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TNA / ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 792

Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 792
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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319
316
- 25
30/5
thoir share. After dinner, Lord Gort and Gonoral Leon discussed the situation with Tennant and myself; it became obvious to me that they folt that they had successfully fallen back more 02 loss intact on the sea in the face of great odds and that it was now up to the Navy to get then off but that the
Navy were not making any real effort in the matter.
Very early in the discussion I stressed the difficulty, slowness, and dependance on Sine weather of any large scale embarkation from the beaches and expressed the view that the bulk should move wostword and como off from
Dunkirk.
This brought from General Loos a disparaging remark which included the
2
words "inoptitude of the Navy." I could not let this pass and told him he had no business or justification to talk like that,
At this time British troops were acting as a rear guard and were holding a line which came down to the coast a little to the north of La Panne. It was then the intention that they should withdraw from this line at midnight on the Friday next day - and fall back on the beaches. These troops were some of the best and Lord Gort was very enxious that they should be got away;
there were about 5,000 of them. He had spoken to the First Soa Lord who had said that the Navy would make a supreme effort to get off the remainder during the next day and the rear guard the following night, and that details were being sent out to me by Captain Bush, who had gone back to Dover In the "HERE."
I must confess I felt daunted at the prospect and the socialing impossibility of the task. Apart from the rear guard there were tons of thousands of others to come off beforehand, and the thought 01 that rear guard falling back in the dark and being embarked with an enemy active in pursuit raised unpleasent pictures.
The plan made by the Admiralty, and Vice Admiral, Dover, had every chance of success, but * did not fall out as planned as I shall toll later.
I arranged with Lord Gort that he would embark from La Panno at 6.0 Della next day and that I would have boats and ships there for the purpose. If embarkation from there was impossible he would go into Dunkirk.
On my return to "WORCESTER" I told Commodore Stavenson of the arrangoments for embarking Lord Gort and put him in charge of them. X intended at that time

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 288.

319
316
- 25
30/5
thoir share. After dinner, Lord Gort and Gonoral Leon discussed the situation
with Tennant and myself; it became obvious to me that they folt that they
had successfully fallen back more 02 loss intact on the sea in the face of
great odds and that it was now up to the Navy to get then off but that the
Navy were not making any real effort in the matter.
Very early in the discussion I stressed the difficulty, slowness, and
dependance on Sine weather of any large scale embarkation from the beaches
and expressed the view that the bulk should move wostword and como off from
Dunkirk.
This brought from General Loos a disparaging remark which included the
2
words "inoptitude of the Navy." I could not let this pass and told him he
had no business or justification to talk like that,
At this time British troops were acting as a rear guard and were holding
a line which came down to the coast a little to the north of La Panne. It
was then the intention that they should withdraw from this line at midnight
on the Friday next day - and fall back on the beaches. These troops were
some of the best and Lord Gort was very enxious that they should be got away;
there were about 5,000 of them. He had spoken to the First Soa Lord who had
said that the Navy would make a supreme effort to get off the remainder during
the next day and the rear guard the following night, and that details were
being sent out to me by Captain Bush, who had gone back to Dover In the "HERE."
I must confess I felt daunted at the prospect and the socialing impossibility
of the task. Apart from the rear guard there were tons of thousands of others
to come off beforehand, and the thought 01 that rear guard falling back in the
dark and being embarked with an enemy active in pursuit raised unpleasent
pictures.
The plan made by the Admiralty, and Vice Admiral, Dover, had every chance
of success, but * did not fall out as planned as I shall toll later.
I arranged with Lord Gort that he would embark from La Panno at 6.0 Della
next day and that I would have boats and ships there for the purpose. If
embarkation from there was impossible he would go into Dunkirk.
On my return to "WORCESTER" I told Commodore Stavenson of the arrangoments
for embarking Lord Gort and put him in charge of them. X intended at that time