TNA ADM 199 792

CONFIDENTIAL
118
Report on Oneration "DYNAMO".
Page 7.
116
CONFIDENTIAL
115
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
Page 6.
re
117
fighting formations were encountered. French troops handl ist were either demoralised and had to be controlled by force or n by the use of fire-arms, or were so rigidly bound by disciplin and tradition that they would not embark except by complete formation under their own unit officers. In either case, the rate of embarkation was much slower than with British troops.
12.
INITIATIVE SHOWN BY COMMANDING OFFICERS AND
last
SUBORDINATE PERSONNEL.
A most satisfactory feature of the operation was the high degree of initiative shown by Commanding and
Subordinate Officers of units operating off the coast, ranging from H.M. Destroyers to comandeered motor boats. The majority of officers and ratings in command were in situations requiring independent action in extrenely difficult
S
conditions. Often the easiest course was to be satisfied with work already achieved' and to return to the United
Kingdom with a final load of troops. The reverse action was invariably executed, namely, continued operation off the 1
coast as long as there were both troops ashore to be n.
evacuated and vessels off shore to receive them. If the craft in use was damaged or sunk the crew invariably seized some other boat to continue their efforts.
gh
Unaware of the military situation ashore and ofter forced to move westward by bombardment from German artillery or even by rifle fire from advancing German forces, the majority of these boats, commanded often by stokers or ure hostility only seamen, had only one object in view, to lif from the beach any, and all troops, British or Allied, with sight of the water's edge.
e
On their return to the United Kingdom when asked report their proceedings it was only in answer to direct enquiry that it would transpire that these young men had subjected, in many cases, to an unparalleled bombardment an the air. They appeared to consider that this was part of day's work requiring no comment.
ork
13.
LOSSES OF TROOPS AFTER EMBARKATION.
It is a distressing fact that many ships were or damaged on the return voyage when laden with troops.
is fortunate that in most of such cases the majority of troops were saved owing to the large volume of traffic t)
was coming and going between Dunkirk and the United King
Exceptions to this were due to the rapidity with which ce cer ships sank after having been bombed or torpedoed, Such cases"
are as follows:-
loat
WAKEFUL torpedoed. Ship broke in half and only those on hore, the upper deck were saved. About 600 troops were belostaff
CRESTED EAGLE. Was bombed and then beached in a burning ven condition. Only about 300 saved out of 600 on board ence to
SKIPJACK. 250 - 300 troops on board, most of whom,
Chi unfor tunately, went down with the ship when sh sank. aff,
Bombed

127
126
128
CONFIDENTIAL..
Page 7.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
29/
Wednesday, 29th May (continued)
well as from Dunkirk harbour, both from the aspect of the military situation and from the fact that Dunkirk was limited by a bottle-neck, formed by the narrow gangway along the East
Pier to the points of embarkation. Furthermore, there was every prospect of the weather improving and the surf reducing as the tide rose. Nevertheless, an increased number of
H.M. ships was ordered to Dunkirk to augment the personnel vessels, though it was feared that an accumulation of ships alongside the East Pier at Dunkirk by day might well invite intensive air attack,
Subsequently, this fear was fully to be justified.
25. Meantime, considerable anxiety was felt as to the fate of the personnel vessels which had been despatched in a steady stream to Dunkirk commencing the previous evening. The first of these was due back at Dover about 0300, but by 0900
nothing had been sighted or reported. But at 0700, O.,
Dunkirk, had reported that the embarkation there was going on at the rate of 2000 an hour, so it was presumed that the transports had failed to enter the harbour during darkness, had waited outside, and had commenced to enter in succession at dawn. The necessity for continuous fighter protection in view of the exposure of these unarmed ships while at Dunkirk and during the dayligh passage through coastal waters, was obvious, Constant touch was maintained with R.A.F. Commands to obtain continuous fighter protection during the hours when the Vice Admiral, Dover, estimated the largest concentration of vessels would be present, it being realised that the R.A.F.
3
resources were not sufficient to provide continuous air cover, ed and to dispense with full cover at less important periods.
26. At 0930 the belated return of the personnel vessels from Dunkirk commenced, and proceeded steadily through the day. In addition to the personnel vessels using Dunkirk the
Admiralty were informed of the necessity for X-lighters and other self-propelled lighters to increase the facilities for beach evacuation. A Medical Party was shipped in VERITY for use on the beaches, and a Naval Medical Party was sent to
Dunkirk.
27. The considerable alarm as to the immediate safety of the B.E.F. felt during the evening and early night of the k
28th, which caused all available resources to be immediately concentrated on the French Coast, eased during the 29th. But e
emergency measures taken late on the 28th had an adverse effect on the orderly organisation for evacuation so necessary le if effective measures were to be devised and put in force.
28. Meantime, in the early hours of the 29th, an unfortunate disaster occurred involving the loss or H.M.
destroyers WAKEFUL and GRAFTON, and the danlayer COMFORT.
WAKEFUL, after embarking troops at Bray, sailed for Dover at
2300/28 by the Zuydecoote Pass and North Channel. Approaching the Kwinte Whistle Buo the speed of the ships was 20 knots, and a zigzag of 40 degrees every 4 minutes was started. At
0045 two torpedo tracks were observed, one torpedo missed, the other hit ship smidships. WAKEFUL broke in half and the two portions sank in 15 secends, each remaining standing midship/ with the

135
14
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 14.
133
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
30/5
Thursday, 30th May. (Continued).
44. At Dunkirk there were no air attacks in the early morning and all was quiet. Later, when ships began to arrive in quantity, in view of the massive target presented by a number of ships alongside the East pier at a time, the S.N.O.,
Dunkirk ordered destroyers alongside only one at a time. At about 0800 a store ship arrived at Dunkirk with provisions but no water. This caused so much congestion on the pier that unloading was abandoned when half complete, and the store ship filled with troops. A certain amount of water was obtained from destroyers.
45. During the forenoon the Military constructed a long pier of lorries with deck planking, into the sea off Bray. This was an excellent piece of work, but was insufficiently stable for use by such craft as paddle steamers, nor even smaller power craft in a lop. It was invaluable later for embarking troops into small boats. As regards general embarkation off the beaches, it was later learnt that it was 0 common occurrence for processions of small boats loaded with troops to be cast adrift when empty and allowed to float away to seaward, owing to the lack of sufficient naval ratings as boat-keepers. For the same reason many of the smaller pulling boats were swamped and sunk due to overloading by uncontrolled "rush" of soldiers.
Both these faults were remedied later.
46. Matters proceeded smoothly throughout the day owing to the mist and there being a big smoke cloud over Dunkirk which prevented the enemy bombers attacking the ships in large numbers.
In order to increase the rate of embarkation through the bottle-neck of the East Pier gangway, the troops were urged to quicken their pace and eventually thousands of troops, tired and without food and water for days, broke into the double and kept it up the whole length of the pier for more than two hours.
47. The attempt to maintain an adequate rate of lift using only the older destroyers was by now shown to be impracticable. The destroyers were lifting about 17,000, personnel vessels about 9500 in the 24 hours. Remaining vessels were estimated to be worth about 15,000 per day. This gave a total lift of about 43,000 per day. The situation called for E lift of at least 55,000 per day. Verbal representations being made to C.M.S., authority was received for the return to the Dover Command of the modern destroyers released the night before.
Accordingly Commander-in-Chief, Nore, at 1531 gave orders to HARVESTER, HAVANT, IVANHOE, IMPULSIVE, ICARUS and
INTREPID to proceed at once to Dunkirk. Subsequently some of these destroyers were diverted to the beaches.
48/

139
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 18.
137
Operation "DYNAMO". Narrative of Events.
31/5
Friday, 31st May (Continued).
Goodwins and commenced to hunt.
55. The arrivals at the home ports indicated that in spite of the frequent requests for more ships and more boats received from the various authorities on the French coast, the rate of evacuation was steadily increasing and would permit, all being well, of implementing the final evacuation plan during the night 31/5 - 1/6, Accordingly, instructions were issued for the special tows to leave Ramsgate at 1300/31 for
Dunkirk via Route X, and Commander-in-Chief, Nore, and Flag
Officer-in-Charge, Harwich, were requested to provide all available M.T.B.'s to escort this convoy for as much of the outward passage as possible, which was timed to commence from
Ramsgate at 1300/31. Speed of advance - 5 knots. A party of Naval officers had been assembled at Dover to embark in these tows and had been given detailed instructions on the plan. Two M.A./S boats and 2 M.T.B,'s in the Dover Command were ordered to accompany the boat convoy and subsequently embark the Commander-in-Chief, B.E.F. and Staff off the beaches.
31MAY
56. Shortly after sunrise an on-shore wind arose and boat work became difficult, many whalers capsizing, and the prospects of completing the evacuation to plan began to be less favourable. The following extract from the report of
Captain Howson, S.N.O., on the beaches illustrates conditions at Bray at this time:
"At 0400 there was a very considerable number of destroyers, paddlers, trawlers, skoots, etc, off Bray, and embarkation was proceeding satisfactorily, but a lop had already started. There were about 10 motor yachts which had arrived from England, These craft drew 6-7
feet and were unable to get close in to any of the beaches. During the forenoon, considerable towing of empty craft towards the beach was carried out, and only about 2 boats were allowed to get adrift and ultimately ground. With the falling tide, however, a number of boats were seen to ground and romain ashore until the tide rose in the afternoon. These included an A.L.C.,
New motor boat and a lifeboat. Other power boats broke down. Nevertheless, the embarkation, much hindered by the lop, proceeded satisfactorily. As further destroyers and sloops arrived, they were directed to lower their motor boats and whalers as this had not already been done, these boats were quite invaluable. About noon, the lop began to subside and with the rising tide conditions for embarkation very greatly improved, more boats were sent in and more boats floated off and matters were proceeding very well, when the gun at La Panne started to shell the beaches and foreshore with great accuracy. A certain number of light craft were sunk. The A.L.C. broke down and was towed away by a steamer, MOSQUITO, destroyers and sloops proceeded westward clear of the firing.
57/

Ed into the long allisk
1. Lieut. E. Treweeks.
192
When we were bombed I was taking cover in after
194
lobby, then proceeded to E.R. hatch but could not get below because of steam, was joined by C. Sto. Ricketts and C.E.R.A.,
Westlake, gave orders to shut off all boiler room emergency valves and then safety valves and shut main steam bulkhead valve on deck. As soon as possible E. Room and after boiler room were entered.
Attention first given to casualties but all bar one were dead.
First thought possible to get some part of machinery going but not possible. Concentrated on leaks. Bomb dropped port fore side E.R. bulkhead and stove in boiler room bulkhead.
Disabling port fan, engine, oil full pump, number three boiler, port circulator, main and reserve feed tanks and all pipes and leads adjacent were pierced and broken.
Leak at after end of E.R. oil fulo tank plugged.
Efforts made to run petrol dynamo for WD/T but the magneto connection broke. Hands were told off to get hand steering in use. P.O. of fore boiler room reported no damage after first.
raid although C. Sto. reported oil suction line pierced and shut off.
2. Sub. Lieut. Jeaves.
During the first attack I was on the bridge as
Officer of the Watch and remained there for some time afterwards while the Captain went off to the engine and boiler rooms.
On the Captain's orders I went aft to the after steering compartment to see whether it was possible to steer by hand.
This was so, and leaving a Leading Stoker and two or three hands I returned to the bridge as the ship was being taken in tow.
When the second attack took place I WAS in the fore and aft passage below the wheelhouse-for some time and eventually went into the Petty Officers' Mess to try and assist the foremost supply party.
After the attack, on the First Lieutenant's orders,
I placed charts in the whaler and a small private motor boat and unshipped the steering compass from the wheelhouse, end put it in the whaler. I then went aft to continue connecting up to steer by hand. To do this it was necessary to clear a good deal of gear out of the compartment. This took about half an hour. By this time another attempt was being made to take the ship in tow, so 1 recovered the charts from the motor boat, and went up on the bridge.
When the ship was attacked for the third time I again went down to the fore and aft passage beneath the wheelhouse, where I stayed till the order Bandon ship was given. of the two charts containing confidential matter concerning minefields in the Dover area, one was destroyed and the other left in the whaler which has not yet returned.
The Fleet notices to Marines were thrown overboard in mid-channel. Fleet charts were left in their folios in the
Charthouse.

SECRET
34.
La
Panne anchorage was
Nieuport passed or La until Caxide the and town this and became under more shell fire under time continuous shell and machine beach at withdrawn from this gun hit and proceeded to the westward.
troops were area. "Vivacious proceeded now reaching. Braye, which the anch
35. At at 0030 slow speed on 1st towards June "Keith" weighed at artillery 0206. were The ship arrived of
36. As dawn broke ships embarking men from weighed anchor, the beach being clear to the eastwa th before returning to England.
the ships proceeded towards Dunkirk to fill up with
37. At 0510 ten enemy fighters attacked the
"Keith" and other ships with bursts of machine gun which were inaccurate but might have caused serious to bridge personnel if pressed home.
38. Shells, apparently fired from shore batter the eastward, again fell close to the ship at 0520
off Braye.
4.7" 39. barrage and pom-pom fire. This barrage was eff
At 0555 enemy bomber aircraft were engaged and split the formation. A fuze setting of 18=4000
considered to be the shortest practical setting than firing this be used the aircraft are above the was at formations of aircraft. If a shorter elevation setti the guns before they get into range.
0630 "Keith" was standing off between ships with and collected La from the beaches during the night.
40. Panne From superintending the departure of
At 0737 a very large number dive heavy 41. bomber and fighter round aircraft were vertical
"Keith" bombers circling which rapidly carried out extremely a no doubt that at the releasing dive five as bombs 80° and each. that the There bombs is good are released as no with mass tar was 900 is as feet. offered steep The and each flying pilot was delivered extremely was attack able skill ammunition and dash. was The exhausted, enemy normal. attack. effect effective gunners gun 42. until in All keeping The addition 3" 3" H.A.gun ammunition the to attackers the proved hit ship's was in this attack a beating but lineaused there action several jamb 43. of bombs the steering very "Keith" eteering.gearterwards.com near across was misses the not after and one part of of these, the Fore as enemy was manoeuvrentro for hand ship engines continued steering aft to by circle at high vouched were in
(NOTE: continually Times from sight. now forward cannot.44. be At about

231
22)
- 2 -
dark, butphosphorescence was very pronounced.
28/5
12. Twelve knots was maintained while in the narrow channels and every time the sound of aircraft engines was heard speed was reduced to slow to reduce wake.
13. I felt that it was very probable that some form of attack would be made near the Kwinte Whistle Buoy and five miles before reaching it speed was increased to 20 knots and a zig-zag of 40 degrees every four minutes was started. All guns crews and bridge personnel were lookout. warned and were keyed up and were keeping a specially good
14. At 0045 (Wednesday, 29th May) when the ship was two cables
29/0045
rest of the Kwinte Whistle Buoy, two parallel torpedo tracks about
30 yards apart one slightly ahead of the other were seen approaching
150 yards away on the starboard bow. They appeared to be running practically on the surface and the tracks were very bright with phosphorescence. No survivor can say what fired them, but it is evident from subsequent events that they were fired by a motor torpedo boat which was probably lying stopped close to the buoy.
15. The wheel was put hard a port and the ship swung sufficiently to cause one to miss ahead. The other hit in the forward boiler room.
The ship broke in half and the two portions sank within about 15
seconds, each remaining standing with its midship end on the bottom and the bow and stern standing about 60 feet above the water.
16. All Signal Publications were in the W/T Office and must have gone down with the ship. The following secret documents were on the chart table and may possibly have floated to the surface:-
Chart in use on which Dover Strait minefields were lightly marked,
Current table of lettered positions.
ficer remained on the stern portion. All the troops were asleep
17. Most of the guns' crows floated clear and thirty men and an
Delow and went down with the ship except one, and all H.M.S. "wakeful's"
engine room department except one or two were lost. I floated clear fhe bridge.
"Comfort" came on the scene and started to pick up those still swimming.
18. After about half an hour the motor drifters "Nautilus" and
Nautilus" picked up six and "Comfort" 16 including myself.
bout fifteen.
M.S. "Gossamer" arrived soon after and lowered boats which picked up re way with the tide after cruising around for about half an hour
19. The swimmers and rescue ships had drifted some distance the houting clinging "Comfort" to go back to the wreck to take off the stern while "Nautilus" carried on to Dunkirk.
n we got there the stern had fallen over and many men were shouting hit reck and I went alongside the former's starboard quarter to warn her the water. H.M. Ships "Grafton" and "Lydd" were close to the ore at she was in danger of being torpedoed. At that moment (0250) a an orpedomentarily swamped and as she bobbed to the surface again I was in the wardroom and the "Comfort" was lifted in the air, que al the full speed ahoad with no-one on deck I soon had to
I was able to grab a rope's end, but as the
O
S1
th H.M.S. "Lydd" and H.M.S. "Grafton" opened a heavy fire on her with
20. The "Comfort" then came round to a wide circle and suddenly

Dynamo 65.
Dyrans. 33V.
Royal Chatham. Naval Barracks,
202
90
:que,
285
15th June, 1940.
13
sir,
I at have the honour to report the loss of H.M. Tug"St Abbs"
0
at Dunkirk 0930 on 1st June 1940, Lieutenant Brooker in command.
5
2.
Blst May, three barges in tow, the "Duchess", the "H.A.C." and
H.M. with Tug"St Abbs" sailed from Dover at 10 a.m. on Friday, the "Doris", bound for Dunkirk.
ng
3. At 2100 31st May the last barge of the tow, the "Doris"
31/5
ne or broke adrift and was taken in tow by a sloop, name not known.
ing
4. At 0030, 1st June, H.M. Tug"St St Abbs" anchored approximately say six miles from Dunkirk, Lieutenant T.E. Brooker considering it unadvisable and dangerous to proceed further before daylight.
5. At 0330 anchor was weighed and ship proceeded towards
Dunkirk.
6. At 0600 H.M. Tug"St Abbs" passed the piers and proceeded
LE
towards the beaches. Enemy aircraft commenced bombing the piers and shipping.
yer
7. At 0630 the barges were slipped and ordered to proceed it:
inshore to the beaches, the "Duchess" towing the "H.A.C."
H.M. Tug"St Abbs" anchored and waited for soldiers to embark.
8. At 0730 attacks by enemy aircraft intensified and anchor take was weighed, it being intended to proceed closer to the beach to a men on facilitate embarking of soldiers.
9. At 0800 approximately, H.M.S. "Keith" was struck by a bomb ng and settled in the water. H.M.Tug " St Abbs" proceeded alongside s:
H.M.S. "Keith" and took off survivors. Captain(D) of Nineteenth
S
Le had
Flotilla, First Lieutenant of H.M.S. "Keith" and other ratings remained on board to estimate the damage and consider the possibility of S. "Keith" being towed back to England. H.M.Tug "st Abbs"
rties ed.
I
proceeded to pick up survivors from ship's boats and from the water.
train
10. At 0830 H.M.S. "Skipjack" was struck by a bomb and sank of quickly. "Salamander" who was also rescuing survivors
Panne sailed for H.M.S. entrance of the harbour. The bombing was very heavy. the
Lo and remainder "St Abbs" then continued to pick up survivors. Bombing
H.M. Tug the returned alongside H.M.S. "Keith" and took off re and became so of heavy the that crew, it was necessary to keep the ship at full speed
S to and at 0900 H. M. Tug "St Abbs" sailed for the entrance.
O set
11. Tug "St Abbs" was blown up by four delay-action and ations, bombs At 0930 the water ahead of the ship. The bottom stern dropped were completely into shattered and the ship sank in approximatel p
i/c hit
45 seconds.
nise
1
H. 12. were swimming in the water and after
M. Tug "St About Abbs" thirty sank. men Approximately one hundred thirty que al ratings and soldiers were on the ship.
ark
0
13. June, I reached a wreck believed two to ratings be the si
"Clan MacAlfister", At 2400, 1st in company with two "Salamander"s" soldiers, whaler's from crew. H.M.S. "Skipjack" and were one from Captain(D), H.M.S. Nineteenth Flotilla, survivors the First Also Lieutenant on the wreck of H.M.S. "Keith" and eight other

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13

SECRET
COPY
58 Allerton Road,
15
Liverpool, 18.
4th June, 1940.
Sir,
Original foreunder.
I have the honour to submit this report of the loss of H.M.S.
"BRIGHTON QUEEN" by enemy action.
2.
At 7.30 a.m. B.S.T. 1.6.40, the ship was got under way and proceeded from Margate Roads towards Dunkirk by route "X". At about 9.30
a.m. when in position 4 miles North of Calais No. 5 buoy H.M.S. "BRIGHTON QUEEN"
engaged enemy aircraft with 12-pounder and Lewis gun fire, action continuing until arrival at Dunkirk. The fire was accurate, keeping aircraft to a height from which bomb aiming was difficult. In the vicinity of Calais No. 4 buoy three salvoes of 4 bombs were aimed at "BRIGHTON QUEEN", the nearest dropping
100 feet from the starboard quarter.
3.
The ship entered the breakwater at Dunkirk at 10.35 a.m. and berthed at the West Lock at 10.45 a.m. 700 French Moroccan troops were embarked and at
11.10 a.m. H.M.S. "BRIGHTON QUEEN" left her berth and proceeded towards Margate.
Calais No. 5 buoy was rounded at 11.50 a.m. and the ship proceeded along route "X".
4.
At 11.05 a.m. a formation of seven single engined aircraft were seen delivering a dive bombing attack to the Southward, after which they reformed and entered clouds at about 5,000 feet. Their engines were heard approaching and the ship's guns were trained in their direction. As they appeared from the cloud they were engaged with 12-pounder and Lewis gun fire, whilst the helm was put hard to starboard.
The formation broke up to attack, by dive bombing, H.M.S. "BRIGHTON
QUEEN", and the transport "SEOLIA" which was two cables distant at Red 50°.
"SCOTIA"
"SCOTIA"
The main attack was directed against leaving her on fire and in a sinking condition. One bomb estimated 200 lbs. exploded very close to H.M.S. "BRIGHTON QUEEN" causing severe damage to the starboard side of the ship abaft the paddle box. The one lifeboat remaining from the previous day's operation at La Panne was blown inboard, causing many casualties amongst the troops on the after deck. The ship began to settle by the stem immediately and after two minutes began to heel to port until she had a list of 50°. The ship was laid over at this angle until she filled forward and sank about 5 minutes after the explosion to rest on the bottom on an even keel in about five fathoms of water.
In this short time my crew worked quickly and efficiently in getting liferafts and all floating material over the side to troops who were struggling in the sea. The French troops were splendidly steady, and although no orders could be given to them except by signs, they acted cooly and intelligently in making use of the life saving material available.
H.M.S. "SALTASH" and several small craft were soon on the scene carrying out the difficult operation of rescuing the survivors with speed and determination, H.M.S. "SALTASH" being laid alongside the wreck until the last man was taken off.
All confidential books remain in the ship. They were placed in a weighted sack ready to be jettisoned in the Commanding Officer's cabin, but this cabin was flooded before it could be reached. The more important books werelanded at Harwich on May 30th, 1940.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your Obedient Seevant,
The Secretary of the
Admiralty, a. Stabbs
Second Sea Lord's Department,
Lieut, see NiL
Rex House, Regent Street, LONDON.
(below) R.N.R. L.10932/40
I regret that probably 50% of the French Colonial troops must have been lost, as a result of the explosion by drowning.

K
CENTRAL
TRY
6245
19
FROM
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER.
4940
DATE
6th June, 1940.
No. G22/869/40.
TO
SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.
(copies to: Commander-in-Chief, Western
Approaches.
Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth.
Commander-in-Chief, The Nore.)
17
with 12 pounder and Lewis 1 mm fire, while the helm has put hard /o starboard.
The formation broke up to all ach, by dive bombing, H.MS. Brightm Inan and the Masport
Seolia which was 2 cables distant as Red 50°
The main allach was directed against Sertie lewing her on fine of in a sinking condition the bomb estimated 200 lbs exploded very close to AMS.
Brightm Incen crusing severe damage tothe slarbourd sixe of ship abill the paddle-box. The me lifebons remaining from the previous day's operation at La Panne has blown inbourd causing many ensualies ammyal the horps n the after duch The ship began 1, sell le by the steen immediately and after /wo minutes began
10 heel 10 porl until she had a list of 50°
XXX the ship was lid over at this angle until she filled forward and sank about 5 minutes after the explosion blest n the bollow in an even keel in about 5 fashous of water.
In this shou time my Clew worked quickly and efficiently in gelling liferafts and all floring material over the side /o north who were shuggling in the pen the French roops were splendides stending and although 20 adas could be given to them except by signs they ached carly a intell with in making was life swing

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CONFIDENTIAL
11131
83
From.
Vice Admiral A.E. Bedford.
1940
Date
17th September, 1940.
No.22/21. AB/40.
To
The Secretary of the Admiralty, London, S.W.1.
REPORT OF ENQUIRY INTO LOSS OF H.M. TRAWLER
"ARGYLLSHIRE" IN OPERATION "DYNAMO".
Sir,
With reference to A.L. M.L. 6245/40 dated 1st August,
1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry into the loss of H.M.A/S
Trawler "Argyllshire" on 1st June, 1940.
2. Sub. Lieut. J.S. Weddle, R.N.R., who was in command of "Argyllshire" was examined on 17th September, 1940.
3. At about 0245 on 1st June "Argyllshire" was about
2 miles E. of "S" Buoy in company with trawlers "Lord Melchett"
and "Stella Rigel. Many trawlers and other small craft were in the vicinity.
"Argyllshire" commenced an attack on what appeared to be a submarine. At 0250 "Stella Rigel" crossed "Argyllshire's"
bows and the latter reduced speed, the target then being about
1800 yards on her starboard beam. Shortly afterwards there was an explosion aft in "Argyllshire" due, it is believed, to a torpedo which struck her on the starboard quarter. The bows
40
stood up at about 45°, all fittings on bridge broke loose and ship went down stern first. Two to three minutes later she was seen with bows to the break of forecastle protruding vertically out of the water. She then sank and disappeared in about 20
fathoms.
4. Asdic gear was intact when ship sank; 5 depth charges set to 200 feet went down with her.
5. Confidential Books and SPs, except two or three in
Wireless Cabinet, and one Secret Mine Chart which was on bridge, were in steel chest in Commanding Officer's Cabin and went down with the ship.
6. The imperceptible time during which this ship remained afloat after the explosion precludes the possibility of learning anything as to the behaviour of material generally, but it is
2/10)
thought that if this class of vessel were fitted with & watertight bulkhead between the Boiler and Engine Rooms there is likelihood of their remaining afloat considerably longer in the
4/11
event of the fore or after compartments being flooded.
7. I was assisted in my enquiry by Commander C.B. Land, R.N.
and Lieutenant (E) R.Haynes, R.N.
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant, a Biaford Vice Admiral

103
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
I
"BASILISK"
II. Auxiliary
II. Petrol Driven Engine for Dynamo
II. (a) Diesel Engine is better than the
(Contd.)
Dynemo Engi ne could not be started owing to
Petrol Engine.
magneto trouble. Consequent
(b) A larger number of 01dham Lamps lack of secondary electric is desirable.
lighting.
(c) There should be a regular supply of torches, either in various spaces or carried by Leading ratings and above.
III. Hull
III. Explosion from bomb near misses.
III. Apparently caused by "whipping" effect
Ship's back broke and fracture putting great strain on a part of the extended down both sides, at a ship where weight is much less and at position between after end of a position where all plating is thinner torpedo tubes and fore end of and where bottom becomes flat.
superstructure.
IV. Steering
IV. No protection from stores etc.,
IV. Steering gear should be enclosed.
Compartment in the compartment, falling and fouling steering gear.
V. Pumps
V. No other means of pumping out
V. Two Portable Electric Pumps WO uld water if these feil

CONFIDENTIAL.
NC
106
11528
24/23AB/40.
1940
20th September, 1940.
Report of enquiry into loss of
H. M. A.B.V. KING ORRY
in Operation "Dynamo".
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty Letter.6245/40 dated
1st August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry into the circumstances attending the loss of H.M Armed Boarding Vessel KING ORRY on
30th May, 1940.
2. Commander J. Elliott, D.S.O., R.N.R., who was in command of KING ORRY, was examined on 20th September, 1940.
3. At about 1930 on 29th May, when ship was approaching
Dunkirk, near misses-about 30 feet from ship - from dive bombers shook ship violently, and a few minutes later, when about to go alongside, a second attack took place. The ship was yet more violently shaken by explosion of near misses:
(i) The steering gear was put out of action through damage to the Telemotor system.
(ii) These near misses burst steam and water pipes on
Starboard side, and also burst steam pipe in after steering compartment, the escaping steam preventing access thereto and thus, neither the secondary steam steering gear nor the Hand wheel could be connected up.
4. Whilst ship was endeavouring to go alongside, near misses from a third heavy attack, which gave the impression of direct hits, holed Starboard side below water line in a number of places, and blew in a port hole and deadlight about 6" above water line in Stokers mess deck. These holes were, soon afterwards, stopped. A fire, the cause of which is unknown, broke out in Stewards Quarters on Starboard side forward. This was quickly put out by Extinguishers, but water was subsequently played into the compartment from fire and bilge pumps.
5. At about 0030, when ship was proceeding, stern first, to sea she developed a heavy list to Starboard which became more serious as water continued to enter the Boiler room.
(ii) Whilst endeavours were being made to point ship's head to seawards, the list grew steadily worse, and at about 0200, when in a position on the North side of the Channel, she turned over on her Starboard side and foundered.
6. Although lighting had gone in some parts of the ship, main and auxiliary engines were running and all bulkheads were intact.
MILITARY BRANOH
7/
Secretary of the Admiralty.
30 SEP 1940
*
ANIPALTY

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on Operati on "DYNAMO".
Page 6.
fighting formations were encountered. French troops handled were either demoralised and had to be controlled by force or by the use of fire-arms, or were so rigidly bound by discipline and tradition that they would not embark except by complete formation under their own unit officers. In either case, the rate of embarkation was much slower than with British troops.
12. INITIATIVE SHOWN BY COMMANDING OFFICERS AND
SUBORDINATE PERSONNEL.
A most satisfactory feature of the operation was the high degree of initiative shown by Commanding and
Subordinate Officers of units operating off the coast, ranging from H.M. Destroyers to comandeered motor boats. The majority of officers and ratings in command were in situations requiring independent action in extrenely difficult conditions. Often the easiest course was to be satisfied with work already achieved and to return to the United
Kingdom with a final load of troops. The reverse action was invariably executed, namely, continued operation off the coast as long as there were both troops ashore to be evacuated and vessels off shore to receive them. If the craft in use was damaged or sunk the crew invariably seized some other boat to continue their efforts.
Unaware of the military situation ashore and often forced to move westward by bombardment from German artillery or even by rifle fire from advancing German forces, the majority of these boats, commanded often by stokers or hostility only seamen, had only one object in view, to lift from the beach any, and all troops, British or Allied, within sight of the water's edge.
On their return to the United Kingdom when asked to report their proceedings it was only in answer to direct enquiry that it would transpire that these young men had been subjected, in many cases, to an unparalleled bombardment from the air. They appeared to consider that this was part of the day's work requiring no comment.
13. LOSSES OF TROOPS AFTER EMBARKATION.
It is a distressing fact that many ships were sunk or damaged on the return voyage when laden with troops. It is fortunate that in most of such cases the majority of such troops were saved owing to the large volume of traffic that was coming and going between Dunkirk and the United Kingdom.
Exceptions to this were due to the rapidity with which certain ships sank after having been bombed or torpedoed. Such cases are as follows:-
WAKEFUL torpedoed. Ship broke in half and only those on the upper deck were saved. About 600 troops were below.
CRESTED EAGLE. Was bombed and then beached in a burning condition. Only about 300 saved out of 600 on board.
SKIPJACK. 250 - 300 troops on board, most of whom, unfortunately, went down with the ship when she sank.
WAVERLEY/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 7.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
Wednesday, 29th May (continued)
well as from Dunkirk harbour, both from the aspect of the military situation and from the fact that Dunkirk was limited by a bottle-neck, formed by the narrow gangway along the East
Pier to the points of embarkation. Furthermore, there was every prospect of the weather improving and the surf reducing as the tide rose. Nevertheless, an increased number of
H.M. ships was ordered to Dunkirk to augment the personnel vessels, though it was feared that an accumulation of ships alongside the East Pier at Dunkirk by day might well invite intensive air attack,
Subsequently, this fear was fully to be justified.
25. Meantime, considerable anxiety was felt as to the fate of the personnel vessels which had been despatched in a steady stream to Dunkirk commencing the previous evening. The first of these was due back at Dover about 0300, but by 0900
nothing had been sighted or reported. But at 0700, S.N.O.,
Dunkirk, had reported that the embarkation there was going on at the rate of 2000 an hour, so it was presumed that the transports had failed to enter the harbour during darkness, had waited outside, and had commenced to enter in succession at dawn. The necessity for continuous fighter protection in view of the exposure of these unarmed ships while at Dunkirk and during the daylight passage through coastal waters, was obvious. Constant touch was maintained with R.A.F. Commands to obtain continuous fighter protection during the hours when the Vice Admiral, Dover, estimated the largest concentration of vessels would be present, it being realised that the R.A.F.
resources were not sufficient to provide continuous air cover, and to dispense with full cover at less important periods.
26.
At 0930 the belated return of the personnel vessels from Dunkirk commenced, and proceeded steadily through the day. In addition to the personnel vessels using Dunkirk the
Admiralty were informed of the necessity for X-lighters and other self-propelled lighters to increase the facilities for beach evacuation. A Medical Party was shipped in VERITY for use on the beaches, and a Naval Medical Party was sent to
Dunkirk.
27. The considerable alarm as to the immediate safety of the B.E.F. felt during the evening and early night of the
28th, which caused all available resources to be immediately concentrated on the French Coast, eased during the 29th. But emergency measures taken late on the 28th had an adverse effect on the orderly organisation for evacuation so necessary if effective measures were to be devised and put in force.
28. Meantime, in the early hours of' the 29th, an unfortunate disaster occurred involving the loss of H.M.
destroyers WAKEFUL and GRAFTON, and the danlayer COMFORT.
WAKEFUL, after embarking troops at Bray, sailed for Dover at
2300/28 by the Zuydecoote Pass and North Channel. Approaching the Kwinte Whistle Buoy the speed of the ships was 20 knots, and a zigzag of 40 deg es every 4 minutes was started. At
0045 two torpedo tracks were observed, one torpedo missed, the other hit ship amidships. WAKEFUL broke in half and the two portions sank in 15 seconds, each remaining standing with the midship/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 14.
peration "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
'hursday, 30th May. (Continued).
44. At Dunkirk there were no air attacks in the early orning and all was quict. Later, when ships began to arrive n quantity, in view of the massive target presented by a umber of ships alongside the East pier at C. time, the S.N.O.,
Dunkirk ordered destroyers alongside only one at a time. At bout 0800 a store ship arrived at Dunkirk with provisions but
10 water. This caused so much congestion on the pier that inloading was abandoned when half complete, and the store ship filled with troops. A certain amount of water was obtained from destroyers.
45. During the forenoon the Military constructed a long pier of lorries with deck planking, into the sea off Bray. This vas an excellent piece of work, but was insufficiently stable for use by such craft as paddle steamers, nor even smaller power craft in a lop. It was invaluable later for embarking troops into small boats. As regards general embarkation off the beaches, it was later learnt that it was c common occurrence for processions of small boats loaded with troops to be cast adrift when empty and allowed to float away to seaward, owing to the lack of sufficient naval ratings as boat-keepers. For the same reason many of the smaller pulling boats were swamped and sunk due to overloading by uncontrolled "rush" of soldiers.
Both these faults were remedied later.
46. Matters proceeded smoothly throughout the day owing to the mist and there being a big smoke cloud over Dunkirk which prevented the enemy bombers attacking the ships in large numbers.
In order to increase the rate of embarkation through the bottle-neck of the East Pier gangway, the troops were urged to quicken their pace and eventually thousands of troops, tired and without food and water for days, broke into the double and kept it up the whole length of the pier for more than two hours.
47. The attempt to maintain an adequate rate of lift using only the older destroyers was by now shown to be impracticable. The destroyers were lifting about 17,000, personnel vessels about 9500 in the 24 hours. Remaining vessels were estimated to be worth about 15,000 per day. This gave a total lift of about 43,000 per day. The situation called for & lift of at least 55,000 per day. Verbal representations being made to C.N.S., authority was received for the return to the Dover Command of the modern destroyers released the ight before.
Accordingly Commander-in-Chief, Nore, at 1531 gave orders to HARVESTER, HAVANT, IVANHOE, IMPULSIVE, ICARUS and
INTREPID to proceed at once to Dunkirk. Subsequently some of these destroyers were diverted to the beaches.
48/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 18.
Operation "DYNAMO". Narrative of Events.
Friday, 31st May (Continued).
Goodwins and commenced to hunt.
55. The arrivals at the home ports indicated that in spite of the frequent requests for more ships and more boats received from the various authorities on the French coast, the rate of evacuation was steadily increasing and would permit, all being well, of implementing the final evacuation plan during the night 31/5 - 1/6. Accordingly, instructions were issued for the special tows to leave Ramsgate at 1300/31 for
Dunkirk via Route X, and Commander-in-Chief, Nore, and Flag
Officer-in-Charge, Harwich, were requested to provide all available M.T.B.'s to escort this convoy for as much of the outward passage as possible, which was timed to commence from
Ramsgate at 1300/31. Speed of advance - 5 knots. A party of Naval officers had been assembled at Dover to embark in these tows and had been given detailed instructions on the plan. Two M.A./S boats and 2 M.T.B.'s in the Dover Command were ordered to accompany the boat convoy and subsequently embark the Commander-in-Chief, B.E.F. and Staff off the beaches.
56. Shortly after sunrise an on-shore wind arose and boat work became difficult, many whalers capsizing, and the prospects of completing the evacuation to plan began to be less favourable. The following extract from the report of
Captain Howson, S.N.O., on the beaches illustrates conditions at Bray at this time:
"At 0400 there was a very considerable number of destroyers, paddlers, trawlers, skoots, etc, off Bray, and embarkation was proceeding satisfactorily, but a lop had already started. There were about 10 motor yachts which had arrived from England. These craft drew 6-7
feet and were unable to get close in to any of the beaches. During the forenoon, considerable towing of empty craft towards the beach was carried out, and only about 2 boats were allowed to get adrift and ultimately ground. With the falling tide, however, a number of boats were seen to ground and remain ashore until the tide rose in the afternoon. These included an A.L.C., motor boat and a lifeboat. Other power boats broke down. Nevertheless, the embarkation, much hindered by the lop, proceeded satisfactorily. As further destroyers and sloops arrived, they were directed to lower their motor boats and whalers as this had not already been done, began to subside and with the rising tide conditions for these boats were quite invaluable. About noon, the lop embarkation very greatly improved, more boats were sent in and more boats floated off and matters were proceeding very well, when the gun at La Panne started to shell the beaches and fore hore with great accuracy. A certain number of light craft were sunk. The A.L.C. broke down and was towed away by a steamer. MOSQUITO, destroyers and sloops proceeded westward clear of the firing.
57/

Page 72
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
M.S. CALCUTTA on Captain Dennis Marescaux Leas. R.N.
Page 71
peration "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
BIDEFORD (Continued).
Displayed great personal courage in his decision to remain on board.
Recommended for decoration,
Stoker Petty Officer Charles William Donnelly. D/K.5995.
n
N.
Acting Cook Albert Victor Hocking, 58549.
When the ship was bombed everyone aft was killed or badly wounded except these two men. Stoker Petty
Officer Donnelly's duty was "in charge of the after fire and repair party". Hocking formed one of the
First Aid Party. The fire main aft was blown away and fire broke out in the cabin flat immediately above the after magazine. These two men, working entirely on their own initiative, ran hoses aft from the first connection and succeeded in getting the fire under control and hoses down the after magazine hatch to flood the magazine (the magazine flooding arrangements were destroyed) and partly flooded it before assistance came. Their prompt and efficient action probably saved the ship.
Recommended for decoration.
Signalman Charles Raymond Craig, D/JX. 141848.
Landed with an officer to organise embarkation on the beach, then joined one of the embarkation posts, took charge of the signalling apparatus and tring tered got into communication with several ships. When vors the station was destroyed by bombing, Craig improvised a signal lamp out of the headlight of a lorry and vas used this until the battery ran down. He remained hom ashore all night and was eventually sent back by the
M
embarkation officer. On arrival at Dover he volunteered to go over to Dunkirk pier, where signalmen were required, and spent another night there.
Recommended for mention.
ed
44
uplo

Page 100.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
M.B. CONSTANT NYMPH (continued).
performed gallant and meritorious service.
courage and disregard of danger, and undoubtedly
Recommended for decoration.
Motor Boat LADY CABLE: - Acting Sub. -Lieutenant a. A. Cadell. R.N.
Recommendations.
(Retired).
OFFICERS:
X
Acting Sub. Lieutenant G. A. Cadell, R.N.
D.S
on the night of June 2nd ferried about 200 French troops from Dunkirk Inner Harbour off to tugs and
WISHART. Finally, when all ships were leaving, embarked
24 French soldiers, having searched the Quay to see if any British remained. Then encountered a series of mishaps with his engines, and on the voyage home attempted to salve W. D. craft HAIG, all his crew and himself at one time or another falling overboard.
Finally broke down at mid-day on the 3rd, close to the
Coast, and was in grave peril of falling into enemy hands
Southwest of Dunkirk. LADY CABLE drifted helplessly about the Channel for many hours before being rescued.
Sub. Lieutenant Cadell, suffering from a weak heart, underwent considerable physical strain, and there is no doubt that he and his crew displayed remarkable courage, coolness and effic) ency.
M.
Recommended for mention.
Cadet Rating G. R. Price.
Acted as first lieutenant to Sub. -Lieutenant Cadell, whom he ably assisted. He had previously been in command of the Motor Boat SKYLARK.
turing stered ivors
Recommended for early promotion, was whom
Motor Yacht MASAYRU: - Skipper G. D. Olivier.
Recommendations.
OFFICER:
Skipper G. D. Olivier.
3
D.S.M.
With a civilian crew of 3 and one Leading Seaman,
R. N. sailed from Sheerness 0400/31 in convoy. On arriving off the beaches spent more than 48 hours on ferrying work, and in salving craft; and in towing off ships aground. Underwent the common experience of being stormed by French troops and having to repel these boarders in order to save his ship. When isolated, attacked by 4 Messerschmitts with machine-guns for about half an hour, and at other times was under sporadic gunfire. Ferried off a total of about 400 French troops.
This civilian displayed a complete disregard of danger and showed a high order of seamanship.
Recommended for decoration.

Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
Page 101.
RATING:
Engineer C. Coggins.
This civilian kept the engines of this motor yacht running the whole time, in spite of propeller required. He also put the engines of several other being fouled frequently and the continuous running boats to rights when they broke down. He ably assisted the Skipper throughout the operations.
Recommended for mention.
30 ft. Motor Yacht MAID ERRANT. - Able Seaman S. Palmer, D/JX.
148052.
Recommendations.
Able Seaman S. Palmer. D/JX. 148052.
Sailed from Sheerness on Friday, 31st May, in convoy for Dunkirk. En route rescued survivors of a French destroyer, then proceeded to the beaches.
There he was swamped by French soldiers swarming over his boat, which drifted ashore. Later the boat refloated and he took one V.C.O. and 8 British soldiers; he had no crew except one Stoker, who had great difficulty with the engine. Off Dunkirk, on the way home, the engine broke down, so he broke up the yacht's wood fittings and made the 8 soldiers paddle the boat. Later, the engine restarted after furing an 18 hour voyage. Next day, without orders, he ister sailed with a crew of one other Able Seaman, but was vivor turned back as his craft was too slow to take part in the night evacuation ordered for that evening.
was
Able Seaman Palmer states that he passed for whom
Leading Seaman in May, 1927. He states he
D.S.M.
possesses the L. S. & G. C. Medal.
n
Recommended for immediate advancement.
Drifter OCEAN BREEZE, War Department Launch HAIG and Skoot PASCHOLL.
(Lieutenant Victor Alexander Christian Henry George de Mauny,
R.N.Retired.
Recommendations,
X
Lieutenant Victor Alexander C.H.G. de Mauny, R.N.
Between noon on the 30th May and 0815 4th June continuously engaged under way on evacuation was duties without any intermission. Commanded in of a group of skoots in PASCHOLL. Brought back more succession OCEAN BREEZE, HAIG and then as Navigator conditions on two separate occasions. Was notably than 300 troops from Dunkirk beach in surf

Page 102.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
OCEAN BREEZE, HAIG
& PASCHOLL (cont).
more same successful than other small craft working in the the areas, On the 31st May, when he was 8 hours off coast, subjected to continuous air
Displayed great devotion to duty under attack. fire, and marked
Senior Officers on more than one occasion.
initiative; and was favourably reported upon by the
M.
Recommended for mention.
Motor Boat PRINCESS LILLY. - Sub. Lieutenant K.E.A.Bayley, R.N.V.R.
Recommendations.
Sub. Lieutenant K.E.A. Bayley. R.N.V.R.
Left Sheerness with 19 other small boats, escorted by a trawler as guide, as most of the boats had no compass. Half way across the trawler left them. Succeeded in making Dunkirk after giving assistance and many tows to motor-boats which broke down. Spent nearly 30 hours ferrying troops from
Dunkirk and La Panne beaches, displaying considerable ingenuity in working small boats in conjunction with
1
his own craft on a lee shore, under fire from bombing, machine-gunning and German artillery. Had a crew of two civilians and one Naval rating aged 191. Displayed determination and leadership of a high order.
M
during
Recommended for mention.
istered vivors was whom dotor Boat TRITON: - Lieutenant Robert Hunter Irving, R.N.R.
m
Recommendation.
&
i:
Lieutenant Robert Hunter Irving, R.N.R.
Took over a flotilla of launches from Sheerness to Ramsgate to Bray beach in the darkness with no navigating instruments. From 0500/30 to 1830/31 worked without help
3
ferrying off troops and co-ordinating the activities of other power boats in the vicinity. His boat acted as in flagship of Commodore Stephenson in control of embarkation, r
per who, together with other senior officers, comments most an favourably on this officer's conduct. Under almost
10
continuous air bombardment and artillery fire in capsized
1
and swamped boats he was inderatigable in his efforts.
of
Directly responsible for the successful embarkation of hundreds of troops. Set an excellent example of devotion to duty and gallant conduct, and performed a remarkable feat of endurance.
DSC
Recommended for decoration.

Page 71
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. BIDEFORD (Continued).
Displayed great personal courage in his decision to remain on board.
Recommended for decoration.
Stoker Petty Officer Charles William Donnelly. D/K.5995.
Acting Cook Albert Victor Hocking, D/MX.58549.
When the ship was bombed everyone aft was killed or badly wounded except these two men. Stoker Petty
Officer Donnelly's duty was "in charge of the after fire and repair party". Hocking formed one of the
First Aid Party. The fire main aft was blown away and fire broke out in the cabin flat immediately
DSW
above the after magazine. These two men, working entirely on their own initiative, ran hoses aft from the first connection and succeeded in getting the fire under control and hoses down the after magazine hatch to flood the magazine (the magazine flooding arrangements were destroyed) and partly flooded it before assistance came. Their prompt and efficient action probably saved the ship.
Recommended for decoration.
Signalman Charles Raymond Craig, D/JX.141848.
Landed with an officer to organise embarkation on the beach, then joined one of the embarkation posts, took charge of the signalling apparatus and got into communication with several ships. When the station was destroyed by bombing, Craig improvised a signal lamp out of the headlight of a lorry and used this until the battery ran down. He remained ashore all night and was eventually sent back by the embarkation officer. On arrival at Dover he volunteered to go over to Dunkirk pier, where signalmen were required, and spent another night there.
Recommended for mention.

Page 100.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
CONSTANT NYMPH (continued).
performed gallant and meritorious service.
courage and disregard of danger, and undoubtedly
Recommended for decoration.
Motor Boat LADY CABLE: - Acting Sub. -Lieutenant G. A. Cadell. (Retired). R.N.
Recommendations.
OFFICERS:
Acting Sub. Lieutenant G. A. Cadell, R.N.
On the night of June 2nd ferried about 200 French troops from Dunkirk Inner Harbour off to tugs and
WISHART. Finally, when all ships were leaving, embarked
24 French soldiers, having searched the Quay to see if any British remained. Then encountered a series of mishaps with his engines, and on the voyage home attempted to salve W. D. craft HAIG, all his crew and himself at one time or another falling overboard.
Finally broke down at mid-day on the 3rd, close to the
Coast, and was in grave peril of falling into enemy hands
Southwest of Dunkirk. LADY CABLE drifted helplessly about the Channel for many hours before being rescued.
Sub. Lieutenant Cadell, suffering from a weak heart, underwent considerable physical strain, and there is no doubt that he and his crew displayed remarkable courage, coolness and efficiency.
Recommended for mention.
Cadet Rating G. R. Price,
Acted as first lieutenant to Sub. -Lieutenant Cadell, whom he ably assisted, He had previously been in command of the Motor Boat SKYLARK.
Recommended for early promotion.
Motor Yacht MASAYRU: - Skipper G. D. Olivier.
Recommendations.
OFFICER:
Skipper G. D. Olivier.
R. N. sailed off the beaches spent more than and 48 in hours towing on
With a from Sheerness 0400/31 in convoy.
civilian crew of 3 and one Leading Seaman, On arriving ships ferrying boarders half stormed attacked aground. by work, by in THE and Underwent troops in salving and the of having craft; common to 400 under When experience repel French sporadic isolated, these for danger troops. of about gun- being off
This fire. Forried off a total disregard of and
Recommended for decoration.

Fage 101
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
RATING:
Engineer C. Coggins.
This civilian kept the engines of this motor yacht running the whole time, in spite of propeller being fouled frequently and the continuous running required. He also put the engines of several other boats to rights when they broke down. He ably assisted the Skipper throughout the operations.
Recommended for mention.
M

Page 102.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
Displayed more same the coast, areas, successful great subjected On devotion than the 31st other to continuous May, small when craft air he attack, was working 8 hours in the off
Senior initiative; Officers and on was more favourably than to duty one reported under occasion. fire, upon and by marked the
Recommended for mention.
Motor Boat PRINCESS LILLY. - Sub. Lieutenant K.E.A.Bayley, R.N.V.R.
Recommendations.
Sub. Lieutenant K.E.A. Bayley, R.N.V.R.
Left Sheerness with 19 other small boats, escorted by a trawler as guide, as most of the boats had no compass. Half way across the trawler left them. Succeeded in making Dunkirk after giving assistance and many tows to motor-boats which broke down. Spent nearly 30 hours ferrying troops from
Dunkirk and La Panne beaches, displaying considerable ingenuity in working small boats in conjunction with his own craft on a lee shore, under fire from bombing, machine-gunning and German artillery. Had a crew of two civilians and one Naval rating aged 191. Displayed determination and leadership of a high order.
Recommended for mention.
Motor Boat TRITON: - Lieutenant Robert Hunter Irving, R.N.R.
Recommendation.
Lieutenant Robert Hunter Irving, R.N.R.
over a flotilla of launches from Sheerness
Took to Bray beach in the darkness with without no navigating help to Ramsgate From 0500/30 to 1830/31 worked activities of instruments. ferrying off troops and co-ordinating His the boat acted as
Directly who, continuous other favourably flagship and swamped together power responsible of on air Commodore boats with in other the for Stephenson vicinity: senior conduct. excellent officers, in control in example Under embarkation fire comments his of remarkable almost efforts, in of embarkation, most capsized devotion of feat hundreds to duty and of gallant troops. conduct, Set an and performed a of endurance.
Recommended for decoration.