← Document collections
TNA / ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 792

Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 792
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Showing only pages tagged with the vessel name Queen. Tags are exact matches from this collection’s OCR tag index. Clear vessel filter ×
Showing only document page 504. Show all matching pages ×

1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.

List page 1 of 1 Showing document pages 504–504 of this collection
Page ImageOCR textOCR tags
504 Page 504 Log in to enlarge

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on Operation "DYNAMO"
Page 3.
7. ENEMY EFFORTS TO FRUSTRATE OPERATION.
Attempts by the enemy to frustrate the operation consisted of the following:-
(a) Minelaying by aircraft.
(b) Intensive air attack.
(c) Action by Motor Torpedo Boats.
(a) Gunfire by coast artillery.
(e) Submarine operations.
(a) Minelaying by aircraft. Minelaying during the dark hours probably commenced during the night 28th-29th, and was maintained with great intensity during the following two nights. Not only were the Dunkirk Roads mined, including the Zuydecoote Pass, but also Route
X and the area round the Kwinte buoy. Folkestone and
Dover Harbour entrances were also mined. Considering the number of mines laid, it is interesting to note that only two British ships are known for certain to have been mined, the personnel vessel MONA's QUEEN
and the F.A.A. Yacht GRIEVE. 1 Hospital Carrier was damaged at anchor off Dover when a mine was blown up by a LL. trawler sweeping close at hand. Two A/S
trawlers on patrol to the northward of the operational area were blown up by what was at first thought to be a M.T.B., but later evidence suggests they were victims of moored mines. The impunity with which degaussed ships were able to operate in this heavily mined area alone made the operation possible and one reaches the conclusion that if the enemy on this occasion had had at hand the means of laying moored contact mines by aircraft, instead of magnetic mines, the results would have been very different.
(b) Air Attack. On the evening of the 29th, the first occasion on which a massed target of ships was presented in Dunkirk Harbour, the enemy seized the opportunity for air attack in great strength, and it was only by good fortune that the vital Dunkirk
Harbour channel was not blocked by sinking ships at this early date. From then onwards the scale and vigour of the air attack increased, and during the
1st June all ships in Dunkirk, off the beaches, or in the approach channels, were subjected every two hours to an unprecedented scale of air attack by aircraft in such numbers, that the R.A.F. were unable to deal with the situation. In this connection experience appears to indicate that in similar circumstances fighters must be present in such numbers that they can simultaneously attack both enemy fighting and bombing forma ons. Otherwise the enemy bombers remain undisturbed to continue their bombing attacks.
The scale of enemy air attack on the 31st and
1st was primarily responsible for the suspension of daylight evacuation from the 2nd June.
(c) Attack by M.T.B.s. These caused 4 casualties, namely, two dostroyers and two trawlers, while the north Route
Y was in use, When the middle Route x, some 26 miles further to the south westward, was brought into use the enemy M.T.B. units failed to follow up, though the continuous stream of unescorted traffic during the dark hours and the ships lying in Dunkirk Roads provided a tempting target to any enterprising Commander.
(a)/

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 504.

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on Operation "DYNAMO"
Page 3.
7. ENEMY EFFORTS TO FRUSTRATE OPERATION.
Attempts by the enemy to frustrate the operation
consisted of the following:-
(a) Minelaying by aircraft.
(b) Intensive air attack.
(c) Action by Motor Torpedo Boats.
(a) Gunfire by coast artillery.
(e) Submarine operations.
(a) Minelaying by aircraft. Minelaying during the dark
hours probably commenced during the night 28th-29th,
and was maintained with great intensity during the
following two nights. Not only were the Dunkirk Roads
mined, including the Zuydecoote Pass, but also Route
X and the area round the Kwinte buoy. Folkestone and
Dover Harbour entrances were also mined. Considering
the number of mines laid, it is interesting to note
that only two British ships are known for certain to
have been mined, the personnel vessel MONA's QUEEN
and the F.A.A. Yacht GRIEVE. 1 Hospital Carrier was
damaged at anchor off Dover when a mine was blown up
by a LL. trawler sweeping close at hand. Two A/S
trawlers on patrol to the northward of the operational
area were blown up by what was at first thought to be
a M.T.B., but later evidence suggests they were
victims of moored mines. The impunity with which
degaussed ships were able to operate in this heavily
mined area alone made the operation possible and one
reaches the conclusion that if the enemy on this
occasion had had at hand the means of laying moored
contact mines by aircraft, instead of magnetic mines,
the results would have been very different.
(b) Air Attack. On the evening of the 29th, the first
occasion on which a massed target of ships was
presented in Dunkirk Harbour, the enemy seized the
opportunity for air attack in great strength, and it
was only by good fortune that the vital Dunkirk
Harbour channel was not blocked by sinking ships at
this early date. From then onwards the scale and
vigour of the air attack increased, and during the
1st June all ships in Dunkirk, off the beaches, or in
the approach channels, were subjected every two hours
to an unprecedented scale of air attack by aircraft
in such numbers, that the R.A.F. were unable to deal
with the situation. In this connection experience
appears to indicate that in similar circumstances
fighters must be present in such numbers that they
can simultaneously attack both enemy fighting and
bombing forma ons. Otherwise the enemy bombers
remain undisturbed to continue their bombing attacks.
The scale of enemy air attack on the 31st and
1st was primarily responsible for the suspension of
daylight evacuation from the 2nd June.
(c) Attack by M.T.B.s. These caused 4 casualties, namely,
two dostroyers and two trawlers, while the north Route
Y was in use, When the middle Route x, some 26 miles
further to the south westward, was brought into use
the enemy M.T.B. units failed to follow up, though the
continuous stream of unescorted traffic during the
dark hours and the ships lying in Dunkirk Roads provi-
ded a tempting target to any enterprising Commander.
(a)/