TNA ADM 199 792

CONFIDENTIAL 116
Report on Operation "DYNAMO",
Page 5.
111
more so as the our outnumbered airmen was so of the same evening, gallantry which of recounted the opposite story. The obvious at the time, and was the admiration of all.
9.
No. 11 Group Fighter Patrols - Dunkirk area history.
Total flying
Enemy aircraft
Date. Patrols.
hours daily.
destroyed.
Enemy aircraft driven down.
26/5
22
480
30
27/5
23
536
20
48
32
28/5
11
576
20
6
29/5
9
674
78
8
30/5
9
704
--
I
31/5
8
490
36
4
1/6
8
558
69
2/6
4
231
16
6
3/6
4
339
--
I
4/6
3
234
--
I
Total flying hours 4,822
Notes: (1) It will be observed that the number of patrols decreased from 27th May onwards, whilst there was an increase in the daily flying hours. This is due to the fact that the fighters were employed in increasingly bigger patrols as the enemy air opposition increased.
(2) Operation Dynamo suffered most from enemy air effort on 29/5 and on 1/6, after which latter date the combination of enemy air attack and shore artillery fire led to the suspension of the operation by day.
10.
The position of enemy batteries had been located by air reconnaissance by nightfall on 31st May, and additional batteries in the Gravelines area on the Ist June.
Air bombardment of these batteries during the 1st and 2nd
June undoubtedly reduced their fire during dusk and dawn on each of the nights 2/6 - 3/6 and 3/6 - 4/6, when seaborne traffic was passing within range of the enemy batteries commanding the south end of X Route, the Dunkirk Roads, and
Dunkirk Harbour. This was a valuable contribution by the
R.A.F. to the successful outcome of the operation. A
similar beneficial result was obtained by the bombing of the batteries which had Dunkirk Pier and roadstead under fire.
11.
CONTROL OF ALLIED TROOPS.
In the earlier stages the large number of British troops located in the dunes off the beach were of rear formations with few officers. Command of these mixed units was fact noticeable that Army by Officers' its absence, uniform aggravated, is indistinguishable no doubt, in by from the that of other ranks. When Naval Officers appeared their order in most cases was quickly restored, to commands in a disciplined manner.
In the absence of any Army embarkation staff or organisation a strong Naval party was required to form up and embark the troops. Later, no difficulty was experienced when fighting/ troops of

124/3
CONFIDENTIAL.
122
Page 3,
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
27/5
Monday, 27th May (continuod).
2 Military Officers from G.H.Q., which suggested that the situation of the B.E.F. was procarious and it was possible that the enomy might succeed in cutting off this force from Dunkirk.
This report appeared to confirm the results of air rcconnaissance, which indicated that German armoured units wore operating to the south of Dunkirk. Sinco it appeared that ovacuation might well be strictly limited, both in regard to numbers and time available for the operation, it was a cided to concentrate every effort in sending 'ovcr as many craft as possible to the beaches without delay. Had the situation appeared to be less critical, an organised flow of large and small craft working in reliefs would have been arranged.
9.
On receipt of these signals from S.N.O., Dunkirk, all available forces were diverted to the beaches, the Personnel
Ships to the beach, code letters A.B.C. and D., the destroyers on patrol being diverted to La Panne. Destroyers that were working off Dunkirk were ordered to divert the Personnel Ships going into Dunkirk to lay off the beaches and the smaller craft such as drifters and motor boats were ordered to be used for ferrying troops from the beach to the larger ships. Two
27MAY
important strings of boats being towed by a tug were lost in the night through the tows being run down and cut in half, the boats being scattered.
10.
As a result of the above action there were assembling off the beaches 2 transports, 9 destroyers, 4 minesweepers,
CALCUTTA, 17 drifters and a few skoots, and all the ships were ordered to use their own boats for ferrying as none of the inshore flotilla had arrived. From signals received it appeared that the situation was desperate, that little could be lifted direct from the Port of Dunkirk, and that the maximum effort must be made from the beaches. Commander-in-Chief, Nore, at this stage provided additional reinforcements of minesweepers and paddlers. During the night, Vice Admiral, Dover, was informed of continuous bombing and machine gunning of troops in the beach areas, and directed Senior Officers present on the beach to use their discretion in ordering withdrawal of the
Naval forces, observing that a strong fighter protection should be expected after dawn; this having been arranged after a special visit by the Liaison Officer to Hawkinge to procure the maximum effort.
11. Limiting factors were thought most likely to be restrictions due to enemy action at Dunkirk and on the beaches, and the difficulties of concentrating the ships and troops at a common point or points. The general evacuation plan had been conveyed to the G.O.C. by the S.N.O. on his way to Dunkirk, and the Vice Admiral, Dover, hoped to receive in return some outline of the Military's operational plan upon which the rate of evacuation in the various areas under the scheme must depend.
Subject to the development of beach evacuation and the continuation of fine weather, it appeared to the Vice Admiral that adequate shipping for his plans was either in, or on, its way to the Dover area, except for a chronic shortage of beaching boats.
nes f the
Tuesday, 28th May ch. their ted to/

127
126
128
CONFIDENTIAL..
Page 7.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
29/
Wednesday, 29th May (continued)
well as from Dunkirk harbour, both from the aspect of the military situation and from the fact that Dunkirk was limited by a bottle-neck, formed by the narrow gangway along the East
Pier to the points of embarkation. Furthermore, there was every prospect of the weather improving and the surf reducing as the tide rose. Nevertheless, an increased number of
H.M. ships was ordered to Dunkirk to augment the personnel vessels, though it was feared that an accumulation of ships alongside the East Pier at Dunkirk by day might well invite intensive air attack,
Subsequently, this fear was fully to be justified.
25. Meantime, considerable anxiety was felt as to the fate of the personnel vessels which had been despatched in a steady stream to Dunkirk commencing the previous evening. The first of these was due back at Dover about 0300, but by 0900
nothing had been sighted or reported. But at 0700, O.,
Dunkirk, had reported that the embarkation there was going on at the rate of 2000 an hour, so it was presumed that the transports had failed to enter the harbour during darkness, had waited outside, and had commenced to enter in succession at dawn. The necessity for continuous fighter protection in view of the exposure of these unarmed ships while at Dunkirk and during the dayligh passage through coastal waters, was obvious, Constant touch was maintained with R.A.F. Commands to obtain continuous fighter protection during the hours when the Vice Admiral, Dover, estimated the largest concentration of vessels would be present, it being realised that the R.A.F.
3
resources were not sufficient to provide continuous air cover, ed and to dispense with full cover at less important periods.
26. At 0930 the belated return of the personnel vessels from Dunkirk commenced, and proceeded steadily through the day. In addition to the personnel vessels using Dunkirk the
Admiralty were informed of the necessity for X-lighters and other self-propelled lighters to increase the facilities for beach evacuation. A Medical Party was shipped in VERITY for use on the beaches, and a Naval Medical Party was sent to
Dunkirk.
27. The considerable alarm as to the immediate safety of the B.E.F. felt during the evening and early night of the k
28th, which caused all available resources to be immediately concentrated on the French Coast, eased during the 29th. But e
emergency measures taken late on the 28th had an adverse effect on the orderly organisation for evacuation so necessary le if effective measures were to be devised and put in force.
28. Meantime, in the early hours of the 29th, an unfortunate disaster occurred involving the loss or H.M.
destroyers WAKEFUL and GRAFTON, and the danlayer COMFORT.
WAKEFUL, after embarking troops at Bray, sailed for Dover at
2300/28 by the Zuydecoote Pass and North Channel. Approaching the Kwinte Whistle Buo the speed of the ships was 20 knots, and a zigzag of 40 degrees every 4 minutes was started. At
0045 two torpedo tracks were observed, one torpedo missed, the other hit ship smidships. WAKEFUL broke in half and the two portions sank in 15 secends, each remaining standing midship/ with the

138
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 17." 136
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
31/5
Friday, 31st May.
51. The Admiralty informed the Vice Admiral that the policy of H. M. Government was that both British and French troops be given an equal opportunity of being evacuated in
British ships and boats.
52. Personnel ships had been sailed the previous evening and throughout the night of the 30th/31st to provide for a continuous flow into Dunkirk harbour. But at 0320 the S.N.O.
reported that once again the majority of these Personnel ships had failed to enter the harbour during the dark hours. MALCOLM, however, left Dunkirk with 1,200 troops at 0300, during heavy shelling, on relief by IVANHOE. S.N.O. Dunkirk, however, continued to call for more ships. No more destroyers were available and there were no means of accelerating the arrival of the vessels despatched there. By 0700 the Vice Admiral had no news of the fate of the personnel ships that had sailed the previous evening and during the night, None of these ships had reached the U.K. to unload, and it appeared probable that these ships may have concentrated in the narrow waters close to Dunkirk, inviting a repetition of the heavy air attacks with consequent damage and loss to transports which had occurred on the two previous occasions when personnel vessels, together with other ships, had been concentrated in large numbers in the approaches to Dunkirk.
At this time there were no less than 9 personnel vessels and 3 hospital carriers known to be on the round trip
U.K. - Dunkirk and back, and one other personnel vessel had been ordered to sail during the night, but horwhereabouts was unknown and it was feared that she had refused to sail.
In addition, 3 other personnel vessels were under orders to sail between 0900 and 1030. Pending the return of the ships en passage, and while the coal-burners were being rebunkered, the further sailing of personnel vessels was in suspense.
Note: Owing to the casualties to Personnel vessels at this stage, coal burning cross channel steamers had to be used for some of the trips and short endurance necessitated coaling between trips which could not be done in the vicinity of Dover, thus preventing a quick turn round.
53. During the night a considerable amount of enemy minelaying activity by air was reported. Shelling was heavy during the evening and night, and operations were greatly hampered. Nevertheless, with the cessation of shelling at about 0300, very good progress was made and by full dawn the beaches were very nearly clear of troops. At 0530 attacks on
Dunkirk harbour and the beach from Dunkirk to Bray developed more strength and the bombardment of Dunkirk continued.
Nevertheless, the S.N.O. reported that the embarkation there was proceeding satisfactorily but stressed the need for more ships and constant fighter protection. At this time French troops began to appear at Dunkirk pier and on the beaches, and were embarked with the British troops.
54. At 0600 VIMY sighted submarine off the N.W.
Goodwins/

143
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 22
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
141
31/5
Friday 31st May (continued).
65. Casualties to H.M, Ships during 31st May,
M/S DEVONIA received damage from near miss bombs whilst off La Panne. About 1600 ship was ordered to be beached.
At 0600 on the 1st, after having destroyed all useful apparatus, and ammunition put overboard, ship was beached and abandoned.
M/S HEBE, whilst off Dunkirk, was damaged by enemy aircraft and returned under own power to Dover.
Destroyer EXPRESS. Damaged by enemy aircraft whilst off Dunkirk.
Saturday 1st June.
66.
2 Hospital Carriers which had sailed the previous
1/6
evening returned shortly after dawn. Only one had succeeded in entering Dunkirk Harbour, the other had laid off 4 hours under heavy fire and returned to Dover. 4 personnel vessels failed to enter Dunkirk during the night, but succeeded in the early hours of the morning. One of these, the PRAGUE, was bombed and severely damaged half-way across on the return journey, but succeeded in making the Downs with the assistance of tugs, where troops transferred to other ships particularly
A/S trawlers LADY PHILOMENE and OLVINA. The supply of personnel vessels was maintained throughout the day, not without a series of setbacks caused by 3 ships refusing to sail and by
2 being turned back when on passage, by French Destroyers owing to heavy bombing and shelling of the approaches to Dunkirk.
Of those that operated during the 24 hours, 1 was sunk, 2
damaged by bombs and shell-fire and 1 by collision.
67. During the middle watch it transpired that no further troops were attempting to evacuate from La Panne off which were stationed one paddle minesweeper, a fleet sweeper and two destroyers, probably due to the heavy shelling from German guns eastward, and later information was received that the troops were marching from La Panne through Bray towards
Dunkirk. Accordingly, during the night the Rear Admiral,
Dover, instructed all small craft to move wast, with boats in tow, towards Dunkirk, and the Vice Admiral directed all ships under orders for La Panne to other positions further west, concentrating the main effort on the beach immediately east of Dunkirk.
To a request from Dunkirk for Hospital Ships, the
Vice Admiral replied at 0715 that the large ship berths alongside at Dunkirk must be occupied by personnel ships and the wounded that could conveniently be embarled should go with personnel. This direction was in accordance with the Government policy previously communicated to the Vice Admiral.
68. Soon after dawn enemy aircraft were active and heavy bombing and machine gun attacks developed at 0500 over the whole area from Dunkirk to La Panne. A second series of attacks commenced at 0830 and lasted until 0900, during which time nearly every ship off the coast was subjected to intensive bombing and machine gunning, formations of 30 and 40
machines/

APPENDIX I.
160
to
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
162
LIST OF H.M. SHIPS, PERSONNEL SHIPS AND HOSPITAL CARRIERS
TAKING. PART.
A.A. CRUISER: CALCUTTA
DESTROYERS:
ANTHONY HARVESTER MALCOLM VIVACIOUS
161
159
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 40
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
June 1st, noon. Dunkirk East Beach.
"Conditions other than state of the sea, which was good, were shocking. The German planes were flying low and using machine guns. Operation delayed as great difficulty was experienced persuading some of the French to embark.
So far as I could understand their units were incomplete, and they were unwilling that part of a unit should embark without the rest. At one point on the beach there were at least 2,000 men, none of whom would embark."
Monday, 3rd June. Dunkirk East Pier. 0045.
"There were no troops on the jetty so I went to the inner end. There I found a French Colonel with about 3,000
men waiting to be told where to go. I had to stand at the end telling them that their Colonel was in my ship before they would follow."
ARTLETT
LA DORADO
RINGIA
STELLA
OLVES
OLVINA
ffice of
Flag Officer Commanding,
MIN
SILVER DAWN
Dover.
DRI
June, 1940.

APPENDIX I.
160
to
Operation "DYNAMO"
Narrative of Events.
162
-
LIST OF H.M. SHIPS, PERSONNEL SHIPS AND HOSPITAL CARRIERS
TAKING. PART.
A.A. CRUISER:
CALCUTTA
DESTROYERS:
ANTHONY
HARVESTER
MALCOLM
VIVACIOUS
BASILISK
HAVANT
MONTROSE
WAKEFUL
BLYSKAWICA
ICARUS
SABRE
WHITEHALL
CODRINGTON
IMPULSIVE
SALADIN
WHITSHED
ESK
INTREPID
SCIMITAR
WINCHELSEA
EXPRESS
IVANHOE
SHIKARI
WINDSOR
GALLANT
JAGUAR
VENOMOUS
WOLFHOUND
GRAFTON
JAVELIN
VANQUISHER
WOLSEY
GRENADE
KEITH
VERITY
WORCESTER
GREYHOUND
MACKAY
VIMY
(40)
SLOOPS:
BIDEFORD
GUNBOATS:
LOCUST
MOSQUITO
UNESWEEPERS:
ALBURY
HEBE
QUEEN OF THANET
BRIGHTON QUEEN
HALCYON
ROSS
BRIGHTON BELLE
KELLETT
SALAMANDER
DEVONIA
LEDA
SALTASH
DUNDALK
LYDD
SKIPJACK
DUCHESS OF FIFE
MARMION
SANDOWN
EMPEROR OF INDIA
MEDWAY QUEEN
SNAEFELL
EL
FITZROY
NIGER
SPEEDWELL
GLENAVON
ORIOLE
SUTTON
GLENGO
PANGBOURNE
SHARPSHOOTER
GOSSAMER
PLYNLIMMON
WAVERLEY
GRACIE FIELDS
PRINCESS ELIZABETH WESTWARD HO
A/S VESSELS:
ARLEY
COMFORT
MARETTA
BOTANIC
CONIDAW
NAUTILUS
BROCK
FYLDEA
POLLY JOHNSON
CALVI
GULZAR
SANGASSO
CHICO
JOHN CATLING
STARLIGHT RAYS
re
SPECIAL SERVICE CRESTED EAGLE
GOLDEN EAGLE
ROYAL EAGLE
ESSELS:
"LL" TRAWLERS: INVERFORTH LORD INCHCAPE OUR BAIRNS THOMAS BARTLETT
it
A/S TRAWLERS:
ARGYLLSHIRE
KINGSTON ANDALUSITE STELLA DORADO
ore
BLACKBURN ROVERS
KINGSTON OLIVINE
THURINGIA
CAYTON WYKE
LADY PHILOMENA
WESTELLA
an
GRIMSBY TOWN
SAON
WOLVES
ue
KINGSTON ALALITE
SPURS
OLVINA
all
INE RECOVERY
FIDGET
JACKETA
SILVER DAWN
RIFTERS:
FISHER BOY
LORD CAVAN

CONFIDENTIAL.
APPENDIX. VI.
179
to
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
177
5
Enemy aircraft destroyed by ships' fire.
Ship.
Locality.
Time.
Polish T.B.D. BLYSKAWICA
Dunkirk Roads.
H.M.S. VIVACIOUS
0315/27
Dunkirk Roads.
H.M.S. VIVACIOUS
1130/27
Dunkirk Roads.
H.M.S. WOLFHOUND
1140/27
Dunkirk Roads.
H.M.P.M/S MEDWAY QUEEN
1500/27
North Goodwin.
HcM.Sc MONTROSE
Dawn/28
Near Kwinte Buoy.
M.T.B. 16
1500/28
Bray.
1530/28
H.M.S. SABRE and other ships
Dunkirk Harbour.
1630/29
H.M.S. BIDEFORD
Dunkirk Roads.
1700/29
H.M.S. EXPRESS
Dunkirk Roads.
1700/29
H.M.S. MOSQUITO
Bray.
1900/29
S.S. LEVENWOOD (Store ship}
Bray.
S.S. LEVENWOOD ( - do
1210/31
Bray.
1220/31
H.M. Skoot AMAZONE
Dunkirk Roads.
1440/31
H.M.S. HEBE
La Panne.
1700/31
af
H.M.S. SCIMITAR and other ships
Bray.
1700/31
S.S. LADY OF MAN (Trassport) Dunkirk Roads.
1700/31
nd
H.M.Y. ARONIA
La Panne.
1830/31
H.M.S. WHITSHED
Dunkirk Roads.
1930/31
H.M.S. SALTASH
Bray.
2000/31
S.S. NEPHRITE (Store ship)
On Route X.
2030/31
H.M.Y. GRIVE
Dunkirk Roads.
2030/31
H.M.Y. ARONIA
Dunkirk Harbour.
0500/1
H.M.S. IVANHOE
La Panne.
0530/1
is
H.M.S. LYDD
Bray.
0600/1
H.M.S. HARVESTER
Dunkirk Harbour.
0600/1
H.M.S. HARVESTER and other ships
Dunkirk Roads.
0610/1
H.M.Ships CODRINGTON,
3
HARVESTER and others
Off Gravelines.
0750/1
S
H.M.S. SKIPJACK
La Panne.
0900/1
H.M.S. MALLARD
On Route X.
1015/1
H.M.S. CALCUTTA
Between W and Y Buoys.
1020/1
H.M.P. M/S MEDWAY QUEEN
West of Dunkirk.
1600/1
H.M.Y. ALOUETTE
Off Gravelines.
1700/1
H.M.Y. CRISTOBEL II and other ships
La Panne.
1730/1.
H.M.S. WORCESTER
Dunkirk Roads.
2000/1
TOTAL: 35 enemy aircraft definitely destroyed by ships'
gun fire between 0300/27 and 2000/1.
ery
In addition over the same period 21 others were heavily damaged by ships' fire (and seen in distress but
NOT seen to crash definitely) of H.M. Ships HARVESTI
IVANHOE, VIVACIOUS, WINCHELSEA, WOLFHOUND, SABRE,
LOCUST, FITZROY, LYDD, MALLARD, MOSQUITO, WOLSEY,
EXPRESS, JAGUAR, GLEN AVON, ORIOLE, H.N.Y. ARONIA, as
Storeship NEPHRITE and French M.T.B.24.
)p]
Note: On 30th May flying conditions were bad and few enemy aircraft operated. After the 1st June operations proceeded only between dusk and day.
i

SECRET
34.
La
Panne anchorage was
Nieuport passed or La until Caxide the and town this and became under more shell fire under time continuous shell and machine beach at withdrawn from this gun hit and proceeded to the westward.
troops were area. "Vivacious proceeded now reaching. Braye, which the anch
35. At at 0030 slow speed on 1st towards June "Keith" weighed at artillery 0206. were The ship arrived of
36. As dawn broke ships embarking men from weighed anchor, the beach being clear to the eastwa th before returning to England.
the ships proceeded towards Dunkirk to fill up with
37. At 0510 ten enemy fighters attacked the
"Keith" and other ships with bursts of machine gun which were inaccurate but might have caused serious to bridge personnel if pressed home.
38. Shells, apparently fired from shore batter the eastward, again fell close to the ship at 0520
off Braye.
4.7" 39. barrage and pom-pom fire. This barrage was eff
At 0555 enemy bomber aircraft were engaged and split the formation. A fuze setting of 18=4000
considered to be the shortest practical setting than firing this be used the aircraft are above the was at formations of aircraft. If a shorter elevation setti the guns before they get into range.
0630 "Keith" was standing off between ships with and collected La from the beaches during the night.
40. Panne From superintending the departure of
At 0737 a very large number dive heavy 41. bomber and fighter round aircraft were vertical
"Keith" bombers circling which rapidly carried out extremely a no doubt that at the releasing dive five as bombs 80° and each. that the There bombs is good are released as no with mass tar was 900 is as feet. offered steep The and each flying pilot was delivered extremely was attack able skill ammunition and dash. was The exhausted, enemy normal. attack. effect effective gunners gun 42. until in All keeping The addition 3" 3" H.A.gun ammunition the to attackers the proved hit ship's was in this attack a beating but lineaused there action several jamb 43. of bombs the steering very "Keith" eteering.gearterwards.com near across was misses the not after and one part of of these, the Fore as enemy was manoeuvrentro for hand ship engines continued steering aft to by circle at high vouched were in
(NOTE: continually Times from sight. now forward cannot.44. be At about

234
REPORT ON THE LOSS OF H.M.S. SKIPJACK, 1st JUNE 1940. 0845 222
(1).
Skipjack anchored at 0030 on June 1st, 1940 off La Panne.
She had only one serviceable small boat and that had no rudder, the ship's boats having been left behind off Dunkirk on a previous trip.
Puler 52
(2).
It was understood that embarkation of troops would commence at once in boats believed to be organised by the Army and beach parties ashore. No boats, however, arrived.
(3).
During the time Skipjack was anchored off La Panne there was considerable enemy air activity, one parashutemine being dropped about one cable inshore from the ship. There was some shelling.
(4).
At break of dawn about 0330 it was decided to weigh and
1/6
endeavour to pick up and man any derelict boats that could be found. Skipjack, therefore, set a course to the westward and managed to secure three boats; some troops were also picked up. As several of H.M. ships were in the vicinity, course was continued to opposite a point on the beach about one mile to the eastward of Dunkirk, where there was only one small skoot operating. The boats were then sent inshore and the embarkation of troops commenced. The ship was kept under weigh owing to considerable enemy air activity.
(5).
From this time onwards, thought to be about 0530, there were continued enemy bombing attacks. Several W/T messages were transmitted asking for fighter assistance. Except for one period of about 5 minutes no fighters were seen.
(6).
At about 0600 a derelict motor launch was got in working order and embarkation of troops continued apace.
P.T.O.

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL.
238
2nd June, 1940.
The Flag Officer in Charge.
Harwich Naval Base.
240
Copy Captain M/S.
WAVERLEY
Sir,
I have the honour to submit my report on the operations ordered by your 1016/28.
The Flotilla viz. Waverley, Oriole, Marmion and Duchess of Fife arrived off La Panne at 2345 and
28/5
anchored.
At dawn positions were taken up along the coast and embarkation of troops commenced. Ships boats were used as the only means of conveyance available at the time, and we passed a line secured on shore to haul the boats across the tide which was running. Thus the process was necessarily a slow one until the use of beach punts and boats accelerated the flow of troops.
first
29/5
At approximately 1,0.00 on the 29th May, Oriole who had gone close to the beach found herself unable to
Pame get off. Meanwhile she was crowded with troops boarding her and it was necessary to relieve the ship from overcrowding.
1e
Marmion and Duchess of Fife embarked troops nearer
Dunkirk and left about mid-day, each taking about 300.
About 1500 Waverley had embarked approximately y
your ahandoned in a smking condition (the sponsons being under water), the position new hi
T busy.
or
The confidential books in safe were qu macessable, onco on bridge r in W/T Room relieved o
to C.13. officer Door.
si d

258
3 -
131
King
255
this damage did not seem so serious as the fact that the steering gear was out of action and that the steam which prevented us from getting into the steering flat being no stop valve accessible.
could not be cut off the boilers - there apparently
29/5
76
A fire had broken out in the Stewards' quarters on the starboard side, but I was able to put this out without much trouble. The holes made forward were of a jagged nature, from three to four inches at greatest width, and also a number of rivets were blown out. Some damage to an oil bunker was apparent, as oil fuel was coming into the seamen's sleeping quarters forward in considerable but not heavy quantity. The worst hole in the stokers' quarters was caused by the blowing in of a completely deadlighted porthole.
All leaks were eventually stopped that were visible, and the pumps seemed to be coping with any influx successfully. Owing to the darkness it was difficult in some parts of the ship to fully ascertain all damage or possible hidden weaknesses.
I went ashore to discuss the situation with the
Senior Naval Officer and had to report that I did not anticipate the ship being seaworthy before dawn, and that she was certainly not in a fit state to take on troops.
The ship had in the meantime been secured alongside, bow in.
It was considered from information now gained that the ship would again become subject to attacks at dawn, and would then most probably be destroyed. The Senior
Naval Officer instructed me to either proceed to sea or endeavour to ground the ship on the East side of the Pier, where she would be useful as a breakwater.
Soon after 0030 on the 30th May I decided to leave
30/5
the berth, as the ship was aground and might be difficult to get off later. I also decided that if the ship was sufficiently manoeuvreable to be grounded where required that she could also possibly be extricated either bow or stern first from Dunkirk Roads and possibly reach assistance
Ph
I found thes:-
my hungomy:- one V.U and 4 scander wounded hilding
:- 4 here killed / Officer and nt men mounded.
tomage to the ship was rus tamed as follows
/. 55. coils severed
2. Two life loats badly boled
3- Boar back piered Priside
4. are rentilator holed and sundy minor depects to wining etc

2
(4)
291
Dark oil tanks when we arrived near Dunkerque. burnin above. lighted up the sky, with Flames from smoke at anchor Saw a ship (CLAN MACALLISTER) a black pall of provided a off Braye: burning until the on fire offshore but plight. Another deserted merchant ship was in similar and guns. useful diversion for German bombers end, deserted, shore
0400 30th May. time, parties in destroyer's boats. South, All landing the We approached beach Dunkerque beaches from the
Cdr. and it was not until 0400 that we found HEBE this took (Lieut.-
the John Temple) off Braye and transferred to her. At
Flat same time the 2 Commodores were put into drifters.
to boats off the beaches. Bush (who was in HEBE) seemed and calm: difficult to see in dark; many ships, drifters be rather despondent, having seen the shore black with men standing up to their waists in water; embarkation process being extremely slow.
Dawn
Arrived ahead. in HEBE off La Panne and got some idea of the task
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Physical description of the beach. Long stretch of sand dunes rising fairly steeply in places from a gently shelving beach which dries for 200 yards or more at L.W.
Offshore the water deepens very gradually and a destroyer cannot get nearer than half a mile, etc.
Large groups of men all over the beaches and a dark line of men at the water's edge. Off Braye BIDEFORD was ashore with her stern completely blown off by a bomb: LOCUST -
river g.b. - trying to tow her off, which she eventually did and got her back to England. Farther towards Dunkerque another ship (CRESTED EAGLE?) was high and dry and burnt out; also many boats broached to on the beach. Lying off were destroyers, sloops, drifters, etc., and men making their way off in whalers, motor boats and pontoon craft.
A slight swell made landing difficult, and many boats broached to and were stranded on a falling tide. The visibility was not good, with low-lying clouds: very thankful for this, a blessing we were not always to enjoy.
Daylight
Could now get a clearer idea of situation and conditions.
Beaches were packed with troops, but they appeared to be orderly and under proper control. A few ships were lying as close in as possible and were being slowly filled up by their own boats and a few local craft. Ships' motor boats were towing off the whalers assisted by motor launchen but these could not get very close in; pontoon craft were being paddled off by soldiers, but it was not easy to get them back ashore again and often they were left to float away empty. As soon as a sloop or destroyer was full up
I
she left and took her boats with her - the boats' crews were guns' crews and no one wanted to be without them.
To anyone with the appreciation of the practical difficult-l ies of embarking in small boats with a long pull to seaward'
the sight of that beach black with troops was dismaying.
The number steadily increased and at back of our minds all ore the time was question and fear of how long the defence line could hold and the weather remain fair.
(6) 0630
Crux of matter was boats, boats' crews and towage; and at
0630 I signalled the urgent need of these. By about 0730
0730
most of the ships had loaded up and were leaving: I asked r for more ships and again stressed need of boats.
I now moved down to Dunkerque to get in communication with hit.
Tennant and went alongside pier in response to a signal.
nore
Description of Dunkerque (see plan). Outer harbour is formed by 2 breakwaters approx at right angles, leaving a and narrow entrance between. Western Arm of solid stone:
que
Eastern Arm (called here East Pier) only solid for short al part of inshore end, the rest being built of concrete piles.o wide enough for 4 men walking abreast. Alongside short through which tide flows and on which is a narrow pathway East isi
Pier is channel to inner harbour and docks. A
length

6
Destroyers, arriving, minesweepers and all manner of 298 205
were at one but there were often periods and when Dunkerque continuously, loading and leaving the beaches craft were
Bombing of place or another and embarkation had no shi wait. ps the ships and beaches had so far been to -
sound day of had been overcast and visibility was not spasmodic good;
freedom from air attack.
fighters overhead seemed to account for our
0400 31st May. Report received at 0400 of aircraft dropping mines 1 mile north of La Panne: planes frequently passed close overhead during dark hours.
Dawn
Light N. W. wind sprang up right on the beaches: many boats seen capsized, broached to or high and diry, including at least one of the local boats which carried a lot of men and could get close inshore. Not a cheering sight.
Sky cleared and visibility improved; absence of haze all day.
0730
Made contact with KEITH. EXPRESS now fully loaded and left for Dover as soon as I had transferred to KEITH, in which ship I now hoisted my flag - prior to this I had used a Red Ensign (no flag being available before) to indicate which ship I was in.
While I was in KEITH she did not embark any troops - same as for HEBE.
1035
To VA, Dover:- "Majority of boats broached to and have no crews. Conditions on beach very bad due to freshening onshore wind. Only small numbers being embarked even in daylight. Under present conditions any large scale embarkation from beach is quite impracticable; motor boats cannot get close in. Only hope of embarking any number is at Dunkerque. Will attempt to beach ship to form a lee to try to improve conditions."
Reply:- Urging importance of using beaches as long as
(15) 1105 To possible. VA, Dover:- "Dunkerque our only real hope. Can guns shelling pier from westward be bombed and silenced?"
Successful use of Dunkerque depended on being able to put ships alongside Eastern breakwater: my constant fear that this might be so accurately shelled as to render it untenable. Signalled to shore urging movement towards Dunkerque: troops seen moving slowly westward.
Beach events clearly visible from seaward. Bodies of men marched along - some in good order, others in groups and knots. Ond battalion in perfect order seen marching down through a winding road from dunes to shore - told later it was the Welsh Guards, but not certain if this was correct.
Embarkation going on all the time, with ships leaving as
Commencing of day before and continuing on form day, a the soon as filled; largest numbers came from Dunkerque. this
Army barricade and breakwater. At Braye the lorries R.E. planked that had been driving lorries down to beach to had and made a handrail on these so a gangway boats could go alongside. As line breakwater ran straight out motor to sea and wind was directly on shore, gave very forenoon sent Stevenson over to some paddle a break- minelittle shelter - still it helped.
During off Braye to get one beached to act as at sweepers Done; next day she was high and dry ship was daylight. long
Don't enough to cover distance tide ran out, so water. know to what extent she was used: no could only be
HEBE of returned with Bush, bringing plan for embarkation value for part of the tide.
1000
that night. numbers Was of boats as follows:- were now being sent over in to tow be of
Large etc. Due to start arriving at 1500; were scheme tugs, for use of rear guard for whom embarkation were being
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kept planned. To take the troops, 11 sloops in company, was and were to rendezvous and proceed Given berths collected being timed for 0130 on 1st June. each of the arrival in which to anchor in 3 batches, 1 batch off embarkation beaches.
An

9
may 301 208
by Stayed moving off La Panne during the night, as could do much
Shelling was continuous and by the sound anywhere. some were about after dark. No lights not falling among the ships at the anchorage. News shells
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no boats; ship message = boats found no one on beach.
conflicting: shore message = thousands of men waiting, very but
Probable truth was - Germans had range of lorry breakwater and beaches near it and they shelled them heavily. Boats went in there and found no one, as troops had moved farther west clear of shell fire. Don't know what really took place. Off shore one felt helpless, etc.
Aircraft passed close overhead flying down the anchorages and fairway; MALCOLM off Braye reported a number of parachute mines dropped to westward of there, and suggested ships should leave by Zuidcoote Pass in the morning as passage to west was so heavily mined. Noise of MTB engines often heard to seaward and eastward:? our own patrol.
2300
Received urgent signal from Admiralty asking where Gort was and why I had detailed the MTBs sent for him to other work.
Gort had just left HEBE in a motor launch: after long search for him in the dark, at last found him, transferred
1st (24) June. As a result of the bombing the day before, asked for him to the MA/SB and sent him off to Dover with Lees.
fighter protection at dawn.
0215
Heard that troops were moving westward and decided that embarkation at La Panne was no longer possible. MALCOLM
and HARVESTER ordered from La Panne to Dunkerque. Also told ships to keep close to fairway buoys to avoid mines in the channel.
0235 (22) To Admiralty and VA, Dover:- "Yesterday ships off Braye under fire. Today's shorter front will bring dangerous area westward. Consider beach work too costly and evacuation must be confined to Dunkerque. Small craft will be moved westward at dawn.
VA, Dover, reply = "While leaving this to your discretion, essential that beaches be used until found impossible.
0330
Growing light. BASILISK with me - kept empty for support- La fire against tanks or lorries along beach. Up by and ing beach was deserted except for lorry breakwater - boats
Panne scattered cars. Sea also seemed deserbed small to the westward. some of the boats adrift. Off Braye Ships were had One or two motor launches about: there them was to a vanished, a few empty ones drifting on tide told collect and a paddle minesweeper ashore. and men were minesweeper still loading off Braye and to the westward, moving down westward off Braye along and the hailed beaches. a tug which and was try on to its tow way
Moved some soldiers on board to go in was back with minesweeper. Master paid no attention; him and sent an only
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off the get away. Trained a gun on board anxious to to take charge, put the soldiers on
RNVR Sub-Lt. which was nearby, and go off to help the minesweeper with
SABRE, was that tugs had been told to regarded go over them-
Real trouble boats in tow and load up, and never they informed of this pulling transports only. I was tugs.
selves as them as tugs and for use as by
All the night, but the degaussing possible. and and regarded this time I was moving in waters mined proved effieient aircraft
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during to edge of fairway when of the
I kept low clouds. Most ships were though full.
0400 (23)
Misty with that were not I sent into Dunkerque, and some for of the
Those were still many men on beaches, of small craft there small gone back boats to for were England. the still night there, Did and not were majority then going realise back June. as they intended. Troops had had been
Reported are evacuating gradually directing to Dunkerque all boats as and eastern small beaches craft sent over "Situation report at 0600, 1st to
0625
are untenable. and loading Am all ships at Dunkerque. and fighter More attacks ships vicinity required. Heavy bombing on Dunkerque About
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on ships."

10
302
About from seaward this time saw a Belgian fishing boat 200
tigate. down the Zuidcoote Pass. BASILISK appear on inves- scene
Was first of a dozen such boats which to tion. appeared; on their way to Dunkerque to assist in shortly evacua-
As mists and clouds dispersed many aircraft appeared scene, and fighters constantly came low over us. Often on they were Spitfires, but our ships were not taking any chances and opened fire indiscriminately on them.
Hoisted signal "Cease Fire" and blew syren to attract attention, but our own machine gun aft in KEITH continued firing - once firing started they could not hear the
"cease fire" gong.
KEITH now had only about 30 rounds of H.A. ammunition left,
SO decided would shortly transfer flag to BASILISK and send
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KEITH into Dunkerque to fill up and return to Dover.
Before I could do this a very heavy bombing attack developed, first of all in and around Dunkerque itself. IVANHOE
was hit and entirely enveloped in smoke just off entrance;
2 hours later saw her being towed back to Dover. HAVANT
was sunk near the entrance.
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Not long afterwards a compact formation of 30-40 JU 87's appeared from the S.W. Everyone opened fire on them and enemy spread out. Fire seemed effective and thought it was driving them away, so left bridge for a moment.
KEITH attacked by 3 D/Bs: one bomb burst 10 yards astern and helm jammed when hard over; two others near misses.
Ship soon under control in hand steering: 1 man hurt.
1900
Attacked by 3 more D/Bs: one bomb down after funnel and
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exploded below; several casualties.
Owing to danger of fire, foremost torpedo tubes were fired As to get rid of torpedoes. Holes in side from bomb.
ship could not steam let go anchor, and shortly after
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MTB 102 came alongside. Could do no good in KEITH, so transferred to the MTB with my staff and 1 wounded man.
Sent two nearby tugs to assist KEITH and then made for
Dunkerque. KEITH again attakked and hit under bridge:
heavy list to port, but H.A. gun still firing. She was twice more and her men were taken off by a tug, which the hit picked up men from BASILISK and SKIPJACK: both sunk:
latter also sunk at this time. Tug also was bombed down and and about 30 of KEITH'S men lost, and planes came machined gunned men in water.
MTB to see General Alexander (now in command Tennant.
bombed most of the way in, but managed to dodge after them.
0915
Landed Gort's departure), but he was away and so was
Learnt that plan was to continue evacuation during the next
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night withdraw from their new positions at dawn and for several from western beaches and Dunkerque; rear guard retire were to
Dunkerque. to This meant continuing embarkation hours spaces round local H.Q. full of ambulances and ounded of daylight: feared heavy losses.
Open doctors doing what they could.
with ships still afloat had left Dunkerque, MTB so returned and, in to make spite of more bombing and machine gunning, Dover
All contact with VA, Dover. Left in the reached
1130
in safety at 1130.
Embarkation Plan to take place between 2100 and of 0330 Dunkerque. and was to for the night:-
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be from this a large number of ships and small also being were being sent the 1½ miles of beach to the east craft
For and sent over. Personnel ships RAF to assembled Dunkerque itself to go alongside pier. were the into their efforts between 1900 and and 0700 from over period concentrate when ships would be on passage to
Dunkerque. cross-channel type used for normal ferrying
Personnel across ships to = France. Manned by and their loading alongside crews troops been going into the harbour so were very and had could carry 3,000 men, used
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valuable; the pier. but Some they were large targets and were reluctance with

12
beaches During the than night found there were more ships 301
304'
the could be loaded: there was lying off the diverting ships from beaches as necessary. Beaches and were pier, so I Kept on the move between harbout plenty of room outside at very Pier heavilCy shelled, but still a lot of men got off.
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where was outlined against glow of fires still burning someto the westward of Dunkerque: steady stream of men passing along it. Numerous small craft passing up to the inner basins. French TBs loading at West Quay.
Shelling seemed to be concentrated on beach and to eastward of pier; shells falling inside harbour, and about midni a side. trawler was sunk. Also casualties in a destroyer along-
2nd June. Went up to shore end of pier to embark the base party:
0200
violent outburst of shelling. No signs of party, so
Wynne-Edwards went to look for them. A number of French troops had cut into the flow of British troops by a converging route: result was that about 5,000 British were held up and did not get off that night. Instead, a lot of
French troops got away from the East Pier in addition to
0245
those from the West Quay. Base party came down at 0245
and embarked.
Dawn
As morning was clear I decided to get ships away at 0300
instead of at 0330 as originally planned. Men were still coming down to pier, but it was no use risking ships being sunk alongside and blocking the pier and harbour.
(Word picture of scene - darkness out to seaward, glare of
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fires inshore, etc. Not very much noise.)
Returned to Dover to discuss next night's operation.
Still 5,000 of B.E.F. to come and an unknown number of
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French (30-40,000?). Plan was to use Dunkerque only, except for some French local craft which would embark from
Dawn beach immediately east of Dunkerque. Embarkation was to start at 2100 and go on till 0300, when blockships were to enter the harbour. Programme was worked out for ships to come in at half-hourly intervals to different berths, so that 3 or 4 ships should be alongside East Pier continuously. Denny thought this was impossible and liable to result in confusion, but a scheme was got out which provided carrying capacity of 37,000 men besides those that would go off in small craft. I also got 2 fast boats told off to act as runners for me (? from VERNON)
Besides the large ships, there were tugs, schuyts, drifters and all manner of small craft going over as well - some to lie off and be loaded by smaller boats, and others to go
Large number of wounded in Dunkerque: orders had been right up harbour past the large ship berths.
embarking given wounded would have taken up too much that fit men were to be got away in preference, valuable as time. Decided to try to get some of the wounded the Germans away in time in Hospital ships, in the hope that bombed day would respect them: 2 were sent over, but one she was had to sunk, the other was so badly damaged that had to be return. and Wounded, except for walking cases, left over again in MA/SB 10, with Somerville and and Goodenough 3
behind.
On Belgian soldiers who were about half-way across a pull-
Went the way over had a mild bombing attack picked in up ing boat. outside the harbour met one of the two the fast other motor
Just Both had been machine-gunned and had to boat be boats. and left (not seen again): this one disabled as she had only one engine left in working his order. staff.
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returned at Dunkerque. Picked up Alexander General and
2030
Transferred Arrived them to a destroyer, and in her bullet was later killed by a machine gun last from of his a
Mansergh when close to Dover. Tennant and the the British plane party left in a MTB as soon as the last of troops had gone.
The

13
305 302
The difficult west-going tide, with a fresh easterly tide turned at about 2300. Used the MA/SB to push one to get ships alongside the East Pier wind, until made the it destroyer in and tried to get other small craft to do likewise. By this time the French had come to life and many of their small craft filled the narrow harbour.
The MA/SB's clutch out of action - could not go astern.
2200
4 destroyers had been got away by 2200, and the last of the B.E.F. was clear soon after.
Then a long pause. The French should have followed our men on the East Pier, but they ddd not appear. Could see crowds of soldiers on West Quay, but as there seemed a scarcity of French ships I sent 2 personnel ships there.
One was ROYAL SOVEREIGN, which was handled magnificently -
went alongside bows out. Other was ROUEN (French cross-
Channel steamer): in getting away she got broadside on to the wind and grounded just to the westward of the quay.
Sent a tug to assist her, but she drew too much water to get near: also a lifeboat to get men away. Think men were got away; ship floated off with next tide in daylight and then returned in safety.
3rd June. A most disheartening night. Flow of French troops to the
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East Pier stopped for some hours. One report = they were held up to make a counter-attack. When they did come it was almost impossible to get them to the ships at the end of the pier: they all wanted to get into the first they came to, and pier was so narrow that they then blocked the way to any ships beyond. One ship lay for 3½ hours at the end berth waiting for men. Finally, began to trickle down, but was then obvious that many of ships waiting outside could not be used and I had to send back empty 2
personnel ships, 3 destroyers and several Fleet sweepers.
Dawn
French coming down faster, and as time of leaving got closer tried to make them double down the pier. Even then they were quite hopeless. Saw men who were on the way to the end ship turn and run back up the pier, because they saw another ship coming alongside farther in.
0300
Again I ordered ships to leave at 0300, and waited to see the last go and to hail the 2 blockships as they passed up harbour shortly after, accompanied by MTBs which were to take off the crews.
One blockship was sunk as arranged across the channel, but the other shifted as she was blown up and lay up and down the channel, leaving a clear passage. Either this night or the next one blockship was blown up on a magnetic mine
After seeing the blockships pass up harbour, the MA/SB took just outside the harbour.
us back to Dover in time to get 2 hours' rest before breakfast. Last night's results were very disappointing and only
24,000 men were embarked. Many more could have been taken but for the long pause in the flow of troops to East Pier.
After the Naval ratings had left at 2300 there was some difficulty in getting ships berthed, as the French did nothing to replace our men although the Port was the H.Q.
of a Naval Command and there were always plenty of French marines in evidence.
Was informed at Dover that there was to be another embarkation that night, but that this really would be the end.
Each night had been thought to be the last, and then each
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day the ships had been asked for one more effort. By the this time many of the Commanding Officers and men were at limit of their endurance, and the VA did not feel he could order ships to go over. Signal asking what ships 6 were ready and able to go. Finally, 10 transports, 2 yachts, destroyers
8 1 gunboat, 10 drifters, 5 schuyts and 1 tug were collected. boats minesweepers, 4 paddle sweepers, 2 corvettes,
Besides these, a large number of small craft and as before.
For

322
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31/5
Destroyers, minesweepors, paddlers and all manner of craft were arriving, loading and leaving the beaches and Dunkirk continuously, but there were often periods when no ships were at one place 02 another and loading had to wait,
Bombing of ships and beaches had so far been spasmodic - the day
X
had been overcast, visibility was not good and you could not SCO from La
Panne to Dunkirk. The sound of fighters out of sight overhead second to account for our freedom from air attack,
A report of aircraft dropping mines one mile north of Is Patine was received at 0400 and planes frequently passed close overhead during the dark hours. With the dawn 2. wind from the N.W. sprang up right on the
X
beaches, and when it was light many boats could be seen capsized or broached to and high and dry on the beach, including one at least of the local boats which carried a lot of men and could get close inshore, It: was not a cheering sight and as the day aged the sky overhead cleared and visibility improved. No watched the sky anxiously for the protection of hase but 16
remained clear all day.
At 0730 I made contact at last with "KEITH." "EXPRESS" was by that time fully londed and left for Dover as soon as I had transferred to "KETHI." Hero
I found that D. flag had been procured and it was flown on my arrivel on board; up till then I had used a red ensign to indicate which sitty I was in.
As had been my intention with "HEBE," "KETTH" did not embark any troops and I moved up and down the coast in her doing what I could to keep ships distributed off the beaches and a flow of ships into Dunkins. A signal made by me at 1035 gives a good picture of the conditions:-
11 To V.A. DOVER. Najority of boats broached to and have no Crows, Conditions on beach are very bad due to freshening on-shore wind. Only small numbers are boing embarked even in daylight. Under present conditions any largoscale embarkation from beach is quite imprecticable. Motor boats cennot get close in. Consider only hope of embarking any number to at Dunkinis.
Will attempt to beach ship to form a Ice to try and improve conditions.
From V.A. Dover coure a signal urging the importance of using the boochou
8.15 long AB possible, and to emphasise the situation made a Surther signal

329
325
- 21 -
31/5
thousands of men were waiting but no boats, messages from ships that thoir beats found no one on the beach. The truth of 1t was, I think, that the
Germans had the range of the lorry breakwator and the beaches nost 1t and they shelled them heavily. Boats went in there and found no one on the troops had moved further west clear of the shell firo. I do not know to this day what really took place there. Off shore one felt helpless, the ships and the boats were there and the troops ashoro and one could do no more.
Aircraft passed close overhead flying down the anchorages and fairway, and "MALCOLM" off Braye reported that a number of parachuto mines had been dropped to westward of there and suggested that ships ought to loavo by the uidcoote
Zudcote
Ruy pass in the morning, as the pasuage to the West WEB no heavily mined.
The noise of M.T.B. engines could often be hobrd to deaward and castward and added to my anxiety, though I thought they might possibly be our own patrol. About 2300 I received an urgent signal from Admiralty asking where
Lord Gort was and why I had detailed the M.T.B.'s sent for him to other work.
As the M.A.S.B. had just returned with Wynne-Edwards, I sent it off at once to "HEBE" to collect Lord Gort. To my horror it came back almost at otice to say that Lord Gort had just left "HEBE" in a motor launch. It was very dork and "НЫВЕ" could not; be seen though we knew where she was and I wellted anxiously for the boat to arrive. Presently out of the dark a boat appeared and como alongside, still not the right one and I had a bad moment thinking of the possibilities of the boat getting lost. However, to my relief, after what appeared about half an hour, the right boat, in charge OF Stevenson once moro, found US at last. Apologizing to Lord Gort for keoping him walting 30 long,
I transferred him to the M.A.S.B. and sent him off to Dovor with Ceneral Iecs.
My experience of the bombing the day before led 100 to request fighter
June, protection at dawn though I had no doubt that this was alroady hoing arrenged.
At 0215 I heard that troops were moving Westward and case to the conclusion that embarkation at La Panne was no longer possible. "MARCOLN" and "HARVISING"
which were off Lo Panne were ordered into Dunkirk in consoquence.
I also made D. signal telling ships to keep close to the buoyo as I hoped that they would thus avoid any minos which had boon Groy od in the channel. At 0235 I made the following signal to V.A. Dover and

330
227
- 22 -
1/6
" Yesterday ships off Braye were under firo. To-day's shorter front will bring dangorous area Westward. For this reason and mining consider any boach work too costly and evacuation must be confined to Dunkirk. Small craft will be moved Westward at dawn." To this V.A. Dover replied "While loaving this to your discretion it is essential that beaches should be used until found impossible."
My signal above was made before it was light but I had alroady protty clear indications that La Panne was untenable and as it grow light about 0330
I anxiously looked ashore. The "BASILISK" was with me as I had kept her empty so as to be ready for any supporting firo against tonks or lorries along the beach. Up by La Panne the beach WRB deserted but for the lorry brankwater and scattored cars. The sea also seemed deserted unfortunatoly the small boats had vanished, a few ompty ones were drifting on the tide to the Westward. One or two motor lounches were about and I told them to collect some of the boats adrift. Down off Braye there was a minesweeper ashore and clso a paddle minesweeper. Ships were still loading off Braye and to the Westward and men were moving Westward along the beaches.
I moved down off Braye and hailed 2. tug which WES on its way back with some soldiers on board and told her to go in and try to ton off the minommoner.
The Captain paid no attention and obviously WO.B only concorned to get every.
I finally trained 2. gun on him and told an R.N.V.R. Sub-Identionent who was on board to take charge, put the soldiers on board the "SABRE" who WEB nearby and go off to the help of the minesveopor. It VALO not nice to have to threaten these men who were really volunteors, but It had to be done. I could not wink ships and mon for the sake of 110 volunteer's feelings to have any effect. The real trouble on this and snother occasion Labor WAS
that the tugs were told to go over with pulling boats in tow and load my and they regarded themselves as transports only. I was never informed of this or their orders and regarded them as tugs and for use as tugs.
All this time I had to move in waters which atrongt had been minding during the night, but I put my faith in the degaussing and also koot to the edge of the fairway when possible, and my faith van justified.

334
331
- 26 -
now positions at dawn and retire to Dunleirk. This meant contituing the ombarkation for several hours of daylight, and the experience of that morning made mo uneasy as I feared hoavy losses under similar conditions.
The local headquarters on the pier looked much the same as when I had last seen it, except that now the open space WOD full of ambulances and wounded with doctors among them doing what they could.
While I was standing there I looked out to sea and I BAW e. destroyer pass the entrance in tow of a tug. I was told it was the "IVARHOE," and it was good to know sho had a chance to reach home in safety, as she eventually did.
As all the ships which had not been sunk were now gono and there was no more I could do there, I decided to return and make contact with the Volez
Dover. I accordingly set off back in the M.T.B. and in spite of more bombing and machino-gunning reached Dover in safety at 1130.
It had seemed a pretty long day already when we maild fast alongoide the depot ship "SANDEURST"," While waiting there for 8. car. I 1720 lont a clean shirt and a new pair of grey flannel trousers by Captain Gladstone to replace those, now rather the worse for wear, which I had borrowed from Allinan in the
"WORCESTER." Soon a car arrived and drove me and my Flag Lioutenant up to the offices of the Vice Admiral, Dover. The others I dropped at the local hotel. I walked into the office, a rather untidy figure, and was greated by
Ramsey and Semerville. They had heard that "КЕТУН" had been hit on the bridge and were pleasantly surprised at our safe return. After sending a tologram to my wife and arranging for a phone message to tell my Secretary to Drive down
0. pair of trousers, shirt and shoes, I wont up to the Vico Admirel's house in
Dover Castle and had Iunch with him. It was a lovely sunny day and the viov over the Channel seemed SQ peaceful, that, in spite of the lerge collection of ships, it was hard to believe that Dunkirk was 30 short a distance away.
After lunch I slopt on Somerville's bed till about 1530 whon I returned to the V.A.'S office tio hear the plans for the night. The way Led down a steep road with a fine view 02" the harbour and Straits and then by a tunnol into the hill below the Castle Firat down a stoop Blope with floor and valls of concrate, then into a widepassage through walls of chelk with leyers of hugo flints, divity 11t by an occasional This opened at the and into

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on OPeration "DERTAMO".
Page 5.
of the same evening, which recounted the opposite story. The more so as the gallantry of our outnumbered airmen was so obvious at the time, and was the admiration of all.
9.
No. 11 Group Fighter Patrols Dunkirk area history.
Total flying
Enemy aircraft
Enemy aircraft
Date. Patrols.
hours daily.
destroyed.
driven down.
26/5
22
480
30
20
27/5
23
536
48
32
28/5
11
576
20
6
29/5
9
674
78
8
30/5
9
704
:
--
31/5
8
490
36
4
1/6
8
558
69
I
2/6
4
231
16
6
3/6
4
339
I
I
4/6
3
234
--
-
Total flying hours 4,822
Notes: (1) It will be observed that the number of patrols decreased from 27th May onwards, whilst there was an increase in the daily flying hours. This is due to the fact that the fighters were employed in increasingly bigger patrols as the enemy air opposition increased.
(2) Operation Dynamo suffered most from enemy air effort on 29/5 and on 1/6, after which latter date the combination of enemy air attack and shore artillery fire led to the suspension of the operation by day.
10.
The position of enemy batteries had been located by air reconnaissance by nightfall on 31st May, and additional batteries in the Gravelines area on the 1st June.
Air bombardment of these batteries during the 1st and 2nd
June undoubtedly reduced their fire during dusk and dawn on each of the nights 2/6 - 3/6 and 3/6 - 4/6, when seaborne traffic was passing within range of the enemy batteries commanding the south end of X Route, the Dunkirk Roads, and
Dunkirk Harbour. This was a valuable contribution by the
R.A.F. to the successful outcome of the operation. A
similar beneficial result was obtained by the bombing of the batteries which had Dunkirk Pier and roadstead under fire.
11.
CONTROL OF ALLIED TROOPS.
In the earlier stages the large number of British troops located in the dunes off the beach were of rear formations with few officers. Command of these mixed units was noticeable by its absence, aggravated, no doubt, by the fact that Army Officers' uniform is indistinguishable from that of other ranks. When Naval Officers appeared in their unmistakable uniform, order in most cases was quickly restored, the troops responding to commands in a disciplined manner.
In the absence of any Army embarkation staff or organisation a strong Naval party. was required to form up and embark the troops. Later, no difficulty was experienced when troops of fighting/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 3.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Monday, 27th May (continucd).
2 Military Officers from G.H.Q., which suggested that the situation of the B.E.F. was procarious and it was possible that the enomy might succced in cutting off this force from Dunkirk.
This report appeared to confirm the results of air rcconnaissance, which indicated that German armoured units were operating to the south of Dunkirk. Sinco it appeared that ovacuation might well be strictly limited, both in regard to numbers and time available for the operation, it was a cided to concentrate every effort in sending 'over as many craft as possible to the beaches without delay. Had the situation appeared to be less critical, an organised flow of large and small craft working in reliefs would have been arranged.
9.
On receipt of these signals from S.N.O., Dunkirk, all available forces were diverted to the beaches, the Personnel
Ships to the beach, code letters A.B.C. and D., the destroyers on patrol being diverted to La Panne. Destroyers that were working off Dunkirk were ordered to divert the Personnel Ships going into Dunkirk to lay off the beaches and the smaller craft such as drifters and motor boats were ordered to be used for ferrying troops from the beach to the larger ships. Two important strings of boats being towed by a tug were lost in the night through the tows being run down and cut in half, the boats being scattered.
10. As a result of the above action there were assembling off the beaches 2 transports, 9 destroyers, 4 minesweepers,
CALCUTTA, 17 drifters and a few skoots, and all the ships were ordered to use their own boats for ferrying as none of the inshore flotilla had arrived. From signals received it appeared that the situation was desperate, that little could be lifted direct from the Port of Dunkirk, and that the maximum effort must be made from the beaches. Commander-in-Chief, Nore, at this stage provided additional reinforcements of minesweepers and paddlers. During the night, Vice Admiral, Dover, was informed of continuous bombing and machine gunning of troops in the beach areas, and directed Senior Officers present on the beach to use their discretion in ordering withdrawal of the
Naval forces, observing that a strong fighter protection should be expected after dawn; this having been arranged after a special visit by the Liaison Officer to Hawkinge to procure the naximum effort.
11.
Limiting factors were thought most likely to be restrictions due to enemy action at Dunkirk and on the beaches, and the difficulties of concentrating the ships and troops at a common point or points. The general evacuation plan had been conveyed to the G.O.C. by the S.N.O. on his way to Dunkirk, and the Vice Admiral, Dover, hoped to receive in return some outine of the Military's operational plan upon which the rate of vacuation in the various areas under the scheme must depend.
Subject to the development of beach evacuation and the ontinuation of fine weather, it appeared to the Vice Admiral hat adequate shipping for his plans was either in, or on, its ay to the Dover area, except for a chronic shortage of beachng boats.
Tuesday, 28th May

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 7.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
Wednesday, 29th May (continued)
well as from Dunkirk harbour, both from the aspect of the military situation and from the fact that Dunkirk was limited by a bottle-neck, formed by the narrow gangway along the East
Pier to the points of embarkation. Furthermore, there was every prospect of the weather improving and the surf reducing as the tide rose. Nevertheless, an increased number of
H.M. ships was ordered to Dunkirk to augment the personnel vessels, though it was feared that an accumulation of ships alongside the East Pier at Dunkirk by day might well invite intensive air attack,
Subsequently, this fear was fully to be justified.
25. Meantime, considerable anxiety was felt as to the fate of the personnel vessels which had been despatched in a steady stream to Dunkirk commencing the previous evening. The first of these was due back at Dover about 0300, but by 0900
nothing had been sighted or reported. But at 0700, S.N.O.,
Dunkirk, had reported that the embarkation there was going on at the rate of 2000 an hour, so it was presumed that the transports had failed to enter the harbour during darkness, had waited outside, and had commenced to enter in succession at dawn. The necessity for continuous fighter protection in view of the exposure of these unarmed ships while at Dunkirk and during the daylight passage through coastal waters, was obvious. Constant touch was maintained with R.A.F. Commands to obtain continuous fighter protection during the hours when the Vice Admiral, Dover, estimated the largest concentration of vessels would be present, it being realised that the R.A.F.
resources were not sufficient to provide continuous air cover, and to dispense with full cover at less important periods.
26.
At 0930 the belated return of the personnel vessels from Dunkirk commenced, and proceeded steadily through the day. In addition to the personnel vessels using Dunkirk the
Admiralty were informed of the necessity for X-lighters and other self-propelled lighters to increase the facilities for beach evacuation. A Medical Party was shipped in VERITY for use on the beaches, and a Naval Medical Party was sent to
Dunkirk.
27. The considerable alarm as to the immediate safety of the B.E.F. felt during the evening and early night of the
28th, which caused all available resources to be immediately concentrated on the French Coast, eased during the 29th. But emergency measures taken late on the 28th had an adverse effect on the orderly organisation for evacuation so necessary if effective measures were to be devised and put in force.
28. Meantime, in the early hours of' the 29th, an unfortunate disaster occurred involving the loss of H.M.
destroyers WAKEFUL and GRAFTON, and the danlayer COMFORT.
WAKEFUL, after embarking troops at Bray, sailed for Dover at
2300/28 by the Zuydecoote Pass and North Channel. Approaching the Kwinte Whistle Buoy the speed of the ships was 20 knots, and a zigzag of 40 deg es every 4 minutes was started. At
0045 two torpedo tracks were observed, one torpedo missed, the other hit ship amidships. WAKEFUL broke in half and the two portions sank in 15 seconds, each remaining standing with the midship/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 17.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Friday, 31st May.
51. The Admiralty informed the Vice Admiral that the policy of H. M. Government was that both British and French troops be given an equal opportunity of being evacuated in
British ships and boats.
52. Personnel ships had been sailed the previous evening and throughout the night of the 30th/31st to provide for a continuous flow into Dunkirk harbour. But at 0320 the S.N.O.
reported that once again the majority of these Personnel ships had failed to enter the harbour during the dark hours. MALCOLM, however, left Dunkirk with 1,200 troops at 0300, during heavy shelling, on relief by IVANHOE. S.N.O. Dunkirk, however, continued to call for more ships. No more destroyers were available and there were no means of accelerating the arrival of the vessels despatched there. By 0700 the Vice Admiral had no news of the fate of the personnel ships that had sailed the previous evening and during the night. None of these ships had reached the U.K. to unload, and it appeared probable that these ships may have concentrated in the narrow waters close to Dunkirk, inviting a repetition of the heavy air attacks with consequent damage and loss to transports which had occurred on the two previous occasions when personnel vessels, together with other ships, had been concentrated in large numbers in the approaches to Dunkirk.
At this time there were no less than 9 personnel vessels and 3 hospital carriers known to be on the round trip
U.K. - Dunkirk and back, and one other personnel vessel had been ordered to sail during the night, but herwhereabouts was unknown, and it was feared that she had refused to sail. In addition, 3 other personnel vessels were under orders to sail between 0900 and 1030. Pending the return of the ships en passage, and while the coal-burners were being rebunkered, the further sailing of personnel vessels was in suspense.
Note: Owing to the casualties to Personnel vessels at this stage, coal burning cross channel steamers had to be used for some of the trips and short endurance necessitated coaling between trips which could not be done in the vicinity of Dover, thus preventing a quick turn round.
53. During the night a considerable amount of enemy minelaying activity by air was reported. Shelling was heavy during the evening and night, and operations were greatly hampered. Nevertheless, with the cessation of shelling at about 0300, very good progress was made and by full dawn the beaches were very nearly clear of troops. At 0530 attacks on
Dunkirk harbour and the beach from Dunkirk to Bray developed more strength and the bombardment of Dunkirk continued.
Nevertheless, the S.N.O. reported that the embarkation there was proceeding satisfactorily but stressed the need for more ships and constant fighter protection. At this time French troops began to appear at Dunkirk pier and on the beaches, and were embarked with the British troops.
54. At 0600 VIMY sighted submarine off the N.W.
Goodwins/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 22
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
Friday 31st May (continued).
65. Casualties to H.M. Ships during 31st May,
M/S DEVONIA received damage from near miss bombs whilst off La Panne. About 1600 ship was ordered to be beached.
At 0600 on the 1st, after having destroyed all useful apparatus, and ammunition put overboard, ship was beached and abandoned.
M/S HEBE, whilst off Dunkirk, was damaged by enemy aircraft and returned under own power to Dover.
Destroyer EXPRESS. Damaged by enemy aircraft whilst off Dunkirk.
Saturday 1st June.
66. 2 Hospital Carriers which had sailed the previous evening returned shortly after dawn. Only one had succeeded in entering Dunkirk Harbour, the other had laid off 4 hours under heavy fire and returned to Dover. 4 personnel vessels failed to enter Dunkirk during the night, but succeeded in the early hours of the morning. One of these, the PRAGUE, was bombed and severely damaged half-way across on the return journey, but succeeded in making the Downs with the assistance of tugs, where troops transferred to other ships particularly
A/S trawlers LADY PHILOMENE and OLVINA. The supply of personnel vessels was maintained throughout the day, not without a series of setbacks caused by 3 ships refusing to sail and by
2 being turned back when on passage, by French Destroyers owing to heavy bombing and shelling of the approaches to Dunkirk.
Of those that operated during the 24 hours, 1 was sunk, 2
damaged by bombs and shell-fire and 1 by collision.
67. During the middle watch it transpired that no further troops were attempting to evacuate from La Panne off which were stationed one paddle minesweeper, a fleet sweeper and two destroyers, probably due to the heavy shelling from German guns eastward, and later information was received that the troops were marching from La Panne through Bray towards
Dunkirk. Accordingly, during the night the Rear Admiral,
Dover, instructed all small craft to move west, with boats in tow, towards Dunkirk, and the Vice Admiral directed all ships under orders for La Panne to other positions further west, concentrating the main effort on the beach immediately east of Dunkirk.
To a request from Dunkirk for Hospital Ships, the
Vice Admiral replied at 0715 that the large ship berths alongside at Dunkirk must be occupied by personnel ships and the wounded that could conveniently be embarked should go with personnel. This direction was in accordance with the Government policy previously communicated to the Vice Admiral.
68. Soon after dawn enemy aircraft were active and heavy bombing and machine gun attacks developed at 0500 over the whole area from Dunkirk to La Panne. A second series of attacks commenced at 0830 and lasted until 0900, during which time nearly every ship off the coast was subjected to intensive bombing and machine gunning, formations of 30 and 40
machines/

APPENDIX I.
to
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
LIST OF H.M. SHIPS, PERSONNEL SHIPS AND HOSPITAL CARRIERS
TAKING. PART.
RUISER:
CALCUTTA
YERS:
ANTHONY
HARVESTER
MALCOLM
VIVACIOUS
BASILISK
HAVANT
MONTROSE
WAKEFUL
BLYSKAWICA
ICARUS
SABRE
WHITEHALL
CODRINGTON
IMPULSIVE
SALADIN
WHITSHED
ESK
INTREPID
SCIMITAR
WINCHELSEA
EXPRESS
IVANHOE
SHIKARI
WINDSOR
GALLANT
JAGUAR
VENOMOUS
WOLFHOUND
GRAFTON
JAVELIN
VANQUISHER
WOLSEY
GRENADE
KEITH
VERITY
WORCESTER
GREYHOUND
MACKAY
VILY
BIDEFORD
TS:
LOCUST
MOSQUITO
EEPERS:
ALBURY
HEBE
QUEEN OF THANET
BRIGHTON QUEEN
HALCYON
ROSS
BRIGHTON BELLE
KELLETT
SALAMANDER
EL
DEVONIA
LEDA
SALTASH
DUNDALK
LYDD
SKIPJACK
DUCHESS OF FIFE
MARMION
SANDOWN
EMPEROR OF INDIA
MEDWAY QUEEN
SNAEFELL
FITZROY
NIGER
SPEEDWELL
GLENAVON
ORIOLE
SUTTON
GLENGOWER
PANGBOURNE
SHARPSHOOTER
GOSSAMER
PLYNLIMMON
WAVERLEY
GRACIE FIELDS
PRINCESS ELIZABETH
WESTWARD HO
ESSELS:
ARLEY
COMFORT
MARETTA
BOTANIC
CONIDAW
NAUTILUS
BROCK
FYLDEA
POLLY JOHNSON
CALVI
GULZAR
SARGASSO
CHICO
JOHN CATLING
STARLIGHT RAYS
AL SERVICE CRESTED EAGLE
GOLDEN EAGLE
LS:
ROYAL EAGLE
TRAWLERS: INVERFORTH LORD INCHCAPE OUR BAIRNS THOMAS BARTLETT
RAWLERS:
ARGYLLSHIRE
KINGSTON ANDALUSITE STELLA DORADO
BLACKBURN ROVERS
KINGSTON OLIVINE
THURINGIA
CAYTON WYKE
LADY PHILOMENA
WISTELLA
GRIMSBY TOWN
SAON
WOLVES
KINGSTON ALALITE
SPURS
OLVINA
RECOVERY
FIDGET
JACKETA
ERS:
SILVER DAWN
FISHER BOY
LORD CAVAN

51.
(Revised-June, 1933.)
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tions of Commander k.
der Dove, Sub Lieutenant
N.V.R. The object was to erect
7th June, 1940.
rt of Dunkirk. Commander Dove atsuki" on May 2000 with 200
-Admiral Sir James ut. Field and Sub Lieut Addis
Somerville, K. C.B., D.S.O.,.
taul". On instructions from took command of the Drifter
On the orders of Commander Yates, we iled from Dover 6345 Friday the honour to submit the following es for the demolition party, 4
ort on the activities of Commander officer Major Russell, 1 Army e's party at Dunkirk.
3 signal ratings. After an
Dunkirk 0930 to find a large
We have the honour to be, Sir, rogress. We noted then, and for that in spite of the courage and
Your obedient Servants, the great majority of their targets. We immediately entered
J.L. Field Subtient RNVILE
the South Quay.
R.G.addis Subtient RMVR.
ratings, we reported to Cdr.
La Rentaul" to keep clear of the nent which had recommenced. We emolition party that we had afterwards made contact with portion of a demolition party.
re-enter the harbour and took
CS.
threatening to block completely a done at once it would have
32" the hospital and personnel y. The, "Gervaise" was mana side to avoid the risk of her ion in the fairway. Ammunition nd handed over to Cdr Banks who y primersor detonators for the a two hospital ships which were
$
The attached papers have been ng these was just put in hand seen by the Vice Admiral, Dover, and note made
* available at any time during for his list of personnel recommendations.
himself and with help of his the necessary work. Now the
Yours sincerely, ble for further hospital and
During these operations Cdr.
e situation in Dunkirk was so he opportunity nor the facilitie hadch Cress rk. Furthermore there was a re-
1" dive bombing until Monday 27th old Cdr Dove that there was no ommandeered a car and bought
SECRETARY to rom estaminets which were still
VICE ADMIRAL.
de tour of inspection and found property and personnel was il tanks on the south side of the atening the railway and timber
S. to S.W. which blew a pall of scene appear far worse than evening the work of loading ship eady a large number of noncomour besides an increasing number quay. The night was quiet planes sincleithe town for over*
ely small number of bombs. Early ho had been instructed by Cdr.
for safety, reported that magnet mines nad Deen 1814 near the entrance and that a French merchantmen had been blown up.
ore dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

Statement of the operations of Commander
Dove's party at Dunkirk.
Prefatory Note.
The party consisted of Commander Dove,R.N., Sub.Lieutenant
Field, and Sub.Lieutenant Addis, R.N.V.R. The object was to erect
& lethal kite barrage round the port of Dunkirk. Commander Dove sailed with H.M.D. "Boy Roy" and "Natsuki" on May 2014 with 200
sets of lethal kite year.,Lieut, Field and ub.Lieut Addis left Daver with H.M.D. "Gervais Rentaul". On instructions from
Captain A/P Dover,.Lieut. Field took command of the Drifter
(skipper Mr.Burgess,R.N.R)
Report.
Sub.Lieut Field and Addis, sailed from Dover 6345 Friday
May 25th with 9 tons high explosives for the demolition party, 4
tons of medical stores, 1 Medical officer Major Russell, 1 Army liaison officer Captain Hill, and 3 signal ratings. After an uneventful passage, we arrived off Dunkirk 0930 to find a large scale air attack by the enemy in progress. We noted then, and for the whole time we were in Dunkirk that in spite of the courage and persistence of the shore A.A.units the great majority of their salvoes were well astern of their targets. We immediately entered the harbour and made fast alongside the South Quay.
ratings, we reported to Cdr.
La Rentaul" to keep clear of the nent which had recommenced. We emolition party that we had afterwards made contact with
OFFICE OF
portion of a demolition party.
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER.
re-enter the harbour and took threatening to block completely a done at once it would have
32" the hospital and personnel
18th June, 1940.
7. The, "Gervaise" was man-
1 side to avoid the risk of her ion in the fairway. Ammunition nd handed over to Cdr Banks who
Dear Gleadowe, y primersor detonators for the
The attached papers have been a two hospital ships which were seen by the Vice Admiral, Dover, and note made ng these was just put in hand for his list of personnel recommendations.
* available at any time during himself and with help of his the necessary work. Now the
Yours sincerely, ble for further hospital and
During these operations Cdr.
8 situation in Dunkirk was so he opportunity nor the facilitie hadch Cres rk. Furthermore there was a re-
1" dive bombing until Monday 27th old Cdr.Dove that there was no ommandeered a car and bought
SECRETARY to rom estaminets which were still
VICE ADMIRAL.
de tour of inspection and found property and personnel was il tanks on the south side of th atening the railway and timber
S. to S.W. which blew a pall of scene appear far worse than evening the work of loading shi eady a large number of noncomour besides an increasing number quay. The night was quiet planes circledthe town for over*
ely small number of bombs. Early ho had been instructed by Odr.
for safety, reported that magnet mines nad been 1810 near the entrance and that a French merchantmen had been blown up.
ore dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

Statement of the operations of Commander
Dove's party at Dunkirk.
Prefatory Note.
The party consisted of Commander Dove, b.Lieutenant
Field, and Sub.Lieutenant Addis, R.N.V.R. The object was to erect a lethal kite barrage round the port of Dunkirk. Commander Dove sailed with "Boy Roy" and "Natsuki" on May 2004 with 200
sets of lethal kite gear. Sub,Lieut,Field and Sub.Lieut Addis left Daver with H.M.D. "Gervais Rentaul". On instructions from
Captain A/P took command of the Drifter
(skipper Mr.Burgess,R.N.R)
Report.
Sub.Lieut Field and Addis, sailed from Dover 6345 Friday
May 25th with 9 tons high explosives for the demolition party, 4
tons of medical stores, 1 Medical officer Major Russell, 1 Army liaison officer Captain Hill, and 3 signal ratings. After an uneventful passage, we arrived off Dunkirk 0930 to find a large scale air attack by the enemy in progress. We noted then, and for the whole time we were in Dunkirk that in spite of the courage and persistence of the shore A.A.units the great majority of their salvoe were well astern of their targets. We immediately entered the harbour and made fast alongside the South Quay.
Army Officers and signal ratings, we reported to Cdr.
Henderson B.N.L.O. who order "Gervais Rentaul" to keep clear of the harbour to avoid the aerial bombardment which had recommenced. We then reported to Cdr. Banks of the demolition party that we had brought his explosives, and shortly afterwards made contact with
Cdr. Dove who had taken charge of a portion of a demolition party.
Cdr.Dove now signalled the G.R. to re-enter the harbour and took in tow two sinking tugs which were threatening to block completely the South Quay. If this had not been done at once it would have been difficulty if not impossible for the hospital and personnel ships to make fast to the South Quay. The, "Gervaise" was maneeuvred to a small lock on the south side to avoid the risk of her being hit and exploding the ammunition in the fairway. Ammunition medical stores were then unloaded and handed over to Cdr. Banks who up to that time had not received any primersor detonators for the depth charges.
Cdr.Dove then signalled in two hospital ships which were in the offing and the work of loading these was just put in hand inmediately. As there was no. labour dock available at any time during our stay in Dunkirk Commander Dove himself and with help of his officers organised and carried out the necessary work. Now the
South Quay was cleared it was possible for further hospital and personnel ships to enter and load. During these operations Cdr.
Dove reached the conclusion that the situation in Dunkirk was so grave that we should have neither the opportunity nor the facilitie to erect a kite barrage round Dunkirk. Furthermore there was a regrettable lack of wind and no low or dive bombing until Monday 27th
At midday dr.Henderson told Cdr. Dove that there was no water in Dunkirk and we therefore commandeered a car and bought sufficient vichy and perier water from estaminets which were still open in Malo form H.Q.staff. We made tour of inspection and found that up to date the damage done to property and personnel was surprisingly little, although the oil tanks on the south side of th town were blazing flercely and threatening the railway and timber yards. There was a light uir from S. to S.W. which blew a pall of smoke over the harbour and made the scene appear far worse than reality. During the afternoon and evening the work of loading shi went on smoothly but there were already a large number of noncombatant forces crowded into the harbour besides an increasing number*
of ambulances lined up on the south quay. The night was quiet except for one air-raid when German planes circledthe town for over
(ca hour before dropping a comparatively small mimber of bombs. Early next morning May 26th, r.Burgess who had been instructed by Cdr.
Dove to anchor outside the harbour for safety, reported that magnet mines had been laid near the entrance and that a French merchantmen had been blown up.
dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

heseou control star wased comt coer
South Quay was by now crowded transport with which ambulances had been and pro Honcombatant The personnel who were traffic awaiting control and their shortly apparent after 093
Traffic ive. These control was negligible, attacks continued there move back bombing ised at dawn. attacks There started was with no THE THE as about troops 1700. object- were in a nervous condition. Dove on the Malo river front. had arrived. The troops were at ordered to take cover the casualties to the wounded small. The only we once and shelter in the in woods the town until the ships and as far As as a result of this to action other troops were remarkably the oil tanks. reason where could personnel estimate suffered badly when being the breeze near freshened of we these rigged up two
In the afternoon the two biggest cranes. One afforded good kites flew well to 2600 Unfortunately, however, in spite of almost immediately units kites from the feet top over of the harbour and might have informing the A.A. protection. and air force personnel the kite was shot down by small arms time. We then About 2000 we returned to the South waiting Quay 2
fire. returned to H.Q. and relieved the cypher to officer find for hospital again no dock labour Cdr Dove organised sort of make a short ships in the harbour and a personnel ship a party outside. to
As there ships was fast and embark the wounded and also some not traffic control. the Bombing had now ceased entirely and did recommence until 6200 next day.
The Hospital ships were made fast abreast and this allowed water brought a working party of 50 soldiers who unloaded returned water, with et the in two gallon tins, maps for staff and medicine the She personnel ship to tie up forward of them. The personnel stores. brought also then were never seen again. It is presumed they to th ship. water off the quay, although it was useful for the the and As a result of this absense of labour it was impossible wounded. Just get the dark a british destroyer (Wolsey?) came up between until piers.
before Dove's instructions we signalled her to keep clear we ha th on Cdr. berth for her. Eventually we told her to tie up alongside to pic up H.Q. officere onboard the destroyer Cdr. Dove asked Senior give a two staff who were to embark in the Destroyer. After General ii found hospital a ships. Lieut. Addis then drove to the Bastion embarking was list but after calling out some officers names The destroyer being there staff satisfied that all his staff were onboard. He refused to satisfi to nominal his presence the nexte he said hour he was Some ready 30 more to proceed. of the general's starf and arri we on the them in the personnel ship. The work of "Wolf.
left. Within quay-side to find the destroyer had sailed without embarkation them we had to embark and there was no air activity. At about 0030 H.M.S. to hound" H.M.S. "Wolfhound" was to provide W/T comminication trans on smoothly berthed alongside the South Quay and we took the Captain
Cdr.Henderson. the "Gervaise Rentual" could get no reply on her pa with mitter Dover and the as shore station had broken down. At0130 on Cdr the.Dove's quayside turned in May a 27th we were awakened by a Frenchman who had fired tha a for few hours sleep in a trench rifle at us coming and that it was his "abis". We movements &
At 0530 on in the trench and insisted probably quite correctly,
Cdr. Dove destroyer which threatened to block the fairway. By and the Germans had were already been up since 0430 controlling the 0730
a French ships except "Gervaise Rentual! had cleared the port all British numbers of troops and a few ambulances (empty?) were thronging the quayside. 0830 an intense aerial bombardment started which at large German reconnaissance patrols were active overhead continued with never Tuesday. The quay was becoming so dangerous that Cdr Dove at about more than 20 minutes interval until we left the port
We noticed equipment, the wrecked cars the
0130 on cleared all the troops out of the harbour into the once again that apart from the acute danger of of abandoned of transportation and the numerous bomb craters had re-
Quay taining wall was damaged in only one place. At Cdr. Henderson's a V.
hope impossible to use any longer, inspite of the fact that the req we spent at the top of the bastion to keep in touch with H.M.S.
the morning making a tour of inspection and arranging "Wolt hound" all communication between the bastion and the signal Engla station which was lying 18 (approx) miles off the beach to northwar station
By now was severed. All telephonic comminication to off by "Gervaise any Rentual" was out of order. At 1200 we returned to the lighthouse route whatsoever was destroyed and the R.T. transmitter the gi

3
ried us four hours to do scale normally bombardment 20 minutes. This ide to fly another work which takes (made in Germany)
which was entirely kite deserted from a except large floating for Bank's crane party. We
THE decided There so cases similar to key this that our uninterrupted and large to wind which continued
Owing to return a contrary to H.Q. We found our the efforts proved of
IM
car presumably the result of about 2 miles and our were of fifth many column activity. We made way times on the way, especially on the We reported leading that H.Q. it it was back to H.Q. on foot, a distance road to were bombed several H.Q. the position seemed extremely from grave. the South Quay. Cdr. was
Henderson hardly informed us that G.H.Q. intended taking to be over evacuation bastion
At practicable to embark troops the and the extreme shortage of supplies. We were and to sail as soon as that all superfluous personnel would have therefore ordered owing by to Dove to go aboard the "Gervaise Rentual" most of the bombardment permitted. The air force personnel, onboard. We demolition the party were, we were informed, already and QZS.60. were On arrival also at the ship we found we had no charts and to the our given a new route order via Zuydcoote Passage therefore made way bastion. At the bastion we found that a number of soldiers, the obviously a back as quickly as we could through the bombardment unnerved by the relentless attack, were approaching H.Q. in went out in the midst of the bombardment, without steel helmets, destroy- or fire threatening manner with their rifles. Cdr.Dove and Cdr. Henderson arms which had just entered harbour, arrived. The situation control and and parleyed with them until a naval landing party from which a might
"
have er developed seriously was immediately brought under take we informed that the evacuation of the town of Dunkirk was to were forthwith. We were therefore given new orders by Cdr.Dove. found We place able to collect a chart and return to the ship where we were Cdr. Bankes. He told us to collect as many small craft as possible and take them and the drifter round to the beaches on the north side of the town to pick up soldiers. We tried to commandeer two Belgian tugs and manage to secure two launches byt on investigation both were too badly a picket boat but the French naval commander objected strongly. We did damaged to be serviceable. One had its steering gear rendered useless one by bombs, and the other, a diesel engine, had no fuel, and no knew how to work it. We now had onboard four air force officers, 10
re moment four drifters arrived in the entrance, two of which were in a soldiers, the majority of the demolition party and Cdr. Bankes. At this sinking condition owing to bombing and machine-gunning, These two the
"Bola Roy" and the "Paxton" were sunk by gun-fire from the "Gervaise
Bentual", clear of the fairway, after all personnel had been taken onboard, the drifters "Playmates" and "Gervaise Rentual." The remaining
2 drifters were ordered by Cdr. Bankes to tie off the beaches and they proceeded thereforthwith.
We were now helded from the South Quay and on crossing there found Cdr. Dove who was the last person to leave the South Quay. We took him aboard and landed him and Cdr. Bankes on the North Jetty, where they met Captain Tenant, Cdr. Dove insisted on returning to the bastion to the end of the pier, within hail for an hour. Captain Tenant then told find out if there were anyone left there and instructed us, to be off us to extend those orders until midnight. It was now about dark and air activity was intense. Huge fires light up the town and later numerbelieved we heard artillery. After standing off for about 1 hour, ous parachute flares were dropped by the enemy. For the first time we gun us, we received enemy a morse message from the beach, to come alongside in which time the enemy dropped magnetic mines and attempting to machine the North Jetty, There we found Naval Commander whose name was not ascertained, other Captain drifter and tell any personnel ships to come alongfrom Tenant's party, who ordered us to make conside the North We spoke to the Queen of the Channel (?)
to this effect Jetty. drifters who were Lying some way to the north and were difficult and to the locate. Another morse message asked us to use and found all possible a despatch. to After this we?) returned ship alongside to the North and fully Jetty loaded. were
We took personnel (Queen of Channel and children and some soldiers, and hound aboard which written) was was destroyer, continuing "Unless and complete W/T dubies. fighter The protection gist of this can be message provided (which only to proceed a home to Dover also an urgent despatch to H.M.S. "Wolfordered aboard about 30 women after delivering women and children before dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

Page 2.
PS WHICH TOOK PART IN OPERATION "DYNAMO" - 26TH MAY - 4TH JUNE, 1940.
PART I - BRITISH SHIPS (continued)
SWEEPING CRAFT.
ARIA
JEANNIE MACINTOSH
REED
TY
JOHN AND NORA
RELONZO
NIC
JOHN CATTLING
RENASCENT
CK
LORD BARHAM
RESTRIVO
I
LORD CAVAN
REWGA
THNESS
LORD COLLINGWOOD
RIG
CO (E.S.)
LORD GREY
SARAH HYDE
FORT
LORD HOOD
SARGASSO
IDAW
LORD INCHCAPE
SATURN
TENTA
LORD KEITH
SILVER DAWN
SIBLE
LORD MELCHETT
STARLIGHT RAYS
GET
LORD RODNEY
STELLA RIGEL
HER BOY
LORD ST. VINCENT
STRATHELLIOTT
DEA
MARE
STRIVE
NIUS
MARETTA
SWIFT WING
A
NAUTILUS
TARANSAY
ZAR
OLIVAE
THOMAS BARTLETT
VERFORTH
OUR BAIRNS
THOMSONS
CKETA
OVERFALLS
THREE KINGS
CKEVE
F
POLLY JOHNSON
TWEENWAYS
UNICITY
S TRAWLERS.
GYLLSHIRE
KINGSTON ANDALUSITE
SPURS
ACKBURN ROVERS
KINGSTON OLIVINE
STELLA DORADO
PE ARGONA
LADY PHILOMENA
THURINGIA
YTON WYKE
OLVINA
TOPAZE
IMSBY TOWN
ST. ACHILLEUS
WESTELLA
INGSTON ALALITE
SAON
WOLVES
HAMES SPECIAL SERVICE SHIPS.
RESTED EAGLE
GOLDEN EAGLE
ROYAL EAGLE
.A/S.B's. M.T.B's. ETC.
M. A/S. B. 10
M.T.B. 68
.C. MOTOR-BOAT
( ex "EXCELLENT")
M.T.B. 16
M.L. 100
A/S. B. 6
M.T.B. 22
M.T.B. 102
.A/S. B. 7
M.T.B. 67
M.T.B. 107
OVER FLARE-BURNING DRIFTERS
PAXTON
BOY ROY
GOLDEN GIFT
SHIPMATES
EILEEN EMMA
GOLDEN SUNBEAM
THE BOYS
FORECAST
LORD HOWARD
TORBAY II
GERVAIS RENTOUL
LORD HOWE
UT PROSIM
GIRL GLADYS
MIDAS
YORKSHIRE LASS
GIRL PAMELA
NETSUKIS
YOUNG MUN
(Continued)
Sunk.

Operation "DYNAMO" Recommendations of Personnel.
Page 62
SALAMANDER. - Lieutenant Commander Lionel James Spencer, Ede, continually ordered tripato the be besches On was
This ship bombed did 3 and and having been at dawn, Dover, to one occasion, to Dunkirk embarked a the further ship continued until 0600, move westward so doing rating 450 men from Bray. and by attack assist one the KEITH, was the slightly wounded. Whilst During proceeding one to attack and four ship was again subjected to bombing ship and lifted the ship bombs bodily. exploded Steam under was water near a the got going again attack in about a quarter of an hour, lost, when but was f
I
port as to reach possible. Ship was again attacked, but to further quickly air as took place. The ship proceeded back a she managed Dover, proceeding on only one boiler.
Recommendations.
FICERS:
ive
Lieutenant-Commander Lionel James Spencer Ede, R.N.
This Officer showed great zeal, initiative and seamanship during the operations. The whole time he was endeavouring to avoid air attacks, and, at the same time, pick up troops from the beaches. His initiative II, in disobeying the order of Rear Admiral, Dover, to proceed from the beach towards Dunkirk at dawn, enabled t
him to save a further 450 men, including 29 wounded cases.
Having moved westward, an air attack took place upon the SKIPJACK and the KEITH, the SKIPJACK being sunk and the KEITH set on fire. Ship appeared to be in danger of sinking due to a near miss, but after a short time found she was still seaworthy and steam was d.
got on to the main engine.
By his great devotion to duty in face of these air attacks, he was still able to bring his ship safely ring to port.
tere
D.S.O D.S.C
vors
Recommended for decoration.
as
Commissioned Engineer Thomas Kirby Reynolds. R.N.
hom al
Showed great initiative and skill in getting steam up and the engines restarted after ship had been damaged by near misses, and in addition it was due to him that the morale of the engine room was so good after having had three heavy attacks in four days, apart from this attack, which was almost continuous for three hours.
By his great devotion to duty, it is felt that the ship was got under way so quickly.
DSC
D.S.C
Recommended for decoration.
RATINGS:
E.R.A. C. H. Andrew, M.28768.
DSM
DSM
to duty After and the his ship initiative, he suceeded in up had been damaged, by his starting devotion

Page 78.
Operation "DYNAMO" cets Recommendations of Personnel.
PORTSMOUTH INNER PATROL YACHTS.
Lieutenant Cyril Cornelius Bone, R.N.V.R. Senior Officer beaches 0600/31/5 to dawn 1/6, they performed
Although from the unit of nine yachts only worked off the particularly time valuable work off La Panne and Bray at
The period also happened to be one of intensive air
British embarking or withdrawing westward.
critical troops when either La Panne was about to be finally a evacuated, bombardment, on the beaches. interspersed with sporadic heavy artillery fire arge
2
Particularly notable was the work of these boats inshore, which included the embarkation of Lord Gort and the G.H.Q. party. 3500 - 4000 troops were lifted.
Recommendations.
FFICERS;
KY. LAHLOO:
gine-
Lieutenant John Vander Ould, R.N.V.R., Commanding Officer.
C with suaded esh
His yacht did particularly well, handling about
1
500 troops. Emabrked Lord Gort. Did valuable work erful rounding up drifting boats for further beach work.
id him
Recommended for mention.
H.M.Y. SERIOLA:
STEAM PICKET-BOAT:
V.Y. MASAYRU:
Sub. -Lieutenant Thomas Ellison Godman. R.N.V.R.
May
D.S
C,
This Officer displayed remarkable determination, ily endurance and devotion to duty. Commencing service in
SERIOLA, he skilfully worked open boats through the surf on
S.
te the beaches during31/5. The next day he was ordered to o the vor command a naval steam picket-boat, and by his determination to and good judgment succeeded in operating this craft for vas nearly 24 hours, though its coal capacity only sufficed for whon
6 hours. Also seized and directed the activities of a number of abandoned boats found drifting off the coast.
Finally returned to Ramsgate and joined another vessel for a further day's service at Dunkirk.
great coolness under heavy fire in dangerous conditions.
Specially recommended by Senior Officers for
Recommended for decoration.
sank, nto
RATINGS:
H.M.Y. AHOLA:
Petty Officer H. H. Holland, J.20594.
Able Seaman F. H. Finch, SSX.23237.
Volunteers for boat work under fire, when boat crew from another unit left their boat.
Recommended for mention.
a in

Page 93.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recomme idations of Personnel.
st H.M.S. KING ORRY. - Commander Jeffery Elliott, R.N.R.
This ship completed one trip, bringing back
1,100 batteries troops, and whilst on her way back was fired over at by shore for 20 minutes and hit three times. In addition, at the same time the ship was bombed and machine gunned, but no damage resulted. The damage from shell fire was made good and the ship again sailed for Dunkirk.
on the way over dive bombing attacks took place, bombs exploded under water and the ship was shaken badly. A
2nd attack outside the harbour put the steering gear out of action and smashed all instruments and woodwork. Ship manoeuvred into the harbour. Another attack took place and again there were near misses. Ship was holed under water forward and aft but pumps appeared to keep water down. As ship would most probably be attacked at dawn it was felt that it would be better to clear the harbour and so avoid blocking the channel. When clear of the harbour, however, ship took a serious lift and water entered the stokeholds. In the end the ship foundered clear of the channel.
n
Recommendation.
OFFICER:
Commander Jeffery Elliott, R.N.R.
n
By his initiative, gallantry under fire and good seamanship, ship was placed alongside at Dunkirk under great difficulties due to steering gear having been put out of action and his decision to move ship out of harbour during dark hours prevented the ship
1
from blocking the harbour and the channel.
DSO
Recommended for decoration.
ps, uring stere ivors was whom
Commissioned Ship
2. 1, Recove, Set V.A. original to carrifer report incommendly
II
ed
Key Only hip.
Llautony Manas site mees leved ain.

Page 62
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
M.S. SALAMANDER. - Lieutenant Commander Lionel James Spencer. Ede.
This ship did 3 trips to the beaches and was continually bombed and machine-gunned. On one occasion, having been ordered by Rear Admiral, Dover, to move westward to Dunkirk at dawn, the ship continued until 0600, and by so doing embarked a further 450 men from Bray. During one attack one rating was slightly wounded. Whilst proceeding to assist the KEITH, the ship was again subjected to a bombing attack and four bombs exploded under water near the ship and lifted the ship bodily. Steam was lost, but was got going again in about a quarter of an hour, when a further air attack took place. The ship proceeded back to port as quickly as possible. Ship was again attacked, but she managed to reach Dover, proceeding on only one boiler.
Recommendations.
)FFICERS:
Lieutenant-Commander Lionel James Spencer Ede, R.N.
This Officer showed great zeal, initiative and seamanship during the operations. The whole time he was endeavouring to avoid air attacks, and, at the same time, pick up troops from the beaches. His initiative in disobeying the order of Rear Admiral, Dover, to proceed from the beach towards Dunkirk at dawn, enabled him to save a further 450 men, including 29 wounded cases.
Having moved westward, an air attack took place upon the SKIPJACK and the KEITH, the SKIPJACK being sunk and the KEITH set on fire. Ship appeared to be in danger of sinking due to a near miss, but after a short time found she was still seaworthy and steam was got on to the main engine.
By his great devotion to duty in face of these air attacks, he was still able to bring his ship safely to port.
Recommended for decoration.
Commissioned Engineer Thomas Kirby Reynolds, R.N.
Showed great initiative and skill in getting steam up and the engines restarted after ship had been damaged by near misses, and in addition it was due to him that the morale of the engine room was so good after having had three heavy attacks in four days, apart from this attack, which was almost continuous for three hours.
By his great devotion to duty, it is felt that the ship was got under way so quickly.
Recommended for decoration.
RATINGS:
E.R.A. C. H. Andrew, M. 28768.
After the ship had been damaged, by his devotion to duty and his initiative, he suceeded in starting up

Page 78.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
PORTSMOUTH INNER PATROL YACHTS.
Lieutenant Cyril Cornelius Bone, R.N.V.R, Senior Officer.
Although the unit of nine yachts only worked off the beaches from 0600/31/5 to dawn 1/6, they performed particularly valuable work off La Panne and Bray at a critical time when La Panne was about to be finally evacuated,
British troops either embarking or withdrawing westward.
The period also happened to be one of intensive air bombardment, interspersed with sporadic heavy artillery fire on the beaches.
Particularly notable was the work of these boats inshore, which included the embarkation of Lord Gort and the G.H.Q. party. 3500 - 4000 troops were lifted,
Recommendations.
OFFICERS;
H.M.Y. LAHLOO:
Lieutenant John Vander Ould, R.N.V.R., Commanding Officer.
His yacht did particularly well, handling about
500 troops. Emabrked Lord Gort. Did valuable work rounding up drifting boats for further beach work.
M
Recommended for mention.
H.M.Y. SERIOLA:
STEAM PICKET-BOAT:
M.Y. MASAYRU:
Sub. -Lieutenant Thomas Ellison Godman. R.N.V.R.
This Officer displayed remarkable determination, endurance and devotion to duty. Commencing service in
SERIOLA, he skilfully worked open boats through the surf on the beaches during31/5. The next day he was ordered to command a naval steam picket-boat, and by his determination and good judgment succeeded in operating this craft for nearly 24 hours, though its coal capacity only sufficed for
6 hours. Also seized and directed the activities of a number of abandoned boats found drifting off the coast.
Finally returned to Ramsgate and joined another vessel for a further day's service at Dunkirk.
Specially recommended by Senior Officers for great coolness under heavy fire in dangerous conditions.
DSC
Recommended for decoration.
RATINGS:
H.M.Y. AHOLA:
Petty Officer H. H. Holland, J.20594.
Able Seaman F. H. Finch, SSX. 23237.
Volunteers for boat work under fire, when boat crew from another unit left their boat.
M
Recommended for mention.

Page 93.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. KING ORRY. - Commander Jeffery Elliott, R.N.R.
This ship and completed whilst one trip, bringing back
1,100 batteries troops, for 20 minutes on her way back was fired over by shore at the and hit three times. at gunned, made and resulted. The damage from shell addition, but no damage same time the ship was bombed and machine In on the way over water bombing attacks took place, bombs fire was good dive the ship again sailed for Dunkirk.
exploded under and the ship was shaken badly. A
2nd attack and outside smashed the harbour put the steering gear out manoeuvred harbour. Another attack took place of action into the all instruments and woodwork. Ship and again there were near misses. Ship was holed under water forward and aft but pumps appeared to keep water down. As ship would most probably be attacked at dawn it was felt that it would be better to clear the harbour and so avoid blocking the channel. When clear of the harbour, however, ship took a serious lift and water entered the stokeholds. In the end the ship foundered clear of the channel.
Recommendation.
uso
OFFICER:
Commander Jeffery Elliott, R.N.R,
By his initiative, gallantry under fire and good seamanship, ship was placed alongside at Dunkirk under great difficulties due to steering gear having been put out of action and his decision to move ship out of harbour during dark hours prevented the ship from blocking the harbour and the channel.
Recommended for decoration.