TNA ADM 199 792

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 38
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
Bray Beach, 2100/27.
"On arrival at Bray beach at about 2100/27, it was apparent that the first flight of the Army were showing signs of lack of discipline and for about 20 minutes we had a difficult time to restore order.
I ordered the soldiers in my vicinity to sit down and at the same time placed my platoon across the road to prevent any more men coming on the beaches. I then called for Army Officers to assist me and about 7 or 8 approached me.
I divided the soldiers up into parties of 30
and placed them under the care of an Army Officer or an Able Seaman and dispersed them at intervals along the beaches in the direction of Dunkirk.
As each party arrived on the road leading on to the beach they were met by seamen who marshalled them into parties of 50 and then led them on to the beaches.
Quiet was then maintained and the embarking on boats cormenced."
M.T.B. 16. Bray Dunes 1600/28.
"Several destroyers were now anchored off the beach, and whalers were embarking troops and taking them to the ships. The two Skoots were aground close inshore. The troops appeared in a demoralised state. They were hampering the work of the whalers, and some were attempting to swim off to the Skoots.
I proceeded close inshore, anchored in one fathom, and succeeded in embarking many troops.
This was done under considerable difficulties, as the troops were in an exhausted state and carrying full equipment. Few of them were able to climb onboard, and most of them had to be hauled in through the torpedo stern doors. A slow and exhausting procedure."
Tuesday 28th May, Bray beach 2125.
"Troops appeared from sand dunes in disorganised parties, mostly R.A.S.C. and R.E.'s who had been engaged on demolition work. Troops were rather shaken by the constant air attacks and machine guns. They had been waiting on the beaches for 30 hours before contacting ships. Very critical of Allied air support during whole of retreat, but were cheerful and disciplined. C.O. reported no embarkation organisation or control ashore. Clean shaven and comparatively fresh appearance of troops and the condition of their equipment contrasted increasingly as the evacuation progressed with the evidences of strain shown by ship's companies 01 H.M. Ships."
A.L.C. 5/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 39.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
A.L.C. 5 Report. East end of Bray beach 29th May.
"A slight surf, thrown up by the onshore wind, made beaching awkward, and the use of an anchor was essential.
Owing to bad seamanship, A.L.C. 5 lost her anchor and warp at the first attempt at beaching, with the result that the craft rode on much farther than was intended or desirable.
She was inmediately rushed on all sides by a wild, undisciplined mob of French soldiers, so many of whom got aboard that the boat was grounded; and it was only by the use of considerable amount of force that a sufficient number could be got overboard, so that the craft could be got off the beach.
Two very good anchors, one complete with a good long warp, were found in a derelict motor boat and these were used to replace the lost anchors before making a further trip.
The second attempt to embark French troops shewed that their undisciplined behaviour was likely to imperil the safety of the craft, and it was decided to proceed farther found. up the coast to La Panne where British troops were
These troops were ferried from the beach to one or other of the craft anchored offshore, at the rate of approximately 3 trips per hour."
A.L.C. 16. Report. 29th May.
and proceeded straight inshore to the beach near Old Dunkirk
"A.L.C. 16 was the first boat to be hoisted out, where she evacuated British troops. After making some seven soldiers, who overwhelmed the boat to such an extent that trips successfully, she was boarded by a mob of French flooded and both engines failed.
she became partially swamped, the starboard battery was
A.L.C. 16 to be floated off, and the port engine started."
Eventually sufficient French were evicted to enable
A.L.C. 17. Report. 29th May.
and followed A.L.C. 5 up the coast towards Bray. On
"A.L.C. 17 was the fourth boat to be hoisted out, of approaching the beach she was promptly boarded by crowd grounded. On the falling tide she was soon left
French soldiers, who so overloaded the boat that a she dry, the and remained In the meantime stranded the for Coxswain some three of A.L.C.17 hours. high procured and bayonets, to drove off the French when these again attempted assistance of some British troops, who with fixed rush the boat as the tide rose."
Wednesday, 29th May.
attempts of Large masses of French troops to intercept boats
"Soat difficulty experienced through persistent holding off French by means of rifle fire 50 yards further and demand passage. Assisted by British troops succeeded in along the beach."
June 1st/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 40
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued)
June lst, noon, Dunkirk East Beach.
"Conditions other than state of the sea, which was good, were shocking. The German planes were flying low and using machine guns. Operation delayed as great difficulty was experienced persuading some of the French to embark.
So far as I could understand their units were incomplete, and they were unwilling that part of a unit should embark without the rest. At cige point on the beach there were at least 2,000 men, none of whom would embark."
Monday, 3rd June. Dunkirk East Pier. 0045.
"There were no troops on the jetty so I went to the inner end. There I found a French Colonel with about 3,000
men waiting to be told where to go. I had to stand at the end telling them that their Colonel was in my ship before they would follow."
EL
of
Flag Officer Commanding,
Dover.
ine, 1940.
IS
LETT
DO
VN

APPENDIX I.
to
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
LIST OF H.M. SHIPS, PERSONNEL SHIPS AND HOSPITAL CARRIERS
TAKING. PART.
RUISER:
CALCUTTA
YERS:
ANTHONY
HARVESTER
MALCOLM
VIVACIOUS
BASILISK
HAVANT
MONTROSE
WAKEFUL
BLYSKAWICA
ICARUS
SABRE
WHITEHALL
CODRINGTON
IMPULSIVE
SALADIN
WHITSHED
ESK
INTREPID
SCIMITAR
WINCHELSEA
EXPRESS
IVANHOE
SHIKARI
WINDSOR
GALLANT
JAGUAR
VENOMOUS
WOLFHOUND
GRAFTON
JAVELIN
VANQUISHER
WOLSEY
GRENADE
KEITH
VERITY
WORCESTER
GREYHOUND
MACKAY
VILY
BIDEFORD
TS:
LOCUST
MOSQUITO
EEPERS:
ALBURY
HEBE
QUEEN OF THANET
BRIGHTON QUEEN
HALCYON
ROSS
BRIGHTON BELLE
KELLETT
SALAMANDER
EL
DEVONIA
LEDA
SALTASH
DUNDALK
LYDD
SKIPJACK
DUCHESS OF FIFE
MARMION
SANDOWN
EMPEROR OF INDIA
MEDWAY QUEEN
SNAEFELL
FITZROY
NIGER
SPEEDWELL
GLENAVON
ORIOLE
SUTTON
GLENGOWER
PANGBOURNE
SHARPSHOOTER
GOSSAMER
PLYNLIMMON
WAVERLEY
GRACIE FIELDS
PRINCESS ELIZABETH
WESTWARD HO
ESSELS:
ARLEY
COMFORT
MARETTA
BOTANIC
CONIDAW
NAUTILUS
BROCK
FYLDEA
POLLY JOHNSON
CALVI
GULZAR
SARGASSO
CHICO
JOHN CATLING
STARLIGHT RAYS
AL SERVICE CRESTED EAGLE
GOLDEN EAGLE
LS:
ROYAL EAGLE
TRAWLERS: INVERFORTH LORD INCHCAPE OUR BAIRNS THOMAS BARTLETT
RAWLERS:
ARGYLLSHIRE
KINGSTON ANDALUSITE STELLA DORADO
BLACKBURN ROVERS
KINGSTON OLIVINE
THURINGIA
CAYTON WYKE
LADY PHILOMENA
WISTELLA
GRIMSBY TOWN
SAON
WOLVES
KINGSTON ALALITE
SPURS
OLVINA
RECOVERY
FIDGET
JACKETA
ERS:
SILVER DAWN
FISHER BOY
LORD CAVAN

APPENDIX I.
Page 2
of and final.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
URNING
BOY ROY
GOLDEN GIFT
PAXTON
:
EILEEN EMMA
GOLDEN SUNBEAM
SHIPMATES
FORECAST
LORD HOWARD
THE BOYS
GERVAIS RENTOUL
LORD HOWE
TORBAY II
GIRL GLADYS
MIDAS
UT PROSIM
GIRL PAMELA
NETSUKIS
YORKSHIRE LASS
YOUNG MUN
IPS AND
LORMONT
MONA'S ISLE
KING ORRY
:
LLANTHONY
ES:
KINGFISHER
GUILLEMOT
CE
GRIEVE
G VESSEL:
i
16
M.A.S.B's:
6
67
7
68
10
100
102
107
EL SHIPS:
ARCHANGEL
LOCH GARRY
PRINCESS MAUD
AUTOCARRIER
LORINA
QUEEN OF THE CHANNEL
BEN MY CHREE
HAID OF ORLEANS
ROUEN
BIARRITZ
MALINES
ROYAL DAFFODIL
CANTERBURY
MANX MAID
ROYAL SOVEREIGN
COTE D'ARGENT
MANX MAN
SCOTIA
FENELLA
MONA'S QUEEN
ST. HELIER
KILLARNEY
NEWHAVEN
ST. SEIRIOL
KING GEORGE V
NORMANIA
TYNWALD
LADY OF MAN
P. LGUE
L CARRIERS: DINARD
ISLE OF GUERNSEY ST. ANDREW
ISLE OF THANET ST. DAVID
PARIS
ST. JULIAN
WORTHING
In addition, some 23 of H.M. Trawlers, Drifters and achts of the Nore Command assisted by taking one or more
OWS of boats to the coast.

APPENDIX III
TO
OPERATION "DYNAMO".
DAILY LIST OF DISEMBARKATION IN U.K. PORTS.
Notes:
(i) The numbers shown against each vessel are often approximate only.
(ii) This list is not necessarily complete as a number of vessels did not record their totals.

APPENDIX III
to
26th May, 1940.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events
DESTROYERS
PERSONNEL SHIPS
MINESVREPERS
-
PADDLE MINESWEEPERS
SKOOTS
FRENCH DESTROYERS
CANTERBURY 1299
MAID OF
ORLEANS 988
DRIFTERS
TRAWLERS
MISCELLANEOUS
HOSPITAL SHIPS
FOREIGN VESSELS
Drifter
24
JORDAN (A.B.V. 624
(Store Carrier)
MONA's ISLE 1312
(A.B.V.)

51.
(Revised-June, 1933.)
OM WHOM
DATE
RKINGS TO BOARD.
SUBJECT.
nt erect ove
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Operations of Commander Dove's party at Dunkerque.
, 4
my
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Referred
NOTATION ONLY
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Ddr.
magne antme ascure been DOLLOWS use ore dawn, the situation will become extremely arim"

tions of Commander k.
der Dove, Sub Lieutenant
N.V.R. The object was to erect
7th June, 1940.
rt of Dunkirk. Commander Dove atsuki" on May 2000 with 200
-Admiral Sir James ut. Field and Sub Lieut Addis
Somerville, K. C.B., D.S.O.,.
taul". On instructions from took command of the Drifter
On the orders of Commander Yates, we iled from Dover 6345 Friday the honour to submit the following es for the demolition party, 4
ort on the activities of Commander officer Major Russell, 1 Army e's party at Dunkirk.
3 signal ratings. After an
Dunkirk 0930 to find a large
We have the honour to be, Sir, rogress. We noted then, and for that in spite of the courage and
Your obedient Servants, the great majority of their targets. We immediately entered
J.L. Field Subtient RNVILE
the South Quay.
R.G.addis Subtient RMVR.
ratings, we reported to Cdr.
La Rentaul" to keep clear of the nent which had recommenced. We emolition party that we had afterwards made contact with portion of a demolition party.
re-enter the harbour and took
CS.
threatening to block completely a done at once it would have
32" the hospital and personnel y. The, "Gervaise" was mana side to avoid the risk of her ion in the fairway. Ammunition nd handed over to Cdr Banks who y primersor detonators for the a two hospital ships which were
$
The attached papers have been ng these was just put in hand seen by the Vice Admiral, Dover, and note made
* available at any time during for his list of personnel recommendations.
himself and with help of his the necessary work. Now the
Yours sincerely, ble for further hospital and
During these operations Cdr.
e situation in Dunkirk was so he opportunity nor the facilitie hadch Cress rk. Furthermore there was a re-
1" dive bombing until Monday 27th old Cdr Dove that there was no ommandeered a car and bought
SECRETARY to rom estaminets which were still
VICE ADMIRAL.
de tour of inspection and found property and personnel was il tanks on the south side of the atening the railway and timber
S. to S.W. which blew a pall of scene appear far worse than evening the work of loading ship eady a large number of noncomour besides an increasing number quay. The night was quiet planes sincleithe town for over*
ely small number of bombs. Early ho had been instructed by Cdr.
for safety, reported that magnet mines nad Deen 1814 near the entrance and that a French merchantmen had been blown up.
ore dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

Statement of the operations of Commander
Dove's party at Dunkirk.
Prefatory Note.
The party consisted of Commander Dove,R.N., Sub.Lieutenant
Field, and Sub.Lieutenant Addis, R.N.V.R. The object was to erect
& lethal kite barrage round the port of Dunkirk. Commander Dove sailed with H.M.D. "Boy Roy" and "Natsuki" on May 2014 with 200
sets of lethal kite year.,Lieut, Field and ub.Lieut Addis left Daver with H.M.D. "Gervais Rentaul". On instructions from
Captain A/P Dover,.Lieut. Field took command of the Drifter
(skipper Mr.Burgess,R.N.R)
Report.
Sub.Lieut Field and Addis, sailed from Dover 6345 Friday
May 25th with 9 tons high explosives for the demolition party, 4
tons of medical stores, 1 Medical officer Major Russell, 1 Army liaison officer Captain Hill, and 3 signal ratings. After an uneventful passage, we arrived off Dunkirk 0930 to find a large scale air attack by the enemy in progress. We noted then, and for the whole time we were in Dunkirk that in spite of the courage and persistence of the shore A.A.units the great majority of their salvoes were well astern of their targets. We immediately entered the harbour and made fast alongside the South Quay.
ratings, we reported to Cdr.
La Rentaul" to keep clear of the nent which had recommenced. We emolition party that we had afterwards made contact with
OFFICE OF
portion of a demolition party.
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER.
re-enter the harbour and took threatening to block completely a done at once it would have
32" the hospital and personnel
18th June, 1940.
7. The, "Gervaise" was man-
1 side to avoid the risk of her ion in the fairway. Ammunition nd handed over to Cdr Banks who
Dear Gleadowe, y primersor detonators for the
The attached papers have been a two hospital ships which were seen by the Vice Admiral, Dover, and note made ng these was just put in hand for his list of personnel recommendations.
* available at any time during himself and with help of his the necessary work. Now the
Yours sincerely, ble for further hospital and
During these operations Cdr.
8 situation in Dunkirk was so he opportunity nor the facilitie hadch Cres rk. Furthermore there was a re-
1" dive bombing until Monday 27th old Cdr.Dove that there was no ommandeered a car and bought
SECRETARY to rom estaminets which were still
VICE ADMIRAL.
de tour of inspection and found property and personnel was il tanks on the south side of th atening the railway and timber
S. to S.W. which blew a pall of scene appear far worse than evening the work of loading shi eady a large number of noncomour besides an increasing number quay. The night was quiet planes circledthe town for over*
ely small number of bombs. Early ho had been instructed by Odr.
for safety, reported that magnet mines nad been 1810 near the entrance and that a French merchantmen had been blown up.
ore dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

Statement of the operations of Commander
Dove's party at Dunkirk.
Prefatory Note.
The party consisted of Commander Dove, b.Lieutenant
Field, and Sub.Lieutenant Addis, R.N.V.R. The object was to erect a lethal kite barrage round the port of Dunkirk. Commander Dove sailed with "Boy Roy" and "Natsuki" on May 2004 with 200
sets of lethal kite gear. Sub,Lieut,Field and Sub.Lieut Addis left Daver with H.M.D. "Gervais Rentaul". On instructions from
Captain A/P took command of the Drifter
(skipper Mr.Burgess,R.N.R)
Report.
Sub.Lieut Field and Addis, sailed from Dover 6345 Friday
May 25th with 9 tons high explosives for the demolition party, 4
tons of medical stores, 1 Medical officer Major Russell, 1 Army liaison officer Captain Hill, and 3 signal ratings. After an uneventful passage, we arrived off Dunkirk 0930 to find a large scale air attack by the enemy in progress. We noted then, and for the whole time we were in Dunkirk that in spite of the courage and persistence of the shore A.A.units the great majority of their salvoe were well astern of their targets. We immediately entered the harbour and made fast alongside the South Quay.
Army Officers and signal ratings, we reported to Cdr.
Henderson B.N.L.O. who order "Gervais Rentaul" to keep clear of the harbour to avoid the aerial bombardment which had recommenced. We then reported to Cdr. Banks of the demolition party that we had brought his explosives, and shortly afterwards made contact with
Cdr. Dove who had taken charge of a portion of a demolition party.
Cdr.Dove now signalled the G.R. to re-enter the harbour and took in tow two sinking tugs which were threatening to block completely the South Quay. If this had not been done at once it would have been difficulty if not impossible for the hospital and personnel ships to make fast to the South Quay. The, "Gervaise" was maneeuvred to a small lock on the south side to avoid the risk of her being hit and exploding the ammunition in the fairway. Ammunition medical stores were then unloaded and handed over to Cdr. Banks who up to that time had not received any primersor detonators for the depth charges.
Cdr.Dove then signalled in two hospital ships which were in the offing and the work of loading these was just put in hand inmediately. As there was no. labour dock available at any time during our stay in Dunkirk Commander Dove himself and with help of his officers organised and carried out the necessary work. Now the
South Quay was cleared it was possible for further hospital and personnel ships to enter and load. During these operations Cdr.
Dove reached the conclusion that the situation in Dunkirk was so grave that we should have neither the opportunity nor the facilitie to erect a kite barrage round Dunkirk. Furthermore there was a regrettable lack of wind and no low or dive bombing until Monday 27th
At midday dr.Henderson told Cdr. Dove that there was no water in Dunkirk and we therefore commandeered a car and bought sufficient vichy and perier water from estaminets which were still open in Malo form H.Q.staff. We made tour of inspection and found that up to date the damage done to property and personnel was surprisingly little, although the oil tanks on the south side of th town were blazing flercely and threatening the railway and timber yards. There was a light uir from S. to S.W. which blew a pall of smoke over the harbour and made the scene appear far worse than reality. During the afternoon and evening the work of loading shi went on smoothly but there were already a large number of noncombatant forces crowded into the harbour besides an increasing number*
of ambulances lined up on the south quay. The night was quiet except for one air-raid when German planes circledthe town for over
(ca hour before dropping a comparatively small mimber of bombs. Early next morning May 26th, r.Burgess who had been instructed by Cdr.
Dove to anchor outside the harbour for safety, reported that magnet mines had been laid near the entrance and that a French merchantmen had been blown up.
dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

heseou control star wased comt coer
South Quay was by now crowded transport with which ambulances had been and pro Honcombatant The personnel who were traffic awaiting control and their shortly apparent after 093
Traffic ive. These control was negligible, attacks continued there move back bombing ised at dawn. attacks There started was with no THE THE as about troops 1700. object- were in a nervous condition. Dove on the Malo river front. had arrived. The troops were at ordered to take cover the casualties to the wounded small. The only we once and shelter in the in woods the town until the ships and as far As as a result of this to action other troops were remarkably the oil tanks. reason where could personnel estimate suffered badly when being the breeze near freshened of we these rigged up two
In the afternoon the two biggest cranes. One afforded good kites flew well to 2600 Unfortunately, however, in spite of almost immediately units kites from the feet top over of the harbour and might have informing the A.A. protection. and air force personnel the kite was shot down by small arms time. We then About 2000 we returned to the South waiting Quay 2
fire. returned to H.Q. and relieved the cypher to officer find for hospital again no dock labour Cdr Dove organised sort of make a short ships in the harbour and a personnel ship a party outside. to
As there ships was fast and embark the wounded and also some not traffic control. the Bombing had now ceased entirely and did recommence until 6200 next day.
The Hospital ships were made fast abreast and this allowed water brought a working party of 50 soldiers who unloaded returned water, with et the in two gallon tins, maps for staff and medicine the She personnel ship to tie up forward of them. The personnel stores. brought also then were never seen again. It is presumed they to th ship. water off the quay, although it was useful for the the and As a result of this absense of labour it was impossible wounded. Just get the dark a british destroyer (Wolsey?) came up between until piers.
before Dove's instructions we signalled her to keep clear we ha th on Cdr. berth for her. Eventually we told her to tie up alongside to pic up H.Q. officere onboard the destroyer Cdr. Dove asked Senior give a two staff who were to embark in the Destroyer. After General ii found hospital a ships. Lieut. Addis then drove to the Bastion embarking was list but after calling out some officers names The destroyer being there staff satisfied that all his staff were onboard. He refused to satisfi to nominal his presence the nexte he said hour he was Some ready 30 more to proceed. of the general's starf and arri we on the them in the personnel ship. The work of "Wolf.
left. Within quay-side to find the destroyer had sailed without embarkation them we had to embark and there was no air activity. At about 0030 H.M.S. to hound" H.M.S. "Wolfhound" was to provide W/T comminication trans on smoothly berthed alongside the South Quay and we took the Captain
Cdr.Henderson. the "Gervaise Rentual" could get no reply on her pa with mitter Dover and the as shore station had broken down. At0130 on Cdr the.Dove's quayside turned in May a 27th we were awakened by a Frenchman who had fired tha a for few hours sleep in a trench rifle at us coming and that it was his "abis". We movements &
At 0530 on in the trench and insisted probably quite correctly,
Cdr. Dove destroyer which threatened to block the fairway. By and the Germans had were already been up since 0430 controlling the 0730
a French ships except "Gervaise Rentual! had cleared the port all British numbers of troops and a few ambulances (empty?) were thronging the quayside. 0830 an intense aerial bombardment started which at large German reconnaissance patrols were active overhead continued with never Tuesday. The quay was becoming so dangerous that Cdr Dove at about more than 20 minutes interval until we left the port
We noticed equipment, the wrecked cars the
0130 on cleared all the troops out of the harbour into the once again that apart from the acute danger of of abandoned of transportation and the numerous bomb craters had re-
Quay taining wall was damaged in only one place. At Cdr. Henderson's a V.
hope impossible to use any longer, inspite of the fact that the req we spent at the top of the bastion to keep in touch with H.M.S.
the morning making a tour of inspection and arranging "Wolt hound" all communication between the bastion and the signal Engla station which was lying 18 (approx) miles off the beach to northwar station
By now was severed. All telephonic comminication to off by "Gervaise any Rentual" was out of order. At 1200 we returned to the lighthouse route whatsoever was destroyed and the R.T. transmitter the gi

3
ried us four hours to do scale normally bombardment 20 minutes. This ide to fly another work which takes (made in Germany)
which was entirely kite deserted from a except large floating for Bank's crane party. We
THE decided There so cases similar to key this that our uninterrupted and large to wind which continued
Owing to return a contrary to H.Q. We found our the efforts proved of
IM
car presumably the result of about 2 miles and our were of fifth many column activity. We made way times on the way, especially on the We reported leading that H.Q. it it was back to H.Q. on foot, a distance road to were bombed several H.Q. the position seemed extremely from grave. the South Quay. Cdr. was
Henderson hardly informed us that G.H.Q. intended taking to be over evacuation bastion
At practicable to embark troops the and the extreme shortage of supplies. We were and to sail as soon as that all superfluous personnel would have therefore ordered owing by to Dove to go aboard the "Gervaise Rentual" most of the bombardment permitted. The air force personnel, onboard. We demolition the party were, we were informed, already and QZS.60. were On arrival also at the ship we found we had no charts and to the our given a new route order via Zuydcoote Passage therefore made way bastion. At the bastion we found that a number of soldiers, the obviously a back as quickly as we could through the bombardment unnerved by the relentless attack, were approaching H.Q. in went out in the midst of the bombardment, without steel helmets, destroy- or fire threatening manner with their rifles. Cdr.Dove and Cdr. Henderson arms which had just entered harbour, arrived. The situation control and and parleyed with them until a naval landing party from which a might
"
have er developed seriously was immediately brought under take we informed that the evacuation of the town of Dunkirk was to were forthwith. We were therefore given new orders by Cdr.Dove. found We place able to collect a chart and return to the ship where we were Cdr. Bankes. He told us to collect as many small craft as possible and take them and the drifter round to the beaches on the north side of the town to pick up soldiers. We tried to commandeer two Belgian tugs and manage to secure two launches byt on investigation both were too badly a picket boat but the French naval commander objected strongly. We did damaged to be serviceable. One had its steering gear rendered useless one by bombs, and the other, a diesel engine, had no fuel, and no knew how to work it. We now had onboard four air force officers, 10
re moment four drifters arrived in the entrance, two of which were in a soldiers, the majority of the demolition party and Cdr. Bankes. At this sinking condition owing to bombing and machine-gunning, These two the
"Bola Roy" and the "Paxton" were sunk by gun-fire from the "Gervaise
Bentual", clear of the fairway, after all personnel had been taken onboard, the drifters "Playmates" and "Gervaise Rentual." The remaining
2 drifters were ordered by Cdr. Bankes to tie off the beaches and they proceeded thereforthwith.
We were now helded from the South Quay and on crossing there found Cdr. Dove who was the last person to leave the South Quay. We took him aboard and landed him and Cdr. Bankes on the North Jetty, where they met Captain Tenant, Cdr. Dove insisted on returning to the bastion to the end of the pier, within hail for an hour. Captain Tenant then told find out if there were anyone left there and instructed us, to be off us to extend those orders until midnight. It was now about dark and air activity was intense. Huge fires light up the town and later numerbelieved we heard artillery. After standing off for about 1 hour, ous parachute flares were dropped by the enemy. For the first time we gun us, we received enemy a morse message from the beach, to come alongside in which time the enemy dropped magnetic mines and attempting to machine the North Jetty, There we found Naval Commander whose name was not ascertained, other Captain drifter and tell any personnel ships to come alongfrom Tenant's party, who ordered us to make conside the North We spoke to the Queen of the Channel (?)
to this effect Jetty. drifters who were Lying some way to the north and were difficult and to the locate. Another morse message asked us to use and found all possible a despatch. to After this we?) returned ship alongside to the North and fully Jetty loaded. were
We took personnel (Queen of Channel and children and some soldiers, and hound aboard which written) was was destroyer, continuing "Unless and complete W/T dubies. fighter The protection gist of this can be message provided (which only to proceed a home to Dover also an urgent despatch to H.M.S. "Wolfordered aboard about 30 women after delivering women and children before dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

D-51.
(Revised-June, 1933.)
FROM WHOM
DATE
4
ban
After we had delivered this message and embarked the women and children we set our course for the northward route home. As we steered N.E. we could see the town of Dunkirk brightly lit by the flames of the 10 or 12 huge fires now raging. Against the smoke we could see the flares of frequent Hu bomb explosions on the jetty and along the beaches, and every now and then the glow of machine-gun bullets. The coastline was like a street in peace-time, the flares hanging at regular intervals like so many lamp-posts and hardly seeming to fall at all for two or three minutes. These lights did not look like parachute flares but seemed to keep a fixed position. There was no wind at all. Always there was the whistle and roar of bombs and the rattle of machine-guns, but we could no longer hear the boom of the botors or the bark of the A.A.guns. There seemed to be no opposition at all.
We finally left Dunkirk about 0230. On the journey home we were approached by bombers, byd reached Dover without losts or injury to ship or personnel at 1630.
We beg to submit that the conduct of Temp Skipper Lieut, Burgess, the Mate, Chief Engineer and all the ship's company was exceeding
!raiseworthy in the face of multifarious dangers of navigation and enemy action. Apart from this the cheerful and confident bearing of was a great support to all our passengers, many of whom were in a highly nervous state.
A note on the effects of prolonged and fierece bombing on a limited area.
A frequent German technique was to send a fighter ahead which made a smoke circle in the sky over the objective to glueathe bombers, which followed; a variant was to draw lanes of approach, also in smoke. This procedure could be largely carried out, owing to the absense of wind.
Otherwise they would first GIRCLE the town for as long as 45 minutes, and then come down to bomb from different directions Their object at
Dunkirk seemed to be to put up a smoke screen to windward of the town so that smoke would provide a shield for their approach. This effectively prevented the A.A. guns from training on the planes until just before their attack.
The accuracy of the bombing varied, H.Q. and Bastion were likes ringed by bombs, but no damage was done to such solid structures.
The pier was a constant target, but the stone and concrete of which it was made suffered to an astonishing small degree. Bombing of the town itself was indiscriminate and callous.
Continuous bombardment seriously interrupts all form of work and makes contact and communication very difficult. Psychologically it is most serious as the noise gradually paralyses the mind and instills a sense of defeat as it begins to seem impossible to strike back.
It produces a bad nervous state if continued all night so that the victimi seems to hear inethesmost ordinary sound the whistle of a bomb, in the slap of the bow wave the noise of machine-gun fire, in the roar of the wind down the ventilators the approach of bombers. But after a good sleep all such hallucinations disappear, and little or no memory of fear remains.
Throughout we were impressed by the small amount of damage an H.E.
bomb will do, if everybody takes cover, or failing that lies flat on the ground.
01-0440

D-51.
(Revised-June, 1933.)
FROM WHOM
DATE
MARKINGS TO BOARD.
SUBJECT.
Operation Dynamo.
Report from H.M.S. Gossamer. 5.6.40
FORMER
NOTATION ONLY
Referred
Date
Referred to
Date to
Referred to
Date
C.E. 7831/1922.
Sta.47/33.
Wt. 48364/D6526 1,000,000 6/40 S.P. & Co., Ltd. 51-6446

DMS
OPERATION "DYNAMO".
bas
H.M.S. # GOSS AMER ",
5th June, 1940.
L
1
D
The Commander in Chief,
H.M.Ships and Vessels at the Nore.
ir,
I have the honour to submit the following despatch on the operations J
£ H.M.Ship # GOSSAMER # under my command during the evacuation of unkirk, for the information of Their Lordships.
1
We made six trips in all, and transported, as accurately as can be scertained, 3214 British and French troops to this country. A list E
18 recomendations for awards is appended. At the same time the entire hips company did as much to deserve a medal as tose few I was able to ingle out.
When this operation is compared with the glordous feat at Zecbrugge in 1918, I am inclined to believe that it imposed greater strain on the ficers and men. This was particularly 80 due to the constant repetition in the belief that each one was the last. Again there were the long hours off the beaches in momentary expectation of the arrival x enemy aircraft(en expectation which was seldom disappointed ). Then the six hour passage home with constant reports of the presence of enemy
L.T.B.'s on the route, and in the knowledge that we had six or sevenhu undred souls on board and no boats whatever.
"GOSSAMER" sailed from Harwich at 1230 on 28th May, 1940, in company with H.M.Ships "KELLETT", "ALBURY", "ROSS", "LYDD", "PAINGBOURNE", sand "LEDA". H.M.S. "SALTASH" was left in the Tyne boiler cleaning.
flotilla arrived at EUIDCOTE addititis Pass at 2030 and stapped off
BRAY at 2115. There cared to be a large wood close to the shore but on neurer approach this was seen to be a mass of troops on the and.
Two ships were left there and the remainder proceeded to the East Pier at Dunkirk which at that time was intact.
As it was low water it took half on hour to embark troops down 1mprovised ladders, but "GOSSAMER" sailed at 2215 with 430 on board.
from now on it was impossible to exercise control over the fiotilla as a unit, and this narrative is concerned with "GOSSAMER" alone.
Just outside the 2UIDCOTE PASS we come upon the "MANNIAN" aground, and S.S. "PRAGUE" stopped, without charts. "MANXMAN" was given directdons, and a boat was sent to "PRAGUE" with a chart of Dunkirk. As will be seen this delay seved our lives.
Proceeding towards KWINT DOUY we soon came into a patch of water filled with mom crying BHelp", and heads could be seen all round in the
Ben.
I stopped and lowered boats ( three whalers and a skiff ).
I
WED then halled by Commonder R.L. Fisher of H.M.S. "WAKEFUL" who said he had been torpedoed and that the Submerine vas still near by.
In actual fact I believe he was attacked by on M.T.B. Dut my boats and almost all my officers were now lost in the night, and it took some time to recover them with such few men as they had been able to pick up.
The skiff was loft alongside a drifter. No doubt we were wrong to stop, but at the time I thought otherwise. We then steered so as to evoid KWINT BUOY, and proceeded without further incident to Dover, arriving there at 0655 an Wednesday 29th May.

Ship sailed from Dover at 0850 on 29th May, did a days minesweeping and arrived off Dunkirk, lit by the red flames of the burning oil tanks at 0040 on 30th May. On this occasion troops were embarked off BRAY
DUNE in our own boats and canvas punts. There were no incidents of note, and we sailed at 0515, arriving at Dover at 1015 on Thursday morning. All boats were left on the beach by order from Rear Admiral
Dover.
Third trip. Sailing from Dover at 1330 with a party of signalmen for LA PANNE, we arrived off BRAY at 1830. Admiral Wake Walker came on board for passage to LA PANNE, where we transferred him to H.M.S.
"WORCESTER" and enchored at 1930. I can recall no. features of this trip, which was eclipsed by the incidents of the following one.
we proceeded at 0118 and arrived at Dover at 0600.
Fourth trip. In order to comply with Vice Admiral Dover's
0446/30 12 hours were spent at Dover.
A
smallamotor-boat, the
"Handy
Billy! was requisitioned. We left at 1800 and anchored as ordered, one mile west of LA PANNE and 4 cables from the shore, at 1207.
Sub-Lieutenant M.Phipps proceeded to search the shore in "Handy Bill and reported no answer to his hails. Inside an hour, however, the situation had changed, and thousands were massing abreast the ship.
UI called for more boats by searchlight up and down the immic coast, and eventually was much assisted by H.M.S. "IVANHOE" who lent me a motor-boat. The vital need now was for more boats. About this time
Lieutenant-Commander McLelland swam off from shore with a message for
Dover which he was just able to gasp out before collapsing. The troops had been forcedout of LA PANNE and were marching West.
We also embarked a Major, 2nd in Command 2nd Coldstream Guards, and on his advice ordered the bulk of the troups to move West on Dunkirk in small groups.
I decided to remain where I was and to embark the wounded and such troops as refused to move on. "IVANHOE" remained with me.
At this time a paddle minesweeper most gallently grounded herself close inshore to save as many as possible. I do not know har name.
At 0500 as I had expected a flight of Messerschmidt 109's appeared from Eastward, flew low over the beaches and sprayed ships and men with machine-gun fire. The silvery tracer bullets were clearly visible in the morning light. Our fire did something to disperse these machines and casualties did not appear to be heavy.
At 0600 Captain D in H.M.S. "CODRINGTON" asked me my intentions
End as I had 675 troops on board I replied I was proceedingt He ordered me to Dunicirk to "Fill up".
On our way there we went alongside H.M.S. "SKIPJACK" who required
8oz.
chloroform. We then berthed on East Arm just beyond the break, and very quickly embarked some 170 French troops. The enemy was now bombing the town and massing off the harbour entrence. As I went astern "IVANHOE" was hit as she steamed full speed past the pierhead.
We set course west, and were about to turn North at 5W Buoy when we were attacked by some five Junkers 87 dive bombers. These were followed by nine or ten otheres the a few minutes later. It was at this time that H.M.S. "HAVANT" was hit. During these attacks
I
attribute our escape to the coolness and precision with which Lieutenant.Menisty and Yeoman of Signals J.Young ( C/J X 131436
observed each aircraft as it turned to the attack, and assisted me in handling the ship. The salvoes sonbanneck of four small bombs and one large one fell very close; on two occasions it was only our swing during the flight of the bombs that saved us. The 0.5" machine-gun fired until all the feree springs fell off. The 4" guns were hampered by the swing of the ship.
This was a most trying time for the troops between decks who could not tell whether or not we were hit. A great deal was done to calm them by P.O. Std. A.Hockney ( L 14824 ) who actually sat on the ladder to the messdeck and sang to the soldiers.

THis was between 0840 and 0850 on Saturday June 1st.
ther incidents.
Our own fighters passed us about 0915 and we arrived
There were no
Sheerness at 1345.
It was now necessary to replenish comunition. Signs of exhaustion beginning to show. I may say as evidence of our fatigue that I
elf burst into tears in the staff office on shore. It was too late send us back that nightend sleep did much to restore us.
There were two more trips after this, on the nights of Sunday 2nd and
3rd June, both to the harbour. There was some shrapnel on the st occasion, but on the Monday all went smoohhly. On both nights
'.B.'s were reported on our return journey. As the whole route was ful motor-boats it was hard to know how to identify these, and the strain considerable.
In all "GOSSAMER" transported almost exactly one hundredth of the total ber of troops evacuated. Two men were slightly wounded by shrapnel.
was landed with shock. S.P.O. H.W.R. Hook (I X 75635 ", who was left ind in the skiff on the first night was subsequently reported missing
Lieved killed. Two soldiers who died of wounds were buried at sea.
army chaplain took their particulars. There is one small shrapnel above the water-line. We are ready for service.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,

-51.
(Revised-June, 1933.)
ROM WHOM
DATE
ARKINGS TO BOARD.
SUBJECT.
ling
Recommendations from F.O.C. Door
OPERATION DYNAMO. 5th 19th July 1940.
Low
FORMER
ing air
NOTATION ONLY
Referred
Date
Referred
Date to to
Referred to
Date and
1
gat high ge 8
is
,ist
:ion ly.
eli hat pas e
rin igh rom to call th:
on
C.E. 7831/1922.
Sta.47/33.
Wt. 48364/D6526 1,000,000 6/40 S.P. & Co., Ltd. 51-6446

SECRET.
Meet Friday 3.
Office of
Flag Officer Commanding,
DOVER.
No.A.14/0/1015/40.
5th July, 1940.
Sir,
Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report and enclosures containing my recommendations of personnel who took part in Operation Dynamo, namely the evacuation of the Allied Armies from Dunkirk and neighbouring beaches between the 26th May and 4th June, 1940.
2.
The special features of this Operation were the air attacks on ships and embarkation points, unparalleled for duration and intensity.
Unlike a naval engagement, the majority of ships and vessels operated over a prolonged period, having to return again and again to face most difficult conditions of navigation and strong enemy activity. These conditions demanded a high degree of physical and mental endurance, apart from courage and determination in the face of enemy action.
3.
The roll of officers and men considered to be deserving of special recognition for their services in this
Operation has been divided into two parts - List 'A' and List
"B".
List "A" comprises those recommended for decoration, for advancement, or for mention.
List 'B' contains recommendations for mention only.
The reason for making a sub-division is that I believe the total number of officers and men recommended is somewhat high, judged by normal standards of naval actions in the past, but at the same time, I should not be doing justice to the deeds of officers and men on this occasion if I did not bring to notice all those whose services I consider to be thoroughly deserving of recognition.
List 'B', therefore, has been formed by taking from the original single list:-
(1) a large number of officers who are undoubtedly
P
deserving of recognition, but whose presence in
List A' would make the proportion of officers to men on that list considerably greater than Admiralty policy hitherto has directed. Some of these
)
officers, were the whole truth known, would undoubtedly fully merit decoration. As it is, thisy still leaves the proportion of officers to men on
List 'A' at 1 to 2.
The Secretary of the Admiralty,
Admiralty,
London, 8.W.1.

-2-
(11) a number of ratings who are outstanding above their fellows, but whose service in this Operation, though meritorious or gallant, 18 not up to that exceptional standard displayed by the other ratings who remain in
List "A".
Were it not for the general practice of strictly limiting decorations and "mentions" in Naval operations, this artificial division of the roll into Lists 'A' and 'B' would not have been undertaken, and it is hoped that Their Lordships will see fit to adopt the recommendations for List 'B' as if it were part of List 'A'.
4.
It is true to say that every officer and man mentioned in List 'A' compiled from a close study of more than
350 separate written reports, earned recognition for gallant service time and time again during the Operation. In compiling the list, normal standards for judging conduct in face of the enemy have had to be set aside and to gain a place in List 'A', instances of gallantry had to be accompanied by other meritorious service, BL in as conspicuous endurance and unremitting devotion to duty over a prolonged period, and/or exceptional display of initiative and judgment.
Similarly, the majority of those individuals recommended for "mention" would, in any normal operation or engagement have been justifiebly recommended for, and awarded, a decoration.
5.
The number of officers and men (including military and civilian Junteers) directly employed afloat, ashore on the Flanders coast, or controlling, directing or serving in the base organisations supporting the Operation, is estimated at 19,000; of these more than 1,700 were officers.
List "A" contains the names of -
224 officers,
446 men.
Of these, recommendations are made for:-
315 for decoration,
345 for mention,
10 for advancement.
List 'B' contains the namesof -
100 officers,
103 men, all of whom are recommended for mention.
Having regard to the unique conditions of service attached to this Operation, the proportion of officers and men recommended for recognition out of the total number involved is considered to be fair, and in fact, to be low.
Admiralty Letter C.W. (undated, but about 15th June)
was received too late for its contents to be brought to the notice of Commanding Officers concerned, but I suggest, in any case, that its terms are hardly applicable to an Operation of this nature in which there were so many deeds of daring, whose representation/

-3-
representation must take precedence over any normal form of proportion as between officers and men.
6.
In List 'A', 93 H. M. Ships and Vessels and 80
requisitioned or other small craft and tenders are represented, ye besides beach parties, pier parties, and base organisations.
r
In List "B", 42 H. M. Ships and Vessels and 37
requisitioned or other small craft and tenders are included;
some of them are also represented in List 'A'.
The total number of H. M. Ships and Vessels and requisitioned small craft and motor boats manned and working independently in this Operation is unknown, but is estimated to be 600.
There were besides H. M. Ships' own boats, a further large number of open boats used in tow or as tenders to the larger craft, estimated at about 200,
7.
As will be seen from the above, it has been impossible to recommend decorations for more than a small percentage of the personnel engaged in the operation. It is therefore submitted to Their Lordships that consideration should be given either to the issue of a special plaque to each ship engaged in the operation, or that a special medal be struck, in
:h addition to any decorations awarded, to be worn by any officer or rating actually taking part in the operation afloat or on the beaches at Dunkirk. of the two, I would prefer the issue of a. medal for the following reasons:
(a) That many unrecorded acts of gallantry and examples of meritorious service took place in small craft and on the beaches and piers which deserve recognition.
(b). A great number of the personnel were not in ships or boats at all, being used for beach parties, etc.
(c). A plaque could only be issued to a ship, and many hundreds of the personnel engaged were in small boats requisitioned for the purpose.
8.
In conclusion, I would refer to Dover Despatch
A.14/0/876/40 of the 18th June, 1940, in which I made special reference to the invaluable services of the following officers, whom I trust Their Lordships will recommend to His Majesty for decoration in recognition of their outstanding services throughout Operation Dynamo.
Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville, K.C.B., D.S.O.
Appointed to H.M.S. LYNX, special service, in connection with the evacuation. The attributes of this officer for initiative and resource are well known throughout the service, but I venture to express the opinion, never in the course of his long and distinguished career have they been put to better use than during the operations for the evacuation of the Allied Armies from Dunkirk.
Captain/

4-
Captain Llewellyn Vauzhan Morgan, C.B.E.. M.V.O.,
D.S.O., R.N.. my Chief Staff Officer.
My Staff at Dover was especially augmented by additional officers for the conduct of this operation.
Captain Morgan, as Chief Staff Officer, was responsible for the welding together of these additional officers with my normal staff into a perfectly working team operating continuously without a pause, day and night, throughout the 10 days that the operation lasted. The successful outcome of their activities was in no small degree due to Captain Morgan's energy and leadership.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) B. H. RAMSAY.
Vice Admiral.

SECRET
Page 18, eration "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel - List 'B'
STAFF OF
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING, DOVER.
Officers.
5th
Acting Lieutenant John Herbert Toon, R.N.
Warrant Telegraphist Walter Arthur Frederick Maybourn,R.N.
Ratings.
Chief Petty Officer Telegraphist Richard Arthur Webb,P.21808
Signalman Eric Joseph Bence, R.N.V.R., L.D./9X 4289
Signalman Desmond Wilson Jeffery, R.N.V.R., LD/9X 4277
some
BASE STAFFS (H.M.S. LYNX).
th
Officers.
tion
B
Warrant Supply Officer Fred Buckley, R.N. (Retd.)
Rating.
espatch
Supply Chief Petty Officer C. F. McCoy, C/MX.50984
COMMODORE SUPERINTENDENT, H.M.S. SANDHURST
and
BASE REPAIR STAFF.
Officers.
Lieutenant-Commander Cecil Graham Lawson, R.N.
Surgeon-Commander John Alfred Cusack, R.N.
Lieutenant-Commander (E) Edward Crossen, R.N. (Retd.)
atto in
Admiralty,
London. S.W.1.

SECRET
Office of
Flag Officer Commanding Dover.
No. A/14/0/1038/40
9th July,1940
Sir,
With reference to Dover Despatch No. A14/0/1015/40 of 5th
July, 1940, forwarding recommendations of personnel who took part in Operation "Dynamo", be pleased to inform Their Lordships that
I have just received a list of recommendations from Captain E.L.
Berthon, D.S.C.,R.N,, Captain (D) 19th D.F. and Commanding H.M.S.
"Keith" at the time of her loss, which brings to notice for the first time several acts of gallantry and courageous conduct by personnel of the ship.
Captain Berthon himself was wounded and has been for some time in the R.N. Hospital, Chatham, but in spite of this he has clearly spared no pains to collect evidence and render his recommendations as soon as possible.
2.
In the original despatch H.M.S. "Keith" is dealt with on page 21 of List A. It is now submitted for the consideration of Their Lordships that the accompanying pages 21, 21A and 21B
may be substituted for that previously forwarded.
3.
The figures given in paragraph 5 of the original despatch will require amendment as follows:-
List "A" contains the names of -
227 Officers
457 Men of these, recommendations are made for:-
327 for decoration,
347 for mention,
10 for advancement.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant.
(Signed) B. H. RAMSAY.
VICE ADMIRAL.
The Secretary of the Admiralty,
Admiralty,
London. S.W.1.

Page 21.
Operation "DYNAMO" Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. KEITH - Captain Edward Lyon Berthon, D.S.C., R.N.
After completing a short refit at Chatham the KEITH
sailed for Dunkirk at 1732/30/5 when she took off about
1400 troops, these being disembarked at Dover. At
0305/31/5 she again sailed for Dunkirk where she acted as
-
flagship of the Rear-Admiral, Dover, in charge of all sea forces on the coast.
From the time of her arrival until she finally sank at about 0940/1/6 she was patrolling along the French and
Belgian coasts during which time she was almost continually opening fire on enemy aircraft, two of which were shot down..J
It is to be noted that the 3" H.A. gun was found to be most effective in warding off the attackers and that all 3"
ammunition was expended before the arrival of the final attacks which sank the ship.
It is evident that few if any ships had to face more severe bombing attacks and that during the whole time the conduct of the ships company was exemplary.
On the afternoon of 31st May, the ship survived both dive and high level bombing attacks and early the next day was subjected to machine gun attack followed by an intensive dive bombing attack. A second powerful dive bombing attack followed as a result of which the ship was lost.
Further bombing and machine gun attacks took place while the ship was being abandoned. Many survivors went to the
Tug St. Abbs, which after escaping one dive bombing attack, was sunk in a further attack; many of "Keith's" survivors being lost in her.
Apart from the names given below, there were many incidents of gallant conduct by men who were lost either in
"Keith" or after they had left the ship. 3 officers and
33 men in all were lost.
RECOMMENDATIONS.
OFFICERS:
Captain Edward Lyon Berthon, D.S.C., R.N.
The Rear-Admiral reports: "Under shell fire and bomb attacks Captain Berthon handled his ship with great coolness and judgment, and met all the calls put upon him and his ship".
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant Charles Paynder Adams, R.N.
By his personal example in action maintained a hig state of discipline and fighting spirit in the ship when subjected to heavy bombing attacks. Later organised the return passage of survivors to England in Yard Craft 63.
Recommended for decoration

Page 21A.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
Lieutenant Graham James Alexander Lumsden. R.N.
showed great ability in manoeuvering ship and avoiding repeated dive bombing attacks in very restricted waters. After the ship had been abondoned he remained behind to ensure that everything possible was done to save the ship and to destroy secret charts etc. Later his coolness and courage was very noticeable when the St. Abbs was bombed and sunk.
Recommended for mention.
(Is being recommended for decoration on account of service at Boulogne on 23rd May, just prior to operation "Dynamo")
Lieutenant Robert Walker Hughes, R.N.
Showed great courage in repairing W/T aerial during repeated bombing attacks. When ship was sinking showed imitiative in destroying signal books and apparatus. After receiving injuries in the Tug St. Abbs his courage and devotion to duty assisted in survivors escaping to Dover for in the wreck of the Clan Mac Allister.
Recommended for decoration.
Midshipman Harry Batten Poustie, R.N.R.
The good bearing, coolness and initiative of this young officer in face of danger was most noticeable.
Remained on board to assist with destruction of secret documents. Later assisted in clothing and feeding survivor on board Clan Mac Allister including the care of two badly wounded men.
Recommended for decoration.
RATINGS:
Acting Petty Officer Ernest F. Standley C/JX 137068.
In charge of H.A. gun. By his leadership, courage and coolness kept his gun in action during repeated bombing attacks which caused casualties to his crew in their exposed positions.
Recommended for decoration
The following members of the Pom-Pom crews showed great courage in keeping their guns in action up to the end.
Able Seaman Eric Bradley Wilkinson C/JX.152120.
Able Seaman Ian A. Nethercott, C/55X 28288.
Able Seaman James Wallis, C/55X 27313.
Recommended for decoration.

(Revised
Page 21B
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
Able Seaman George E. Davis C/J 86552 (wounded)
Able Seaman George J. Woodger, C/J 45802. P.N. 22573.
Both these ratings fought their Lewis Guns courageously until the ship sank.
Recommended for decoration.
Leading Telegraphist Ernest J. N. Beeley C/JX 141015
By his devotion to duty repaired main aerials three times whilst ship was being bombed. Later he manned the
Lewis Guns in the St. Abbs although he had never fired one before.
Recommended for decoration.
Able Seaman Daniel Fossey. C/JX 148554.
Sick Berth Attendant Robert Brown, S.R. 16465
Both these ratings did valuable work to the numerous wounded in the Tug Vincia.
Recommended for mention
Leading Seaman Elric I.J.A.G. Joplin C/JX1 38400
Although wounded showed great courage and was forward in every duty including the destruction of secret matter.
After the order "Abandon Ship" volunteered to remain on board sustained. in order to make a careful investigation of the damage
Recommended for decoration.
Able Seaman Thoman F. Osprey. C/J 114945,
Showed great courage in manning Pom-Pom Guns until finally ordered to leave.
Recommended for mention
(Is being recommended for decoration on account of service at Boulogne on 23rd May, just prior to
Operation "Dynamo")

(Revised
CONFIDENTIAL.
FROM. SECRETARY TO FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER.
DATE.....13th July, 1940.
NO. B14/0/1295/40.
TO
C.W. BRANCH, ADMIRALTY (Mr. Gleadowe)
DYNAMO - RECOMMENDATIONS.
With reference to Dover Despatch No.A.14/0/1015/40
of 5/7/40, page 77, the Commanding Officer of H.M.S.
"Mosquito" has reported that a mistake was made in the name of the Stoker Petty Officer mentioned.
Delete James Salter C/K 65722 1 who was killed)
and substitute Stoker Petty Officer William Edward White
C/K 64353.
health has,
SECRETARY TO
VICE ADMIRAL.
of
N.
JLV

(Revised-June, 1933.)
HOM
DATE
E
GS TO BOARD.
SUBJECT.
Operation Dynamo.
Recommen da tions of Personnel.
List B:
FROM
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER,
DATE
18th. July 1940.
No. 414/0/1090/40
TO
SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.
It is requested that the name of the last rating mentioned in Dever Letter №A14/0/1038/40 dated 9th. July, 1940,
Recommendations from H.M.S. "Keith" in Operation "DYNAMO", may be amended to read
Able Seaman Themas F. Asprey, C/J114945.
(not Osprey)
g
M. Les Warus.
(SIGNED) LLEWELLYN V. MORGAN.
life Forber adam has a colon q 2his for the gazetie
CHIEF STAFF OFFICER
far VICE ADMIRAL.
of
N
JL
446

(Revised-June, 1933.)
WHOM
DATE
E
INGS TO BOARD.
SUBJECT.
Operation Dynamo.
Recommen da tions of Personnel.
List List B: B:
ER
)
NOTATION ONLY
eferred
Date
Referred
Date to to
Referred to
Date g
N.
JL/
7831/1922.
7/33.
Wt. 48364/D6526 1,000,000 6/40 S.P. & Co., Ltd. 51-0440

Operation "DYNAMO",
Recommendations of Personnel.
LIST 'B'.
Recommendations for Officers and men supplementary to those contained in List 'A'.
In all cases the recommendations are for conspicuous devotion to duty, unflinching determination in the face of enemy action, or in the case of base staffs for continuous and exceptionally valuable work contributing to the success of the operation. All these individuals set an excellent example to their ship-mates, and have been selected by their Commanding
Officers for recognition.
All these recommendations are for a "Mention".
N.

Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel - List E
DESTROYERS
H.M.S. GRAFTON.
Officers:
Lieutenant Hugh Charles James McRea, R.N.
Lieutenant Leslie Edney Blackmore, R.N.
H.M.S. GRENADE.
Commanding Officer.
DSC
Commander Richard Courtney Boyle, R.N.
Officer.
Sub. Lieutenant John Bremer Richards Horne, R.N.
H.M.S. IMPULSIVE.
Officer.
Lieutenant Commander John David Lewis Williams, R.N.
H.M.S. JAGUAR.
Commanding Officer.
1
Lieutenant Commander John Franklin William Hine, R.N.
H.M.S. JAVELIN.
Commanding Officer.
Commander Anthony Follett Pugsley, R.N.
Officer.
Sub.Lieutenant James Isaac Arthur Mitchell, R.N.
Ratings.
Leading Stoker Leslie A. F. Gollop, P/JX.136910
Acting Leading Stoker F. C. Smith, P/JX.138236.
Leading Stoker Robert Keith, P/K.57158.
Stoker Lawrence Robinson, (2nd Class) P/JX.27218.
H.M.S. VIVACIOUS.
Commending Officer.
Commander Emile Frank Narlaine Deschaineux, R.A.N.
Officers.
Lieutenant Commander Frank Reginald Woodbine Parish, R.N.
Sub.Lieutenant Thomas Keath Metcalfe, R.N.R.
Midshipman Rupert Blackwood Hallowes, R.N.R.
H.MS. WAKEFUL/

Page 2.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recomme ations of Personnel - List 'B
DESTROYERS (continued).
I.M.S. WAKEFUL.
Officer.
Sub.Lieutenant John Septimus Percival-Jones, R.N.
H.M.S. WHITSHED.
Commanding Officer.
DSC
Commander Edward Reignier Conder, R.N.
H.M.S. WINCHELSEA.
Officers.
Lieutenant Roland Chirwell Watkin, R.N.
Lieutenant (E) Richard William George Logg, R.N.
Ratings.
Chief Stoker Edward Graimes, P/K.46095.
Stoker 2nd Class Albert Norman Griffiths, P/KX.103743.
George Spencer Sutaliff, Canteen Manager.
H.M.S. WINDSOR.
Officers.
Lieutenant Cyril George Hart Brown, R.N.
Sub. -Lieutenant Michael Harvey Collar, R.N.
Commanding Engineer Robert Arthur Marsh, R.N.
Ratings:
C.E.R.A.2Frederick Edward Standing, P/M.39535.
Chief Stoker Bernard Gillam, P/K.56298.
E.R.A.3 Reginald Bone, P/MX.52059.
Acting Stoker Petty Officer Stanley Thomas Rosser,P/KX.
75570.
Acting Leading Stoker George Alexander Langlands, P/KX.
77751.
Stoker 1st Class Robert Shields, P/K.17772.
Chief Petty Officer Frederick Charles Hallett, P/J.33846.
Petty Officer Stanley Gordon Renouf, P/J.108703.
Able Seaman Jack Lamb Ritchie, ESDX.1805.
Able Seaman Reginald William Buckle, P/JX.158915.
Ordinary Seaman James Seivwright, ESDX.1956.
Leading Seaman Thomas Reginald Dibble, 1.65216.
Leading Telegraphist David Ballard, P/J.30932.
H.M.S. WOLFHOUND.
Officer.
Sub.Lieutenant Philip Roger Canning Higham, R.N.

Page 3.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel - List 'B'.
MINESWEEPERS.
M.S. BRIGHTON BELLE.
Rating.
Leading Seaman R. G. Myers, J/58522.
M.S. DUNDALK.
Commanding Officer.
Lieutenant Commander Frederick Arthur Ivan Kirkpatrick, R.
.M.S. GLENAVON.
Commanding Officer.
Lieutenant B. H. Loyms,R.N.R.
Officers.
Sub. Lieutenant George Henry Law, R.N.V.R.
Ratings.
Able Seaman James Lawrence Boddy, D/SSX.1422
Able Seaman Arthur Jasheph Usher, R.N.P.S., LT/JX.167061.
Stoker William Charles Harteveld, T.124.
I.M.S. GLENGOWER.
Officers.
Temporary Sub. Lieutenant Noel Arthur Francis Williams,
R.N.V.R.
Temporary Sub.Lieutenant Richard Arthur Snell, R.N.V.R.
Temporary Lieutenant (E) Edward Alfred Rees, R.N.R.
Ratings.
Ordinary Seaman John Frederick Stokes, H.O., SSX.23129.
Assistant Steward Thomas Matthews, T.124.
Leading Stoker Charles William Thomas, T.124.
Signalman James Joseph Ricketts, R.N.V.R., MDX.2120.
I.M.S. MARMION.
Commanding Officer.
Lieutenant Harry Cecil Gaffney, R.N.V.R.
Officer.
Sub.Lieutenant James McFarlane Black, R.N.V.R.
Ratings.
Chief Petty Officer Henry Brotherton (c), C/J.20237.
Leading Stoker Albert Thomson, T.124.
H.M.S.ORIOLE/