Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.
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CONFIDENTIAL 114 |
Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 52.
CONFIDENTIAL 114 Report on Operation "DYNAMO". 8 Page 3. 11? 7. ENEMY EFFORTS TO FRUSTRATE OPERATION. consisted Attempts of the following:- by the enemy to frustrate the operation (a) Minelaying by aircraft. (b) Intensive air attack. (c) Action by Motor Torpedo Boats. (a) Gunfiro by coast artillery. (e) Submarine operations. (a) Minelaying hours by aircraft. Minelaying during the and was probably commenced during the night 28th-29th, dark following two nights. Not only were the Dunkirk the Roads maintained with great intensity during mined, including the Zuydecoote Pass, but also Route x and the area round the Kwinte buoy. Folkestone Dover Harbour entrances were also mined. Considering and the number of mines laid, it is interesting to note that only two British ships are known for certain to have been mined, the personnel vessel MONA's QUEEN and the F.A.A. Yacht GRIEVE. 1 Hospital Carrier was damaged at anchor off Dover when a mine was blown up by a LL. trawler sweeping close at hand. Two A/S trawlers on patrol to the northward of the operational area were blown up by what was at first thought to be a M.T.B., but later evidence suggests they were victims of moored mines. The impunity with which degaussed ships were able to operate in this heavily mined area alone made the operation possible and one reaches the conclusion that if the enemy on this occasion had had at hand the means of laying moored contact mines by aircraft, instead of magnetic mines, the results would have been very different. (b) Air Attack. On the evening of the 29th, the first occasion on which a massed target of ships was presented in Dunkirk Harbour, the enemy seized the opportunity for air attack in great strength, and it was only by good fortune that the vital Dunkirk Harbour channel was not blocked by sinking ships at this early date. From then onwards the scale and vigour of the air attack increased, and during the 1st June all ships in Dunkirk, off the beaches, or in the approach channels, were subjected every two hours to an unprecedented scale of air attack by aircraft in such numbers, that the R.A.F. were unable to deal with the situation. In this connection experience appears to indicate that in simil ar circumstances fighters must be present in such numbers that they can simultaneously attack both enemy fighting and bombing formations. Otherwise the enemy bombers remain undisturbed to continue their bombing attacks. The scale of enemy air attack on the 31st and 1st was primarily responsible for the suspension of daylight evacuation from the 2nd June. (c) Attack by M.T.B.s. These caused 4 casualties, namely, Route two and two trawlers, while the north 26 miles Y further was destroyers in use. the When south the westward, middle Route was brought X, some into though use the to M.T.B. units failed to follow up, the the continuous stream and the ships lying in Dunkirk Roads Commander. provi- enemy of unescorted traffic during ded dark a hours tempting target to any enterprising (a)/