TNA ADM 199 792

3.
/
the Dutoh and Belgian authorities that arrangements
11
a for sending the larger ships - the long journey will be essential. If the Datch and Belgian authorities
S
know this beforehand, they will have B chance to make dam arrengements for provisioning the ships and warning he the captains not to allow on board more passengers than can be conveyed on so lengthy a journey.
If no such warning is given beforehend the gravest difficulties may arise. In an emergency large numbers of persons may crowd on to an ill-provided boat
75
and the captain, who has been contemplating a short en journey, will then be told by the Admiralty representative
3
that he has to make a three days' journey.
I imagine the difficulties of consultation with the authorities of these countries are serious.
on n the
Ly other hand, if no such consultation takes place the gravest troubles may arise and the British Government may be accused of lack of humanity in foreing an 111-
including children aga mifim persons provided ship crowded with distressed people to take 80
long a journey.
us
The Admiralty representative told se that their officers in the Dutch and Belgian ports are at present being nad for their sarety and health during a 3 to 4 days winter voyage.
This estimate is offered with the greatest reserve, and should be subject to improvement in the light of fuller information.
4./

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CONFIDENTIAL
115
Page 4.
8
(d)
Shore
Artillery.
At the the southern batteries Route Z was found commencement to be under of the operation, from only be used by near night. Calais, The and consequently gunfire could only by night fire to when later the northern batteries Route near Y was usable brought too narrow to permit bear on the Zuydecoote Pass, Nieuport which was running Route X was gauntlet of fire. By this time, however, the a reasonable chance of ships batteries available, and was free of gunfire
German Dunkirk near Gravelines brought its exit until into the Roads under gunfire. This occurred in with the of enemy air attack, led to the the afternoon result on Saturday, 1st June, and in conjunction suspension of daylight traffic altogether.
(e) Submarines. U-boats do not appear to have caused any casualties. It is unlikely that the one thought to be present penetrated further than the northern Route Y.
It may well be that this U-boat laid moored mines, which are thought to have caused the loss of two A/S trawlers.
8.
AIR CO-OPERATION.
The system of co-operation between the Naval and
R.A.F. Commands does not permit of direct contact with the
R.A.F. operational units allocated for duty with the Naval
Command. For this reason much time appears to be lost and the needs of the ever-changing situation may not be provided for. Delays and lag occur, resulting often in the R.A.F. effort being brought to bear either in the wrong place or at the wrong time, or with inadequate force to meet the current situation. The requirement is for the Naval Commander in charge of an operation to be able to convey his requirements direct to the R.A.F. Commander of the R.A.F. Operational Units, and for this latter officer to communicate direct to the Naval Commander the steps that he is taking to meet the stated requirement.
It is unnecessary to stress the vital necessity for effective air co-operation in an operation of this nature. Not only did unopposed German air effort interrupt and reduce seaborne traffic, but it also prevented embarkation by suspending troop movement. To both Naval and Military observers on the coast, the situation at times was extremely disheartening. Rightly or wrongly, full air protection was expected, but instead, for hours on end the ships offshore were subjected to a murderous hail of bombs and machine gun bullets.
Required by their duty to remain offshore waiting for the troops, who themselves were unable to move down to the water for the same reason, it required the greatest determination and sense of duty, amounting in fact to heroism, on the part of the ships' and boats' crews, to enable them to complete their mission.
In their reports, the Commanding Officers of many ships, while giving credit to the R.A.F. personnel for gallantry in such combats as were observed from the ships, at the same time express their sense of disappointment and surprise at the seemingly puny efforts made to provide air protection during the height of this operation.
In this connection, as one Commanding Officer remarks, the formations of our own fighters when operating machines surprise down than were enemy, and feelings was no area were to so the observer to note that more of over the outnumbered by enemy aircraft British that it disgust were were engendered shot on listening in to the B.B.C. of report

CONFIDENTIAL
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117
fighting formations were encountered. French troops handl ist were either demoralised and had to be controlled by force or n by the use of fire-arms, or were so rigidly bound by disciplin and tradition that they would not embark except by complete formation under their own unit officers. In either case, the rate of embarkation was much slower than with British troops.
12.
INITIATIVE SHOWN BY COMMANDING OFFICERS AND
last
SUBORDINATE PERSONNEL.
A most satisfactory feature of the operation was the high degree of initiative shown by Commanding and
Subordinate Officers of units operating off the coast, ranging from H.M. Destroyers to comandeered motor boats. The majority of officers and ratings in command were in situations requiring independent action in extrenely difficult
S
conditions. Often the easiest course was to be satisfied with work already achieved' and to return to the United
Kingdom with a final load of troops. The reverse action was invariably executed, namely, continued operation off the 1
coast as long as there were both troops ashore to be n.
evacuated and vessels off shore to receive them. If the craft in use was damaged or sunk the crew invariably seized some other boat to continue their efforts.
gh
Unaware of the military situation ashore and ofter forced to move westward by bombardment from German artillery or even by rifle fire from advancing German forces, the majority of these boats, commanded often by stokers or ure hostility only seamen, had only one object in view, to lif from the beach any, and all troops, British or Allied, with sight of the water's edge.
e
On their return to the United Kingdom when asked report their proceedings it was only in answer to direct enquiry that it would transpire that these young men had subjected, in many cases, to an unparalleled bombardment an the air. They appeared to consider that this was part of day's work requiring no comment.
ork
13.
LOSSES OF TROOPS AFTER EMBARKATION.
It is a distressing fact that many ships were or damaged on the return voyage when laden with troops.
is fortunate that in most of such cases the majority of troops were saved owing to the large volume of traffic t)
was coming and going between Dunkirk and the United King
Exceptions to this were due to the rapidity with which ce cer ships sank after having been bombed or torpedoed, Such cases"
are as follows:-
loat
WAKEFUL torpedoed. Ship broke in half and only those on hore, the upper deck were saved. About 600 troops were belostaff
CRESTED EAGLE. Was bombed and then beached in a burning ven condition. Only about 300 saved out of 600 on board ence to
SKIPJACK. 250 - 300 troops on board, most of whom,
Chi unfor tunately, went down with the ship when sh sank. aff,
Bombed

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Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Monday, 27th May, 1940. (continued)
embarkation from beaches in the La Panne-Dunkirk area, as such matters as crews, fuel and general organisation were taken in hand. Five Personnel Vessels routed to start in daylight completed the round trip during the 27th and lifted a total of 3952. In addition 17 drifters of the Dover Command sailed from Dover for the Malc beach, and during the night
X
lifted 2000 troops from the beach by ships' dinghies. During the day destroyer patrols had been established to the Northward to cover the passage of merchant ships between Dunkirk and the Downs, and the Admiralty asked Western Approaches to reinforce the Dover destroyers.
6.
Commander-in-Chief, Nore, sailed 6 small skoots for the South Downs to co-operate in Dunkirk, and sailed 4 skoots loaded with Army stores direct to Dunkirk. In the evening
Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate, was asked to take over the fuelling and despatching of all small power boats with the attendant pulling boats forming the inshore flotilla. Some unnecessary delays occurred at this stage as the majority of the Naval Authorities and the Admiralty were directing the small craft for Dunkirk to be routed to Dover, although the
Vice Admiral, Dover, had asked for the Downs to be their destination. Once despatched by the Authorities no communication with these vessels was possible until they arrived at their destination, and so the requirements of assembling these craft at the Downs or Ramsgate was in many cases delayed by as much as 24 hours or more since during the night misfortune befell many tows that came adrift due to moderate weather or collisions and the business of rounding them up could not be effected until daylight.
7. The Vice Admiral had intended to maintain a destroyer at Dunkirk as a W/T link, but the S.N.O., on arrival, decided that conditions at Dunkirk made this impossible,
8. At 2025 the Vice Admiral, Dover, received a Most
Immediate message from the S.N.O., Dunkirk, who had just reached his station, as follows: "Port consistently bombed all day, and on fire. Embarkation possible only from beaches
East of harbour A.B.C.D. Send all ships and passenger ships there to anchor. Am ordering WOLFHOUND to load there and sail
T.O.O. 2005/37". Meanwhile Vice Admiral, Lover, had asked the Commender-in Chief, Nore, to send every available shallow draught power boat, capable of ferrying from beaches to ships lying off the beaches Eastward of Dunkirk, stocked with fuel and provisions for two days; this move being made with a view to saving time by cutting out the passage to, and subsequent reorganisation, at Ramsgate, prior to proceeding to the French Coast. It should be noted at this time
X
(2000/27) there were no pulling boats, cutters or whalers immediately available for attendance on Power Boats. A
further signal: "Please send every available craft to beache
East of Dunkirk immediately. Evacuation tomorrow night is ir problematicalTo01958/27 was received from S.N.O., Dunkirk.
Later that evening a roport WAS received from

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127
Tuesday, 28th May. (continued)
beach with the object of embarking that force as soon as possible.
19. As regards enemy activity, this day the Germans contented themselves with bombing the town and port of Dunkirk, but on a small scale compared with that to be experienced later, probably because of increasing R.A.F. air cover and also due to the fact that a heavy pall of smoke from the burning town covered the operation most of the day.
20. Losses to H.M. Ships - 28th May.
A/S Trawler THURINGIA sunk by mine in position 51° 20' N,
2° 03' E. Four survivors.
Flare-burning Drifters PAXTON and BOY ROY damaged by enemy aircraft and beached. No casualties.
Destroyer WINDSOR. Bombed about 1100. Damage to hull and aerials. Various casualties.
Minesweeper BRIGHTON BELLE. Sunk in collision. struck
LL Trawler THOMAS BARTLETT sunk by mine in shallow water whilst trying to avoid gunfire in position 51 2 12 N, 54 E.
Personnel Vessel QUEEN OF THE CHANNEL sunk by bombing attack.
Wednesday, 29th May.
21. The Northern Route Y having been swept, it was arranged to sail personnel ships to Dunkirk at daylight and to continue to sail throughout the day; this route would take ships clear of the artillery fire on shore. Personnel ships accordingly started at 0230.
22.
Much consideration had been given to the practicability of building piers on the beaches using lines of berges. Reports from ships that worked off the beaches showed, however, that owing to the very gradual shoaling of the water at all states of the tide such a barge pier, to be effective, would have to be of very great length, beyond the resources available.
23. Information was received that the Personnel Vessels with their Mercantile Marine crews were having difficulty in making the entrance to Dunkirk harbour in the face of the navigational difficulties caused by a heavy smoke pall over the entrance and in face of bombing and shelling encountered en route and whilst alongside. [In certain vessels the crews were unwilling to sail when ordered, consequently application was made to the Commander-in-Chief, Nore, for Naval Officers and ratings for duty in the Personnel Ships.) Nevertheless, it subsequently transpired that at Dunkirk there had been a good number of ships throughout the night, at times exceeding the influx of troops.
24. S.N.O., Dunkirk, and other Senior Officers on the
Coast reported during the early hours that surf on the beaches was retarding boat work. S.N.O., Dunkirk, at 0709, asked for all ships to go to Dunkirk. The Vice Admiral could not accept this as it was essential to maintain lifts off the beaches as well/

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Wednesday, 29th May (continued).
route provided the passage between Calais Bell Buoy and
Dunkirk be made in darkness.
Route X passed some 26 miles to the South-westward of the extreme N.E. point of the Northern Route Y, the locality in which enemy M.T.B. attack threatened, and was shielded by the
French minefields in the Ruytingen and Dyck channels. It appears that the enemy M.T.B. command failed to appreciate the withdrawal of traffic to the S.W. and did not follow up.
In the evening it was reported that there was no congestion anywhere on the coast, except at La Panne. The force at La
Panne was accordingly reinforced as ships became available.
30. An additional beach party of 7 officers and a number of ratings under Captain J. Howson was sailed in SABRE at
1600 for Dunkirk, and Captain E. Bush, who had already visited
Dunkirk and was aware of the general conditions, was sent to
HEBE as S.N.O. afloat off the beaches. An M.T.B. was placed at the disposal of the S.N.O. on the coast.
31. At about 1600 a heavy air attack commenced on the
East Mole Pier, Dunkirk harbour, mainly by dive bombing, which lasted continuously for more than 2 hours. At the same time, other air attacks took place on ships lying off Bray.
Attacks were renewed from time to time up till after 2000, not only on Dunkirk, but on ships off Bray, in the Zuydecoote
Pass and those in the Southern end of x Route. These attacks were to have a disastrous result on the evacuation arrangements at Dunkirk. There were present alongside the inner side of the Eastern Arm 2 destroyers GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 Trawlers ahead of the GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 more trawlers ahead of them with the CANTERBURY in the next berth, and a French destroyer ahead of the CANTERBURY. Outside the harbour on the outside of the Eastern Arm the Transport FENELLA was berthed opposite the
GRENADE and JAGUAR and the CRESTED EAGLE opposite the 6 trawlers.
In addition, the MALCOLM and VERITY were also in the harbour but further inside. This presented a very good target and the ships were soon hit and embarkation of troops ceased for the time being. CANTERBURY, accompanied by JAGUAR, succeeded in leaving harbour, but both were hit by bombs and damaged. Both succeeded in reaching Dover, though JAGUAR had to be towed part of the way and was subjected to many attacks on passage.
CANTERBURY reached harbour at 2115 and disembarked 1950 troops but was sufficiently damaged to prevent her being used again in these operations. To return to Dunkirk - FENELLA was lying alongside on the outside of the pier, and was hit and sunk.
GRENADE and one of the trawlers on the East side were hit and the trawler sank in the fairway. GRENADE sinking and on fire had to be abandoned and appeared to be about to sink in the fairway. A trawler was detailed to tow her clear. VERITY, who witnessed this occurrence was continuously straddled by bombs for 35 minutes. Passage all along the pier having ceased, she cast off, and skirting the burning GRENADE and trawler, proceeded out of harbour, grounding slightly on a sunk drifter in the entrance. At about 1800 KING ORRY arrived to find the harbour occupied only by burning and sinking ships, was with no sign of any one on the pier nor any boat moving in thantly harbour uld little
36

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Thursday, 30th May.
40. As an example of the difficulty of any one man appreciating the situation at Dunkirk and the beaches during the night, at 0030/30 the S.N.O. on the French Coast reported that he had no destroyers. In fact, at that time, all available destroyers, namely 10, in the Dover Command, were either on, or on passage to or from, the coast, and the remaining 5 were at Dover discharging troops, embarking ammunitition, fuelling, etc. and were to sail within the next
4 hours.
Simultaneously the V.C.I.G.S. reported that the beaches were well organised, the troops in good heart, and there had been no bombing since dark, but that there was still a great shortage of small craft - urgently required. This last fact was well known to the Vice Admiral, Dover.
41. Commander-in-Chief, Nore, was requested to send as much grass hawser as possible to Ramsgate, as quickly as possible, for supplying the skoots, to haul boats off the beaches, thus speeding up the boat work to compensate for the shortage of boats, which would continue for at least another
24 hours.
42. At 0500 the 7 modern destroyers remaining with Vice
Admiral, Dover - ICARUS, IMPULSIVE, INTREPID, IVANHOE, HAR-
VESTER, HAVANT and JAVELIN - sailed to Sheerness in accordance with Admiralty instructions. The MONTROSE and MACKAY sailed for repairs.
43. Meantime the Vice Admiral, Dover, had been much exercised regarding the possibility of the continued use of
Dunkirk harbour for personnel vessels and was anxiously awaiting the report from VANQUISHER, who had been sent to investigate the reported obstruction. VANQUISHER'S report was received at 0610 stating entrance was practicable but that obstruction exists towards outer inside end of the EASTERN ARM.
Pending amplifying reports, the sailing of personnel vessels to Dunkirk was resumed, although at this time there were still
4 personnel vessels presumed to be in the vicinity of Dunkirk
Harbour, whose movements and whereabouts throughout the night still remained obscure.
The Vice Admiral asked R.A. Dover, who was in HEBE, whether personnel ships could, in fact, still use Dunkirk. In the meantime a series of signals from Rear Admiral Dover, and destroyers off the coast, were received, stating that the beaches were filling up rapidly and more ships and boats were urgently required there. Although it was known that the destroyers could use Dunkirk, it appeared at this time that the best division of transport was to send the great majority of destroyers to the beaches, where urgent demands could not be ignored, and the personnel vessels to Dunkirk Harbour, only an occasional destroyer being sent to Dunkirk from the reduced number now available for the operation.
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Narrative of Events.
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Thursday, 30th May. (Continued).
44. At Dunkirk there were no air attacks in the early morning and all was quiet. Later, when ships began to arrive in quantity, in view of the massive target presented by a number of ships alongside the East pier at a time, the S.N.O.,
Dunkirk ordered destroyers alongside only one at a time. At about 0800 a store ship arrived at Dunkirk with provisions but no water. This caused so much congestion on the pier that unloading was abandoned when half complete, and the store ship filled with troops. A certain amount of water was obtained from destroyers.
45. During the forenoon the Military constructed a long pier of lorries with deck planking, into the sea off Bray. This was an excellent piece of work, but was insufficiently stable for use by such craft as paddle steamers, nor even smaller power craft in a lop. It was invaluable later for embarking troops into small boats. As regards general embarkation off the beaches, it was later learnt that it was 0 common occurrence for processions of small boats loaded with troops to be cast adrift when empty and allowed to float away to seaward, owing to the lack of sufficient naval ratings as boat-keepers. For the same reason many of the smaller pulling boats were swamped and sunk due to overloading by uncontrolled "rush" of soldiers.
Both these faults were remedied later.
46. Matters proceeded smoothly throughout the day owing to the mist and there being a big smoke cloud over Dunkirk which prevented the enemy bombers attacking the ships in large numbers.
In order to increase the rate of embarkation through the bottle-neck of the East Pier gangway, the troops were urged to quicken their pace and eventually thousands of troops, tired and without food and water for days, broke into the double and kept it up the whole length of the pier for more than two hours.
47. The attempt to maintain an adequate rate of lift using only the older destroyers was by now shown to be impracticable. The destroyers were lifting about 17,000, personnel vessels about 9500 in the 24 hours. Remaining vessels were estimated to be worth about 15,000 per day. This gave a total lift of about 43,000 per day. The situation called for E lift of at least 55,000 per day. Verbal representations being made to C.M.S., authority was received for the return to the Dover Command of the modern destroyers released the night before.
Accordingly Commander-in-Chief, Nore, at 1531 gave orders to HARVESTER, HAVANT, IVANHOE, IMPULSIVE, ICARUS and
INTREPID to proceed at once to Dunkirk. Subsequently some of these destroyers were diverted to the beaches.
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Friday, 31st May (Continued).
Goodwins and commenced to hunt.
55. The arrivals at the home ports indicated that in spite of the frequent requests for more ships and more boats received from the various authorities on the French coast, the rate of evacuation was steadily increasing and would permit, all being well, of implementing the final evacuation plan during the night 31/5 - 1/6, Accordingly, instructions were issued for the special tows to leave Ramsgate at 1300/31 for
Dunkirk via Route X, and Commander-in-Chief, Nore, and Flag
Officer-in-Charge, Harwich, were requested to provide all available M.T.B.'s to escort this convoy for as much of the outward passage as possible, which was timed to commence from
Ramsgate at 1300/31. Speed of advance - 5 knots. A party of Naval officers had been assembled at Dover to embark in these tows and had been given detailed instructions on the plan. Two M.A./S boats and 2 M.T.B,'s in the Dover Command were ordered to accompany the boat convoy and subsequently embark the Commander-in-Chief, B.E.F. and Staff off the beaches.
31MAY
56. Shortly after sunrise an on-shore wind arose and boat work became difficult, many whalers capsizing, and the prospects of completing the evacuation to plan began to be less favourable. The following extract from the report of
Captain Howson, S.N.O., on the beaches illustrates conditions at Bray at this time:
"At 0400 there was a very considerable number of destroyers, paddlers, trawlers, skoots, etc, off Bray, and embarkation was proceeding satisfactorily, but a lop had already started. There were about 10 motor yachts which had arrived from England, These craft drew 6-7
feet and were unable to get close in to any of the beaches. During the forenoon, considerable towing of empty craft towards the beach was carried out, and only about 2 boats were allowed to get adrift and ultimately ground. With the falling tide, however, a number of boats were seen to ground and romain ashore until the tide rose in the afternoon. These included an A.L.C.,
New motor boat and a lifeboat. Other power boats broke down. Nevertheless, the embarkation, much hindered by the lop, proceeded satisfactorily. As further destroyers and sloops arrived, they were directed to lower their motor boats and whalers as this had not already been done, these boats were quite invaluable. About noon, the lop began to subside and with the rising tide conditions for embarkation very greatly improved, more boats were sent in and more boats floated off and matters were proceeding very well, when the gun at La Panne started to shell the beaches and foreshore with great accuracy. A certain number of light craft were sunk. The A.L.C. broke down and was towed away by a steamer, MOSQUITO, destroyers and sloops proceeded westward clear of the firing.
57/

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Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
31/5
Friday, 31st May (continued).
effective quantities direct from the beaches, and to use the special tows, ships lifeboats, power lifeboats and tugs, which were on passage from Ramsgate, and which had been ear-marked for lifting the final covering force.
In the afternoon, however, it was learned that the
Military plan had been changed, and that it was no longer possible for the original covering position, as planned, to be held by 4,000 troops who were then to withdraw to the beaches for embarkation by boat. Instead, it was learned that the
Eastern-most Division was to be withdrawn Westward from the
La Panne area, and that the special flight of boats was to be used to lift this force from the beaches. At the same time, the troops in the Bray and Malo sectors were being thinned out by movements Westward towards Dunkirk itself. This change of plan involved concentrating the special tows and the minesweepers - to which they were to transfer the troops - into the stretch opposite the beach between Bray and one mile East of La Panne, and also advancing the commencement of the operation by one hour. The risk of this change of plan was obvious as the boat tows were not in communication with the
Vice Admiral, and reliance had to be placed on the Minesweepers to inform and see that the escorting M.A.S.B. would shepherd the tows to the new positions. The minesweepers had anchored so as to serve as guiding marks, as had been explained to the
Naval Officers in each tow.
Apart from the special tow, a very large number of small power boats despatched, in most cases direct, from the
South East Ports, Newhaven to Sheerness, were arriving off the beaches, and compensated in a large measure for the heavy losses that had occurred amongst the original towing boats, whalers, cutters, lifeboats and ships' boats, which had
31MM
occurred on the beaches during the preceding 3 days.
On the La Panne beaches after 1600 very good progress was made. The piers of pontoons built by the Military the previous day were extremely useful, and were largely responsible for the rapid evacuation of troops. All the troops that could be found were embarked by midnight and ferried off to the ships. The local Beach-master (Captain R. Pim, R.N.V.R)
searched the adjacent beaches for stragglers at midnight, and was informed by a Staff Officer that no more troops would embark from the La Panne beaches, but would march to Dunkirk, as it was anticipated that these beaches would be shelled and probably be in German hands the following day. This, as it turned out, was a correct forecast. The Beach-master estimates that 5,000 men were lifted from the La Panne beaches during the evening and up to midnight.
62. At 1920 all ships in the fleets were informed by the Vice Admiral that the final evacuation of the B.E.F. was expedted on the night lst/2nd June, and that the evacuation of the French from Dunkirk and Malo beach would continue from
1st June by both British and French ships.
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Saturday, 1st June (continued).
proportion 50 per cent. British and 50 per cent. French. The plan was set in motion without incident until 2200, when it was reported that a number of towing craft and small boats were returning empty from the coast. All ships were warned to look out for these, and to force them back to their duty on the coast.
Subsequent investigation gives reason to believe that this defection was due to false information being passed between ships on the coast and believed to originate from a non-identified skoot.
77. Commander Maund proceeded to the mouth of the harbour in a motor boat commanded by a Dutch Naval Officer with a
Dutch naval crew and led all ships into harbour to their berths.
The Rear Admiral, Dover, was also afloat in a M.T.B. supervising traffic control.
By 2300 the night was very dark, sometimes as many as
6 or 7 vessels were entering the port of Dunkirk at once whilst yet others were leaving. All were without lights and displayed the highest degree of seamanship in these difficult and fateful circumstances.
78. At 2315 the S.N.O., Dunkirk, signalled: "Withdrawal now proceeding according to plan. Shall have certain reserves here tomorrow to assist French. Intend to complete evacuation.
tomorrow by midnight."
Remarks.
78A. The outstanding feature of the day was the series of events leading to the abandonment of daylight evacuation.
Increasing enemy air attack, which the R.A.F. were unable to smother with the means at their disposal, caused serious loss of ships, and continual interruption of embarkation on the beaches and in Dunkirk. Further, the sole remaining cross channel route was now under fairly heavy and accurate shore artillery fire.
In these circumstances it was apparent that continuation of the operation by day must cause losses of ships and personnel out of all proportion to the number of troops evacuated, and if persisted in, the momentum of evacuation would automatically and rapidly decrease.
79. Casualties to H.M. Ships on 1st June.
Trawler ARGYLLSHIRE sunk by torpedo from M.T.B. near
S. Buoy. Survivors taken off by MALABAR.
Trawler STELLA DORADO sunk by torpedo from M.T.B.
Survivors picked up by KINGSTON GALENA.
Minesweeper SALAMANDER attacked by enemy aircraft and hit at about 0850. Ship disabled but was able to return to
Dover under her own steam.
Personnel/

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Sunday, 2nd June (continued).
daylight hours enabled all transport resources to accumulate during the day and to be held available for a massed descent upon Dunkirk Harbour during the night. By making provision for increased pier and berthing parties and traffic controlled by motor boat in the harbour channels, it was hoped to berth all craft that were available between the hours of 2100/
2 and 0300/3.
The times of sailing of all vessels were adjusted so as to space them out over the evacuation period at Dunkirk, and allowance was made for a proportion failing to make the passage.
The French agreed to make their own arrangements for embarkation from the Dunkirk East Beach and the West Pier on the new outer harbour.
At. 1530 two R.A.F. Motor Boats, 243 and 270, left in company for Dunkirk carrying Commander J.C. Clouston and an augmented pier party. When off Gravelines attacks were made on the boats by eight Junkers 87 with machine guns and small bombs. No. 243 had a near miss which damaged her. For ten minutes No.270 carried on trying to avoid attacks. She then returned to No.243 but Commander Clouston who was in the water instructed 270 to proceed. Destroyers were instructed to look for survivors. Two were picked up only. One stated that he saw Commander Clouston dead in the water.
84. At 1030 an urgent request transmitted "en clair"
was received from Dunkirk for Hospital Ships as follows:-
"Wounded situation acute and Hospital Ships should enter during day. Geneva Convention will be honourably observed it is felt and that the enemy will refrain from attacking."
As this appeared to be the only way of evacuating the wounded, observing that the whole facilities of the port during the night evacuation hours would be required for fighting troops, it was decided to send two Hospital Ships. The WORTHING
sailed at 1300 and the PARIS at 1700. At 1440, the A/S Patrol was overheard on R/T reporting that the WORTHING was being bombed at a point about two-thirds of the way across the
Channel. She returned to United Kingdom reporting that she had been attacked by 12 Junkers. The attack caused no casualties, but plates were started and there was some superficial damage. She had to return to harbour to refuel before commencing another trip to Dunkirk.
At 1915 PARIS reported that she was bombed and badly damaged with engines useless, at the point where the WORTHING
had been attacked, and at 1947 she sent out an S.O.S. Tugs were sent to her assistance.
Thus the last attempt to evacuate the wounded by
Hospital Carrier from Dunkirk was brought to nought.
The PARIS subsequently sank shortly after midnight at W. buoy 10 miles off the French coast.
85./

CONFIDENTIAL.
153
Page 32.
151
152
4/6
150
its
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 31
it of
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
he
3/6
at
S
ed 33
h
Monday, 3rd June (continued).
d
93.
In the evening the Vice Admiral was informed by the
B.N.L.O. Marceau that it was estimated 30,000 French remained and that the French Admiralty agree that evacuation should be terminated that night if possible. Force used was to consist of 9 Personnel Vessels with one in reserve, 9 Destroyers
(maximum number available), 4 Paddle Minesweepers, 7 Fleet
Minesweepers, 9 Drifters, LOCUST, 2 Corvettes, 4 French
Destroyers and a number of organised motor boat flotillas including lifeboats from Ramsgate and Dover, together with a large number of French and Belgian fishing vessels. The lifting capacity of this force, if used to the full, was more than 30,000, but it was certain that the facilities within
Dunkirk could not permit more than about 25,000 to be embarked in the time available, and this number only if the French troops moved with the greatest rapidity at all points of embarkation. This point was impressed upon the French Liaison
Officers and a number of French officers and ratings added to the augmented pier parties which were despatched to Dunkirk at 2200 in advance of the evacuation force.
toots
94. The movements commenced according to plan. The weather conditions at Dunkirk, although favourable as regards ere tide were adverse with a north easterly wind tending to blow the
Personnel Vessels and Destroyers off the vital East Pier makin berthing difficult. The MANXMAN, the seventh Personnel Ship king to due to sail refused to sail, and her place was taken by the theless,
ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
power
4/6
or
Tuesday, 4th June.
tretch
00/2/6.
95. At midnight when the earlier vessels had commenced thin the return voyage fog was reported in mid-channel and off the cipally
Thanet coast and a number of ships had to anchor before entering harbour. The EXPRESS and SHIKARI were the last ships llery the to leave Dunkirk at 0318 and 0340 and carried approximately
1,000 troops and the British pier parties. Except for an air attack on SHIKARI this final passage was made without intere ruption by the enemy and though the fog made navigation r to extremely difficult it undoubtedly served to shield the Armada ne gun, from enemy aircraft.
German ceasing
96. When the count was taken later in the day it was ements ascertained that 27,000 troops had been evacuated as a result d as of the night's operation and Admiral Nord agreed that the operation should be considered as completed, observing that all anmunition at Dunkirk had been expended and that the olunteer numbers left behind were small consisting principally of noncombatant troops. This decision was agreed to by the French
1
Admiralty at 1100, and the operation Dynamo terminated by
Admiralty Message 1423/4.
97. It was realised that in all probability there might be a number of open boats, barges, etc. tsmouth, bout in the channel with troops on board. It was accr scided to inary/
have

153
CONFIDENTIAL,
Page 34.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
155
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
boats which never left the estuary and only one of their crews had been further afield than Ramsgate before. In spite of this fact perfect formation was maintained throughout the day and night under the control of a Sub-Lieutenant, R.N.V.R.
in command of the Unit and all orders were carried out with great diligence even under actual shell fire and aircraft attack.
103. The difficulties of passage from the United
Kingdom to the Flanders coast were great. With compasses of doubtful accuracy and no navigational instruments other than a lead pencil, once a boat lost contact with a main convoy the chances of making a correct landfall in the strong currents of the straits were slight. Many of the small craft had not even a compass, yet all who left the Flanders coast in safety managed to reach the English coast to refuel and the majority set off again to repeat the adventure.
Cases occurred, however, of boats attempting to enter Calais instead of Dunkirk, where they received a rousing reception from the Boche, and yet another case where the landfall was made between Gravelines and Calais and the Sub-Lieutenant in command landed, finding it necessary to shoot 2 German soldiers before leaving for his proper destination of Dunkirk.
Open boats of all kinds, from the naval cutters and whalers to seaside dinghies, were towed over from
England by the motor boats themselves or in special tows by tugs. Some of these pulling boats were manned by odd naval ratings as boat keepers, and others by soldiers off the beach.
One of the principal difficulties was to avoid fouling the motor boats' screws with painters and lines attached to all these pulling boats. Carley floats and infl: 1 motor inner tubes also played their part in carrying men from the beach to the motor boats.
104, Having reached the coast the business of ferrying from the water line to the offshore craft was by no means easy. Apart from the surf, which was usually experienced for some hours every day, derelict lorries, which had been abandoned below the high tide mark, proved a serious danger to boats. Another source of much trouble close inshore was the large amount of floating grass rope which various craft had used and lost in their rescue work, and numerous articles of military equipment such as great coass jettisoned during the evacuation. A great number of small power boats were put temporarily out of action by such ropes and garments fouling the screws, usually resulting in broaching to and being swamped while they were thus unmanageable.
The number of' soldiers taken off the beaches by motor boats cannot be estimated, One 35 ft. motor launch, however, ferried off 600 men to transports and carried 420
direct to England.
105. Of the pulling boats used, the main difficulty was insufficient provision made for Naval boat keepers to take charge of the outgoing boats and bring them back to the disembarkation points. As a result, the soldiers detailed to act as boat keepers for an outward trip, failed to return the boat on the inward trip and it was necessary for the
Naval boat keepers to swim or to wade out to the drifting boats/

CONFIDENTIAL.
154
Page 35.
156
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Inshore Flotillæsand Naval Shore Parties (continued)
boats which had been cast away by the soldiers on disembarkation.
106. By the night of the 30th/31st a considerable number of collapsible boats and pontoons had been received from the Royal Engineers of the B.E.F. These were of great assistance and paddled off about 10 men in each trip, but again, in spite of all efforts, in the vast majority of cases, the soldiers left these craft when they arrived at the offshore ship.
107. Much of the most meritorious work of lifting off the beaches was done by the offshore warships' own boats, who were tireless in their efforts. All small pulling boats and small power boats were lowered and were lent from ship to ship when their own parent ship left the coast to unload at a United Kingdom port. In addition, H.M. ships seized drifting and abandoned boats as opportunity offered and manned them up with boat keepers. Owing to the physical exhaustion of these boats' crews after hours of work, relief crews of stokers were frequently provided from amongst the many volunteers that came forth.
108. A typical example of dogged work by a ship's boat was afforded by the action of JAVELIN's and JAGUAR's boats off Bray beach in the afternoon of 28/5. When their two motor cutters and two whalers first grounded offshore they were rushed and swamped by soldiers. Order being restored the boats had to be baled out and the wet engines restarted, following which) 700 troops were embarked by these few boats in a short time during continuous bombing attacks.
109. Of the power boats available by far the most useful and suitable were the A.L.Cs., M.L.Cs. and the small type of R.N.L.I. life-boat. The high speed service motor boats such as DOLPHIN's and EXCELLENT's boats and the R.A.F.
Seaplane tenders proved unsuitable for work in shallow waters on a lee shore owing to the vulnerability of their propellers and rudders and their poor manoeuvring powers at low speeds.
110. Of the civilian manned craft one of the best performances was that of the London Fire Brigade fire float
MASSEY SHAW. All the volunteer crew were members of the
London Fire Brigade or Auxiliary Fire Service and succeeded in doing 4 round trips to the beaches in their well-found craft. In contrast to this performance and that also of the R.N.L.I. crews of the Ramsgate and Margate life-boats, who took their boats over to Dunkirk, no volunteers, except for the coxswain and engineer of the Dover life-boat, were forthcoming from the R.N.L.I. crews of the other life-boats, which were accordingly manned by R.N. crews. Also it must be noted that civilian craft of such flotillas as the Rye fishing fleet did not relish the idea of carrying out ferrying work off the Flanders coast. Fishing boats and pleasure boats from as far along the south coast as Brixham and
Dartmouth arrived at various times up to p.m. 30/5, but again the civilian crews were not prepared to proceed to Dunkirk.
Accordingly, the most suitable of such boats as could be manned by the Naval personnel available were taken up, but the remainder took no part in the operations.
111./

160
CONFIDENTIAL.
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158
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
A.L.C. 5 Report. East end of Bray beach 29th May.
"A slight surf, thrown up by the onshore wind, made beaching awkward, and the use of an anchor was essential
Owing to bad seamanship, A.L.C. 5 lost her anchor and warp at the first attempt at beaching, with the result that the craft rode on much farther than was intended or desirable.
She was immediately rushed on all sides by a wild, undisciplined mob of French soldiers, so many of whom got aboard that the boat was grounded; and it was only by the use of considerable amount of force that a sufficient number could be got overboard, so that the craft could be got off the beach.
Two very good anchors, one complete with a good long warp, were found in a derelict motor boat and these were used to replace the lost anchors before making a further trip.
The second attempt to embark French troops shewed that their undisciplined behaviour was likely to imperil the safety of the craft, and it was decided to proceed farther up the coast to La Panne where British troops were found.
These troops were ferried from the beach to one or other of the craft anchored offshore, at the rate of approximately 3 trips per hour."
A.L.C. 16. Report. 29th May.
"A.L.C. 16 was the first boat to be hoisted out, and proceeded straight inshore to the beach near Old Dunkir where she e vacuated British troops. After making some sever trips successfully, she was boarded by a mob of French soldiers, who overwhelmed the boat to such an extent that she became partially swamped, the starboard battery was flooded and both engines failed.
Eventually sufficient French were evicted to enabl
A.L.C. 16 to be floated off, and the port engine started.
A.L.C. 17. Report. 29th May.
"A.L.C. 17 was the fourth boat to be hoisted out, and followed A.L.C. 5 up the coast towards Bray. On approaching the beach she was promptly boarded by a crowd of French soldiers, who so overloaded the boat that she grounded. On the falling tide she was soon left high and dry, and remained stranded for some three hours.
In the meantime the Coxswain of A.L.C.17 procured the assistance of some British troops, who with fixed bayonets, drove off the French when these again attempted to rush the boat as the tide rose."
Wednesday, 29th May.
"Sono difficulty experienced through persistent attempts of large masses of French troops to intercept boa and demand passage. Assisted by British troops succeeded holding off French by means of rifle fire 50 yards further along the beach."

185
SECRET.
187
R.N. BARRACKS,
DEVONPORT,
2nd June 1940.
BASILISK
Sir,
I regret to have to report the loss ofcH.M.S.
"BASILISK" by enemy action at 1213 1st June 1940 off the Belgian coast. The circumstances are as follows.
2.
At about 0815 while embarking British troops off
A/C
LAPANNE I was attacked by a squadron of nine German JUNKERS
dive bombers. They=approached from astern and on sighting I went full speed ahead (3 boilers connected) and as the bombs were released turned hard to port. As far as I could judge each aircraft released a pattern of five bombs one being a large "B" type and four smaller bombs with slight delay action. One of the latter exploded at the after end of No.3 boiler room on the port side and piereed blew away the bulkhead, piercing both main and auxiliary steam lines and main oil fuel supply. All engine room and boiler room personnel were killed. About six of the "B" type bombs then exploded underneath the ship flooding the after magazine and shell room and probably the gland compartments and store rooms just forward of this position. The upper deck and sides of the ship cracked right across in the vicinity of the mainmast. This is a general line. of weakness in destroyers.
JUNEI
3.
In order to preserve stability the torpedoes and depth charges were jettisoned and the ship floated comfortably with little increase in draught. I inspected engine room and No.3
boiler room and found that a small amount of water was making its way through shrapnel holes. These were plugged and collision mat placed over the worst leaks. It was found impossible to get steam to the engines and the ship thereafter remained immobile.
4.
Efforts were now made to send out messages for assistance. A tug who had been attending on H.M.S. "KEITH" passed me a signal telling me to sink KEITH to which I replied that I
was out of action and required immediate assistance. I also requested him to inform The Flag Officer Commanding, Dover to this effect. Tug then disappeared. Signals for assistance were also made by W/T using type 4 H with battery power. It is doubtful whether any of these messages were received owing to very heavy traffic at the time and comparative weakness of my signals.
5.
A Belgian fishing smack under French colours was seen in the distance and the motor boat was despatched to summon her to our assistance. She was LE JOLIE MASCOTTE of CAEN and after some efforts a tow was passed and corse set to open from the coast
This had hardly been accomplished before a second attack devellopp at about 0945. This consisted of level bombing from about 000ft each bomber acting independently. About half a squadron of 18
carried out the attack. Considering the ship was & stationary target and there was little wind these attacks were poorly carri out and no bombs hit. This may have been due to pom pom fire of which Mr FRANCIS Gunner (T) was in charge. Unfortunately this gallant officer was killed at his post by machine gun bullets whic were fired continuously as the bombers passed overhead.

SECRET.
Bage 2.
186
188
June
6.
A second attempt was now made to tow the ship clear but little progress had been made before a third attack noon developped at about noon, carried out by a squadron of HENSCHEL?
dive bombers. By this time nearly all ammunition was expended and the 4.7" guns were firing S.A.P. in the hope of keeping the enemy at a distance. The Germans, however, made a determined diving attack which was well pressed home to about 400 feet.
The ship was completely smothered by hits and near misses some of which were of the "B" bomb type. The ship immediately began to settle and I gave the order to abandon ship. Thanks to the adequate preparations made by my First Lieutenant, Lieutenant-
Commander W.G.BOAKS, R.N., there were plenty of boats and carley floats ready for survivors. After collecting all stray swimmers the boats and floats pulled out to sea. LE JOLIE MASCOTTE
picked up 6 officers and 71 ratings and H.M.S. "WHITEHALL" 2
officers and 52 ratings. One whaler and the motor boat had proceeded too far over the shoals which run parallel to the coast for H.M.S. "WHITEHALL" to pick them up.
noon
Sunk
7.
H.M.S. 'BASILISK" sank in about 4 fathoms of water in approximate position with her upper deck awash. Although the Asdic and V.C.-V.F.
gear and all important documents had been destroyed I was anxious to complete the destruction of the vessel. Accordingly
I requested the Captain of H.M.S. "WHITEHALL" to fire guns and torpedoes. This was done and the ship was left on fire forward.
It is not certain whether any of the torpedoes hit and I
consider further destruction advisable. I intimated this in a signal timed 2036/1 to the Flag Officer Commanding Dover despatched as a secret hand message.
8.
When the ship was rendered immobile after the first attack I ordered the destruction of all Signal
Publications except the Fleet Signal Book bridge copy, Syko machine and current naval Syko card. This was done by Sub-
Lieutenant W.H.ELLIS, R.N. who burnt them in the two galleys.
All Confidential Books prefixed '0' were dumped overboard in a weighted sack except those out on loan to officers as these could not be got at due to damage aft. The Asdic gear in the cabinet and on the bridge was dismantled where possible and thrown overboard and the remainder smashed. The oscillator was removed and brought on the upper deck amidships as the final attack developped. It is not known for certain whether the oscillator slid overboard when the ship sank. V.C.-V.F. lanterns were unshipped and thrown overboard.
9.
The following books and documents were left on the bridge: C.B. 1618 Q and certain charge documents in the
Captain's springback and the Fleet Signal Book. The bridge was burning fiercely when last seen and it can be confidently stated that these documents and papers were destroyed.
10.
I would like to emphasise that the older destroyers with pom poms using belted ammunition and 4.7" guns with only 30 degrees elevation are no match for a determined air attack. OurcLewis guns had also been recently surrendered.
When ships of this type are operating within range of enemy air attack losses must be expected unless adequate fighter protection is afforded. In all the enemy launched four big air attacks at about hourly intervals during the forenoon of the 1st June. The first, second and fourth of these were unopposed apparently unopposed by any British Aircraft

Ed into the long allisk
1. Lieut. E. Treweeks.
192
When we were bombed I was taking cover in after
194
lobby, then proceeded to E.R. hatch but could not get below because of steam, was joined by C. Sto. Ricketts and C.E.R.A.,
Westlake, gave orders to shut off all boiler room emergency valves and then safety valves and shut main steam bulkhead valve on deck. As soon as possible E. Room and after boiler room were entered.
Attention first given to casualties but all bar one were dead.
First thought possible to get some part of machinery going but not possible. Concentrated on leaks. Bomb dropped port fore side E.R. bulkhead and stove in boiler room bulkhead.
Disabling port fan, engine, oil full pump, number three boiler, port circulator, main and reserve feed tanks and all pipes and leads adjacent were pierced and broken.
Leak at after end of E.R. oil fulo tank plugged.
Efforts made to run petrol dynamo for WD/T but the magneto connection broke. Hands were told off to get hand steering in use. P.O. of fore boiler room reported no damage after first.
raid although C. Sto. reported oil suction line pierced and shut off.
2. Sub. Lieut. Jeaves.
During the first attack I was on the bridge as
Officer of the Watch and remained there for some time afterwards while the Captain went off to the engine and boiler rooms.
On the Captain's orders I went aft to the after steering compartment to see whether it was possible to steer by hand.
This was so, and leaving a Leading Stoker and two or three hands I returned to the bridge as the ship was being taken in tow.
When the second attack took place I WAS in the fore and aft passage below the wheelhouse-for some time and eventually went into the Petty Officers' Mess to try and assist the foremost supply party.
After the attack, on the First Lieutenant's orders,
I placed charts in the whaler and a small private motor boat and unshipped the steering compass from the wheelhouse, end put it in the whaler. I then went aft to continue connecting up to steer by hand. To do this it was necessary to clear a good deal of gear out of the compartment. This took about half an hour. By this time another attempt was being made to take the ship in tow, so 1 recovered the charts from the motor boat, and went up on the bridge.
When the ship was attacked for the third time I again went down to the fore and aft passage beneath the wheelhouse, where I stayed till the order Bandon ship was given. of the two charts containing confidential matter concerning minefields in the Dover area, one was destroyed and the other left in the whaler which has not yet returned.
The Fleet notices to Marines were thrown overboard in mid-channel. Fleet charts were left in their folios in the
Charthouse.

Page 3.
194
Teut. car. W.G. Boaks.
BASILISK
196
4.
With after guns until motor boat lowered and then went forward to make quite sure coxswain of boat (Hicks) understood his orders reference embarking troops and collection of drifting boats, Just as we got the baat clear I heard a bomb whistling down and dived under Pom-Pom platform. About six, possibly more, bombs dropped, one of which was presumably the one that went through the engine room -- this very seriously wounded and burnt one rating and seriously burnt another but I escaped the full force of the back flash although thrown heavily against Pom-Pom deck overhead and almost knocked out.
I then went to the bridge to see what the position was there, but there were no casualties there and I then went aft to the after guns to find en route that deck was buckled by mainmast.
The after magazine and shell room were flooding and decided to close down. I then went down to my cabin and passed up about eight spare torches (placed there for use in disembarking troops previous day are night) as all lights were out and being daylight few were carrying torches on them. I found general chaos in Captain's Cabin flat and sent extra hands down to resecure deadlights as this compartment being next to the buckled part was rather important.
I then went forward to supervise tow forward. In the midst of this another heavy attack was made and most hands took shelter, some in forecastle locker. I then found all but three of the cordite rounds from "A" gun had been jettisoned and in view of the nature of the attack ordered these three to be thrown overboard. After this attack we came out and then started to provide cordite again. I then went aft to see what damage had been done during which the fishing drifter returned and I again went forward to rig new tow lines and also ordered individual hands to turn out and lower boats and carley floats into water as by then it was known ship could not move and drifter could not have towed faster than say four knots, I also placed one hand with a lead line aft to keep check on amount of water ship was in from point of view of grounding and stationed hands ready to cast off boats' painters should ship sink without warning.
Then to the forecastle to get up the after hemp and also 3-3-11 wire during course of which the third attack developed and I went aft to the after guns and with one round of cordite from forward fired the remaining round in Y gun myself at a passing bomber but not enough aim off in field of view to hit even with full deflection. After firing this round I went forward and noticed that X gun had a round left but was unable to fire as recoil cylinder had been emptied in preparation for firing and tearing gun out of mounting overboard. This cylinder was refilled but on going forward I discovered that the crack in deck appeared to have widened and gave orders that after guns were on no account to be fired in view of probable breaking off of after end. I then ordered every possible container of water to be filled from only remaining water left in hot water tank in galley and tore up soldiers ground capes to provide covers to prevent loss or contamination of this water. Boats' anchors were then placed in spare boats alongside and oars provided, sailing gear hi placed in whaler, after steering compass unshipped and placed in spare motor boat, torches distributed to boats, the after lifebuoy flare placed in whaler for possible use. After steering an party detailed and party to clear the flat of weeckage. I then que went forward for third time to take in tow during which the fourth attack developed - dive bombing - and upper deck was cleared.

105
4. (contd.).
197
On completion when ship had been struck and water was level with waist the question of scuttling ship came up but
Captain decided this was unnecessary and order was given to abandon ship. I reached one of the spare Army boats two hundred yeard away and after collecting survivors to limit of boats capacity went to drifter. After collecting all but two floats we went off to head off a destroyer for the remainder.
Particular merit:-
A.B. Rawstron - courage, example & cheerfulness.
A.B:s Glover and Ord. Sea Mullins - courage & cheerfulness.
P.O. Robinson took charge well on forecastle,
A.B. Davis. Torp. although badly burned took a lively interest in remaining action taken.
Lieut. Sowry - for tenacity of purpose with French drifter resulting in the recovery of seventy survivors and message passed to destroyer for remaining fifty,
5. Surg. Lieut. A.W. McHaffie.
1st. Attack, In Sick Bay - which was reduced to chaos from concussions. Casualties arrived after attack.
Soldier compaining of burns of arms.
Stocker complaining of burns of face.
2xStanker Terpedoman complaining of extensive surface burns of face, scalp, neck and both eyes.
Another rating complained of splinter wound of left arm.
L.S.B.A. reported A.B. Riddle lying under Pom-Pom platform. When
I arráved there I found him complaining of fracture of left femur and very extensive burns of face and shoulders - Dressed him and then went down into engine room where I saw two ERA's dead.
Griffeths & Griffeths& Putt (stoker) was also dead.
L.S.B.A. reported four dead in boiler room,
2nd. attack. Ordered to clear upper deck - and I went to port side alley way. Saw Mr. Francis of Pom-Pom platform and one rating. He called for rest of crew and I passed on call to ratings in fore mess deck. No hands came forward. Saw Captain climbing on to platform followed by rest of crew. Was called by
Captain to attend to Mr. Francis and I went on to Pom-Pom platform and found Mr. Francis unconscious - splinter through lungs. Gave
1/6th. morphine.
3rd. attack. Was still on Pom-Pom platform until shortly after attack when Mr. Francis died.
During interval between 3rd. and 4th. attacks.
Evacuated wounded into water boat lying in water amidships on starboard side. Was helped in this by L.S.B.A and Coxswain.
Orders to do so were given by First Lieutenant.
boat
4th. attack. Most of #crew of motor, boarded ship including all wounded except A.B. Riddle who was comatose and lying in
Robertson stretcher c. me on forecastle of motor boat - two ratings remained in boat.
Bomb hit water 10 yards off motor boat and wave upset and smashed boat against ship's side upsetting all within - Riddle disappeared before I could get to him and I lost sight of other menbers of boat's crew.
Ship by this time was being abandoned.

page 5.
198
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
196
6.
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though ship was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with it, ordering a torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off during attack. Complete jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S Pannel. Was ordered by 1st. Lieut. to load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned, threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
7.
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the bridge on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F - load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60° and at no time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were passing 1/2 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. A wire was passed and made fast round a stout beam in the smack, which carried away some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongside the forecastle bows pointing aft. At this point second bombing attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile, the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to taking up the slack too väolently. This was due to the language difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the only other man on board the smack being an R.A.F. pilot. A
further bombing attack started, the final one, and I again stood off from the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship and I picked up all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and some men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men aboard, Whitehall appeared in the distance and we made out to intercept her, using the smack's siren and the French ensign half way up the foremast. We met her about 12 miles away and passed information to her and requested her to collect men from remaining boats. I then set out on a course for England and in mid-chai.nel we transferred everyone to H.M. Trawler Olvina.

Page 6.
197
Leading Seaman Wordhouse.
Motor hoat.
199
Whilst pushing the towing vessel into position, the bombing formation came over. I let go and sheered off, the first salvo lifting the boat almost out of the water.
Messerschmidt fighters attacked us with machine gun and cannon (Bombs were also dropped) for just a few minutes short of an hour. L.S. Hicks watched their flight and gave me helm and engine orders, the boat not being hit though a couple of cartridge cases dropped into us. We found ourselves out of sight of the ship, had a little council of war, and decided, knowing the ship was out of wireless communication to make Dunkirk for help. We headed west, and not far outside the harbour two troopships were bombed and sunk. We picked up what we considered a safe complement, tried to get in touch with a vessel to assist Basilisk.
In this were not successful and were told to make England.
We drew a rough chart and set our course, arraving
Ramsgate roughly eight hours later. I then turned over the boat to the Naval authorities. We reported that Basilisk was badly hit and were assured that help had been sent.

219
217
SECRET.
Appendix II. to report of sinking of H.M.S. GRENADE.
After the explosion aft I observed a large number of ratings blown into the oily water, several of whom were badly injured. With the aid of the Gunner T. I cut away the lashing of the after Carley float and launched it. I
swam after the drifting float and with the mutual help of one or two ratings we hauled each other on board. I then collected the seriously injured and one or two uninjured men.
The First Lieutenant was heard to order men to to remain in the ship and I took the float back to the ship collecting a steward en route. The ship lurched heavily to port as I reached the side and since the forecastle was blazing I ordered the raft to stand off. At this juncture another rating was observed in a patch of oil fuel about 40
yards from the ship. I rescued this man with the float and took in tow a T.S.D.S. float which was supporting two P.Os who had since abandoned ship. Two destroyers and two trawler passed without stopping and a French tug landed our party on the west side of the docks amid the blazing ruins. An ambulance picked up our party and proceeded towards the heart of the town. When the ambulance stopped for more casmalties the party disembarked, and were forced to leave one seriously injured seaman (Coates) who WELE then taken to the base military hospital. At this point a lost Bren gun crew joined forces and the idea of escaping to England in a small boat was formulated.
I took the whole party, eight sailors and eight soldiers, and proceeded on the carrier to the docks.
A
gendarme prevented our embarkation in a drifter, the captain of which had signified his willingness to take us. We then proceeded on the carrier towards the eastern jetty, but our progress was halted by a blazing ammunition lorry. The commencement of intense aerial bombardment forced us to seek shelter in the vaults where Army officers and men provided us with dry clothing etc.
I then reported the Naval party to the S.N.O.
Dunkirque and after suggesting we remained in the town he gave the party full permission to seek a boat and sail to
England. We made our way towards the pier and P.O. Emery and myself became detached from the main party. In the course of a talk with a French soldier I discovered he possessed a motor boat with which he was desirous of escaping to England.
P.O. Emery sought out and brought along the remainder of the party, including the Bren gun crew and with P.O. Bennion managed to embark the whole party, with equipment, and against the wishes of the Frenchman. Then after considerable tactful persuasion and adjustment of top weight, plus the encouragement of casting off the painter, the engine was started and the bows pointed towards England at 21.00/29.
P.O. Bennion took the wheel and I shaped a course for the harbour mouth and channel buoys. After darkness fell
I checked my compass on the stars and found it had a variation of about 10° W. I.was then able to set a course for the S.E.
coast of England. All lights were extinguished outside the small cabin and most of the party fell asleep after having eaten a little food. The boat was well equipped with fuel and stores and the small engine gave us an estimated speed of five knots.

-2-
was stopped to other engined
The trip allow across a German was diesel uneventful. The
Several passed one destroyers floating At 03.30 and mine the which engine craft I decided stopped passed to us, leave while we time two drifters hove in sight. I decided to hail th untouched. and about the drifter because I was uncertain of my position, having chart or maps. The drifter altered course towards us took us aboard and the boat in tow. I found my positi to be about 15 miles S.E. of Ramsgate and I estimate the my course made good would have brought us to a point S.
Ramsgate (Deal?) at about 0800 on Thursday, May 30th.
P.O. Bennion remained at the wheel continuousl from 2100 to 0200 and with P.O. Emery brought the wounde seamen safely to the Naval base in spite of attempts by the Army to claim him as a casualty. The two P.O's mentioned carried out all duties with precision and showe great initiative in the handling of the situation. The behavious of the naval party was exemplary and their unflagging energy and support enabled us to escape and at the same time bring eight English and two French soldiers safely to England.
(Sgd) Reginald J. Crews.
5.6.40.

222
220
Page 3.
OPERATION "DYNAMO" - PRELIMINAT REPORT OF PROCENDINGS FOR
PERIOD 30TH MAY - 1ST JUNE, 1940.
(Commanding Officer, I.M.S. "Keith's" No.4/32 of 15th June 1940)
29. At 1703 the ship was attached by enemy dive bombing 31/5
X
aircraft, which were engaged by the 3" П.А. and pom poms. One aircraft was shot down by the port pom pom and two other enemy machines were seen to crash, probably due to our fighters.
30. At 1716 a bomb dropped close on the port quarter and the aircraft was engaged by H.A. armament.
31. At 1730 six enemy Messerschmitt aircraft were observed attacking three friendly Hudson reconnaissance aircraft. The attack dispersed after "Keith" opened fire with 3" H.A. sun.
32. At 1815 "Keith" arrived off La Panne to find that the anchorage was under fire from a gun or guns situated near
Nieuport. Its location could not be seen but an enemy observation balloon was observed.
33. At 1835 "Keith" proceeded Westwards again until at
1845, when between La Panne and Braye, signalling was seen from the beach informing us that the General Headquartero were there awaiting embarkation. The motor boat and starboard whaler were lowered and proceeded inshore. At 1908 the first boat load were aboard. Lord Gort, the Commander-in-Chief, went to H.M.S.
31
"Hebe" in a yacht. Our boats returned inshore for other officer
34. At 1910 about 80 enemy aircraft were sighted coming over and "Keith" circled in the constricted space at high speed engaging the enemy with 3" H.A. The enemy however proceeded in the direction of Dunkirk. At 1927 large numbers of enemy aircraft again appeared overhead on their way back to enemy territory.
35. At 1937 an enemy high level bomber attacked "Keith"
dropping four bombs without result. This aireraft was engaged by 3" H.A. and pom pom: the ship was again circling.
36. At 1942 the boats returned from the beach with their second load of Staff officers and was sent back for the remaining men.
37. At 2005 a further large number of enemy bombers and fighters were seen overhead and the ship engaged them with H.A.
armament. On this occasion, a few bombs were dropped near the ship and one aircraft attacked the boats inshore, narrowly missing them. At 2016 the boats returned to the ships and were hoisted. At 2018 "Keith" proceeded towards Dunkirk. The dunes and beaches near La Panne were at this time under steady artillery fire.
May
38. At 2120 "Keith" was off Dunkirk passing orders to boats tugs and yachts as to their duties.
39. At 2125 she proceeded Bastwards again and at 2140 was off Braye where she remained for some time marshalling small craft.
40. At 2310 "Keith" proceeded to La Panne where at 0015/1
after laying off, she anchored.

223
221
OPERATION "DYNAMO" - PRELIMINARY REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS FOR
Page 4.
PERIOD 30TH MAY - 1ST JUNE, 1940.
(Commandi ng Officer, H.M.S. "Keith's" No.4/32 of 15th June '40
41. During the hours between 2200 and midnight, several enemy aircraft passed overhead and, as reported later, dropped magnetic mines to the West of La Panne and off Braye.
La Panne anchorage was under shell fire from Nieuport of La
Caxide and this became more accurate as time passed.
"Vivacious" vas hit twice and proceeded to the Westward.
42. At 0030/1 June, "Kei th" weighed anchor and proceeded 1/6
at slow speed towards Braye, which the enemy artillery were now reaching. At 0206, the ship was off Braye.
43. At 0510 ten enemy fighters fired on the shore beaches and on "Keith" and other ships with bursts of machine gun fire, which was inaccurate.
44. At 0520 shells from shore batteries again fell close to the ship off Braye.
June
45. At 0555 onemy bomber aircraft were engaged with 4.7"
X
barrage and pom pom fire. Only two rounds of H.A. ammunition now remained and about 100 rounds of pom pom.
46. At 0630 "Keith" was standing off between Braye and
La Panne superintending the departure of ships with men collected from the beaches during the night.
47. At 0737, a very large number of enemy dive bombing, heavy bombing and fighter aircraft were sighted approaching.
"Keith", circling rapidly round a wreck, was attacked by
Junker 87 dive bombers which carried out extremely vertical dives and released five bombs each. The ship however was not hit but a near miss, probably of a delayed action bomb, jammed the steering gear.
The enemy were engaged with pom pom and lewis guns.
The ship manoeuvred by engines until shortly afterwards she was under control in hand steering aft.
"Keith" continued to circle at speed as enemy aircraf were continually in sight.
1/6, 0805
NOTE: Times from now forward cannot be vouched for.
48. At about 0805, further numerous dive bombing attacks took place on "Keith", a salvo of which straddled the ship.
One bomb set No.2 boiler room on fire and caused severe flooding there. Lieutenant (E) Kenward, Royal Navy, and the boiler room's crew perished in this fire. The ship began to list heavily to port until eventually her upper deck was touch:
ing the water.
The torpedoes were fired with no range on and depth charges were set to safe and thrown or fired overboard due to the danger from further aircraft attacks. The ship now had no steam and had anchored.
49. An M.T.B. came alongside and took off Rear Admiral
Dover and his Staff.
undamaged
50. The Port whaler, the only/boat remaining, was lowered and all carley floats secured to it. A considerable quantity of timber was collected and thrown overboard.

SECRET
PAGE 3. 225
H.M.S. "KEITH" - FINAL REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 30th MAY - 227
1st JUNE, 1940, WITH HER EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION.
(Captain Berthon's No.31 of 1st July to Vice-Admiral,1 Dover)
22.
Six enemy Messerschmidt aircraft were observed at
1730 attacking three British Hudson reconnaissance aircraft.
The attack dispersed after "Keith" opened fire with 3" H.A.
gun.
23.
At 1815 "Keith" arrived off La Panne to find that the anchorage was under shell fire from a gun or guns situated near Nieuport. The location of the battery could not be established but an enemy observation balloon observed to the eastward was immediately hauled down by the enemy on the approach of our fighter aircraft.
24. "Keith" resumed course to the westward at 1835 until at 1845, when between La Panne and Braye, signalling was observed from the beach informing us that the Army G.H.Q.Staff was there awaiting embarkation. The motor boat and starboard whaler were lowered and proceeded inshore.
25. At 1908 the first boat load of the staff was onboard.
Lord Gort, the Commander-in-Chief, went to H.M.S. "Hebe" in a yacht. Our boats returned inshore for other officers.
26. At 1910 about 80 enemy bombing aircraft were sighted coming over and "Keith" circled in the constricted space at high speed, engaging the enemy with 3" H.A. The enemy however carried on to Dunkirk.
31/5
27.
A large number of enemy aircraft again appeared overhead at 1927 on their way back to enemy territory. At
31/5
1937 an enemy high level bomber attacked "Keith", dropping four bombs without result. This aircraft was engaged by
3" H.A. and pom-pom, the ship again circling.
28. "Keith's" boats returned from the beach at 1942
with their second load of staff officers and were sent back for the remaining men.
29. At 2005 a further large number of enemy bombing aircraft were sighted overhead and the ship engaged them with the H.A. armament. On this occasion a few bombs were dropped near the ship and one aircraft attacked the boats inshore narrowly missing them.
30. At 2016 the boats returned to the ship with the last load of the Army staff and were hoisted. "Keith" then proceeded towards Dunkirk. The dunes and beaches near La
Panne were at this time under steady shell fire.
31. "Keith" was off Dunkirk at 2120 passing orders to boats, tugs and yachts as to their duties. At 2125 she continued to the eastwards and at 2140 was off Braye where she remained for some time marshalling boats and small craft.
32. At 2310 "Keith" proceeded to La Panne where she anchored at 0015 after lying off for a short period. Between
2200 and midnight several enemy aircraft passed overhead and, as was reported later dropped magnetic mines to the west of
La Panne and off Braye.
reduced 33. to 2 rounds of 3" H.A. ammunition and 150 rounds of
After the air attacks of the day the ship was now
X
pom-pom per gun. This shortage was represented to the
Admiral in view of the certainty of further attacks on the following day.
...34.
La Panne anchorage

226
SECRET
PAGE 5.
H.M.S. "KEITH" FINAL REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 30th MAY -
228
1st JUNE, 1940, WITH HER EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION.
(Captain Berthon's No.31 of 1st July, 1940 to V.A. Dover.)
44. At about 0750 on 1st June a further heavy dive-
/
June bombing attack was launched on "Keith" by the same type of aircraft. A salvo of bombs from one ai rcraft straddled the ship. A near miss or hit on the starboard side made a large hole in the ship's side at the forward end of the
Engine Room below the waterline and the same, or another, bomb burst the bulkhead between the Engine Room and the after
Boiler Room on the same side. The Engine Room was instantly flooded and the controls wrecked and the after Boiler Room flooded very shortly afterwards; a bomb may have gone down the funnel as the after Boiler Room caught fire. Steam was gradually lost and the ship came slowly to rest.
45. Lieutenant (E) William Henry Kenward R.N. was knocked off the control platform of the Engine Room by the explosion and killed, as were several other men in the Engine
Room and after Boiler Room.
46. It is thought that there must also have been serious damage to the hull on the port side as the ship at once took up a heavy list to port and this gradually increased until the upper deck was within a few inches of the water. Spectators in ships nearby reported at least two direct hits in this attack on "Keith".
47. Torpedoes were fired with no range on and all depth charges jettisoned, set to safe, due to the danger from further aircraft attacks.
48. Signal and wireless books were then jettisoned in safes and all secret charts were jettisoned in a weighted chart container. Confidential folios were locked in a drawer with the exception of folio H for which there was no space. This was thrown overboard with Fleet Notices to
Mariners in weighted Guard Boards. Telegraph charts ware in the locked drawer with the current Z chart.
49. During this time an M.T.B. came alongside and took off Rear Admiral Dover and his staff, who returned to Dover.
50. Main W/T aerials were blown down in this attack and efforts were made to repair them. All boats on the starboard side were holed by near misses. The port whaler was lowered and all carley floats were got out and secured to it. A
considerable quantity of timber was collected and thrown overboard.
51. As the ship was settling the order to abandon ship was given and the majority of the men, who were able to find timber to hold on to or a place in the boat and floats, left the ship.
series
52. At this moment the enemy launched a further ****** of dive bombing attacks without hitting the ship but several near misses again shook her. Some of these bombs landed amongst the men in the water.
53.
The enemy was

231
22)
- 2 -
dark, butphosphorescence was very pronounced.
28/5
12. Twelve knots was maintained while in the narrow channels and every time the sound of aircraft engines was heard speed was reduced to slow to reduce wake.
13. I felt that it was very probable that some form of attack would be made near the Kwinte Whistle Buoy and five miles before reaching it speed was increased to 20 knots and a zig-zag of 40 degrees every four minutes was started. All guns crews and bridge personnel were lookout. warned and were keyed up and were keeping a specially good
14. At 0045 (Wednesday, 29th May) when the ship was two cables
29/0045
rest of the Kwinte Whistle Buoy, two parallel torpedo tracks about
30 yards apart one slightly ahead of the other were seen approaching
150 yards away on the starboard bow. They appeared to be running practically on the surface and the tracks were very bright with phosphorescence. No survivor can say what fired them, but it is evident from subsequent events that they were fired by a motor torpedo boat which was probably lying stopped close to the buoy.
15. The wheel was put hard a port and the ship swung sufficiently to cause one to miss ahead. The other hit in the forward boiler room.
The ship broke in half and the two portions sank within about 15
seconds, each remaining standing with its midship end on the bottom and the bow and stern standing about 60 feet above the water.
16. All Signal Publications were in the W/T Office and must have gone down with the ship. The following secret documents were on the chart table and may possibly have floated to the surface:-
Chart in use on which Dover Strait minefields were lightly marked,
Current table of lettered positions.
ficer remained on the stern portion. All the troops were asleep
17. Most of the guns' crows floated clear and thirty men and an
Delow and went down with the ship except one, and all H.M.S. "wakeful's"
engine room department except one or two were lost. I floated clear fhe bridge.
"Comfort" came on the scene and started to pick up those still swimming.
18. After about half an hour the motor drifters "Nautilus" and
Nautilus" picked up six and "Comfort" 16 including myself.
bout fifteen.
M.S. "Gossamer" arrived soon after and lowered boats which picked up re way with the tide after cruising around for about half an hour
19. The swimmers and rescue ships had drifted some distance the houting clinging "Comfort" to go back to the wreck to take off the stern while "Nautilus" carried on to Dunkirk.
n we got there the stern had fallen over and many men were shouting hit reck and I went alongside the former's starboard quarter to warn her the water. H.M. Ships "Grafton" and "Lydd" were close to the ore at she was in danger of being torpedoed. At that moment (0250) a an orpedomentarily swamped and as she bobbed to the surface again I was in the wardroom and the "Comfort" was lifted in the air, que al the full speed ahoad with no-one on deck I soon had to
I was able to grab a rope's end, but as the
O
S1
th H.M.S. "Lydd" and H.M.S. "Grafton" opened a heavy fire on her with
20. The "Comfort" then came round to a wide circle and suddenly

232
230
- 3 -
Lewis guns and, I think, four inch. I realised that they very naturally thought she was enemy and kept under water as much as possible when the bullets were coming near me.
21. I understand that all the "Comfort's" crew except one and all H.M.S. "Wakeful's" survivors onboard her except four were killed during this affray. of these four, two were later found wounded in the "Comfort's" skiff and picked up. Sub-Lieutenant
Percival-Jones is known to have been amongst those killed.
22. The firing ceased and I awam to the "Comfort" which had stopped engines and was drifting towards me slowly. As I reached her bow and was feeling for a rope's end, H.M.S. "Lydd" bore down on her at full speed and rammed her amidships on the opposite side, outting her in half.
23. I was submerged but came to the surface after an interval and swam about till about 0515 when I was picked up by a boat from the Norwegian ship "Hird" carrying 3000 troops from Dunkirk.
24. I very much hope that some expression of Their Lordships'
appreciation can be sent to the widow of Mr Tucker, Warrant Engineer, on whose high zeal, efficiency and sense of duty I have previously reported to the Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches, and who dealt personally with a burst auxiliary steam pipe at the time of the bomb damage on May 29th. He was unhappily killed with practically the whole of his staff when the ship was torpedoed.
Royal Naval Barracks, Chatham.
25. The list of casualties has been reported by the Commodore,
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
VICE ADMIR
1- JUN 1940
Richer re
DOVER
COMMANDER, ROYAL NAVY.
r
The Vice Admiral, Dover hi
(Copies to:- The Commander-in-Chief, The Nore.
The Commodore, R.N. Barracks, Chatham.
The Admiral Commanding Western Approaches.
an
Captain (D) Plymouth.)
al
O
si

234
222
REPORT ON THE LOSS OF H.M.S. SKIPJACK, 1st JUNE 1940. 0845
(1).
Skipjack anchored at 0030 on June 1st, 1940 off La Panne.
She had only one serviceable small boat and that had no rudder. the ghinle boats having been left behind off Dunkirk
B22/
B22/112
233
221
16, Staunton Road,
Headington,
Oxford.
51
4th June 1940.
Sir,
I beg to submit the following report on the loss of H.M.S. Skipjack under my command on the 1st June last.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
Lieutenant Commander,
(retired)
Royal Navy.
The Vice Admiral
Commanding
VICE ADMIRAL
5- JUN 1940
*
Dover.
DOVER

234
REPORT ON THE LOSS OF H.M.S. SKIPJACK, 1st JUNE 1940. 0845 222
(1).
Skipjack anchored at 0030 on June 1st, 1940 off La Panne.
She had only one serviceable small boat and that had no rudder, the ship's boats having been left behind off Dunkirk on a previous trip.
Puler 52
(2).
It was understood that embarkation of troops would commence at once in boats believed to be organised by the Army and beach parties ashore. No boats, however, arrived.
(3).
During the time Skipjack was anchored off La Panne there was considerable enemy air activity, one parashutemine being dropped about one cable inshore from the ship. There was some shelling.
(4).
At break of dawn about 0330 it was decided to weigh and
1/6
endeavour to pick up and man any derelict boats that could be found. Skipjack, therefore, set a course to the westward and managed to secure three boats; some troops were also picked up. As several of H.M. ships were in the vicinity, course was continued to opposite a point on the beach about one mile to the eastward of Dunkirk, where there was only one small skoot operating. The boats were then sent inshore and the embarkation of troops commenced. The ship was kept under weigh owing to considerable enemy air activity.
(5).
From this time onwards, thought to be about 0530, there were continued enemy bombing attacks. Several W/T messages were transmitted asking for fighter assistance. Except for one period of about 5 minutes no fighters were seen.
(6).
At about 0600 a derelict motor launch was got in working order and embarkation of troops continued apace.
P.T.O.

-2-
252
254
The Skipper went over the side between "Nautilus" and
"Greyhound" to rescue seaman who had fallen into the ditch.
The "Greyhound" had to be taken in tow by a Polish
Destroyer and we arrived back in Dover at 0430 on Thursday the
30th May, 1940.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Drfelling
Lieutenant R.N.R.
my.ked hilitary
:- 4 then killed / Office a nt men mounded.
tamage to the ship was rus tained as foll
/. 55. coils severed
2. wo life loats badly holed
3- Boat back hiered Partside
4. are quetilator holed and Duady minor defects a wining etc

822/ 1110 13"2
253
255
No. 3102/212.
FROM:-
Naval Officer in Charge, Ramsgate.
DATE:-
4th June 1940.
TO:-
Flag Officer Commanding Dover.
73
LOSS OF H.M.S. "KING ORRY"
In forwarding the attached report by Commander a
J. Elliott RD., R.N.R., Commanding Officer of H.M.S.
"KING ORRY", I desire to bring to your notice that
Commander Elliott landed here on 30th May, after his vessel had been sunk at Dunkirk.
2.
He then expressed a desire to assist at this Base.
After 24 hours stand-off he turned to on Pier duty on the
East Pier, assisting in the handling of craft as they came alongside with troops.
3.
When the hospital ship "PARIS" was damaged, he proceeded out in charge of the two tugs "SUN IV" and "SUN XV
to render assistance. "PARIS" was found without crew and a line was put on board. Both tugs were subjected to machine gun fire. At about 0200 on 3rd June, the tow was abandoned and both tugs returned to this Base at 0600.
4.
Commander Elliott has now been sent on leave p.m.
4th June - to his home address.
VICE ADMIRAL
5- JUN T 1940
#
CAPTAIN.
DOVER
R
NAVAL OFFICER IN CHARGE
RAMSGATE.
my kings my:- one V.U and + seamen wounded history
:- 4 here killed / Officer and nt men wounded.
tomage of was rus tained as follows
/. 55. coils severed
2. Two life loats badly holed
3- Boat back meried Parside
4. are questilator holed and Auady minor depects to wining etc

254
1342
FROM:- Commander J. Elliott, R.N.R.
256
DATE:- 4th June 1940.
TO:- V.A. Dover.
KING ORRY
Sir,
I beg to report as follows on the loss of H.M.S.
"KING ORRY".
Proceeding in accordance with your orders on the afternoon of the 29th May, I arrived in Dunkirk Roads at
730.
The voyage was without incident.
On rounding No. 6 Buoy and approaching Dunkirk it was evident that considerable aerial activity was in progress, and one of H.M. Destroyers appeared to be making a smoke screen.
29/5
I proceeded along the channel and was subjected to a direct attack from a dive bomber when about half a mile
West of the West Breakwater end. Six bombs straddled the bow - two to Port and four to Starboard. My thought at that moment was that we were fortunate to be missed, especially as two bombs bounced off the water on Port side - but as it happened, all the bombs exploded under water at the time the ship had passed into their zone.
This shook the ship convulsively, but as no damage was reported or seemed evident at the time, I proceeded towards the harbour.
There was a continuous attack on the harbour and vicinity in progress. Two ships were in sight sunk at the East Pier on the inner and outer sides and one of
H.M. Destroyers was burning furiously in the Western Basin.
A Drifter was alongside about half way down the East Pier.
There was no sign of anyone on the pier, nor was any boat moving in the harbour.
I now
The
"my:- one V.U and 4 seamen wounded hilitary
:- 4 here killed / Officer and nt men nounded.
tomage the Ship was rus tained as follows
/. 55. coils severed
2. Two life loats badly holed
3. Boot back hiered Patside
4. are rentilator boled and Duady minor depects to wining etc

- 2 -
king 01r257 257
I now endeavoured to get alongside the East Pier on inner side but failed to turn ship head out at first attempt owing to strong set away from the Pier, so I
drew off to try again. Unfortunately at this time we again came under heavy bombing attacks, which appeared at the time to be continuous. The ship was violently 29/5
shaken and the steering gear was put out of action. All instruments, woodwork, etc. were shattered.
It seemed essential to get the ship alongside the
75
quay and this I proceeded to do, but in closing the pier damaged same considerably. I do not think the structure could have been very strong as no damage was done to the ship, and my impression was that the ship merely pushed hard - there was no shock or rebound whatever.
We were now attacked again but no direct hits were made - bombs falling so close, however, as to give the impression of direct hits, especially as various debris flew up at every explosion.
I now resolved to secure the ship and shelter the crew ashore till we could examine the damage under cover of darkness. An immediate withdrawal from the harbour did not seem practicable without steering gear. Even although the engine room was intact it would take some little time to discover all damage, and I was not at all confident from previous experience that the ship with her small propellers would manoeuvre with engines alone in a tideway in the narrow waters, and might become a serious obstruction if she grounded.
Having secured the ship by the bow I made along the quay towards the drifter and placing the wounded in her, stood by for a short while, noting developments. But as the attack had ceased I returned to the ship and prepared to repair the steering gear, etc.
A Naval Commander from Headquarters ashore now came along and I consulted with him as to general position and as to steps to be taken if it were found necessary to leave the ship.
An examination of the ship showed that she was holed below the water line forward in two or three places and aft in the starboard Firemen's sleeping quarters. But
Ph this damage thes:-
my kingdomy one V.U and 4 seamen wounded hilditary
:- 4 knew killed / Officer and nt men wounded.
samage ship was rus tained as follow
/. 55. coils severed
2. Two life loats badly holed
3- Boat buck hiered Patside
4. are genetilator holed and Away minor defects to wining etc

259
131
- 4
King Ony
I found, however, that she was not at all handy on her
256
propellers, and whilst endeavouring to point her for the channel she began to develop a list to starboard which developed seriously. Water was reported entering the stokehold and I sent the First Lieutenant to investigate.
Almost immediately, however, it became obvious that the ship was sinking, and I ordered abandonment. Ship was
77
now clear of entrance over towards North side of channel.
Our one remaining available boat on starboard side was turned out previous to this but was submerged as ship heeled over. As we had two Carley floats and a large number of rafts this was not a serious loss.
30/5
At about 0200, or shortly before, the ship foundered.
I was on the bridge and was joined by the Chief
Engineer, Mr. Cowley (Temp. Lieut. Engineer). The First
Lieutenant, Lieut. J. Lee, R.N.R., was attending to abandonment generally.
The ship turned completely on her starboard side.
and I stepped into the water, being afloat near the forward starboard hoat, now submerged. The Chief Engineer was with me.
After and during the following hour several ships, including H.M.S. "VIVACIOUS" and H.M. Drifter "LORD GREY", picked up survivors, but I regret to report that two
Engineer Officers, T.124, and seven other ratings were lost.
A complete readiness to carry out all orders was shown throughout by all officers and ratings. Steam was maintained in the engine room, and everything done to find some means to repair the steering gear.
Fire from the 12 Pdr. H.A. gun and Lewis guns was
I
kept up throughout all attacks, and from my own observation, one aircraft was damaged - a piece seeming
11-
to fall off.
As I was required for duty at Ramsgate on the
31st May and subsequent days, I have not been able to
Ph report thes:-
my king my:- one V.U and 4 Scandar wounded hilditary
:- 4 knew killed / Officer and nt men wounded.
tomage to the of was rus tained as follows
/. 55. coils severed
2. Two life loats badly holed
3- Boar back piered
4. are rentilator holed and Away minor depects to wining etc

Dynamo Z. A14/0/13192
258
N.A. Dover
Hus. King Only
28 5-40 261
Sir,
19
There Thousand to report as follows he accordance with your orders we lep the towns for Drunkish at 09/30/26 26/5
among off trunkisk a1-0200/27. we cruised.
in ricinity till day light entering harbour at
0439/27.
27/5.
we em baked 1131 Frooks at 0730 and ship sailed for bover at 0803.
Whilst paining between Grovelines and
Calais the ship was shelled from positions ashore from 0900-0420. Two on Three
Mells his ship. Fine was not opened by
King Grry' as it we not hos ill to locate batteries. at the same time enemey aircraft attacked with bouls and machine gans her failed to hir the ship. we replied math 12 Ph and Lewis Sucs.
Inequer to nefort the following canal thes:-
thus King Omj:- one P.O and 4 Scandar wounded hilitary
:- 4 knew killed / Officer and nt men mounded.
tomage the ship was rus tained as follows
/. 55. coils severed
2. Two life loats badly holed
3- Boat back pieried Prtside
4. are rentilator holed and minor depects to wining etc

- 2 -
12
she if she was spared further direct attack it seemed tug likely
By now H.M.S. "IVANHOE" was in tow with a and
261
who had earlier taken troops and survivors off H.M.S. "IVANHOE", would make home, in the meantime H.M.S. "HAVANT,"
264
was hit and on fire and did not look likely to last, she was half-hull down and listing badly to port. "GRIVE" got alongside and took off all the troops and "IVANHOE" survivors together with wounded and her medical officer, another vessel had "HAVANT" in tow. "GRIVE" then proceeded to Dover having
1300. about 700 on board including many wounded, she arrived about
At this stage Captain Lambart put Lt. C.E. est R.N.R.
of the ship at the beach and in harbour and alongside ashore, his work had been tremendous and his skilful manouevring
H.M.S. "HAVANT" contributed enormously to "GRIVE" 8" success, but he had done his share, and as a man of over sixty had earned a rest.
Nevertheless Captain Lambart himself would not rest and having called the crew together, who had been simply magnificent, told them of his intention to start off again
1/6
immediately and take part in the operation at 2200. that night.
They were all as determined as he, and "GRIVE" sailed about 160
having first taken on provisions and ammunition.
Before sailing we were reinforced by S/Lt. Meyer.
R.N.V.R. from Dover, and also we put ashore the 4th Engineer
Officer (T.124), Mr. Terry, whose nerves were not standing the strain, incidentally he had already lost his ship once in this war, the H.M.Y. "PRINCESS".
Lt. Branwell was throughout a tremendous value and showed great energy and efficiency. "GRIVE" proceeded slowly to the rendezvous and whilst proceeding along the South side of the channel to Dunkirk we heard an aeroplane in the vicinity though could not see anything, a few minutes later
(about 22307 there was a tremendous explosion and "GRIVE" was literally blown to pieces and sank in a few seconds. I
think it is probably that the 'plane we heard was actually sowing magnetic mines in the paths being used by shipping ano
"GRIVE" was an immediate victim.
Together with three others of the ships company I
was picked up by a boat from a drifter and I believe about a dozen others were picked up by another drifter and 3 or 4
more by a destroyer. The ships proceeded to Dunkirk and took off troops and we were all landed at Ramsgate.
I trust this report, sir, though not necessary is not tedious, but having regard to the personality of my fine old
Captain and to the fact that so far as I know I am the only surviving officer I felt it my duty and thought that you would wish to have an account of the matter.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) J.K.B.Miles.
S/Lt. R.N.V.R.
ide pped dous
[over

- 2
Royal Noval Hospital 263
By now H.M.S. "IVANHOE" was in tow with a tug and if she was spared further direct attack it seemed likely
266
she would make home, in the meantime H.M.S. "HAVANT,"
The who had earlier taken troops and survivors off H.M.S. "IVANHOE", was hit and on fire and did not look likely to last, she was half-hull down and listing badly to port. "GRIVE" got longside and took off all the troops and "IVANHOE" survivors together with wounded and her medical officer, another vessel had "HAVANT" in tow. "GRIVE" then proceeded to Dover having
1300. about 700 on board including many wounded, she arrived about
At this stage Captain Lambart put Lt. C.E. est R.N.R.
ashore, his work had been tremendous and his skilful manouevring of the ship at the beach and in harbour and alongside
H.M.S. "HAVANT" contributed enormously to "GRIVE success, but he had done his share, and as a man of over sixty had earned a rest.
Nevertheless Captain Lambart himself would not rest and having called the crew together, who had been simply magnificent, told them of his intention to tart off again immediately and take part in the operation at 2200. that night.
They were all as determined as he, and "GRIVE" sailed about 160
having first taken on provisions and ammunition.
Before sailing we were reinforced by S/Lt. Meyer.
R.N.V.R. from Dover, and also we put ashore the 4th Engineer
Officer (T.124), Mr. Terry, whose nerves were not standing the strain, incidentally he had already lost his ship once in this war, the H.M.Y. "PRINCESS".
Lt. Branwell was throughout a tremendous value and showed great energy and efficiency. "GRIVE" proceeded slowly to the rendezvous and whilst proceeding along the South side of the channel to Dunkirk we heard an aeroplane in the vicinity though could not see anything, a few minutes later
(about 22307 there was a tremendous explosion and "GRIVE" was
14
.iterally blown to pieces and sank in a few seconds.
I
think it is probably that the 'plane we heard was actually sowing magnetic mines in the paths being used by shipping and
"GRIVE" was an immediate victim.
Together with three others of the ships company I
was picked up by a boat from a drifter and I believe about dent a dozen others were picked up by another drifter and 3 or more by a destroyer. The ships proceeded to Dunkirk and took off troops and we were all landed at Ramsgate.
I trust this report, sir, though not necessary is not tedious, but having regard to the personality of my fine old
Captain and to the fact that so far as I know I am the only surviving officer I felt it my duty and thought that you would wish to have an account of the matter.
way
I have the honour to be, Sir, further
Your obedient servant, at
30th
(Signed)
J.K.B.Miles.
Mrs commander
S/Lt. R.N.V.R.
1400
the at ded
[over

270-
207
ashore the 4th Engineer officer (T. 124) Terry whose nerves were not standing the strain, incidentally he had already lost his ship once in this war, the H.M.Y. Princess.
Lt. Branwell was throughout of tremendous value O slowed great energy Q efficiency.
grive proceeded slowly to the rendez-vous o whilst proceeding along the South side of the channel to Dunkiik we heard an aeroplane in the vicinity though could not see anything, a few minutes later Cabout 2230) there was a tremendous explosion Q grive was literally blown to pieces D sank in a few seconds. I
think it is probable that the plane we heard was actually sowing magretic mines in the paths being used by shipping D Grive was an immediate victim.
Together with three others of the ships company
I was picked up by a boat from a drifter
Q
I believe about a dozen others were picked up by another drifter D 3 or 4 more by a destroyer. The ships proceeded to Dun Rirk
Q took off troops o we were all landed at Ramsqate
I trust this report sir though not necessary is not tedious, but having regard to the personality of my fine old captain of to the fact that so for as I know I am the only surviving officer I felt it my duty
Q thought that you would wish to have an account of the matter
MMANDER-I I THIEF have the honour to be,
8. JUN 1940
*
su, e
ORTSMOUTH
your obedient servant
(J. K. B. MILES.)
s/lt. RN.V [over

270 2
H.M.T. Gula.
273 al
6.C. Base Lowestoff.
17-6-40. 17- 40.
91
He GRIVE
Sir so requested that on the night of 1st
I beg to report
P
une 1940 @ 23 hours 45 hinutes H.M.Y
aday
Greives passed us on our starbord and pulled into line ahead, at a distance of about 100 ydo a big eseplazion was
345
2
elen. when the whole of the Vessel was dure blown to prices this occured about a at will outside Due kuk harbour whilst land the Port. Jessel We was on her way in to the to munched our small boat and received
EACH insdiately stopped. thiship b was eleven survivors who were seen chinging ble to wreekage, a small motor boat also to gave a hand + we understand that a they micked up four of the survivors.
ord thorough search was made and and of epr
N.C.G.O.'s were also destroyed. the next signal received was a eypher which came first as Mosquito was waiting on her way backagth loading up. It was improsible to decypler this an a second report stating that all cyphes were destroyed was me in anxiliary lode.
2. Mosquito arrived Bray Dunes about 1830 and immediate commenced taking hoops oH the beach. I found the bestmethon was to anchor with my how afloat and my stein just on The bottom and with a hass time form the ship to the shore
This enabled the army portoons and my whaters to have out
[over

5.
SECRET
277 274
Dunkerque I was attacked by a dive bowber which came very ddenty outs a low cloud. The whell was put hard over and the salvo nussed, but me bowb fell very close alongride, causing a slight bak in the enjine 200m and a hole in an oil fuel tank. The pumps stopped and the dynamo went off the board, but on starting every thing again, it was not considered that damage was suffer cient to
95
prevent embacking troops and there was sufficient ri to complete the trip without using the damaged tank.
% Mosquito arrived of Dunkergue about 1230 and 1/6
there did not appear toke any other naval ships ex eept motorboats and drifters in the roads 5 has bour.
a motor boat towing a ships lifeboat, both full of french and Belgian trops (about thirty albojethes) was found in the middle of the roads. There troops were embarked in Mosquito and unimediately a W/T signal was received stating that there was a hansport sinking ar the western end of the channel. I told the motor boat to follow and invediately proceeded at full speed towards where the report had come pom. I had handly started when about
20 Junkers appeared. Hospito happened tobe the only food float ing Karget and there were no friendly ancraft about. I am not certain exactly how many attacked
Mosquito but certainly at least six did from different directions and it was not possible to engage all targets. Indeavoured to take avoiding action and I think it was not until the fourth salvo that we were hit, th ough one bomb just before had exploded right ahead of the ship, bringing a large quantity
JOVER

4
296
VA, A destroyer Dover, having reported that Dunkerque was
293
0830 I asked me if ships should be sent there. usable,
0830
signalled from HEBE that destroyers could At into
Dunkerque in succession and that troops were waiting come close to the pier. Loading off beaches was proceeding slowly:
conditions were not bad, but the slight swell running in was enough to render boats liable to broach to. At La
Panne and Braye, lorries were being driven into the sea to form a sort of breakwater.
Noon
About midday there was an air attack on ships and on La
Panne. Later, when it had cleared a bit overhead, there was an attack on Dunkerque. Several French destroyers came in by Y channel and were fired on from the north of
La Panne; some guns tried to shell beach between Braye and La Panne, but the steep dunes protected it.
On returning to La Panne met Stevenson who had transferred to a motor launch and was doing excellent work. He saw
(9)
Lord Gort who was anxious to see me. As conditions were getting worse and I did not want to get stranded, decided to go to Dunkerque and drive to La Panne from there.
HEBE could not be detained any longer, so sent her back to
Dover with troops and wounded and told Bush to explain the boat situation and point out vital necessity for sending out boats and crews.
1530
Transferred my staff to WINDSOR and went into Dunkerque in
MTB 102, sent at my request. Badly wanted some means of getting about quickly and a fast boat of light draught would have been invaluable: when I did get one its endurance was so low that it had to return almost at once to
Dover.
On getting to Dunkerque found Tennant was with Gort and that to drive there would take up more time than I cared to be away: decided to land from a boat after all.
The MTB had not enough fuel to reach La Panne and return to Døver, SO boarded GOSSAMER and took her to La Panne
1730
where I transferred to WORCESTER at about 1730.
La Panne was in telephonic communication with England;
also received W/T messages from Dover. One (1749) said ships were urgently wanted off La Panne: actually, at
1900, there were 4 destroyers and 1 minesweeper there and situation was constantly changing.
G.H.Q. was in touch with Admiralty and VA, Dover, and gave views and criticisisms of what was happening. This probably accounts for signal from 1st SL on this day asking if boats were distributed along beaches to best advantage.
Actually, only boats that could get inshore, except distri- pontoons bution depended on position of ships they belonged but and a few local craft, were the whalers, and their to.
(10)
badly So hampered by lack of quick transport: once ships had far as possible kept ships off all beaches, was boats away a re-distribution was impracticable.
1900
beaches; with ammunition. Told her to beach cleared at as La
Small and about this time the TINY puffer herself their numbers of aircraft attacked La Panne and arrived, ships off loaded tide being then high; did so and was of was
Panne, tide fell, though think that a good deal cargo finally on beach in slight swell (thied attempt visual to see Gort), dumped in the sea.
2000
Landed Flag-Lieut. and a few signalmen to and open General went with them to GHQ - last villa but one on communication taking with GHQ. Met by Tennant south edge Lees;
of La Panne. situation. Seemed obvious to me back that more the
(11)
Discussed felt they had successfully fallen it now or soldiers intact inn face of great odds and that was not making up to less the Navy to get them off, but that Navy were
Stressed of large scale embarkation from beaches; off said from any real difficulty, effort to do slowness so. and dependence on fine weather that bulk of any troops should move westward and come This
Dunkerque.

297
This included brought the from General Lees a disparaging which 204
At this no business or justification to Navy. talk Told he had words "ineptitude of the remark him were holding time British troops were acting as like that.
of La a line which came down to coast rear guard and
These at midnight on 31st May and fall back on the from line Panne. Intention was for them to withdraw a little north this
31st troops (about 5,000) were some of the best, beaches. and Gort
0400
was very anxious they should be got away. 1st SL said that the Navy would make a supreme effort to get off the remainder the next day (31st) and the rear guard the following night: details were being sent over to me by
Bush. Felt daunted at the prospect and the seeming impossibility of the task. Plan made by Admiralty and
VA, Dover, had every chance of success, but it did not fall out as planned.
Arranged for Gort to embark from La Panne at 1800 on 31st and that boats and ships would be there for the purpose:
if that was impossible he would go to Dunkerque. On returning to WORCESTER informed Stevenson of the arrangements and put him in charge of them: intended to be there myself also.
(12) 2200 Started back to ship; then getting dark. No boats at the
1035
beach - too precious to be kept hanging about. Tide was farther out and a number of boats and pontoons were stranded. Some of the 12th Royal Lancers were trying to get pontoons afloat, and it was good to see them trying to help themselves.
With some soldiers got an unused pontoon afloat and 8 men,
Flag-Lt. and myself got in, but soon found that the boat, which had only 3 inches of freeboard, would inevitably be swamped before we could get to the ship. Sea was calm, with a small swell coming in. It was still fairly shallow so we all jumped out and returned to the beach to empty the boat of water. Tennant and Lees were still there, watching our progress, and as we came ashore I remarked to the latter, "Another example of Naval ineptitude."
Had to reduce crew by 2 and then set off again. Soldiers
2230
(13)
WORCESTER was slowly filling up with troops and I remained paddled well and we got back on board WORCESTER at 2230.
there till 0100/31: she was then full and I sent her back
Earlier to on 30th I had asked for a ship with 2 lines of W/T
Dover, transferring to EXPRESS.
communication and was told that KEITH would arrive at 2000.
She did not appear and I remained for rest of night in
EXPRESS, which was gradually embarking troops.
There were tens of thousands of men on or near to know the beaches how
Picture as I saw it was as follows:-
and The rear guard were to be withdrawn and night, must in and around Dunkerque - no one seemed next many. 24 hours ahead: they were the best troops where i.e. off. Dunkerque itself was the only place be got embarkation could take place, and a large and Braye, proportion 10
rapid of the troops were coming down to La Panne and beaches the only boats available, except ships' for
5 miles away from Dunkerque.
At the and a very few local craft, were crewless boats if pontoons went away with their ships or were motor boats left.
which cases they had to pull in, as ships' needed.
In many often out of action, and towage was badly were depended entirely on fair weather - an entirely. onshore
Embarkation of any force would have stopped embarkation shallow wind stressed the vital necessity for more draught I had boats and crews, and knew that everything possible was being the day French destroyers had been coming fired at in from by the done at home.
During passage and channel and had been at the
Northern They went into Dunkerque and loaded to be the West shore. Quay: otherwise no French ships seemed there.
Destroyers,