Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
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127 126 128 CONFIDENTIAL.. Page 7. Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events. 29/ Wednesday, 29th May (continued) well as from Dunkirk harbour, both from the aspect of the military situation and from the fact that Dunkirk was limited by a bottle-neck, formed by the narrow gangway along the East Pier to the points of embarkation. Furthermore, there was every prospect of the weather improving and the surf reducing as the tide rose. Nevertheless, an increased number of H.M. ships was ordered to Dunkirk to augment the personnel vessels, though it was feared that an accumulation of ships alongside the East Pier at Dunkirk by day might well invite intensive air attack, Subsequently, this fear was fully to be justified. 25. Meantime, considerable anxiety was felt as to the fate of the personnel vessels which had been despatched in a steady stream to Dunkirk commencing the previous evening. The first of these was due back at Dover about 0300, but by 0900 nothing had been sighted or reported. But at 0700, O., Dunkirk, had reported that the embarkation there was going on at the rate of 2000 an hour, so it was presumed that the transports had failed to enter the harbour during darkness, had waited outside, and had commenced to enter in succession at dawn. The necessity for continuous fighter protection in view of the exposure of these unarmed ships while at Dunkirk and during the dayligh passage through coastal waters, was obvious, Constant touch was maintained with R.A.F. Commands to obtain continuous fighter protection during the hours when the Vice Admiral, Dover, estimated the largest concentration of vessels would be present, it being realised that the R.A.F. 3 resources were not sufficient to provide continuous air cover, ed and to dispense with full cover at less important periods. 26. At 0930 the belated return of the personnel vessels from Dunkirk commenced, and proceeded steadily through the day. In addition to the personnel vessels using Dunkirk the Admiralty were informed of the necessity for X-lighters and other self-propelled lighters to increase the facilities for beach evacuation. A Medical Party was shipped in VERITY for use on the beaches, and a Naval Medical Party was sent to Dunkirk. 27. The considerable alarm as to the immediate safety of the B.E.F. felt during the evening and early night of the k 28th, which caused all available resources to be immediately concentrated on the French Coast, eased during the 29th. But e emergency measures taken late on the 28th had an adverse effect on the orderly organisation for evacuation so necessary le if effective measures were to be devised and put in force. 28. Meantime, in the early hours of the 29th, an un- fortunate disaster occurred involving the loss or H.M. destroyers WAKEFUL and GRAFTON, and the danlayer COMFORT. WAKEFUL, after embarking troops at Bray, sailed for Dover at 2300/28 by the Zuydecoote Pass and North Channel. Approaching the Kwinte Whistle Buo the speed of the ships was 20 knots, and a zigzag of 40 degrees every 4 minutes was started. At 0045 two torpedo tracks were observed, one torpedo missed, the other hit ship smidships. WAKEFUL broke in half and the two portions sank in 15 secends, each remaining standing midship/ with the