TNA ADM 199 792

(1952) Wt. 20906/9711 40M 8/39 S.E.R. Ltd. Gp. 671
107
Register No.
Minute Sheet No. 105
Page 6 is included in the ww.ord copies distributed.
Submitted, in the- first instance, whether any action should be. taken with the Air Ministry as pupaned m D.T.S.D.
Capits of the upot have not been 25ml trAin Ministry or was office.
Prosine,
HW 7th
15-7-40
Had a combined staff been told to investigate the problem of evacuating 300,000 men from a harbour and beaches under the shadow of hostile shore based aircraft and in close contact with the enemy's troops, it is probable that their appreciation would have been very pessimistic. It is even possible that by all known rules the operation could have been summed up as impossible.
2. DYNAMO was carried out by impromptu measures, executed with the greatest courage.
3. The lessons to be learned and it is hoped, applied to future combined operations, can only be extracted by the most carful analysis.
4. The portions of the Report which in any way reflect on
R.A.F. co-operation or on the conduct of troops have been marginally lined in blue. There are some stronger criticisms of the conduct of troops - particularly of the Pioneer Corps -
in V.A. Dover's letter of 6th July, B.14/0/1028/40, advance copies of which have been circulated under M. Branch minute
M. 013316/40 of 14th July, but which has not yet come before the Board.
5. Propose that the document complete be analysed by a
Committee of 3 Officers of the rank or equivalent rank of
Captain, R.N. One officer from
& Savie
A.C.N.S. (H).
22.7.40.

139
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 18.
137
Operation "DYNAMO". Narrative of Events.
31/5
Friday, 31st May (Continued).
Goodwins and commenced to hunt.
55. The arrivals at the home ports indicated that in spite of the frequent requests for more ships and more boats received from the various authorities on the French coast, the rate of evacuation was steadily increasing and would permit, all being well, of implementing the final evacuation plan during the night 31/5 - 1/6, Accordingly, instructions were issued for the special tows to leave Ramsgate at 1300/31 for
Dunkirk via Route X, and Commander-in-Chief, Nore, and Flag
Officer-in-Charge, Harwich, were requested to provide all available M.T.B.'s to escort this convoy for as much of the outward passage as possible, which was timed to commence from
Ramsgate at 1300/31. Speed of advance - 5 knots. A party of Naval officers had been assembled at Dover to embark in these tows and had been given detailed instructions on the plan. Two M.A./S boats and 2 M.T.B,'s in the Dover Command were ordered to accompany the boat convoy and subsequently embark the Commander-in-Chief, B.E.F. and Staff off the beaches.
31MAY
56. Shortly after sunrise an on-shore wind arose and boat work became difficult, many whalers capsizing, and the prospects of completing the evacuation to plan began to be less favourable. The following extract from the report of
Captain Howson, S.N.O., on the beaches illustrates conditions at Bray at this time:
"At 0400 there was a very considerable number of destroyers, paddlers, trawlers, skoots, etc, off Bray, and embarkation was proceeding satisfactorily, but a lop had already started. There were about 10 motor yachts which had arrived from England, These craft drew 6-7
feet and were unable to get close in to any of the beaches. During the forenoon, considerable towing of empty craft towards the beach was carried out, and only about 2 boats were allowed to get adrift and ultimately ground. With the falling tide, however, a number of boats were seen to ground and romain ashore until the tide rose in the afternoon. These included an A.L.C.,
New motor boat and a lifeboat. Other power boats broke down. Nevertheless, the embarkation, much hindered by the lop, proceeded satisfactorily. As further destroyers and sloops arrived, they were directed to lower their motor boats and whalers as this had not already been done, these boats were quite invaluable. About noon, the lop began to subside and with the rising tide conditions for embarkation very greatly improved, more boats were sent in and more boats floated off and matters were proceeding very well, when the gun at La Panne started to shell the beaches and foreshore with great accuracy. A certain number of light craft were sunk. The A.L.C. broke down and was towed away by a steamer, MOSQUITO, destroyers and sloops proceeded westward clear of the firing.
57/

CONFIDENTIAL.
153
Page 32.
151
152
4/6
150
its
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 31
it of
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
he
3/6
at
S
ed 33
h
Monday, 3rd June (continued).
d
93.
In the evening the Vice Admiral was informed by the
B.N.L.O. Marceau that it was estimated 30,000 French remained and that the French Admiralty agree that evacuation should be terminated that night if possible. Force used was to consist of 9 Personnel Vessels with one in reserve, 9 Destroyers
(maximum number available), 4 Paddle Minesweepers, 7 Fleet
Minesweepers, 9 Drifters, LOCUST, 2 Corvettes, 4 French
Destroyers and a number of organised motor boat flotillas including lifeboats from Ramsgate and Dover, together with a large number of French and Belgian fishing vessels. The lifting capacity of this force, if used to the full, was more than 30,000, but it was certain that the facilities within
Dunkirk could not permit more than about 25,000 to be embarked in the time available, and this number only if the French troops moved with the greatest rapidity at all points of embarkation. This point was impressed upon the French Liaison
Officers and a number of French officers and ratings added to the augmented pier parties which were despatched to Dunkirk at 2200 in advance of the evacuation force.
toots
94. The movements commenced according to plan. The weather conditions at Dunkirk, although favourable as regards ere tide were adverse with a north easterly wind tending to blow the
Personnel Vessels and Destroyers off the vital East Pier makin berthing difficult. The MANXMAN, the seventh Personnel Ship king to due to sail refused to sail, and her place was taken by the theless,
ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
power
4/6
or
Tuesday, 4th June.
tretch
00/2/6.
95. At midnight when the earlier vessels had commenced thin the return voyage fog was reported in mid-channel and off the cipally
Thanet coast and a number of ships had to anchor before entering harbour. The EXPRESS and SHIKARI were the last ships llery the to leave Dunkirk at 0318 and 0340 and carried approximately
1,000 troops and the British pier parties. Except for an air attack on SHIKARI this final passage was made without intere ruption by the enemy and though the fog made navigation r to extremely difficult it undoubtedly served to shield the Armada ne gun, from enemy aircraft.
German ceasing
96. When the count was taken later in the day it was ements ascertained that 27,000 troops had been evacuated as a result d as of the night's operation and Admiral Nord agreed that the operation should be considered as completed, observing that all anmunition at Dunkirk had been expended and that the olunteer numbers left behind were small consisting principally of noncombatant troops. This decision was agreed to by the French
1
Admiralty at 1100, and the operation Dynamo terminated by
Admiralty Message 1423/4.
97. It was realised that in all probability there might be a number of open boats, barges, etc. tsmouth, bout in the channel with troops on board. It was accr scided to inary/
have

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 18.
Operation "DYNAMO". Narrative of Events.
Friday, 31st May (Continued).
Goodwins and commenced to hunt.
55. The arrivals at the home ports indicated that in spite of the frequent requests for more ships and more boats received from the various authorities on the French coast, the rate of evacuation was steadily increasing and would permit, all being well, of implementing the final evacuation plan during the night 31/5 - 1/6. Accordingly, instructions were issued for the special tows to leave Ramsgate at 1300/31 for
Dunkirk via Route X, and Commander-in-Chief, Nore, and Flag
Officer-in-Charge, Harwich, were requested to provide all available M.T.B.'s to escort this convoy for as much of the outward passage as possible, which was timed to commence from
Ramsgate at 1300/31. Speed of advance - 5 knots. A party of Naval officers had been assembled at Dover to embark in these tows and had been given detailed instructions on the plan. Two M.A./S boats and 2 M.T.B.'s in the Dover Command were ordered to accompany the boat convoy and subsequently embark the Commander-in-Chief, B.E.F. and Staff off the beaches.
56. Shortly after sunrise an on-shore wind arose and boat work became difficult, many whalers capsizing, and the prospects of completing the evacuation to plan began to be less favourable. The following extract from the report of
Captain Howson, S.N.O., on the beaches illustrates conditions at Bray at this time:
"At 0400 there was a very considerable number of destroyers, paddlers, trawlers, skoots, etc, off Bray, and embarkation was proceeding satisfactorily, but a lop had already started. There were about 10 motor yachts which had arrived from England. These craft drew 6-7
feet and were unable to get close in to any of the beaches. During the forenoon, considerable towing of empty craft towards the beach was carried out, and only about 2 boats were allowed to get adrift and ultimately ground. With the falling tide, however, a number of boats were seen to ground and remain ashore until the tide rose in the afternoon. These included an A.L.C., motor boat and a lifeboat. Other power boats broke down. Nevertheless, the embarkation, much hindered by the lop, proceeded satisfactorily. As further destroyers and sloops arrived, they were directed to lower their motor boats and whalers as this had not already been done, began to subside and with the rising tide conditions for these boats were quite invaluable. About noon, the lop embarkation very greatly improved, more boats were sent in and more boats floated off and matters were proceeding very well, when the gun at La Panne started to shell the beaches and fore hore with great accuracy. A certain number of light craft were sunk. The A.L.C. broke down and was towed away by a steamer. MOSQUITO, destroyers and sloops proceeded westward clear of the firing.
57/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 32.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 31
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Monday, 3rd June (continued).
93. In the evening the Vice Admiral was informed by the
B.N.L.O. Marceau that it was estimated 30,000 French remained and that the French Admiralty agree that evacuation should be terminated that night if possible. Force used was to consist of 9 Personnel Vessels with one in reserve, 9 Destroyers is
(maximum number available), 4 Paddle Minesweepers, 7 Fleet
Minesweepers, 9 Drifters, LOCUST, 2 Corvettes, 4 French
Destroyers and a number of organised motor boat flotillas including lifeboats from Ramsgate and Dover, together with a large number of French and Belgian fishing vessels. The lifting capacity of this force, if used to the full, was more than 30,000, but it was certain that the facilities within
Dunkirk could not permit more than about 25,000 to be embarked in the time available, and this number only if the French troops moved with the greatest rapidity at all points of embarkation. This point was impressed upon the French Liaison
Officers and a number of French officers and ratings added to the augmented pier parties which were despatched to Dunkirk at 2200 in advance of the evacuation force.
94. The movements commenced according to plan. The weather conditions at Dunkirk, although favourable as regards tide were adverse with a north easterly wind tending to blow
S,
Personnel Vessels and Destroyers off the vital East Pier making berthing difficult. The MANXMAN, the seventh Personnel Ship due to sail refused to sail, and her place was taken by the
ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
Tuesday, 4th June.
95. At midnight when the earlier vessels had commenced the return voyage fog was reported in mid-channel and off the r
Thanet coast and a number of ships had to anchor before entering harbour. The EXPRESS and SHIKARI were the last ships to leave Dunkirk at 0318 and 0340 and carried approximately
1,000 troops and the British pier parties. Except for an air attack on SHIKARI this final passage was made without interruption by the enemy and though the fog made navigation extremely difficult it undoubtedly served to shield the Armadas from enemy aircraft.
I
96. When the count was taken later in the day it was ascertained that 27,000 troops had been evacuated as a result of the night's operation and Admiral Nord agreed that the operation should be considered as completed, observing that all anmunition at Dunkirk had been expended and that the numbers left behind were small consisting principally of noncombatant troops. This decision was agreed to by the French
Admiralty at 1100, and the operation Dynamo terminated by
Admiralty Message 1423/4.
97. It was realised that in all probability there might be a number of open boats, barges, etc. drifting about in the channel with troops on board. It was accordingly decided to have val

7432 50M 10/38 S.E.R. Ltd. Gp. 671.
base'beservi
Register No.
Minute Sheet No.
X
Temporary Skipper Alfred Manning Lovis, R.N.R., W.S.3397,
H.M.Drifter PAXTON.
x
Captain Gordon Dyer Walter, Master, MAID OF ORLEANS.
Captain George Johnson, Master, ROYAL DAFFODIL.
Captain Thomas Aldis, Master, ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
Distinguished Service Medal
Petty Officer Thomas A. Topley, C/J.112800.
Yeoman of Signals Geoffrey Piper, C/JX.132686.
Able Seaman Alexander C. Moore, C/JX.129026.
Able Seaman James G. Owen, R.F.R., B.20977.
Able Seaman Joseph L. Turner, C/SS.X.24037.
Able Seaman Walter F. Cox, R.F.R., B.22716.
Able Seaman Gilbert Rose, C/J.X151776.
Able Seaman Francis H. McLaughlin, C/J. X146012.
Ordinary Seaman Andrew McKay H. Miller, C/JX.174079.
Ordinary Seaman William J. Edward Burrows, C/JX.154411.
Ordinary Seaman Sydney V. Genner, C/JX.150954.
A special note would be put in the Gazette making it clear that circumstances had made it possible for these recommendations to be made in advance of the general body of recommendations and that they have not been in any sense specially selected.
*
The Distinguished Service Cross may, at the discretion of the Admiralty, be awarded to Officers of the Merchant
Navy, and the Committee think that the award of the
D.S.C. to these three Masters would be both correct and unobjectionable.
R.Gleadowe for HEAD OF COMMISSION AND WARRANT BRANCH
5th June, 1940.
The King has 1 been pleased to apparer