TNA ADM 199 792

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CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 4.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
125
Tuesday, 28th May.
12.
By 0100/28 a large number of craft was approaching
the Belgian-French coast, while two Personnel Carriers were
crossing to Dover with 1400 troops. Two other carriers,
whose entry into Dunkirk had been stopped as a result of
S.N.O., Dunkirk's signals 2005/27 and 1958/27, were unable to
make the beaches and one, the MAID OF ORLEANS was damaged by
enemy bombing and another, the QUEEN OF THE CHANNEL was sunk.
During the preceding afternoon the Hospital Carrier ISLE OF
THANET was shelled and damaged by the Calais battery. All
available destroyers were working off the La Panne-Malo
beaches using their own boats, since the supply of beaching
boats from the United Kingdom had not yet reached across the
Channel. A moderate surf on the beaches reduced the rate of
embarkation, exhausted the boats' crews, the majority of whom
were hostility only ratings, rendering the whole operation
slow and difficult.
13.
In view of the heavy casualties experienced durin
thellast 24 hours to personnel carriers caused by the devel
ment of German air threat over Dunkirk and the increasing
artillery fire on the sea approaches to Dunkirk, it was
decided that until the situation was restored, these personnel
vessels could not be used on the French coast during full
daylight, and consequently for the moment evacuation from
Dunkirk by day must be confined to warships and other small
vessels. Furthermore, since evacuation from the beaches by
day with the troops exposed to bombing and machine gunning was
likely to be ineffective with the small number of beaching
craft at the Vice Admiral's disposal, the plan provided for
evacuation from both Dunkirk and the whole length of beaches
by night. (At that time - 1100/28 - information was being
received of the loss of a great number of the small beaching
craft during the preceding night and of the considerable
amount of organisation still required to bring the surviving
boats effectively to bear on the beaches).
14. During the forenoon it became more evident that the
greatest effort must be made the following night and the
Admiralty instructed Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches,
and Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, to sail every available
destroyer to Dover (Admiralty message 1229/28/5). In addition
the 7th and 8th M/S Flotillas were ordered to Harwich under
the orders of the Vice Admiral (Admiralty message 0163/28).
Commander-in-Chief, Nore, arranged a patrol of all available
M.T.Bs. and A/S Trawlers to cover the North-east flank of the
evacuation area against attack by enemy surface craft from
the North between 2030/28 and 0600/29.
15.
At this time great concern was felt over the lack of
water which had been reported on the beaches and joint Naval
and Military measures were set on foot to provide for the
supply of water in receptacles and in tanks to the beaches
apart from the arrangements for evacuation. Ships off the
beaches were also instructed to do what they could with their
own resources to help in this matter.
16.
Evacuation plan for the night was communicated
to/