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TNA / ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 792

Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 792
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Showing only pages tagged with the vessel name INTREPID. Tags are exact matches from this collection’s OCR tag index. Clear vessel filter ×
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1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.

List page 1 of 1 Showing document pages 73–73 of this collection
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73 Page 73 Log in to enlarge

134
13
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 13.
132
Operation "DYNAMO"
Narrative of Events.
30/5
Thursday, 30th May.
40. As an example of the difficulty of any one man appreciating the situation at Dunkirk and the beaches during the night, at 0030/30 the S.N.O. on the French Coast reported that he had no destroyers. In fact, at that time, all available destroyers, namely 10, in the Dover Command, were either on, or on passage to or from, the coast, and the remaining 5 were at Dover discharging troops, embarking ammunitition, fuelling, etc. and were to sail within the next
4 hours.
Simultaneously the V.C.I.G.S. reported that the beaches were well organised, the troops in good heart, and there had been no bombing since dark, but that there was still a great shortage of small craft - urgently required. This last fact was well known to the Vice Admiral, Dover.
41. Commander-in-Chief, Nore, was requested to send as much grass hawser as possible to Ramsgate, as quickly as possible, for supplying the skoots, to haul boats off the beaches, thus speeding up the boat work to compensate for the shortage of boats, which would continue for at least another
24 hours.
42. At 0500 the 7 modern destroyers remaining with Vice
Admiral, Dover - ICARUS, IMPULSIVE, INTREPID, IVANHOE, HAR-
VESTER, HAVANT and JAVELIN - sailed to Sheerness in accordance with Admiralty instructions. The MONTROSE and MACKAY sailed for repairs.
43. Meantime the Vice Admiral, Dover, had been much exercised regarding the possibility of the continued use of
Dunkirk harbour for personnel vessels and was anxiously awaiting the report from VANQUISHER, who had been sent to investigate the reported obstruction. VANQUISHER'S report was received at 0610 stating entrance was practicable but that obstruction exists towards outer inside end of the EASTERN ARM.
Pending amplifying reports, the sailing of personnel vessels to Dunkirk was resumed, although at this time there were still
4 personnel vessels presumed to be in the vicinity of Dunkirk
Harbour, whose movements and whereabouts throughout the night still remained obscure.
The Vice Admiral asked R.A. Dover, who was in HEBE, whether personnel ships could, in fact, still use Dunkirk. In the meantime a series of signals from Rear Admiral Dover, and destroyers off the coast, were received, stating that the beaches were filling up rapidly and more ships and boats were urgently required there. Although it was known that the destroyers could use Dunkirk, it appeared at this time that the best division of transport was to send the great majority of destroyers to the beaches, where urgent demands could not be ignored, and the personnel vessels to Dunkirk Harbour, only an occasional destroyer being sent to Dunkirk from the reduced number now available for the operation.
44/

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 73.

134
13
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 13.
132
Operation "DYNAMO"
Narrative of Events.
30/5
Thursday, 30th May.
40. As an example of the difficulty of any one man
appreciating the situation at Dunkirk and the beaches during
the night, at 0030/30 the S.N.O. on the French Coast reported
that he had no destroyers. In fact, at that time, all
available destroyers, namely 10, in the Dover Command, were
either on, or on passage to or from, the coast, and the
remaining 5 were at Dover discharging troops, embarking
ammunitition, fuelling, etc. and were to sail within the next
4 hours.
Simultaneously the V.C.I.G.S. reported that the
beaches were well organised, the troops in good heart, and
there had been no bombing since dark, but that there was still
a great shortage of small craft - urgently required. This
last fact was well known to the Vice Admiral, Dover.
41. Commander-in-Chief, Nore, was requested to send as
much grass hawser as possible to Ramsgate, as quickly as
possible, for supplying the skoots, to haul boats off the
beaches, thus speeding up the boat work to compensate for the
shortage of boats, which would continue for at least another
24 hours.
42. At 0500 the 7 modern destroyers remaining with Vice
Admiral, Dover - ICARUS, IMPULSIVE, INTREPID, IVANHOE, HAR-
VESTER, HAVANT and JAVELIN - sailed to Sheerness in accordance
with Admiralty instructions. The MONTROSE and MACKAY sailed
for repairs.
43. Meantime the Vice Admiral, Dover, had been much
exercised regarding the possibility of the continued use of
Dunkirk harbour for personnel vessels and was anxiously
awaiting the report from VANQUISHER, who had been sent to
investigate the reported obstruction. VANQUISHER'S report
was received at 0610 stating entrance was practicable but that
obstruction exists towards outer inside end of the EASTERN ARM.
Pending amplifying reports, the sailing of personnel vessels
to Dunkirk was resumed, although at this time there were still
4 personnel vessels presumed to be in the vicinity of Dunkirk
Harbour, whose movements and whereabouts throughout the night
still remained obscure.
The Vice Admiral asked R.A. Dover, who was in HEBE,
whether personnel ships could, in fact, still use Dunkirk. In
the meantime a series of signals from Rear Admiral Dover, and
destroyers off the coast, were received, stating that the
beaches were filling up rapidly and more ships and boats were
urgently required there. Although it was known that the
destroyers could use Dunkirk, it appeared at this time that the
best division of transport was to send the great majority of
destroyers to the beaches, where urgent demands could not be
ignored, and the personnel vessels to Dunkirk Harbour, only an
occasional destroyer being sent to Dunkirk from the reduced
number now available for the operation.
44/