TNA ADM 199 792

the wounded; after the bombing of the writester and lend again much in evidence in his professional he
Chief Petty officer Lawyer was in command eepa of the porupom and He worked his crew up to a high states a
97
efficiency. was very seriously wounded and I
ТВЯОДЗ

Dynamo 65.
Dyrans. 33V.
Royal Chatham. Naval Barracks,
202
90
:que,
285
15th June, 1940.
13
sir,
I at have the honour to report the loss of H.M. Tug"St Abbs"
0
at Dunkirk 0930 on 1st June 1940, Lieutenant Brooker in command.
5
2.
Blst May, three barges in tow, the "Duchess", the "H.A.C." and
H.M. with Tug"St Abbs" sailed from Dover at 10 a.m. on Friday, the "Doris", bound for Dunkirk.
ng
3. At 2100 31st May the last barge of the tow, the "Doris"
31/5
ne or broke adrift and was taken in tow by a sloop, name not known.
ing
4. At 0030, 1st June, H.M. Tug"St St Abbs" anchored approximately say six miles from Dunkirk, Lieutenant T.E. Brooker considering it unadvisable and dangerous to proceed further before daylight.
5. At 0330 anchor was weighed and ship proceeded towards
Dunkirk.
6. At 0600 H.M. Tug"St Abbs" passed the piers and proceeded
LE
towards the beaches. Enemy aircraft commenced bombing the piers and shipping.
yer
7. At 0630 the barges were slipped and ordered to proceed it:
inshore to the beaches, the "Duchess" towing the "H.A.C."
H.M. Tug"St Abbs" anchored and waited for soldiers to embark.
8. At 0730 attacks by enemy aircraft intensified and anchor take was weighed, it being intended to proceed closer to the beach to a men on facilitate embarking of soldiers.
9. At 0800 approximately, H.M.S. "Keith" was struck by a bomb ng and settled in the water. H.M.Tug " St Abbs" proceeded alongside s:
H.M.S. "Keith" and took off survivors. Captain(D) of Nineteenth
S
Le had
Flotilla, First Lieutenant of H.M.S. "Keith" and other ratings remained on board to estimate the damage and consider the possibility of S. "Keith" being towed back to England. H.M.Tug "st Abbs"
rties ed.
I
proceeded to pick up survivors from ship's boats and from the water.
train
10. At 0830 H.M.S. "Skipjack" was struck by a bomb and sank of quickly. "Salamander" who was also rescuing survivors
Panne sailed for H.M.S. entrance of the harbour. The bombing was very heavy. the
Lo and remainder "St Abbs" then continued to pick up survivors. Bombing
H.M. Tug the returned alongside H.M.S. "Keith" and took off re and became so of heavy the that crew, it was necessary to keep the ship at full speed
S to and at 0900 H. M. Tug "St Abbs" sailed for the entrance.
O set
11. Tug "St Abbs" was blown up by four delay-action and ations, bombs At 0930 the water ahead of the ship. The bottom stern dropped were completely into shattered and the ship sank in approximatel p
i/c hit
45 seconds.
nise
1
H. 12. were swimming in the water and after
M. Tug "St About Abbs" thirty sank. men Approximately one hundred thirty que al ratings and soldiers were on the ship.
ark
0
13. June, I reached a wreck believed two to ratings be the si
"Clan MacAlfister", At 2400, 1st in company with two "Salamander"s" soldiers, whaler's from crew. H.M.S. "Skipjack" and were one from Captain(D), H.M.S. Nineteenth Flotilla, survivors the First Also Lieutenant on the wreck of H.M.S. "Keith" and eight other

Dynamo 65
ROYAL NAVAL BARRACKS,
CHATHAM.
285
291
TAI
6th June, 1940.
200
288
87
kerque,
LENA
90
I have the honour to report that the Dutch
293
ot "LENA" (D.B.10) departed Sheerness at 0430
the 27th May calling at Southend for orders.
times given are approximate, as the rough log ation t was left in the ship at Dunkirk.
ennant
3
h May. Departed Sheerness 0430. Called at
1e.
Southend for orders. Anchored off Deal 1100.
Departed for Zuidcote Beach 1300. Arrived 2130.
ds.
Embarked 120 British troops between 2206 -
ong
0400 (28th).
ome h
May. 0001 - 0400. Embarking troops. Slow ling loading due to darkness and lack of boats.
say
Transferred the 120 to "SHIKARI" during forenoon sh and embarked 350 British early in the afternoon.
Departed for Ramsgate by Zuidcote Pass route.
Ships off the beaches attacked shortly after
89
leaving and hospital ship and transport bombed without success off the Middlekerke buoy.
Anchored off Ramsgate 2330.
LE
th May. Disembarked 350 troops 0700.
Anchored in roads.
107
oyer
1500 entered for water and provisions.
ht:
1600 departed for Dunkirk by direct route.
th May. Embarked 300 British at daylight using our own boats. 0800 departed for Ramsgate. Disembarked take troops during the afternoon. Informed at Ramsgate men that no further embarkations at Dunkirk would be n
effected.
Anchored in Roads.
g
..
st June. 0545. Received orders to proceed to Dunkirk
Le had with 25 small kedge anchors. Departed Ramsgate and arrived off beaches at Dunkirk 1300. No other ships ties were present. Embarked 400 British using our own ed.
I
boats and grass to kedge anchor ashore. Attacked by train dive bombers before entering Dunkirk roads and again off beach. There was one minor casualty from of splinters. Engineroom gauges smashed and ship
Panne holed forward which was plugged with wooden wedge.
D and
As the enemy were bombing the wrecks in the roads, re idently taking them for transports afloat, I
nd msidered it inadvisable to get under way before to rk. The troops were put below and no movement owed to give the appearance of being abandoned.
set
5. Departed for Ramsgate.
tions, 1"
0630. Disembarked 400 troops at Ramsgate.
i/c hit.
hed in roads to await orders for dispersal.
ise ore
1100. Received orders to disperse, calling and
- uthend for further instructions.
que
N. Retd.)
al
Proceeded.
5. Recalled. Anchored in roads.
ark
0
0. Received operation orders for embarkation si inkirk harbour.
D
Departed for Dunkirk in company with thre chopts.

M
017978
(Revised-June, 1933.)
CONFIDENTIALI
DATE
WHOM
287
90
RA.C RACINGS.
9.11.41
que
461/15.16.
290
SUBJECT.
NGS TO BOARD.
Report of R.A. wake walker on the wasuation
Ann Dunkint 29 may June. 1940
3rd June (cont.) 2300. Grounded when going alongside middle pier of Avant port at Dunkirk. Tug was
286
ordered from ashore but did not arrive. The schoot
"BORNRIFF" and a British drifter endeavoured to tow
3/6
off but without success.
289
4th June. On being informed that no further embarkations could take place after daylight and it then being about two hours after high water I decided at 0145 to send the crew to a British drifter astern. The first party embarked on her, the second party in a French drifter and the remainder including Lieutenant Morton, R.N.V.R. 107
the 1st Lieutenant and myself to a lifeboat ferrying to
H.M.S.LOCUST outside the harbour. The British drifter and the Locust landed their parties at Dover, from where I reported to the N.O.I.C. at Ramsgate. The remainder of the crew were landed by the French drifter at Ramsgate, and the crew returned to Chatham complete at 1615. I consider the "LENA" of little use to the enemy apart from the six tons of Diesel oil onboard, as her screw hit an obstruction when going astern.
I would mention L.M.W. GIBB, Leading Seaman
O.N. D.J. 64311, the coxswain, for his untiring work during the embarkations, and attention to the troops comfort aboard as far as was possible under the circumstances.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
R.DC Hanhmis
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, (R.N. Retd.)
The Vice Admiral,
Dover. Admiralty House,

2
294291
M.017978/41. 9.11.41.
(R.A., 1st C.S. 461/K.16) 290
Rear-Admiral to Wake-Walker's account of the evacuation from Dunkerque,
29th May 4th June, 1940.
293
29th May.
1445
Asked there. by VCNS to go to Dunkerque to organise embarkation
Title:- R. -A., Dover. Not to supersede Captain Tennant
(SNO, Dunkerque), but to be i/c offshore at Dunkerous
70,000 men already
CENTRAL
17 NOV 1941
MO
THE EVACUATION AT DUNKIRK.
REGISTRY
280
292
From
THE REAR-ADMIRAL COMMANDING, FIRST CRUISER SQUADRON.
No.
461/K.16.
Dated 9th November 1941.
To
MIRALTY.
Military Branch 88
Admiralty,
18NOV 1941
S.W.1.
M.017978/41.
27th November, 1941. account of experiences
CONFIDENTIAL.
M
291
may be thought of sufficient
Dear Secretary, interest for
1ty records or the library.
is ions and signals, and except
I should be glad if you otes were made at the time, but would inform for the Rear Admiral Wake-
Walker that the his personal account been checked by my staff.
of experiences during the evacuation of Dunkirk has been read by the
Board and has now been sent to the Historical Section.
REAR ADMIRAL.
Yours sincerely,
(sd.) A Simpson he Secretary to
Rear Admiral W.F. Wake-Walker,
C.B., O.B.E.,
H.M.S. DEVONSHIRE.

1761 AON / T
THE EVACUATION AT DUNKIRK.
REGISTRY
KAN STATE STATE
289
292
From THE REAR-ADMIRAL COMMANDING, FIRST CRUISER SQUADRON.
No. 461/K.16.
Dated 9th November 1941.
To
THE SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.
18NOV 1941
*
The attached personal account of experiences during the evacuation at Dunkirk may be thought of sufficient interest for inclusion in Admiralty records or the library.
It is largely based on recollections and signals, and except for the night of 2/3rd June no notes were made at the time, but the most important details have been checked by my staff.
REAR ADMIRAL.

2
291
.017978/41.
9.11.41.
(R.A., 1st C.S. 461/K.16)
Rear-Admiral 29th May to 4th Wake-Walker's June, 1940. account of the evacuation from Dunkerque, 200
29th May.
293
1445
Asked there. by VCNS to go to Dunkerque to organise embarkation
Title:- R.-A., Dover. Not to supersede Captain Tennant
(SNO, Dunkerque), but to be i/c offshore at Dunkerque.
5
70,000 men already embarked.
Accompanied by Cdr. Norfolk, Lieut. -Cdr. Wynne-Edwards.
Own Flag-Lieut. then at Newcastle, so one lent from among the signal officers at Dover (Viscount Kelburn) with some signal ratings.
Told by ISL that the French were not thought to be pulling their weight:? to refuse them embarkation if British troops were ready to embark. (On 31st May, signal to say
Government policy was for equal opportunities to British and French troops.)
(2)
1600 Left for Dover by car. Arrived at 1800.
General idea:-
3 beaches, each in 3 sections, for British troops at
La Panne, Braye & St.Malo. French were using other beaches between St. Malo & Dunkerque.
Dunkerque had been heavily bombed: GRENADE and other ships sunk there. One Eastern approach to Dunkerque could not be used at night as E-boats had sunk a destroyer there: Western one being shelled from shore in daylight:
centre one difficult for navigational reasons.
Captain Bush (HEBE) i/c offshore until my arrival.
Arrangements:-
2 destroyers ready to sail from Dover to Dunkerque to take over 2 lots of beach parties. One of 80 officers and men
(G. & T. Long Courses) was for disciplinary purposes on the beaches. In the earlier stages the troops were completely disorganised, discarding their rifles, lying down on the beaches and refusing to get into the boats:
it was intended that men would not be taken off unless they had their rifles. By the time I arrived things had improved very considerably in this respect.
(3)
Another party of 200 were intended to act as beach parties to assist the embarkation, but these never materialised.
I
Commodores Stevenson and Hallett arrived at Dover by train after I did - thought they were already at Dunkerque.
2000
Sailed in ESK with all the above, except the 200 men of the beach parties. Stevenson to take charge off La Panne
Hallett off Braye. Intended myself to be off St. Malo and
Dunkerque, or to put Bush i/c there.
ore
Warned officers of beach parties not to get caught, and that it møght be impossible to give them any order as to when to come off.
Had no clear idea of what might be possible or how to set about it, nor any idea of local conditions, communications, I
General etc. plan was to put an officer in some small ship i/c hit offshore at each of the main beaches and try to organise ore the flow of ships to beaches myself from some central and position.
que al
(4)
Dark
0
isi

2
(4)
291
Dark oil tanks when we arrived near Dunkerque. burnin above. lighted up the sky, with Flames from smoke at anchor Saw a ship (CLAN MACALLISTER) a black pall of provided a off Braye: burning until the on fire offshore but plight. Another deserted merchant ship was in similar and guns. useful diversion for German bombers end, deserted, shore
0400 30th May. time, parties in destroyer's boats. South, All landing the We approached beach Dunkerque beaches from the
Cdr. and it was not until 0400 that we found HEBE this took (Lieut.-
the John Temple) off Braye and transferred to her. At
Flat same time the 2 Commodores were put into drifters.
to boats off the beaches. Bush (who was in HEBE) seemed and calm: difficult to see in dark; many ships, drifters be rather despondent, having seen the shore black with men standing up to their waists in water; embarkation process being extremely slow.
Dawn
Arrived ahead. in HEBE off La Panne and got some idea of the task
(5)
Physical description of the beach. Long stretch of sand dunes rising fairly steeply in places from a gently shelving beach which dries for 200 yards or more at L.W.
Offshore the water deepens very gradually and a destroyer cannot get nearer than half a mile, etc.
Large groups of men all over the beaches and a dark line of men at the water's edge. Off Braye BIDEFORD was ashore with her stern completely blown off by a bomb: LOCUST -
river g.b. - trying to tow her off, which she eventually did and got her back to England. Farther towards Dunkerque another ship (CRESTED EAGLE?) was high and dry and burnt out; also many boats broached to on the beach. Lying off were destroyers, sloops, drifters, etc., and men making their way off in whalers, motor boats and pontoon craft.
A slight swell made landing difficult, and many boats broached to and were stranded on a falling tide. The visibility was not good, with low-lying clouds: very thankful for this, a blessing we were not always to enjoy.
Daylight
Could now get a clearer idea of situation and conditions.
Beaches were packed with troops, but they appeared to be orderly and under proper control. A few ships were lying as close in as possible and were being slowly filled up by their own boats and a few local craft. Ships' motor boats were towing off the whalers assisted by motor launchen but these could not get very close in; pontoon craft were being paddled off by soldiers, but it was not easy to get them back ashore again and often they were left to float away empty. As soon as a sloop or destroyer was full up
I
she left and took her boats with her - the boats' crews were guns' crews and no one wanted to be without them.
To anyone with the appreciation of the practical difficult-l ies of embarking in small boats with a long pull to seaward'
the sight of that beach black with troops was dismaying.
The number steadily increased and at back of our minds all ore the time was question and fear of how long the defence line could hold and the weather remain fair.
(6) 0630
Crux of matter was boats, boats' crews and towage; and at
0630 I signalled the urgent need of these. By about 0730
0730
most of the ships had loaded up and were leaving: I asked r for more ships and again stressed need of boats.
I now moved down to Dunkerque to get in communication with hit.
Tennant and went alongside pier in response to a signal.
nore
Description of Dunkerque (see plan). Outer harbour is formed by 2 breakwaters approx at right angles, leaving a and narrow entrance between. Western Arm of solid stone:
que
Eastern Arm (called here East Pier) only solid for short al part of inshore end, the rest being built of concrete piles.o wide enough for 4 men walking abreast. Alongside short through which tide flows and on which is a narrow pathway East isi
Pier is channel to inner harbour and docks. A
length

length of piling runs out parallel to East Pier 295
292
wide. encloses the entrance to this channel - about 150 and
A new series of docks under construction has yards into the harbour by this entrance is the West Quay.
entrance opening off the inner harbour, and jutting out an
93
West Quay was used entirely by the French; luckily for us they did not consider East Pier suitable for embarkation. to
All British troops were embarked from East Pier, and on se last 2 days a large number of French troops also.
Bi g rise and fall of tide: at H.W. can step straight on a destroyer's deck, but at L.W. it was a 15 ft. drop.
Many ladders were sent over and secured to sides of pier,
O
but sobdiers with rifles and packs took a long time to get down ladders.
When I first went in (30th) there was a trawler (c) sunk alongside pier and another ship (A) sunk outside the end.
The trawler and drifter shown sank later, as also the
(9
blockships.
4 berths alongside East Pier could be used. Inner one (F)
only by small ships at L.W., but at H.W. personnel ships
(7
could get into B, D and E.
On 24th May, KING ORRY had rammed the pier during a bombing raid and made a large gap in it abreast E berth: until this was bridged outer berths could not be used as roadway along pier was cut. Harbour very shallow to the west of
West Quay, and place where ROUEN went ashore on night of
2nd June when leaving the quay is shown - also where
KELLETT grounded on night of 3rd June.
As soon as HEBE got alongside East Pier I went to local
Naval H. Q., while she was quickly filled up with 6-700
some of them wounded.
men, Naval H.Q. were established in a dug-out at shore end of
East Pier. This area was not large and was separated from mainland by a bridge over a cabal. Surface was uneven and covered with heaps of rubble; there was a and a few ambulances, cars and wounded men.
Bofors small gun staff of the SNO, Captain Tennant, did wonderful the
The controlling the embarkation and dealing with shell work ashore: they worked under constant Tennant fire and were was away with the General, but was and that situation short of sleep and food. Did not informed see that as he of troops were ready to embark at sent pier in.
plenty would take all ships that could be East
At this cut off the end, so that the only Later, accessible this they time gap in roadway halfway along Pier completely points were inside this point. along its embarkation bridged so that pier could be alongside. used whole
Had intended to keep HEBE as my headquarters, so she had length gap was except where ships were sunk not been used to embark any troops from beaches. Felt this I
could not refuse to do this at Dunkerque, and once done the question of their disposal arose.
was returned to beaches and sent any surplus ships to load to
(8)
I Dunkerque, and from then on had continually to and try needs hold beaches and Dunkerque. Also reported that, essential to more at the balance between the respective claims until boats of were available for ferrying, it was itself.
Explanation why Dunkerque was then being so little used concentrate on evacuation from Dunkerque and 25th so May, Dunkerque was heavily attacked from sunk, the and air much effort expended on beaches:-
On harbour was full of ships. GRENADE was when ORRY and several other ships alongside piers Party were ashore hit.
KING result of this, a junior member of Naval of the day, whose off in a car to La Panne where he Dunkerque and a judgment had been affected by events saw Lord Gort dashed Admiralty that further embarkation from sending al phoned was impossible. Dover was, therefore, took 2 days to itself to beaches and none to Dunkerque: which had a ships overcome results of this indiscretion, consi erable temporary effect on the plans.

4
296
VA, A destroyer Dover, having reported that Dunkerque was
293
0830 I asked me if ships should be sent there. usable,
0830
signalled from HEBE that destroyers could At into
Dunkerque in succession and that troops were waiting come close to the pier. Loading off beaches was proceeding slowly:
conditions were not bad, but the slight swell running in was enough to render boats liable to broach to. At La
Panne and Braye, lorries were being driven into the sea to form a sort of breakwater.
Noon
About midday there was an air attack on ships and on La
Panne. Later, when it had cleared a bit overhead, there was an attack on Dunkerque. Several French destroyers came in by Y channel and were fired on from the north of
La Panne; some guns tried to shell beach between Braye and La Panne, but the steep dunes protected it.
On returning to La Panne met Stevenson who had transferred to a motor launch and was doing excellent work. He saw
(9)
Lord Gort who was anxious to see me. As conditions were getting worse and I did not want to get stranded, decided to go to Dunkerque and drive to La Panne from there.
HEBE could not be detained any longer, so sent her back to
Dover with troops and wounded and told Bush to explain the boat situation and point out vital necessity for sending out boats and crews.
1530
Transferred my staff to WINDSOR and went into Dunkerque in
MTB 102, sent at my request. Badly wanted some means of getting about quickly and a fast boat of light draught would have been invaluable: when I did get one its endurance was so low that it had to return almost at once to
Dover.
On getting to Dunkerque found Tennant was with Gort and that to drive there would take up more time than I cared to be away: decided to land from a boat after all.
The MTB had not enough fuel to reach La Panne and return to Døver, SO boarded GOSSAMER and took her to La Panne
1730
where I transferred to WORCESTER at about 1730.
La Panne was in telephonic communication with England;
also received W/T messages from Dover. One (1749) said ships were urgently wanted off La Panne: actually, at
1900, there were 4 destroyers and 1 minesweeper there and situation was constantly changing.
G.H.Q. was in touch with Admiralty and VA, Dover, and gave views and criticisisms of what was happening. This probably accounts for signal from 1st SL on this day asking if boats were distributed along beaches to best advantage.
Actually, only boats that could get inshore, except distri- pontoons bution depended on position of ships they belonged but and a few local craft, were the whalers, and their to.
(10)
badly So hampered by lack of quick transport: once ships had far as possible kept ships off all beaches, was boats away a re-distribution was impracticable.
1900
beaches; with ammunition. Told her to beach cleared at as La
Small and about this time the TINY puffer herself their numbers of aircraft attacked La Panne and arrived, ships off loaded tide being then high; did so and was of was
Panne, tide fell, though think that a good deal cargo finally on beach in slight swell (thied attempt visual to see Gort), dumped in the sea.
2000
Landed Flag-Lieut. and a few signalmen to and open General went with them to GHQ - last villa but one on communication taking with GHQ. Met by Tennant south edge Lees;
of La Panne. situation. Seemed obvious to me back that more the
(11)
Discussed felt they had successfully fallen it now or soldiers intact inn face of great odds and that was not making up to less the Navy to get them off, but that Navy were
Stressed of large scale embarkation from beaches; off said from any real difficulty, effort to do slowness so. and dependence on fine weather that bulk of any troops should move westward and come This
Dunkerque.

297
This included brought the from General Lees a disparaging which 204
At this no business or justification to Navy. talk Told he had words "ineptitude of the remark him were holding time British troops were acting as like that.
of La a line which came down to coast rear guard and
These at midnight on 31st May and fall back on the from line Panne. Intention was for them to withdraw a little north this
31st troops (about 5,000) were some of the best, beaches. and Gort
0400
was very anxious they should be got away. 1st SL said that the Navy would make a supreme effort to get off the remainder the next day (31st) and the rear guard the following night: details were being sent over to me by
Bush. Felt daunted at the prospect and the seeming impossibility of the task. Plan made by Admiralty and
VA, Dover, had every chance of success, but it did not fall out as planned.
Arranged for Gort to embark from La Panne at 1800 on 31st and that boats and ships would be there for the purpose:
if that was impossible he would go to Dunkerque. On returning to WORCESTER informed Stevenson of the arrangements and put him in charge of them: intended to be there myself also.
(12) 2200 Started back to ship; then getting dark. No boats at the
1035
beach - too precious to be kept hanging about. Tide was farther out and a number of boats and pontoons were stranded. Some of the 12th Royal Lancers were trying to get pontoons afloat, and it was good to see them trying to help themselves.
With some soldiers got an unused pontoon afloat and 8 men,
Flag-Lt. and myself got in, but soon found that the boat, which had only 3 inches of freeboard, would inevitably be swamped before we could get to the ship. Sea was calm, with a small swell coming in. It was still fairly shallow so we all jumped out and returned to the beach to empty the boat of water. Tennant and Lees were still there, watching our progress, and as we came ashore I remarked to the latter, "Another example of Naval ineptitude."
Had to reduce crew by 2 and then set off again. Soldiers
2230
(13)
WORCESTER was slowly filling up with troops and I remained paddled well and we got back on board WORCESTER at 2230.
there till 0100/31: she was then full and I sent her back
Earlier to on 30th I had asked for a ship with 2 lines of W/T
Dover, transferring to EXPRESS.
communication and was told that KEITH would arrive at 2000.
She did not appear and I remained for rest of night in
EXPRESS, which was gradually embarking troops.
There were tens of thousands of men on or near to know the beaches how
Picture as I saw it was as follows:-
and The rear guard were to be withdrawn and night, must in and around Dunkerque - no one seemed next many. 24 hours ahead: they were the best troops where i.e. off. Dunkerque itself was the only place be got embarkation could take place, and a large and Braye, proportion 10
rapid of the troops were coming down to La Panne and beaches the only boats available, except ships' for
5 miles away from Dunkerque.
At the and a very few local craft, were crewless boats if pontoons went away with their ships or were motor boats left.
which cases they had to pull in, as ships' needed.
In many often out of action, and towage was badly were depended entirely on fair weather - an entirely. onshore
Embarkation of any force would have stopped embarkation shallow wind stressed the vital necessity for more draught I had boats and crews, and knew that everything possible was being the day French destroyers had been coming fired at in from by the done at home.
During passage and channel and had been at the
Northern They went into Dunkerque and loaded to be the West shore. Quay: otherwise no French ships seemed there.
Destroyers,

6
Destroyers, arriving, minesweepers and all manner of 298 205
were at one but there were often periods and when Dunkerque continuously, loading and leaving the beaches craft were
Bombing of place or another and embarkation had no shi wait. ps the ships and beaches had so far been to -
sound day of had been overcast and visibility was not spasmodic good;
freedom from air attack.
fighters overhead seemed to account for our
0400 31st May. Report received at 0400 of aircraft dropping mines 1 mile north of La Panne: planes frequently passed close overhead during dark hours.
Dawn
Light N. W. wind sprang up right on the beaches: many boats seen capsized, broached to or high and diry, including at least one of the local boats which carried a lot of men and could get close inshore. Not a cheering sight.
Sky cleared and visibility improved; absence of haze all day.
0730
Made contact with KEITH. EXPRESS now fully loaded and left for Dover as soon as I had transferred to KEITH, in which ship I now hoisted my flag - prior to this I had used a Red Ensign (no flag being available before) to indicate which ship I was in.
While I was in KEITH she did not embark any troops - same as for HEBE.
1035
To VA, Dover:- "Majority of boats broached to and have no crews. Conditions on beach very bad due to freshening onshore wind. Only small numbers being embarked even in daylight. Under present conditions any large scale embarkation from beach is quite impracticable; motor boats cannot get close in. Only hope of embarking any number is at Dunkerque. Will attempt to beach ship to form a lee to try to improve conditions."
Reply:- Urging importance of using beaches as long as
(15) 1105 To possible. VA, Dover:- "Dunkerque our only real hope. Can guns shelling pier from westward be bombed and silenced?"
Successful use of Dunkerque depended on being able to put ships alongside Eastern breakwater: my constant fear that this might be so accurately shelled as to render it untenable. Signalled to shore urging movement towards Dunkerque: troops seen moving slowly westward.
Beach events clearly visible from seaward. Bodies of men marched along - some in good order, others in groups and knots. Ond battalion in perfect order seen marching down through a winding road from dunes to shore - told later it was the Welsh Guards, but not certain if this was correct.
Embarkation going on all the time, with ships leaving as
Commencing of day before and continuing on form day, a the soon as filled; largest numbers came from Dunkerque. this
Army barricade and breakwater. At Braye the lorries R.E. planked that had been driving lorries down to beach to had and made a handrail on these so a gangway boats could go alongside. As line breakwater ran straight out motor to sea and wind was directly on shore, gave very forenoon sent Stevenson over to some paddle a break- minelittle shelter - still it helped.
During off Braye to get one beached to act as at sweepers Done; next day she was high and dry ship was daylight. long
Don't enough to cover distance tide ran out, so water. know to what extent she was used: no could only be
HEBE of returned with Bush, bringing plan for embarkation value for part of the tide.
1000
that night. numbers Was of boats as follows:- were now being sent over in to tow be of
Large etc. Due to start arriving at 1500; were scheme tugs, for use of rear guard for whom embarkation were being
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kept planned. To take the troops, 11 sloops in company, was and were to rendezvous and proceed Given berths collected being timed for 0130 on 1st June. each of the arrival in which to anchor in 3 batches, 1 batch off embarkation beaches.
An

7
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206
were An impracticable not feature of this plan was that craft inshore asking too much to think that when our crying need It was for to be used except for the rear guard. small boats, any such could be held idle while was men were on beaches with ships waiting to take them so many off.
Actual development of this plan was very different.
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HEBE sent up to La Panne, to be there at 1800 to receive
Gort whom Stevenson was to bring off.
Beaches shelled during the day, but in most cases shells landed on dunes which had a fairly steep scarp and protected the beach. Shelling was principally to westward of
Braye; at one time a French battery 2 or 3 miles out of
Dunkerque on top of dunes, but close to sea, received a lot of attention.
1330
As I was returning to eastward HEBE signalled she had been shelled off La Panne at 1200 and had had to move westward a couple of miles.
1430
Went up in KEITH off La Panne to see if battery could be shelled, but had to withdraw - not essential to be so far to the eastward and battery was not visible. Its fore was directed by an observation balloon over Nieuport;
aircraft came out to shoot it down, but without result;
it was re-hoisted as soon as they left. Shell bursts appeared to be 6 or 8-inch, in salvoes of four.
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Owing to the shelling of anchorage at La Panne urged Gort to embark as soon as possible, but he would not leave before the time arranged.
Soon after, I moved down to Dunkerque so as to be on spot when boats arrived. En route a terrific air battle overhead - 3 Spitfires shot down, 2 in the sea; onepilot killed, the other not found.
While waiting off Dunkerque signal from VA, Dover, to say
Army wanted to start embarkation at 2000 instead of 0100.
Replied: Boats had not arrived and sloops would not be there then, but would do my best. (This had an unfortunate effect: as sloops could not be there in time I had to keep destroyers, etc., off the beaches which would otherwise have been sent to Dunkerque during the night.
Result = though many were embarked from beaches, very few ships went into Dunkerque where men were waiting, and full use of it was not made.)
Always impossible for me to do more than deal with the situation of the moment. Did not know what ships were coming or when - except for the pre-arranged plan of the sloops; nor could Dover give me much information.
The stream of ships was constant, but irregular; not possible to see any way ahead. My policy was to keep only enough ships off the beaches and send all others into
Dunkerque, but situation changed continually. I wanted
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to be in several places at once.
The first of the boat tows did not arrive until 1700 - a tug with what looked like 6 dinghies in tow: she was
Could not wait off Dunkerque as I wanted to get up to La preceded by some motor yachts which came in company.
Panne for Gort, so left Wynne-Edwards in a motor yacht to direct the tows as they arrived, and to order a large number of hoppers and other craft that were lying off the westwen beaches to beach themselves on the rising tide so that men could embark.
Gort's embarkation produced some odd incidents.
Dover had sent over 4 MTBs and MA/SBs to get him: the reached me. During the afternoon 2 MTBs came to me and signal informing me of this, like many others, never said they were to embark a party from a point 2 miles west of La Panne. Could not understand this; thought they must have been sent to fetch off some of Naval landing the H.
party, but realise now the party concerned was
Staff. While approaching La Panne, shortly before 1800, HEBE
1800
signalled to me "General on beach abreast you, and saw a group at water's edge with 2 cars and some KEITH'S gnalmen.

8
300
KEITH'S I learnt boats he sent in, but Gort was not in 207 and
No one his staff: heavy air attack trips necessary time.
to bring off was in HEBE already. Three first boat
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ships and was hit, though narrow escapes. Many during this on increase beaches; HEBE shot down a Heinkel. attacks
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of shell fire off Braye, where CLAN Great was and a valuable decoy: she was hit and bombed MACALLISTER several times blindly into this area, as shells fell near CLAN MACALLIS-
started burning again. Enemy guns seemed to be firing
TER but not among ships loading which were some inshore of her. Later, these ships did come under fire, way and
VIVACIOUS was hit twice and had 11 casualties - 2-300
troops on board. Ordered her to go into Dunkerque and fill up there.
Lees was Senior Staff Officer of H. Q. Staff, and I thought it would be a good education for him to see something of what the naval problem was, so I kept him on the bridge with me. As Gort was in HEBE I felt he was safe, and as
HEBE was doing good work embarking troops I did not send her back to Dover with him at once. Therein, perhaps, I
was wrong, as I had not realized the anxiety of Government to have him safe and sound at home, but felt he would
1st sooner the ship helped to bring off more men than he should land a few hours earlier in England.
During the day made signal to all ships with instructions for supporting fire against enemy tanks and lorries on the beach. Critical place likely to be at La Panne after the line was evacuated; intended to be there myself in KEITH
at daybreak next morning. Also kept BASILISK free of
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1700
Weather improved gradually. Signal = "Weather off beaches now good: many more boats should come into use again as tide rises. General movement of troops westward towards
Dunkerque. No petrol supply yet and many boats getting short off La Panne and Braye. Movement from Dunkerque continues. Great air activity. "
1815
Drifters with petrol arrived.
After embarking H. Q. Staff I returned to Dunkerque and found Wynne-Edwards had been doing good work. Saw for the first time that strange procession of craft of all kinds that has become famous - small motor yachts, motor launches drifters, Dutch schuyts, Thames barges, fishing boats, pleasure steamers, tugs towing dinghies, lifeboats and all manner of pulling boats.
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As tows of boats appeared they were told to which beach be they should go; particularly anxious there should sufficient at La Panne which was farthest off. Directed 10
miles up the coast; and as light was beginning the remaining to fail, several tows to go on to La Panne, telling them it was
Motor I left and Wynne-Edwards went on up to in La a MA/SB Panne myself. to direct Off Panne Braye were I saw tows I had feared - that tows ordered to La stopping what at Braye: got there just in farther time to on. warn
CODRINGTON (off Braye) to send them out to Lees how easy it was to talk about ten-mile distribu-
Pointed boats and craft at certain places along different a ting of coast, but that it was a very craft which thing stretch it done in practice, in the dark, by to help to get not been there before and with no lights the first place them. they had inevitable tendency was to stop assembled. at
The where other craft were
In the (on a his return to me at about off was La Panne.
came to end pretty fair distribution was 2230) made, and able Wynne- to
Edwards report that it was there this were evening a number that of I boats saw 2 would transports be bombed. go into
Dunkerque and out was just as it was getting from dark, that direction.
I think very nervous that they and shortly
They moved heard very heavy bombing aircraft attacking off
Actually, afterwards bombing was from our NOW own dark and I remained batteries La Panne in down company the coast. with HEBE and several other Stayed ships.

9
may 301 208
by Stayed moving off La Panne during the night, as could do much
Shelling was continuous and by the sound anywhere. some were about after dark. No lights not falling among the ships at the anchorage. News shells
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no boats; ship message = boats found no one on beach.
conflicting: shore message = thousands of men waiting, very but
Probable truth was - Germans had range of lorry breakwater and beaches near it and they shelled them heavily. Boats went in there and found no one, as troops had moved farther west clear of shell fire. Don't know what really took place. Off shore one felt helpless, etc.
Aircraft passed close overhead flying down the anchorages and fairway; MALCOLM off Braye reported a number of parachute mines dropped to westward of there, and suggested ships should leave by Zuidcoote Pass in the morning as passage to west was so heavily mined. Noise of MTB engines often heard to seaward and eastward:? our own patrol.
2300
Received urgent signal from Admiralty asking where Gort was and why I had detailed the MTBs sent for him to other work.
Gort had just left HEBE in a motor launch: after long search for him in the dark, at last found him, transferred
1st (24) June. As a result of the bombing the day before, asked for him to the MA/SB and sent him off to Dover with Lees.
fighter protection at dawn.
0215
Heard that troops were moving westward and decided that embarkation at La Panne was no longer possible. MALCOLM
and HARVESTER ordered from La Panne to Dunkerque. Also told ships to keep close to fairway buoys to avoid mines in the channel.
0235 (22) To Admiralty and VA, Dover:- "Yesterday ships off Braye under fire. Today's shorter front will bring dangerous area westward. Consider beach work too costly and evacuation must be confined to Dunkerque. Small craft will be moved westward at dawn.
VA, Dover, reply = "While leaving this to your discretion, essential that beaches be used until found impossible.
0330
Growing light. BASILISK with me - kept empty for support- La fire against tanks or lorries along beach. Up by and ing beach was deserted except for lorry breakwater - boats
Panne scattered cars. Sea also seemed deserbed small to the westward. some of the boats adrift. Off Braye Ships were had One or two motor launches about: there them was to a vanished, a few empty ones drifting on tide told collect and a paddle minesweeper ashore. and men were minesweeper still loading off Braye and to the westward, moving down westward off Braye along and the hailed beaches. a tug which and was try on to its tow way
Moved some soldiers on board to go in was back with minesweeper. Master paid no attention; him and sent an only
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off the get away. Trained a gun on board anxious to to take charge, put the soldiers on
RNVR Sub-Lt. which was nearby, and go off to help the minesweeper with
SABRE, was that tugs had been told to regarded go over them-
Real trouble boats in tow and load up, and never they informed of this pulling transports only. I was tugs.
selves as them as tugs and for use as by
All the night, but the degaussing possible. and and regarded this time I was moving in waters mined proved effieient aircraft
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during to edge of fairway when of the
I kept low clouds. Most ships were though full.
0400 (23)
Misty with that were not I sent into Dunkerque, and some for of the
Those were still many men on beaches, of small craft there small gone back boats to for were England. the still night there, Did and not were majority then going realise back June. as they intended. Troops had had been
Reported are evacuating gradually directing to Dunkerque all boats as and eastern small beaches craft sent over "Situation report at 0600, 1st to
0625
are untenable. and loading Am all ships at Dunkerque. and fighter More attacks ships vicinity required. Heavy bombing on Dunkerque About
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on ships."

10
302
About from seaward this time saw a Belgian fishing boat 200
tigate. down the Zuidcoote Pass. BASILISK appear on inves- scene
Was first of a dozen such boats which to tion. appeared; on their way to Dunkerque to assist in shortly evacua-
As mists and clouds dispersed many aircraft appeared scene, and fighters constantly came low over us. Often on they were Spitfires, but our ships were not taking any chances and opened fire indiscriminately on them.
Hoisted signal "Cease Fire" and blew syren to attract attention, but our own machine gun aft in KEITH continued firing - once firing started they could not hear the
"cease fire" gong.
KEITH now had only about 30 rounds of H.A. ammunition left,
SO decided would shortly transfer flag to BASILISK and send
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KEITH into Dunkerque to fill up and return to Dover.
Before I could do this a very heavy bombing attack developed, first of all in and around Dunkerque itself. IVANHOE
was hit and entirely enveloped in smoke just off entrance;
2 hours later saw her being towed back to Dover. HAVANT
was sunk near the entrance.
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Not long afterwards a compact formation of 30-40 JU 87's appeared from the S.W. Everyone opened fire on them and enemy spread out. Fire seemed effective and thought it was driving them away, so left bridge for a moment.
KEITH attacked by 3 D/Bs: one bomb burst 10 yards astern and helm jammed when hard over; two others near misses.
Ship soon under control in hand steering: 1 man hurt.
1900
Attacked by 3 more D/Bs: one bomb down after funnel and
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exploded below; several casualties.
Owing to danger of fire, foremost torpedo tubes were fired As to get rid of torpedoes. Holes in side from bomb.
ship could not steam let go anchor, and shortly after
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MTB 102 came alongside. Could do no good in KEITH, so transferred to the MTB with my staff and 1 wounded man.
Sent two nearby tugs to assist KEITH and then made for
Dunkerque. KEITH again attakked and hit under bridge:
heavy list to port, but H.A. gun still firing. She was twice more and her men were taken off by a tug, which the hit picked up men from BASILISK and SKIPJACK: both sunk:
latter also sunk at this time. Tug also was bombed down and and about 30 of KEITH'S men lost, and planes came machined gunned men in water.
MTB to see General Alexander (now in command Tennant.
bombed most of the way in, but managed to dodge after them.
0915
Landed Gort's departure), but he was away and so was
Learnt that plan was to continue evacuation during the next
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night withdraw from their new positions at dawn and for several from western beaches and Dunkerque; rear guard retire were to
Dunkerque. to This meant continuing embarkation hours spaces round local H.Q. full of ambulances and ounded of daylight: feared heavy losses.
Open doctors doing what they could.
with ships still afloat had left Dunkerque, MTB so returned and, in to make spite of more bombing and machine gunning, Dover
All contact with VA, Dover. Left in the reached
1130
in safety at 1130.
Embarkation Plan to take place between 2100 and of 0330 Dunkerque. and was to for the night:-
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be from this a large number of ships and small also being were being sent the 1½ miles of beach to the east craft
For and sent over. Personnel ships RAF to assembled Dunkerque itself to go alongside pier. were the into their efforts between 1900 and and 0700 from over period concentrate when ships would be on passage to
Dunkerque. cross-channel type used for normal ferrying
Personnel across ships to = France. Manned by and their loading alongside crews troops been going into the harbour so were very and had could carry 3,000 men, used
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valuable; the pier. but Some they were large targets and were reluctance with

11
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300
reluctance when bombing was probable, especially several would only go into Dunkerque in daylight. as This now considered too dangerous, and Naval Officers were put on board to act as advisers to the masters and crews were stiffened with seamen. They went in every night and did
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magnificent work. Other craft, also, including French destroyers, were to go in and load alongside: British at
East Pier, French at West Quay.
Gap in pier had been bridged, but I feared that Germans would now shell pier heavily and make it impossible for ships to be kept alongside. Asked RAF to reconnoitre:
report gave accurate account of gap, but no word as to whether pier was being shelled.
1700
Arranged to leave Dover at 1700. Picked up Wynne-Edwards and Norfolk and embarked in MA/SB 10, in which a portable loud-speaker was fitted (similar sets found very useful in
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HEBE and EXPRESS). A flag had been made for me out of a piece of cleaning cloth - the red stripe made one half of the cross, and the other half and the balls had been added in red paint. Harbour was full of destroyers, sloops, etc., many showing signs of minor damage. Some were out of action all together, and all were enjoying a short, well-earned rest. I had an hour's sleep on way over; up till then had had about 7 hours in short snatches, but felt quite fresh and fit.
When some miles away from Dunkerque sighted 2 MTBs approach ing on port bow. They did not make contact and were
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probably French.
1900
Arrived at Dunkerque and made fast alongside shore end of pier. Went to the "Bastion" (H.Q. of Army and the local
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French Naval and Military Command) - 10 minutes' walk.
Many buildings and sheds damaged. A French field gun was firing back over the town. Road fairly clear, but litter-
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ed with vehicles the whole way. Men straggling along the road, but very few troops seen as they were kept away on beach behind shelter of wall except when ships came along-
Found side. Tennant and Alexander at the "Bastion. Heard that
French were holding a line in rear of ours and that rear would continue to hold. Joined by my proper Flag-Lieut. with guard were to withdraw through this line which the French
(Balfour): he had come over the day after I left, a
Returned to the pier. A Lysander Army Co-op plane, which
W/T set.
had been flying over pier all day, was fired at by several
Bofors guns - not hit. Explained it was probably the reconnaissance plane I had asked for.
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While having some food in the MA/SB, the Navigating Officer He of KEITH appeared, saying he was the only survivor.
had swum ashore and reached a battery on the dunes some distance outside Dunkerque, and had then walkked in.
(Actually, only 3 Officers and 33 mon were lost, and 16
wounded.) Close by my boat was Tennant's drifter; he also had 2 old steamboats. Next day the drifter was sunk by a shell.
Naval Party ashore = about 6 Officers and a number of men messengers, signalmen, etc. Arranged to collect some of them at 0200/2, but Tennant would not leave then.
"Tomorrow we'll either be back in London, in a German prison or done for.
went outside harbour to meet the first ships arriving.
2100
Beginning to get dark. First ship was a sloop, followed off
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by beaches to the east of the pier and boats ferried men minesweepers, destroyers and tugs. They anchored the off. Noticed 3 or 4 Thames barges anchored off them beach; and they seemed to be deserted, but men got off to full of away. soldiers who were trying to sail her home: a Officer
One barge was met later in mid-Channel Naval was put on board and she got back safely.
During

12
beaches During the than night found there were more ships 301
304'
the could be loaded: there was lying off the diverting ships from beaches as necessary. Beaches and were pier, so I Kept on the move between harbout plenty of room outside at very Pier heavilCy shelled, but still a lot of men got off.
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where was outlined against glow of fires still burning someto the westward of Dunkerque: steady stream of men passing along it. Numerous small craft passing up to the inner basins. French TBs loading at West Quay.
Shelling seemed to be concentrated on beach and to eastward of pier; shells falling inside harbour, and about midni a side. trawler was sunk. Also casualties in a destroyer along-
2nd June. Went up to shore end of pier to embark the base party:
0200
violent outburst of shelling. No signs of party, so
Wynne-Edwards went to look for them. A number of French troops had cut into the flow of British troops by a converging route: result was that about 5,000 British were held up and did not get off that night. Instead, a lot of
French troops got away from the East Pier in addition to
0245
those from the West Quay. Base party came down at 0245
and embarked.
Dawn
As morning was clear I decided to get ships away at 0300
instead of at 0330 as originally planned. Men were still coming down to pier, but it was no use risking ships being sunk alongside and blocking the pier and harbour.
(Word picture of scene - darkness out to seaward, glare of
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fires inshore, etc. Not very much noise.)
Returned to Dover to discuss next night's operation.
Still 5,000 of B.E.F. to come and an unknown number of
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French (30-40,000?). Plan was to use Dunkerque only, except for some French local craft which would embark from
Dawn beach immediately east of Dunkerque. Embarkation was to start at 2100 and go on till 0300, when blockships were to enter the harbour. Programme was worked out for ships to come in at half-hourly intervals to different berths, so that 3 or 4 ships should be alongside East Pier continuously. Denny thought this was impossible and liable to result in confusion, but a scheme was got out which provided carrying capacity of 37,000 men besides those that would go off in small craft. I also got 2 fast boats told off to act as runners for me (? from VERNON)
Besides the large ships, there were tugs, schuyts, drifters and all manner of small craft going over as well - some to lie off and be loaded by smaller boats, and others to go
Large number of wounded in Dunkerque: orders had been right up harbour past the large ship berths.
embarking given wounded would have taken up too much that fit men were to be got away in preference, valuable as time. Decided to try to get some of the wounded the Germans away in time in Hospital ships, in the hope that bombed day would respect them: 2 were sent over, but one she was had to sunk, the other was so badly damaged that had to be return. and Wounded, except for walking cases, left over again in MA/SB 10, with Somerville and and Goodenough 3
behind.
On Belgian soldiers who were about half-way across a pull-
Went the way over had a mild bombing attack picked in up ing boat. outside the harbour met one of the two the fast other motor
Just Both had been machine-gunned and had to boat be boats. and left (not seen again): this one disabled as she had only one engine left in working his order. staff.
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returned at Dunkerque. Picked up Alexander General and
2030
Transferred Arrived them to a destroyer, and in her bullet was later killed by a machine gun last from of his a
Mansergh when close to Dover. Tennant and the the British plane party left in a MTB as soon as the last of troops had gone.
The

13
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The difficult west-going tide, with a fresh easterly tide turned at about 2300. Used the MA/SB to push one to get ships alongside the East Pier wind, until made the it destroyer in and tried to get other small craft to do likewise. By this time the French had come to life and many of their small craft filled the narrow harbour.
The MA/SB's clutch out of action - could not go astern.
2200
4 destroyers had been got away by 2200, and the last of the B.E.F. was clear soon after.
Then a long pause. The French should have followed our men on the East Pier, but they ddd not appear. Could see crowds of soldiers on West Quay, but as there seemed a scarcity of French ships I sent 2 personnel ships there.
One was ROYAL SOVEREIGN, which was handled magnificently -
went alongside bows out. Other was ROUEN (French cross-
Channel steamer): in getting away she got broadside on to the wind and grounded just to the westward of the quay.
Sent a tug to assist her, but she drew too much water to get near: also a lifeboat to get men away. Think men were got away; ship floated off with next tide in daylight and then returned in safety.
3rd June. A most disheartening night. Flow of French troops to the
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East Pier stopped for some hours. One report = they were held up to make a counter-attack. When they did come it was almost impossible to get them to the ships at the end of the pier: they all wanted to get into the first they came to, and pier was so narrow that they then blocked the way to any ships beyond. One ship lay for 3½ hours at the end berth waiting for men. Finally, began to trickle down, but was then obvious that many of ships waiting outside could not be used and I had to send back empty 2
personnel ships, 3 destroyers and several Fleet sweepers.
Dawn
French coming down faster, and as time of leaving got closer tried to make them double down the pier. Even then they were quite hopeless. Saw men who were on the way to the end ship turn and run back up the pier, because they saw another ship coming alongside farther in.
0300
Again I ordered ships to leave at 0300, and waited to see the last go and to hail the 2 blockships as they passed up harbour shortly after, accompanied by MTBs which were to take off the crews.
One blockship was sunk as arranged across the channel, but the other shifted as she was blown up and lay up and down the channel, leaving a clear passage. Either this night or the next one blockship was blown up on a magnetic mine
After seeing the blockships pass up harbour, the MA/SB took just outside the harbour.
us back to Dover in time to get 2 hours' rest before breakfast. Last night's results were very disappointing and only
24,000 men were embarked. Many more could have been taken but for the long pause in the flow of troops to East Pier.
After the Naval ratings had left at 2300 there was some difficulty in getting ships berthed, as the French did nothing to replace our men although the Port was the H.Q.
of a Naval Command and there were always plenty of French marines in evidence.
Was informed at Dover that there was to be another embarkation that night, but that this really would be the end.
Each night had been thought to be the last, and then each
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day the ships had been asked for one more effort. By the this time many of the Commanding Officers and men were at limit of their endurance, and the VA did not feel he could order ships to go over. Signal asking what ships 6 were ready and able to go. Finally, 10 transports, 2 yachts, destroyers
8 1 gunboat, 10 drifters, 5 schuyts and 1 tug were collected. boats minesweepers, 4 paddle sweepers, 2 corvettes,
Besides these, a large number of small craft and as before.
For

14
For 2230 this and night the time was cut down by
306 303
destroyers docks of the inner harbour; the go right up quays and 0230. The small craft were to an hour to between to the and the and paddle sweepers were to use the transports, East to remainder the West Quay. Arrangements Pier, made bring off the French Admiral in MA/SB 7, as his were own
MTBs were said to be out of action.
Naval pier and berthing parties for the East Pier, under
Cdr. Buchanan, were to go over early in WHITSHED. I went over in MTB 102 which had a cruising engine - very useful inside the crowded harbour. On the way over we passed other ships which had started earlier, and in the distance they seemed to be having a hot time from an air attack.
2220
I got over at 2220 to find the harbour swarming with French fishing craft and vessels of all sorts. They were yelling and crowding alongside the East Pier which was already thick with French troops. Managed to get them out of the way of transports and destroyers in time and go on up the inner harbour.
WHITSHED also arrived at 2220, but owing to fresh easterly wind and west-going tide she could not get alongside pier where there was no one who would take a line. She was soon followed by SABRE and KINGFISHER. KINGFISHER was sent to the West Quay, but the others were backing and filling in the narrow harbour trying to get alongside and
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being continually set off. Situation was not made easier by the stream of French craft coming in or leaving harbour;
seamanship displayed was really magnificent. A small hand:
handy tug to push them in would have been invaluable.
Could not use the MTB for this as a similar attempt on the previous night had put the MA/SB's engine out of action.
2300
Took some of the berthing party from WHITSHED to land them on the pier, but had great difficulty in getting alongside,
2330
even in the MTB. Finally got them ashore, and by 2330
WHITSHED, SABRE and 3 personnel ships were alongside.
Note.- There was a wreck alongside the pier itself, a wrecked trawler off the end of the piling on the west side of the up-harbour channel and blockships sunk in the channel: task of these ships in getting alongside against wind and tide could hardly have been more difficult.
Luckily tide was high. Meanwhile, schuyts, Fleet sweepers and French TBs had been making their way into the West Quay where embarkation was going well.
The hold up at the East Pier had thrown out the programme tion in the entrance. At times had to stop ships coming of ships entering the harbour and there was great congesin the move and the handling of them was to let others out in safety, but ships seemed marvellous. always to be Collisions on were inevitable: KINGFISHER was badly holed trawler by a her D.G. cable had been cut and there were plenty to Dover.
French trawler. She transferred her troops to a of magnetic of 6 E-boats proceeding S. W. from off the as mines about. Then she was sent off back Ostende.
4th June.
0100
Report (Several ships of all sizes lying stopped harbour
KELLETT breakwater. A lifeboat towed her to risk keep- and entrance.) aground on a falling tide, right up stern against clear the
0140
western refloated. Was then too near daylight have been she her: West Quay was occupied and it would then so slow ing time before she could be loaded. By her return, as a some would be exposed to great danger on our fighter
(39)
ship might not be able to get back while empty.
she were operating. Sent her back
Flow bad pauses. The first group quickly personnel patrols of men on the East Pier was better this night, of but there were and destroyers some got away by 0100 there and were were crowds replaced by West Quay where more ships could be know so the at ships others. All the time used, of men on the led a large personnel ship, which did clear, not another
0145
0145 I this berth. As soon as she was till 0330, way, - ROYAL into SOVEREIGN - went in and stayed there At i.e. half an hour after the time intended.

15
307
F
0245
At the East Pier MALCOLM left with 1,000 men at 0245, 301 and
6
0300
EXPRESS left at 0300 after I had taken off Buchanan and the berthing party who were in her. When she left there were still about 200 men on the East Pier, who were brought blockships. off by SHIKARI which came in later escorting the last two
Of all the ships sent over, only 1 paddler and KELLETT
were not used. The French Admiral could not be found by the MTB sent for him, and he finally came away in one of his own MTBs.
I don't know the exact figure, but think that at least
30,000 men were embarked on this night in about 3 /2 hours.
Heard there were still 30,000 French there.
Returned to London in the afternoon.
@@@@@Q0000000000000000000000000
Note. +
The chatty bits (borrowing a pair of trousers, sharing
Gort's last bottle of champagne, etc.) have been omitted.
DUNKIRK
2 Enclos: Chart of coast and plan of Dunkerque.
20th May - 4th June
1940

308 305 306
DUNKIRK
29th May - 4th June
1940
Rear Admiral W.F. Wake-Walker,
C.B., O.B.E.
April 1941.

309 306
DUNKIRK
29th May - 4th June 2940.
On my return 10 the Admiralty from lunch on Wednesday,
29th May, I was told that I was wanted by Vice Admiral Phillips DCNS and
I went to his room at 2.45. There I found him with the Navel
Secretary and he asked me if I would like to go to Dunkirk to try and get some organisation into the embarkation there. I said that I
would be delighted. Some discussion then followed as to my appointment, as it was not intended that I should supersede Captain Tennant who was already the Senior Naval Officer, Dunkirk. It was decided that
I should be Rear Admiral, Dover, and be in charge off shore at Dunkirk.
Vice Admiral Phillips told me that 70,000 had already been embarked and that 3. great effort was needed to get off many more. He suggested that I should fly my flag in a Trawler, and told me that Commodores
Stevenson and Hallett were already over there in charge of certain boaches. Ho had no idea how long it would last but thought for not more than a very few days.
I immediately arranged for a car to drive me to Dover and told
Lieutenant-Commandor Wynne-Edwards and Commander Norfolk to come with me. My signal officer was unluckily away in Newcastle but I arranged with the Director of the Signal Division to tell off one of the signal officers at Dover for mo.
Before leaving I saw the First Sea Lord who told me that it was thought that the French were not doing their full share and that I was to stress this on my arrival so that pressure could be brought to bear on them to send more ships. There was also the difficult question whether French troops were to be refused embarkation; it was obvious that our own troops had first call but it would be difficult to discriminato against Frenchmen. Actually it was not until Friday, 31st
May, that a signal vias made stating the Government's policy to give equal opportunities to British and Prench troops.
We all set off for Dover in D. oar about b'clock with a subtome apiece and a minimum of gear. Passing through Centerbury we stopped and

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MAy 29
bought a large supply of chocolates and cigarettes, and reached Dover about 6.0 p.m.
At the casemates in Vice Admiral, Dovor's offices I was given somo idea of the situation and shown a map of the coast to the Northward of
Dunkirk; on this three boaches off In Panne, Braye and St. Molo had been optimistically numbered for embarkation of British troops, each beach
?
being divided into three sections. I was told that the Army were coming down to these particular beaches and that certain others between St. Melo and Dunkirk were heing used by the French, I received very little other information except that Dunkirk harbour itself had been heavily bombed, and "GRENADE" and other ships had been sunk there,
I was also shown the three approaches to Dunkirk. One of them from the East could 120 longer be used at night as enemy H.T.B.' had sunk a dostroyer there.
The Western one was being sholled from the shore in daylight and the centre one was none too easy to make for navigational reasons,
Captain Bush was in the "HEBE" and was in charge off shore until my arrival.
Two destroyers were ready to sail from Dover for Dunkirk and were to take over two lots of beach parties. One of these parties amounting to about 80 was made up of Lieutenants from the Gunntory and Torpedo
Long Courses with Petty Officers and Mon; they were intended to not 08
disciplinary parties on the beaches. In the carlier stages of the embarkation many of the troops were completely disorganised and had become a rabble, some throwing away their riflee and others lying on the beaches refusing to get into the boats. These disciplinary beach pertics were intended to check this and an order vas contemplated that no man would be embarked unless he had his rifle.
Actually by the time I got there things had improved and the fina bearing of the men, their discipline, and the way they stuck to their equipment was most marked.
Another party of 200 mon were intended to not as beach parties to assist the embarkation.

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The Vice Admiral, Dover, stressed that those Navol Ratings must be got away and must not run the risk of getting caught schore at the ond. I met the signal officer, Viscount Kelburn, who had been lont to me, and arranged that he should collect a party of Signal Ratings to accompany me.
I was also much surprised to meet Commodores Stevenson and Hallett, who arrived at Dover by train after I did; I thought they were already at Dunkirk.
I finally sailed in the "ESK" at 2000 with these two Officers, the disciplinary beach parties and my signalmen and staff. There was no news of the 200 men of the beach parties and I do not know to this day what became of them.
On the way over I arranged that Commodore Stevenson would take charge off La Panne, and Commodore Hallett off Braye, and at that time
I intended to be off St. Malo and Dunkirk myself or to put Captain Bush in charge there. I also spoke to the officers in charge of the disciplinary parties and warned them not to get caught but said that it would probably be impossible to give them any order as to when to come off,
It was thought that the embarkation could hardly go on for 1201'C than a day or two and each day we expected to be the last.
At this time I must confess that I had very little idea of what it was going to be possible to do or how to set about it. I knew that large numbers of craft of all sorts, Destroyers Sloops and Minesweepers were fetching troops back, but I had no idea at all of local conditions -
where they could borth, the possibilities of using the harbour - boat facilities for off shore transport - or what communications oxisted.
My general plan was to put an officer in some amall ship in charge off shore at each of the main beaches and to try and organise the flow of ships to the beaches myself from some central position.
In the "ESK" we were kindly given some sandwiches, and after a short talk we made ourselves as comfortable as we could in the Captain's cabin and tried to sleep. I...

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had hoped to get over to Dunkirk in daylight but the Various dolays in collecting men and BO on mode this impossible and it was dark whon we got near. From a long way off the flamos from burning oil tanks at
Dunkirk lighting up the sky, and a black pall of smoko above It, could be seen.
A3 we got nearor we could also see a ship on fire off shore, and this eventually proved to be the "CLAN MACALLISTER" at anchor off Erayo.
She continued to burn up till the end and there were accesional pops of small arm ammunition. She Was deserted but played a very useful part as a distraction for the Germans who sholled and bombed her continuously instead of the ships nearby who were embarking non. Often an I passed her later on I thought of getting her towed away but there was no ship to spare from the more important work of saving mon, and I expect she is still there.
you.
30
Another deserted Merchant ship off the entrance to Dunkirk played a similar useful role and was the target for many bombing attacks.
We approached the Dunkirk beaches from the South and stopping off each we sent the beach parties ashore in the Destroyer's boats. All this took time and it was not till 0400 that we found the "HEBE"
0400
(commanded by my old shipmate, Lieutonamt-Commender John Temple) off
Braye and tronsferred to her. At the same time the two Commodores were put into drifters. It was difficult to see in the daik what the situation was, except that there were many ships, drifters and boats off the beaches, end they were joined by the two destroyers. It was flat calm,
In the "HEHE" I found Captain Bush and heard more of the situation, and he spoke of the ghastly sight of the shore Week with mon standing in the water up to their waists. He had had to watch the terribly slow progress of embarkation which I had not then seen, but I as.d not feel that J. could accept the note of despair which I Becomed to detect in his voice.
In the "HEBE" we moved eastward to La Panne and there down Sound us and gave us some idea of the task ahead.
The coast here is a long stretch of Band dunes rining fairly steoply in places from a gently sholving beach which drice for 200 yards 03' more

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at 1017 water. Off shore the water deopons very gradually and a destroyer connot get nosrer than half a mile. At intervals along the coast there ore small towns, seaside resorts, which apposr perched on the top of the dunos which slope there more gently to the beach. Such are La Panno, Braye and
St. Malo - red brick houses, protentious villes and the typical modern seaside architecture. But now the growing light showed a different picture -
at the water' S câge was a dark line of men and there were large groups of mon all over the beaches. Off Brayo the "BIDEFORD" was ashore with her storn completely blown off by a bomb; the "LOCUST" - a shallow draft river-gunboat -
was trying to take her in tow and eventually did BO and got her off and back to England. Further down towards Dunkirk another ship was high and dry and burnt out on the beach - this, I think, was the "CRESTED EAGLE" and there were also many boats of one sort and another broached to on the beach.
Lying off the beaches were Destroyers and Sloops, Drifters and other
X
craft, and men were making their way off in whalers, motor boats and portoon craft.
There was a slight swell which made landing difficult and many boats broached to and were stranded by the tide. The visibility was not good and overhead there were low lying clouds - a blossing for which tye were preatly thankful, and which we were not always to enjoy. As soon as it Was light
I was able to get some clearer idea of the situation and conditions. The beaches were packed with troops, but they appeared to be orderly and under
X
proper control. Off the beaches were a few ships as close as they could got and these were being slowly filled up by their own boats and a fow local craft. Ships' motor boats were towing off the whalers assisted by NOVOR
launches, but these could not get very close in. Pontoon craft were being paddled off by soldiers but it was not easy to got them back inshere again, often they were left to float away empty. All soon as a Sloop 02'
D. Destroyer was full up she left and took her boats with her - the boate'
crews were guns' crews and no-one wanted to be without thom.
To anyone with an appreciation of the practical difficultion of embarking in small Boats with a long pull to seaverd, the sight of that beach black with troops was dismaying. The musibers increased stoudily as more men filed down the sand dunes and at the back of our minds all the

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time was the question and fear of how long the defence line could hold and the weather remain fair
30/5
The Grux of the matter was boats, boats' crews and towage to and fro, x
and at 0630 I signalled the urgent need of these, Intor, about 0730, most of the ships had loaded up and were leaving and I asked for more ships and again stressed the need of boats.
About this time I moved down to Dunlcirk to get in comunication with
Tennant and went in alongside the pier in response to a signal.
The outer harbour at Dunkirk (see plan) 10 formed by two breakwaters approximately at right angles, leaving a narrow entrance between, The
Western arm is built solidly of stone, but the Eastern arm, or East Pier r
08 it will be called, is only solid for a short part at the inchore end,
The rest of it is built of concrete piles through which the tido flows and on which is supported a narrow pathway wide enough for four mon walking abreast, Alongside the East pier is the channel to the Innor harbour and docks. A short length of piling runs out parallel to the East pior and encloses the entrance to this channel which is about 150 yords wide.
A now series of docks under construction has an entrance opening off the outer harbour, and jutting out in the harbour by this entrance is the
West quay.
The Nest quay was used entirely by the French and luckily for 11:3 they did not consider the East pier suitable for omberkation. It: was from the
East pier that all the British embarked and on the last two days a large number of French troops also.
The tide had a big riso and fall and at high tide you could step straight on to a destroyer's dook, but at low tide 10 was a filteen foot drop. A. lot of ladders were sent over and secured to the sides of the pier, but 1t took time to get soldiers with their rifles and packs down these laddors. on Thursday morning when I first went in trawler (0) sunk alongside the pier and another ship (A) sunk outside the end. The trawler and drifter shown sank later, SB also the blook ships.
There were four berths alongside the Bast pior which could be used.
The innor one (F) could only be used by small ships at low title, but et

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high tide personnel ships could get into B, D and E.
30/5
The "KING ORRY" during a bombing attack on 24th May rammod the pier /29th and made a large gap in it abreast E borth; until this WO.ES bridged the outer berths could not be used as the roadway along the pier was cut. The harbour was very shallow to the west of the West quay, and the place where the "ROUEN" went ashore on the night of 2nd June when leaving the Quay is shown - also where the "KELLETT" grounded on the night of 3rd Juno.
As soon 2B "HEBIG" got alongside the East Pier I made my way up to the
Local Naval Headquarters while the "HEBE" was quickly filled up with six to seven hundred men - some of them wounded.
The Naval Headquarters were established in a dug-out at the shore end of the East Pier. This area was not large and VISA separated from the mainland by a bridge over a canal. The surface was uneven and covered with heaps of rubble. there was a Bofors gun and a fow ambulances, dust-stained dishevelled cars and wounded men. I was greeted by some of the staff of the
S.N.O., Captain Tennant. This small band of Officers with a party of ratings did wonderful work controlling the embarkation and doaling with the situation ashore. They worked under constant shellfire and were short of sleep and food. While I was waiting there, shelling of the area began and we retired to the dug-out entrance - but were urged by a French soldier to go further down and round the corner as he said the direction of the fire was straight into the entrance. I did not see Tonnant as he was away somewhere with the General, but I learnt that there were plenty of troops ready to embark at the pier and they would take all the ships that could be sent in.
At this time the gap in the roadway half way along the East Pier completely out off the end, so that the only berths where we could embark were inside this point. Later this hole was bridged DD that the whole pier could be used except where ships were sunk alongside.
It had been my intention to keep "HERE" as my headquarters, and for this reason she had not taken any troops on board from the beaches. I did not feel I could refuse to fill her up at Dunkirk, and onco this was done the question of their disposal inovitably arose. On leaving Dunkirk I

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returned to the beaches, sending in any surplus ships to load at Dunkirk and from then on I had continually to try to hold the balance between keeping sufficient ships off the beaches and keeping Dunkirk supplied.
I also reported that until more boats were available for ferrying it was
X
essential to concentrate on evacuating from Dunkirk itself.
tay
It may be as well here to explain why Dunkirk Was being so little used
2
at this time while so much effort was being expended on the beaches. On
28th
Tuesday, 25th May, a heavy bombing attack was made on Dunkirk when the herbour was full of ships. "GRENADE" was sunk and "KING 29/1700 ORRY" and several other ships p344
Case 5450
alongsido the piers were hit. As a result of this a junior member of the Navel P350
Co.,Dove
Party ashore, whose judgement had been affected by the events of the day, dashed
(Eu Canne off in'a car to La Panne where he 38W Lord Gort and telephoned to the Admiralty to say that further embankation from Dunkirk itself WOB impossible. In consequence Dover was sending all ships over to the beaches and none into Dunicirk and it took us two days to overcome the results of this indiscretion, which had a considerable temporary effect on the plans.
As a result of a report from a destroyer that Dunkirk WAS usable Vice
30/5
Admiral, Dover, asked me is ships should be sent there, and at 0850 I signalled from "HCEE" that destroyers could come into Dunkink in succession and that troops were waiting close to the pier,
Off the beaches loading was proceeding slowly. Conditions were not bad, though there W&S D. slight swell running in sufficient to make boats liable to broach to. At In Panne lorries were being driven into the sea to form a sort of breakwater, and this was also done at Brayo.
About mid-day there was an air attack on ships and on La Panne, and
30/5
later when it cleared a bit overhead there was an attack on Dunkirk. Soverol
Prench destroyers came in by 'y' channel, and were fired on from the north of
X
La Panne, and there were some guns which tried to shell the beach botween
Braye and La Panne but the steep dunets protected it,
On my return to Le Panne I met Commodore Stevenson who had transforrol to a motor launch and was doing excellent work. Ho had landod and WOO
to the waist. Ashore he had seen Lord Gorth who was anxious to DOC TO, AD

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the conditions inshore were getting worse and I did not want to get stranded I decided to go into Dunkirk and drive to La Panne from there.
All this time the large number of mon and wounded in "НЯ" had been on my mind. Feeling that I could not keep her any longer I decided to send her back to Dover with Captain Bush to explain the boat situation and point out the vital necessity of sending out boats and crews.
Accordingly at 3.30 I transferred my staff to "WINDSOR" and went into Dunkirk in M.T.B. 102 which had come at my request. I had folt badly in need of means of getting about quickly, and a fast boat of
X
light draft would have been invaluable. The trouble was that when I did get one its endurance was so low that it had to return almost immediately
X
to Dover.
On arrival at Dunkirk I found that Tennant was with Lord Gort and that to drive there would be likely to take a longer time than I cared to be away so I decided that I must land from a boat after all.
The M.T.B. had not onough fuel to reach La Panne and roturn to
Dover, so I boarded the "GOSSAMER" and took her up to La Panne where
I transferred to "WORCESTER" at about 5.30 p.m. There I again found
Commodore Stevenson and lent him my spare pair of trousers and underclothea as he got soaked through whenever he landed.
La Panne was in telephonic communication with England and sometimes
I received messages by W/T from Dover about the situation there - 80 for
31
instance one timed 1749 saying that ships were urgently wanted off In
Panne actually at 1900 there were four destroyers and one minesweeper
X
at LO. Panne and the situation was constantly changing. G.H.Q. wear in touch with Admiralty and Vice Admiral, Dover, and gave their views and criticisms of what was happening. This probably accounts for a signal from the First Sea Lord on this day asking if boats were distributed along the beaches to the best advantago. Actually of course practically the only boats that could get inshore except the pontoons and D. few local craft were whalers and their distribution was dependont on the position of the ships they belonged to.

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So for as was possible I kept ships off all beaches, but in doing DO I
was badly hampered by the lack of means of gotting about quickly. Often when I was off La Penne ships would arrive and stop off the other two beaches, send in their boats and start loading, by then perhaps some off
La Panno would leave and a redistribution might be desivable, but it WAS
impracticable once ships had their boats may.
At 1900 small numbers of aircraft made attacks on I.O. Panne and ships off the beaches and about this time a puffer, the "Tiny," loaded with
/Shoot.
ammunition arrived. She was told to beach herself at In Fanno, the tide being then high; this she did and was cleared as the tide vont out, though I believe 8. good deal of her cargo Was finally dumped in the 502.
At 2000 I started inshore again in "WORCESTER'S" whaler on my third attempt to see Lord Gort, There was a slight swell and I got wet to the waist landing. I took in with me my Flag Licutenant and a small party of signalmen to open visual communications with G.H.Q.
I was met on the beach by Tennant and General Lees and werrt with them to G.H.Q. which was established in the last villa but one on the south edge of La Panne. This was a pretentions house with a largish dining-room with French windows opening direct on to S road ruming along the top of the sandy slope from the beach,
I found Lord Gort and his staff about to have dinner and he insisted on my joining thom. No was charming and seemed very checrful and 1111-
perturbed and glad to see me. He had been told that a Rear Admirel was being sent to take charge of the embarkation and made TO feel that that simple fact should have E. great effect. I must confess I did not feel so confident of what 10 was possible for me to do. However, we aid not really disouss matters till after dinner.
I shall not easily forget that meal. For one thing my brousors and seat were very wet and it seemed so strange to be sitting there sharing the Commander-in-Ohief's last bottle of champagne and looking out BOROSS
the beach to the sea, There were eight 02 nine of us including Tonnant and myself. I forget what we ate except that the final dish WOB fruit salad from a tin and I felt that my extra mouth was robbing the others of

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thoir share. After dinner, Lord Gort and Gonoral Leon discussed the situation with Tennant and myself; it became obvious to me that they folt that they had successfully fallen back more 02 loss intact on the sea in the face of great odds and that it was now up to the Navy to get then off but that the
Navy were not making any real effort in the matter.
Very early in the discussion I stressed the difficulty, slowness, and dependance on Sine weather of any large scale embarkation from the beaches and expressed the view that the bulk should move wostword and como off from
Dunkirk.
This brought from General Loos a disparaging remark which included the
2
words "inoptitude of the Navy." I could not let this pass and told him he had no business or justification to talk like that,
At this time British troops were acting as a rear guard and were holding a line which came down to the coast a little to the north of La Panne. It was then the intention that they should withdraw from this line at midnight on the Friday next day - and fall back on the beaches. These troops were some of the best and Lord Gort was very enxious that they should be got away;
there were about 5,000 of them. He had spoken to the First Soa Lord who had said that the Navy would make a supreme effort to get off the remainder during the next day and the rear guard the following night, and that details were being sent out to me by Captain Bush, who had gone back to Dover In the "HERE."
I must confess I felt daunted at the prospect and the socialing impossibility of the task. Apart from the rear guard there were tons of thousands of others to come off beforehand, and the thought 01 that rear guard falling back in the dark and being embarked with an enemy active in pursuit raised unpleasent pictures.
The plan made by the Admiralty, and Vice Admiral, Dover, had every chance of success, but * did not fall out as planned as I shall toll later.
I arranged with Lord Gort that he would embark from La Panno at 6.0 Della next day and that I would have boats and ships there for the purpose. If embarkation from there was impossible he would go into Dunkirk.
On my return to "WORCESTER" I told Commodore Stavenson of the arrangoments for embarking Lord Gort and put him in charge of them. X intended at that time

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to be there rysolf also.
About 10 p.m. I started back to the ship. It was getting dark and as I left the house with Lord Gort on enemy plano came over and a Bofors gun opened fire on 1t. I said goodbye to Lord Gort and went down the boach with Termant, General Lees and my Flag Lieutenant. Tennant asked if I had got 2 boat and I Laughod and vold him that I. hot got to make my otm way off -
boats were too precious to be kept hanging about. The tide was further out and there were a number of boats and portoon craft stranded. A number of mon of the 12th Lancers were trying to get pontoons afloat, and 10 YES
good to see them taking action to help themselves. Lying unused was a pontoon boat about 8 foot by 4. - flat-bottomed with sides about 18 inches high. I called over some soldiers and we got round it and carried it to the waters cdge. I then placed four 02 them each side and told than to wade out with 1t and get in when I told them. As we waded out thesea was calm, but a small swell was coming in and as the water got deoper I got them into the boat two by two until only Flags and I were still wading at the stern with the water well over our knees. Finally we got in togother and t started the soldiers paddling by numbers, rather like E racing boat's CLOW. They soon picked it up but I noticed there was already a good doal of water in the boat 4. the freeboard W&G about 3 inches and the wavelets were washing up to my stern as I sat on the gunwhale. I decided we should not get for before we swamped, and finding by means of my paddle that we were still in fairly shallow water I told my crow to jump'out. Out we all got and returned with our boat to the beach and emptied it. Tennant and Ceneral Leos had been
2
standing all this time watching and as we came ashore I could not asist the temptation of saying to the latter "Another example 0:3 Novel ineptitude."
Reluctantly I had to reduce my crew by two and off we set again. This time things went All right and the soldiers settling down to paddling in fine style with the aid of occasional "one-two-threes" soon brought us off to the
"WORCESTER" ogain.
Having already lent all my spare olothing to Commodore Dovemson I had to fall back on Commender Allison for a change and I emerged From his cabin wearing an anotent pair of (Tey flamnol trousers, dirty white Gym shoos and

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no pants. Luckily it was fairly warm even at night, though at times I
did feel rather lightly clad about the legs.
It was about 2230 when I got aboard the "WORCESTER" which was slowly
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filling up with troops and I remained there till 0100. By that time she was full up and I sent her back to Dover and transferred to the "EXPRES."
Earlier in the day I had asked for a ship with two lines of W/T communication and had been told that "KETTH" was detailed and was due at 2000. She did not appear and I remainod for the rest of the night in "EXPRESS" which gradually filled with troops.
by this time I had been off the beaches for 24 hours and they had seemed very full ones. I don't know when I ate or slept though I have a recollection of lying down in the "HEBE" for an hour, and of trying to sloop sitting down on the bridge of the "EXPRESS" loaning against some instruments with very sharp corners.
The picture as I saw it then was briefly this: There were tens of thousands of men on or near the beaches and in and around Dunkirk - no-one
X
seemed able to say how many. The rearguard were to be withhlrawn at midnight the next night, i,e., 24 hours ahoad, they were the best troops and must be got off. Dunkirk itself was the only place where rapid embarkation could take place and D. large proportion of the troops were coming down to Is Panno and Braye, 10 and 5 miles away from Dunkirk,
At the beaches the only boats available except for pontoons and a very few local boats were ships' boats which went away with their ships 02' were r
crewless if left. In many cases they had to pull in DD ships' motor boats were often out of action, and towage was badly needed. Embarkation depended entirely on fair weather - an onshore wind of any force would have stopped embarkation completely.
I had stressed the vital necessity for more shallow drought boats and crews and knew that steps were being taken at home to do all that WSD possible.
During the day French destroyers had been coming in by the Northorn passage and channel and had been fired at from the shore. They went into
Dunkirk and loaded at the West quay. Otherwise no French ships sceemed to be there.

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Destroyers, minesweepors, paddlers and all manner of craft were arriving, loading and leaving the beaches and Dunkirk continuously, but there were often periods when no ships were at one place 02 another and loading had to wait,
Bombing of ships and beaches had so far been spasmodic - the day
X
had been overcast, visibility was not good and you could not SCO from La
Panne to Dunkirk. The sound of fighters out of sight overhead second to account for our freedom from air attack,
A report of aircraft dropping mines one mile north of Is Patine was received at 0400 and planes frequently passed close overhead during the dark hours. With the dawn 2. wind from the N.W. sprang up right on the
X
beaches, and when it was light many boats could be seen capsized or broached to and high and dry on the beach, including one at least of the local boats which carried a lot of men and could get close inshore, It: was not a cheering sight and as the day aged the sky overhead cleared and visibility improved. No watched the sky anxiously for the protection of hase but 16
remained clear all day.
At 0730 I made contact at last with "KEITH." "EXPRESS" was by that time fully londed and left for Dover as soon as I had transferred to "KETHI." Hero
I found that D. flag had been procured and it was flown on my arrivel on board; up till then I had used a red ensign to indicate which sitty I was in.
As had been my intention with "HEBE," "KETTH" did not embark any troops and I moved up and down the coast in her doing what I could to keep ships distributed off the beaches and a flow of ships into Dunkins. A signal made by me at 1035 gives a good picture of the conditions:-
11 To V.A. DOVER. Najority of boats broached to and have no Crows, Conditions on beach are very bad due to freshening on-shore wind. Only small numbers are boing embarked even in daylight. Under present conditions any largoscale embarkation from beach is quite imprecticable. Motor boats cennot get close in. Consider only hope of embarking any number to at Dunkinis.
Will attempt to beach ship to form a Ice to try and improve conditions.
From V.A. Dover coure a signal urging the importance of using the boochou
8.15 long AB possible, and to emphasise the situation made a Surther signal

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at 1105 to say:-
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" Dunkirk our only real hope. Can guns cholling pier from Westward be
FRID
bombed and silenced. 17
The successful use of Dunkirk depended on our being able to put ships alongside the Eastern breakwater and it was my constant fear that this might be so accurately shelled as to render it untenable.
I also signalled to the shore urging movement towards Dunkirk and 00 a result troops could be seen moving slowly westward,
From seaward, everything that happened on the beach could be clearly seen. Bodies of men marched along - some in good order, others in groups and knots. At one time a battalion in perfect order marched down through a winding road from the dunes to the shore and I was told later that it was the Welsh Guards, but I am not certain that this was no.
It must not be thought that embarkation from the beaches coased - all the time slowly men came off and ships filled and left, but the largest numbers came from Dunkirk itself.
Commencing the day before and continuing on this Friday the army had been driving lorries down the beach to form a sort of barricade and breakwater. At Brayo the R.E. had planked a. gangway and made D. handrail on these lorries so that motor boats could go alongside. Unfortunately the line ran straight out to sea and as the wind was directly on shore the broakwater gave very little shelter - still it did help.
During the forenoon I made contact again with Commodore Stevenson who by now had completely lost his voice. I sent him over to some paddle minesweepers which were off Erayo to got one beached to not 20 a broakwater.
This he eventually did and the next day she was high and day at daylight.
I do not know to what extent she was of use - the trouble boing that no ship was long enough to cover the distance the tide ran out, and so could only be of value for part of the tide.
The "HEBE" returned at 1000 with Captain Hush and the plan for the embarkation that might. Briefly the plan W&B this:-
Large numbers of boats were now being sent over in tow of tugo end oll manner of vessels. They vero due to stert arriving at 1500 and these boats

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were to be kept for the use of the rearguard for whom the ombaitation scheme was planned.
To take the troops II sloops were being collected and WO1'0 to rendesvous and proceed in company, their arrival boing timed for 0130 on the lot. They were given berths in which to anchor in three batches, one batch off each of the embarkation beaches.
A. feature of this plan which I folt to be impracticable was that the r small craft were not to be used except for the resrguard, It was asking too much to think that when our crying need WSS for inshore boats any such could possibly be held idle while so many men were on the beaches with chips ready waiting to bring them off.
The actual dovelopment of this plan WOB very different and the results will be told later,
After discussion with Captain Bush I sent "HEBE" up to In Panne with orders to be there at 1800 to receive Lord Gort whom Stevenson was to bring off. I intended to be there myself but was concerned to have 2. second string in case of mischance,
There was some shelling of the beaches during the day, but in most cases the shells landod on the dunes which had a fairly steep scarp and protocted the beach. This shelling was principally to the westward. of Braye one at ene time a French battery 2 or 3 miles out of Dunkirk on the top of the dunce but close to the sea received a lot of attention.
About 1330 as I was returning to the eastward "HEES" signalled that she had been shelled off La Panne at 1200 and had had to move westward & couple of miles. Later at 1430 I went up in "КЕТТИ" 02% In Panne to see 15 the battery could be shelled. As soon as we got there shells began to fall and got gradually closer until I judged 10 wisest to move out of range. It WAS
not essential be be so far east and there was nothing to be soon of the battery, The fire W8.8 being directed by 211 observation balloon away over by Nicupert which was plainly visible. I asked for It to be shote down, atroreft came over apparently for the purpose and at times ** was hauled down but always reappeared. The sholl bursts wore Entrly heavy and opported to be 6 02' 8-inch and they fell In salvoss of four.

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Owing to the shelling of the anchorage at La Panno and the difficulty it might cause later in the day I urged Lord Cort to ombark as soon SD
(ca)
possible, but he would not leave before the time that he had arranged.
1330
Soon after, I moved down to Dunkirk so as to be on the spot when the boats arrived. On the way a terrific air battle took place overhead and 1415-30
1t seemed to go against us. I saw three Spitfires shot down, one went inland over the dunes, still under control, one came down towards the sea at a fairly gentle angle and when only one hundred feot or so up the pilot seemed to be pulled out by his parachute and came down in the sea with his parachute open - the plane went on for quite a way and than flow into the water. The third pilot baled out a good way up and came down a couple of miles away.
An M.T.B. and a. motor boat in sight went off to try and pick them up and the
Captain of the M.T.B. told me later that the pilot they got to W&S shot to pieces and they salved his parachute for identification purposes. I am afraid the other was not found.
I waited anxiously off Dunkirk for the arrival of the boat town and 31/5
while I waited, came a signal from V.A. Dover to say that the Army wanted to start embarkation at 2000 instead of 0100. I replied saying that the boats had not arrived and the sloops would not be there then but that I
would do my best. To anticipate - this had an unfortunate effect, because, as the sloops intended for the beaches could not be there in time I had to keep destroyers, minesweepors and other craft off the beaches which would otherwise have been sent in to Dunkirk during the night. As a result though many were embarked from the beaches very fow ships worrt into Dunkirk where men were already waiting and full use of it was not made.
It was always impossible for me to do more than doal with the situation of the moment. I did not know what ships were coming 02' whon - execut for the pre-arranged plan of the sloops. Nor was 1t possible for Dover to give me much information. Ships got back there, unloaded, and were OST again, the stream W&B constant but irregular and it was not possible to see any way shead. My policy was always to keep only sufficient ships off the beaches and send all the others into Dunkirk, but the situation changed continually. When I was off La Panne I could not watch the other and of the

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line - I wanted to be in several places at once.
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The first of the boat tows was due at 1500 but did not appear till a couple of hours later. I can well remember the first, a tuz with what looked like helf a dozen dinghies in tow. She was proceded by some useful motor yachts which came in company.
I could not wait off Dunkirk as I VAB anxious to get eway up to In
Panno for Lord Gort, so I left Wynne-Edwards in 2. motor yacht to direct the tows as they arrived, and to order a large number 0: hoppers and other craft that were lying off the Western beaches to beach themselves on the rising ride so that men could embark,
The embarkation of Lord Gort produced some odd incidents, As already related I had orranged with Stevenson to bring him off at six o' clock, If the weather was too bed he was to go into Dunkirk and emhark from there.
I had ordered "HEBE" to be off La Panne at that time and was going up there myself in "KNITH." In the meantime Dover had been busy and had sent over four M.T.B.'s and M.A.S.B's to get him. The signal informing me of this, like many others, never reached me. During the afternoon two N.T.B.'s came to me and said that they were to enbark a party from a point two miles west of La Panne. This quite baffled me and I thought that they must have been sent to fetch off some of the Naval lending party, but I realise now that the party concerned was the H.Q. Staff.
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Anyway, shortly before 1800 I was approaching La Panne when "HEBS"
signalled to me "General on beach abreast you," and there I saw a group etc the water's odge with a couple of cara and some signalmen. "XEXST"S"
boats were at once sent in, but to my surprise Lord Gort Y.O.D not in the first boat and I learnt that he was in "HERE" already. Three taxipo were necessary to bring off his staff and a heavy air attack book place while this was going on. One plane tried to bomb the boats and they had a mireculous escape. I saw one bomb burst between than 08 they 1701'0 loading up and the motor boat returned covered in grey mul.
Many air attacks were made at this time on the ships and baschos, and
"HEBE" shot down a Heinkel. There WRB also a great increase in sholl The off Brayo, where the "OLAN MACATI.TSWER" was a valuable docoy. She you 1:20

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and bombed several times and started burning again. I got the impression that these guns were firing blindly into this area, as sholls foll near the
Olan Macallistor" and over her but not among the ships loading which were some way inshore of her. Later, however, these chips did COMO under fire, and "VIVACIOUS" reported she had been hit twice and had eleven casualties, and two or three hundrod troops on board, I ordered her to 80 into Dunkirk and fill up there.
General Lees 172.S the Senior Officer of the H.Q. Staff and I thought it
2
would be a good education for him to see something of what the naval problem was, so I kept him on the bridge with ICC. As Lord Gort was in the "EdEE"
I felt that he WGB safe, and as the "HEBE" was doing good work caberking troops I did not send her back to Dover with him at once. Thorein perhaps
I was wrong, as I had not realized the anxiety of the Government to have him safe and sound at home but had felt he would soonor the ship helped to bring off more men rather than that he should land a few hours carlier in
England.
During the day I made a signal to all ships with instructions for supporting fire against enemy tanks and lorries on the boach. The critical place was likely to be at La Panne after the line was evacuated, and I intended to be there myself in "KETTH" at deybreak the noxt morning. I also kopt
"BASTLISK" free of troops for the same purpose.
The weather improved gradually and at 1700 I was able to signal:-
" Weather off beaches now good. Many more boats should come into use again
Q.B tido rises. General movement of troops westward towards Dunkirk. No petrol supply yet and many basts are getting short off La Panno and Braye,
Movement from Dunkirk continuos. Great air activity."
Actually drifters with petrol arrived not long after at 1815.
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After embarking the Headquarters Staff I returned to Dunkirk to DOG
how the boat situation was getting on. There I found Wynne-Invardo who had been doing good work, and I saw for the first time that strange procession of craft of all kinds that has become Pamous - tuge towing dinghise, lifeboats and all manner of pulling boats - small motor yachts, motor Isunchos, drifters, Dutch scoots, Thames barges, fishing boats, pleasure ateamoro,

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As the town of boats appeared they were told to which beach they should go, and I was particularly anxious that there should be sufficient at La Panno which was farthest off. I directed several town to 80 on to In Penno, tolling them it was ten miles up the coast, and shortly after, as the light WDD
failing, I decided to leave Wynne-Edwards in an M.A.S.B. to direct the remaining town and go Q11 up to La Panne myself. are Braye I saw what I had fourd, that the tows I had ordered to La Panne were stopping at Braye and I arrived there just in time to warn "CODRINGTON," who was off Braye, to send them on. further.
I had General Lees on the bridge and I remember pointing out to him how easy
Z
it was to talk about distributing boats and craft at certain places along a ten mile stretch of coast, but that it was a very different thing to get it done in practice, In the dark, by craft which had not been there before and with no lights to help them. The inovitable tendency was to stop at the first place they came to where other craft were assombled.
However, in the end a protty fair distribution vas made and Wynno-
Edwards, when he returned to me at about 2230, was able to tell no that there were a number of boats off LQ Panne.
It must have been on this evening that I saw two Transports go into
Dunkirk and I was very nervous that they would be bombed. Just as it was getting dark they moved out and shortly after there came the sounds of Very heavy bombing from that direction. I felt sick SC I thought that these two ships were being attacked, but I learnt later that 10 was not so, and this bombing, I think, was from our own aircraft attacking battorios down the posst.
It was now dark and I remained off La Panne in company with and
Hebe several other ships.
Once it was dark I ase not feel that much could be done by moving about, so I stayed off LA Panne during the night. I waited there wordoring how things were going. Everything was Back, ships and boats end shore showed no lights though I had asked for a light to be shown ssaward to guide boats inchore. So far as I know the rearguard was falling back and 1t was a question whother to could got off before the Germans found out and could follow up. Shelling was continuous and by the sound some shells were falling among the ships at the anchorage. what nows I had was conflicting - a message from shore to Day that

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thousands of men were waiting but no boats, messages from ships that thoir beats found no one on the beach. The truth of 1t was, I think, that the
Germans had the range of the lorry breakwator and the beaches nost 1t and they shelled them heavily. Boats went in there and found no one on the troops had moved further west clear of the shell firo. I do not know to this day what really took place there. Off shore one felt helpless, the ships and the boats were there and the troops ashoro and one could do no more.
Aircraft passed close overhead flying down the anchorages and fairway, and "MALCOLM" off Braye reported that a number of parachuto mines had been dropped to westward of there and suggested that ships ought to loavo by the uidcoote
Zudcote
Ruy pass in the morning, as the pasuage to the West WEB no heavily mined.
The noise of M.T.B. engines could often be hobrd to deaward and castward and added to my anxiety, though I thought they might possibly be our own patrol. About 2300 I received an urgent signal from Admiralty asking where
Lord Gort was and why I had detailed the M.T.B.'s sent for him to other work.
As the M.A.S.B. had just returned with Wynne-Edwards, I sent it off at once to "HEBE" to collect Lord Gort. To my horror it came back almost at otice to say that Lord Gort had just left "HEBE" in a motor launch. It was very dork and "НЫВЕ" could not; be seen though we knew where she was and I wellted anxiously for the boat to arrive. Presently out of the dark a boat appeared and como alongside, still not the right one and I had a bad moment thinking of the possibilities of the boat getting lost. However, to my relief, after what appeared about half an hour, the right boat, in charge OF Stevenson once moro, found US at last. Apologizing to Lord Gort for keoping him walting 30 long,
I transferred him to the M.A.S.B. and sent him off to Dovor with Ceneral Iecs.
My experience of the bombing the day before led 100 to request fighter
June, protection at dawn though I had no doubt that this was alroady hoing arrenged.
At 0215 I heard that troops were moving Westward and case to the conclusion that embarkation at La Panne was no longer possible. "MARCOLN" and "HARVISING"
which were off Lo Panne were ordered into Dunkirk in consoquence.
I also made D. signal telling ships to keep close to the buoyo as I hoped that they would thus avoid any minos which had boon Groy od in the channel. At 0235 I made the following signal to V.A. Dover and

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" Yesterday ships off Braye were under firo. To-day's shorter front will bring dangorous area Westward. For this reason and mining consider any boach work too costly and evacuation must be confined to Dunkirk. Small craft will be moved Westward at dawn." To this V.A. Dover replied "While loaving this to your discretion it is essential that beaches should be used until found impossible."
My signal above was made before it was light but I had alroady protty clear indications that La Panne was untenable and as it grow light about 0330
I anxiously looked ashore. The "BASILISK" was with me as I had kept her empty so as to be ready for any supporting firo against tonks or lorries along the beach. Up by La Panne the beach WRB deserted but for the lorry brankwater and scattored cars. The sea also seemed deserted unfortunatoly the small boats had vanished, a few ompty ones were drifting on the tide to the Westward. One or two motor lounches were about and I told them to collect some of the boats adrift. Down off Braye there was a minesweeper ashore and clso a paddle minesweeper. Ships were still loading off Braye and to the Westward and men were moving Westward along the beaches.
I moved down off Braye and hailed 2. tug which WES on its way back with some soldiers on board and told her to go in and try to ton off the minommoner.
The Captain paid no attention and obviously WO.B only concorned to get every.
I finally trained 2. gun on him and told an R.N.V.R. Sub-Identionent who was on board to take charge, put the soldiers on board the "SABRE" who WEB nearby and go off to the help of the minesveopor. It VALO not nice to have to threaten these men who were really volunteors, but It had to be done. I could not wink ships and mon for the sake of 110 volunteer's feelings to have any effect. The real trouble on this and snother occasion Labor WAS
that the tugs were told to go over with pulling boats in tow and load my and they regarded themselves as transports only. I was never informed of this or their orders and regarded them as tugs and for use as tugs.
All this time I had to move in waters which atrongt had been minding during the night, but I put my faith in the degaussing and also koot to the edge of the fairway when possible, and my faith van justified.

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At 0400 it was misty with low clouds and I hailed these conditions with reliof, but unluckily they did not last, Most of the ships were full, Those that were not I sent into Dunkirk for though thore were still many mon on the beaches, and some of the small boats were still there, the majority of small craft had disappeared back to England. Here again I did not realize that they had beon sent over for the night and were making their way back as intended.
At 0625 I reported "Situation report at 0600 1st June. Troops DIC
evacuating gradually to Dunkirk as Eastern beaches are untonable. I an directing all boats and small craft to vicinity and Ideding all ships at Dunkirk.
More ships required. Heavy bombing on Dunkirk and fighter sittacks on ships."
About this time I suddenly saw a Bolgian fishing boat appear on the scone
Zudcote from seaward down the Ruytigon pass. I WOD suspicious 01 hor and ordered
"BASILISK" to investigate, She turned out to be the first of a dozen such beats which shortly after appeared. They were on their way into Dunkirk to assist in the evacuation.
As the mists and clouds dispersed many aircraft appeared on the scone and
X
fighters constantly came low over us. Mot'c often than not they were Spitfires, but owr ships were not taking chances and nearly always opened fire indiscriminately on them. As this kept happening I hoisted 6 Flag "Coase firo,"
and blow the syren to draw attention and try and stop the firing. In spito of this I can remember our own machine gun aft in "KEITH" firting away regardless of the "cease fire" gong; once started firing they could hear nothing.
"KETTH" by this time was running very short of П.А. amminition and had only about 30 rounds left for her H.A. gun. The 4.7's could be used for barrage fire only and had n. limited elevation. I decided in conseguence that
I would shortly transfer my flag to "BASILISK" and and "KEX" into Dunktik to fill L13) and return to Dover. Before I had time to do SO a very heavy bombing attack developed, first of all in and around Dunkink itsolf. I remember someone saying "B destroyer has blown up off Dunkirk" and I looked and DAY D. ship entirely enveloped in smoke just off the entrance. This was the "IVANEROS"
but she did not below use and = couple of hours later I BOW her boing howell back to Dover- In this attack the "HAVAN was also sunk near the entrence.