
August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an Enquiry into the loss of H Paddle Minesweeper
PaNL 9530 /to
NL
NL7/8
I
79
CONFIDENTIAL.
10932
Harwich.
No. 17/16A.B/40.
1940
3rd September, 1940.
MILITARY
Report of Enquiry into the loss of H.M.
de
Drifter "Lord Cavan" in Operation "Dynamo".
Sir,
OL/E/2/8.
With reference to Admiralty Letter M.L.6245/40
dated 1st August, 1940, be pleased to lay before their
Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry held into the circumstances attending the loss of
H.M. Drifter "Lord Cavan" on 1st June, 1940.
2.
Commander A.J. Cubison, D.S.C., R.N. who, as
Senior Officer of the group was on board at the time, was examined on 3rd September, 1940.
3.
At about 2200 on 1st June "Lord Cavan" embarked a General Officer and his staff at Dunkirk Pier to transfer them to a Destroyer berthed at the Seaward End of the pier.
4.
When shoving off from the Pier a shell hit the ship on the port side forward just on the water line, passing through the messdeck and out through the Starboard side, bursting on the pier. The explosion made a hole about two feet square in the Starboard side. Ship flooded and sank in three minutes.
5.
There were no C.Bs. or S.Ps. on board.
6.
I was assisted in my Enquiry by Lieutenant
Commander (E) W.G.H. Nicholson, R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant, a Beatord
VICE ADMIRAL
The Secretary of the, Admiralty.

H.M.S. "HAVANT".
report
With reference to paragraph.10. of
I
Generator was fitted in No.1. Boiler Room.
the Diesel enclose pump, provision which be used steering gear of these ships there for 2. working In the event of electrical failure jammed. can provided the rudder head is by not hand
011

-
80
CONFIDENTIAL.
N.L.
10932
No.16/15.AB/40
Harwich.
1940
3rd September, 1940.
Sir,
Enquiry into the loss of.Paddle Minesweeper
"BRIGHTON BELLE" in operation "Dynamo".
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L. 6245/40 dated bst
August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an Enquiry into the loss of.Paddle Minesweeper
"BRIGHTON BELLE" on the 28th May, 1940:-
2.
Temporary Acting Lieutenant Commander L.K.Perrin, R.N.V.R.
who was in command of "BRIGHTON BELLE" was examined on 3rd September, 1940.
3.
At about 1300 on 28th May, the ship with about 350 troops on board was closing the Examination Vessel off Ramsgate for instructions when the Commanding Officer saw ahead what he thought to be shoal water or a submerged object and as he had been previously warned that there were in this vicinity two or three uncharted wrecks, he stopped engines immediately, ordered full speed astern, and as the ship was nearly stopped the stern struck a submerged object and the after part of the ship flooded rapidly.
4.
About 7 minutes later the engine room bulkend gave and the engine room was flooded. Engines were stopped and all troops and crew were transferred to "SANDOWN" and other craft. "SANDOWN" took "BRIGHTON
BELLE" in towbut had not proceeded more than about a quarter of a mile when the tow was cut off and the latter ship sank in 3 to 4 fathoms, the Commanding
Officer, First Lieutenant and two men being picked up by "SANDOWN".
5.
At the time the ship was holed aft there was an air battle in progress and bombs were-dropping all around her though none fell near enough to cause any damage. The ship was zigzagging before engines were stopped and her stern was still swinging when she was damaged.
6.
There is no evidence of any explosion and it seems almost certain that the loss of this ship was due to damage caused by striking a submerged object.
7.
All loose Books and Charts were brought ashore but Books in the Steel Chest went down in the ship.
8.
I was assisted in my Enquiry by Commander H.J.Cubison, D.S.C.,
R.N. and Lieutenant Commander (E) W.G.H.Nicholson, R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant, seening (above) 1's 6246/40 for report aBeatorg VICE ADMIRAL.
The Secretary of the Admiralty.

Pr.NL9530/-60.
NL
meror
Invoice
81
CONFIDENTIAL.
10932
Harwich.
No.15/14.A.B/40
1940
3rd September, 1940.
Sir,
Report of Enquiry into the loss of H.M.S. "HAVANT"
in Operation "Dynamo".
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L. 6245/40 dated
1st August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an Enquiry into the loss of H.M.S.
ADMIRALTY
6 SEP 1940
"HAVANT" on 1st June, 1940.
2. Lieutenant Commander.H.Terry, R.N. who was First Lieutenant of "HAVANT" was examined on 3rd September, 1940.
3. At about 0900 in a low level attack "HAVANT" was hit by two bombs which entered the starboard side of the engine room above the water line and exploded, killing everyone in the engine room and causing the following damage:-
(a) Started leak in port side of engine room causing list to port.
(b) Fire in engine room; apparently from fuel tank of auxiliary
Diesel.
(c) Fractured oil fuel pipe to No.2 Boiler Room causing fire in that compartment.
(d) Ignited cartridges in ready use locker of "X" gun.
(e) Put all auxiliary machinery out of action, thus causing failure of electric supply for power and lighting and heavy escape of steam.
4. Emergency main stop valve controls on upper deck were operated and engines stopped on account of inability to work steering gear. One anchor was dropped.
5.
After all troops and some of the crew had been transferred to a skoot and to "SALTASH", the latter took "HAVANT" in tow, but could make little way due to fixed helm, "HAVANT's" rudder not being amidships when steering gear failed.
6.
Whilst "SALTASH" was endeavouring to tow "HAVANT", heavy delay action bomb attacks were made and list to port increased considerably by concussion from near misses. It was therefore decided to abandon "HAVANT". Tow was slipped and the remaining officers and men transferred to the skoot which was still standing by. Magazines were flooded before the ship was abandoned.
7.
"SALTASH" fired about 12 rounds of 4" at "HAVANT". There seemed to be an explosion in the vicinity of the after magazine. She went down by the stern and rolling to port sank in about 15 fathoms.
8.
S.P$, C.Bs and Charts were throm overboard in a weighted bag before the ship was abandoned.
Addic recorder was smashed and thrown overboard, but no arrangements lad been made to destroy the Dome, which therefore went down intact.
90/

-2-
10932
82
1940
9.
The ship up to the time she was abandoned was making no water except in the flooded engine room.
10.
The following are points which were revealed by this Enquiry:-
(i) The use of the auxiliary Diesel set was lost on account of its being in the damaged and burning engine room. In any case, it is considered, however, that the Diesel should always be kept running under "action" conditions.
(ii) There is no means of breaking clear or disconnecting steering gear, nor, if this could be done, is there an efficient method of secondary operation of same. In this case, inability to operate the steering gear rendered towing almost impracticable.
11. I was assisted in my Enquiry by Commander A.J.Cubison, D.S.C.,R.N.
and Lieutenant Commander (E) W.G.H.Nicholson, R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant, a Beatorg
VICE ADMIRAL.
The Secretary of the Admiralty.

Pr NL9530/40
NL
83
10932
CONFIDENTIAL.
HARWICH.
No. 18/17 A.B/40.
1940
4th September, 1940.
MILLIN
NH
Report of Enquiry into Circumstances
Attending Loss of H.M.S. "Mosquito" in operation Dynamo.
SEP1940
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L. 6245/40 dated 1st
August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry into the loss of H.M. Gunboat "Mosquito"
on 1st June, 1940.
2.
Lieutenant D.H.D. Gardiner R.N. who was in command of "Mosquito"
was examined on 4th September, 1940.
3.
At about 1100 on 1st June when 15 miles from Dunkirk a near miss from an enemy bomber caused ship to lift in the water, started slight leak in Engine Room, stopped air pump and threw the Dynamo off the board.
The Dynamo was got running again and fire and bilge pumps kept water under. Ship proceeded, after about seven minutes, on her course to
Dunkirk.
4.
At about 1230 off Dunkirk ship was attacked by about 20 Junker
Dive Bombers. A near miss ahead from the fourth salvo enveloped fore part of ship in mud and water and put the fore.5 gun out of action.
(ii)
A direct hit by a small bomb on the starboard side of upper deck abreast the funnel burst fresh water tanks, damaged funnel, wrecked sick bay and was probably the cause of jambing steering gear between wheel house and engine rooms.
5.
From a further salvo a delay action near miss on the part side caused a. large leak in the engine room. This may have been due to the sheering of the rivets securing the circulator intake casting to the hull. Water flowed first into Engine Room, ship taking a list to port. Engines stopped. This explosion also made small holes in port side in boiler room.
6.
To prevent ship drifting into the channel an anchor was let go.
The list to port increased and ship was abandoned when the port side of the upper deck was awash.
7.
Before abandoning ship the Commanding Officer made a pile of S.Ps and Charts and destroyed them by fire.
8.
Ship was seen later whilst settled on the bottom on an even keel in shallow water. She was subsequently subjected to another bombing attack.
9.
About two days later "Locust" placed two depth charges on board
"Mosquito" and blew her up.
10.
In the circumstances it appears that material behaved normally and no particular defects or weaknesses were revealed.
11.
I was assisted in my enquiry by Lieutenant Commander (E) W.G.H.
Ticholson R.N.
I am Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Beatory
The Secretary of the Admiralty.
VICE ADMIRAL.

P. NL 9530/40
84
CONFIDENTIAL.
Harwich.
10932
4th September, 1940.
No. 19/18 AB/40.
1940
Report of Enquiry into loss of H.M.Paddle A.A.
Ship "Crested Eagle" in operation "Dynamo".
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L 6245/40 dated
1st August, 1940, be pleased to lay before their Lordships the following report resulting from an Enquiry held into the loss of H.M. Paddle A.A. Ship "Crested Eagle" on 29th
May, 1940.
2. Temporary Lieutenant Commander B.R. Booth, R.N.R, who was in command of "Crested Eagle", was examined on 4th
September, 1940.
3. At about 1800 on 31st May, "Crested Eagle" was leaving
Dunkirk with troops on board when enemy dive bombers attacked her. One bomb passed through the engine room to generator flat where it exploded, fractured oil drums and started a severe fire.
(ii) At the same time a second bomb struck the ship a little further aft and a third and fourth still further aft.
4. The shock of the explosions lifted the ship well out of the water and in a few minutes she was burning furiously from the engine room to stern.
5. The ship was beached and abandoned, whilst further bombing attacks were being made on her.
6. Before beaching the ship, the Commanding Officer had thrown the steel chest containing S.Ps and C.Bs. and Charts overboard in about 12 fathoms of water, 2 to 3 miles from the shore.
7. When last seen at about 1845 the ship was almost completely gutted by fire.
8. There is in the circumstances no criticism of material.
The severe bombing caused fires with which it was quite impossible to cope. She had no W.T. bulkheads and excepting for the hull was entirely constructed of wood.
9. With reference to paragraph 4 above, although the ship was badly shaken by the explosion the steering gear continued to function. This is attributed to the fact that instead of the usual chain and rod connections, liable to fracture, from the bridge to the tiller, she was fitted with a heavy wire hawser which gave to the movement of the ship.
10. I was assisted in my enquiry by Lieutenant Commander (E)
W.G.H. Nicholson, R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient aBeatord Servant,
Vice Admiral.
The Secretary of the Admiralty.

R
/19. AB/40.
NL9530
SEPTRAL REGISTRY MAL
NL
86
8
CONL
CONFIDENTIAL.
Admiralty,
6th September, 1940.
Report of enquiry into the loss of
H.M. M/S Trawler "Calvi" in operation
"Dynamo".
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L. 6245/40
dated 1st August. 1940, be pleased to lay before
1/20. AB/40
PrNC9530/40
CENTRE
N47/8
NIL
(7-SEP 1940
-
85
REGISTRY
CONFIDENTIAL.
Admiralty.
6th September, 1940.
Report of enquiry into loss of
10932
H.M. Drifter "Boy Roy" in operation
"Dynamo".
19401
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L. 6245/40
dated 1st August, 1940, be pleased to lay before
Their Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry held into the loss of H.M. Flare
Burning Drifter "Boy Roy" on 28th May, 1940.
2. Temporary Skipper E.F. Dettman, R.N.R., who was in command of "Boy Roy" was examined on
5th September, 1940.
3. As "Boy Roy" was approaching Dunkirk at about
2100, Dive bombers dropped about 12 bombs all round the ship. These near misses opened the seams of the wooden hull and she made water everywhere.
4. As the ship was sinking fast, the Commanding
Officer turned her aside out of the channel and ran her towards the shore on the Western side of the entrance where she was grounded about 7 minutes after the attack.
5. Before furnaces were flooded, C.B's and S.P's
N.
were burnt. The secret charts, two Lewis guns and the breech of the 3-pdr. gun were transferred to a destroyer.
6. There is nothing to be learnt from the experience of "Boy Roy" which was a wooden hull and being subjected to such tremendous shocks from explosion, was certain to sink almost immediately.
7

7. I was assisted in my enquiry by
Commander A.J. Cubison, D.S.C., R.N., and
Lieutenant Commander (E) W.G.H. Nicholson, R.1
I am, Sir,
20
8301
Your obedient Servant,
At a Beaford
Vice Admiral.
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NL
NL9530
NL REGISTRY
86
CONFIDENTIAL.
Admiralty,
6th September, 1940.
Report of enquiry into the loss of
H.M. M/S Trawler "Calvi" in operation
"Dynamo".
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L. 6245/40
dated 1st August, 1940, be pleased to lay before
Their Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry held into the loss of H.M. Trawler
"Calvi" on 29th May, 1940.
2. Temporary Skipper B.D. Spindler, R.N.R., who was in command of "Calvi" was examined on
5th September, 1940.
10932
3. About noon on 29th May, "Calvi" was alongside the wall at Dunkirk with "Grenade" berthed outside her.
940
4. In a dive bombing attack one bomb struck
"Calvi" aft and she sank instantly by the stern, leaving her bow standing up so as to be visible at low water.
5. The Commanding Officer had, before going in to Dunkirk, burnt secret charts and some S.P's and
C.B's. The remainder of the S.P's and C.B's were in a steel chest and were left in the ship, it not being possible to remove the chest in the very short time available before she sank.
(ii), I am making enquiries to ascertain what books were held by this Trawler and whether the circumstances of their loss have been previously reported.
6
.......
BRAND
in the
Looded.
4/
-1y by Commander C.B. Land, R.N.
A.N.
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant, aBiaford Vice Admiral

Noted.
useless a and would not prevent the vessel practically the bulkhead Re para. fitted 6 of the in letter mentioned. the compartments the event of the flooding of either of sinking occasions. converted been on previous of
The practicability fishing trawlers of reducing has the Vulnerability
W.T. to a reconstruction, of is which would be necessary the
In bulkheads wartime both the repositioning of the boiler and shortages. prohibite ___???___ due to docks amounting
Insteed fore
3/3/41
MAR 1941
Concur with D.N.C. The conversion of Trawlers Drifte etc., to MS. craft already takes between 3 and 4 months, which is an additional reason for not adopting V.A. Bedford's suggestion.
for D. T. M.
AAS.
10/3/41.
Aam with DNC
he BAlow /4.3.41
The Secretary of the Admir
Whitehall,
London,
S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL
11131
83
From.
Vice Admiral A.E. Bedford.
1940
Date
17th September, 1940.
No.22/21. AB/40.
To
The Secretary of the Admiralty, London, S.W.1.
REPORT OF ENQUIRY INTO LOSS OF H.M. TRAWLER
"ARGYLLSHIRE" IN OPERATION "DYNAMO".
Sir,
With reference to A.L. M.L. 6245/40 dated 1st August,
1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry into the loss of H.M.A/S
Trawler "Argyllshire" on 1st June, 1940.
2. Sub. Lieut. J.S. Weddle, R.N.R., who was in command of "Argyllshire" was examined on 17th September, 1940.
3. At about 0245 on 1st June "Argyllshire" was about
2 miles E. of "S" Buoy in company with trawlers "Lord Melchett"
and "Stella Rigel. Many trawlers and other small craft were in the vicinity.
"Argyllshire" commenced an attack on what appeared to be a submarine. At 0250 "Stella Rigel" crossed "Argyllshire's"
bows and the latter reduced speed, the target then being about
1800 yards on her starboard beam. Shortly afterwards there was an explosion aft in "Argyllshire" due, it is believed, to a torpedo which struck her on the starboard quarter. The bows
40
stood up at about 45°, all fittings on bridge broke loose and ship went down stern first. Two to three minutes later she was seen with bows to the break of forecastle protruding vertically out of the water. She then sank and disappeared in about 20
fathoms.
4. Asdic gear was intact when ship sank; 5 depth charges set to 200 feet went down with her.
5. Confidential Books and SPs, except two or three in
Wireless Cabinet, and one Secret Mine Chart which was on bridge, were in steel chest in Commanding Officer's Cabin and went down with the ship.
6. The imperceptible time during which this ship remained afloat after the explosion precludes the possibility of learning anything as to the behaviour of material generally, but it is
2/10)
thought that if this class of vessel were fitted with & watertight bulkhead between the Boiler and Engine Rooms there is likelihood of their remaining afloat considerably longer in the
4/11
event of the fore or after compartments being flooded.
7. I was assisted in my enquiry by Commander C.B. Land, R.N.
and Lieutenant (E) R.Haynes, R.N.
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant, a Biaford Vice Admiral

Noled.
H. tarDMS. 25-9-40. reason depth charges were not first sent explos homan hunting this a contact at the time of the were
It is understood that these two vessels
SET
Rohd
Jacus
5.10.4

CONFIDENTIAL
NL
phone: CENTRAL 8700.
90
NAVAL OFFICES, grams: "NAVYCHARGE," GLASGOW.
ST. ENOCH HOTEL,
GLASGOW, C.I.
No. 23/22 A.B./40.
11166
17th September
1940.
1940
MILITERY
REPORT OF ENQUIRY INTO THE LOSS OF H.M.
TRAWLER "WESTELLA" IN OPERATION "DYNAMO
ADMIRALTY 22SEP 1940
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty Letter L.6245/40 dated 1st August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an Enquiry into the loss of H.M.A/S Trawler WESTELLA on 2nd June, 1940.
2. Chief Skipper A. Gove, R.N.R. who was in command of WESTELLA was examined on 13th September, 1940.
3. At about 1600 on 2nd June when patrolling in the vicinity of "I" buoy in company with BLACKBURN ROVERS the latter was blown up by a mine or torpedo, and sank instantly. WESTELLA went full speed ahead towards the position where
BLACKBURN ROVERS had sunk. As she neared the position explosions from BLACKBURN
ROVERS' depth charges shook and lifted the ship out of the water and put her asdic installation and pumps out of action.
4. Shortly afterwards whilst "WESTELLA" was in about the same position a heavy explosion underneath the ship's port bow opened up the bow and blew in the foremost bulkhead. Cables fell through the bottom and the gun platform on the forecastle deck was bent upwards about 2 feet. She was flooded to the engine room fore bulkhead and took a heavy list to port. About 10 minutes later, Depth Charges having been set to 'Safe', the sinking ship was abandoned survivors being taken onboard GRIMSBY TOWN.
5. As WESTELLA was a danger to navigation GRIMSBY TOWN was ordered by SAON to sink her. Chief Skipper Gove states that he understands that this was done.
6. The ship was probably sunk in about 12/15 fathoms. Except for a few books which were loose, and in use, the Confidential Books and Secret Publications went down with the ship in a weighted perforated bag.
7. Asdic installation was not destroyed before ship was abandoned, but may have been badly damaged by gunfire which sank the ship.
8. It has not been possible to establish definitely what caused the explosion, but all the evidence available points to the probability of it being due to a moored wire. mine D
9. In the circumstances in which this Trawler was lost no useful information was elicited as to the behaviour of material.
10. I was assisted in my Enquiry by Lieutenant Commander S.J. Hunt, R.N. and
Commissioned Engineer G.W. Feast, R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant, aisedford
VICE-ADMIRAL
The Secretary of the Admiralty,
Whitehall,
London, S.W. 1.